FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE KMT INTERVENTION IN BURMA THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM The Southeast Asia Program was organized at Cornell University in the Department of Far Eastern Studies in 1950. It is a teaching and research program of interdisciplinary studies in the humanities, social sciences, and some natural sciences. It deals with Southeast Asia as a region, and with the individual countries of the area: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The activities of the Program are carried on both at Cornell and in Southeast Asia. They include an undergraduate and graduate curriculum at Cornell which provides instruction by specialists in Southeast Asian cultural history and present-day affairs and offers intensive training in each of the major .languages of the area. The Program sponsors group research projects on Thailand, on Indonesia, on the Philippines, and on the area's Chinese minorities. At the same time, individual staff and students of the Program have done field research in every Southeast Asian country. A list of publications relating to Southeast Asia which may be obtained on prepaid order directly from the Program is given at the end of this volume. Information on Program staff, fellowships, requirements for degrees, and current course offerings will be found in an Announcement of the Department of Asian Studies, obtainable from the Director, Southeast Asia Program, 120 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14850. • • 11 FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE KMT INTERVENTION IN BURMA by Robert H. Taylor Data Paper: Number 93 Southeast Asia Program . Department of Asian Studies Cornell University, Ithaca, New York Price: $3.50 CORNELL UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM 1973 International Standard Book Number 0-87727-093-7 lV PREFACE One of the most neglected episodes in the history of post-war Asian international relations has been the invasion of Burma by the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) troops of Chiang Kai-shek and the enduring consequerices of this action. Beginning in 1950 and continuing for more than a decade, Kuomintang military operations had a maj•or impact on Burma's internal political life and foreign policy, with consequences which are still operative. Indeed, the pattern and dynamics of power in present-day Burma ,cannot be adequately appreci­ ated without an understanding of this phenomenon. Conceived in Washington as part of a grand strategy to contain the People's Republic of China, the plan to utilize remnants of Chiang's forces for the purpose of harassing and weakening the Peking government from bases wrested from the Burmese was an ignominious failure. These Kuomintang troops had little stomach for the risks involved in military probes back into China and instead moved deeper into Burma, occupy­ ing and pillaging extensive areas. Modern U.S. military equipment was airdropped to them in such quantity that they were able to provide many of these arms to Shan and Karen insurgents with whom they made tactical military alliances against the government of Burma. As a consequence, centrifu­ gal ethnic political forces in the country were significantly strengthened. Although the CIA played a major role in this affair during both the Truman and th· e Eisenhower admini.strations, no substantial treatment of it appeared in the American press until April 1966 when The New York Times included it in a general over-view of CIA activities. Moreover, Western studies of Asian international relations, ev�n those confined to Southeast Asia, have nearly all eschewed all but the most limited reference to this matter and have usually avoided any reference to the CIA's pivotal role. The only exceptions known to me aie Oliver Clubb Jr.'s brief (four pages}, but forthright, treatment in his United States and the Sino­ Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia, published in 1962, and his earlier Rand Corporation study dealin� with the 1950-1954 period, "The Effect of Chinese Nationalist Military Activity in Burma on Burmese Foreign Policy." But his accounts and that of The New York Times cover only a small part of the V story, with even Clubb's longer Rand Corporation study deal­ ing with just the beginning years. Continuing U.S. government secrecy has made it difficult to marshal! the data necessary for providing anything ap­ proaching a full account. Only investigation of a wide range of sources, research informed by an extensive knowledge of both modern Burma and Asian internatj_onal relations, could make possible fitting the many scattered pieces of pertinent data into a coherent and meaningful picture. This has been Robert Taylor's achievement in preparing this first compre­ hensive study of the nature and consequences of what the Burmese refer to as "The Kuomintang Aggression." Those who wish to understand the problems of contempo­ rary Burma as well as those interested in the facts of post­ war Asian international relations and American Far Eastern policy should be grateful to Mr. Taylor for his scholarly account of a development of major importance whose character and dimensions have until now been so obscured. George McT. Kahin Ithaca, July 15, 1973 . V1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I . Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 I I. Background • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3 III. The KMT Emergency, 1949-1954 • • • • • • • • • 10 IV. Continued Effects of the KMT Intervention, 1954-1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • 51 V. The Second KMT Crisis, February-March, 1961 • • 59 VI. The Consequences of the KMT Intervention for Burma in the 1960's . . . . . . . . o. . . . . 63 VI I. Conclusion • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 66 Bibliography • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 68 Vl1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The intrusion of Chinese Nationalist troops into the Union of Burma, soon after Burma regained independence, posed serious problems of internal and external security for the new government. These troops, normally referred to as the KMT,tl entered northern Burma from Yunnan Province following their defeat by the army of the People's Republic of China. Internally, the primary problem faced by independent Burma was the need to integrate into one state the five major ethnic groups that composed the Union. These groups histori­ cally had had only tenuous ti.es with each other, and the four minorities distrusted the Burman majority. The intervention· of the KMT into the minority areas greatly increased the mag­ nitude of the problem of national unity and allowed the mi­ nority regions to become more powerful vis-l-vis the central government while increasing the minorities' - distrust of it. Both internal and external factors motivated the govern­ ment of Burma to pursue a neutralist foreign policy. Since different groups within Burma desired to support one or the other bloc in the Cold War, the government felt it necessary to _follow a neutralist policy in order to avoid antagonizing either the pro-Western minorities or the pro-Soviet or pro­ Chinese communist groups. Burma is located between neutral­ ist India to the west, the People's Republic of China to the north, and war-torn Laos and pro-United States Thailand to the east. Situated in the middle of these states with dif­ fering ideologies and deep antagonisms, Burma has tried to remain on friendly terms with all of them. The existence of an anti-communist Chinese army on the borders with China, Laos and Thailand has made the maintenance of an independent foreign policy increasingly necessary but increasingly diffi- cult. The nations neighboring Burma and the United States have all displayed an interest in the KMT in Burma. The People's 1. KMT are the initials of the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party. The Burmese and most other sources cited in this paper refer to these Chinese Nationalist troops as the "KMT." This usage will be followed in this paper. 