PATTERNS OF MILITARY CONTROL IN THE INDONESIAN HIGHER CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY
John A. MacDougall*
Summary
This article analyzes current military penetration of Indonesia's higher central government bureaucracy. Any civilian or military officeholder in this bureaucracy is referred to as a karyawan. The article focuses on the incumbent Cabinet and topmost echelon of civil service officials. Findings are based on public biographies of these persons and published specialized secondary sources on the Indonesian military. The principal conclusions follow below.
The Higher Central Bureaucracy
The Indonesian military has long played a "dual civil and military function." Military karyawan, active duty and retired officers in civilian assignments, comprise an increasingly visible, influential, and strategic segment of the dominant military faction, that of President Suharto and his 1945 Generation supporters.
--The military karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy are especially critical actors in maintaining the Suharto regime.
--Together with their civilian karyawan colleagues, virtually all of them wield decision-making powers of some considerable degree.
--Some mix of military and civilian karyawan occurs in all Cabinet Departments except the Department of Defense and Security, now entirely military-controlled.
--The Indonesian armed forces' doctrinal commitment to preventing civilian con­ trol of the military has resulted in the Department of Defense and Security be­ coming effectively equivalent to the consolidated armed forces' staff and command structure.
Extent o f Military Penetration
Active and retired military karyawan now occupy half the positions in the Indo­ nesian higher central bureaucracy.
--A t the highest levels, military penetration remains near complete (the President and his principal immediate aides) or has increased (Coordinating Ministers) over the course of the New Order regime (1966 to the present).
--Shifts to historical high points of military penetration occurred in the two top Departmental positions (Ministers and particularly Secretaries-General), a pattern reinforced by an increase in military Inspectors-General attached to each Depart­ ment.
* The views expressed here are solely the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the US International Communication Agency or government of the United States.
89

90
--Civilians maintained clear numerical edges only in positions with the most spe­ cialized functions (Ministers of State and Directors-General), but in both such instances work under mainly military supervisors.
--There is no practical evidence suggesting an effort to "recivilianize" even grad­ ually those slots now held by military karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy.
Structuring Military Domination
Military karyawan, in concert with supportive civilian karyawan colleagues, dominate the affairs of every Cabinet Department.
--The most crucial Departments for ensuring regime maintenance, Defense and Security and Home Affairs, are under the most solid military control (100 percent and 89 percent of their leading positions, respectively).
--Over the duration of the New Order, the armed forces have never held less than 90 percent of the leading positions in the Department of Defense and Security.
--Internal armed forces personnel and organizational changes in 1965-66, 1969-70, 1974-75, and 1978-81 increasingly concentrated power centrally in the Army, the Defense Ministry in Jakarta, and the person of the Defense Minister himself.
--Military penetration of the Department of Home Affairs has risen more steadily and markedly over the course of the New Order than in any other Department (from 29 percent of the leading positions in 1966, to 71 percent in 1971, and 89 percent currently).
--Greater military penetration of particular Departments (Information, Social Affairs, Religion, Foreign Affairs, and Justice) has proceeded alongside the in­ crease in military incumbency for specific categories of office. In two other De­ partments (Communications, Manpower and Transmigration) military penetration continued at high levels throughout the New Order.
--There is no Department in which the military is not suitably placed, through filling the Secretary-General or Inspector-General slots or more usually both, to control and remain apprised of the full range of Departmental activities. Direct Presidential involvement in Departmental affairs serves to maintain these capa­ bilities .
--The topmost civilian technocrats and career civil servants, whose tenure de­ pends on their maintaining the trust of military patrons, are at least as active public proponents of government policies as the military karyawan.
--Save only in two cases, all civilians of Ministerial rank have one or more ex­ plicit military credentials or linkages which enhance their attractiveness to, or ability to work with, their military colleagues.
Military Karyawan Role Enhancement
Once disparaged by senior officers, karyawan assignments now carry increased rank and prestige.
--Disparagement of karyawan assignments by military officers has decreased as the perceived importance of controlling the central bureaucracy and its actual penetration by the military has increased.
--Wide public visibility and the impeccable military credentials of many serving military karyawan have also worked to elevate the prestige accorded the role by older and younger officers alike.

91
--The attractiveness and power of the military karyawan role has been yet fur­ ther enhanced because the Army, the most prestigious service, occupies the great bulk (81 percent) of military karyawan positions.
--Finally, the military karyawan has grown in officer esteem because the military ranks of those holding these positions have sharply escalated (from mainly Lieu­ tenant-Colonels or Colonels to Major-Generals in the case of the Army) over the course of the New Order.
Generational Power Monopoly
The 1945 Generation, those who successfully waged armed struggle in the Indo­ nesian Revolution, retains a near monopoly of military karyawan slots in the higher central bureaucracy and intends to hold this power base for at least the next five years.
--This solid control by the 1945 Generation persists despite the fact that all those military karyawan born by 1925 (61 percent of the total) have now been retired from active duty status.
--The Ministry of Defense and Security maintains effective control of retired military karyawan by holding military rank promotion exercises for them and mandating their membership in a military retirees association, through which loyalty to the armed forces is reinforced. Retired military karyawan also remain embedded in long-term webs of patron-client and close friendship networks, mainly composed of fellow officers.
--The determination of President Suharto and the readiness of the 1945 Genera­ tion to continue in karyawan roles make chances of a voluntary generational suc­ cession within military karyawan ranks remote over the next five years.
--There is not yet a single graduate of the new military academy at Magelang filling a karyawan position in the higher central bureaucracy.
The Successor Generation Crisis
The 1945 Generation faction loyal to President Suharto evidently intends to re­ tain its dominance in the higher central bureaucracy to preside over a smooth trans­ fer of leadership to Young Generation officers in the Army staff and command struc­ ture. This formula for generational succession is unlikely to succeed.
--The 1945 Generation Army leadership (from all current factions) has given assurances to the Young Generation Army officers that an intra-Army intergenerational power transfer will be substantially accomplished in 1983. Defense and Security Minister General Yusuf has on many public occasions promised Young Generation officers this change of generations within the Army will occur.
--T he formula for regime maintenance thus seems to be that for some indetermi­ nate period of time there will be a sharp and unprecedented cleavage between two major military power centers, the 1945 Generation military karyawan control­ ling politics and the Young Generation officers in the staff and command struc­ ture controlling the guns.
--It is far from clear that the Young Generation Army officers will accede to their subordinate political role in this emerging new-model New Order.
--No justification exists in Army doctrine for such generational stratification in the carrying out of the political aspects of the armed forces' dual civil and mili­ tary function.

92

--It is likely that Young Generation Army officers will therefore increasingly probe privately and publicly the operational meaning of the armed forces' dual function in a changing Indonesia.
--Several important retired 1945 Generation factions already critical of the Suhar­ to faction's implementation of the dual function include widely respected officers who have influenced the Young Generation intellectually during their professional military education.
--Successful generational successions in political leadership in Malaysia and Singapore are also likely to heighten Young Generation Army officers' concerns that the means for a comparable transition in Indonesia has not yet been fully worked out.
Introduction
In this article I will assess the scope, patterns, and implications for regime maintenance of penetration of Indonesia's higher central bureaucracy by the coun­ try's dominant military faction. That bureaucracy is defined here as the incumbent Third Development Cabinet (Kabinet Pembangunan III) and the topmost echelon of officials in its component Departments.1 Any civilian or military officeholder in the higher bureaucracy is referred to as a karyawan, essentially an honorific equiva­ lent of "functionary."2
This particular group of military karyawan, active duty and retired officers in top civilian bureaucratic assignments, comprise an increasingly visible, influential, and strategic segment of the broader military elite, particularly in the context of the vital regime maintenance issue of generational succession within ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia Armed F o rce s ).3 Other major military elite segments, such as other karyawan long active in the public and private sectors of the economy or active-duty flag- and field-grade officers within

1. Appendix A contains a full list of offices and their civilian and military incum­

bents in the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy. Positions in what are officially

labeled Higher State Institutions (Lembaga Tertinggi/Tinggi Negara) and Non-

Departmental Government Boards (Lembaga Pemerintah Non Departmen), vary

greatly in potential influence and fall outside such positions ought to be included in a more

the focus complete

of this study o

farmtiicliltea.ryHkoawryeavwera,n

.

A list of civilian and military incumbents in leading roles in these additional bodies

appears for reference purposes in Appendix B. About half these incumbents, as in

the higher central bureaucracy, are military karyawan.

e2m. bTrahceeselaanstyic"wcooirnkeedr"teirnmakcairvyilaiawnan(,s

iapsil

)uspeodsiitniotnh,e

broadest sense governmental or

by the military, nongovernmen­

tal. However, karyawan most often denotes higher-status government officials,

whether civilian or military.

3. Includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. Some recent sentiment for separating the Police from ABRI and restoring their civilian role (lost since 1961) has been voiced by parliamentarians of both opposition parties. However, the Police internal security role is thoroughly integrated with that of the Army and govern­ ment intelligence agencies. Reaction from pro-government parliamentarians and from the National Police Chief was therefore predictably negative. Still, the Police,
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93

the general and separate services’ staff and command structures, are treated here only when they overlap with the karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy.
Full-dress studies of the Indonesian military are remarkably few, usually his­ torical, sometimes overly general, and occasionally ideologically laden.4 Opportuni­ ties for sustained, direct, scholarly access to Indonesia's military establishment are controlled and pose real limits in outsiders' ability to answer some basic questions. Particularly relevant here is the unavailability of any official Indonesian roster of military karyawan.
However, it is also the case that a very large amount and considerable variety of pertinent public source materials have simply not been fully exploited or even examined.5 Findings reported here, derived from both these primary data and re­ liable secondary sources, are current as of mid-December 1981. The new (p ost-1972) spelling system is used throughout for all Indonesian words, including personal names.6
The Higher Central Bureaucracy
For analytic purposes, the higher central bureaucracy here encompasses the Development Cabinet and its top Departmental leadership. Specific offices included are
• the Presidency (Kepresidenan)--the President and Vice-President,
• the State Secretariat (Sekretariat Negara)--eight key aides supporting the Presidency,7

4. Appendix D contains a list of the more important of these studies written in

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osef eA Us ialfn
different

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wealth of explicit materials on the military appearing daily in them. General and specialized biographic directories and rosters also remain unexploited. Since this last category of resources has been employed extensively in this article, a list of the more useful compilations appears in Appendix C. Most of the limited number of major monograph-length studies on the Indonesian military are cited in Appendix D .
6. Personal names appear in the new spelling ( ejaan ya ng disem purnakan) even
when the individual involved uses the old spelling or some mix of old and new. This facilitates accurate pronunciation of names by readers not familiar with the large number of persons involved. Indonesian newspapers frequently spell a given individual's name in several ways. Consequently, readers needing reliable guides to personally preferred spelling of names should consult the Jakarta telephone directory and official government publications.

