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Residencies of Central Sumatra

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON WEST SUMATRA DURING THE REVOLUTION
Audrey Kahin
Japanese Impact on Sumatra
At the time o f T okyo’ s su rren der in August 1945 Indon esian n a t io n ­ a l i s t s on Sumatra were i l l - p r e p a r e d , p o l i t i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y , to take over a dm in istration from the departing Japanese. During the o ccu ­ p a tio n the is la n d had been governed by the Japanese 25th Army s e p a r a te ly from Java and o th e r p a r ts o f the In don esia n a r c h i p e l a g o .1 In a d d it io n , Japanese a d m in is tr a tio n in Sumatra was f a r more d e c e n t r a liz e d than th a t on Java. Although in A p r il 1943 the Japanese m ilit a r y a d m in is tr a tio n ’ s head qu arters ( g u n s e ikanbu) which had a u t h o r it y ov er Sumatra was moved from Singapore to B u k ittin g g i, the ten s h u 2 o f Sumatra (corresp on d in g to the residen cy d iv is io n s under the Dutch) continued to be governed in p r a c t i c e , as la r g e ly autonomous u n its by t h e i r in d iv id u a l g ov ern ors (ohokan) . 3
The i n c l i n a t i o n o f the Japanese o c c u p a tio n f o r c e s throughout South­ e a st A sia towards such a d e c e n t r a liz e d form o f a d m in is tr a tio n was based on the idea o f s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y f o r each r e g io n . In Sumatra th is
1. For the fir s t year o f the occupation Sumatra was governed in conjunction with Malaya from the 25th Army Headquarters in Singapore. However, because of the differences in the character o f the regions and the economic importance o f Suma­ tra, in April 1943 the 25th Army moved to Sumatra, followed by the Department of the Chief Military Administrator. From this time on, there were separate depart­ ments for Malaya and Sumatra, but nevertheless for a considerable period ties be­ tween Sumatra and Malaya continued to be regarded as more important than those between Sumatra and Java. Waseda Daigaku, Tokyo, Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Research Center (team led by Nishijima), Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (Washington: U.S. Dept, o f Commerce, Clearing House for Federal Scien­ t i f i c and Technical Information, Joint Publications Research Service, 1963), pp. 110, 155-56.
2. George S. Kanahele, ’’The Japanese Occupation o f Indonesia: Prelude to Indepen­ dence” (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1967), p. 62. These were divided into bunshu (sub-shu), gun and son. The ten shu were Atjeh, East Sumatra, Tapanuli, West Sumatra, Riau (excluding the islan ds), Djambi, Palembang, Bengkulen, Lampung and Bangka-Belitung. See Map 1 for the residency divisions.
3. In each o f the shu or ’’States,” a ’’State Governor, Director o f General A ffairs, Director o f Industrial A ffairs, and Director o f Police were established,” fille d by Japanese civ ilia n or military o f f ic ia ls . See Nishijima, Japanese Military Administration, pp. 149-50, which also describes the powers o f these governors. According to Kanahele, ’’the Chokan o f the West Coast and Palembang Shuu were given supervisory authority over neighboring Shuu involving matters such as inter-Shuu distribution and supply o f commodities.” (’’Japanese Occupation,” p. 62.)
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g en era l p o l i c y was stren g th en ed by the geography o f the is la n d , the p oor com m unications between the d i f f e r e n t a re a s , and the c h a r a c te r o f the Japanese a d m in istra to rs who were a p p oin ted t h e r e .4 However, the degree o f d ecen tra liza tion led to con siderable hardship in parts o f Sumatra, p a r t i c u l a r l y the East Coast r e s id e n c y , which was cut o f f from i t s t r a d i t i o n a l so u rce s o f r i c e supply and was hard put to p ro v id e b a s ic n e c e s s i t i e s f o r i t s p o p u la tio n from i t s own r e s o u r c e s .5
The 25th Army on Sumatra was much more r e lu c t a n t than i t s c o u n te r ­ p a rt on Java to a llo w In don esian s any r e a l r o le in c i v i l i a n or m ilit a r y a d m in is tr a tio n . Only s lo w ly , p a r t i a l l y and w ith r e lu c ta n c e d id i t f o l ­ low i n i t i a t i v e s launched by le a d e r s o f the Japanese 16th Army on Java towards granting a greater degree o f independence to the Indonesian n a t i o n a l i s e s .6 In the e a r ly months o f the o ccu p a tio n the r e p r e s s iv e nature o f the Japanese a d m in is tr a tio n on Sumatra was p ro b a b ly a r e s u lt o f i n i t i a l pla n s which en v isa g ed in c lu d in g Malaya and Sumatra d i r e c t l y w ith in the Japanese e m p ir e ,7 because MMalaya and e s p e c i a l l y Sumatra" were seen as "th e c e n te r o f in d u s t r ia l developm ent in the Southern a r e a ." As "th e n u cle a r Zone o f the E m pire's plans f o r the Southern a rea " th ese t e r r i t o r i e s were to be t i g h t l y c o n t r o l le d and "a c lo s e r e ­ la tio n s h ip o f mutual interdependence between [them] should be fo s t e r e d and measures taken so as to p ro v id e f o r t h e ir i n t e g r a t i o n . " 8 In the la t e r years o f the occu pation un w illin gness to grant rea l power to the Sumatrans would have been in cre a se d by fe a rs that the A llie s planned
4. For a discussion of the decentralized administration on Sumatra, see ib id . , p. 63; also pp. 281-82.
5. In Deli (East Sumatra) three-quarters o f the acreage o f land which in 1940 had been used for tobacco cultivation was switched to production o f food crops. Throughout Sumatra the Military Administration Department controlled the indus­ tries relating to defense, such as rubber, tin and iron, while they encouraged the Indonesians to rehabilitate factories that would contribute to the goal o f self-su fficien cy and increase the production o f basic food supplies. Nishijima, Japanese military Administration, pp. 273, 292.
6. Anthony Reid, "The Birth o f the Republic in Sumatra,MIndonesia, No. 12 (October 1971), p. 22.
7. Kanahele, !!Japanese Occupation,” p. 57.
8. All these quotations are from "Instructions on the Administration o f Malaya and Sumatra (April 1942)," which is translated as Document 44 in Benda, Irikura, and Kishi (ed s.), Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), p. 169. By "indus­ tria l development" these instructions must have meant sources o f industrial materiel, as in 1942 there was l i t t l e industry on Sumatra. The record o f Japa­ nese negotiations with the Dutch during 1940-41 shows that o il was the most vital product needed by Japan after the United States had moved to limit exports there in July 1940. See H. J. van Mook, The Netherlands Indies and Japan (London: George Allen § Unwin, 1944), pp. 37, 51-63, 86. Two months before negotiations were broken o f f in July 1941, the Japanese were requesting up to 3,800,000 tons p.a. o f mineral o i l . Van Mook believed that with regard to rubber and tin Japan*s most c r itic a l needs had already been met by her control over Thailand and Indochina: "The two countries together produced 130,000 tons o f rubber annu­ a lly as against a Japanese consumption in past years o f 50,000 tons; her need for 10,000 tons o f tin per annum was exceeded by at least 50 per cent in the pro­ duction o f her new sphere o f influence." Ibid. , p. 77. See also Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 38-39, 265.

