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Ezra’s Archives 
A CORNELL HISTORICAL SOCIETY PUBLICATION 

HISTORICAL RESEARCH BY

KATRINA SOMMER
LILLIAN WILLIAMS
NINA CRABTREE 

EMMA PROE 
LILI ADKINS

VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2024 



Ezra’s Archives 
A Publication of the  

Cornell Historical Society 

Fourteenth Edition

2024 



1 

Acknowledgments 
It is with great gratitude that the Editorial Board thanks for their 
continued support our faculty advisor, Professor TJ Hinrichs, the 

Executive  Board of the Cornell Historical Society, and our amazing 
editorial teams,  without whom this publication would not be possible. We 

would also like to thank Judy Yonkin, the Cornell University History 
Department, the  Student Activities Funding Commission, the authors 
published within this edition, and all the students who submitted their 

work for consideration within this publication.  

Ezra’s Archives is a publication of the Cornell Historical Society. All rights reserved. 
Reproduction in whole or in part is prohibited.  



2 

The Editorial Board 

Editor-in-Chief 
Kate Sullivan ‘25 

Managing Editor 
Nnenna Ochuru ‘25 

Senior Editors 
Ruqian (Sophie)  Liu ‘25

Caleb Cho ‘24
Julia Fritsch ‘25   

Michaela Ferrario ‘24 

Staff Editors
Jaden Schmit ‘27  Hadrian Barki ‘27  

Nicholas Vega ‘26  Sebastian Klein ‘26 
Jack Bentley ‘27  Eddie Elliott ‘26

Xuanming (Sean) Zhao ‘27 Mia Battistella ‘26 
Martha Samadashvili ‘26 Sharon Sun ‘26 



3 

On the Writers 
KATRINA SOMMER graduated from UCLA with a degree in History and 
Global Studies in 2023 and now is pursuing a Master’s in Cybersecurity 
Policy and Governance at Boston College. Her thesis research led her to 
her current focus on personal privacy, disinformation, government 
transparency, and cybersecurity within the digital and legal ecosystems. In 
her free time, she likes to train for triathlons and visit coffee shops.

LILLIAN WILLIAMS studied history and constitutional democracy at the 
University of Missouri. Williams was inspired to write this piece after 
studying race and politics in South Africa in the Winter of 2023. Her 
research interests include geographic information systems, public history, 
constitutional democracies, the intersections of race and gender, and the 
Santa Fe Trail. Since writing this article, Williams has begun working 
toward a Master's in Atlantic History and Politics at the University of 
Missouri (expected May 2024). Her current project is contributing to the 
Kinder Institute on Constitutional Democracy's podcast, Wheels Across 
the West: Histories and Legacies of the Santa Fe Trail.  

NINA CRABTREE studies history, art history, and Hispanic studies at 
Creighton University under Dr. Scott Eastman. She has been developing 
her research project “Drawing from Memory” since the spring of 2022. 
She intends to enter a PhD program in 2025 to study social history and art 
under, and after, far-right governments. In the future, she hopes to teach 
this specialization in a university setting.



4 

EMMA PROE graduated in the class of 2023 from Denison University 
with a major in history and a minor in anthropology and sociology. Her 
research interests revolve around contemporary social movements in the 
U.S., and she is particularly interested in how history can inform 
sociological phenomena.

LILI ADKINS  is a third-year history student at the University of Southern 
California with minors in Russian and Urban Sustainable Planning. Her 
historical interests include women and sexuality, nineteenth-century 
fashion, and the development of prisons. Next year, she will write her 
Senior Thesis on gender expression and homosexuality at Cascades 
Female Factory in Hobart, Australia. 



5 

Table of Contents 
6 

8 

49 

74

102 

133 

Letter from the Editors 

Stained Glass   
A Window into Kwame Nkrumah’s Legacy in Post-colonial 
Ghana  
Katrina Sommer 

Story Cloth as Historical Source in Post Apartheid South 
Africa
Methodological Benefits from an Underutilized Source 
Lillian Williams 

Drawing from Memory
Children’s Drawings and Spain’s Collective Memory 
Movement  
Nina Crabtree  

Placing Wisconsin on the Map of Gay Liberation
The Impact of Milwaukee's Gay Peoples Union
Emma Proe  

Creating a Heaven in Tehachapi
Gender, Race, and Rehabilitation at the California 
Institution for Women
Lili Adkins

About the Cornell Historical Society 159 



6 

From the Editors 
It is with great pleasure that we present the fourteenth edition of 
Ezra’s Archives. This journal represents the hard work and dedication of 
a small group of undergraduates committed to carrying on the tradition 
that Maya Koretzky and Andrew White first began in Spring 2011. 
Their goal: to provide a space for undergraduates to share exemplary 
historical research. In their original letter from the editors, published in the 
very first edition of Ezra’s Archives, Maya and Andrew asked two simple 
questions: Why study history? Why write and read history? They rightly 
observed that the practice of studying history, of putting it into words, and 
sharing it with others gives us the context necessary to understand our 
present. 

Ezra’s Archives, however, does not operate in a bubble. The recent 
global pandemic has forced many of us to re-evaluate what matters and 
why we do what we do. This includes why we study history. History, of 
course, is not an instruction manual. We cannot look to the past to find 
neat morals or lessons. Regardless, we believe that looking to the past is 
one of the ways that we can best understand the present and imagine 
a new future. In moments like these, the mission of history is particularly 
important. 

This is why the editors of Ezra’s Archives have always aimed to provide a 
platform for undergraduate historians working in under-studied areas. 
Since the first issue, the journal has showcased research on diverse 
topics, from Christian polemics in Umayyad Spain, the economy of the 
Viceroyalty of Peru, blood and militarism in colonial Hawai’i, and even  
German water policy in Quindao from 1898 to 1914. 

As in past years, we received a variety of submissions from undergraduates 
across the country and beyond, at institutions both large and small. 
This year, we are proud to offer new research on LGBTQ+ 
student movements in the Midwest, post-independence leadership 



7 

in Ghana, South African story cloth as a historical source, children's 
drawings from the Spanish Civil War, and the Tehachapi women's prison 
in California.

This year saw a sixty percent increase in submissions for Ezra's Archives, 
illustrating undergraduate commitment to studying history internationally. 
In the coming years, we hope to increase collaboration with our 
authors and increase the amount of research we are able to share. One 
benefit of the switch to more virtual modes of instruction has been 
the ability to connect across great distances. We hope to further 
harness this technology in subsequent publications, reach out to more 
authors across the globe, and connect them with our editorial teams.

We appreciate all of the support we have received from the editorial team 
of Ezra’s Archives, members of the Cornell Historical Society, and faculty 
members. Without them, this publication would not be possible. We are 
pleased to present the fourteenth edition of Ezra’s Archives, and we hope 
you enjoy. 

Sincerely,  
Kate and Nnenna



8 

Stained Glass 
A Window into Kwame Nkrumah’s Legacy in 

Post-colonial Ghana 

Katrina Sommer 

Introduction 

By approaching African postcolonial history through the case study 
of Kwame Nkrumah's regime in Ghana, a broader analysis of postcolonial 
politics and leaders emerges. Analysing the power of symbolism, 
information flows, and broader civic movements, Nkrumah’s legacy 
reveals the structural impacts of colonialism and corruption on democratic 
political regimes. Centering the agency of African actors, such as 
Nkrumah, who introduce their own form of governance within their 
nations provides a nuanced perspective on dialogic approaches to 
postcolonial political structures. Nkrumah used the press, legal and 
economic system, and the Pan-African and decolonization movements of 
the 1950s and 1960s to personify himself as the hope of Africa.

As the leader of these movements, Nkrumah’s image became 
synonymous with his beliefs.  His image as leader became synonymous 
with Ghana’s foundation in a similar way George Washington became the 
symbol of the United States. As he consolidated power over time, 
Nkrumah used the Convention People’s Party (CPP) to centralize his 
control throughout the government and economy.

By infusing himself into the fabric of African politics and leveraging 
his cult of personality, Nkrumah tied his image to the established 
structures of power at the genesis of Ghana. This was extended by 



9 

corruption that became entrenched in the political and economic systems 
of Ghana, thereby eroding the legal structure of checks and balances and 
suppressing dissent by inhibiting free press. The hope of good governance 
vanished with the fall of Nkrumah’s regime in a coup led by opposition 
leaders. Nonetheless, the legacy Nkrumah had on Ghana and the larger 
African diaspora highlights the significance of studying this history.

Figure 1: Kwame Nkrumah as Prime Minister of Ghana and leader of CPP. 
From: Getty Images, Kwame Nkrumah, circa 1955.

Figure 2: “Forward Ever, Backward Never:” Convention People’s Party (CPP) logo and slogan. 
Founded on June 12, 1949, by Kwame Nkrumah with an ideological focus on Nkrumahism, 
Pan-Africanism, and anti-colonialism. Its symbol of a red rooster is depicted welcoming the 
dawning of a new day. 
From: Convention People's’ Party, CPP logo, Wikimedia Commons, 14 Jul. 2014.



The Iconography of Nkrumah in Changing Ghana (1948-1956)

Nkrumah leveraged his political position within the African diasporic
leadership and insulated himself against opposition using his image as a
credible leader. His education and ideological evolution mirrors the ascent of
educated African elites advocating for independence, akin to �gures like
Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, and Léopold Sédar Senghor.1 Born in 1909
to a middle-class family, he was educated in a Roman Catholic primary
school and pursued higher education in America and Europe, where he was
exposed to socialism, nationalism, and Black leadership of the 1920s.
Nkrumah's education in the Global North imbued him with the ideological
foundation necessary for spearheading his own country's liberation from
colonial rule. Networking with other Black liberation leaders, he became
president of the African Students’ Organization of the United States and
Canada after completing his Masters at the University of Pennsylvania.2 As
his �rst international political organization, he stewarded the 5th Pan-African
Congress in Manchester, England which became the genesis of African
decolonization discussions. This entry into political organizing gave him the
experience needed as the UGCC’s general secretary, and later CPP leader.