7. Effectively, this means supporting President Suharto. Vice-President Malik re­ lies mainly on his own personal staff selected by the Secretariat. The Head (Kepala)

94
• three senior Coordinating Ministers (Menteri Koordinator), each at least nominally responsible for oversight of several Cabinet Departments,
• three Ministers of State (Menteri Negara) assigned special functions, 8 • seventeen Ministers (Menteri), heads of the Cabinet Departments proper, • six Junior Ministers (Menteri Muda) handling specific programs, 9 • eighteen Secretary-General (Sekretaris Jenderal) level persons, usually
the top civil servant in a Department, • seventeen Inspectors-General (Inspektur Jenderal) empowered to inquire
into any matter within their respective departments, • seventy-one Directors-General (Direktur Jenderal) , numbers varying
among Departments, subordinate to their respective Secretaries-General. The idealized formal, as opposed to the actual informal, lines of authority in this hierarchy of positions (for any given Department) appears below. Such o r­ ganization charts for the higher central bureaucracy are sparse and inconsistent. The relationships shown are therefore indicative rather than definitive.
FORMAL LINES OF AUTHORITY IN THE HIGHER CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY
General
I
DirectorGeneral
of the Presidential Household (Rumah Tangga Kepresidenan), while an aide, does not have Secretary (Sekretaris) rank and is excluded from consideration. 8. State Secretary Sudharmono also has the personal rank of Minister of State, but because he functions as the paramount Presidential aide in the State Secretariat, is counted only in that category. 9. Five under Cabinet Ministers and one (Women's Affairs) under a Coordinating Minister (People's Welfare).

95
While it is difficult to be precise, informally power is concentrated in the Presi­ dent, with the State Secretary (Sekretaris Negara) acting very effectively as the principal screen. Generally, the Coordinating Minister for Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs (and indirectly through him, his long-time economist Minis­ terial colleagues) and the Department Ministers under the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (and that Minister himself to a lesser degree) are best able to gain the cooperation of State Secretariat gatekeepers for direct access to the President.
The Commander of Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Command for the Restoration of Security and O rder), as head of the principal state intelligence body with operational responsibilities, has unique Presidential access, even though he is nominally under the Minister o f Defense. Similarly, other lesser officials may sometimes wield more power than formal superiors because of personal ties to leading figures in and out of government. However, all the positions in the higher central bureaucracy are power centers of some significance. Virtually all incumbents, including Directors-General, appear regularly and prominently in the press, most often in roles of decision makers or implementers of decisions of those above them in the bureaucratic hierarchy.
Coordinating Ministers by one or another name10 have been present in Indone­ sian Cabinets since 1959. During President Sukarno's Guided Democracy and Presi­ dent Suharto's early New Order, such persons were both more numerous and more powerful than in the current Third Development Cabinet. As the total number of portfolios in Cabinets declined, so did first the number and then the power of Coor­ dinating Ministers. Generally, increased power for Department Ministers has meant decreased power for Coordinating Ministers. Today's three Coordinating Ministers do not appear in the press as frequently as the Department Ministers they oversee.
Political and Security Affairs Coordinating Minister Panggabean and Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs Coordinating Minister Wijoyo are able to exert in­ fluence when necessary,due to their having the confidence and ear of the President. People's Welfare Coordinating Minister Surono enjoys neither, and has accordingly played in public the figurehead role designed for him. Panggabean covers the im­ portant "security" Departments, Wijoyo all the "development" ones (plus Communi­ cations), and Surono the lesser "social" domains.11
Among the Departments, Hankam (Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Depart­ ment of Defense and Security) differs in two major respects from all others. First, it is literally wholly controlled by the military. Second, it has neither a SecretaryGeneral nor any Directors-General.
Military control of Hankam has its roots in the so-called 17 October 1952 Affair, a failed coup d'etat led by General Nasution and his military modernizers but con­ founded by Sukarno's resistance. Subsequently, civilian politicians were able to replace with ease key figures in a sharply divided Army. By 1955, both "pro 17 October" and "anti 17 October" military had become convinced such "civilian inter-
10. "Core Ministers" in the July 1959 Work Cabinet (Kabinet Kerja), "Deputy First Ministers" in the March 1962 Work Cabinet, and "Chief Ministers" in the July 1966 Ampera (Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat, Message of the People's Suffering) Cabinet.
11. This hardly means the "social" Departments are inconsequential. Indeed, three of these Departments--Religion, Manpower and Transmigration, and Educa­ tion and Culture--perform important political control functions over Muslim organi­ zations, the urban labor force, and university and secondary school students re­ spectively, each seen as potentially destabilizing forces by the regime.

96

ALLOTMENTS OF PORTFOLIOS TO COORDINATING MINISTERS IN THE THIRD DEVELOPMENT CABINET

(PGoelAintifecfraaalilrsaPnaMdnignSgiesactbeuerraitny) InEdcou(nsPotrmroiaifcel,sAsFfoifnaraiWrnscijiMoayli,on)iasntedr

P e o p(Glee'sn eWraellfaSrueroMnion)is te r

Home Affairs Foreign Affairs
Defense and Security Justice Information

Finance Trade and Cooperatives Agriculture
Industry Mining and Energy
Public Works Communications

Education and Culture Health Religion Social Affairs Manpower and Transmigration

ference" could only be halted if the Defense Minister was a military man selected in accordance with seniority principles. This demand was formalized in what is now known as the "Yogya Charter." Since 1959, the Defense Minister has "by tradition" been military. Under Suharto's New Order, ABRI's now doctrinal rejec­ tion of "civilian control of the military" has reached the point where Hankam is for all practical purposes equivalent to the consolidated ABRI staff and command struc­ ture.
The Hankam Minister doubles as Commander (Panglima) of ABRI. Immediately under him are two closely related positions: Deputy Commander (Wakil Panglima) of ABRI/Commander of Kopkamtib and Chief-of-Staff (Kepala Staf) of Kopkamtib. These two positions were equated to those of Secretary-General in other Depart­ ments. One step down in Hankam's precedence order are seven positions with Chief-of-Staff rank (distinct from the autonomous Kopkamtib apparatus). Strictly from an organizational point of view, their rank is similar to that of DirectorsGeneral in other Departments. Three of these positions are the top military staff slots, Chiefs-of-Staff for Operations, Administration, and Functional Affairs. The remaining four are Chiefs-of-Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the National Police Chief.
Extent of M ilitary Penetration
Active and retired military officers now occupy half (50 percent) of the 145 posi­ tions in the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy.12 Specifically, these military karyawan include
12. The Indonesian government does not publish for public consumption a list of its officials containing any military ranks they may have. Consequently, this and
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karta Kodam V Jaya (Jayakarta Welfare Foundation of Military Area Command V, Greater Jakarta). Nine national daily newspapers were then used to verify this list and ascertain changes in incumbents. This yielded a list of 145 incumbents, 144 known to be current and one the last known. Each name on this list was then checked for military or civilian status by using an alphabetic file of public military biographies put together mainly from the sources cited in Appendix C . The final list complete with current military ranks of incumbents is given in Appendix A.

97

• the President (a retired four-star General),
• seven of his eight principal aides (8 8 percent) in the State Secretariat,1314
• two of the three Coordinating Ministers (Political and Security Affairs, People’ s Welfare, both retired four-star Generals),
• eight of seventeen Department Ministers (47 percent),
• two of six Junior Ministers (33 percent),
• sixteen of eighteen Secretary-General level slots (89 percent),
• eleven of seventeen Inspector-Generalships (65 percent),
• twenty-five of seventy-one Director-General level posts (35 percent).
In addition, the Head and Deputy Head of Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, State Intelligence Coordinating B ody), responsible for internal security estimates, are military (General Yoga Sugama and Lieutenant-General L. Benny Murdani, respectively). Bakin does not usually appear in official lists of government officeslit but maintains an extensive network and reports directly to the President.15
Trends
How does this level of penetration compare with earlier periods in the New Or­ der? Some reliable reference points are tallies made by Crouch for 1966,16Emmerson

Conceivably, a very few military figures may not have been identified as such, and even fewer civilians may have been categorized as military. Any such errors should not materially change any of the conclusions drawn here, but the author would appreciate knowing of any suspected misclassifications.

13. Sometimes this group is collectively referred to loosely as "the palace," so named because of their ready access to President Suharto, whose ceremonial head­ quarters is Istana Merdeka (Independence Palace).
14. These two top Bakin officials are not counted in the higher central bureaucracy,
as defined here.

15. General Yoga has been Head of Bakin since 1974 and remains in this position

despite his retirement from active duty in mid-1981. He was simultaneously Chief-

of-Staff of Kopkamtib from mid-1978 through the end of 1980. Lieutenant-General

Murdani, despite his low public profile one of the most important figures in the re­

gime, is not only Deputy Head of Bakin but also Assistant for Intelligence (Asintel)

and Head of the Strategic Intelligence Center (Kapusintelstrat) in Hankam (both

positions technically under the Chief-of-Staff for Operations). He is also a Suharto

confidant on par with Information Minister Lieutenant-General Ali Murtopo and In­

spector-General for Development Major-General Sujono Humardani. Together with

them, he is a major patron of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

one of the few persistently influential think-tanks in Indonesia. With Defense Min­

ister General Yusuf, he has been intimately involved East Timor. For more details, see Hamish McDonald,

wS iuthhamrtoan'sagInindgontehseiaco(nBflliacctki­n

burn [Australia]: Fontana Books, 1980).