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la n d in g s in Sumatra as the spearhead o f t h e ir c o u n te r -a t t a c k a g a in s t the J a p a n e s e .9 Thus, c e r t a i n l y u n t il 1945 th e re was l i t t l e m ention o f ev en tu a l in d ep en den ce, and the Japanese a c t i v e l y d isco u ra g e d any n a tio n a l i s t movements on the is la n d .
It is against the background o f these fa c to r s that one should view such la t e r Japanese statem ents on the backwardness o f the Sumatrans' p o l i t i c a l con sciou sn ess as th at o f General Shimura:
The demand for independence was not nearly so strong as in Java. The opinion o f the Japanese Army o ffic ia ls in Sumatra was that the people o f that country were not su fficien tly developed, socia lly and culturally, to take on themselves the responsibilities o f self-gov­ ernment . 10
For a sh ort p e rio d a ft e r they invaded Sumatra the Japanese had fo ste re d the hopes o f Indonesian n a tio n a lis ts , p a r tic u la rly the Islam ic le a d e rs. P rior to th e ir la n d in g s, accord in g to Benda, they had support ed the foundation o f Islam ic anti-D utch re sista n ce groups both in A tjeh and in West Sumatra which had prom oted the id e a th a t the coming o f the Japanese would le a d to I n d o n e s ia 's in d e p e n d e n ce .11 During the e a r ly months o f the o ccu p a tio n they had a ls o p erm itted Sukarno to e s t a b lis h a "Komite R a k ja t" in Padang which spread to o th e r p a rts o f West Sumatra12 and Chatib Suleiman to form h is "Pemuda Nippon R a j a . " 13 This freedom , however, apparently la sted only u n til they con solidated th eir authority on the is la n d , a ft e r which both o f th ese o rg a n iz a tio n s were d is s o lv e d
9. The number o f Japanese troops on Sumatra probably exceeded those on Java through much o f the occupation. Kanahele notes that on Java their military forces were reduced from 45-50,000 in March 1942 to about 10,000 by November o f that year, though in the last year o f the war they were again increased to 40-50,000 ("Japanese Occupation," pp. 65, 282). Before their invasion o f Sumatra the A llies estimated that there were 71,500 Japanese on Sumatra, though i t is un­ clear how many o f these were military men. See Rajendra Singh, Post-War Occupa­ tion Forces: Japan and South-East Asia (in the series O fficia l History o f the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-45) (New Delhi: Combined InterServices Historical Section India § Pakistan, 1958), p. 255. Wehl states that there were totals o f approximately 70,000 Japanese on Java and 75,000 on Sumatra at the time o f the surrender, but does not break these figures down between civ ilia n and m ilitary. David Wehl, The Birth o f Indonesia (London: George Allen § Unwin, 1948), p. 3.
10. Quoted in Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," p. 23.
11. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 105-6. According to M. D. Mansoer, et a l., Sedjarah Minangkabau (Djakarta: Bhratara, 1970), pp. 216-17, Islamic leaders were favored by the Japanese in contrast with adat and intellectual leaders throughout the occupation, but i f this were the case it must have been at the personal level. In general, the Japanese appear to have maintained a balance between adat, Islamic and other groups. See nn. 14 and 15 below.
12. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 28-29, 259; Kementerian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Sumatera Tengah (n .p ., n .d ., c. 1954), p. 457. Sukarno was detained in Padang in the spring o f 1942 before returning to Java, after his detention by the Dutch in Bengkulen. (Propinsi Sumatera Tengah w ill be abbrevi­ ated to PST in the footnotes hereafter.)
13. Ibid., pp. 79, 457.