1 2 Republic of China obviously would not look favorably on an anti-communist army on its southern border. Thailand's anti­ communist foreign policy and historical distrust of Burma ex­ plains part of that government's interest in the KMT. The United States was actively involved in supporting the KMT in Burma. The actions of all of these governments have deeply affected Burma's foreign and domestic policies. This paper is an attempt to describe the history of the KMT intrusion into Burma and to analyze the consequences of that intrusion on the domestic and foreign politics of Burma. An analysis of the effects of the KMT intervention must be rather speculative because of the nature of the available in­ formation and the difficulty of making causal links between activities and events. It is possible, however, to draw a general pattern of what the KMT and their supporters have done in Burma and what the response of the government of Burma has been. The sources used in this paper are those which are readily available in English. They are normally government statements, documents and newspaper accounts or research based on these sources. The government sources, whether from Burma, the United States, Thailand or other countries, must be suspect as they have been made available by these governments normally for their own purposes. Newspaper ac­ counts are either themselves based on government supplied information or on second-hand reports from usually unspeci­ fied informants. When different sources substantiate each other it is more likely that the information can be con­ sidered reliable. CHAPTER II BACKGROUND The Union of Burma is a multi-ethnic sta·te composed of five major ethnic groups. These are the Burmans, the Karens, the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins. Othir smaller groups include the Mons, the Arakanese and the Karenni, and recently immigrated Chinese and Indians. The Burmans, who compose more than 70 per cent of the total population, occupy the central interi9r of the country and the delta of the Irra­ waddy River. The other major groups live in the mountainous arch that encircles the Burman areas. Historically, the kings of Burma had governed these other peoples through their hereditary rulers who had been the king's vassals. It was only after the end of British rule that an attempt was made to include the non-Burman peoples within the framework of the central government.t1 The integration of the minorities into a national union has been difficult for several reasons. Among these are tra­ ditional antagonisms characterized by ethnic· chauvinism or racism. British administration did nothing to lessen these animosities and halted any indigenous efforts to overcome them. The British allowed the Frontier or Excluded Areas, as the minority areas were called, to remain essentially un­ touched in their political system and to be administered separately from the Burman areas.t2 • 1. John F. Cady, A HistoPy of Modern Bu.rma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 39-44; Josef Silverstein, ''Bunna," in Governments and Politias of Southeast Asia, ed. by George McT. Kahin (2nd ed.t, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 96-98. 2. After Burma had been separated from India in 1937 and given a parlia­ mentary form of government within the Burman areas of the country, the Governor, who administered these areas without the advice of the Burman ministers, adopted a program intended "to raise them both in education and in material prosperity to a standard at least compara­ ble with that of their brethren in the plains and to enable them at some future time an equal place with the Bunnans in the development of British Burma.t" The Governor felt the division of the hill peoples from the Bur­ mans was justified because (1) the hill peoples lived primitive, 3 4 The first constitution of Burma attempted to solve the problems of ethnic conflict by establishing subordinate state govern1nents for tl1e four largest minorities and the Karenni. The minorities were thus to obtain a degree of autonomy from the ethnic Burmans. As Tinker notes, this unique form of federalism was "a form of atonement for the age-old suspicion of the Burmese which the hill peoples could not at once dis­ card."3 Four states were established plus a Special Division of the Chins.t4 The Constitution and related legislation listed in detail the powers and rights of the states, includ­ ing the right of secession by the Shan State and the Kayah or Karenni State after 1958. In fact, however, the "federal structure was more nominal than real. . . .t "t5 For only a isolated lives and, excepting those who had served in the army, all were illiterate, (2) since they spoke no language but their own which were spoken only by small numbers of people in isolated valleys it was difficult to corranunicate with them, (3) there was "an inherited hostility between the men of the hills and the men of the plains. . . . The hillmen look down on the Burman as the descendant of a race whom his ancestors could raid and rob with impunity, while the Burman despises the hillmen and looks upon him as a wild and uncivi­ lized savage.t" Letter, Governor A. D. Cochrane to the Secretary of State for Bunna, the Marquess of Zetland, 15 March 1940, Burma Office File 1600/40 in the India Office Library and Archives. The group which most objected to Burmans being given a role in the governing of the hill areas was the Shan S(JJJ)bwas who as the hereditary rulers of the Shan States had the most to lose by the introduction of cen­ tral government rule in their areas. For a further discussion of some of the questions raised here, see Cady, History of Modern Burma, pp. 544-545; Kyaw Thet, "Bunna: The Political Integration of Linguistic and Religious Minority Groups,t" in Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia, ed. by Phillip W. Thayer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 156-168; Peter Kunstadtert., "Introduction: Burma,t" in Southeast Asian Tribes, Minor­ ities and Nations, ed. by Peter Kunstadter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Volume I ., p. 77. 3. Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Inde­ pendence (4th ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 30. British usage nonnally refers to the majority ethnic group as the Burmese as Tinker does in the above quotation. Following Silverstein, Burman is used in this paper in the ethnic sense and Burmese in the political sense, meaning all the citizens of Burma. Silverstein, "Burma, " p. 76, n. 1. 4. The Karen State was fonned by Constitutional Amendment in 1951. 5. Silverstein, "Burma," p. 119. 5 brief period were the minorities' suspicions of the Burmans lessened by the constitutional provisions.t6 The neutralist foreign policy which Burma has pursued has sometimes leaned toward the West and at other times to­ ward the socialist states. In the initial 'three years after independence Burma was linked rather closely to the West and especially with Great Britain. The Nu-Attlee Agreements, signed in October, 194 7, provided for British advisors and material assistance to the new Burma army. Burma supported the United Nations' actions in Korea and voted with the United States and other Western nations on seven of the first nine UN resolutions dealing with the Korean War. Burma ab­ stained on two resolutions. It was not until the United Nations passed a resolution branding the People's Republic of China an aggressor on January 30, 1951, that Burma clearly rejected a pro-Western position. 7. Post-independence relations with Thail. and and National­ ist China were slow in developing. Diplomatic relations were not established with Thailand until approximately eight months after independence.t8 Despite the fact that in their earlier wars Burma had always been the aggressor, many Bur­ mese were wary of Thailand because of the two countries' ear­ lier rivalries, because of Thailand's alignment with the United States after World War I I and because of beliefs that Thailand might have designs of Burmese territory.t9 Burma recognized the Nationalis� Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek in 1948 but contacts between the two govern- 6. The relations of the Karens and the Shans to the central government are especially important for understanding the KMT intervention as the KMf occupied areas .primarily of Shan and Karen populations. For the Karens see Saw Hanson Tadaw,· "The Karens of Burma," Journa.l of the Burma Reseapch Society, 42 (1959), pp. 31-40; for the Shans see Josef Silverstein, "Politics in the Shan States: The Question of Secession from the Union of Burma," Journal of Asian Studies, 18 (November, 1958), pp. 43-57. 7. Isabelle Crocker, Burn7a's Foroign Policy and the Korean War: A Case Study (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1958), p. 55. \ . 8. August 24, 1948. William c·. Johnstone and the Staff of the Rangoon­ Hopkins Center, A Chronology of Burma's Intema,tional Relations (Ran­ goon: Rangoon University, 1959), p. 12. 9. In a survey, Burmese newspaper editors saw border problems with Thai­ land a grave threat to Burma's security. New York Times, April 28, 1949. 6 ments were few. A local agreement was made between the Chi­ nese Nationalist commander in Yunnan, and Kachin and Shan chiefs in Burma, "for cooperation in suppressing banditry and for mutual respect of the frontier.t"10 Although Burma demonstrated an initial apprehension of the Chinese communist government when it came to power in October, 1949, it was the first non-communist state to recognize the new government. Nationalist China broke diplomatic relations with Burma the day after the People'ts Republic was recognized.11 Diplomatic relations were not established with the Chinese People's Re­ public (CPR) until June 8, 1950.o12 Although Burma initially voted with the West in the United Nations on the Korean War, the government made it clear that this did not mean that friendly relations were not to be maintained with all countries, including the CPR. In December, 1950, Burma joined with other African and Asian governments in the UN in an effort to resolve the Korean War through a proposal for a ceasefire and a conference on Asian problems.t13 Burma did not show much interest in close ties with the United States, and presumably U.S. policy makers felt that Burma was primarily in the British sphere of interests. Al­ though Burmese officials met with United States Secretaries of State in 1948 and 1949, little appears to have resulted from these meetings.14 The United States may have offered in these meetings to assist the government of Burma in put­ ting down the insurgents then rampant in the country, but the government of Burma refused such offers of assistance.15 In September, 1950, the United States agreed to grant eight to ten million dollars under the Economic Cooperation Admin- 10. Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1958 (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 197. 11. December 17 and 18, 1949. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 17. 12. Ibid.t, p. 20. 13. Ibid.t, p. 21. 14. Ibid., pp. 13, 15. 15. In 1967 U Thant told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S. would have given Burma assistance "in 24 hours" to put down the communist insurgencies. A Conversation with U Thant, Seareta:ry Gen­ eral of the United Nations by Members of the Corrunittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Marah 22, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1. 7 istration to Burma for a ten-month period ending June 30, 1951. At the same time, however, a U.S. arms aid mission left Burma off its itinerary because of signs it would not be welcome there.t16 The U. S. did send Burma t�n river pa­ trol boats in November, 1950.17 Of primary concern to the government of Burma during the years 1948-1951 was the civil war in Burma. The civil war itself was an important factor in shaping the neutralist foreign policy of Burma. The government was esstentially faced with two insurgencies. One in�urgent group favored alliance with the Soviet Union while the other supported closer ties with the West, including the United States. The government, caught between these two irreconcilable posi­ tions, attempted to compromise by not aligning with either maJ• or power. The civil war began in March, 1948, when the Communists resorted to arms against the government. Their motives were as diverse as their leadership but they posed a substantial threat to the new government. The Communists were soon fol­ lowed by the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) whtch was the para-military arm of the ruling Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. Most of the PVO's joined with the Commu­ nists. Dissident Karens, seeing the government's weakness in the face of the Communist-PYO revolts, also rebelled. Organized as the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), they sought greater autonomy within Burma if not existence as an independent state. The KNDO had contacts with British citizens and wanted the Burmese government to adopt a pro­ Western foreign policy. A small group of Moslems known as Mujahids and some Mons also revolted. 18 Estimates vary as to the number of rebels during the civil war. Prime Minister Nu estimated in 1949 that there were 10,000 KNDO's and 10,000 Communist-PYO insurgents.19 The map of p. 8 suggests the extent of rebel control in the first half of 1949. Gradually the Burma army was strength­ ened and the rebels were forced to retreat. Many surrendered to the government during periods of amnesty, and by 1950 it 16. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 16. · 17. "Military Assistance to .Burma,t" The Depm1tment of State Bulletin, 23, No. 595 (November 27, 1950), p. 856. 18. Tinker, Union, Chapter 2: "The Background of the Civil War, 1948- 1960,t" pp. 34-61; Cady, History of Modern Burma, pp. 578-605. 19. Tinker, Union, p. 47. 8 • I I • · I ,. r--·-.; c:� -- • ... . ---.:, I 15 '"'· • ".C • 14 ( • , •,.. _,. - II 10 I 'MANDALAY 9 8 A Y OF BENGAL THE CIVIL WAR IN BURMA ·:\ 0 YI l I I 200 •• ·.., Areo s domi noted by Rebels .:.-, February to May 1949 CJ ' KN DO DIIIl PVO and Army mutineers • ' § Communists I�:�� Mujohids • •J x. Main Bottles ' From Hugh Tinker from The Union of Burma Published by Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Insti­ tute of International Affairs. 9 appeared that the government would soon eliminate almost all pockets of resistance. The success of the army in great measure was due to its advantage over the rebels in arms and discipline. While the rebels had superiority in numbers, they never were able to coordinate their activities because of their differing goals and ideologies.t20 Just as the government felt it could turn its attention from the problems of civil war to the tasks of national inte­ gration and economic construction, a new threat arose. The new threat was a remnant Nationalist Chinese Army fleeingt. from the victorious People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Yunnan Province into northern Burma. The new force possessed the two military.assets the Burmese insurgents had lacked, a good supply of arms· and discipline. 20. Ibid., pp. 47-48. CHAPTER I I I THE KMT EMERGENCY, 1949-1954 When the Communists achieved power in China in October, 1949, they did not effectively control the area along the Burmese border. Largely mountains and jungles, this area is sparsely populated by various tribal groups who often strad­ dle the international border. These conditions provided the defeated KMT armies in Yunnan Province an excellent place to which to retreat. The Burma-China border was not clearly de­ fined or marked in many areas and the government of Burma, like the new government of China, had little control on its side of the boundary. Many of the KMT troops were reported to be natives of Yunnan and presumably some of them knew the border region well. According to Chinese sources, the People's Liberation Army did not enter Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, until February, 1950.t1 It can be assumed that it was several months after that before the PLA was able to penetrate the mountains of southern Yunnan. The KMT troops remaining in southern Yunnan resisted the PLA advance by conducting guer­ rilla harassment operations. The Chinese press later re­ ported that Following the peaceful liberation of Yunnan, remnant forces of the running dog of American imperialism, Bandit Chiang, instigated landlords and armed secret service agents to organize riots, murder cadres and seize grains and funds, availing themselves of the political vacuum existing at the time and the complicated national fron­ tiers and mountain terrain. They even formed bands of several thousand men and attacked and occupied our chu and hsiang govemments.t2 1. Chen Tien, "Yunnan--China' s Gorgeous Frontier,t" Wen Hui Pao (Hong Kong), June 13 and 14, 1955, translated in United States Consulate­ General, Hong Kong, Survey of the Current Mainland Press (SCMP), 1092, p. 39. 2. Kunming Yunnan Jih Pao, March 4, 1954, in ibid.t, 783, supplement, p. xix. 10 11 'f'h is indicates that the CPR was not able to control effec­ tively the border region for some time and the KMT was able to organize resistance to the government. Land reform and other campaigns in the border areas were usually two or more years behind the rest of China because of the lack of govern­ ment control and the desire not to alienate the minority peoples from the new government. As late as July, 1950, re­ ports from Saigon indicated that 4,000 KMT troops already in Burma were returning to Yunnan to carry on guerrilla warfare. They had been dissuaded by French officials from enteringt· Indo-China.t3 As the PLA advanced further into southern Yunnan, more KMT's entered northern Burma.t. During most of 1948 the government of Burma showed little concern over the activities of the Chinese on the northern border. There was one report of clashes between government of Burma troops and Chinese guerrillas.t4 . Late in the year Prime Minister Nu, in a broadcast speech, noted that Chinese refugees were "pouring over the border" from Yunnan. He suggested that this posed a threat to the peace of Burma and apparently felt that among the refugees might be Commu­ nists sent to infiltrate the country.t5 The government of Burma reported that in April, 1949, a force of 2,000 Chinese "army deserters" apparently from Yun­ nan entered the Kengtung area of the Shan State and burned Shan villages.t6 A survey published by Bur�ese newspaper edi­ tors stated that "armed Chinese bands" were "roaming at will over three-fifths of Kengtung.t"t7 Organized KMT units, ac­ cording to the Sawbwa of Kengtung, passed through his state in early 1949 on their way to join the Free Laos Movement in neighboring Inda-China, but they were defeated by the French and returned to Yunnan.t8 . . An organized unit of approximately 200 KMT's entered Kengtung State ·in January, 1950. They were joined in March by 1,500 troops who brought with them 500 dependents.t9 The 3. New York Times, July 13, 1950. 4. Ibid., April 9, 1948. 5. Ibid., December 6, 1948 .. 6. Ibid., April 11, 1949. 7. Ibid., April 28, 1949. 8. Ibid., March 31, 1950. 9. Union of Bunna, Ministry of Information, Kuomintang Aggression Against Burma (Rangoon, 1953), p. 9. 