16. Harold Crouch, The A rm y and P olitics PB reersses,nja1t9a78li)s, tpipn.clu24d1in-4g2.milHitiasryfigsutaretussaerse.

in Indonesia
based on an

A(Iutghuascta:8,C1o9r6n6elAl nUgnkiavtearnsity

98

for 1967,17 and MacDougall for July 1971.18 These are the principal trends.
• The President remains military (from 1967 o n ), the Vice-President civilian (from 1973).1920
• The President's principal aides remain overwhelmingly military (all 8 in 1971, 7 of 8 in 1981).
• Earlier counterparts of today's Coordinating Ministers were less likely to be military (1 of 5 in 1966, 0 of 3 in 1971, 2 of 3 in 1981).
• Ministers of State, with their specialized responsibilities, continued to be wholly civilian (1971 and now).
• Department Ministers were 44 percent military at the beginning of the New Order in 1966-67 and in July 1971, dropped to 22 percent military in the new Cabinet appointed in September of that year, 0 but now stand at an all-time high of 47 percent military.21*
• Military-held Secretary-Generalships stood at 55 percent in 1966-67, dropped to 41 percent in 1971, but have dramatically increased to 89 percent today.
• Inspector-Generalships declined slightly from 73 percent military in 1971 (when only 11 Departments had them) to 65 percent now (when all do). Over this same time period, however, the absolute number of military Inspectors-General increased from 8 to 11.
• Director-Generalships seem to have been held at constant levels of military incumbency over the course of the New Order (36 percent in 1966, 36 per­ cent in 1971, 35 percent in 1981).
At the highest levels, military penetration has remained near complete (the President and his principal immediate aides) or increased (Coordinating Ministers). Cyclic shifts to historical high points of military penetration have occurred in the two top Departmental offices (Ministers and particularly Secretaries-General), a pattern reinforced by an increase in military Inspectors-General in the upswing phase of the cycle. Civilians managed to maintain decisive numerical edges only

17. Donald Strength,"

inK.PEomlitimcaerl sPono,w

e"Tr hane

dBCuoremamucurnaiccaytioinn

PinoliItnidcaoln eCsoinat, exetd:.

Weakness in Karl Jackson

and Lucian Pye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 100-103.

His 1967 figures are based on informed persons' knowledge of whether an incum­

bent was military or civilian.

W18h.o

iTnalI lnidedo nferosmia

a list including military ranks in O. G. Roeder, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), pp. 521-28.

compiler,

Who's

19. Sukarno remained titular President in the Cabinet formed in July 1966. Su­ harto became Acting President in March 1967 and President in March 1968. The Vice-Presidency was vacant from 1956 until March 1973.

20. A consequence of the July 1971 elections in which the government-backed Gol­
kar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) obtained 63 percent of the recorded popu­ lar vote.

21. This exceeds the figure for any Cabinet during Sukarno's Presidency, even

those from the Guided Democracy period of 1959-65. Based on Emmerson's tallies

d1e9r4i5v-e1d965fro(mIthSaucsaa: nCFoirnncehll

and Daniel Lev, compilers, Modern Indonesia Project,

Republic
1965).

of

Indonesia

Cabinets

99

in positions with the most differentiated functions (Ministers of State and DirectorsGeneral) although in both instances worked under mainly military superiors.
There is as yet no practical evidence of any effort to "re-civilianize" even grad­ ually military karyawan slots in the higher central bureaucracy. Such a reversal of the historic trend would seriously upset the many dependent clients of serving mili­ tary karyawan. However, occasional statements by military spokesmen refer to ABRI's need only to guard "the strategic points" in the administration of the country.
Structuring Military Domination
For regime maintenance it is more critical that the military control certain De­ partments than others. One indicator of how President Suharto and his closest colleagues assess this matter is the proportion of top slots, from Coordinating Min­ ister down to Directors-General, filled by military officers. Using this gauge, the most crucial Departments are now Hankam (100 percent of its leading positions occupied by the military) and Home Affairs (89 percent).
Effective total military control of Hankam has its motivational origins in the united ABRI determination that never again should civilians be placed in positions whereby they could create disunity within or among the several armed services. Indeed, examination of Hankam rosters for 1966, 1971, and 1981 shows that ABRI has never held less than 90 percent of that Department's top slots.22 Moreover, these figures conceal unprecedented major organizational consolidation of the mili­ tary staff and command structure over the course of the New Order.
This prolonged process of concentrating power at the center began simply with the reshuffling, dismissal, detention, or killing of military officers considered un­ reliable in the purges and battles following the murders of six Army generals on the night of September 30, 1965 (officially labeled the 30 September Movement, Gerakan September Tigapuluh, with the deliberately sinister acronym Gestapu). Centralization advanced more sharply between November 1969 and April 1970 when service heads were downgraded from Ministerial rank to Chiefs-of-Staff (Chief for the Police) and lost operational control over their respective forces. Their staffs were shifted to Hankam. A revised system o f Regional Defense Commands (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan, Kowilhan) integrating services in the field together with re­ moval of "native sons" from top command roles outside Java effectively ended any recurrent threat of "warlordism." All these changes also worked to institutionalize Army dominance over the other services.23
Another centralization exercise during 1974 and 1975 followed the anti-Japanese, anti-government riots of January 1974 with their related intra-Army intrigues (offi­ cially, the 15 January Calamity, Malapetaka 15 Januari, Malari). This shifted major staff and specialized agencies from Kopkamtib, seen as having abused power in anti-regime power plays, to clear Ministerial control under a rationalized system of

22. Based on the same sources as in the "Trends" section, except that, since

Crouch provides no breakdowns by Department, tallies had to be made from a raw

list of July 1966 positions Change: Four Indonesian

C(tahbeinAemtspSerinacCe aObcintoebt)erfo1u,n1d9i6n5,E" dIintdoorsn,es"Ciao, n2tin(Ouicttyobaenrd

1966). Positions in 1966 and 1971 subsequently consolidated were coded under

their 1981 counterparts. Chief Ministers (1966) and certain State Ministers (1971)

were equated with counterpart Coordinating Ministers (1981).

23. the

For details, see Reorganization o

fE1d9i6to9r-s7,0,""CIunrdroennetsDiaa, ta10on(OtchteobInerdo1n9e7s0ia),n

Military Elite pp. 195-208.

after

100

functionally ordered Chiefs-of-Staff and their principal Assistants (the current organizational format). 21t

Particularly after General Yusuf’ s appointment as Minister in 1978, still more

power flowed to the center as a consequence of the need to deal with unanticipated

protracted resistance in East Timor, increased outlays for arms and equipment

modernization, sioned officers

l(obningt-adreala) yaenddimenplriostveedmemnetns

(itnamcotanmdiat)io,nasdohferseenrcveiceto

for non-commis­ plans for retir­

ing senior officers at age 55, and carefully calculated promotions for some younger

ones.

While ABRI's struggle for ascendancy in Hankam began late in the period of Parliamentary Democracy (1949-57), its pursuit o f dominance in Home Affairs is of more recent vintage. In no other Department has military penetration increased so
steadily and markedly over the course of the New Order (29 percent of top slots in 1966, 71 percent in 1971, 89 percent in 1981). ABRI’ s doctrine of a guerrilla-based
territorial defense, official state policy from December 1960, already inclined it to exert influence in areas within the domain of Home Affairs (as well as other Depart­ ments outside Hankam).

But the Second Army Seminar in August 1966 yielded a revised doctrine, justi­ fying a considerably expanded non-military role for ABRI in deciding almost all na­ tional issu es.245 Within Home Affairs, ABRI’ s presence grew, along with doctrinally sanctified felt needs to control or oversee the governmental apparatus from provin­ cial down to village le v e l,26 to assure positive outcomes in periodic electoral exer­
cis e s ,27 and to advance regional development projects on which the regime's legiti­ macy came increasingly to rest. 28

I2n4d.onFeosriad,et1a8il(sO, csteoebeErd1it9o7r4s),,

"Current Data pp. 153-67.

on

the

Indonesian

Military

Elite,"

25. See particularly Chapter 4, "Indonesian Military Literature," in Harold May­ nard, "A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philip­ pines" (Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1976).

26. Through such military-dominated joint civilian-military institutions as the re­ gional parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People's Represen­ tative Council) and consultative forums (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Regional Leadership Deliberation). For a thorough fleshing out of how the Home Affairs' control system works, see Ronald Grant, "Administration in the Province of West Java: Patterns of Integration and Problems of Coordination" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1976).

27. Again through military-controlled institutions, including particularly the polit­ ical party-surrogate Golkar, and the mandatory membership of Korpri (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Corps of Officials of the Republic of Indonesia). The two most extended treatments of such corporatist trends in Indonesia are David Reeve, "An Alternative to the Party System in Indonesia: An Historical Evaluation of the Functional Group Concept" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sydney, 1977) and Dwight King, "Social Mobilization, Associational Life, Interest Mediation, and Polit­ ical Cleavage in Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978).

28. This aim involves the cooperation of technocrats (mainly economists), who,

with local

tChheinmeisleitafirnyaanncdiercsen(tcruakl obnugr)eaauncdrafocrye, igfonrminvtheestocursrraenndt

ruling "triarchy," with experts in supporting

roles. The most complete and balanced treatment of the technocrats is "Technocrats

as Modernizers: The Economists of Indonesia's New Order," a 1975 University of

101

Among the remaining Departments, the most direct high-level military participa­ tion occurs in Information, Social Affairs, Communications, Religion, Foreign A f­ fairs, Justice, and Manpower and Transmigration. Excepting only Communications and Manpower--where military penetration has remained at relatively high levels (between 40 percent and 82 percent) throughout the New Order--these Departments are also the only ones registering marked increases to high levels o f such involve­ ment from 1966 to now.