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and the pemuda le a d e rs b r i e f l y a r r e s t e d . The o r g a n iz a t io n s th a t were a llow ed to co n tin u e were e x p e cte d to eschew any p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . 1lf
In com parison w ith Java, a d visory groups o f Indonesians w ith in the lo c a l shu were la te in bein g e s t a b lis h e d , w ith the e x c e p tio n o f West Sumatra where ChSkan Yano s e t up a c o n s u lt a t iv e c o u n c il as e a r ly as J u ly 1942, w ith 15-20 members drawn from "a d a t , Is la m ic and n a t i o n a l i s t g rou p s." i s Elsewhere in Sumatra th ese r e g io n a l a d v isory c o u n c ils (Shu S a n g i-k a i) were o n ly s e t up in November 1943, and no Sumatra-wide ce n ­ t r a l a d v is o ry c o u n c il p a r a l l e l to th a t on Java was e s t a b lis h e d u n t i l 1 9 4 5 .1456 Attem pts by Chatib Suleiman and Mohammad S j a f e i in J u ly 1943 to esta b lish a region al Putera, corresponding to the b a sic organization on J a va , were quashed by the Japanese a u t h o r i t i e s , 17 so th a t u n t i l 1945 In don esian p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the government was r e s t r i c t e d to the l o c a l advisory cou n cils.
There was a more ra p id developm ent o f the In don esian m ilit a r y fo r c e s on Sumatra than o f the c i v i l i a n o r g a n iz a t io n s , but they shared the same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .18 The Heiho had been form ed v ery s h o r t ly a f t e r the a r r iv a l o f the Japanese in March 1942, and in November 1943, a month a f t e r e sta b lish m e n t o f the Peta on Java, i t s Sumatran e q u iv a le n t , the Gyugun (L a sjk a r R ak ja t) was fo r m e d .19 Members o f the Gyugun were t r a in e d and q u a rte re d near t h e ir home d i s ­ t r i c t s , and i n i t i a l l y the la r g e s t u n it was the p la t o o n . L a te r, how­ e v e r , companies were o r g a n iz e d , some under In don esian commanders, and t h e ir was r e p o r t e d ly one b a t t a lio n in South Sumatra under a Japanese o f f i c e r . 20 A lthough a c c o r d in g to K anahele, the s i z e o f the Gyugun was sm a lle r than th a t o f the P e t a ,21 i t to o p ro v id e d t r a in in g f o r many o f

14. They included the Muhammadijah, Perti, the Madjelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (MTKAAM), and the Madjelis Islam Tinggi (MIT). Ibid. , p. 458.

15. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 68. This council, a successor o f the Minang­ kabau Raad o f the Dutch period, apparently met regularly. It was formed and led
by S ja fei, Sjech M. Djamil Djambek (representing the ulama) and Chatib Suleiman from the pemuda group. PST, p. 79. In the following March, a 56-member in s ti­ tute to study adat problems relating to regional administration was set up under the chairmanship o f Datuk Simaradjo (Balai Penjelidikan Masjarakat Minangkabau). Chokan Yano's sympathy toward ideas o f Indonesian independence led to his re­ moval from Sumatra in April 1944. See Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 148, 306.

16. Nishijima, Japanese Military Administration, p. 172.

17. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 86-87.

18. Apart from the small size and local nature o f the units, there were at least three training schools for the Gyugun, at Padang, Pagar Alam and Siborongborong (West, South, and East Sumatra). Ibid . , p. 128. According to the PST, p. 79, it was as a result o f the arguments o f Chatib Suleiman (who became its head in West Sumatra) that the Japanese agreed to form the Gyugun in Minangkabau.

19. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 128.

20. Ibid. , p. 129.

21. Kanahele estimates its peak strength in 1945 at 8,000 as compared with 33,000 on Java. Ibid. , p. 129. However, Reid puts its size at 30,000 (Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution [Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman Australia, 1974], p. 14) and the Propinsi at 44,000 (PST, p. 541).

