CURRENT D A TA O N TH E INDONESIAN M ILITARY ELITE
Ben Anderson
More than tw o years have now elapsed since the conclusion of the three—part series in Issues 36 (October 1983), 37 (April 1984), and 40 (October 1985), which analyzed the major changes in the structuring and leadership of the Armed Forces inaugurated in March 1983. These tw o years have witnessed some significant develop­ ments which warrant a revised form at for the "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite" series. The two main modifications involve dropping the listing of positions in the Department of Defense and Security (Hankam), and including new data on regional leaderships at the Kodam (Military Region Command) and the Korem (Military Resort Command) levels. In the analysis offered in issue no. 37, it had been argued that Law 20/1982, formally separating the functions of Minister of Defense/Security and Commander—in—Chief o f the Armed Forces, would reduce the form er to political insignificance, while creating an enormous concentration of power in the latter. The past two years have confirmed the validity of this prognosis, to the point that it seems largely irrelevant to chart personnel transfers within the Department of Defense/Security. On the other hand, the territorial reorganization of 1985, by which the old combined-service interregional commands (KowiRian) were abolished, and the number of Kodam reduced from sixteen to ten seems to have run into some obstacles, so that attention is warranted particularly to those regions which prior to 1985 were Kodam—level, but were subsequently reduced to Korem status. Furthermore, since Commander—in—Chief General Murdani has made clear that the Korem commands are to be key jobs for middle—ranking officers destined for top military and political posts in years to come, itwill probably be useful to start keeping a systematic eye on Korem leaderships, as weR as on the chief—of— staffships o f the ten Kodam. In Issue 46 (October 1968) an attem pt will be made to give fufl listings with some preliminary analysis.
/. Structural—Sociological Developments
A Generational
The past tw o years have seen the retirement from active service of all members of the so -called *45 Generation, and virtuafly aR those o f the "bridging" generation (i.e., the products o f the Yogyakarta MHitaiy Academy of 1948 and 1949, the Dutch Military Academy at Breda, and the P3AD (Army O fficer Training Center] o f the early 1950s). Retirement has normally meant taking up new positions in the Depart­ ment o f Defense, as well as other ministries and government agencies, seats in
parliament, ambassadorships, or jobs in s ta te - or state-supported enterprises.1 The
sole "bridger" left on active duty is the Commander—in -C h ief himself, and he would
1. One important exception is B reda-educated M aj. Gen. Soebijakto Prawirosoebroto (lo n g -tim e deputy to Murdani while the latter was Armed Forces’ inteHigence czar) who has been kept on, in retirement, as Governor o f Lemhannas.
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have been required to retire at the end of October 1987, had President Suharto not granted him a special o n e-year extension.
The result o f these retirements has been the rise to leadership of the first two graduating classes (1960 and 1961) of the Military Academy (AM N), with the form er predominating in top staff jobs in Jakarta, and the latter in the key regional commands. Class Three (1962) graduates have still, with a couple of notable excep­ tions, to make their mark beyond the Korem level. The men of Classes One and Tw o were bombetween 1935 and 1938, were young boys during the Revolution, in their early thirties a t the tim e o f the 1965 ■Coup," in their early forties when the East Tim or W ar began in 1975, and are today in their early fifties. (In so fa r as they have real combat experience (and a good many do not], it has been in East Tim or, and the experience has not been notably successful.)

B. Setvice and Ethnicity

In the earlier analyses, it had been pointed out that the rise of the AM N

graduates meant the ascendancy of a group o f officers whose formative experiences

and emotional solidarities derived from the classroom, rather than from an tico lo -

nial guerrilla warfare. Hence a rapid decline was predicted in the importance of

affiliation with the historic territorial Divisions (Siliwangi, Diponegoro, Brawijaya,

etc.) which were bom during the Revolution o f 194S -1949. This prediction is largely

confirmed by the way in which printed minibiographies o f leading AM N graduates

are now organized. There are only rare mentions o f Divisional attachment, while

emphasis is typically placed on technical service branch (Infantiy, Artillery, Cavalry,

Engineers, and so on). As might be expected from the pattern in other modem

militaries, Infantry is, formally at least, the privileged branch, but the others are

quite well represented. Unofficially, however, it is prettyd ear that experience

in

■InteHigence" may be the single most significant qualification fo r leadership in the

Suharto—Murdani era. A rough calculation on the basis o f fragmentary evidence

suggests that well over o ne-third o f all the officers listed in this issue have "Intelli­

gence" backgrounds o f one kind or another.

In ethnic term s, the Javaneseare overwhelmingly dominant (wed over 70 percent of the current listing). Sundanese come next, but, at less than 10 percent, a very long way behind. A fter them , a minimal scattering o f Batak, Balinese, Minangkabau, Buginese, and so on. Seven o f the ten Kodam commanders are Javanese, while one is Sundanese and two Batak. It is not altogether clear why Javanese dominance should still be so strong. In earlier years theobvious explanation was the concen­ tration of Republican combat troops in Java and Sumatra during the Revolution, and the expulsion of most Sumatran revolutionary-era military leaders during the civil war o f the late 1950s. But the Military Academy, as designed by General Nasution and others in the late 1950s, was intended to overcome ethnic jealousies by recruiting on a broadly proportional, demographic basis, with no favoritism for the Javanese as such. That Indonesia today has, in Ida Bagus Sudjana and I Gde Awet Sara, two very prominent Balinese generals, while there were no Balinese generals at all in the entire ’45 Generation, shows the sincerity and effectiveness o f the Nasution policy. Thus the ascendancy of A M N Javanese probably occurred in the 1970s by a selective promotion process— whether fo r political reasons or not remains uncertain.

C. The Regional Pattern
The territorial reorganization discussed in Issue no. 40 has produced a structure consisting of ten Kodam and thirty-nine Korem. Kodam 1 (N. Sumatra) has six Korem, 2 (S. Sumatra) has four, 3 (W. Java) has four, 4 (C. Java) has four, 5 (E. Java)