Nkrumah’s ability to become the personalized image of Ghana’s
independence granted him unchecked power. With this authority, Nkrumah
leveraged social and cultural capital, such as postage stamps and clothing, to
consolidate his political dominance. Using the traditional title “Osagyefo”
meaning “hero or the redeemer,” every facet of Nkrumah’s persona codi�ed
his image as Ghana’s founding father.3 Transforming himself into the symbol
of African independence and Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah limited the ability

3 Kumor, Timothy Tsifokpor. Gold Coast Now Ghana, 9.
2 Ibid.
1 Paul Nugent. Africa Since Independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd Edition, 2012.

10



of citizens to hold his emerging powers accountable. This transition was
captured through newsreels and newspaper journals. Images of Nkrumah
alongside British government o�cials or overlaid on symbols of Ghanaian
freedommerged Nkrumah into the foundational fabrics of Ghana’s self-rule.
By establishing his image as the symbol of Ghana as well as the inheritor of
the British colonial administration, Nkrumah’s ability to charm his citizens
during the �rst few years of rule veiled the drive towards authoritarianism.

Figure 3. One of three novelty stamps issued during the commemoration of National
Founder’s Day on September 21, 1960. The Ghanaian �ag, adopted in 1957, symbolizes the
attainment of independence from British rule. The image of Nkrumah painted over the
Ghanaian �ag represents his role in the post-independence era. He becomes the embodiment
of Ghanaian independence and freedom through images and objects like this.
From: Directory of the Republic of Ghana, 1961-62 including Trade Index and Biographical
Section. The Diplomatic Press and Publishing Co. no. 13 Cotswold Gardens, London, N.W.2.

Charismatic leadership might not be seen as a foundation for
authoritarian rule; however, it was foundational to Kwame Nkrumah’s
political perspective. The mechanisms of building trust, reliance on a single
or few political elites, and the symbiosis of the nation and the leader create an
ecosystem where corruption can grow. David Apter, an American political
scientist, �rst used this concept of charisma to explain the institutional power
transfer from colonial rule to Nkrumah’s regime.4 As Nkrumah’s charisma

4 Bienen, Henry (cited David Apter). Armies and Parties in Africa, 43.

11



enforced the CPP political machine, he established himself as the sole
political authority within Ghana.5 Nkrumah had an absolute monopoly on
politics through his ability to harness the public’s perception of him and his
social capital. Through the example of postage stamps with his image
pictured with or on top of other images of Ghana, his role became an image
akin to the nation’s sovereign. His power overwhelmed the constraints of
democracy. By strategically placing himself alongside other images of
structural power and historical value, Nkrumah re�ned Ghana’s political
atmosphere and reinforced his existing political authority.

The CPP institutionalized Nkrumah’s power and political ideology.
The CPP was formed in 1949 and, in 1951 won a majority of votes in the
�rst Gold Coast elections.6 The formalization of the party reinforced his
personal authority by merging his political ideology into a structured party.
The growing omnipresence allowed a process of coercion, intimidation, and
cooperation to fuel the party.7 Within Ghana’s political ecosystem, this
allowed Nkrumah to use the CPP as his dogmatic political machine. In
merging man to party, Nkrumah’s political power was stabilized and the CPP
was able to advance as a uni�ed front. The Ghanaian Times, a Ghanaian
newspaper, pointed out the symbiotic relationship between the party and
Nkrumah. On September 30, 1965, it stated, “the monolithic foundation of
the [CPP]’s organization and philosophy can best be expressed in the fusion
of the party’s ideology with the personality of the author of this ideology.”8

During this period of newfound independence, the emergence of a

8The Ghanaian: Africa’s Leading Prestige Magazine, Vol. 8, No. 1, (Jan. 1965).
7 Bienen, Henry. Armies and Parties in Africa, 51.

6 Ahmand, Murtada Busair, Chudey Pride, and Anthony Komlatse Corsy. “Free Speech, Press Freedom, and
Democracy in Ghana.”

5 Ibid, 51.

12



strongman was seen to propel decolonization, rather than foreshadowing
Nkrumah-authored corruption.

By the 1950s, most newspapers were owned by educated Ghanaians
who believed in self-rule.9 These newspapers became a platform to criticize
British colonialism as well as a battleground of in�uence between the UGCC
and CPP.10 This rising politicization of newspapers in�uenced both parties to
start information campaigns. The CPP established the Accra Evening News,
the SekondiMorning Telegraph, and theDailyMail,11 while the UGCC
founded theNational Times, Talking Drum, and the Ashanti Pioneer.12 In
funneling political ideology into the press, the division between the press
ecosystem and political power corroded. The competition between the CPP
and UGCC intensi�ed by dividing the press environment to re�ect the
political views of the two main rival parties. As the emerging rival of the
UGCC, the CPP leveraged Nkrumah’s image in mass media to edify using its
power.

Figure 4. The CPP “has caused trouble in the past. Will power breed in them a sense of
responsibility?” In the �rst vote for the legislative assembly, members of each major party
watched the �nal vote. With the CPP winning, Nkrumah was released from Accra’s Fort
James.

12 Ibid, 421.
11 Ibid, 421.

10 Ahmand, Murtada Busair, (cited Faringer, 1991) “Free Speech, Press Freedom, and Democracy in Ghana,” 419-
420.

9 Ibid, 419.

13



From: British Pathe. “First Steps to Self-Rule (1951).” YouTube video, 2:23, 13
Apr. 2014.

Nkrumah additionally targeted the British colonial legacy to galvanize
support. In the lead-in to the Gold Coast’s �rst election in 1951, Nkrumah’s
position against the UGCC and his exclusion from the Gold Coast
Legislative Council fueled his dissent. The only limit to his emerging power
was the conservative nature of the constitutional reforms enacted by the
UGCC and Legislative Council. Before being released from jail, he had said
that anything produced by the UGCC or Gold Coast Legislative Council
was ‘bogus and fraudulent’ because the British had been involved in drafting
the documents.13He labeled the constitution as further proof of imperial
legacy and attacked the integrity of any reforms he was not directly involved
in. Only after being elected as PrimeMinister did Nkrumah withdraw his
claims of fraud against the Coussey Constitution.

Figure 5. Katharine, Duchess of Kent, as the Queen’s representative, meets with Prime
Minister Kwame Nkrumah and former Governor Charles Arden-Clarke during the celebration
of Ghanaian Independence. Attire becomes a costume of colonialism. The fashion embodies
two contrasting worlds, from Arden-Clarke’s Governor Pith helmet to Nkrumah’s traditional
kente cloth dress.
From: British Pathe. “Birth of A New State (1957).” YouTube video, 1:17, 13 Nov. 2014.

13 Ibid, 703.

14



Nonetheless, now as PrimeMinister, Nkrumah had to prove his
political leadership to the Ghanaians and convince the global community he
could lead Ghana through this transitional period. To solidify his position,
he used the media to capture images of him beside the Duchess of Kent,
Governor Charles Arden-Clarke, and other established leaders. In Figure 5,
the importance of attire is captured in the British newsreel. Nkrumah
symbolized the traditional styles of governance by wearing kente clothing.
Governor Clarke, dressed in a Governor’s Pith helmet, acts as a contrasting
symbol to the British colonial costume. Nkrumah’s philosophy sought to
return Africa to a shared hope of life without colonial powers, as well as to
evoke a nostalgic return to a mythicized history.14 Through his image, the
analysis of attire helps contextualize the political atmosphere during
independence and howNkrumah undermined and reimagined the British
colonial legacy.

Figure 6. Nkrumah visited Ghana’s High Commissioners’ o�ce in the United Kingdom in
1959 where saw the newly carved statue of himself in the entry. There, visitors would see
Nkrumah’s image greeting them as the symbol of Ghana.
From: British Pathe. “Farewell Nkrumah (1959).” YouTube video, 1:02, 13 Apr. 2014.

Expanding beyond the political ecosystem within Ghana, Nkrumah
became an African icon through his envelopment of Pan-Africanism. By
expanding his political agenda to include Pan-Africanism, he had a broader
14 Apter, Andrew. Lecture, University of California, Los Angeles, Winter 2022.

15



African mission and ideology to galvanize support. He could also diminish
the in�uence of both British and UGCC power by shifting Ghana’s political
priorities to a broader agenda. As a colonial o�cial stated in 1953, “By
turning Ghanaian eyes outwards towards the goal of Pan-Africanism, he has
been anxious to enhance his reputation as a father �gure; the curtailment of
the personal liberties of those opposing him seems a small price to pay for
putting Ghana on the map.”15 This shift helped Nkrumah argue anyone
against him was also in opposition to the Pan-African movement. The
expansion of Pan-Africanism positively impacted decolonization movements
in Africa regardless of his political use of it. Nkrumah established Accra, the
capital of Ghana, as the “symbolic headquarters for emerging African
states.”16 As a result, Nkrumah established a personal link to Pan-Africanism
that made him an icon of the movement.

Cultural capital transformed into political power through the
symbolism of Nkrumah. Analysis of Nkrumah's meeting with the Duchess
of Kent and the resulting commemorative postage stamps reveal his
motivation to infuse his personality with the broader goals of inspiring
Pan-Africanism and decolonization. He placed himself as a �gurehead of
opposition to British colonialism, while simultaneously becoming the
inherent gatekeeper to Ghanaian governance. As a result, Nkrumah became
revered as the symbol of Ghanaian freedom and Pan-African unity. In the
resulting immunization from criticism through his cultural in�uence and the
emerging political economy, he laid the roots of corruption within the
foundation of Ghana.

16 McQuade, Lawrence C. “Ghana's Bid for Leadership."

15 Li, Ansahn (cited Chiefs of Staff Committee Joint Intelligence Committee). “Asafo and Destoolment in Colonial
Southern Ghana, 1900- 1953, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1995).