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the young o f f i c e r s who would le a d the independence s t r u g g le a f t e r the w a r .22 S e r v ic e A s s o c ia t io n s ( K o e n k a i ) were a ls o o rg a n iz e d to r a is e p opu lar support f o r these f o r c e s , but these too e x is t e d on a p u rely r e g io n a l b a s i s . In West Sumatra the l o c a l Koenkai was headed by Chatib Suleiman and S j a f e i . 23
Thus, when the Japanese 25th Army f i n a l l y agreed in e a r ly 1945 to prom ote Sumatran n a t i o n a l i s t o r g a n iz a t io n s 24 th e re was an absence o f e a r l i e r groups on which to b u ild , and few Sumatrans had been c l o s e l y in v o lv e d in the b u rea u cra cy or a d m in is t r a t io n .25 On an u n o f f i c i a l b a s is the Japanese had re co g n iz e d the stan din g o f s e v e r a l Sumatran le a d e rs as t h e ir a d v is o r s : Chatib Suleiman and S j a f e i in West Sumatra, A. K. Gani in Palembang, Hamka and A din egoro in East Sumatra, and Daud B eureuh,*N ja A r i f , and Mohammad A l i in A t j e h .26 These men, how ever,
22. Kanahele lis ts among its platoon commanders, Achmad Tahir, Sitompul, Ismael Lengah, Bambang Oetojo, Dachlan Ibrahim, Hoesein, Amir Noor, and Gingtings. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 128-29.
23. Mohammad Sjafei (1897-1969) was born in West Kalimantan and was the adopted son o f Marah Soetan. He attended the Sekolah Radja in Bukittinggi from 1908 to 1914. He was a member o f Boedi Utomo and later the Indische P a rtij. During the 1930s he was associated with the PNI-Baru. In 1926 he founded the Indische Nationale School (INS) in Kaju Tanam. It changed its name to Indonesia-Nippon at the time o f the Japanese occupation. See Taufik Abdullah, Schools and P o litics : The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933) (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1971), p. 127; Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," p. 27; Kementerian Penerangan, Kami Perkenalkan (Djakarta: n .p ., n .d .), p. 120. Chatib Suleiman (1906-49) was bom in Sumpur (on Lake Singkarak) o f poor parents. He was educated only at MULO. After leaving school he moved to Padang Pandjang where he became a follower o f Hatta and was active in the PNI-Baru. After the party was dissolved he turned to economic activity and was one o f the founders o f Inkorba (an Indonesian import firm established in Bukittinggi on February 28, 1938) and the National Bank. He was arrested by the Dutch for sus­ pected Japanese sympathies and exiled to Atjeh, only returning with the Japa­ nese. Hamka writes o f him: " I f one wishes to define his s p ir it, there were gathered love for his country, so cia list ideas, Islamic religion and a 'Minang1 sou l." He likens him to Hatta in his social relationships and considers him as being the mind behind most o f S ja fe i's programs. See Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka), Kenang-kenangan Hidup (2nd ed.; Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1966), pp. 422-25; Sumatera Tengah, March 10, 1953; January 25, 1954.
24. In January 1945 i t was announced that a Sumatra Central Advisory Council would be set up, the number o f Sumatrans in the administration and the advisory coun­ c ils would be increased, and that H5k5kai (Patriotic Service Organizations) would be established. The H5kokai were set up as separate, apparently autono­ mous, units in the different shu. (Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. ISO82.) The leaders o f the H5k5kai o f West Sumatra were S ja fei, Chatib Suleiman, R. Datoek Perpatih, and Datuk Madjo Oerang. Ibid . , p. 314.
25. According to Kanahele in the regional administration the highest positions held by Indonesians on Sumatra were those o f d istrict head and mayor. There was an Indonesian mayor in Padang (Dr. A. Hakim) and a deputy mayor o f Palembang (Radnen Hanan). Ibid . , pp. I l l , 181, 314.
26. These were a ll nominated to the Chuo Sangi-in (Central Advisory Council) o f Sumatra, which has its fir s t and only meeting in Bukittinggi in June-July, 1945. Also participating from West Sumatra were Dt. Perpatih Baringek (from the adat group) and A. R. St. Mansur (representing the ulama). An account o f this meet­ ing appears in Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 261-66.

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p la yed no a c t iv e r o le in a d m in is tr a tio n , and t h e ir a d v iso ry p o s it io n s were r e s t r i c t e d to t h e ir own r e g io n .
The la ck o f a Sumatra-wide le a d e r s h ip o r in d ig en ou s a d m in is tr a tio n em bracing the whole is la n d had a c o n s id e r a b le b e a rin g on the way in which the independence s t r u g g le d e v elop ed in Sumatra. The n a t i o n a l i s t movements on the is la n d grew in t o la r g e ly autonomous l o c a l o r g a n iz a ­ t io n s and n ever a ch ie v e d the d egree o f c o o r d in a t io n n e ce s sa ry to b u ild up a u n if ie d Sumatran s t r u c t u r e .27
West Sumatra a ft e r the Independence P roclam ation
The su rren d er o f the Japanese on August 14 o c c u r r e d at a time when the P a n itia P ersiap an Kemerdekaan In don esiS (PPKI) [Committee f o r the P re p a ra tio n o f In don esian Independence] was g a th e rin g in D ja k a r ta ,28 the f i r s t o cc a s io n on which th ere had been d ir e c t Sumatran communica­ tio n w ith the n a t io n a lis t fo r c e s on Java sin ce the beginning o f the o c c u p a t io n . The Japanese had a p p oin ted th re e d e le g a te s from Sumatra to t h is c o n f e r e n c e :29 Abdul Abbas, Dr. Mohammad Amir, and Teuku Mohammad H asan .30 The c h o ic e appears a stra n g e o n e , f o r alth ou gh re p r e s e n tin g th ree o f the main e t h n ic groups on the is la n d , the men were n ot as w id e ly known a s , f o r exam ple, Gani, S j a f e i and A d in e g o ro . I t has been argued th a t they were p o s s ib ly n ot so com m itted to the id e a o f a Suma­ tran s t a t e as were some o f the o th e r le a d e r s fa v o re d by the 25th A rm y,31 but i t appears p ro b a b le th a t the o p p o s ite was in f a c t the c a s e ; and th a t th ese men were s tr o n g e r su p p o rte rs o f autonomy from Java than were S j a f e i , A d in e g o ro , Gani, who a l l had c lo s e t i e s w ith the n a t i o n a l i s t le a d e rs on J a v a .32 In the f i r s t s e s s io n o f the PPKI, Dr. Amir in p a r ­
27. With regard to relations with Java, however, the ban imposed by the 25th Army on any v isits to Sumatra by nationalist leaders from there does not seem to have affected Sumatran recognition o f Sukarno-Hatta as the supreme leaders o f the nationalist movement in Indonesia. See B. R. O’ G. Anderson, Some Aspects o f Indonesian P olitics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1961), p. 12; Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 223; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 263; Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," pp. 39-40.
28. A Sumatran "Committee to Investigate Preparations for Independence" had been announced on July 25, under the chairmanship o f S ja fei, and with Adinegoro as head o f the secretariat. It consisted o f 24 members (including 15 from the Central Advisory Council). Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 231-32.
29. They were taken fir s t to Singapore, where they saw Hatta and Sukarno returning from Saigon. According to Hatta, the two groups had separate meetings with the Japanese there. See Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi (Djakarta: Tintamas, 1970), pp. 23-25.
30. Abbas was a Mandailing Batak, Dr. Amir a Minangkabau and Hasan an Atjehnese. For biographical notes see Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," pp. 27, 30.
31. Reid states: "It seems possible that the Japanese planners in Singapore or Dja­ karta distrusted the leadership developed by the intransigent 25th Army as too d istin ctly Sumatran, or too much the creatures o f the Gunseikan." Ib id ., p. 30.
32. Adran Kapau Gani, for example, in January 1946, was asserting that South Suma­ tra ’ s lack o f leaders demanded a flood o f Javanese pemuda and military men to