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has four, 6 (Kalimantan) has four, 7 (Sulawesi) has five, 8 (W. Irian and the Moluccas)
has four, 9 (Lesser Sundas) four, and 10 (Metropolitan Jakarta) none. Kodam 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10 are more or less unchanged renamings of the old Kodam IV, VI, VII,
VIII, XVI, and V. Kodam 1 amalgamated Kodam I, II, and III; Kodam 6, Kodam IX, X , and X II; Kodam 7, Kodam X III and XIV; and Kodam 8, Kodam XV and XVII.
W hat is curious, however, is that over the past tw o years no renumbering o f Korem has taken place to fit the new Kodam structure, indeed the numbering of some new Korem has adapted to the "old" pattern rather than the new.
It should be explained that in the "old days," and in accordance with the typical rationality o f. military command structures, the numbering o f territorial units at different levels was intended, and did, reflect hierarchies of jurisdiction and command. Thus, for example, if the Kodam o f Central Java was assigned the number VII, its four constituent Korem would be numbered 071 through 074, and the th irty-five low er-level Military District Commands (Kodim)— roughly corresponding to the kabu— patbn o f the civilian administration— would be numbered 0701 through 0735. As things
now stand, however, Kodam 1 , based in Medan, has under it six Korem numbered 011, 012, 022, 023, 031, and 032 (and the Kodimfollow the same pattern). Korem
O il and 012 were the tw o traditional Korem in Kodam I (Aceh), and the numbering reminds everyone o f this. Korem 031 and 032, however, are new, products o f the merger and repartitioning of the three Korem earlier composing the now—liquidated Kodam III (West Sumatra and Riau). Yet, they still bear the 03 numbering of Kodam III, thus keeping the "West Sumatra" tradition alive and visible. The odd retention o f the pre—reorganization regional codes has also affectedSouth Sumatra and Java, where no Kodam were eliminated in 1985, in that the 01, 02, and 03 series have been kept fo r the North Sumatra Korem, "forcing" Kodam 2 (S. Sumatra) to stick with the old Kodam IV’s 04 series, and Kodam 3 - 5 to retain the old Kodam VI—V lll’s
06, 07,and 08 numberings. In Kodam 6 (Kalimantan), the Korem also underscore
their old origins: 091 corresponds territorially to old Kodam IX (East Kalimantan); 101 and 102, the combined Kodam X (South and Central Kalimantan) developed when Kodam X I (Central Kalimantan) was eliminated on February 14,1974; while 121 is Kodam X II (W est Kalimantan) in new guise. The numbering o f Kodam 7 ’s five Korem (131 and 132; 141, 142, and 143) shows the residual visibility of the old Kodam X III (North Sulawesi) and X IV (South Sulawesi). A final most interesting case is
Kodam 8, an amalgamation of old Kodam XV (Moluccas) and XVII (West Irian). For
this new Kodam, not only has Kodam XV II’s 17 numbering been retained fo r its form er Korem, but the liquidated Kodam X V has also been given (as Korem 174) a late number in the same series.
These anomalies suggest that General Murdani has felt it necessary to proceed cautiously with his territorial reorganization, and that he recognizes the continuing strength o f local sentiments and loyalties among the soldieiy (especially in the Outer Islands). He is certainly fully awarethat these sentiments helped break up the territorial system o f the 1950s (to which his new system bears so strong a resemblance). A t the same tim e, there may be important lo n g -term implications in the retention o f these anomalies. The reduction of, say, Kodam X III to Korem 131 means a reduction in the rank of its commander, from Brigadier-G eneral to Colonel. A t the same tim e, the Governor of North Sulawesi (covering exactly the same area as Korem 131) is likely to be a retired M ajor-G eneral or even Lieutenant-General. The Korem commander has to report to Jakarta via Kodam 7 ’s HQ in Makasar, while the governor answers directly to the Minister o f the Interior. Retention o f the 1 3 - numbering serves to remind the people o f the region, including the soldiers in it, that in the very same ("ethnically" defined) territory, the local "military* leader­ ship is decisively lower in status than the "civilian" leadership, and that this structural situation will persist even if Jakarta nominates a civilian to the governorship. There are here the seeds of a quiet decline in the authority of the dwifungsi doctrine,

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which for so many years was reinforced by the layer—by—layer interlock between military and civilian territorial administrative jurisdictions and the status—subordina­ tion of the latter. (It was not so long ago that Kodam commanders had higher military ranks than the generals assigned as governors in the corresponding regional jurisdic­ tions.)

II. Politics o f the Changes

Any analysis of the political side of recent developments in the Indonesian military elite must necessarily focus on the pivotal figure of General Murdani. As of December 31, 1987 (the c u t-o ff point for this article), he had served as Armed Forces’ Com m ander-in—Chief and as Kopkamtib Commander for almost 5 years (57 months) making him not only the highest officeholder in the Armed Services but the active-duty officer with the longest tenure. In previous articles, emphasis was laid on the extraordinaryconcentration of power achieved by Murdani over these years— partly the result of the institutional changes created by Law 20/1982, partly
of the reduction of all service chiefs to the status o f "his1 staff officers, partly
of his long, iron grip on the state’s more effective intelligence bureaucracies, and partly of the active support of President Suharto. It was then argued that the reason for this concentration of power was that Suharto needed someone capable, determined, and trustworthy to manage the generational transition in the Army, not least because the Army had always been the political guarantor of the New Order regime. This confidence appears to have been w ell-placed in that the transition, and the accompanying structural reforms, have been carried out smoothly, and now seem firmly in place.

Yet there is one interesting exception, the D raft Law on the Military (RUU Keprajuritan), which was amply discussed at the October 2 1 -2 3 , 1967 Rapim ABRI (Armed Forces’ Leadership Annual Conference), with the likelihood that it would be presented to the Parliament (DPR) in December. The most significant feature of this bill is that it envisages raising the normal retirement age fo r ranking officers (colonel and above) from 55 to 60, a change justified on the grounds o f customary practice in the US and Thai militaries, and the greater physical fitness and longevity of postrevolutionary Indonesians. W hat is very interesting is that the bill seems clearly not designed to keep Murdani as Commander—in—Chief fo r another five years. For while the draft bill was being worked on in committee, Murdani is said to have offered (in May) his resignation to the President in view o f his soon reaching, on October 2, 1987, the 5 5 -y e a r limit on active duty status according to the existing law. The President chose to use the escape clause in the existing law to give Murdani an additional o n e-year extension of his active duty status. Since the D raft Law could have been presented at ariy tim e in the last three years (making Murdani’s continued tenure unproblematic), it seems obvious that the President has decided that Murdani will be out o f the Com m ander-m -Chiefship by some tim e next year.

W hat will happen then to Murdani, and what to the offices he holds and the policies he secures? It may be helpful to start with Murdani himself, before turning to the question of Suharto’s own intentions.

A t 55, Murdani is a t the height o f his powers in every sense. He has been an

active player m military politics fo r over thirty years, starting from his junior

participation in the failed Zulkifli Lubis coup o f 1955, through the crushing of the

Permesta rebellion in North Sulawesi in 1958, the campaign fo r W est Irian in 1 9 6 1 -

1962 (when he was parachuted into Dutch-controUed territory), the murky m aneuver-

ings o f 1 9 6 4 -1 9 6 6 whereby the Suharto group came to power in Jakarta and ended

Confrontation with Malaysia, the firstmajor intraregime crisis o f

the New Order

in Januaiy 1974 (M alari), the assault on East Tim or (1975), up to the present. For

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most o f this period he has been intimately associated with Suharto (who in many
ways has made his career).2 He has dominated Indonesia's m ilitaiy intelligence
apparatus since 1974 (and one key function of this system is the internal monitoring
of loyalties within the Armed Forces). Finally, he has played a central role in Indo­
nesia’s foreign relations, including special missions to Vietnam and China, as well
as making policy on Papua New Guinea and East Tim or.3

Since 1983 he has husbanded his power jealously. The positions o f Deputy Com­

mander—in—Chief and Deputy Commander of Kopkamtib have been abolished. It is widely

believed that even after assuming the two top military jobs in March 1983, he refused
to give u p 4 direct control of ABRI Intelligence, and continues personalty to direct

the shadowy activities o f BAIS (Strategic Intelligence Agency). Since 1983 he has

also taken an increasingly visible role in Indonesian domestic politics— outside the

strictly military sphere. He is generally credited as masterminding the "mysterious
killings1 of 1 9 8 3 -1 9 8 5 in which, if Amnesty International is correct, about 8,000

petty criminals were extralegally executed mainly by military personnel in mufti.

He took personal responsibility for the violent handling of the Tanjung Priok A ffair

in September 1984. He has regularly and openly intervened in appointments to gov­

ernorships, bupati-ships, memberships in national and provincial legislatures, and

posts in importantstate agencies.