16



Suppression of Opposition and Dissent (1957-1962)

Once the CPP’s political authority was formalized and the opposition
was limited, Nkrumah’s authoritarian behavior bred systematic corruption.
Between 1957 and 1962, the erosion of democratic practices limited public
participation and political opposition and strengthened his own Golden
Stool.17 The government passed laws giving the PrimeMinister absolute
power to expel any person fromGhana, remove judges from the bench, and
hold complete economic control through the cronyism of the Ghana Cocoa
Board. Once the basic checks and balances were removed, the guardrails of
freedom of speech alongside democracy eroded. Following a massive
disinformation campaign, laws restricting civil liberties, and formal bans on
opposition parties, the election of 1960 marked the de�nitive corruption of
Nkrumah's government. Consolidating his power through legal, political,
and social reforms, Nkrumah harnessed his image on coins, clothing, and in
media to solidify his place as a strongman. Ghana, born with the hope of
being a beacon of good governance and democratic hope within Africa, had
transformed into a dictatorship by repressing dissent and homogenizing
Nkrumah’s image with the state.

The duality of Nkrumah’s �gure represents purposeful limitations for
oppositional views within Ghana as well as the expansion of Pan-African
rhetoric. Ghana achieved formal independence from British imperialism on
March 6, 1957.18 As the �rst Sub-Saharan African nation to escape
colonialism, Nkrumah’s prime ministership made him the �rst Black leader
within the British Commonwealth of Nations.19 The press re�ected this

19 British Pathe. “Birth of A New State (1957).” YouTube video, 1:17, 13 Nov. 2014.
18 Ahmand, Murtada Busair. “Free Speech, Press Freedom, and Democracy in Ghana,” 422.

17 Note: The Golden Stool continues to be the symbol of ultimate power in the Ashanti Kingdom, whom became the
dominating ethnic tribe in precolonial Ghana.

17



milestone within the Pan-African movement: “They see it more than just
independence for a tribe, but because they are the �rst independent
dominion within the British commonwealth, a position of great
responsibility,” expressed the announcer in a British newsreel.20 However,
within Ghana, Nkrumah’s developing powers soon targeted the domestic
press as he asserted his political, economic, and social ideological perspective
through the CPP’s established newspapers.21 On September 24, 1957, the
Daily Express, a London-based journal, quoted Krobo Edusei, the Minister
of the Interior, who explains the political mechanisms the CPP used to
restrain dissent: “We have the machinery to round up the Opposition, and
they may never see the sun again,”22 he declared. Mass media, such as
newspapers, solidi�ed the domination of the CPP by eliminating opposition.
Continuing his press interactions with Timemagazine in October 1957,
Edusei asserted, “Anybody who gives a speech to the discredit of the
government will be removed to a detention camp.”23 Nkrumah and the CPP
utilized the press as an essential instrument for state-sponsored education
and mobilization, as well as a method of intimidation.24 Through these
practices, Nkrumah thereby dismantled the media as an independent body
through threats and propaganda, completely diminishing opposing agencies.

Beyond controlling the press, three laws passed in 1958 enabled
Nkrumah to act corruptly. After winning the majority of seats in the
National Assembly, the CPP could enact Nkrumah’s legislative agenda.25

Some of the �rst acts passed under Nkrumah were the Avoidance of

25 “Ghana (1957-present),” University of Central Arkansas, Political Science.
24 Ahmand (cited Anokwa: 2011). “Free Speech, Press Freedom, and Democracy in Ghana,” 421.
23 Ibid, 40.

22 Abrefa Busia, Kofi Dr. (cited Daily Express) Ghana’s Struggle for Democracy and Freedom Speeches 1957-69.
Accra, Ghana: Danquah Memorial Publishing Company Limited, compiled by H.K. Akyeampong, 40.

21 Ahmand. “Free Speech, Press Freedom, and Democracy in Ghana,” 421.
20 Ibid.

18



Discrimination Act, the Deportation Act, and the Emergency Powers Act.
The Avoidance of Discrimination Act outlawed parties based on racial,
regional, or religious di�erences. However, a fundamental part of Ghana’s
political ecosystem relied on pre-colonial kinship groups based on these
di�erences.26 Therefore, the rise of the independent nation of Ghana
depended on the extreme politicization of kinship ethnicity that Nkrumah
was now trying to limit. By targeting traditional chiefdom
governance—which he saw as too conservative for his socialist agenda—and
regional kinship groups, opponents such as the National Liberation Council
(NLC) were banned.27 Nkrumah allowed these traditional organizations to
retain their ceremonial duties while ultimately curtailing their political
in�uence. The Deportation Act allowed Nkrumah to expel any non-citizen
or anyone deemed to be undermining the public good, e�ectively eliminating
any potential threat to his regime.28 By targeting business and religious
leaders, he was able to remove political opposition fromGhana without
trial.29 Finally, the Emergency Powers Act calci�ed these undemocratic
practices. Under this Act, Nkrumah had sole authority to declare a state of
emergency, send in troops, and detain accused individuals without judicial
hindrance. As Ko� Abrefa Busia, one of Nkrumah’s biggest opposition
leaders, recalled, “the CPP government pushed through the party-controlled
Parliament the Emergency Powers Bill to deal e�ectively with its political
opponents.”30 By breaking down some of the last remaining checks and
balances, Nkrumah eroded transparency and trust between the people and
the government.

30 Ibid, 43.
29 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
27 Abrefa Busia, Kofi Dr. Ghana’s Struggle for Democracy and Freedom Speeches 1957-69.
26 Mondlane, T.C. (cited Chabla: 1992). Remedying Africa’s Self-Propelled Corruption: The Missing Link, 352.

19



Democratic conditions further deteriorated as Nkrumah’s government
explicitly banned all oppositional rallies as well as passed the Constitutional
Repeal of Restrictions Bill. By November 1958, the government had
removed protections for minority groups and chieftaincy, constrained the
courts and the auditor general, and nationalized property.31 These laws
represented the end of democratic norms and allowed political and economic
corruption to �ourish. This degradation of the state was not only felt within
Ghana but observed by the world. Symbolizing the �rst African nation free
from colonial rule, Ghana was crumbling under the pressure to lead Africa to
freedom. Nonetheless, through adopting these austere laws, democratic
conditions melted away, leaving space for corruption to grow.

As part of the conditions of independence, Ghana was required to hold
a UN-managed plebiscite. In 1960, Ghanaians returned to the polls to
con�rm their choice for independence and voted to make Ghana a republic.
With 89% of the vote for Nkrumah and 11% for J.B. Danquah of the United
Party, the leading opposition party, it seemed like Nkrumah’s political
maneuvers had e�ectively sustained his power.32 Once sworn in, a new
constitution was enacted by the National Assembly. However, there was little
structural di�erence between the government and the CPP party. Nkrumah
and the CPP were still the main political machine within Ghana. As a symbol
of the regime, Kwame Nkrumah was inaugurated as the �rst president of the
Republic of Ghana on July 1, 1960.33 Thus, the political reclassi�cation of
Ghana from dominion to republic did little to preserve the democratic values
of equal participation within government.

33 Ala-Adjettey, Peter, Rtd. Hon. Reflections on the Effectiveness of the Parliament of the Fourth Republic of Ghana,
Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2006, 5-6.

32 “Ghana (1957-present),” University of Central Arkansas, Political Science.
31 Abrefa Busia, Kofi Dr. Ghana’s Struggle for Democracy and Freedom Speeches 1957-69., 68.

20



Figure 7. The statue of Kwame Nkrumah stands in front of the Parliament House. Ten years
after assuming o�ce and independence, Nkrumah was revered as the founding father of
Ghana. Yet, in the 1960s, when Ghana became a republic, the sustainability of democracy
already seemed to be deteriorating. Thus, raising the question of how a culturally worshiped
politician cannot stay in power.
From: British Pathe.“Opening of Ghana Parliament (1960).” YouTube video, 4:10, 13 Apr.
2014.

As a result of the referendum, the 1960 Constitution explicitly de�ned
and criminalized corruption for the �rst time. Under Section 240, the
practice of corruption was broadly de�ned, encapsulating a variety of
intentions and forms. However, the vague nature of the law allowed the
government to apply it selectively to speci�c people and actions rather than
to anyone who met the de�nition. As the think tank, Corruption Risk
Assessment (CRA) reports, the adoption of the “Ghana Criminal Code,
1960 (Act 29) de�nes corruption narrowly as the taking of bribes, which
generally does not re�ect the multi-dimensional and complex nature of the
phenomenon.”34 In adopting a code on corruption, Nkrumah’s government
made steps to protect governmental integrity; however, the broadness of the
code corroded its purpose and allowed the government to claim action
without actual guardrails.

34 Corruption Risk Assessment (CRA), 14.

21



Furthermore, economic reality contrasted with political rhetoric. A
fundamental facet of Nkrumah’s political ideology involved African
Socialism, the myth that pre-colonial Africa shared economic resources
under socialist practices.35 Emerging from colonization, African leaders like
Nkrumah used the term to reclaim their exploited labor and aim for
economic equality. Therefore, by adopting African socialism, Nkrumah
believed he achieved economic independence for Ghana. However, as
Colonel A. A. Afrifa, witnessing the decline of freedom in Ghana argued,
Nkrumah’s economic policies “lacked socialism and were capitalist in nature
with state-run corporations and control.”36 Without an actual economic
policy, socialism transformed into a dogmatic word. As Nkrumah stated,
“Socialism means opposition to all imperialist wars, military interventions
and support for the self-determination of nations and national liberation
movements.”37 While Nkrumah sought economic agency for Ghana after
centuries of imperial exploitation through African socialism, this endeavor
failed to materialize without substantive policy.

Nkrumah used the term ‘socialism’ to veil economic corruption and
plaguing Ghana’s economic agenda. Inheriting £215 million sterling from
the British, Nkrumah used the Ghana Cocoa Board to funnel economic
resources to nationalize property and invest heavily in wasteful projects that
did not result in economic growth.38 By accruing government control over
commerce, Nkrumah limited public participation and fair market policies
such as industrialization initiatives. Political dissent tried to hold his
economic policy to account, accusing Nkrumah of packing the Ghana Cocoa

38 Ibid.

37 Mentan, Tatah (cited Kwame Nkrumah). Democratizing or Reconfiguring Predatory Autocracy?: Myths and
Realities in Africa Today, Mankon: Langaa Research & Publishing CIG, 2009, 72.