Thus, besides a rise in military occupancy of certain categories of office in the higher central bureaucracy, there has occurred an accompanying military penetra­ tion of many particular programmatic sectors of government. The quantum leaps apparently occurred after the intra-regime power struggle peaking visibly in the January 1974 riots (Malari). In retrospect, Malari marks the watershed of the Suharto 1945 Generation faction's internal consolidation and consequent broad sei­ zure of the higher central bureaucracy.

There is no Department--even those overseen by the one civilian Coordinating Minister--in which the military is not suitably placed to control and remain apprised of its full range of activities. In nine of seventeen Departments, the SecretaryGeneral and Inspector-General positions are both held by military officers. In the other eight Departments, one or the other of these posts is held by a military man.
(See the table on the next page.) In addition, Department Ministers periodically report to the President, much more typically one by one rather than in a limited or full Cabinet setting. Many of these meetings result in a press conference in which the Minister merely announces the Presidential imprimatur on a heretofore unre­ vealed Departmental decision or passes on a Presidential instruction he has received.

Generally, the higher central bureaucracy has become rationalized, energized,

and more coercive in pursuing the goals of the New Order. 29 In their own posi­

tions, civilian technocrats and career bureaucrats are at least as active public pro­

ponents of government policies as the military karyawan. Almost all of these civil­

ians hold their positions because they, just as the military karyawan, have in the

past earned the trust of President Suharto or some other high-level military patron.

If the current University of Indonesia Faculty of Economics team of leading techno­

crats has groomed successors, they are not yet numerous at these highest levels of

the central bureaucracy. an opposition party. All

Moreover, none of these formally give sole loyalty

(cmivoilniaonloybaulriteaasu) ctroattshebegloovnegrsnt­o

ment-backed party-surrogate Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups). No

Department is any longer a fief of a particular party, such as Religion once was

for the Nahdatul Ulama30 and Information for the Partai Nasional Indonesia.31

Michigan dissertation by John James MacDougall (a namesake not otherwise related to the present article's author, John A. MacDougall).

29. This global conclusion, originally drawn by Donald Emmerson in the mid-1970s,

is amply confirmed today by recurrent editorials in the Indonesian press explicitly

noting the striking power and intrusiveness of the central bureaucracy. Consistent

with such patterns, about 62 percent of Golkar's candidates for the May 1982 parlia­

mt(iIonenndstoanrreeyspi(oaDrntPeORd ,lbysDeceorwmvaeenr ,fPrNoemrowvetahmkeiblaegrnov4Re,rank1m9y8ae1tn,)t.

People's Representative Council) elec­ bureaucracy and 16 percent from ABRI. Indeed, the regime has been called a

"bureaucratic polity" (Karl Jackson) and a "bureaucratic dictatorship" (Heri

Akhmadi).

30. The conservative Muslim Scholars party, now "fused" with three other smaller Muslim parties in the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Development Unity Party) .

102

DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN INCUMBENTS IN THE HIGHER CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY*

Department

Position

Percentage Coordinating Department Junior Secretary- Inspector- Directors-

Military

Ministert Minister Minister$ General General General

Home Affairs Foreign Affairs Defense and Security Justice Information Finance Trade and Cooperatives Agriculture Industry Mining and Energy Public Works Communications Education Health Religion Social Affairs Manpower and Transmigration

89 50 100 50 57 30 38 40 38 14 12 56 44 38 56 57 50

M M M M M C C
c c c c c
M M M M M

M - M M 4M, 1C

C - M M 1M, 3C
M 2M M 7M

M - M C 1M, 3C

M - M M 3C

C

-C

M 2M, 4C

C M M M 3C

c CM

M 2M, 3C

c c c

- M M 1M, 3C

-C

M 3C

c C M 3C

cM

-M

C 3M, 2C

MM

C 1M, 3C

cM - M

4C

cM - M

2M, 3C

M - M M 3C

C

CM

M 1M, 2C

* For a listing of the Departmental Ministers and Senior Civil Servants in these Departments, see Appendix A. f M stands for military, C for civilian incumbent. $ Indicated for those Departments that have a Junior Minister.

103
Except for Agriculture Minister Sudarsono and Junior Minister for Women's Affairs Lasiyah, every civilian Minister has one or more explicit military credential or linkages which could enhance his attractiveness to, or ability to work with, mili­ tary colleagues. These include:
• claimed military service during the 1945-1949 Revolution (at least Wijoyo, Sumarlin, Salim, Radius, Subroto, Suhud, Harun Zain, Daud Yusuf, Affandi, Martono) and afterward (Radius, Suhud);
• lecturing at the Army Staff and Command School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, Seskoad), National Defense Institute (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, Lemhanas), other military schools, and/or participation in the key Second (1966) or Third (1972) Army Seminars (at least Wijoyo, Salim, Wardhana, Subroto, Purnomosidi, Mochtar);
• involvement in planning or executing a major military campaign (Subroto);
• supervision of local manufacture of arms and military equipment (Habibie);
• service on the Hankam staff (A ffandi);
• previous leadership in military-related or supported organizations (Martono, Batubara).
Military Karyawan Role Enhancement
Karyawan positions, even in the higher central bureaucracy, have not tradi­ tionally been regarded as choice assignments by Indonesian military officers. Com­ mand duty, tied to now venerated or romanticized memories of the Revolution against Dutch colonialism, suppression of nation-destroying regional rebellions, and assaults crushing repeated communist treachery, was seen as embodying most closely ABRI's heroic mission. The apparent loss of the "idealism of struggle" is now often bruited about in press interviews with senior officers. Indeed, the only remaining "battle­ field" today is East Timor and the last previous one (under Sukarno) was Malaysia, episodes which the intensely nationalistic ABRI leadership, as well as junior officers, find easier to equate with recent national disarray than past national glory.
Earlier disparagement of the karyawan role has also decreased as the perceived importance of controlling the government bureaucracy and its actual penetration by the military has increased. Wide public visibility through the mass media and the impeccable military credentials of many incumbents have also worked to enhance the prestige accorded the karyawan role by both younger and older military officers. Assignment and promotion committees within the Hankam increasingly understand that certain officers are particularly suited by administrative and technical talents or temperament for karya rather than military staff and command positions. A minority of officers may even aspire to certain karyawan positions regarded as "wet," offering opportunities for personal or institutional graft. General Yusuf has warned senior officers publicly that ABRI should not be used as a steppingstone to prestigious karya slots.
The most prestigious service within ABRI is the Army, and it is the Army which holds four-fifths (81 percent) of military karyawan posts in the higher central bu­ reaucracy. Moreover, these Army karyawan are almost all high (flag-grade) com­
31. The Indonesian National Party, now "fused" with two other "nationalist" and two "non-Muslim religious" parties in the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indone­ sian Democracy P arty).

104

missioned officers (perwira) . Twelve percent are four-star Generals, 22 percent Lieutenant-Generals, 52 percent Major-Generals, and 10 percent Brigadiers. The remainder (two officers) are Colonels. In the other services, the distribution is even more skewed toward the higher ranks. Eighty-three percent of Navy karyawan are Admirals or Vice-Admirals, 72 percent of Air Force karyawan Marshals or Vice-Marshals, and the sole Police representative a General.
Further, the average rank of military karyawan has clearly escalated from available 1966 and 1971 benchmarks. At the beginning of the New Order, a plural­ ity (44 percent) of Army karyawan were only Colonels or Lieutenant-Colonels, whereas now the single most frequent rank is Major-General (52 percent). Younger officers can readily follow in the press periodic promotions in military rank among serving karyawan. These various shifts clearly have enhanced the clout of military karyawan in their respective Departments.
Generational Power Monopoly
The Generation of 1945 (Angkatan 45), participants in the Revolution, retains a near monopoly on military karyawan positions in the higher central bureaucracy. Most (61 percent) of these karyawan were born by 1925 (making them at least twen­ ty years old in 1945) and all but two of the remainder by 1930. Only Cabinet Secre­ tary Brigadier General Murdiono and Junior Minister for Youth Affairs Air Major Abdul Gafur belong clearly to the Young Generation ( Generasi Muda) .
This solid control by the Generation of 1945 persists despite the fact that all those military karyawan born by 1925 have now been retired from active duty statu s.32 While some have received their karya appointments after or upon retire­ ment, more have simply retired in place. Even if these retired officers are no longer formally within some Hankam command chain, Hankam influence on them re­ mains heavy, quite apart from continuing influences by the webs of patron-client ( bapak-anak buah) and close friendship ( kawan akrab) ties in which they remain embedded.33 Hankam-run honorary promotion (in military rank) exercises are held for them even after retirement, most recently in September 1981.3“* The corporatist Association of Retired Members of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Pepabri), to which they belong, is controlled by regime loyalists.35 Pepabri enjoins them at its annual

32. The sole apparent exception is Lieutenant-General Kharis Suhud, the important

Functional Affairs Chief-of-Staff in Hankam responsible for making military karya

assignments.