It is clear that he made substantial contribu­

tions to the "opposition" PD I party in the April 23, 1987 elections, and he has visibly

cultivated rural ulama and aristocratic politicians in Java and the Outer Islands, it

has reached the point that many Indonesians speak o f tw o major political factions

in current political life, the "Murdani group" and thegroup of General Soedharmono,

who is currently head of the government's party Golkar, as well as Minister of

State (effectively the President's domestic chief of staff).

A t 55, Murdani is ten years older than Suharto was when he seized power from Sukarno in 1 9 6 5 -1 9 6 6 . It is difficult to imagine that he does not aspire to becoming President himself. Until he relinquishes his current offices he controls all the significant firepower in Indonesia; and he has been assigning key members of the "Timor group"— officers who worked closely with Mm on East Tim or over the years— to key positions in the present military hierarchy.If anyone could make a coup against Suharto, it would be Murdani. A t the same tim e, he has to think about the political liabilities o f being a Catholic and of partty-European descent (how great a liability m fact these traits would be remains uncertain. Many powerful Third World militaiy leaders come from religious and/or ethnic minorities, e.g ., Hafez aI—Assad, kU Amin, Yakubu Gowon, etc.). Furthermore, he does not have much tim e left.

The problem is that once he ceases to be Commander—in—Chief and Commander o f Kopkamtib, any other job will mean a substantial loss in power. Perhaps only the Vice—Presidency would have any attraction for him, but there is as yet no sign that Suharto is planning anything along these lines.

How is Suharto himself likely to be thinking about the future? W e may start a tentative analysis by focusing ontw o questions: what arethe implications o f the RUU Keprajuntan, and what is the character today o f high-level army factionalism?

2. It is very rare anywhere fo r an officer to be appointed Commander—in -C h ief whose largest previous unit o f command was a battalion.
3. He was Charge d’Affaires in Seoul from 1971 to 1974, at the height of the Park Chung Hee militaiy dictatorship, and certainly learned a lot from the experience. He remains the most "Korean" o f Indonesian officers.

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A The RUU Keprajuritan
The obvious beneficiaries of the RUU Keprajuritan are the Military Academy graduates of 1960—1963. Even if they privately believe that their professional capaci­ ties are greater than those of the Generation o f ’45, they have rather little to show the public to demonstrate this superiority. The only major war in which they have been involved has been the tw elve-year counterinsurgency in East Tim or, which continues at great cost in Indonesian and Tim orese fives and resources, with little prospect of victory in sight. Moreover, they have had to wait for a long tim e to become controllers of their country’s armed forces— not so much long by conven­ tional, international standards, as by comparison with their predecessors. Suharto was Divisional Commander inCentral Java at the age of 35; M ajor-G eneral Setiyana, who took over this same position at the beginning of 1987 was then 48; Suharto was Army Chief o f S taff at 44, while General Try Sutrisno, who took up this post in June 1986, was then almost 51.
The RUU Keprajuritan should guarantee these officers almost a decade o f a c tiv e service duty at the top (Sutrisno, among the oldest, is now 52). W hile the ag e-exten ­ sion for active service will surely create dissatisfaction among graduates o f p o s t1963 graduating Magelang classes, who could have hoped to rise more quickly under the existing system, from Suharto’s point o f view the law should serve as an invaluable form of personal patronage as well as discouraging political ambitions among the AM N—generation army leaders. It will also leave to members o f Suharto’s own Genera­ tion of '45 a monopoly o f militarized positions in the state bureaucracy and state enterprises. From this perspective, the RUU Keprajuritan represents the final step in a well thought-out plan to handle the transfer o f real military power to a group of younger officers without close personal ties to the President, with maximal smooth­ ness and minimal short— and lo n g -term risks to the regime.
B. Factionalism
in the final part o f the analysis presented in Issue no. 40, it was suggested that the pattern o f personnel transfers seemed to indicate some tension between the interests o f General Murdani and those o f President Suharto. D o the changes of the past tw o years bear this analysis out? Possibly, but not necessarily. W hat is certain is that the changes have meant an increase in Murdani’s power in the capital city. The commander o f Kodam Jaya (Metropolitan Jakarta), M ajor General Sugito, who came in directly from doubling as commander o f Kostrad’s Airborne Combat Command and of the Operations Security Command in East Tim or, is clearly a Murdani prot£g£. His new Chief o f S taff, Brig. Gen. Arie Sadewo, came in from heading one of BAJS’s Directorates (H /W an— meaning?) where he would have worked very closely with Murdani). And the new Commander o f Kostrad, M aj. Gen. Adolf Rajagukguk, has long been a Murdani instrument in East Tim or. He was the first commander o f Korem 164/East Tim or when it was set up on March 26, 1979, and later served as Commander of Kodam 9 (Lesser Sundas) which oversees East Tim or’s
military administration.4
There may also be something to be learned from examining the timing o f appoint­ ments over the past tw o years. Table A lists all appointments aside from those o f Korem commanders and Kodam chiefs o f staff; Table B covers this residual group.
4. He gained a certain international fam e when Amnesty International published secret documents he had signed authorizing the use of torture against people suspected of Fretilin connections.

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O c to b e r November December January February March April May June July August S eptem ber

1985
1 0 1

Table A
1986
0 1 1 2 1
5
10 2 2 1 0 1

1987
0
9
0 0 0 0
4
1
7
1

1985
0 1
5

Table B
1986
2 1 1 2
3
3
0
3
2 1 1 0

1987
3
3
2 2 0 1 2
3 4
1

B shows a pattern o f steady change which suggests a system o f routinized

turnovers, never more than five a month, and typically around tw o or three. There

are only five months out o f twenty—five where no changes at all occur. Table A ,

on the other hand, shows very marked oscillations, with thick clusters in April 1986,

Januaiy 1987, and August 1987. Especially notable is the heavy clustering o f appoint­

ments (seventeen in M arch -M ay 1986) just prior to TrySutrisno’s becoming Army

Chief of Staff. K we further recall that his elevation took place about eight months

later than it "should have” (i.e., his predecessor General Rudini was permitted to

stay in the job for eight months «Hter he should have gone into retirement); that

the seventeen above appointments included most o f the Assistants to the Anny

Chief of S taff (ie -, saddling T iy with a set o f Assistants by no means certainly

o f his choosing);* and thatsix months had to elapse before a sizeablenumber of

new appointments were made— then we may be inclined to think that Try’s position

is much less strong than Murdani’s despite his being widely viewed as Suharto’s

personal favorite among the New Generation o f senior officers. In fact, rumor has

it that there are tw o loose factions withinthe active-duty military elite,

one com­

posed of "hard" East Tim or veterans with strong ties to Murdani, the other a "soft"

clique nominally headed by T iy , and composed o f "mainstream" professionals without

conspicuous intelligence and counterinsurgency backgrounds. Yet even if these rumors

have some basis in reality, it does not necessarily mean that Suharto has been

putting his weight forcibly behind one and against the other. It may suit his book

to keep them in rough competitive balance.