36 Afrifa, A. A. The Ghana Coup: 24th February 1966. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1966, 22.
35 Apter, Andrew. Lecture, University of California, Los Angeles, Winter 2022.

22



Board to gain control of the revenue produced by agriculture, then lobbying
the National Assembly to “threw the Board reserves into a general fund,
available for any project favored by the CCP. And within a short space of
time, the money had been squandered.”39 This embezzlement of funds
abused the farming population into an even more hopeless condition while
consolidating money in the hands of the CPP.40 The economic policies
became a mechanism of wealth transfusion from the British ruling elite to
the CPP elite without the economic advancement of the citizens of Ghana.

Since Nkrumah had become synonymous with the Pan-African agenda
and co-opted the rhetoric as a political tool, his investment in the idea led
Ghana deeper into economic trouble. As a leader in Pan-Africanism,
Nkrumah siphoned o� money to try to achieve his personal and partisan
aspirations rather than the economic promises he made to Ghanaians.
Nkrumah was working against the colonial legacy and was already limited
with resources.41 However, he still approved a £10 million sterling loan to
Guinea, an ally in Pan-Africanism.42 This “manifestation of African
fraternity and solidarity” caused more political dissent within Ghana as
Ghanaian citizens struggled to support themselves.43 As a result, cocoa
farmers saw their real income fall, and the �rst ‘austerity’ budget highlighted
the sharp rise in consumer prices.44 Straining Ghana’s monetary resources,
Nkrumah overestimated his ability to achieve Pan-Africanism while
improving life for Ghanaian citizens. For the price of prioritizing his

44 Ibid, 89.
43 Abrefa Busia, Kofi Dr. Ghana’s Struggle for Democracy and Freedom, 75.
42 Ibid, 75.
41 Abrefa Busia, Kofi Dr. Ghana’s Struggle for Democracy and Freedom Speeches.
40 Afrifa, A. A. The Ghana Coup: 24th February 1966, 89.
39, Ibid, 10.

23



Pan-African project, he ultimately showed his intentions of supporting a
political message over Ghana.

As an example of the rising political tensions, Nkrumah’s image on
coins became a signi�cant debate. Alluding to the economic conditions of
Ghana from 1960 to 1962 and political strati�cation, coins embodied a wide
range of complaints fromNkrumah’s critics. Minister of Finance, Komla
Agbeli Gbedemah, publicly defended Nkrumah's symbiotic relationship
with Ghana's founding, stating, “Now it may seem to some that this is a
dictatorship or the road to dictatorship, but we do not think so because, with
the production of these coins, there is not going to be any of the traits of
dictatorship attached to the coins.”45 Gbedemah de�ects those arguments by
claiming that coins are only a small part of Ghana’s government and should
not be used as a measure of corruption. However, these images support
Nkrumah’s rising authoritarianism. Nkrumah himself argued that many
Ghanaians could not read and write and “that they had to be shown that
they were really independent and that the only way to do that was by
signs.”46 Without a literate population, these symbols communicated the
con�ation of Nkrumah and the state to the body politic.47He had
successfully modeled the system into his own image, such that even the most
minute symbols of statehood had been eroded. As a result of the covert
economic mismanagement, money became a medium of political
representation and debate.

47 Ibid, 24.
46 Ibid, 23.

45 Abrefa Busia, Kofi Dr. (cited Minster Komla Gbedemah) Ghana’s Struggle for Democracy and Freedom
Speeches, 23.

24



Figure 8 & 9. During a durbar for Queen Elizabeth II’s visit to Ghana in 1961, the images of
the Queen and Nkrumah were printed onto DutchWax and worn by elite African women. By
tying their images together, Nkrumah’s image as the inheritor of British power and the body
politic of Ghana is strengthened.
From: British Pathe. “Durbar For Queen (1961).” YouTube video, 3:43, 13 Apr. 2014.

Despite the rising domestic unrest, Nkrumah presented a united
Ghana and an example of successful decolonization to the world. During
Queen Elizabeth II’s �rst visit to Ghana, the government hosted durbars and
horse racing to celebrate the new relationship between the former colonial
power and colony.48 Captured in Figures 8 and 9, elite Ghanaian women
wore dresses with screen-printed images of Nkrumah and Queen Elizabeth.
Symbolically, these images codify Nkrumah’s power next to the British
Crown. These women helped reinforce Nkrumah’s political leadership by
acknowledging Nkrumah as the natural successor of both British rule and
neo-traditional African power. Thus, these women’s attire naturalized
Nkrumah’s political agenda and solidi�ed his position during an uptick in
political opposition.

TheWest left Ghana alone to cope with Nkrumah’s rising
dictatorships and corruption of democratic norms. Going as far as to
legitimize Nkrumah’s regime through the Queen’s visit to Ghana, British
o�cials remained detached from the worsening political situation within

48 British Pathe. “Durbar For Queen (1961).” YouTube video, 3:43, 13 Apr. 2014.

25



their former colony. Opposition leaders were frustrated by theWest’s excuses
for Nkrumah’s corrupt behavior, stating “Africa, we are told [by theWest], is
di�erent. ‘We cannot apply our own standards there. One-party government
is good for them. They do not understand democracy in the way we do.
Corruption has always been a way of life there.’”49 Through this example, the
tropes of African corruption were established to absolve the British colonial
legacy in the political degradation under Nkrumah’s regime.

The cult of personality surrounding Nkrumah allowed his behaviors to
fall deeper into authoritarianism. From the myriad laws to the physical
placement of his statue in front of the Parliament House, dissent was severely
restricted. In his attempt to strengthen his prime ministership by weakening
courts and opposition, Nkrumah broke democratic practices and governance
norms. From hindered economic growth to political freedoms, 1957 to 1962
tracked the rise of the CPP and Nkrumah’s authoritarian power over Ghana.
Therefore, the hope of a democratic Ghana faded as the political situation
worsened during these �ve years.

Coup against Nkrumah (1963-1966)

Nkrumah originally emerged as a benevolent leader; however, by 1963,
his political maneuvering and corruption had transformed his regime into a
dictatorship. The legal, cultural, and economic foundations of the state,
along with the social capital he constructed, placed him at the center of
political power. Nkrumah’s corruption was veiled behind his political
rhetoric, only for it to come to light between 1963 and 1966. Thus, his
government spread and enforced his symbolic meaning through elections,
laws, and media freedoms while increasing restrictions on freedoms in

49 Abrefa Busia, Kofi Dr. Ghana’s Struggle for Democracy and Freedom Speeches, 28.

26



Ghana. From the Newspaper Licensing Law to the 1964 Referendum
Election, these themes of controlling information and suppressing dissent led
to simmering talks of coups against Nkrumah’s government.

Nkrumah invested heavily in the projects of Pan-Africanism because it
had become one of the political techniques in which he could control dissent
and sustain his political power. “The political uni�cation of all Africa and a
determination to breathe the air of freedom, which is theirs to breathe,”
Pan-Africanism will achieve total African liberation, he attested.50 Believing
his one-party state was the vessel in which this political agenda could grow, he
crystallized his position in power and his political agenda. Nonetheless,
opposition continued to contest Nkrumah’s authoritarian practices under
the veil of postcolonial liberation. In his personal journal collection, Edward
Collins questioned Nkrumah’s continued use of “colonialism” to mark
dissent. Stating the hypocrisy, “Dr. Nkrumah has been making a great
wordplay against a nonexistent colonialism and has been condemning
Western imperialism, and at the same time has begun campaigns against his
neighbors on the east and west which bear all the signs of imperialism
expansionism.”51 In actuality, Nkrumah’s rhetoric contrasted political action,
especially as his economic and political agendas started to fail.

51 Collins in Crosben, “Nkrumah Hits ‘Nonexisting’ Colonialism.” Brazzaville, Daily Report. Foreign Radio
Broadcasts, 12 April 1960, 3.

50 “Excerpts from Osagyefo’s Five Point Peace Plan,” The Ghanaian: Africa’s Leading Prestige Magazine, Vol. 6-7,
(Jan. 1963– Dec. 1964).

27



Figure 10. “If only he would look back and see what is happening to his country while he
spends all his energy blowing up Africa.” One of the most prevalent complaints about
Nkrumah’s political ideology was the overemphasized importance of Pan-Africanism. As a
result, Ghanaian citizens felt abandoned by their government as Nkrumah and the CPP
magni�ed African independence over the everyday functioning of the Ghanaian government
for its own citizens.
From: Crobsen, Kodjo. …Power to the People–Reflections on Retrogressive Politics. London: 1984.

Nkrumah’s government tried to control the public’s perception of his
authoritarian policies. In a speech criticizing the state-limited freedom of
speech, Busia, a prominent opponent, argued Nkrumah’s governance was
more damaging to democracy than British rule. He claimed, “The imperial
powers never thought of banning the slogan “Freedom!” even in the colonial
days under colonial rule and even though that slogan brought people
together and attacked the very existence of that colonial power.”52 The
government-sponsored repression of freedom of speech expanded
Nkrumah’s political power by giving himmore of a political amplitude.

In response, some journals claimed these signi�ed colonial tendencies
within Nkrumah’s Pan-African agenda. Written in the Accra Ghana
Domestic Service report, “TheWeekly Spectator observed that what
[Nkrumah] was aiming at was the creation of a fabulous empire for himself
in Africa.”53 The opposition argued that he was transforming
Pan-Africanism into a colonialist ideology. However, it is also important to
remember the enormous impact Pan-Africanism had on the liberation of
Africa as well as Nkrumah’s signi�cance in advancing that agenda. Under the
pressure of symbolizing such a massive undertaking, Nkrumah could not

53 “Weekly Papers Comment on Nkrumah’s Downfall.” Accra Ghana Domestic Service, Daily Report. Foreign
Radio Broadcasts, 13 March 1966, 2.

52 Abrefa Busia, Kofi Dr. Ghana’s Struggle for Democracy and Freedom Speeches 1957-69, 57.

28



hold the embodiment of Pan-Africanism without it corrupting his political
agenda.