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t i c u l a r was arguing f o r c o n s id e r a b le Sumatran autonom y.33 Over the o b je c t io n s o f H atta, the committee d ecid ed th at Sumatra as a whole would c o n s t it u t e a s in g le p r o v in c e , w ith i t s c a p it a l in Medan and w ith Hasan as i t s g o v e r n o r .3**
While these d e cis io n s were being reached in D jakarta, however, in West Sumatra the pemuda were a lre a d y moving to take o v e r c o n t r o l from the o c c u p a tio n f o r c e s . A lthough news o f the Japanese su rren d er d id n ot reach Medan u n t i l August 2 2 ,35 r e p o r t s o f the Independence P roclam a tion had rea ch ed Padang and B u k itt in g g i at l e a s t by August 1 8 . 36 I t is r e ­ p o rte d th at on th a t day Ismael Lengah org a n ized a m eeting in Padang o f form er members o f the Heiho and Gyugun37 and by August 25 t h is group had form ed a B a la i Penerangan Pemuda In d o n e sia (BPPI) under h is le a d e r ­ s h i p . 38 At about the same time the pemuda in B u k itt in g g i were a ls o h o ld in g m e e tin g s, and by August 25 had form ed t h e ir own o r g a n iz a t io n ,
the island. G. W. Overdijking, Het Indonesische Probleem: De Feiten (The Hague: Martinus N ijhoff, 1946), p. 84. Adinegoro was the only "resident Sumatran in a potential Indonesian Cabinet presented to the Japanese in March 1942 by the leading nationalist p a rties.11 Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," pp. 27-28; Nishijima, Japanese Military Administration, pp. 342-43. S ja fe i’ s stance in favor o f Sumatran autonomy (see Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization as a P olitica l Prob­ lem [Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1958], p. 41) appears to have de­ veloped later, and was partly a result o f the centralization p olicies o f Dja­ karta after the transfer o f sovereignty. He was to have been a representative to the PPKI, but his departure was forbidden by the Japanese. (PST, p. 83.)
33. Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang2 Dasar 1945 (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja , 1959), I, p. 410. Amir later claimed that the selection o f delegates was named by Java behind the backs o f the Sumatrans (see Kanahele, "Japanese Occupa­ tio n ," n. 126, p. 321b), but this seems unlikely.
34. Yamin, Naskah, pp. 451-52. Hatta was arguing for the division o f Sumatra into three provinces, as were several other members on the committee. Hasan was the strongest proponent o f a single Sumatran province, and he was also opposed to the idea o f subprovinces. His reasoning is not very clear. See also Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi, pp. 71-72.
35. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 272. Hamka was then in Medan, but immediately set o f f for Bukittinggi to find out what the Sumatran attitude towards the changed situation might be. He arrived there on August 27, meeting with Chatib Sulei­ man, Mr. Nasroen, and Aziz Chan. Sjafei was then at his home village o f Kajutanam, proceeding to Padang on the night o f August 28. (Ibid . , pp. 278-79.)
36. PST, p. 542; Departemen P.D. dan K., Biro Pemuda, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pemuda Indonesia (Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1965), p. 155. News o f the Japanese surren­ der did not apparently reach West Sumatra either until August 21.
37. Dates are unclear as to when the Japanese disarmed the Heiho and Gyugun. According to PST, p. 83, this took place in Bukittinggi on August 15, while Reid states that the Gyugun was disarmed between August 19 and 21. (Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," p. 37.)
38. Headed by Ismael Lengah and Suleiman, the Propinsi lis ts other leaders o f the BPPI as: Nasrun A.S., Jahja D ja lil, Dahlan J. St. Mangkuto, Iljas Jacub, Burhanuddin, Dr. Nazaruddin, Rusdi, Kasim Dt. M alilit Alam, S ja rif Usman, BGD. Aziz Chan, Chatib Suleiman. (PST, p. 87.) This cannot be exact fo r at least Ilja s Jacub and Burhanuddin had not yet returned from their exile in Digul.