But this tactic will not solve the problems o f what to do about Murdani, and what to do about the offices he now holds. The present concentration o f power in Murdani’s hands is the result of a particular crisis-specific set o f needs, talents, and opportunities, and is unlikely to be maintained after Murdani’s departure. One possible solution would be to put command o f the Armed Forces and of Kopkamtib in separate hands, as more or less happened in the days o f Generals Panggabean and Sumitro. It is not clear that the Kopkamtib Commander has to be an officer on active service, so perhaps Murdani could retain this office after retirement, especially if the egregious Yoga Sugama, nominal head of Bakin fo r the past thirteen years, were to yield his post to Murdani. Another alternative, the rebuilding o f the Ministry o f Defense under Murdani’s leadership, seems less likely. Law 20/1982 is firmly in place, and a major institutional upheaval would be required to create5

5. Usually an incoming official of this rank is expected to have the freedom to pick Ns own staff right away.

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a Defense Minister more powerful than the Com m ander-in-C hief; and it would be an upheaval very difficult to justify in terms of presentneeds or current army doctrine. Only ifthe Minister were concurrently Kopkamtib Commander would the appointment be minimally attractive. Still another alternative for Suharto is to name Murdani his Vice-President in March 1988, easing him out of real power, but compen­ sating fo r the! by naming him as his successor. But for twenty years Suharto has been very careful to avoid appointing a Vice-President who could plausibly succeed him (he clearly intends to be, in fact, if not in name, president for life), and it seems unlikely that he will change his style at this stage. Yet it is also uncertain whether Suharto really trusts the Military Academy types sufficiently to be able to dispense with Murdani’s capacities and knowledge; no one in Indonesia knows where more bodies, physical and figurative, are buried than he.
In any case, the decisions will be coming very soon now. In line with past practice Suharto will announce his Vice-President in March, and acabinet reshuffle will certainly be carried out around the same tim e. W e shall then have a much clearer picture o f Murdani’s future and o f the way power within the military is going to be allocated, formally and informally, over the coming five years.
***
April 1, 1988 Postscript
Since the above analysis was completed, a series of important transfers has begun, which will probably continue throughout the rest o f 1988. It is not possible yet to offer a confident interpretation, so that these concludingnotes are necessarily speculative.
The chain of events opened on February 10, when, after a private meeting with the President, General Murdani told the press that he was being retired from active duty and would promptly be replaced by Army Chief o f S taff General T iy Sutrisno. The transfer duly took place on February 29, preceded on February 23 by Edy Sudradjat becoming Army Chief o f Staff. Sudradjat was then succeeded in early March as Deputy Chief of S taff by Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk, the Kostrad Commander, who was replaced on March 15 as Kostrad Commander by Sugito, Com­ mander o f Kodam Jaya. The previous day Sugito himself had been replaced as Jaya Commander by Diponegoro Chief o f S taff M aj. Gen. Suryadi Sudirdja.
It was widely noticed that on leaving the Commander—in-Chiefship Murdani did not give up the other key post he held, that o f Kopkamtib Commander. As o f this writing it is still unclear what the future of Kopkamtib will be and whether Murdani will continue to control it. A number of highly placed officials have said publicly tin t Kopkamtib’s mission is to be thoroughly revamped, with more emphasis being laid on securing economic stability and security. It has only been made plain that whoever eventuaHy heads it, or its successor, that person will not be the new Armed Forces Commander—in—Chief.
In the meantime, at the M PR meeting on March 11, Lt. Gen. Sudharmono, State Secretaiy and General Chairman o f Golkar, emerged as Suharto’s chosen candidate for Vice-President. This candidacy was the first in the history o f the New Order to arouse visible antagonism, most evidently from the military. An obscure B rig ad ierGeneral (Ibrahim Saleh), a member of the Armed Forces’ fraksi in the MPR, startled the session by springing to the speaker’s podium to protest the President’s selection. John Naro, the slippery head of the Muslim PPP party, put forward his own candidacy, purportedly with some military backing. Moreover, the Armed Forces’ fraksi ostenta­ tiously refrained from cosponsoring Sudharmono. But in fairly short order these

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murmurs of dissent were silenced. Naro withdrew his candidacy, and the military fraksi in the end joined the unanimous approval of the President’s choice. Tw o weeks later, the new Cabinet was announced, and the questions about Murdani’s future as a retired officer were partly settled by his nomination as Minister of Defense and Security replacing General Poniman.
It is difficult not to read this series of curiosities as— at least in part— a political struggle between the Palace and Armed Forces’ Headquarters. The most plausible explanation of Murdani’s abrupt removal as C om m ander-in-C hief a bare month before the M PR session is that Suharto had already privately decided not to make Murdani his Vice-President and potential legal successor, and thought it prudent to remove him from command of troops before breaking the disagreeable news. If one looks at the promotions and transfers that followed in late Februaiy and early March, most o f the beneficiaries are thought to be Murdani men— generals with RPKAD backgrounds, deep involvement in East Tim or, and significant intelligence ties. (In other words their careers look very different from Try Sutrisno’s.) It is also worth noting that, on Januaiy 15, Rear Admiral Soedibyo Rahardjo was installed as the new Chief of the General S taff (the no. 2 position in Armed Forces’ Headquarters) replacing L t.-G en . Ida Bagus Sudjana. The admiral is a form er BAIS man and long­ tim e intelligence aide to Murdani. If this line of speculation is correct, it suggests that Murdani has been trying to remain a powerful force and policy-determ iner in Armed Forces’ Headquarters, even after he has lost the Commander—in—Chiefship. His retention, for the tim e being, of the Kopkamtib command, points in the same direction.
On paper, Murdani’s appointment as Defense Minister is an honorable promotion, one that it would be difficult to complain about in public. But the fact is that, as a result of Law 20/1982, in the drafting of which Murdani had a major hand, the Defense Ministry is a pale shadow of what it was in the days o f Generals Nasu— tion, Suharto, Panggabean, and Yusuf. As detailed in an earlier analysis (see Indo­ nesia, No. 37 (April 1984)), its functions are routine-adm inistrative and it has no institutional extensions in the provinces. During his five years as Defense Minister General Poniman was a largely invisible figure. If we add that, at least formally, the Defense Minister does not answer directly to the President but is supposed to go through the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Suharto faithful Admiral Sudomo, it looks as though Murdani has fo r the tim e being lost a good deal o f power. If, as is likely given his character, he now attem pts to reinvent the Defense Ministry, it will be hard not to set the C om m ander-in-C hief and the Minister on an antagonistic course— which may, o f course, suit the President’s book. The key things to watch in the coming months will be: (1) whether Murdani manages to keep control o f Kopkamtib, and of the labyrinthine intelligence networks that he has dominated since 1974; and (2) whether Try Sutrisno proves able to create his own group m Armed Forces’ Headquarters, and free himself wholly or partially from the appointees o f his predecessor.
**♦
The form at approximates that used in the previous listing Indonesia, No. 40 (October 1985)) and is fo r the period ending December 31, 1987. (Additional material on the regional leaderships at the Kodam and Korem levels will be included in Issue 46 (October 1988).) A glossary o f some of the most used abbreviations follows. There is, finally, a list of the members of the Fifth Development Cabinet announced by President Suharto on March 21 after the closing o f the 1988 M PR session.