By 1964, limitations of press freedom fostered an ecosystem of
disinformation and lack of transparency. Under the Newspaper Licensing
Act, the law required all newspaper publishers to renew their licenses every
year directly fromNkrumah’s government which became a weapon for
absolute control over the development of private news media.Without the
press having the freedom to hold politicians accountable, no one could know
of or discuss Nkrumah’s corrupt actions. Nkrumah’s hostility towards the
media became a point of attack for political rivals. From the perspective of
Nkrumah’s opposition, “the press, which in some countries champions the
freedom of the people, is now an instrument of oppression in Ghana. It
denounces civil servants, judges, even party members, and all who do not toe
the party line. The denunciation is usually a prelude to demotion, dismissal
or detention.”54 By censoring political resistance, Nkrumah masked his
government’s degradation of democratic norms. Busia expands on his point
by stating “that Ghana is the only country I know of in Africa where
freedom of speech is not only denied but has also been made an o�ense
punishable by law. The ‘rumor-mongering’ law means anyone can be tried
and punished for saying anything or expressing any opinion of which
Nkrumah does not approve.”55 In curbing the political discord, Ghana’s free
press su�ered under the government’s censorship. By 1964, Ghana’s media
system was a state-controlled monolith.56

Beyond controlling publications, Nkrumah also undermined the press
by injecting state-sponsored disinformation. Through this form of press

56 Ibid (cited Asare: 2009), 421.
55 Abrefa Busia, Kofi, Ibid, 101.
54 H.K. Akyeampong. Ghana’s Struggle for Democracy and Freedom Speeches 1957-69, 102.

29



censorship, Nkrumah projected his own failings onto his political rivals. In
an address to Parliament later publicized, he stated, “The country must be
cleansed forever of corruption and nepotism, coercion, intimidation, bribery,
and subversion must be eliminated for good.”57 Nkrumah diverted blame by
making himself the sole salvation for Ghana’s political troubles. To quash
corruption allegations, Nkrumah formed the Abraham Commission on
Trade Malpractices to create the appearance of exposing corruption.58

Nkrumah limited the accusations of bribery by tying the term to a speci�c
event. This maneuver allowed him to claim he had eliminated corruption
while dismantling future accusations’ potency. Thus, Nkrumah’s successful
de�ection of corruption accusations allowed corruption to �ourish even
more.

Voting became an illusion of political participation by the 1964
Referendum election. Disinformation had warped public opinion by
obscuring Nkrumah’s actions. Thus, when Ghanaians went to the polls, they
voted to support the amendments to the 1960 Constitution.59 With results
showing overwhelming support (2,773,920 ‘Yes’ votes and 2,452 ‘No’ votes),
Nkrumah and his political ideology could claim undoubted support from
the public.60Assuming the title of “President for Life,” Nkrumah wrote
himself and the CPP into the legal framework of Ghana.61 As stated in the
Directory of the Republic of Ghana, 1964, the amendments included:

61 Kumor, Timothy Tsifokpor. Gold Coast Now Ghana: The Early Flagbearers of Ghana The True Selfless Warriors,
Accra: Juventus Letters, 2000, 9.

60 Directory of the Republic of Ghana, 1964 including Trade Index and Biographical Section. The Diplomatic Press
and Publishing Co. no. 13, 19.

59 Ala-Adjettey, Peter, Rtd. Hon. Reflections on the Effectiveness of the Parliament of the Fourth Republic of Ghana,
6.

58 Amundsen, Inge. “Political Corruption,” 25.

57 “Text of Nkrumah Address to Parliament.” Accra Ghana Domestic Service, Daily Report. Foreign Radio
Broadcasts, 2 Oct. 1962.

30



“That there shall be one national party which will serve as the leading
core of all organizations of the people and as the vanguard of the
people in their struggle to build a socialist society; That Parliament can
surrender the sovereignty of Ghana only in furtherance of African
unity; That the President can remove a judge of the Supreme Court or
of the High Courts on the grounds that appear to him su�cient.”62

However, the election itself was insu�cient in delivering the democratic
values on which Ghana was constituted. Behind the curtain, Colonel Afrifa
wrote about his �rst-hand experience of the 1964 Referendum Election.
Afrifa wrote that his relative “who was Returning O�cer in one of the
constituencies, told [him] that before the election, he was instructed by the
Regional Commissioner that before the votes were counted, all the ‘nos’ were
to be either destroyed or transferred into the ‘yes’ ballot box.”63 The election
became a �ction of Ghanaian democracy and sanctioned Nkrumah’s regime
of corruption behind the veil of a free election.

Nkrumah used the press to justify the one-party system generated in
the post-referendum. By insisting on the validity of the election against
wide-spread acknowledgment of electoral integrity questions, Nkrumah
broke the democratic structures of a free election, free press, and checks and
balances. In doing so, he planted political corruption, which grew over
governance institutions. An example of the democratic norms manipulation
needed to hide bad governance was written in The Ghanaian. In “Osagyefo
Dilates on One Party System,” they quote “Osagyefo” [Nkrumah] to defend
the one-party state, writing, “that the African revolution had adopted [a one

63 Afrifa, A. A. The Ghana Coup: 24th February 1966. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1966, 94.
62 Ibid.

31



party] system as its more appropriate political instrument for ending
tribalism and for planning development within the democratic framework of
the African society.”64 Through this example, Nkrumah paints African
governance as incomparable to other forms of democratic development. Yet,
a single-party state eliminates accountability, allowing governments to
become corrupt.65 Beyond that, this journal illustrates the trope that Africa is
innately incapable of standard democracy and perpetuates the stereotype of
endemic African corruption.

Furthermore, the emphasis on tribalism and chieftaincy’s impact on
democracy further obscures the corruption in Ghana. Nkrumah scapegoated
his own political failures by limiting dissent. Clientelism became one of the
last forms of kinship accountability on Nkrumah. As a preventative measure
against possible rivals, he assigned their impacts as destructive on Ghana's
democracy.66 Nkrumah escaped blame by assigning all economic and political
failures to a singular facet of Ghanaian governance. From personal anecdotes,
Colonel Afrifa stated, “Between 1961 and 1965, Nkrumah proceeded to
undermine [chieftaincy]. He created paramount chiefs over and above the
heads of the natural divisional chiefs. All their traditional powers were
removed and vested in Nkrumah. He even claimed some of their titles under
the guise of portraying the African personality.”67 Nkrumah reappropriated
the same political stratifying practices British colonial o�ces used to prevent
decolonization. As a result, Nkrumah’s action corrupted traditional

67 Afrifa, A. A. The Ghana Coup, 115.

66 Mondlane, T.C., “Remedying Africa’s Self-Propelled Corruption: The Missing Link,” Politikon, 43:3, 345-370,
(2016), 352.

65 Mehra, Chander. Corruption: Dealing with the Devil, Nairobi: Shiv Publications, 2000.

64 “Osagyefo Dilates on One Party System,” The Ghanaian: Africa’s Leading Prestige Magazine, Vol. 6-7, (Jan.
1963– Dec. 1964).

32



governance structures as well as engineered political mechanisms of
corruption.

Figure 11. “Of the 8 million Ghanaians, what makes him feel he alone has all the answers.”
One of many political cartoons depicting the mass incarceration of political dissenters during
the �nal years of Nkrumah’s regime. Claiming he had all the answers and anyone not within
him was against Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah used a mass network of indoctrinated youth to jail
political opponents.
From: Crobsen, Kodjo. Power to the People–Reflections on Retrogressive Politics. London: 1984.

Nkrumah’s authoritarian actions bred hidden dissent. Recalling these
rising tensions, Colonel Afrifa stated Ghanaians feared the political and
economic insecurity: “Fathers did not trust their sons who had been
indoctrinated with Young Pioneer ideas. It was a reign of terror. The
Preventive Detention Act was used indiscriminately. Nkrumah was strong;
there were no constitutional means of getting rid of him.”68 From jailing the
opposition or expelling them from the country, society lived under the
dictatorship of Nkrumah’s regime.69 Nkrumah had embedded corruption
into the social and moral fabric. In abusing the public for his own interests,
Nkrumah had degraded societal cohesion. In a report labeled “Weekly Papers
Comment on Nkrumah’s Downfall,” theDaily Radio Broadcast Report
argued that “the frustrations were due, says the Mirror, to the fact that
Nkrumah, the dictator, [allowed] intellectuals to gather around him,
fraudulent, corrupt, and disgusting individuals who sold their conscience

69 Crobsen, Kodjo. Power to the People–Reflections on Retrogressive Politics. London: 1984.
68 Afrifa, A. A. The Ghana Coup, 37.

33



only to do the tyrant’s bidding.”70 In this watershed moment, the press
abandoned Nkrumah.

After years of hidden opposition, widespread dissent bubbled to the
surface. AnotherDaily Radio Broadcast Report, titled “Nkrumah’s
Corruption and Tyranny Scored,” states, “The whole country has been
shocked by the revelation of Nkrumah’s dishonesty, embezzlement of public
funds, and his utter disregard for the welfare of the people. While he was
preaching socialism at home, he was fraudulently misusing public funds on a
licentious and brutish private life.”71 These allegations were substantiated by
these leaked records.72 However, without the spreading of grassroots
movement through subversive interpersonal communication and foreign
press, the political environment might have remained corrupted. The
economic environment, which led many Ghanaians to a state of desperation,
further pushed citizens to galvanize together against the CPP and Nkrumah.

While on a diplomatic trip en route to Hanoi, North Vietnam, the
NLC used Nkrumah’s absence to overthrow the government in a military
coup.73 Colonel Kotoka, the leader of the NLC, declared a military coup on
the radio at 6 a.m., on February 24, 1966, stating, “The military, in
cooperation with the Ghana police, has taken over the government of Ghana
today. The myth surrounding Nkrumah has been broken.”74 The years of
economic hardship and political instability wore heavy once the public
learned of Nkrumah’s political manipulation and party embezzlement.

74 Afrifa, A. A. The Ghana Coup, 37.
73 Kumor, Timothy Tsifokpor. Gold Coast Now Ghana, 9.
72 Ghana Year Book 1966-67. Accra: 1966-67.

71 “Nkrumah’s Corruption and Tyranny Scored.” Accra Ghana Domestic Service, Daily Report. Foreign Radio
Broadcasts,16 March 1966, 2.