33. B ap ak-an ak buah ties are vertical patronage relationships among unequals.

While difficult to ascertain, their importance among the Indonesian military has long

been conceded. Kawan akrab ties are horizontal cooperative relationships among

peers. No one has systematically investigated the role these play among the Indo­

nesian military. Unless one posits marked cultural discontinuities between the pre­

dominantly Javanese military and their technocrat colleagues, these intimate friend­

ship bonds should be significant among the military as well (perhaps especially so

among retired military, military karyawan, and graduates of the military academy

in Magelang) . For the seminal article on kawan akrab ties among the technocrats

(with some military examples as well),
Tgeiens TaontddTehTeiaraPl-,oliLtiacnadl -O, regnanVizoaltkieonnkaul

nsFedueen,Jcot1ih3on7n,sJ:a1mT(1hes9e8MC1aa),csDepopouf.gIa6nl1ld,-8o"9nE.elsitiea,"FrBieinjddrsah-ip

34. For the complete list, see Indonesia Times, September 9, 1981.

35. Retired General Makmun Murod is the new General Chairman ( K etua Umum) .

He is a former Kostrad, Kostranas, and Kowilhan II Commander as well as ex-Army

105

n( paetijounaanlgc)onwghroe scasens

naenvderotbheersecpearreamtoendia(ld

oipcicsaashioknasn

to remain always ) from ABRI. 36

fighters

Given President Suharto's expressed desire to spend the rest of his life serv­

ing the people because there is nothing he wants to do more37 and the continuing

roef agdeinneersastioofnh(isa

tmih ilgiteanrye r aagsei)

cohort within

to perform karya duty, the phalanx of military

any voluntary change karyawan is remote

over the next five years. If such a generational succession among these karyawan

has even been planned, it is not a subject of general public discussion as is the

succession for active duty military in the staff and command stru ctu re.38

rasi

Ajetmmbaostat,n

coarresfcuhlalyk eslegleecnteedr a ot ifef)ic3e9rhsafvreombetehne

misnamed bridge seconded to some

generation ( gene­
of these karya

slots. These figures broadly encompass officers schooled at the wartime Akademi

Militer in Yogyakarta (classes of 1948 and 1949/50),90 the short-lived and contro­

versial Candradimuka Academy at Bandung (in 1951 and 1952),1*1 and a variety of

other shorter courses in Indonesia and abroad (mainly under General Nasution's

sponsorship between 1950 and 1960) before the Akademi Militer Nasional (AMN),

now known as Akabri (Akademi Militer Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia),

opened at Magelang (in 1957, with its first "fully professionally-trained" graduating

class in 1960).

There is not one Magelang graduate among the military karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy. If there is any ultimate intent to move Young Generation

Chief-of-Staff, sensitive positions all. Pepabri deliberately tolerates a few "here­

tics," such as tralizing them

ttohesoSmoelodaergisrteoec.raPt eLpiaeburtienaalsnot-pGuebnleisrhalesGPPHu rJnaatwikiruaswuamno,,

thereby neu­ a generally

tame journal for which ABRI retirees may write for those o f like status.

36. For recent examples of this emotional appeal, see A ng katan B e rse n ja ta , Sep­

tember 22, 1981.

37. A n ta ra , November 5, 1981. FBIS
November 10, 1981. The November 6,

D a ily
1981,

RKoemp oprats

Asia & P
reports

a cific, Vol. 4, No. 217,
Suharto's actual words

as the lead sentence of its lead story on page one: "Bagi saya tak ada lain, saya

hanya in gin menggunakan sisa-sisa hidup saya untuk mengabdi bagi kepentingan

rakyat." The statement, made to the third Congress o f the government-backed

KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian National Youth Committee),

usseaneitdmilshheSe uwdhiisaehrset.od'sItnointsederierrvsetecitn"Jgthalyev,annAaentsiteoanrwaaa1nsydEo fnthgselaisyshitnagsteehr,"veicnineotteqn"utdohsteestpoeSrouephmlaear"itno(

President
raask yhaavt)i,nghis

actual choice of word.

38. For example, Generasi: Alamiah

saetaeuthTeerheingchalynai?ll"umininMatuitniagraa,rtNicloe.

by Bondan Winarno, "Alih 252, September 30-October

13,

1981.

39. Misnamed because the concept is too often tied to officers' military education institution(s) rather than to age. As a consequence, many officers who self-iden­ tify as Generation of 1945 find themselves annoyingly categorized as "transitional" or "bridge," a less prestigious location.

40. Includes here Sabara (education interrupted), Yogi Supardi, and Atwar Nurhadi on the active list; and Urip Widodo, Sukoco, Pang Suparto, and Aswasmarmo, retired.

41. Includes here Worang, Panggabean, Surono, Ahmad Tahir, and Tirtosudiro, all retired.

106

officers into these karya jobs, it is difficult to understand why that process has not even begun. Suharto has instead facilitated moving retired officers of any age into these positions by an October 1981 regulation forming a military reserve.
The Successor Generation C risis

By maintaining dominance over the state apparatus via its military karyawan staffing patterns, the Generation of 1945 leadership loyal to President Suharto seeks to assure itself the political stability required for a smooth generational transfer of leadership positions elsewhere within the Army by sometime in 1983. What is entailed there is not simply a seeding of the Army staff and command struc­ ture with token representatives of the Young Generation but rather a wholesale intra-Army intergenerational power transfer.

The Generation of 1945 senior officers (from all current factions) made what amounts to a solemn contract to this effect in the Third Army Seminar in 1972.lf2 The consensual results of those cross-generational meetings were subsequently published and used as instructional materials in the various military educational institutions. Defense Minister General Yusuf has on many public occasions given assurances this power transfer will occur and should not be resisted, and other senior Army spokesmen have cautioned civilians neither to worry about nor meddle in the process.

The overall design thus eventually would entail two major power centers: the retired military karyawan of the 1945 Generation in the higher central bureaucracy
and the active duty Army staff and command structure of the Young Generation. For some indeterminate period of time the cleavage between the retired Army offi­ cers in control of politics and the active duty Army officers in control of the guns
would therefore be sharply drawn. The formula for regime maintenance would essentially be shifted from depoliticization to repoliticization.

It is not inconceivable that such an arrangement could remain stable, but its

longevity would be inherently limited by the aging and dying off of the 1945 Genera­

tion. Before relinquish on

tshcehne,d uitle sttrhaeintospcrHeadnuklaitmy

to think the posts it now

1945 Generation will so tightly grasps as

voluntarily levers

controlling the career fates of the Army's Young Generation. At year-end 1981

just four Magelang graduates--Brigadier-Generals Sugiarto, Edy Sudrajat, Tri Su-

trisno, and Sarwono--had been appointed Military Area ("Divisional") Commanders

42. This March 1972 seminar arose as a consequence of a Seskoad survey ostensi­

bly revealing marked difference in outlook between the then current class and the

1945 Generation leadership (only the Seskoad students were actually surveyed).

The seminar aimed to forge an inter-generational agreement on which of the values

of the 1945 Generation could be transferred as an inheritance to the Young Genera­

tion and on the mechanisms for achieving this end. A very abbreviated English

vNeurgsrioonhooNf tohtoissu"saagnrteoe,mTehnet"

T(raacntusafellryotfheVa1lu9e45s

Gi nent heeraItniodno nveesrisainonA or mnleyd)

Fiso rgcievse,n

in pub­

luPstieumsrnmahetseamsadnarrgaerbynsyPu,velHotHwliauniamnmgrkipseafuarmninona'msndICantHnhednaeoIsntnseielteresmPigfaeoirnnraruasmirAsi.ruamtsriaetTelndehpdiSuFsbDionmlrhidcicanielkryesmaotaHafvIiPasisntiulo/fsaodrabrykmlVeai:naIt,4Hi51oa.i9nmn7dp4bA.ueAtnacalTraenihdaneesgAtmmmoficniaavjnAoetarhptoe,patnrhiHasdeisimrsulaepevlnuoognlf­tahny

generational succession remains unanalyzed by outsiders. Extensive surveys of

1969-1978 Akabri graduates (all perwira) in 1978-79 and 1980-81 have distressed

ABRI's 1945 Generation is provided in "Sekolah

leadership once Tentara, Tidak

again. Kebal,"

ATegmlipmop, sMe aoyf

these survey 30, 1981, pp.

results 66-67.

107

(Pangdam) or their Chief-of-Staff (Kasdam). The change of generations within the Army clearly has been begun by General Yusuf but is not yet proceeding at a pace the Young Generation might have anticipated.

Even leaving aside other political forces in Indonesia, it is far from clear the

Army's Young Generation would accede to the formation, much less the temporary

institutionalization, of such a new model New Order. Essentially, the emerging

arrangement consigns the Young Generation military to a continuing secondary and

subordinate political role. Save perhaps for some adroit token appointments of

younger rewards

ionfftihceercsi,violn(lys

ipthile)

Young Generation would be

1sp9ide4re5fooGrfemnAieBnrgaRtIti'ohsnedmmuaiillliittfaaurrnyyctw(imoonuillidt(edrwre)iaspfiudtnehg.es

ti)op.

positional Only the

It is possible, but on the basis of present evidence unlikely, that the Suharto 1945 Generation faction actually now posits a pressing, near-future need to reduce significantly this cleavage. Should such a felt need develop, it may come too late for Suharto himself, and perhaps his faction generally, to reap the full benefits for regime perpetuation of moving toward construction of a network of interpersonal links across generational lines. At present, General Yusuf, by virtue of his pre­ siding (more intimately than Suharto) over assignments and promotions and his well-publicized prodigious travel to field commands, would appear to be the princi­ pal beneficiary of such interpersonal bonds as have been forged. It is implausible that approximately six thousand younger Army officers actually have, or personally see, their fates, orchestrated primarily by Suharto himself.

ABRI doctrine does not sanction generational stratification in the carrying out of its dual function. At minimum, the Young Generation could charge a deviation from a still valid core ABRI doctrine. But another more likely outcome would seem an increasingly active private and even public probing of the operational meaning
of ABRI's dual function in a changing Indonesia. It is likely this will mark the emergence at the national level of the Young Generation's more politically skilled
otkhfafairtcyeaprausnb.)licwTaahtsiiosinmpmoroficnaeesnssot.umnadyerbe( lespbuihrruetdu hb)y fGoremnuerlaatlioYnusouf fA'sBMRaI'rschciv1i9l82mdisesciolanra(tkioen-

Already several retired 1945 Generation ABRI factions have attacked the ruling 1945 Generation faction for expanding the civil side of the dual function far beyond what was originally envisaged. Past writing by widely respected current ABRI 1945 Generation "outs" has comprised major textual material in the professional mili­ tary education of the ABRI Young Generation. **3 Among others, retired General

43. The impact of the four-year academy course at Magelang for Army cadets

( taruna) is great. Cadets are effectively isolated from the surrounding civilian

AsoncgiektaytaanndB

esrusbejnejcatteadatnodroigthoreoruosffiincidaolctArBinRaItiponubalincdattioranisnianrge.