146

A R M ED FORCES HEADQUARTERS (Mabes A B R I)

I. Commander—in—Chief

Commander—in—Chief of the Armed Forces Gen. Leonardos Benjamin ("Benny") Murdani (b. October 2, 1932, Cepu) (P3AD)
Commander o f Kopkamtib Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani

28.iii.83 (57 months)

Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf

Assistant for Security, Hankam; Head,

Strategic intelligence Center; Deputy

Head, Bakin

RPKAD

J

28.iii.83 (57 months) Admiral R. Sudomo As above RPKAD

J

II. S taff Echelon

Chief of the General S taff (Kasum)

1. V ice-M arshal Oetom o (b. April 15, 1935, Malang)
2. Lt. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi (b. April 14, 1931, Cilacap) (P 3 A D )
3. Lt. Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana6
(b. June 5, 1937, Bali) (AMN 1, 1960)

c. 10.xi.84—18.iv.86 (17 months)

Lt. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto

Deputy Chief of S taffof the Air Force

Air Force

J

18.iv.86-5.i.87 (81/2 months)

Assistant for Logistics to the C -'m -C

Armed Forces; Head, Armed Forces’

Supply Body (Babek)

RPKAD

J

5 .i.8 7 -1 0 .x .8 7 (10 months)
Assistant for Social and Political
Affairs to the C—in—CArmed Forces
7 Balinese

Chief o f the Social and Political S taff (KassospoQ

1. Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro (b. Januaiy 7, 1931, Surabaya)
2 Lt. Gen. Soegiarto (b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar, Kebumen) (AMN 1, 1960)

21 .vm.85—5.i.87 (16!/2 months)

Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono (deceased)

Deputy Army Chief of S taff

Ordnance

J

5.i.87 (12 months)
Assistant for Personnel to the Army Chief of S taff
DJ

6. On October 10, 1987 Sudjana replaced Lt. Gen. Yogi Supardi as Secretary-G eneral,
Department of Defense. No successor had been named as of December 31.

Inspector—General (Irjen ABRI) 1. Air Vice-M arshal Iskandar
2. Rear Adm. Gatot Suwardi (b. January 21, 1935, Jember)
Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum) 1. Vice Adm. F. Parapat
2. Air Vice—Marshal Tedy Roesdi Hayuni
Assistant for Security (Intelligence] (Aspam)
1. M aj. Gen. M. I. Sutaiyo8
(P 3 A D )
2. M aj. Gen. Soedibyo9
Assistant for Operations (Asops) 1. M aj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat (b. April 22, 1938, Jambi) (AMN 1, 1960)
2. Rear Adm. Soedibyo Rahardjo

147

c. iii.1984—31.V.86 (c. 26 months)

U . Gen. Gunawan Wibisono (deceased)

?

Air Force

J

31.V.86 (19 months) Commander of the Fleet, Eastern Zone

Navy

J

? (1 9 8 0 )-? (1986)7

M aj. Gen. Ignatius Yogi Supardi

?

Navy

Toba Batak

? 1986 A Director in BAIS ?

?

? 1983—? M aj. Gen. Soelarso ? ?
?
? ?

? ?

c. 30.iv.85-16.vi.86 (13l/2 months) First A ir Marshal Ibnu Subroto Commander Kodam VI (3) SI J
c. vi.86 (c. 18 months)
Head, External Affairs Directorate of BAIS (1984)
??

7. He was concurrently D irector-G eneral of Budget and General Planning in the Defense and Security Department in March 1986.
8. In November 1986 he was also reported to be Deputy Head of BAIS. (AS November
26, 1986.)
9. I have been unable to find any information on M aj. Gen. Soedibyo and it is likely he too served in BAIS.

148

Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)
1. M aj. Gen. Sarwono10
(b. 1332)
2. M aj. Gen. Sutahan M.

c. 15.v.85-?.viii.86 (c. 15 months) M aj. Gen. Eddy Marzuki Nalapraya Chief of Staff, Kodam 4 SI? J
?.viii.86 (16 months)
?
??

Assistant for Communications and Electronics (Askomlek)

Air Vice—Marshal Soebagyo

? xi.1984 (38 months) V ice-M arshal Tedjo Suwamo ?
Aar Force

J

Assistant for Security and Social Order (Askamtibmas)

Police M aj. Gen. Drs. Achmad Djuaeni11

c. 20.vii.85-? (29 months)

Police M aj. Gen. Drs. Poerwata

Chief of Police, N. Sumatra

Police

J?

Assistant for Personnel (Aspens)

1. M aj. Gen. Soegiaito

c. 30.iv.85 -c. l.i.8 7 (20 months) M aj. Gen. Suharto Partoatmodjo Commander, Kodam V II (4) DJ

2. First Marshal Soedarma

c. l.i.8 7 (12 months)

(probably) Director, Personnel and

Placement, Air Force

Air Force

J?

Assistant for Logistics (Aslog)

1. Lt. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi

c. ii.l9 8 3 -c . 18.iv.86 (38 months)

Lt. Gen. Supardjo

Commander, Kodam XVI

RPKAD

J

2. Rear Admiral Emir Hamzah Mangaweang

c. 30.iv.86-?? (?)

Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center

Navy

Buginese

3. Rear Admiral A. Rahadi

? (?)
?
Navy

?

10. Reportedly he became Secretary-G eneral of the Social Affairs Ministry in about
August 1986.
11. A B reports that on June 20, 1986 he was also made Deputy for Administration to the Head of National Police. It is not clear how long he kept his old job.

149

Assistant fo r Finance (Asku)
Lt. Gen. Widyo Sarwono12

6 .ix .7 5 -?

M aj. Gen. Suhanto

O fficer seconded to the Army Chief of S taff

Finance Corps

J

Assistant for Social and Political Affairs (Assospol)

1. M aj. Gen. Goenarso S.F.

4 .iii.8 0 -c . 30.X.85 (c. 68 months)
(retired November 1985) Brig. Gen. Prapto Praj'rtno Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center BJ

2. M aj. Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana

c. 30.x.8 5 -5 .i.8 7 (14 months) Assistant for Territorial Affairs to
the Army Chief o f S taff ? Balinese

3. M aj. Gen. Harsudiyono Hartas (b. June 4, 1935, Jepara) (AMN 1, 1960)

5.L87 (12 months) Commander, Kodam 4 Cavalry

J

Assistant for Functional Group Affairs (Asyawan)

1. M aj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa (b. July 20, 1933, Bandung) (Akad Zeni, 1956)

c. 9.viii.85 (281/ 2 months)

M aj. Gen. ChaNmi Imam Santoso

Commander, Kodam 2

Engineers

S

Head, Armed Forces’ Financial Center

1. Col. Rachmansyah

c. 23.iB.85-?

2. Col. Dts. H. F. Putong 3. Navy Lt. Col. M. Sudjana B.Sc.

? Finance Corps

J?

? -2 3 .ix .8 6 ?
Finance Corps

?

23.ix.86 (15 months)

Head, Sub Dinas Pembiayaan

(Sub Service fo r Expenditures ??]

Armed Forces’ Financial Center

Navy

J?

Central Executive Organs (Lakpus)

1. Governor, National Defense Institute (Lemharmas)

M aj. Gen. Soebijakto Prawirosoebroto (b. August 17, 1929, W ates) (Breda)

31.V.83 (49 months) [retired November 1985)
Lt. Gen. Sutopo Yuwono O fficer seconded to the C—in—C BJ

1 2 It is almost certain that Gen. Sarwono has retired, but I have been unable to find any note of a successor.