70 “Weekly Papers Comment on Nkrumah’s Downfall.” Accra Ghana Domestic Service, Daily Report. Foreign
Radio Broadcasts, 13 March 1966, 2.

34



Once exposed by government o�cials and leaked documents, the
subsequent coup of 1966 symbolized the end of Nkrumah’s regime in
Ghana. The degradation of a free press and political opposition led the
people to rely on Nkrumah's political rhetoric. Behind the scenes, Ghana
crumbled under the lack of economic advancement and unrealistic policy
goals. From the public's view, Ghanaians saw the rising economic
inequalities, unfair elections, and the implementation of draconian laws. The
upwelling of societal stress formed networks of hidden opposition. The coup
of 1966 shattered the political illusions crafted by Nkrumah and the CPP.

Figure 12. The broken statue of Nkrumah was located outside Parliament House in Accra
after the successful coup on February 24, 1966. The beheaded statue symbolizes the epiphany
of the citizens that the images Nkrumah had created were merely veils over the reality of his
actions.
From: Getty Images, Ghana Coup, circaMarch 1966.

By unveiling Nkrumah's dissipative actions, the NLC justi�ed its own
authoritarian seizure of power. Citing corruption and lack of moral character
of Nkrumah's government, the NLC overthrew the 'democratic' government
with a military regime. As a common rationale of military coups in Africa,
they targeted howNkrumah had failed to deliver on his Pan-African
promises which led to Ghana’s underdevelopment. The NLC used this
contrast to exaggerate his harm and greatly relied on exposing Nkrumah’s
political failures to sustain their coup. Amundsen argues that their goal was

35



“to discredit the Nkrumah regime as thoroughly as possible, and thereby to
legitimize its seizure of power.”75 Allegations were furthered by arguing that
“the country’s leading newspapers and journals were still �lled with reports
of corruption and discussions of causes, e�ects, and curses.”76 Reports of
personal embezzlement in the Cocoa Board and government infrastructure
like Lake Volta sustained their accusations. Thus, the public had to reckon
with the shattering of Nkrumah’s political illusions. In theDaily Radio
Broadcast Report labeled “Papers Discuss Nkrumah Statements, Chiefs”
leading Chiefs re�ected on the public’s poignant feelings writing that
Nkrumah had “founded and built his corrupt party and government on a
pack of lies by deliberately detaining honorable citizens of Ghana, some of
whom died in prison cells for daring to make the truth known.”77 After the
coup, Nkrumah was reimagined within Ghana. The NLC leveraged real and
exaggerated claims of corruption to cloak Nkrumah’s achievements while
�lling the political gap left by his absence. However, the coup merely
transferred power without fundamentally reshaping Ghana's political
ecosystem.

The story of Nkrumah’s regime in Ghana ended with the 1966 military
coup and the exposure of his political corruption. However, his legacy
fundamentally in�uenced African independence and Pan-Africanism.
Nkrumah, painted within this context, is not constrained within a binary
between good and bad. Instead, he embodies the multidimensional outcomes
of decolonization and African independence. Colonel Afrifa perfectly
summarizes the impact Nkrumah had on the African continent. He claimed

77 Papers Discuss Nkrumah Statements, Chiefs.” Accra Ghana Domestic Service, Daily Report. Foreign Radio
Broadcasts, 14 April 1966, 1.

76 Ibid, xi.
75 Amundsen, Inge. “Political Corruption,” 25.

36



Nkrumah’s nefarious actions led to a perversion of the constitution and the
plight of Ghanaians which justi�ed the coup.78 However, “one cannot
underrate his impact on African politics and his contribution to the
emancipation movement of the Black people in their quest for human
dignity and a place in history.”79 Thus, this analysis shows the duality of
Nkrumah and the independence movement in the First Republic. By
comparing the harsh realities of corruption with Nkrumah’s cultural impact
on the African diaspora, studying this history is critical in understanding
Ghana’s political history and global legacy.

Conclusion

Kwame Nkrumah and the study of post-colonial leaders do not exist as
a binary between omniscient benevolence and destructive corruption.
Understanding the way theoretical and rhetorical tools help analyze the
cultural and political lens reveals a complex history. By structurally applying
how the erosion of trust, violation of freedoms, and corruption transforms
democracy into authoritarian rule and even dictatorship, a picture of Ghana's
postcolonial instability emerges.

Within African History and Postcolonial History, Ghana exempli�es
some of the most fundamental patterns and themes that emerged during the
ThirdWorld Colonial Independence movements. By looking at Ghana's
political history, from the rising nationalism of the 1940s to the corrupted
governance of Nkrumah, Ghana's postcolonial government fell into
authoritarian rule through both visible and invisible corruption. This
analysis of Ghana’s political history proves to be critical in understanding its

79 Ibid, 124.
78 Afrifa, A. A. The Ghana Coup, 124.

37



history and the broader implications of post-British colonialism within
Africa. By using media forms as a measure of free speech, research reveals
how symbols of Ghana's rise and fall of democracy are embedded within the
cultural, social, and political fabric. Through analysis, this study aimed to
track the multiple pathways Nkrumah used to form structural oppression,
media, and cult of peronality to harness others into supporting his own
ambitions during the transfer of authority in post-colonial Ghana.

More broadly, Ghana’s political history illustrated pathways developing
countries have navigated as they strive for economic and democratic
expansion. Through the historical analysis of Ghana, the connections of
economic data as proof of good governance and economic advancement are
reversed and refocused on the cultural and social historical patterns. This
presents a fuller image of Ghana's political climate in the postcolony.

Figure 13. “The hornblowers are announcing the demise of a great leader and ushering
visitors to his tomb.” Kwame NkrumahMemorial Park represents the signi�cance of
Nkrumah and what his legacy means to present-day Ghanaians.
From: Horn Blowers in the Fountain Pool, Heritage and Cultural Society of Africa Foundation:

Ghana, Google Arts & Culture, 2020.

Time has washed away the accusations of corruption and the people
have reclaimed the political dei�cation of Nkrumah in a transformed light.

38



When the complexities of history are lost within the cultural context over
time, it allows new authors of society to revise and repurpose history for a
new set of conditions. This is seen through the changes in cultural
perception of Nkrumah’s legacy and image. Now, Nkrumah's name printed
across banners includes only part of the history. His image symbolizes the
best portrayal of his regime and of his beliefs to indicate where the people
hope their country's future lies. Tied to the hope he inspired and his legacy of
African empowerment, his name is an allusion to the political imagery he
created during his years of leadership. The omnipresent allusions to
Nkrumah keep history alive and ingrain it into modern discourse.

39



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Company Limited, 1966.

Ahmand, Murtada Busair, Chudey Pride, and Anthony Komlatse Corsy.
“Free Speech, Press Freedom, and Democracy in Ghana: A Conceptual
and Historical Overview,” inMedia Controversy: Breakthroughs in
Research and Practice, Vol. 2, 418- 432, (2020).

Ala-Adjettey, Peter, Rtd. Hon.Reflections on the Effectiveness of the
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Story Cloth as Historical Source in Post

Apartheid South Africa

LillianWilliams

Introduction to Story Cloth:
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)

often excluded Black and indigenous women from its collective
history-writing. Several embroidery projects for the creation of story cloth
were founded in the poorest parts of the country in the 1980s-2000s to
address this silencing of Black women’s voices and alleviate their struggles.
Story cloth, also called memory cloth, is a type of narrative made through the
textile art of embroidery or appliqué.1 Story cloth portrays stories or scenes
and may or may not feature words. Through story cloth, Black and
indigenous women have widened the archive to include social history and
re�ect the experiences of those least remembered. These projects allow
women to share memories of apartheid and broaden the opportunities for
those who cannot write or do not have the platform to share their
stories. This paper will explore how four embroidery projects can broaden
the understanding of apartheid through story cloth: the Amazwi Abesifazane
(Voices of Women) Project, the Mapula Embroidery Project, the Intuthuko
Embroidery Project, and the Mogalkwena Craft Art Development
Foundation Storybook Project.

1 Ria Van der Merwe, “From a Silent Past to a Spoken Future. Black Women’s Voices in the Archival Process,” Archives and
Records 40, no. 3 (2019):.4.

49



Since the late twentieth century, historians have promised to improve
their craft by evaluating material objects.2 Despite this, story cloth is a
signi�cant resource yet to be used in a meaningful way by historians. In the
2000s, after the founding of several story cloth projects, scholars such as Ria
Van der Merwe, Puleng Segalo, Brenda Schmahmann, and Carol Becker
began highlighting the impact they could have in transforming South
African history from individualistic to collectivist narratives. These scholars
not only study history but psychology, sociology, art history, and visual
culture. Despite this swell of support, change has not come. Perhaps the
reason is that historians simply do not know how to use this type of evidence.
John T. Schlebecker argues that historians ignore objects because “they
cannot tell in advance what they might learn” from them.3 This lack of vision
and understanding of how to analyze material sources has not changed much
since his article was written forty-seven years ago.

As scholar Ria Van Der Merwe explains, the TRC and scholars alike
agree that if South Africa is to develop into a stable democracy, all people in
South Africa must be able to share their past and histories.4 Ultimately, the
longevity and success of South African democracy is at risk. Yet, there is a
glaring gap in the history of South Africa, with women, especially Black
women, being predominantly ignored. To �ll this gap, historians must
democratize histories in order to support democracy. Story cloths, as Van Der
Merwe argues, “could be seen as a step towards addressing the absence of
women in history and their role in contributing to the collective memory

4 Ria Van der Merwe, “From a Silent Past to a Spoken Future. Black Women’s Voices in the Archival Process,” Archives and
Records 40, no. 3 (2019): 22-23.

3 John T. Schlebecker, “The Use of Objects in Historical Research,” Agricultural History 51, no. 1 (Agricultural History
Society: 1977): 202.

2 Many scholars cite Colleen E. Kriger’s 1996 work “Museum Collections as Sources for African History,” in which she
argues objects are useful as historical sources in the African context.