Discipline is staple reading

harsh. fare.

Cadets have better classrooms, accommodations, and food than in most non-military

educational institutions in Indonesia. When allowed to leave the campus for Mage­

lang, an old garrison town of the Dutch colonial army, they are discouraged from

eating at roadside stalls (in favor of the better restaurants) or using pedicabs (in

favor of motorized transport). They graduate with an expectation they will become

a ruling class and exhibit considerable self-confidence and esprit de corps. Besides

ScBboecrmihinteotgolafnrvro,sem,r"yI7An,dBdio3RsnpI(erJfsouaipalmoy'sr-ilStiiNeeospne.toae-tCmFeolobylreornJmiaa1ovlr9ae7An5dre)mse,eteap,diplas.Fb,oo1usr4ect-ee24s1v0,."aprBeioruucleslenittsinsoufoefnseCowofnAAckekaranbberrdii

cadets
aAnsdia nPeter

108

Nasution, considered influential among these post-Revolutionary officers, has widely published stinging critiques of the later New Order regime. ^
Indonesia's succession politics are not occurring in a regional vacuum. While politically aware officers remain Indonesia-centric in outlook, more attention is paid other ASEAN (Association o f Southeast Asian Nations) members than in past years. Many of Singapore's and Malaysia's younger Ministerial-level leadership have visited with their Indonesian counterparts, some many times. Dr. Mahathir's ascension to the Malaysian Prime Ministership was especially widely commented on in the Indone­ sian press as a smooth and successful generational transfer of power which Indone­ sia might admire or even emulate. His subsequent anti-corruption campaign has been similarly acknowledged.
But Indonesia has no dominant ruling mass-based political party comparable to Malaysia's UMNO (United Malay National Organization) or Singapore's PAP (People's Action Party) through which those countries' generational successions have so far been so well managed. Nor on closer examination would the "free-fight liberalism" within UMNO or the PAP's "guided democracy" meet ideological canons of accepta­ bility among almost any of Indonesia's dominant and alternative elites. Still, the plain facts of ongoing successful generational transitions in these two neighboring states will aggravate the naggingly insistent perception that Indonesia's own change of generations is a necessary end without a sufficient means. The odds for anomic change therefore increase.

44. Two groups of ABRI's 1945 Generation "outs" cluster in the Forum for Study

and Communication of Retired Officers (Forum Studi dan Komunikasi Purna Yudha,

or Fosko) and the Institute for Constitutional Awareness (Lembaga Kesadaran Ber-

konstitusi, or LBK). In one of the rare studies of retired ABRI officers, these two

more Fact,

vFoiccatliofna,ctPiornesdiacrteiondsis,"cuAssseiadn

bSyu

rUvlef

yS,un21d,ha8u(sAseung,us"tRe1g9i8m1e),

Crisis in Indonesia: pp. 815-37. For a

forthright statement by retired General Nasution on how he perceives the New Or­

der his

to have deviated from his initial "Dwi Fungsi: Pada Mulanya dan

Kfoirnmi,"ulPatriiosnm

ao,f

the "dual function" 9 (December 1980),

concept, see pp. 39-43.

AifnoucInandud toiinnoeuUssi,labf,uStu19ens4ds5he-1an9ut7isa7sl,elynS,osuSymtohcpeiaaaltshtPeoAtilscici,asyunAmOsmpcceaacrsytsioonifnaNlDaPesafueptneisroenS'saenrvideiesSwe(sQcmuu eraieyt ny asPllsaloanndbn:ein g

James Cook University, 1980). Retired officers and their associations will play

more important political roles in the future than in the recent past and deserve

close attention.

109

APPENDIX A
THE THIRD DEVELOPMENT CABINET AND SENIOR DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALS

The positions and incumbents comprising the Indonesian "higher central bu­ reaucracy," as the term is used in this article, are listed in full below. The list is believed current as of mid-December 1981. One incumbent (asterisked) is the last known occupant of his position and may or may not still be current. Personnel changes which are known to have occurred since this list was compiled are men­ tioned in footnotes. Military officers are distinguished from civilians by the mili­ tary rank preceding their names. The notation (R) after such a rank means that
the officer is retired whereas (?) means that it is not known whether the officer is retired or on active duty. Absence of either notation means that the officer is on
the active rolls. Titles placed before or after names are usually abbreviated and may be distinguished from parts of the name by absence of any period following them.

Key to Abbreviations

Brig-Gen Col Dr Drs/Dra
Gen H Ir K Kopkamtib
Lt-Gen MA MA Sc Maj-Gen MBA MPA MPH MSc Ny PhD Prof R RM (R)
(?)
SE SH

Brigadier-General (Army) Colonel (Army) Doktor (holder of doctoral degree) Doktorandus/Doktoranda (male/female holder of doctoral degree not
involving dissertation) General (Army) Haji (one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca)
Insinyur (holder of engineering degree) Kiai (venerable Islamic religious teacher or scholar)
Romando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for the
Restoration of Security and Order) Lieutenant-General (Army) Master of Arts Master of Arts and Science Major-General (Army) Master of Business Administration
Master of Public Administration Master of Public Health Master of Science Nyonya (M rs., Madam)
Doctor of Philosophy Profesor (Professor) Raden (Javanese aristocratic title) Raden Mas (Javanese aristocratic title somewhat higher than Raden) Retired (from active military duty)
Retired or active military status not known Sarjana Ekonomi (Master of Economics) Sarjana Hukum (Master of Law) Last known incumbent in position

Positions and Incumbents

President Vice-President

Gen (R) Suharto Adam Malik

110

State Secretariat

Minister of State/State Secretary Cabinet Secretary Military Secretary
Secretary, Development Operations Control Secretariat
Inspectors-General, InspectorateGeneral for Development

Lt-Gen Sudharmono SH Brig-Gen Drs Murdiono Air Vice Marshal Kardono
Lt-Gen (R) R Solihin Gautama Purwanegara
E. Sukasah Somowijaya Maj-Gen (R) Sujono Humardani Maj-Gen (R) Hein Victor Worangf Maj-Gen (R) Tahir

Coordinating Ministers

Political and Security Affairs (Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs,
Defense and Security, Justice, Information)
Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs (Finance, Trade and Coop­ eratives, Agriculture, Industry, Mining and Energy, Public Works, Communications)
People's Welfare (Education and Culture, Health, Religion, Social Affairs, Manpower and Transmi­ gration)
Junior Minister, Women's Affairs

Gen (R) Maradean Panggabean
Prof Dr Wijoyo Nitisastro
Gen (R) Surono Reksodimejo Ny Lasiyah Sutanto SH

Ministers of State

Perfecting the State Apparatus Research and Technology Development Supervision and
Environment

DP rroJf oDhranInreBs aBhaaprutidsdtsinSuYmusaurlfinHabibie
Prof Dr Emil Salim

Departmental Ministers and Senior Civil Servants

Home Affairs Minister Secretary - General Inspector-General
Directors - General Social and Political Affairs General Government and Regional Autonomy Rural Development Agrarian Affairs Regional Development

Gen (R) Amir Machmud Maj-Gen (R) R Suprapto Maj-Gen H Eddy Sahara
Maj-Gen (R) R Prapto Prayitno
Brig-Gen (? ) H Ahmad Adnawijaya Maj-Gen (R) Drs Umar Said Joyosaputro Maj-Gen Daryono SH Drs Atar Tarigan Sibero

Foreign Affairs Minister Secretary - General Inspector-General

Prof Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmaja Air Vice Marshal Sudharmono Lt-Gen (R) Sarwo Edhie Wibowo

t Maj-Gen Worang has died and the position is now vacant.

Ill

Direetors-General Political Affairs Foreign Economic, Social and Cultural Affairs Safeguarding of Foreign Relations Protocol and Consular Affairs
Defense and Security Minister/Commander of the Armed Forces Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces/Commander, Kopkamtib Chief of Staff, Kopkamtib Inspector - General Chief of Staff, Operations Chief of Staff, Administration Chief of Staff, Functional Affairs Chief of Staff, Army Chief of Staff, Navy Chief of Staff, Air Force Chief of Police, Indonesia
Justice Minister Secretary-General Inspector- General Directors - General Law and Legislation Public Judiciary Development Rehabilitation Immigration
Information Minister Secretary - General Inspector - General Director s- General General Information Radio, Television, and Film Press and Graphics Development
Finance Minister Secretary - General Inspector-General Directors - General Budget Tax Domestic Monetary Affairs Foreign Monetary Affairs Customs State Monetary Control

H Munawar Syadzali MA
Gusti Rusli Noor Maj-Gen (R) RM Suyono Wiryo Atmojo SH Yoop Avef
Gen Andi Muhammad Yusuf
Admiral R. Sudomo Gen Wijoyo Suyono Air Vice-Marshal (?) Subambang Vice Admiral Muhammad Romly Lt-Gen Ignatius Yogi Supardi Lt-Gen M. Kharis Suhud Gen S . Poniman Admiral Waluyo Sugito Air Marshal Ashadi Cahyadi Police Gen Dr Awaluddin Jamin MPA
Lt-Gen Ali Said SH Maj-Gen (R) Nasrun Syahrun SH Kamil Kamka SH
Hadipurnomo SH| Suroto SH§ Ahmad Arif SH MPA Maj-Gen (R) Nichlany Sudarjo
Lt-Gen (R) Ali Murtopo Maj-Gen (R) Sutikno Lukitodisastro Maj-Gen (R) Drs H Slamet Heryanto
Drs Joko Kartodiharjo MPA Drs Sumadi H Sukarno SH
Prof Dr Ali Wardhana Maj-Gen (R) Elly Sungkono Yusuf L. Indradewa SH
Maj-Gen (R) Yusuf Ramly Drs Salamun A. T. Drs Oskar Suryaatmaja Drs R Sugito Sastromijoyo MA Sc Lt-Gen (R) Wahono Drs Gandhi

t Yoop Ave has been replaced by R Achmad Jumiril. t Hadipurnomo has been replaced by Harsono Adisumarto SH MPA. § Suroto has been replaced by H Rusli SH.