150

2. Commander—General, Armed Forces Academy (Akabri)

1. U . Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Suriadiredja (b. June 14, 1931, Bandung)

21.ii.85-15.xi.86 (21 months) Lt. Gen. Murgito Commander, Kowilhan IV Marines

S

2. Rear Adm. Soegiatmo

15.xi.86 (13V2 months) Governor, Naval Academy Navy

J

3. Commander-General, Armed Forces’ S taff and Command School (Sesko ABRI)

1. M aj. Gen. Drs. Sumargono Kartoprajitno

23.vi.84-12.iv.86 (21]/2 months)
[retired November 1986) Vice-M arshal Aried Riyadi ?
?J

2. M aj. Gen. Sukarto (b. c. 1937) (AMN 1, 1960)

12.iv.86 (20}/2 months)

Assistant for Research and Development

to the Army Chief of S taff

Cavalry

J

4. Head, Armed Forces’ Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal)

1. Rear Adm. Dr. Tarm izi Thaher (b. Padang, 1936)

1 9 8 2 -c . 30.viii.87 (c. 60 months)
Brig. Gen. M. Soegeng W idjaja 7

Navy

Minangkabau

2. Col. H. N. Nurdin

30.viii.87 (4 months)

Head, Army M ental Upbuilding Seivice

Engineers

?

5. Head, Research and Development Center (Puslitbang)

1. Brig. Gen. Drs. Ngandani, M.Sc. 2. Col. Lukman R. Boer

c. 4 .v i.8 3 -l.x ii.8 6 (c. 42 months) M aj. Gen. Theo Sumantri ? ?J

l.x ii.86 (13 months)

Deputy Head, Center for Research and

Development, Armed Forces’ Headquarters

Engineers

?

6. Head, Armed Forces’ Center of History and Tradition (Pusjarah)

Brig. Gen. Gatot Surjadi13

? 1 9 8 2 -l.x i.8 6 (7) Brig. Gen. (Titular) Dr. Nugroho
Notosusanto (deceased) ?
SI J

13. Gatot Surjadi retired in November 1986 and no note has been found of his successor. In October 1987 the deputy head o f Pusjarah was Col. (Cav.) Soeparmo. (AB October 20, 1987.)

151

7. Head, Armed Forces’ Medical Center (Puskes)

1. M aj. Gen. Dr. Kumia Natadisastra 2. Brig. Gen. P. Pasaribu

c. 2.vi.79—c. l.v ii.8 7 (97 months) [retired November 1985)

Brig. Gen. Dr. Abdullah Hassan ?

Medical Corps

S

c. l.v ii.8 7 (6 months)
?
?

Toba Batak

8. Head, Armed Forces’ Military Police Center (Puspom)

1. Brig. Gen. R. Sardjono

c. late Feb. 85—15.vi.87 (c. 28

months)

Brig. Gen. Gatot M atrai

Head, President’s Security Squad

(Paswalpres)

Military Police

J

2. Brig. Gen. Hadi Baroto

15.vi.87 (6V 2 months)
? Military Police

J?

9. Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center (Puspen)

1 . Rear Adm. Emir Hamzah
Mangaweang
2. Brig. Gen. Pieter Damanik (b. October 18, 1934, Pematang Siantar)

17.vi.83-24.iv.86 (34 months) Brig. Gen. Drs. Encung A.S. ?
Navy

Buginese

24.iv.86-16.x.87 (18 months)14
?
? Simalungun Batak

10. Armed Forces’ Survey and Mapping Center (Pussurta)

1. Brig. Gen. Utaiyo Surodirono
2. First Admiral Sri W askito (b. February 21, 1937, Solo) (AAL 1959)

8.xi.83-8.iv.86 (29 months)
Vice Adm. D. U. M artojo ?

Army Topography Corps

J

8.iv.86 (21 months)

Head, Navy Hydro—Oceanographic Service

Navy

J

11. Head, Armed Forces’ Legal Upbuilding Body (Babinkum)

M aj. Gen. M. Djaelani SH

? (certainly by 1984) ? ?
?

?

14. Damanik was appointed to a position in the foreign office on October 16, 1987, but I have found no report o f his successor. {AB, October 17, 1987.)

152

12. Head, Armed Forces’ Supply Body (Babek)

1. M aj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi

c. March 8 3 -c . April 86 (37 monlhs)

M aj. Gen. M. R. Sunardjo

Commander, Kodam XVI

RPKAD

J

2. Col. Soemartono

c. April 86 (?) (20 monlhs?)
? Cavalry

J

13. Head, Armed Forces’ Functional Group Upbuilding Body (Babinkar)

M aj. Gen. Roestandi A Moestafa

c. 15.vii.85 (29‘/2 months)

M aj. Gen. Chalimi Imam Santoso

Commander, Kodam 2

Engineers

S

14. Commander, National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas)

1. Vice—Marshal Hartono

c. 8.vi«.84—ll.v i.8 7 (34 months)

Air V ice-M arshal Iskandar

?

Air Force

J

2. First Air Marshal Ateng Suarsono

ll.v i.8 7 (6!/2 months)

Commander, Koharmat AU (Air Force

Maintenance and Supply Command

[Pemeliharaan dan Pembekalan AU]

Air Force

J

SERVICE HEADS A N D A R M Y HIERARCHY

Commander—in-C hief of the Armed Forces Gen. Leonardus Benjamin ("Benny") Murdani
Army Chief o f S taff 1. Gen. Rudini (b. December 15, 1929, Malang) (Breda)
2 Gen. Try Sutrisno (b. November 15, 1935, Surabaya) (Aktekad 4, 1959)
Navy Chief of S taff 1. Adm. Mohammad Romly
(b. December 8, 1928,
Tubing Agung)

28.iii.83 (57 months)

Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf

Assistant for Security, Dept, of

Defense and Security; Head,

Strategic Intelligence Center;

Deputy Head, Bakin

RPKAD

J

7 .iii.83—24.vi.86 (391/? months) Gen. S. Poniman Commander, Kostrad DJ

24.vi.86 (18 months) Deputy Army Chief of S taff Engineers

J

4 jtii.8 2 -1 7 .iv .8 6 (40 months)

Adm. W alujo Sugito

Chief of Operations Staff, Dept, of

Defense and Security

Navy

J

2. Admiral Rudolf Kasenda (b. May 15, 1934, Rantepao)
Air Force Chief of S taff 1. Air Marshal Sukardi (b. December 1931, Bojonegoro)
2. Air Marshal Oetom o
Chief of the National Police 1. Police Gen. Anton Sudjarwo (b. September 21, 1930, Bandung) (Brimob)
2. Police Gen. Drs. Moch. Sanoesi (b. 1935, Bogor)
Commander o f the Marine Corps 1. M aj. Gen. (Marines) Muntaram (b. c. 1 9 3 3 -3 4 , Cianjur)
2. Brig. Gen. (Marines) Aminullah Ibrahim (b. 1937, Banyuwangi)
Deputy Army Chief o f S taff 1. Lt. Gen. T iy Sutrisno (b. November 15, 1935, Surabaya) (Aktekad 4, 1959)
2. Lt. Gen. Edy Sudradjat
First Assistant (Intelligence) M aj. Gen. I Gde Awet Sara (b. March 3, 1936, Bali) (Aktekad 4, 1959)

153

17.kr.86 (201/2 months)

Deputy for Logistics, Armed Forces’

C -in -C

Navy

Torajan

4.xii.82—17.kr.86 (40 months)

Air Marshal Ashadi Tjahjadi

Commander, Kostranas [now abolished

National Strategic Command)

Air Force

J

17.kr.86 (20*/2 months)

Chief of the General Staff, Armed

Forces’ Headquarters

Air Force

J

4.xii.82-3.vii.86 (44 months)

Police Lt. Gen. Dr. Awaloedin Djamin

Chief of Police, Jakarta

Police

J

3.vii.86 (18 months)

Chief of Police, Central Java

Police

J? S?