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the Pemuda In d on esia ( P I ) , whose name a few weeks l a t e r was changed to Pemuda R epublik In d o n e sia ( P R I ) .3940123
Toward the end o f the month two o f the Sumatran d e le g a te s to the PPKI, Hasan and Dr. Amir, passed through B u k itt in g g i on t h e ir way from Palembang to Medan, and conveyed the in s t r u c t io n s o f the com m ittee r e ­ g a rd in g fo rm a tio n o f a KNI (Komit6 N asion al I n d o n e s ia ), a d efen se f o r c e (Badan Keamanan R a k ja t, BKR) and the s t a t e PNI p a r ty . At a m eeting in Padang on A ugust*29, S j a f e i read the Independence P rocla m a tion and e x ­ p ressed the lo y a lt y o f the Indonesian p eop le on Sumatra to the SukarnoHatta l e a d e r s h i p .1*0 The Hokokai in West Sumatra form ed i t s e l f in t o a KNI, w ith S j a f e i at i t s head, Dt. P e rp a tih B aringek and M. Djam il as h is d e p u t ie s , and S t. Mohd. R a s jid as t r e a s u r e r .1*1
A lthough Sumatra was now o f f i c i a l l y u n if ie d as one p r o v in c e w ith in the R epu blic o f In d on esia , th is f a c t had l i t t l e in flu e n ce on the course o f even ts on the is la n d . From the b e g in n in g the new Governor Hasan was handicapped in a ttem p tin g to a s s e r t le a d e r s h ip because he was r e l a t i v e ­ l y unknown o u t s id e o f A tje h and Medan.1*2 N e ith e r Palembang nor West Sumatra was l i k e l y to welcome a le a d from Medan, even i f i t co u ld be a s s e r t e d , as both r e g io n s f e l t they had b e t t e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to assume such a r o l e . The f a c t th a t B u k itt in g g i had d u rin g the Japanese o ccu p a ­ t io n been the o f f i c i a l ce n te r o f Sumatra c le a r ly in flu e n ce d the a t t i ­ tude o f the p eop le in West Sumatra. Throughout the r e v o lu tio n events in th a t re g io n tended to be view ed in the co n te x t o f th ose o ccu rrin g on Java ra th e r than o f th ose in o th e r p a rts o f Sumatra. The k in sh ip o f the Minangkabau w ith t h e ir r e p r e s e n t a t iv e in the D w itunggal, H a tta , was c lo s e r than w ith the Sumatran g ov ern or; and, o f c o u r s e , s e v e r a l oth e r Minangkabau were prom inent in the re p u b lica n c e n tr a l le a d e rsh ip on Java.
The tendency to autonomous developm ent in West Sumatra was fu r t h e r in c re a s e d by the p a tte rn o f A l l i e d la n d in g s and Dutch pla n s f o r g a in in g c o n t r o l ov er the d i f f e r e n t p a r ts o f the is la n d . As e a r ly as the end o f August sm all u n its o f Dutch o f f i c e r s were b e g in n in g to a r r iv e in Medan,1*3
39. On August 21 a meeting was held at the o ffic e o f the Madjelis Islam Tinggi at the in itia tiv e o f the following pemuda: Chaidir Gazali, Nasrul, Noesjirwan Ami nuddin Junus, Zainul, R. Hadjimar Bermawi, Marakarma, Sjofjan Kamal, Sjahbuddin; at a further meeting four days later the PI was formed. Also present at that meeting were Iskandar Tedjasukmana and S ja rif Usman. ( Ibid. , p. 88.) In a later part o f the Propinsi, however, it is stated that the PRI was formed in Bukittinggi on August 29. In this account Nuzirwan (a pemuda newly arrived from Java) was present and he was named head o f the PRI fo r Bukittinggi. (Ib id ., p. 544.)
40. Ibid . , pp. 84-86.
41. These men were successively to hold the post o f resident o f West Sumatra. For the fu ll membership o f the f ir s t KNI Sumatera Barat, see ib id . , pp. 380-81.
42. Governor Hasan attempted to strengthen feelings o f unity by v isitin g a ll the re­ gions o f the island. However, his fir s t tour around Sumatra in the early spring o f 1946 was probably occasioned largely by the events in East Sumatra during those months. See ib id . , p. 100; Semangat Merdeka, January 25, 1945; March 20, 29, 1946; Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica, I (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1953), p. 224.
43. Reid, "Birth o f the Republic," p. 32; Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, p. 180. This was a party from RAPWI ALFSEA, who collected some o f the more important