112

Trade and Cooperatives Minister Junior Minister, Cooperative Affairs Secretary - General Inspector- General Directors - General Domestic Trade Foreign Trade Cooperatives
Agriculture Minister Junior Minister, Food Production Secretary- General Inspector- General Director s- General Food Plant Agriculture Plantations Fisheries Forestry Animal Husbandry
Industry Minister Secretary - General Inspector-General Director s- General Basic Metal Industry Basic Chemical Industry Miscellaneous Industry Small Industry
Mining and Energy Minister Secretary - General Inspector-General Directors - General General Mining Oil and Natural Gas Energy
Public Works Minister Junior Minister, People's Housing Secretary-General Inspector-G eneral Directors - General Highways Irrigation Buildings Construction

Drs Radius Prawiro
Lt-Gen (R) Bustanil Arifin SH Vice Admiral Lalu Manambai Abdulkadir Maj-Gen (R) R Sukoco
Karjono Wirioprawiro Prof Dr Suhadi Mangkusuwondo Prof Dr Ir Sujanadi Ronohadiwiryo MSc
Prof Ir Sudarsono Hadisaputro Ir Ahmad Affandi Maj-Gen (R) Panuju Maj-Gen (R) R Mung Parhadimulyo*
Ir Wardoyo Brig-Gen (?) R Pang Suparto Atmodipuro Vice Admiral Iman Sarjonof Dr Sujarwo Prof Dr Ir Johannes Humantal Hutasoit
Ir Abdul Rauf Suhud Maj-Gen (R) Ir Agus Sujono Commodore (R) R. J. Sulamet
Ir Eman Yogasara Ir Hartarto Sastrosunarto Ir Kusudiarso Hadinoto Brig-Gen Gitosewoyo SH
Prof Dr Subroto Drs Sutaryo Sigit Col Atwar Nurhadi
Prof Dr John Ario Katili Ir Wijarso Prof Dr Ir Samaun Samadikun
D.r Purnomosidi Hajisaroso Drs Cosmas Batubara Dr Yulianto Mulyodiharjoj; Col (R) Imam Sukoto§
Ir Suryatin Sastromijoyo Ir Suryono Sosrodarsono II Ir Radinal Mochtar

f This position is now occupied by Rear Admiral Aburachman. $ Dr Yulianto Mulyodiharjo has died and been replaced by Ir Suryono Sosrodarsono. § This position is now occupied by Drs Herman Rusdi Usman. II Ir Suryono Sosrodarsono has been replaced by Ir Y. Sudaryoko.

113

Communications Minister Secretary - General Inspector-General Directors - General Land Communications Sea Communications Air Communications Post and Telecommunications Tourism
Education and Culture Minister Junior-Minister, Youth Affairs Secretary - General Inspector-General Directors- General Basic and Secondary Education Higher Education Extra-curricular Activities, Youth and Sports Culture
Health Minister Secretary-General Inspector-G eneral Directors- General Public Health Development Health Services Food and Drug Control Prevention and Combating of Contagious Diseases
Religion Minister Secretary - General Inspector-General Directors- General Islamic Guidance and Haj Affairs Islamic Institutions Development Protestant Guidance Catholic Guidance Hindu and Buddhist Guidance
Social Affairs Minister Secretary - General Inspector-General

Air Marshal Rusmin Nuryadin Lt-Gen (R) Ahmad Tahir Ir Sutomo Adisasmito
Nazar Nurdin Pongky Suparjof Air Vice Marshal (?) Sugiri Maj-Gen (R) Suryadi Lt-Gen (R) H Ahmad TirtosudiroJ
Prof Dr Daud Yusuf Air Major Abdul Gafur Tengku Idris Lt-Gen (R) Sutanto Wiryoprasonto F. X. Sudiyana SH
Brig-Gen (R) Prof Darji Darmodiharjo SH Prof Dr Ir Doddy Achdiyat Tisna Amijaya
Prof Dr Washington Pandapotan Napitupulu Prof Dr Ny Haryati Subadio
Maj-Gen (R) Dr Suwarjono Suryaningrat Maj-Gen (R) Dr Suyoto Dr Bahrawi Wongsokusomo MPH
Dr R Subekti Harjodiwiryo MPH Dr IGM§ Brata Ranuh MPH Dr Midian Sirait
Dr M. Adhyatma MPH
Lt-Gen (R) H Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara Brig-Gen (R) H Aswasmarmo SH H Abdul Qadir Basalamah
Maj-Gen (R) H Ahmad Burhani Cokrohandoko H Anton Timur Jaelani MA Pestos Nehemia Harefa Maj-Gen (R) Ignatius Joko Mulyono Gde Puja MA SH
Maj-Gen (R) Saparjo Maj-Gen (R) Albertus Maruli Tambunan Maj-Gen (?) Ibnu Hartomo

f No biography available. According to one source, a possible Navy Vice Admiral. However, no military title appears in his Jakarta telephone book listing.
$ This position is now occupied by Yoop Ave.
§ Balinese title, possibly I Gusti Made.

114

Directors-General Social Development Rehabilitation and Social Services Social Aid
Manpower and Transmigration Minister Junior Minister, Transmigration Affairs Secretary-General Inspector-General Directors- General Development and Use of Manpower Protection and Care of Manpower Transmigration

Drs Agung Yuwono Cokrosuseno Drs Yuwono Drs Ade Harun Alrasyid
Prof Drs Harun Alrasyid Zain
Martono Maj-Gen (R) Urip Widodo SH Maj-Gen (R) H Marsan Siregar SH
Ir Drs Danang Jokowatoro Yudonegoro Utoyo Usman SH Maj-Gen (R) H Kadarusno

115

APPENDIX B
HIGHER STATE INSTITUTIONS AND NON-DEPARTMENTAL GOVERNMENT BOARDS

The abbreviations and conventions used here parallel those in Appendix A. Positions and incumbents in this list are believed current as of mid-December 1981. Persons with an asterisk after their names, however, are the last known incumbents
in their positions and may or may not currently hold them.

Higher State Institutions

People’ s Consultative Assembly/People’ s Representative
Council (MPR/DPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/ Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) f

Head
Deputy Head Deputy Head Deputy Head Deputy Head Deputy Head Secretary-General

Gen (R) Daryatmo Mashuri SH Mohamad Isnaenif KH Masykur Maj-Gen (R) R Kartijo Sastrodinoto Brig-Gen (R) H Ahmad Lamo Lt-Gen Wang Suwandi SH

Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung)

Head Deputy Head

Lt-Gen Mujono SH Purwoto S . Gandasubrata SH

Supreme Advisory Council (DPA, Dewan Pertimbangan Agung

Head Deputy Head Deputy Head
Deputy Head Deputy Head

Dr KH Idham Khalid Prof Dr Sunawar Sukowati SH Lt-Gen (R) Gusti Pangeran Hario Jatikusumo
Maj-Gen (R) Dr Sujono Sumodiwiryo Dr H Jaelani Naro SH

Supreme Audit Board (Bapeka, Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan)

Head Deputy Head

Gen (R) Umar Wirahadikusumah Maj-Gen (R) R H Ahmad Sudrajat

Office of the Attorney-General (Kejaksaan Agung)

Attorney - General Deputy Attorney-General,
Development Deputy Attorney-General,
General Supervision
Deputy Attorney-General, Intelligence
Deputy Attorney-General, Operations

Lt-Gen (R) Ismail Saleh SH Kohar Hari Sumamo SH Brig-Gen Sugiri Cokrodijoyo SH Brig-Gen (R) Datuk R. Mulia SH Muhammad Salim SH

f The same top officials now head both institutions.
% Mohamad Isnaeni has been replaced by Drs Harjantho Sumodisastro.

116

Non-Departmental Government Boards

State Personnel Administration Board (BAKN, Badan Administrasi Kepegawaian Negara)

Head

Maj-Gen (R) A. E. Manihuruk

State Administration Institute (LAN, Lembaga Administrasi Negara)

Head

Prof Dr Sondang Paian Siagian MPA

Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS, Biro Pusat Statistik)

Head

H M. Abdulmajid

State Code Institute (Lembaga Sandi Negara)

Head

Dr Rubiono Kertopati*

Logistics Affairs Board (Bulog, Badan Urusan Logistik)

Head Deputy Head

Lt-Gen (R) Bustanil Arifin SH Maj-Gen (R) Sukriya Atmaja

National Atomic Energy Agency (Batan, Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional)

Director - General

Prof A . Baiquni MSc PhD

Telecommunications Council (Dewan Telekomunikasi)

Head

Air Marshal Rusmin Nuryadin

National Development Planning Board (Bappenas, Badan Perancanaan Pembangunan Nasional)

Head Deputy Head

Prof Dr Wijoyo Nitisastro Prof Dr Johannes Baptista Sumarlin

National Space and Aviation Institute (Lapan, Lembaga Penerbangan Antariksa Nasional)

Head

Air Vice Marshal (R) Dr R Sunaryo

Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia)

Head

Prof Dr Ir H Bachtiar Rifai

National Archives (Arsip Nasional)

Head

Dra Sumartini

National Survey and Mapping Coordination Board (Badan Koordinasi Survey dan Pemetaan Nasional)

Head

Maj-Gen (?) Ir Pranoto Asmoro

117

National Defense and Security Council (Wanhankamnas, Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional)

Secretary-General Deputy Secretary-General

Lt-Gen (R) Ahmad Wiranatakusumah Admiral Mahmud Subarkah

National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN, Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berancana Nasional)

Head

Maj-Gen (R) Dr Suwarjono Suryaningrat

Capital Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM, Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal)

Head

Ir Suhartoyo

Technology Study and Application Board (BPPT, Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi)

Head

Prof Dr Ir Baharuddin Yusuf Habibie

Bank Indonesia

Governor

Drs Rahmat Saleh SE

Operation Order Central (Opstibpus, Operasi Tertib Pusat)

Head

Maj-Gen Empi Yohan Ranter SHf

Board for Molding, Education, Implementation, Orientation, Living and Practice of the Five Basic Principles (BP7, Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila) $

Head

Maj-Gen (R) Hari Suharto SH

State Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakin, Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara)§

Head Deputy Head

Gen (R) Yoga Sugama Lt-Gen L. Benny Murdani

f Apparently still on active duty although past age 55.