12 KMT's who entered Burma were members of the Eighth Army com­ manded by General Li Mi, the 26th Army under General Liu Kuo Chwan and the 93rd Division under Major-General Mah Chaw Yu.t10 The 93rd had been forced from Burma by the Japanese during World War II.t11 None of these units had made great records of military accomplishment either in World War II or during the Chinese civil war.t12 The Burma army had interned some of the first KMT troops who had entered Burma but later arrivals refused to submit to the Burmese. The KMT commander in Kengtung, in June, 1950, demanded that the Burma army release the interned KMT's, and he announced he would attack if the Burma army attempted to capture his men.t13 The KMT had established a headquarters. at Tachilek and were attacked there by the Burma army in July, 1950. By then their total strength had increased to 2,500 men.t14 General Li Mi established a new headquarters at Monghsat in late 1950 and recruited more troops from Chi­ nese and Shans on the border. Most of the Shans had to be bribed or threatened into joining. By April, 1951, the KMT had increased to 4, 000. 15 The government of Burma reported that 100 Nationalist Chinese troops arrived in Kengtung in late 1950 to organize three training camps.t16 Diplomatic sources in Rangoon reported that Chinese volunteers from Malaya, Thailand and Burma were joining the KMT and that they were being supplied daily by air from Thailand.t17 By mid- 1951, the problem was becoming more serious for the Burma government. The KMT had spread further west and crossed the Salween River to prey on villages there.18 10. Tinker, Union, p. SO. 11. New York Times, March 13, 1950. 12. Maung Maung, Grim War Against the KMT (Rangoon: Private Printing, 1953). 13. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 9, Exhibit document 1, pp. 139-141. 14. Tinker, Union, p. 52. 15. Ibid.; Tibor Mende, South East Asia Between Two Worlds (London: Turnstile Press, 1955), p. 148. 16. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 9. 17. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 23. 18. Cady, History of Modem Burma, p. 621. 13 In January, 1952, reports indicated that well-armed KMT troops "were moving daily from Formosa, through Thailand to join General Li's army . . o. . "1 9 Their strength had increased to at least 8, 000 men in Burma20 and many of the troops were armed with United States-made w�apons.o21 . The Thai policeo_ arrested a Chinese newspaper editor in Bangkok for recruiting Chinese Thais to join the KMT.o22 Estimates of the total number of KMT's v�ry but the New York Times reported that there were 12,o000 KMT's in Burma by February, 1952.o23 Nine hundred more arrived from Formosa in late February.o24 By March 1953, it was reported that 30,o000 KMT's were on the border.o2 1 ::, General Li Mi claimed to command 30,o000 troops.o26 As noted above, the KMT were being supplied by air drops in 1951. C-46 and C-47 transports flew supplies in at least twice a_ week.o27 By March, 1952A planes were landing supplies at a KMT airfield at Monghsat.o2 The KMT were also_ supported by banditry and opium smug­ gling. They monopolized the Shan opium trade and used the revenue to buy guns in Thailand. A Chinese, posing as a mer­ chant, but probably a KMT officer, conducted an opium for guns business in Chiengmai.o29 19. New York Times, January 29, 1952. 20. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 26. 21. New York Times, January 29, 1952. 22. Ibid., February 2, 1952. 23. Ibid., February 11, 1952. 24. Ibid., February 22, 1952. 25. Ibid., March 3, 1953. 26. Time, 61, No. 20 (May 18, 1953), pp. 30-31. 27. Burma, Kuorrrintang Aggression, pp. 10-11, 15. 28. Ibid., p. 15. 29. New York Times, March 9, 1952; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chronology of International Events and Documents (London), No. 9, p. 216; "The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Burma," The Atlantia Monthly, May 19, 1954, p. 6. 14 In their first .few years in Burma, the KMT launched several attacks and border raids on the Chinese Communists in Yunnan. They were never successful and were always driven back by the PLA. Once in early May and again in July, 1951, major offensives were attempted.t30 Assaults were also at­ tempted in August, 1952,o31 and again in January, 1953.o32 In the last effort the KMT were badly routed. Reports indicated that only 20 per cent of the 30,000 troops involved in vari­ ous operations returned from Yunnan.t33 Following this ef­ fort, the KMT apparently concentrated their efforts on con­ trolling the border with China and took the border post of Kyotkok, opposite Wan-t'ting in Yunnan, from the Burma army.t34 · The Burma army was soon able to retake the post, however. 3 5 According to the government of Burma, the KMT also attempted to create border incidents which would have caused Burmese and PLA troops to fight each other. The KMT would post as either Burma Army or PLA soldiers and attempt to draw fire from one side onto the other. Incidents of this nature were reported to have occurred on August 26, September 14, December 23, 1951, and January 23, 1952.36 The• Burma army and PLA commanders apparently did not fall for these ploys. KMT units also fought each other.37 Some had report­ edly been infiltrated by Communists but hostility may have developed over opium collection and other activities. By 1953 the KMT virtually occupied Kengtung, Manglun and Kokang States in the Shan State. The map on page 15 illustrates the extent of KMT domination. They had forced the administration of the government of Burma to flee the area and had themselves assumed the functions of de facto government, including tax collection. They built over one hundred miles of road, seventy in Burma and thirty in Thai- 30. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, pp. 13-14. 31. Ibid., p. 14. 32. Nation, February 15, 1953. 33. New York Times, March 2, 1953. 34. Bangkok Post, February 20 and 23, 1953. 35. Ibid., February 25, 1953. 36. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 15. 37. Nation, February 22, 1953. 15 ., . ' I ' , • • � h i • .: , , MYITKYINAI," • · "· I • I � r----i1 BHAMO��fi- - •.J I LASMIO. I· · I• t ,, •"·'· -I =MANDALAY •- (A -= 1//. W,,, - � GGY1. �11Jlil rAIJN 1 •PROME :.-��. .-:..::_.-{1 . . , .... - ·-. · IA Y OF .,.-. ..,. ::.= -=- :• ... .14 .. 1 ..:-..IENGAI. ...i•- � � ··,i�. .":.:B ASS.Et"N l" ·-:". . .. RA GOO ·: ::i ··. ·-:. .. -..:: : .:: :·= >. 16:·\ •, • f• ' I ..• , . THE CIVIL WAR IN BURMA •' 0 II IL I I 100 •' • Areas dom inoted by Rebels \, The KMT Invasion 1953 ..... TAVOY, � KMT � Mujohidt • D ' KNDO § Communi1t1 • •J[Il!D PVO ond Army 111u\in•er1 l From Hugh Tinker from The Un ion of B urma Published by Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Insti­ tute of International Affairs. 16 lan d . t3 8 The KMT, according to the government of Burma, even issued calls for the Burmese to overthrow the central govern­ ment. 3 9 The KMT entrance into northern Burma prolonged the civil war and disrupted efforts toward ethnic integration and eco­ nomic and political development. The activities of the KMT had four negative effects on the ability of the government to end the insurgencies and unify the nation. First, the KMT intervention required Burma troops to be moved to the north. Second, the KMT increased the supply of arms and ammunition available to the insurgents. Third, the KMT'ts depredations demonstrated the inability of the government to protect the people, which in turn weakened their loyalty to it. Fourth, the concentration of government troops in the Shan State resulted in increased distrust of the Burmans by the Sh ans. Before the KMT entered Burma it appeared that the govern­ ment would soon be in control of all the country. In 1949 the government had gone on the offensive and the rebels, both the Communist- PVO's and the KNDO's, were retreating. During 1950 and 195 1, the government slowly consolidated its control and carried on a "slow process of attrition" against the rebels.t4 0 When the government diverted its limited forces against the KMT, the rebels were again able to take the offensive. To cope with the KMT, over 25,t0 0 0 Burma army soldiers were sent north. This left less than 20,t0 0 0 troops to face the various insurgencies.t4 1 As the figures in Table I suggest, the army was able to reduce further the number of rebels after the KMT entered, but none of the groups was eliminated as had been expected. Initially the KMT kept to themselves within the Shan State and did not collaborate with the other anti-government forces. In late 1951, however, they began to turn their attention away from Yunnan and toward Burma. They first col­ luded with and sold weapons to the Karen National Defense Organization.t42 In January, 1952, the government of Burma 38. Ibid. 39. These claims are documented in Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, espe- cially pp. 16-18 and documents in the appendix. 40. Tinker, Union, p. 48. 41. Mende, South East Asia Between Two Worlds, pp. 148-149. 42. Cadyt, His_tory of Modern Burma, p. 621; Nation, January 23, 1953. 