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and from e a r ly O ctob er i t was the sp rin g b o a rd from which they hoped to r e e s t a b lis h t h e i r a u t h o r it y o v e r Sumatra. From O ctob er 9 , B r it is h f o r c e s , c h i e f l y the 26th Indian D i v i s i o n ,**** began la n d in g in Medan, Padang and Palembang, but they c o n c e n tr a te d on the more im portant s t r a ­ t e g i c and econom ic areas round Medan and Palembang, a f t e r the end o f 1945 never c o n t r o l lin g any t e r r i t o r y in West Sumatra beyond the boun­ d a r ie s o f P adang.1+5 Thus, from the b e g in n in g the c a p it a l o f the repub­ l ic a n government on Sumatra, Medan, was a ls o the c e n te r o f Dutch pow er, w h ile u n t il the end o f 1948 the re p u b lica n fo r c e s in West Sumatra were a b le to o rg a n iz e and run t h e ir own a d m in is t r a tio n , o n ly p e r ip h e r a lly a f f e c t e d by the Dutch f o r c e s around the p o r t c i t y o f P adang.1*6
In both m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n m a tters, th en , the stru g g le a g a in st the Dutch in West Sumatra was e s s e n t i a l l y a l o c a l on e, l i t t l e c o o r d i ­ nated w ith a c t io n s in o th e r p a r ts o f the is la n d and on ly f i t f u l l y meshed in w ith the o v e r a ll plans bein g form ulated by the c e n tr a l gov­ ernment on J ava. At the v ery o u t s e t , although the PPKI in D jak arta had sen t out o rd e rs f o r a KNI, a P N I,4567 and a p a r a m ilita r y group to be formed in a l l region s o f In d on esia , no s p e c i f i c in s tr u c tio n s were g iv en , and i t was l e f t to the i n i t i a t i v e o f the l o c a l le a d e r s as to how such groups were to be set up.
As n oted a b ove, the KNI in West Sumatra was e s t a b lis h e d on August 31, but as w ith the o rg a n iz a tio n s during the Japanese p e rio d i t would be in a cc u ra te to assume th a t becau se the name and outward form o f the o r g a n iz a t io n p a r a l le le d th a t on J a va , i t s co n te n t and c h a r a c te r were a ls o s im ila r . W hile the l o c a l KNI on Java were u s u a lly l i t t l e more than fig u reh ead s, w ith th e ir working committees being the a ctiv e b o d ie s,
Dutch internees to discuss the evacuation o f Dutch prisoners o f war via three o f the principal towns on Sumatra: Medan, Padang and Palembang. See also Raymond Westerling, Challenge to Terror (London: W. Kimber, 1952), pp. 37-38.
44. Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, p. 240. He states that o f the division 's three brigades earmarked for service in Sumatra (the 4th, 36th, and 71st), the 36th was diverted to Java.
45. Padang became the headquarters o f the 26th Indian Division and its 71st Infantry Brigade. The A llies in itia lly planned to occupy Bukittinggi, and the 8/8 Punjab Regiment reportedly arrived there from Medan on October 10. However, after the death o f Brig. Maj. Anderson in Padang on December 3 (see n. 56 below) this regiment was moved from Bukittinggi to strengthen the forces on the coast. It appears that control even over Padang was always tenuous, for according to Singh, the arrival o f extra forces from Java on August 5, 1946, "enabled the whole o f Padang town to be brought under effectiv e con trol." Ib id ., pp. 239, 243-44.
46. This, o f course, did not apply to economic matters which I have not the data to explore in this a rticle . It is , however, clear that the Dutch control o f Padang did mean that the West Sumatrans were cut o f f from their principal trading port except for a short period during the spring o f 1947. The d iffic u ltie s caused by this were aggravated by the economic blockade carried out by the Dutch from late 1947. Although this was by no means tota lly successful throughout the revolu­ tionary years the West Sumatrans apparently experienced considerable economic hardship as a result o f i t .
47. The plans for the PNI were almost immediately cancelled (B. R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time o f Revolution [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972], p. 95), and the state party appears never to have been formed in West Sumatra.

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in West Sumatra the fu n c t io n in g o r g a n iz a t io n was the KNI i t s e l f , and i t was the movements both w ith in t h is body and in i t s in t e r a c t io n w ith o th e r groups in the r e g io n th a t shaped many o f the p o l i t i c a l d e v e lo p ­ ments in West Sumatra during the f i r s t th re e y ea rs o f the r e v o lu t io n .
I t to o k lo n g e r to o rg a n iz e the m ilit a r y Badan Keamanan R akjat (BKR)48 than the c i v i l i a n KNI. The KNI to o k the f i r s t ste p s on Septem­ b er 2 towards s e t t in g up a BKR o r g a n iz a t io n at the d i s t r i c t l e v e l under c o n t r o l o f Ismael Lengah, but throughout th a t month the two pemuda groups in West Sumatra, the BPPI in Padang and the PRI in B u k it t in g g i, r e ta in e d t h e ir in d e p e n d e n ce ,49 w ith the PRI in p a r t ic u la r a ls o e s t a b ­ lis h in g branches in the towns and v i l l a g e s o f the r e g io n . Only when the A l l i e s began to land in Padang d id the two groups d ecid e th a t t h e ir members w ith m ilit a r y t r a in in g sh ou ld j o i n the o f f i c i a l TKR (T entara Keamanan R ak ja t) w h ile the rem ainder would a ct as l o c a l d e fe n se f o r c e s o u t s id e o f the o f f i c i a l m ilit a r y s t r u c t u r e . The BPPI in Padang d i s ­ banded i t s e l f on O ctob er 1 0, w ith the m a jo r ity o f i t s members jo in in g the TKR, and on O ctober 13 the PRI in B u k itt in g g i a ls o moved to amalga­ mate w ith the TKR.50 N o n -m ilita ry members o f both groups jo in e d t o ­ g eth er in the PRI o r g a n i z a t i o n .51
The West Sumatrans i n i t i a l l y co o p e ra te d w ith the A l l i e d f o r c e s . 52 However, as i t gra du ally became c le a r that under th e ir p r o te c tio n the NICA (N etherlands In d ie s C i v i l A d m in is tr a tio n ) was b ein g r e -in t r o d u c e d in c id e n ts soon began to m u l t i p l y .53 These came to a head a f t e r Novem­
48. The name was changed on October 5 to TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakjat).
49. They also could not agree to unite with each other, though a meeting was held on September 15, primarily at the in itia tiv e o f Dt. Radjo Mangkuto, to attempt to achieve this. At this meeting Dahlan Djambek proposed recalling a ll former members o f the Gyugun, Heiho and Kaigun to form a reserve military force. PST, pp. 544-45.
50. Ibid. , pp. 547-48. Local battalions were set up as follows: Padang (Jazid Abidin); Air Hadji Sungei Penuh (Thalib); Sp. Gaung Air Hadji (Alwi St. Marad jo ); Pariaman (Mahjudin Tonek); Padang Pandjang (Anas); Solok (S ja rif Usman); Batu Sangkar (Dahlan Ibrahim); Bukittinggi (Dahlan Djambek); Pajakumbuh (Makinuddin); Bakan Baru (Hasan Basri); and Djambi (Abun Djani). See also A. H. Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (2nd ed.; Bandung: Ganaco, 1963), I, p. 113.
51. Until the end o f 1945 this remained the principal pemuda organization, but as early as October 1, the Muhammadijah was organizing young members into the Hizbullah. (PST, p. 553.)
52. In general, the repatriation o f the Japanese went smoothly, though there were some friction s over the release o f Dutch prisoners o f war. Raliby reports a battle between pemuda groups and former Dutch soldiers as early as October 15. Documenta, p. 57. See also Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, pp. 180-81, 256-57.
53. PST, pp. 96-98. On November 8 the BBC was reporting clashes at Padang between Indonesian nationalists and Indian forces. Raliby, Documenta, p. 85. See also Departemen P.D. dan K., Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pemuda, p. 172, which reports that many o f these clashes were then with remnants o f the Japanese forces, during which a considerable number o f arms were seized. Nasution (TNI, I, p. 155) speculates that in East Sumatra there were sufficient arms for one or two infan­ try regiments, and in both Central and South Sumatra su fficien t for several battalions, most o f which had presumably been seized from the Japanese.