7.V.83—7.i.87 (44 months)

Lt. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Suriadiredja

Chief of Staff, Marine Corps

Marines

S

7.i.87 (12 months)

Chief o f Staff, Marine Corps

Marines

J? Madurese?

21.viii.8S -16.vi.86 (10 months)

Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro

Commander, Kodam V (10)

Engineers

J

16.vi.86 ( I 8V 2 months)
Assistant fo r Operations, Armed Forces’ C -in -C
SI J

26.vi.85 (30 months)

M aj. Gen. Ari Bandiyoko (deceased)

Commander, Kodam IX

Engineers

Balinese

154

Second Assistant (Operations) 1. M aj. Gen. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk (b. December 31, 1338, Medan) (AMN 2, 1961)
2 M aj. Gen. Zein Maulani

26.vi.85-c. mid—March 86 (8V 2 months)
M aj. Gen. Prajitno Commander, Kodam XIII D Toba Batak
c. m id-M arch 86 (21!/2 months)
Deputy Assistant for Operations (Waas Ops) to the Army Chief of S taff
? Buginese?

Third Assistant (Personnel)
1. M aj. Gen. Syaukat Banjaransari15
(b. c. 1937) (AMN 1, 1960)
2. M aj. Gen. Soetopo

26.vi.85-c. February 86 (8 months)
M aj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh Chief of Staff, Kostrad ?J
c. February 86 (c. 22 months)
Deputy Assistant for Personnel to the Army Chief o f S taff
??

Fourth Assistant (Logistics)

1. M aj. Gen. Ishak Odang

23.v.83-?.vi.85 (c. 24 months) Li. Gen. Haroen Soewardi Head, Army General Supply Sendee ? S?

2 M aj. Gen. Sugeng Subroto (b. Surabaya) (AMN 1, 1960)

?.vi.85-4.viii.87 (c. 26 months) Chief of Staff, Kodam 10 B? J?

3. M aj. Gen. Soedarto

4.viii.87 (5 months) ? Engineers

J?

Fifth Assistant (Research and Development/Planning and Budgeting)

1. M aj. Gen. Sukarto

26.vi.85-c. 12.iv.86 (81/2 months)

M aj. Gen. Darsoyo

Deputy Governor, General and Army

Division, Armed Forces’ Academy

Cavaliy

J

2. Brig. Gen. Tiopan Bernhard Silalahi (b. 1940) (AMN 2, 1961)

c. m id-M arch 1986 (20]/2 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam 4 D Toba Batak

Assistant fo r Territorial Affairs

1. M aj. Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana

9.X .84-30.X .85 (14V 2 months) Brig. Gen. Harjono Prawirodirdjo (deceased) Commander, Kodam X II ? Balinese

15. Syaukat Banjaransari then became Military Secretary to the President, replacing (14.ii.86) retired Air Vice-M arshal Kardono.

155

2. M aj. Gen. B. P. Makadada

30.X.85 (26 months) Chief of S taff, Kowilhan IV Hasanudin?

Menadonese

Commander, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)

1. Lt. Gen. Soeweno (b. c. 1929, Madiun) (P3AD)
2. M aj. Gen. Soeripto (b. November 18, 1934, Temanggung) (AMN 1, 1960)

24.V.83—30.L86 (32 months) (retired

November 1986)

Lt. Gen. Rudini

Second Assistant (Operations) to the

Army Chief of S taff

RPKAD

J

30. i.86—21.viii.87 (19 months)
Commander, Kodam 1 DJ

3. M aj. Gen. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk

21.vm.87 (4 months) Commander, Kodam 9 D

Toba Batak

Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces’ Academy

1. M aj. Gen. Untung Sridadi Tjokrowidjojo (Breda)
2. M aj. Gen. Hasudungan Simandjuntak (b. 1936) (AMN 1, 1960)

c. 6.vi.83—8.iii.86 (33 November 1986)
M aj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh Army Inspector-General D

months) J

[retired

8.i8.86—c. l.ix .8 7 (18 months)

Commander, Kodam 8

Infantry

Toba Batak

3. Brig. Gen. Toni Hartono (AMN 2, 1961)

c. l.ix .8 7 (4 months) Deputy Governor of General and Army
Division, Armed Forces’ Academy ??

Commander, Army S taff and Command School (Seskoad)

1. M aj. Gen. Theo Sumantri (Breda)

4.vi.83-27.v.86 (36 months)

M aj. Gen. Bagus Sumitro

Head, Research and Development Center,

Armed Forces’ Headquarters

Signal Corps

J

2. M aj. Gen. Damuanto

27.V.86 (19 months) Deputy Commander, Army S taff and
Command School ?J

Commander, Kopassus (Special Forces Command)

1. Brig. Gen. Sintong Pandjaitan (b. September 4, 1941, Tarutung) (AMN 4, 1963)

22.V.85—8.viii.87 (26*/2 months)

Brig. Gen. Wismoyo Aris Munandar

Commander, Airborne and Secret W ar

Training Center [Pussandha Linud) of Kopassus

RPKAD

Toba Batak

2. Brig. Gen. Kuntara

8.vMi.87 (5 months)

Deputy Commander, Kopassus

RPKAD

J?

156

REGIONAL MILITARY LEADERS

KODAM (Military Region Command) 1

BUW T BARISAN (North Sumatra)

KO DAM Commander

1. M aj. Gen. Soeripto

27.iv.85-28.i.86 (9 months)

2. M aj. Gen. D jarot Supadmo
3. M aj. Gen. Ali Geno17
(b. September 20, 1936, Cirebon) (AMN 1, 1960)
4. Brig. Gen. Asmono Arismunandar (b. c. 1938, Ponorogo) (AMN 2, 1961)

Commander Kodam III D
28.i.86—28.ii.86 (1 month)16

J

23.iv.86—6.vi.87 (13!/2 months)

Chief of Staff, Kodam I

Engineers

Cirebonese

6.vi.87 (7 months) Chief of Staff, Kodam 5 B?

J

SRIWIJAYA (South Sumatra) 1. M aj. Gen. Siswadi
2. M aj. Gen. R. Soenardi (b. December 31, 1937, Yogya) (AMN 2, 1961)

KODAM 2

P anglim a

23.v.85-24.viii.87 (27 months)

M aj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa

Director, Social & Political Doctrine

Development, Armed Forces’ S taff and

Command College

Engineers/D

J

24. viii.87 (4 months) Chief o f Staff, Kodam 2 Cavalry

J

SILIWANGI (West Java)
M aj. Gen. Raja Inal Siregar (b. c. 1938) (AMN 2, 1961)

KODAM 3
P anglim a 18.V.85 (291/2 m onths) M aj. Gen. Edy Sudrajat Commander Kodam X III SI

Sipirok Batak

16. Supadmo was killed in a helicopter crash on this date.
17. Newspaper accounts suggest that Ali Geno was abruptly removed because of openly criminal behavior by some of his subordinates.

DIPONEGORO (Central Java)
1. M aj. Gen. Harsudiyono Hartas
2. M aj. Gen. Setiyana (b. February 12, 1939, Solo) (AMN 2, 1961)
BRAWUAYA (East Java)
1. M aj. Gen. Saiful Sulun
(b. January 6, 1937, Medan)
(AMN 1, 1960) 2. M aj. Gen. Sugeng Subroto
(b. Surabaya) (AMN 1, 1960)
TANJUNGPURA (Kalimantan)
M aj. Gen. Faisal Tanjung (AMN 2, 1961)
WIRABUANA (Sulawesi)
M aj. Gen. Nana Narundana (b. c. 1937, Tasikmalaya) (AMN 1, 1960)

157

KODAM 4

Panglhna
18.V.85—12187 (20 months)
M aj. Gen. Soegiarto Commander, Kodam II Cavalry
12187 ( l l x/2 months) Commander, Kodam 8
?