17 Table I Ins urgents in Burma, 19 51 and 19 53 December, 19 51 April, 19 53 BCP ( Communis ts) · 6 , 0 0 0 4, 0 0 0 Red Fl ags (Communists )o 1, 800 600 PVO's 15,o000 4, 0 00 KNDO's 12, 000 3, 7 00 Mujahoids 2, 000 300 KMT's 7, 0 0 0 12, 0 0 0 Total 43 ,000 24 , 6 0 0 Source: Nation , April 16, 19 53. reported 10 0 KMT's had es tablished contacts with the K ND0.o4 3 The next month Saw Shwe, a B rigadier in the K NDO, reportedly traveled to Bangkok t o meet with General Li Mi.o4 4 By mid­ year a l oos e al liance had been formed between the K NDO and the KMT. 4 5 In Augus t, KNDO l ead.ers met with KMT official s in Chiengmai to arrange arms aid.o4 6 In April, 19 53, the Rangoon Nati on reported a captured l etter from Major- General Saw Ohn Pe, th � l eader of the KNDO delegation, to General Li Mi's headquart ers, dis cus s ing "European instructors for the training of students . " 4 7 Although the init ial KMT aid t o the KNDO had been l im­ ited to weap ons and advis ers,o4 8 by February, 19 53, combined bands of KMT's and KNDO's were fighting together. The KMT'so. were rep orted to be wearing KNno· uniforms .o4 9 On February 9 a j oint group of 300 attacked Loikaw in the Karenni State.os d 43. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p . 1 1 . 44. Ibid., p. 19. 45. Tinker, Union, p .e. 52 . 46. New York Times, August 26, 1952. 47. Nation, April 1 , 1953 . . . 48. New York Times, January 17, 1953. 49. :Nation, February 1 and 16, 1953. SO. New York Times, February 1 0 , 1953 . 18 In March combined units were attacking within 1 0 miles of Rangoon.t5 1 In April, a combined group of 2,o500 KMT's and KNDO's launched an attack from Thailand on the Moulmein area, 350 miles south of Kengtung. A Reuters dispatch said the attack ,vas part of an effort to remove pressure on the Keng­ tung area by Burma army troops and to open a port to get supplies by ship from Formosa.t52 Combined units were found within 80 to 1 50 miles of Rangoont-in August, September and November of 1 953o.o5 3 A variety of factors made a KMT-KNDO alliance useful for both groups. Both found the neutralist foreign policy of Burma unsatisfactory. Both looked to the West for aid. Collusion between the two forces also brought together their differing resources so that both could be more effective against the army. While the KMT had weapons and other mili­ tary supplies, the KNDO had contacts with the population in some areas and had easier access to food supplies. The various groups of communist rebels benefited from the KMT intervention. When the Burma army launched assaults against the KMT in July, 1950, and during the Autumn of 1 951 , the Communists were able to advance.t5 4 The Burman Communists apparently had established "joint operational commands" with the KNDO in late 1 952.o5 5 The Communists were probably re­ ceiving United States-made weapons from the KNDO which received them from the K1'1T. Prime Minister Nu believed this to be the situation.t5 6 Others stated that the Communists were getting arms directly from the KMT.t5 7 51. Bangkok Postt, March 20, 1953. 52. New York Times, April 21, 1953. 53. Ibid.t, August 17 and September 4, 1953. William C. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy : A Study in Neutralism (Cambridge, Mass.t: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 321. 54. Tinker, Union, pp. 50, 52. 55. Nation, January 23, and February 10, 1953. 56. Ibid.t, March 31, 1953; "Chinese Kuomintang and Burmese Communists Are Friends," The GUOPdia:n (monthly), Vol. I, No. 3 (January, 1954) , pp. 22-23. 57. Statement by U Ba Swe, the Burmese Minister of Defense, in Johnstone, Chronologyt, p. 31; Mende, South East Asia Between TWo Worlds, p. 168. - 1 9 Whatever the precise details, it seems apparent that the KMT did increase the quantity of weapons available to the antit-government forces, and, as a result, improved those forces' position vis- � -vis the Burma army. The net effect was to decrease the government's control of the rebel areas, expand the area of rebel activity and strengthen the rebels' belief that they could defeat the government. The KMT attempted an alliance with the Sawbwas of the Shan State. They appeared to champion their cause against the central government but the Sawbwas did not join with tl1em. 5 8 Silverstein has suggested the KMT intervention may have temporarily strengthened the desire for Shan unity .in the Union.t5 9 In the long run, however, the KMT intervention had a negative effect on Shan-Burman relations. The large number of Burman troops in the area, and the imposition· of martial law in 22 of the 33 Shan States because of the KNDO' s and the KMT' s,t6 0 increased the antagonisms of the Shans to­ ward the central government.t· When, in 19 5 8 , Shan separationt­ ist feelings were on· the increase, the negative experience of the army'ts rule was an additional argument for greater autonomy. The government of Burma had adopted a mildly socialist economic policy which was intended to reconstruct the war­ destroyed economy, raise the standard of living of the people, and convince the leftists that the government was not a tool of foreign capitalists and that they did not need to resort to arms to accomplish economic reforms. Because of the civil war and its extension as a result of the KMT intervention, economic· development was set back.t6 1 Land re­ form, a key aspect of the government program to gain peasant support, was not implemented to a large extent until 1954 even though it had been planned in 1948.t6 2 In 1952 the_ government spent approximately 40 per 58. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 18. 59. Josef Silverstein, "The Struggle for National Unity in the Union of Burma" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1960), p. 401. 60. Silverstein, "Politics in the Shan State,t" p. 51. 61. Cady, History of Modern Burma, p. 624 . 62. Charles A . Fisher, Southeast Asia: A Soaial, Eaonomic and Politiaal Geography (London: Metheun and Co.t, Ltd.t, 1966), p. 415. 2 0 cent of its revenue on internal security.t63 In 1 9 5 4 , after the KMT problem had lessened, the govetrnment sti l l budgeted 28 per cent of its expenditure for anti- rebel activity.t6 4 While not all of this expenditure was the direct result of the KMT intervention, a large portion was. In the eastern Shan State, especial ly near Kengtung, consumer prices increased rapidly when Thailand closed the border between Chiengmai and Kengtung city because of Burma Army-KMT military activity on the border.t6 5 Much of the trade of Kengtung was with northern Thailand. The loyalty of the Shans to the central government was precarious in any case, and this economic hardship imposed on them, along with the depredations of the KMT and the Burma army, did not im­ prove relations between the central government and this re­ gion. Also, the termination of United States economic aid, discussed below, delayed or forced the abandonment of a num­ ber of projtects designed for economic and social develop­ ment. 6t6 In summation, the KMT intervention forced the gov­ ernment to delay its ambitious economic programs, and, as a resu lt, it was less able to convince the Burmese, regardless of ethnic background, that the government deserved their loyalty. Among the political elite in Rangoon, there was little disagreement on how to handle the KMT intervention during the 1 9 5 0- 19 5 4 period. The Anti-Fascist Peop le' s Freedom League held a large majority in the legislature and the elite, including the army , apparently supported U Nu's ef­ forts to solve the problem. The leading critic of the government'ts handling of the crisis was the smal l Burma Worker'ts and Peasant's P�rty. It offered in November, 1 9 5 2 , ' to organize a private army to rout the KMT but the govern- ment turned down the offer. 6 7 The Communists and PVO rebels also offered to join the govetrnment in attacking the KMT but 63. New York Herald Tribune, March 31, 1953. 64. New York Times, April 23, 1955. 65. Tinker, Union, p. 359. 66 . Ibid., p. 106. 67. Cady, History of Modern Burma, p. 622 n. 1 ; see also Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 25; Geoffrey Fair­ bairn, "Burma and the ' Cold War, ' " Australian Outlook, 6 (Septem­ ber, 1952), pp. 147-148; Fifield, Diplomacy , pp. 2 02-203; Nation, March 6, 1 953. 2 1 on terms which the government would not accept.6 8 Presum­ ably they wanted amnes ty, weapons and Buima ' s al ignment with the Communi st bloc. From 1950 to March 1 9 5 3, the government attempted to so lve the problem through m i l i tary means and by negotiat ing with Nat ional i s t China for the KMT ' s internment or evacua­ tion through the good offices of the United States and India. Mi l i tary efforts by the government of Burma agains t the KMT extended from 19 50 . to the 1960 ' s, but the discus s i on here wi l l be l imited to the period from 1950 to September, 1 9 5 4, the end of the first evacuation of the KMT ' s to For ­ mosa . The Burma army had attempted to intern the KMT when they first began to enter Burma. The first few were interned but they later escaped and spl it into sma l l bands.69 After i s suing an ultimatum . to the KMT that they e ither surrender the i r arms or l eave the country, the Burma army in Kengtung launched its first maj or operat ion agains t the KMT in June, 1 9 50. 