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acknowledged”.5 If South Africa is to be a “Rainbow Nation,” a truly
inclusive state, it must recognize the contributions of all its citizens and allow
them to add to the collective memory of their nation’s history. I argue that
although story cloths are often undervalued as material objects for historical
study, universities must prioritize instruction in analyzing material objects
and legislatures should subsidize story cloth projects, as they are essential in
determining the endurance and prosperity of South African democracy, as
the nation tries to create its memory and history.

In the next three sections, I will demonstrate the signi�cance of story
cloth as a historical source and support my argument for the necessity of
university instruction in analyzing material objects and government
subsidization of work with story cloth. I will �rst highlight ongoing debates
regarding story cloth to explain why this gap continues and why correcting
this in the historical �eld is imperative. I will then suggest methodological
strategies to analyze story cloth to improve the study of South African
history. Finally, I will demonstrate the usefulness of story cloth as a historical
source by analyzing story cloths from each of the projects using my proposed
methodology.

Key Debates:
Most of us will readily agree that South African historians should

analyze story cloth more often to learn from the rich personal histories it has
to o�er. This agreement usually ends, however, when determining how this
analysis should be done and what cautions should be taken during this
process. Story cloth projects were developed with two goals: to be a means of
�nancial support for the poorest demographics and a way of recording stories
5 Ibid., 23.

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of those who were ignored by the TRC. Psychology researcher Puleng Segalo
warns against simply analyzing story cloth as “empowering” for the women
involved in these projects, explaining that many participants have no choice
due to �nancial hardships.6 Other historians, such as Brenda Schmahmann,
caution that pro�t may in�uence what women can and cannot include in
their story cloths 7 Furthermore, the projects are carried out mostly by
women in the most rural and poorest parts of South Africa and thus should
not be taken to be emblematic of all Black and indigenous women’s
experiences. However, these are not fundamental barriers to the use of story
cloth as a historical source, but rather critical ways to approach them.
Historians must always consider bias, regardless of the source type.

For the sake of democracy in South Africa and the progression of
history as a �eld, historians of South Africa must actively seek to include
story cloth in their work. Moreover, the scholars conducting these projects
must strive to make these collections more readily available. Puleng Segalo
and gender scholar Carol Becker emphasize that when many story cloths are
viewed together, common historical patterns may be drawn out.8 Becker
argues that “when amassed, these memory cloths become a collective
indictment of apartheid.”9 Yet, scholars often only make a few representative
story cloths available digitally. The largest archival collection, Amazwi
Abesifazane, is currently unavailable due to maintenance. The government,
as Bernice Stott points out, should subsidize Amazwi Abesifazane by

9 Carol Becker, “Amazwi Abesifazane (Voices of Women),” Art Journal 63, no 4, 2004): 119

8 Puleng Segalo, “Using Cotton, Needles, and Threads to Break the Women’s Silence: Embroideries as a Decolonising
Framework,” International Journal of Inclusive Education 20, no. 3 (May 28, 2015): 7; Carol Becker, “Amazwi Abesifazane
(Voices of Women),” Art Journal 63, no 4 (2004): 122.

7 Brenda Schmahmann, “Stitches as Sutures: Trauma and Recovery in Works by Women in the Mapula Embroidery
Project,” African Arts 38, no. 3 (September 2005): 56.

6 Puleng Segalo, “Using Cotton, Needles and Threads to Break the Women’s Silence: Embroideries as a Decolonising
Framework,” International Journal of Inclusive Education 20 (May 2015): 14.

52



“gathering and housing” its archive .10 Through housing this archive, the
government could lend support to cultural and artistic resources. Some
projects, such as Amazwi Abesifazane, have been used to hear the voices of
women in parliament, showing how impactful these projects may be.11

Increasing their presence digitally and in archives will a�rm the legitimacy of
story cloth and give historians greater access. Further, maintaining online
archives can be expensive and labor-intensive so government assistance could
relieve this.

I argue that as more historians include material objects in their
research, the more accepted and expected this practice will become.
Historians shy away from analyzing material objects because they are
uncomfortable doing so. At �rst glance, the meaning of an art piece or object
may be unclear while written sources, such as newspapers, diaries, and letters
can be safer and more digestible for historians. In addition to the
contextualization that any historical source requires, material sources require
more labor to extract meaning from. Moreover, historians may fear that their
interpretation of objects or art may be contested. Interpreting these objects
often requires a multidisciplinary approach. As The Oxford Handbook of
History and Material Culture explains, a material object is just as rich as a
written document but requires “the application of interpretive skills
appropriate to it” that are developed from �elds that “are often relatively
unfamiliar to historians, including anthropology, archaeology, and art
history.”12 History programs should design coursework to develop this skill. I

12 Gaskell, Ivan, and Sarah Anne Carter, eds. “Introduction: Why History and Material Culture?” In The Oxford
Handbook of History andMaterial Culture. Online: Oxford Academic, (2020): 4.

11 Bokamoso Bo Rona, “Amazwi Abesifazane National Campaign Gauteng Workshop,” Produced by Shoot the Breeze
Productions for the Parliamentary Millennium Programme. (June 7, 2012): 1:05.

10 Bernice Stott, “The Reconstitution of African Women’s Spiritualities in the Context of the Amazwi Abesifazane (Voices
of Women) Project in Kwazulu-Natal 1988-2005,” (Master’s thesis, Durban Institute of Technology 2006): 124.

53



believe that students exercising a methodology like the one I will propose can
introduce them to using this type of source material. Getting students to
think early on about what constitutes a source can encourage them to
develop the exploratory and creative critical thinking required to analyze
material culture. The historical �eld overall would bene�t from more
experience in utilizing material objects as historical sources. In this case,
material objects often grant insight into the lives of lower classes who are not
included in the archive, such as Black women in post-Apartheid South
Africa.

ProposedMethodology:
My interest in story cloth as a historical source stems from my own

initial hesitancy and illiteracy in analyzing material and artistic sources as a
junior historian. The analysis of material objects in traditional history
courses has never been part of my curriculum, but I was struck by the
amount of story cloth I saw in museums when visiting South Africa and
became interested in their historical value. I realized that in order to argue
that story cloth should be included in histories, I needed to suggest a method
by which to do this. A methodology for working with story cloth seemed
challenging because of the overwhelming nature of the medium, which
features many colors and depictions of seemingly disjointed images or events.
Furthermore, sometimes there are no words to help determine what the
images may be.

To create a methodological strategy, I �rst looked at skillful analyses of
story cloth by scholars who have advocated for their use as a historical source.
I pulled out common strategies they used and questions they answered about
the pieces. I then researched common methodologies for analyzing material

54



and artistic sources.13 Combining these sources of advice, I have developed
the following strategy for analyzing story cloth for historical use.

First, gather as much background information as possible. This process
begins before analyzing the story cloth itself. By discovering key information
about the author and the context, patterns and greater signi�cance may be
more distinguishable in the story cloth. By asking key questions, you can
develop a toolkit to keep in mind while analyzing the story cloth. What year
was the piece created? Who is the artist? What is the artist’s background, and
how might it relate to their art piece? Under which project (if applicable) was
the story cloth created, and how might this in�uence the �nal piece? Did the
artist have any incentives in making the art piece? Was the art piece a response
to something? Is this story cloth unique in the context of the project? Was it
sold? What biases may this artist or project have?

Once you have this background information in mind, write down any
initial impressions and observations you have about the story cloth. What
grabs your attention? What are the colors like? What is the size of the piece?
What is the composition (or organization) of the piece? Does the piece have
any obvious function?

Next, get specific and detailed with the work. What images are featured?
What might be the signi�cance of these images? For instance, if there is a
plant, does it have any signi�cance in South African history or culture? Make
note of any image and, if there are multiple images, how they relate to one
another. Make note of any words and what these might allude to. Do
background research on any images that you can and make note of these.

13 World History Common’s “Analyzing Material Objects,” and Skidmore College’s “Visual Analysis Guidelines” were
particularly helpful.

55



After you have made your initial research and ideas of what the author
was trying to achieve, connect this to your larger research question. Does this
source add any new information to your research? Does it support other
sources or con�ict with them? Does the story cloth say anything about the
longevity of an idea or event in the mind of the creator and their larger
society?

The exact order of these steps is not important. What is more
important is seeing how these questions and pieces of the puzzle can come
together to make what once was indiscernible into a story of larger historical
consequence. I will show how my methodology can be useful by breaking
down each step with a di�erent story cloth from each of the projects
discussed earlier.
A Closer Look at Story Cloth:

56



Figure 1. Elizabeth Malete, When You Strike aWoman You Strike a Rock, 2005, 84 x 115 cm,
embroidery on black cotton cloth. Collection of the Institute for Social and Economic
Research (ISER), Rhodes University, Grahamstown. Used with permission from
photographer Paul Mills.

Historian Brenda Schmahmann e�ectively demonstrates how
gathering background
information can deepen and strengthen the analysis of a story cloth in her
book Mapula: Embroidery and Empowerment in theWinterveld.
Schmahmann analyzes Elizabeth Malete’s story cloth entitled, “When You
Strike a Woman You Strike a Rock” (Figure 1). She identi�es key background
information of both the artist and the project the artist operates in. The
project’s location and therefore the home of the artists is central to the cloth.
Due to laws passed under apartheid that pushed Black people from many
areas, the Winterveld became an abode for “many dislocated Africans of
di�erent ethnic and cultural backgrounds.”14 Despite consisting of many
peoples of various ethnicities, this area was legally reclassi�ed as a Tswana
‘homeland’ under the Bantu Homelands Citizens Act of 1970.15 This meant
that Tswana speakers, who only made up around 20% of this region, would
be granted special privileges, and any other citizens could be considered
“illegal.”16 The apartheid government left the social welfare of these people to
the Bophuthatswana government, which refused to help them. The area was
led by Lucas Mangope, who was an ethnic nationalist and harassed
non-Tswana speakers.17 Moreover, the living conditions of this region were

17 Ibid, 11.

16 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

14 Brenda Schmahmann, Mapula: Embroidery and Empowerment in theWinterveld, (Parkwood, South Africa: David Krut
Publishing, 2006): 10.