$ Not readily comprehensible either in Indonesian or English. This is also at least

the second version of what

oEfcotnhoism, icseRee Dv iaevwi,d

Jenkins, July 24,

the seven "The Tale 1981.

Ps of

stand for. For the political P4--and How P7 Irked P3,"

FsiagrnEifaicsatenrcne

§ Not listed as Non-Departmental Government Board in any official listing but in­ cluded here on de facto basis.

118

APPENDIX C SELECTED BIOGRAPHIC SOURCE MATERIALS

The variety of sources from which biographic information on the Indonesian military may be drawn is quite large. What appears below reflects only one of these
types of sources: compilations of biographies using a uniform format. Most of these resources also include numerous biographies of civilians. Name lists of several types proved quite valuable as well but are not included here. The author would appreciate knowing of additional major compilations.

Major Biographic Compilations

A. Official Hankam Directories

DepaPretejambeant

PTeerratashHanaannk-aKmea/AmBaRnIa.n,

Pusat Sejarah ABEI. Penerbitan Sementara

Siapa-apa (Who's Who)
Edisi Ketiga. 1971.

DepaPretermtaehna

nPaenr-tKaehaamnaann-aKne.amPaennaenr,biLtaenmbSaegmaenSteajararaPhe. rtaSmiaap.a

-apa (W
1967.

ho

's

Who)

S ta f

B. Official and Quasi-Official DPR/MPR Directories

LembRaigwaayPaetmHiliahsailnPUemmuilmiha. n BTuakhuunPe1le97n7g.kapB uIVku PIe. miBlihuaknu

UI Im. um(21v97o7l..)

Ringkasan
Circa 1978.

Lembliahgaan

PUemmuilmihaTna

hUumnum19.77RuinngtukkasWanilaRyaiwhaJyaawt aH.

fd

up An
1979.

g

g

o

ta

DPRD-I.

Hasil Pemi­

Lembliahgaan

PUemmuilmihaTnahUumnum19.77RuinngtukkasWanilaRyaiwhaSyaumt Hatiedruap.

Anggota
1979.

DPRD-I.

Hasil Pemi­

DepaUTrtamehmuumnen).1D97Ra7lianmugnkNtausekagneWrRiil,aiwyDaaihryeaKkt oaHrliamidtauJnpetanAndneg&rgaSol utSalaowDsiePaslRiP.Do-lIi1.t9ik80H.(aDsiirl ePkeomrailtihPanemUbminuaman

DepaUTrtamehmuumnen).1D9R7a7lianmugnkNtausekagneWrRiil,aiwyDaaihryeaNkt tuHosraidatuTpJeenAngndggeagrraoalt,aSMoDsaPilauRlkDuP-,oIl.ditaiknHa(IDsriialirnPeekJmtaoiyrliaah.tanP1eU9m8mb0ui.nmaan

LembtaangaRPaekmy ialithHana sUil mPuemm.ilihRainw

aUymaut mH

id19u7p1.A

nggo
(1 v

ta-A
ol.)

n

ggota
Circa

Majelis
1973.

Permusyawara-

ParlaUumnugmanP, ecrtoammpai—ler1.95H5)adsiil

Rakjat Memilih Tokoh-Tokoh R epublik Indonesia. 1956.

Parlemen

(Hasil

Pemilihan

Kementerian Penerangan. Kami P erke nalka n........... ! 1954.

C. Privately Published Directories
Tim Redaksi Majalah Tempo. Apa & Siapa Sejumlah O rang Indonesia 1981-1982.
Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1981.
Roeder, O. G ., and Mahmud, Mahiddin, compilers. Who's Who in Indonesia.
Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1980.
Roeder, O. G. Who's Who in Indonesia. Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971. The Indonesian M ilita ry Leaders: B iographical and O ther B ackground Data. 2nd
ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief Associates, 1979.

119

Who's Who in Indonesian M ilita ry . 1st ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief Associates, 1977. Who's Who in Indonesian Business. 1st ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief Associates, 1975.

D. Official Japanese Source
Gunseikanbu. O rang Indonesia Jang Terkemoeka d i Djawa. Tjetakan Pertama.
2604 (1944).

Minor Biographic Compilations

Depakrataemn.enSSeorsi iPala,hlBaawdaann

Pembina Nasional.

Pahlawan 1972.

Pusat.

Pahlawan Pembela Kemerde-

Angkatan Darat, Pusat Sejarah Militer. B io g ra fi 9 Pahlawan R evolusi Indonesia.

Undated.

120

APPENDIX D
SELECTED MONOGRAPH LENGTH STUDIES ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY

Below is a reading list of monograph length studies focusing explicitly on the Indonesian military or containing much significant material on it not easily available
elsewhere. Relevant article-length materials and general works on Indonesian poli­ tics have been excluded in the interest of drawing attention to a limited number of studies containing large amounts of information. The list is not exhaustive. West­ ern sources in English prevail, but some Indonesian primary sources and a variety of viewpoints are represented.

Akhmadi, Heri. B reaking the Chains o f Oppression o f the Indonesian People.
Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series, 1981.

Anderson, David. "Military Politics in East Java: A Study of the Origins and

Development of the Armed Forces in East Java between 1945-1948." Ph.D.

dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1976.

Ande1r9s6o5nC, oBuepniendiIcntd,

oanneds

iaM. cVIetyh,acRau: thC.ornAelPl

relim ina
Modern

ry Analysis o f the
Indonesia Project

Octobe
Interim

r

1,

Reports Series, 1971.

Crouch, Harold. The A rm y and P olitics in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University

Press, 1978.

DepatratnemDeanraPte. rtDahhaanrmana-KPeuasmakaana4n5,.

Markas Besar Tentera Jakarta, 1972.

Nasional

Indonesia

Angka-

DepaDrtoekmtreinn PPeerrtdajhuaannagna-nKeTaNml-aAnDan,"TSRekI-oUlaBhASYtAaf-CdAanK TKIo"m. anBdaonAdunngkg,ata19n66D.arat.

DepaBrtuekmue-nI &PeBrtuakhuan- lal.n-KJeaakmaratnaa,n,19S7t8a.f Teritorial. D o k trin T e rito ria l N usantara.

Depasretnemjaetan

RPeerptuabhlaiknaInn-dKoenaemsiaan. anJ,akPaurstaat,

Sejarah 1976.

ABRI.

30 Tahun Angkatan B e r-

Gregory, Ann. "Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided Democracy and the New Order." Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1976.
Harvey, Barbara. Perm esta: H a lf a R ebellion. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia
Project Monograph Series, 1977.

Harvey, Barbara. "Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965." Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1974.
Hering, B. B. Sukarno and His S oldiers: A Docum entary S tu d y o f the T .N .l.
Brussels: Centre du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l'Extreme Orient Monograph Series, 1977.

Maynard, Harold. "A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philippines." Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1976.

McVPeya,rtRIu, "thI.n d"oTnhees iaP,os1t1-R(eAvporluilti1o9n7a1r)y,

Transformation of the pp. 131-76; and "Part

IInId,"onIensdioanneAsiram, y1,3

(April 1972), pp. 147-81.

121

Mrazoefka, nRIundteorlfv.e

nTtihoen

.U

nite
(2

d
v

State
ols.)

s and the
Prague:

Indonesian M
Czechoslovak

ilitary 1945-1965: A S
Academy of Sciences

tu

d

y

Oriental Institute, 1968.

Moehkardi. Akadem i M ilite r Yogya Dalam Perjuangan P isik 1945-1949. Jakarta:

PT Inaltu, 1977.

Muhammad Rusli Karim. Peranan A B R I Dalam P o litik . Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu,

1981.

Nasution, Abdul Haris. Fundamentals o f G u e rrilla W arfare. Singapore: Donald

Moore Books, 1965.

Notonseussiaan. toT, oNkuygor: oWhoa.sedTaheUnPiEvTeArsiAtyrmPyredsusr,

ing the
1979.

Japanese

Occupation

of

Indo­

PaukMearn, aGgeumy.entT. heSaInndtao

nesian D
Monica:

octrine o f
The Rand

T erritorial Warfare
Corporation, 1963.

and

T e rrito ria l

Robison, Richard. "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia, 1965-1975."

Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sydney, 1977.

Roeder, O. G. The Sm iling General: P resident S uharto o f Indonesia. Jakarta:

Gunung Agung, 1970.

SimaWtuapr.angIt,hTaacah:i

Bonar. Cornell

Report
Modem

from Banaran: Experiences during the People's
Indonesia Project Translation Series, 1972.

Sundhaussen, Ulf. "The Political Orientations and Political Involvement of the

Indonesian Officer Corps 1945-1966: The Siliwangi Division and the Army Head­

quarters." Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University, 1971.

Utrelcehgte,d EGrnrosutp.

inThteh

eInDdoenveesloiapnin

gA

rCmoyu:

nAtr

ieSso.c

io-political Stu
Queensland:

dy of
James

an Armed, P rivi­
Cook University

South East Asian Monograph Series, 1980.