7 0 By July i t appeared the attack had been succes sful as the KMT were reported to be re treat ing into Yunnan . 7 1 The army was able to secure the Kengtung- Tachilek road and to take Tachilek from the KMT. 7 2 · Wi th the ces sat ion of maj or mi l i tary operations the KMT r we re able to return to Burma and resume thei r act ivities . The Burma army launched a s econd attack on them, known as "Operat ion Frost, " in November, 1 9 5 1 . ? 3 Addit i onal efforts were made to rout the KMT during 19 52, 7 4 but apparently be ­ cause of the increased s trength of the KMT the confl ict was s talemated. In February, 1 9 5 3, the army launched another maj or campaign agains t the KMT, 7 5 but by early March they 68. Fifield, DipZomaay, p. 203. 69. New York Times, July 6, 1950. KMT troops which had entered French Indo-China had been interned in accordance with international law. Between 1949 and rnid-1950 between 55,000 and 60,000 were interned by the French. Ibid., June 15 , 1951. 70. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 9. 71. New York Times, July 11, 1950. 72. Ibid., September 9, 1950; Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 9. 73. Ibid., p. 10 . 74 . Johnstone, Chronology, pp. 25, 27. 75. New York Times, February 17 and 25, 1953. 22 were spread more widely than they had ever been. 7 6 By this time, according to Burmese sources, the KMT had ample weapons and ammunition plus new Dodge and Ford trucks. The concen­ tration of equipment was the "largest Burma had ever seen. "t7 7 The government offensive continued into March , in an effort to form a pincer to force the KMT back into Yunnan.t7 8 A monitored radio command ordered the KMT to retreat east of tl1e Salween River. It was reported that the KMT were "rush­ ing supplies and ammunition from Thailand to consolidate and hold at all costs their positions in Kengtung State.t"t7 9 Although Burmese sources indicated the KMT's were retreating from Monghsat in March,t8 0 they were still located there in early April.tB l This flurry of military activity in February and March was possibly in response to an increase in KMT activity in January, but it was also probably designed to coordinate with the plan of the government to take its complaint against Nationalist China to the United Nations General Assembly in late March. It might have been intended also to convince the KMT that they would have to leave Union territory or face constant military harassment. The government of Burma in 1951 requested I ndia and the United States to use their good offices to assist in getting Nationalist China to evacuate the KMT. Burma had originally planned to take the problem to the UN General Assembly in 195 1 but was dissuaded from doing so by United States diplo­ mats in Rangoon who proposed using U. S. good offices first.t82 The U.tS. Ambassador at that time, David McK. Key, and later his successor, William J. Seband, attempted to get the State 76. Tinker, Union, p. 53. 77. Nation, March 5, 1953. The Burma air force bombed the KMT headquar­ ters at Monghsat on February 26, 1953. New York Times, February 27, 1953. 78. Ibid.t, March 8, 1953. 79. Ibid., March 17, 1953. The Bangkok Post reported that the order was for the KMT to spread out and stand firm. March 17, 1953. 80 . New York Times, March 15 , 1953. 81. Ibid.t, April 7, 1953. 82. Frank N. Trager, Note 7a, pp. 1216-1218 of Burma, ed. by Frank N. Trager (New Haven, Conn. : Human Relat ions Area Files, 1956, 3 vol- unes). ,. � . 2 3 Department to pressure the Nationalist Chinese government but their efforts received li ttle response in Washington.o8 3 As Indi a had li ttle influence in Taipeh and the U. S. govern­ ment applied no pressure on the Nationalist government, these di plomati c attempts to find a solution to the KMT prob­ lem failed. Burma finally turned to th� Uni ted Nati ons Gen­ eral Assembly in March, 1 9 5 3 . On March 2, 19 5 3 , Pri me Minister Nu made a major speech on the KMT in the Burma legi slature. In i t he announced the deci si on of the government to ask the Uni ted Nati ons to label Nati onalist China an aggressor against Burma and to assist Burma ino_osolving the KMT problem. In the speech he outlined the three options the government felt i t had. These were: (1) To take the matter to the United Nations Organization; (2) To negotiate with the Chinese National Government in Formosa, through the good offices of those governments which have diplomatic relations with it, with a view to the withdrawal of the KMT forces from the Union terri­ tory ; (3) To counter-attack the KMT aggressors by the armed forces of the Union.t84 U Nu stated that opti ons ( 2) and ( 3 ) had been· attempted and had failed. Reluctantly, therefore, Burma was forced to take the first alternative.oB S Previ ously, Nu said, Burma had not ·e�erci sed opti on ( 1) for three reasons. First, the government feared that " the Chinese Nati onalist Government· [ might] flatly repudioate i ts own responsibi li ty for the KMT forces . . . b y declaring that they are deserters from the Nati onali st forces . . . o. 1 1 8 6 I f this were to happen, Burma would have no other recourse than to attempt a mili tary soluti on as the . UN would have no jurisdi cti on in the matter. Second, " . . . the Chfnese 83. Ibid. ; see also Frank N. Trager, Patricia Wohlgemuth and Lu-Yut. Kiang, Burma 's Role in the United Nations, 1948- 1955 (New York: Institute for Pacific Relations, 1956), p. 10. The New York Times reported that "it appears that the State Department is merely passing on the Burmese Government's complaint rather than urging General Chiang'ts Government to take action.t" May 16, 1951. 84. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 1. 85. The Bangkok Post reported on March 12, 1953, that Prime Minister Nu had been very reluctant to take the KMf matter to the UN. 86. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 1. 2 4 Nationalist Government [migh t ] _come out with more blatant assertions that the so-called KMT forces in Burma are in fact soldiers of the People's Republic of China wearing KMT uniforms."t8 7 Third, Nu stated, Since the KMT aggressors are also enemies of the People ' s Republic of China, the latter will naturally take a keen interest in this matter. Therefore , wil l the step or steps taken by the United Nations antagoni 'ze the People ' s Republic of China and make the present simple case of aggression a much more complicated issue?88 In both the second and third reasons, Nu expressed the fear that Burma could become the site for a major war between the CPR and the members of the UN. This was not an unrealis­ tic apprehension. Since November, 1950, Chinese "volunteers" had been fighting UN forces in Korea. Already the UN had branded China an aggressor and the policies of the United States, Nationalist China and some of their allies in the UN were vigorously anti-CPR. The second reason raised the pos­ sibility that the UN might send forces into Burma against the CPR, while the third raised the possibility that the CPR might send troops into Burma against the KMT and/or the United Nations. In either event, Burma would be a battle­ field in a two-front UN war with China. Since the earlier efforts of the government of Burma at military and diplomatic solutions had failed, Burma had no choice but to take the risks involved and request UN assis- · t ance. Nu stated that the CPR would be kept fully informed of all the efforts of the government to find a solution in the UN. The situation was getting more acute and action had to be taken soon, because the KMT were becoming more aggres­ sive within Burma.t8 9 Foreign observers cited three reasons for Burma finally seeking UN assistance. One, as U Nu indicated, was the grow­ ing danger the KMT posed to the government, especially the strengthening of the KMT- KNDO alliance.t9 0 A second was the fear that the United States and Nationalist China were plan- 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid.t, p. 2 . 90 . Virginia Thompsone, _ " Burma and the Two Chinas , " Foreign Policy Bulle­ tin, 23 (May 1 5 , 1953)e, p. 1 ; Mende, South East Asia Between 'I'Wo Worlds , p. 140. 