57



abysmal under apartheid rule. There were no sewage or electricity services.18

There was no public water supply, so instead people would have to pay plot
holders for access to water, which often carried diseases.19 Residents su�ered
from cholera, malnutrition, scabies, and the infant mortality rate ranged
from 10-50%.20 These already dire health situations worsened in the 80s and
90s when HIV/AIDS swept through the region.21 In addition to poor living
conditions, education was virtually inaccessible. Lessons were only given in
Tswana, and school registration required a birth certi�cate.22 The schools
that did exist lacked sta� and funding. These conditions have had lasting
impacts beyond the end of the apartheid government. Many adults had
received no formal education at all in 1990, with only 59% of women and
40% of men having gone to school.23 As of 1990, 80% of people were
unemployed. Poverty is rampant in the region as well as crime. While water
has become more available, lack of electricity remains prominent.24

Educational systems are still poor, with overcrowding. These lasting
infrastructural damages have created challenges that projects such as the
Mapula Embroidery Project seek to address.

The project was founded in 1991 and was funded and supported by
numerous groups including the sta� at the University of South Africa,
Soroptimists International, and the Sisters of Mercy. These groups o�ered
support to the project because of a commitment to upgrade “the

24 Brenda Schmahmann, Mapula: Embroidery and Empowerment in theWinterveld, (Parkwood, South Africa: David Krut
Publishing, 2006): 15.

23 Ibid.

22 Ibid..

21 Ibid.

20 Ibid..

19 Ibid.

18 Ibid, 13.

58



circumstances of women in the Winterveld.”25 The Mapula artists are
women in the Winterveld who are “victims of an apartheid system that
denied them basic human rights” and su�ered “discrimination on the
grounds of their gender.”26 This project provides an income to the artists and
allows for their histories and experiences to be recorded and shared and to
re�ect on local and world events.27 In this discussion, there are a variety of
key pieces of contextual information of which historians should take
particular note. First, this project was designed to help assuage the situations
of women in some of the most a�ected regions of the country. The
experiences of these artists are not to be taken as every woman’s experience.
Next, the women are working for an income and the project relies on the
support of various groups and individuals. Thus, this funding requirement
may in�uence what is created. It is often a necessity for the livelihood of these
women, which should be considered in their motivations and experiences.

Next, Schmahmann gives background on the artist, Elizabeth Malete.
She explains that Malete created this story cloth in 2005, after watching a
television report that Sarah Baartman’s remains had been returned to South
Africa.28 Sarah Baartman was a Khoisan woman who was exhibited under the
name “Hottentot Venus” and studied by Europeans who were fascinated
with her anatomy and wanted to support their perceived racial superiority.29

Schmahmann explains that while Malete was encouraged by this public
event, she probably chose this topic because it was relatable to her own

29 “Sara ‘Saartjie’ Baartman,” South African History Online, accessed May 03, 2023.

28 Brenda Schmahmann, Mapula: Embroidery and Empowerment in theWinterveld, (Parkwood, South Africa: David Krut
Publishing, 2006): 2.

27 Elaine Ericksen Sullivan, “Review of BearingWitness: Embroidering History in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Ufamu: A
Journal of African Studies 38, no. 1 (2014): 295

26 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

59



experiences. Malete lives in what was once part of Bophuthatswana, as
discussed above.30 Malete and her family spoke Ndebele, which would have
made their situation di�cult in this Tswana ‘homeland.’ Indeed, ultimately,
they were denied the ownership of land and faced the threat of eviction.31

Malete was not considered a citizen and was unable to vote until she was
thirty-�ve years old.32

Schmahmann adeptly links Malete’s personal background to the
signi�cance and meaning of the subject of her story cloth stating:
“Baartman’s homecoming signi�ed her return to a country that seeks to
ensure human dignity for all its citizens, and Malete is likewise celebrating
the liberties and rights a�orded her in a new political dispensation.”33 She
could also be speaking to her own sort of homecoming through the
acquisition of citizenship rights in 1994.34 Schmahmann demonstrates how
gaining background information on the project and the artist can present
new pathways of historical relativity and connection. We can see how
Malete’s story can be linked to that of Sarah Baartman’s, as well as a larger
story of human dignity and autonomy for Black South African women both
in the nation and globally. The title refers to the song sung by 20,000 women
of all races on a march protesting the 1952 announcement that Black women
would have to start carrying passes. The highly unpopular pass law dictated
where and when Black people were allowed to be and had previously only
applied to Black men. While the women marched to the capital, they sang
“‘Wathint’ abafazi, wathint’ imbokodo’ which means “You Strike a Woman

34 Ibid..

33 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

30 Brenda Schmahmann, Mapula: Embroidery and Empowerment in theWinterveld, (Parkwood, South Africa: David Krut
Publishing, 2006): 2.

60



You Strike a Rock.”35 These famous words have come to represent the work
of women to gain independence and rights throughout South African
history. Malete’s cloth gives insight into women’s struggles during apartheid
and how they continue to struggle today.

Figure 2. Elisa Mangka, Photograph 11.27 Senwabarwana, 2007. Embroidery, Coll.
Mogalakwena Ethnographic Art Archives (MEAA). Used with permission from copyright
owner Dr. Elbé Coetsee. This photograph is part of Dr. Coetsee’s research project The

35 SAHA - South African History Archive. “You Strike the Women, You Strike the Rock!” Accessed March 15, 2024.
https://www.saha.org.za/women/national_womens_day.htm.

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https://www.saha.org.za/women/national_womens_day.htm
https://www.saha.org.za/women/national_womens_day.htm


documentation, categorisation, contextualisation, preservation and dissemination of
contemporary Northern Sotho culture.

To demonstrate how initial impressions and observations can lead to
e�ective analysis, I will discuss a story cloth created by Elisa Mangka for the
Mogalkwena Craft Art Development Foundation embroidered story cloth
project (Figure 2). Even in cases when one does not have much information
on the artist’s background—as we do in the case of Elizabeth Malete—it is
still possible to get rich details. Elisa Mangka’s story cloth is entitled
Senwabarwana, after an underdeveloped South African region. However,
this underdevelopment is not the focus of Mangka’s piece. Even just an initial
impression conveys what she most cares about: people. The people are the
largest �gures depicted and represent a variety of races. Wearing colorful
clothes and carrying shopping bags from the clothing store “Jet,” the people
appear happy. The piece is labeled “2007,” showing that in a post-apartheid
South Africa, perhaps the most signi�cant change is that people of all races
may once again live and work together. Also central to the piece are two cars,
which could represent modernity and technological advancements in the
area. A man in the right corner withdraws money from a bank, which had
long been unsafe. The people are also seemingly engaging in shopping from
businesses, showing perhaps better living standards with more spending
money.

The cloth seemingly celebrates conspicuous consumption, which is
signi�cant in the context of South African apartheid and the construction of
democracy and citizenship politics. Conspicuous consumption allows people
to demonstrate status, accomplishments, and citizenship.36 As Dr. Hannah J.

36 Hannah J. Dawson, “Faking It or Making It: The Politics of Consumption and the Precariousness of Social Mobility in South
Africa,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 29 (2023): 145.

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Dawson, Senior Researcher at the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies at
the University of the Witwatersrand, explains, “in a country that for decades
denied the Black majority’s claim to citizenship, and restricted what they
could consume, conspicuous consumption is more than a signal of wealth or
status,” it also symbolizes “belonging and freedom from apartheid.”37

Mangka’s story cloth illustrates the perceived connection between democracy
and equality to access to material goods. Overall, the people are engaging
with and enjoying their region’s infrastructure and economic developments.
While we do not know much about Mangka, we can make conclusions about
her everyday life and what she values through this piece. Despite her region of
South Africa being comparatively underdeveloped, she shows an
appreciation for a region where people of all races can live peacefully and
enjoy a safer and more economically prosperous life than before. Her story
cloth serves as an archival source to show development in regions of South
Africa post-apartheid and the signi�cance of these improvements in the
everyday lives of Black South African women. It also illustrates South
African constructions of the meanings of democracy and wealth through a
presentation of a rainbow nation in which all may freely move and spend.

37 Ibid.

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Figure 3. Florence N. Mdolo. Violence in 1996-97: Train Victims, 2001-02. Cloth with
embroidery and beadwork. 10 ½ x 13 ¼ in. (26.7 x 34.9 cm), irreg.

Next, Florence N. Mdolo’s Violence in 1996-97 Train Victims,
demonstrates the bene�t of the speci�city of imagery in a piece (Figure 3).
Mdolo created this story cloth from 2001-2002 for the Amazwi Abesifazane
(Voices of Women) project. Taking up most of the cloth is a yellow and
orange train on white tracks. To the right, there are criminals violently
robbing and even murdering those waiting for the train. The train is an
important symbol of apartheid in South Africa. While many had been able to
walk to work in the years before, apartheid zoning laws forced Black people
to live and work in new, distant townships and settlements, sometimes three

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hours away from their original homes. Therefore, the train became a
constant feature of life.

Not only were families torn apart due to the distance and strain, but
commuters were also frequent targets of violent crime. As Mdolo explains,
“those who went to work would thank God for coming back home alive.
Others resigned from their jobs while some were dismissed because of being
absent from work for so many days because of the lack of transport.”38

Mdolo’s narrative makes analyzing this story cloth easier and more expansive
(the Amazwi Abesifazane collected these narratives, accessible via Carol
Becker’s article on the project). Mdolo’s words show how the violence in the
scene impacted life in individual families and in the obstacles blocking Black
people from working. Her narrative expands the circumstances of this scene.
Violence was not only something that happened by the government in
sporadic events, but it was also a daily part of life. People were driven to
desperation and families were torn apart. Mdolo’s story cloth helps illustrate
the power of these sources in revealing social history. As human geography
professor Cheryl McEwan explains, “Unlike the grand narratives of histories
of apartheid, the memory cloths also reveal that everyday survival struggles
and violence against women within communities are often foremost in the
memories of Black women.”39 These story cloths highlight the more intimate
features of everyday life that Black women experienced that may be lost in
larger narratives of apartheid. Through the symbolism of the train, Mdolo
emphasizes that violence had become an everyday event.

39 Cheryl McEwan, “Building a