J J

KODAM 5

P anglim a

1 4 .v .8 5 -U .v iii.8 7 (27 months)

M aj. Gen. Soelarso18

Artillery

Minangkabau

ll.v iii.8 7 (4*/2 months)
Assistant for Logistics to the Kostrad Chief of S taff
B? J

KODAM 6

Panglim a
2.V.85 (32 months)

Commander, Infantry Weapons Center

RPKAD

Mandating Batak

KODAM 7

P anglim a
c. 14.V.85 (31V2 months)
Commander, Kodam I Cavaliy

S

18. M aj. Gen. Soelarso became D irector-G eneral of Army Headquarters.

158

CENDRAWASIH (Irian Barat St Maluku) 1. M aj. Gen. Hasudungan Simanjuntak

KODAM 8
P anglim a 8.v.85—13.iii.86 (10 months)

2. Brig. Gen. Setiyana
3. M aj. Gen. Wismoyo Arismunandar (b. Februaiy 2, 1940) (AMN 4, 1963)

Commander, Kodam X V Infantry

Toba Batak

13.iii.86—9.i.87 (10 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam X lll,5> ?J

9 1 8 7 (12 months) Chief o f Staff, Kodam 9 RPKAD

J

UDAYANA (Nusatenggara) 1. M aj. Gen. R. P. D. Soetarto
(P 3 A D )
2. M aj. Gen. Adolf Sahala Rajaguguk
3. Brig. Gen. Djoko Pramono

KODAM 9

P anglim a
9. iv.85—6. iii.86 (11 months)

Commander Kodam XVI SI

J

6.iii.86—12.viii.87 (17 months)
Assistant for Operations to the Army Chief of StafT
D Toba Batak

12.viii.87 (41/2 months)

Commander, Artillery Weapons Center

A rtille iy

J

JAYA (Greater Jakarta)
M aj. Gen. Sugito (b. c. 1939, Yogya) (AMN 2, 1961)

KODAM JAYA

P anglim a

9.viii.85 (29 months)

M aj. Gen. T ty Sutrisno

Commander, Airborne Combat Command,

Kostrad; Commander, Security Operations

Command, East Tim or

RPKAD

J

***

19. A fter graduating from the Military Academy, he had Zl/ 2 years in Ceram—Maluku,
then was a Battalion Commander in Padang; then served 3*/2 years in the Embassy
in Vientiane; then to Kostrad before going to Kodam X III in 1985.

159

Head State Intelligence Coordination Board (Bakin)

Gen. Yoga Sugama (b. May 12, 1925, Tegal) (Rikugun Shikan Gakko (Japanese Military Academy])

281 7 4 (167 months) Lt. Gen. Sutopo Yuwono Deputy Ambassador to the UN DJ

Commander, Presidential Security Squad (Paswalpres)

Brig. Gen. Pranowo

30.i.85 (85 months)

Brig. Gen. R. Sardjono

Commander, Military Police, Kodam V

Military Police

J

160
ABRI
Akabri
Akad Zeni A k te k a d
AMN B BAIS Bakin
BB D J Kodam Kodim Kopassus Kopkamtib
Korem Kostrad
Kowilhan KSAD (Kasad) Paswalpres P3AD
RPKAD
S Seskoad
Seskogab
SI

Abbreviations
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata
Akademi Zeni Akademi Teknik Angkatan
D a ra t Akademi M iliter Nasional Brawijaya Badan Intelijen Strategis Badan Koordinasi Intelijen
Negara Bukit Barisan Oiponegoro
Komando Daerah M iliter Komando Distrik M iliter Komando Pasukan Khusus Komando Pemulihan Keamanan
dan Ketertiban Komando Resort M iliter Komando Strategis Angkatan
D arat Komando Wilayah Pertahanan Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat Pasukan Pengawal Presiden Pusat Pendidikan Perwira
Angkatan Darat Resimen Para Komando
Angkatan Darat
Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat
Sekolah Staf dan Komando Gabungan
Siliwangi

Armed Forces of the Republic o f Indonesia
Indonesian Armed Forces’ Academy
Engineers’ Academy Army Technical Academy
National Military Academy
Strategic Intelligence Agency State Intelligence Coordinating
Agency
Javanese Military Area Command Military District Command Special Forces’ Command Command for the Restoration
of Security and Public Order Military Resort Command Army Strategic Command
Defense Region Command Army Chief of S taff Presidential Security Squad Army O fficer Training Center
Army Paracommando Regiment
Sundanese Army S taff and Command
School Joint Services’ S taff and
Command School

161

TH E FIFTH D EVELO PM ENT CABINET As Announced by President Suharto on March 21, 1988
(Asterisks denote active or retired military officers)

Minister of: Home Affairs Foreign Affairs Defense and Security Justice Information Finance Trade Industries Agriculture Forestry Mining and Energy Public Works Communications Cooperative Affairs Manpower Transm igration Tourism, Posts, and Telecommunications Education and Culture Health Religious Affairs Social Affairs
Coordinating Minister for: Politics and Security Economics, Finance, Industry, and Development Supervision Public W elfare
Ministers of State: Secretary of State National Planning and Development (concurrently chairman o f the National Development Planning Board— Bappenas) Research and Technology (concurrently chairman of the Board for Research and Application o f Technology) Population and Environment Public Housing Youth and Sports Reform of State Apparatus Women’s Affairs
Junior Ministers: Cabinet Secretary Finance Trade Industries

* Rudini Ali Alatas, S.H.
* L B. (Benny) Murdani * Ismail Saleh, S.H.
H arm oko Prof. Dr. J. B. Sumariin Dr. Ariftn Siregar Ir. Hartarto Ir. Wardoyo Ir. Nasjrul Harahap Ir. Drs. Ginandjar Kartasasmita Ir. Radinal Moechtar Ir. Azwar Anas * Bustanil Arifin, S.H. Drs. Cosmas Batubara Sugiarto
* Susilo Sudarman Prof. Dr. Fuad Hassan Dr. Adhyatma, M .P A H. Munawir Syadzali, M .A. Prof. Dr. Haryati Soebadio
* Sudomo
Drs. Radius Prawiro * Soepardjo Rustam
Drs. Moerdiono
Prof. Dr. Saleh Afrff
Prof. Dr. Ir. B. J. Habibie Prof. Dr. Emil Salim Ir. Siswono Judohusodo Ir. Akbar Tanjung Ir. Sarwono Kusumaatmadja Ny. A. Sulasikin Moerpratomo
Drs. Saadillah Mursjid, M .P A Drs. Nasrudin Sumintapura, M .A. Dr. J. Sudradjat Djiwandono Ir. T . Ariwibowo

162

Agriculture National Planning and
Development (concurrently Bappenas vice chairman)
In addition to ' these ministers, there are state ministerial ranks. They are:
Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
Attorney General Governor of the Central Bank

Dr. Ir. Sjarifudin Baharsjah
Prof. Dr. Benny Sugiarto Muljana i—ranking state officials who are accorded
* Try Sutrisno Sukarton Marmosudjono, S.H. Dr. Adrianus Mooy