25 ning a general war against China through Burma. This will be discussed in greater det ail below but, briefly, such ac­ tions as President Eisenhower's removal of the Seventh Fleet from the Formosan Strait in early February, the st alemate in the Korean War and the general at mosphere of "rolling back communism" which emanated from Washington, heightened this · · fear.o9 1 The third reason "was to impress further upon Communist China the sincerity of [ Burma's] efforts to end the Nat ional­ ist threat .o"9 2 This seems unlikely in light of Nu's speech of March 2 and the attitude of restraint demonstrated by the CPR. A more likely reason may have been the belief that the publicity which the KMT intervention would receive, if de­ bated in the UN and in the world press, would pressure the United States and Nationalist China to change their policies and evacuate the KMT. In preparat ion for going to the UN, the government of Burma notoified the United States that it did not desire the U. S. economic aid program to con t inue past J une 30, 1953.o9 3 Although there were other reasons for the Burmese decision to terminat e the U. S. aid program,9 4 the crucial factor was the 91. Thompson, "Burma and the Two Chinas," p. 1. For example, the follow­ ing reports appeared in the Bangkok Post immediately before and after Nu's March 2 speech which give something of the nature of the prevailing atmosphere. On February 24 it was reported that National­ ist Chinese guerrillas had successfully landed on the south Chekiang coast of China on February 19. On February 25 it wa� reported that the retiring Director of the U.S. Military Assistance Program, who had recently toured Southeast Asia and Formosa, would recommend in his final report that the U.S. aid the "10 million Chinese in SQuth­ east Asia" who were "ready to support the Nationalist war effort against their Communist held homeland ." The apprehensions that the government of Burma felt must have been intensified by the comments of President Eisenhower that Sta­ lin' s recent death. would be a possible cause for "exp.losions in Iran or Burma . " Bangkok Post, March 5, 1953. Later that year the non­ communist government of Iran was overthrown with the assistance of the U .S . CIA. Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: Ameriaa 's Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World (New York: Meridian Books, 1968), pp. 226-228. 92. Fifield, Diplomaay, p. 203. 93. See The Department of State Bulletin, 38, no. 720 (April 13, 1953), p . 530, for the text of the letter of Foreign Minister Sao Hkun Hkio to the U.S. Ambassador, William J . Sebald. 94. Johnstone, Buiffla 's Foreign PoZ�4vJy, pp . 64-66. Because of the obvi­ ous anti-communist nature of the U.S. aid program, it had never been 2 6 Rlt r1nese h c l i e f tl1 at tl1e U. S. was supporting the KMT in Burma. I n f a c t , t l1e o r i g i n a l letter rcq11es ting the termination of a l l aiJ co11ta i 11eJ l anguage referring to the KM'r intervcnt i o11. I t was removed by an informal agreement between the Foreign Minister of Burma and the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon. 9 5 The decision to end U.S. aid was determined by the need not to appear linked in any compromising manner to a state which would have an active part in the discussion and any subse­ quent UN action. Also, terminating the aid agreement was an important means of demonstrating to the United States govern­ ment the displeasure of the government of Burma with the U.S. role 1n the intervention. On March 25, the Burma government cabled the United Nations to ask that the gov�rnment of Formos� be charged with aggression. Six days later the UN Steering Commit tee agreed to recommend that the complaint of Burma against National ist China be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly.t9 6 Before the matter could be debated in the UN, efforts to solve the problem outside the UN were made. After confer­ ring with the U.tS. Ambassador to Thailand, the Thai govern­ ment offered to permit the KMT passage through Thailand to Formosa.t9 7 The United States began a concerted effort to forestal l a UN debate because it was stated that such a de­ bate would serve only the advantage of the Soviet Union and would drive a wedge between the United States and the govern­ ments of Asia. The U.S. a lso offered to pay for the removal of the KMT'ts from Burma.t9 8 Nat ionalist China a lso attempted to avoid a UN debate on the quest ion.t9 9 Possibly the more basic reason the U . S. and Nationalist China desired to avoid a debate was that ful l disclosure of a l l the circumstances surrounding the KMT intervention woul d prove embarrassing to them. popular in Burma with either politicians of th e l eft and som etimes the center and with the press. For a further discuss ion s ee John D. Montgomery, The Polities of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia (N ew York : Praeger for the Council on Foreign Rela­ tions, 196 2), pp. 32-33 and 140-146. 95. Frank N. Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Republic (New York : Prae- g er, 1966), p. 321. 96. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 32. 97. New York Timest, March 28, 1953; Bangkok Postt, March 27, 1953. 98. New York Times, April 8, 1953. 99. Ibid.t, April 14, 1953. . 2 7 The Burmese draft re solution to the UN was explicit and pointe d directly to the Nationalist Chine se regime as the re sponsible party. I t said in part : The General Assembly . . . Notes that the armed forces of the KMT Government of For­ mosa have committed acts of infringement against the territorial integrity of the Union of Bunna and acts oft· violation of its frontiers. reaommeonds to the Security Council: a) to condemn the KMT Government of Formosa . . .t b) to take all necessary steps to ensure immediate cessa­ tion of acts of aggression . . . aalls upon all states to respect the territorial integri­ ty of the Union of Bunna. . . t. 1 0 0 In the debate in the UN Political Committee ( Committee I) on the charges _of Burma, the Nationalist Ch inese Ambassa-· dor denied that his gove rnme nt had any control over the KMT in Burma but admitt�d that it did exercise some influe nce over General Li Mi and his officers.o1 0 1 Nearly all the other gove rnme nts supported the charge that the KMT h ad seriously violated the te rritorial integrity of Burma but most did not support the strong language of the draft resolution submitted by Burma. 1 0 2 · · · On April 22, the UN Political Committee approved a Mexi­ can draft resolution with several amendments proposed by Lebanon rather than the draft resolution of Burma. This substitute resolution was approved 57 to O in the Political Committe e , with Burma and Nationalist China abstaining. The following day the Gene ral Assembly accepted the amended Mexi­ c an resolution unanimously except for Nationalist China's absteontion. Burma voted for it primarily out of gratitude to the nations which had supported Burma in the de bate . The re solution passe d by the Ge neral Assembly was much less stringent than Burma's draft had been . It included no reoference to a request for Security Council action and did not refe r directly to the Chine se Nationalist governme nt. ·o· Rather it re ferred too·ounspecified "foreign forces" in Burma. The resolution also- said : 100. Text taken from Trager, Bunna 's Role in the UN, pp. 10-11. 101. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, pp. 43-47. 102t. Ibid. , pp. 50-72 ; see also the comments of the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.t, The Department of State Bulletin, 28 , No. 723 (May 4 , 1953), p. 664. 2 8 The General Assembly Deplores this situation and condemns the presence of these forces in Burma and their hostile acts against that country. Decla:r,es that these foreign forces must be disarmed and either agree to internment or leave the Union of Burma forthwith . . . Recommends that negotiations now in progress through the good offices of certain member states should be pursued • • • Urges all states: to afford . . . Burma . . . a ll the assistance in their powers . . . t o refrain from furnishing any assistance to these forces. . . t. 103 To the government of Burma this resolution was far from adequate. The weak UN response to the KMT intervention some­ what embittered the Burmese in their attitude toward the UN. As Burma's Ambassador to the UN, James Barrington, later said, "It seemed that the United Nations had two yardsticks for measuring aggression ; that the shorter and more handy one is used when Communists are involved, and a longer one is used if self-proclaimed anti-communists are invol,red. . . . "t 1 0 4 The negotiations referred to in the UN resolution were discussions between the United States, Thailand, Nationalist China and Burma to establish some means of solving the prob­ lem. The proposal of Thailand •and Nationalist China to evacu­ ate some KMT's was the basis of these negotiations. The United States was the prime mover behind them.t1 0 5 On May 8, 195 3, the United States formally proposed a four-power mili­ tary conference to be attended by Nationalist China, Thai­ land, Burma and the U.S., to reach an agreement on evacua­ tion. These discussions eventually led to a partial evacua­ tion of the KMT from Burma. That story will be taken up after discussing the roles of Nationalist China, the People's 103. Trager, Burma's Role in the UN, p. 12. The full text of all the resolutions introduced is found in Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 29. 104. "The UN Through Burmese Eyes," pp. 8-9, speech at Colby College, Waterville, Maine, March 18, 1954, quoted in Trager, Bunnat's·tRole in the UN, p. 13. 105. The Burmese were convinced that the United States would have to apply pressure on Formosa if Burma was ever to agree to a cease--fire · with the KM!' as they demanded. New York Times, April 20, 1953. 2 9 Republic of China, Thailand and the United States in the first KMT crisis. The Chinese People's Republic did not intervene in Burma against the KMT and this restraint is probably the chief reason why a major war did not occur in Burma in the early 1950t' s. PLA troops did enter Burmese territory in pursuit of the KMT on several occasions but "such units were always withdrawn upon Burma'ts protest with the explanation that local commanders had made technical errors."t106 There was one report of a CPR effort to infiltrate and take over the KMT in Burma but it was not substantiated and no further ret­ ports of such efforts are known.t107 Early in the KMT intervention the CPR stated that it would not tolerate Burma'ts harboring antit-Communist troops on her border. This statement raised apprehensions in Ran­ goon that the PLA might invade northern Burma. There appar­ ently was a Burma-CPR military clash in early 1950, but it was of little consequence.1 0 8 In March, Prime Minister Nu said that persons wishing to disrupt the harmonious relations between Burma and the CPR were spreading a myth of Burmese­ CPR hostility.t1 0 9 In October, Nu further said that his gov­ ernment had firm assurances from Peking that the PLA would not pursue the KMT into Burma.t1 1 0 If the Chinese had entered Burma in pursuit of the KMT prior to these assurances, the government of Burma probably wished to deny the fact so that other states, such as Nationalist China or the United States, 106. Frederick C. Teiwes, "Force and Diplomacy on the Sino-Burmese B·or­ der,t" in The Next Asia: Problems for U.S. Policy, ed. by David S. Smith (New York: The International Fellows Program Policy Series, Columbia University, 1969), p. 201. 107. New York Times, July 16, 1952. 108. Ibid., March 13, 1950. In June, 1950, in a radio broadcast, the government of China said it would not accept the construction in Burma of airfields for use by U. s·. or British air forces. John­ stone, Chronology, p. 19. On January 31, 1951, the Associated Press reported that 3,000 PLA troops had entered northern Burma to investigate a rumor that the United States was building ant- air base at Putao (formerly Fort Hertz). New York Times, February 1, 1951. This report was denied by the government of Burma in a letter from U Maung Myat Kyaw to the New York Times dated February 17, Ibid.o, February 26, 1951. 109. Ibid.o, March 9, 1951. 110. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 24. could not use these incursions as a pretext for a larger anti-Chinese war. In December, 1 9 5 1 , the CPR issued a statement c laiming that the U.tS. was aiding the KMT in Burma.t1 1 1 On January 3 1 , 19 5 2 , U Zaw Lin, the Burmese representative, reportedly told the UN General Assembly that Burma was considering asking China to aid her in dislodging the KMT. Burmese spokesmen the next day said that Zaw Lin had been misinterpreted, and Burma was not considering requesting CPR aid.t1 1 2 In April, 1 9 5 2 , PLA troops were reported to have clashed with the KMT inside Burma.113 It is not possible to determine whether such a c lash did occur or whether the report was fostered to create the appearance of enmity between Burma and China. During the spate of KMT activity in January and Febru­ ary, 19 5 3 , there was a reported offer of CPR aid to the Burma army. They rejected the offer. Since the report of the offer was made by a staff officer in northern Burma, perhaps it was intended merely as an offer of aid in a limited area.t1 1 4 Apparently no high level government discussions between Ran­ goon and Peking over PLA assistance occurred at this time. However, when U Kyin Thein spoke on the United Nations radio in late March, he said his government expected aid against the KMT from both UN-member states and non-members as well . Many observers interpreted this to mean that he expected CPR assistance.1 1 5 On balance, the government of Burma felt that the Chi­ nese government had responded with restraint and had a "cor­ rect attitude" toward the KMT provocation. The CPR was prob­ ably content to allow the Burma government to handle the K�1T. 116 The Chinese were certainly aware that a neutral Burma would be better protection to their southern border than a pro-Western, antit- communist Burma would be. If China had intended to rout the K�1T, Burma might have either joined or been forced into the anti-communist bloc and the CPR's prob­ lems would have been more serious. Also, China was occupied 111. New Yo-Pk Times , December 28, 1951. 112. Ibid. , February 1 and 2, 1952. 113 . Ibid. , April 4, 1952. 114 . Ibid. , February 26, 1953. 115. Ibid. , March 28, 1953. 116. Johnstone, Burma 's Fo-Peign Policy , p. 190. 3 1 at that time by the netessity of internal reconstruction fol­ lowing World War I I and the revolution, and by the war in Korea. Leaving the KMT problem to the Burmese made the most sense to the Chinese. - To have themselves attacked the KMT in Burma would have been "playing the imperialist's game." The government of Nationalist China, as U Nu suspectedt, denied that it had any direct control over the KMT in Burmat� The government of Burma's white paper, Kuomintang Aggrtession Agatinst Burma, and Burma's presentation in the UNt, were in large measure briefs to prove that Nationalist China was in control of the KMT troops in Burma. The documentation pre­ sented there is fairly conclusive. This discussion will merely sketch in broad outline the interrelationship between the KMT in Burma and the Formosan government, relying on both Burmese and non-Burmese sources of information. When the KMT entered Burma in late 194 9 and early 1950, they were effectively cut off from the Nationalist govern­ ment. In June, 1950, General Lai Iang Tia of the KMT 26th Army traveled to Bangkok to consult with the Chinese Nation­ alist Military Attache there. He went to obtain instructions from the Nationalist government for his army.t1 1 7 General Li Mi, who had been appointed the President of Yunnan Province as well as Commander- in-Chief of the Yunnan Anti-Communist and National Salvation Army, reportedly went to Formosa for consultations in November, 1951.o1 1 8 He was back in northern Burma in late January, 1952o, presumably with orders from Taipeh .t119 In February he was in Bangkok, 120 at about the time that several hundred K1v1T troops returned to Burma from For­ mosa where they had received training.1 2 1 Li Mi apparently had frequent contacts with the Nationalist government through Bangkok and Taipeh during this period. In February, 1953o, immediately prior to the decision to go to the United Nations, General Li Mi was back in northern 117. Interview published in La,k Maung, a Thai newspaper and reproduced in Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, Exhibit . Document No. 2, p. 14 2� 118. Ibid.t, p. 13 . 119. Johnstone, Chronology, p. 26. 120. New York Times, F ebruary 22, 1952. 121 . Mende, South East Asia Between Two Worlds, p. 140. 3 2 Rurina.t122 Alsot, at this time, the Nationalists pressured the French government in Indo-China to release 35,000 Chinese Nationalist troops interned there so that they could go to Burma.t1 2 3 The French rejected the request .1 2 4 On March 28, 1953, "the Nationalist Charge d'Affaires in Bangkok issued a statement saying that the troops in Yun­ nan were under the direct command of military headquarters in Formosa, that they were employed in undemarcated territory where the authority of the Burmese government was at least questionable, and that their operations were really an exten­ sion of the struggle against Communism in Korea, Inda-China and Malaya.t"t1 2 5 In this statement the Nationalists admitted their direct command over the KMT but suggested the possibil-· ity that they were operating only in Yunnan or in parts of Burma claimed by Nationalist China as part of Yunnan, and thus of no concern to Burma or the United Nations. It was known that there was a direct supply line by air from Formosa.126 Additional evidence linking the Nationalist government to the supply and reinforcement of the KMT in Burma was noted above. The motives of the Chinese Nationalist government in keeping an army in Burma are not difficult to determine. There was probably an emotional attachment to these troops by Taipeh. This was one of the last anti-communist Chinese armies left on the Asian mainland. More important, however, was the desire of Chiang Kai-shek ahd his followers to recon­ quer the mainland from the Communists. They believed their best hope of achieving this was through a general war on 1 2 2 . Determined by documents found in the possesseion of three Cauca­ sians kileled while fighting for the KMT. Burmae, Kuomintang Aggres­ sion, p. 38. 123 . New York Times, February 19, 1953 , and Nation, February 18, 1953 . 1 24. Nation, February 19, 1953. The French had interned these troops initeialely on the is lands of De Phu Aoc and I Ire off Nha Trang and later they had been used as laborers in the coal mines near Hanoi and the rubber estates in the south. 125e. Royal Institute of International Affairs , Chronology of Interna­ tional Events, 9, p. 190. 126. Burma, Kuomintang Aggression, p. 10; "Atlantic Report : Burma , " p. 6. The KMT continued to receive material and financial assistance from Formosa after the UN resolution cal led for an end to such activitiese. New York Times, July 24, 1953. 3 3 scve ra 1 fro11t s wi t}1 tl1e CJJR . The Korea11 War provi