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b e r 25 when the B r it is h command ceded the T e ch n ica l S ch ool o f Simpang Haru in Padang to the NICA d e s p ite an e a r l i e r agreement th a t the Dutch would not be allow ed to occupy any p art o f the c i t y w ithou t the Indo­ n e s ia n s ' p e r m is s io n .5t* Pemuda f o r c e s alm ost im m ediately launched a tta ck s a g a in s t the s c h o o l com p lex, and in e a r ly December an E n g lish b rig a d e m ajor and a "la d y w ork er" were a s s a s s i n a t e d .545 A ft e r t h is o ccu rre n c e a s t r i c t c i v i l i a n cu rfew was im posed, and by the end o f the y ea r Padang was in a s t a t e o f c o n s id e r a b le t e n s io n , w ith Indian tro o p s from B u k ittin g g i being brought in to strengthen A llie d c o n tr o l over the to w n .56
Upheaval and R e o rg a n iz a tio n
A d m in is tr a t iv e ly the p r o v in c e o f Sumatra was d iv id e d in t o r e s id e n ­ c i e s , each w ith i t s l o c a l KNI. The f i r s t r e s id e n t o f West Sumatra, S j a f e i , was a p p oin ted on O ctob er 1 , and i n i t i a l l y he a ls o headed the r e s id e n c y KNI. At i t s t h ir d p le n a ry s e s s io n , h e ld in m id -O cto b e r, how­ e v e r , the KNI d e cid e d to se p a ra te the two p o s i t i o n s , w ith Dr. Djam il assuming the KNI l e a d e r s h i p .57 O f f i c i a l l y because o f i l l - h e a l t h S j a f e i was re p la c e d as r e s id e n t by Dt. P e rp a tih B aringek in the m iddle o f Novem ber.58 Under the new r e s id e n t th e re were m ajor p e rso n n e l changes at the demang ( d i s t r i c t ) l e v e l and a b o v e .59 This r e s h u f f le appears to have caused c o n s id e r a b le d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , w ith s e v e r a l o f the new o f f i ­ c i a l s , n o ta b ly in Painan, S o lo k , Pajakumbuh and K e r in t ji b ein g r e je c t e d by the l o c a l KNI and by communist g r o u p s .60
54. PST, p. 99.
55. See Singh, Post-War Occupation Forces, p. 244; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 234-35; PST, p. 100, which suggests that i t was the NICA who were responsible. The v ic ­ tims were Brig. Maj. Anderson and Miss Allingham o f the Red Cross.
56. Mountbatten states that "by December, the situation was so satisfactory that it was possible to divert to Java a brigade o f 26 Indian Division intended for Sumatra." It seems likely that this diversion occurred before the death o f Major Anderson. Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten o f Burma, Post Surrender Tasks: Section E o f the Report to the Combined Chiefs o f Staff, by the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, 1943-1945 (London: H.M. Stationery O ffice, 1969), p. 299.
57. PST, pp. 382-83. At this same meeting the membership o f the KNI was increased to 97, and attempts were made to include representatives o f a ll groups, organi­ zations and d istricts o f the region. See also ib id . , pp. 90-92.
58. Ibid. , p. 112.
59. The PST states that these changes were instituted "with the aim o f imbuing the administrative organization with revolutionary sp irit" (PST, p. 108). In view o f the character and record o f Perpatih Baringek and the groups which protested the appointments this appears unlikely. But I have been unable to establish the reasons for and character o f the reorganization. For the officeholders as o f October 1, see ib id . , pp. 89-91; and for the new administrative o ffic e r s , ib id . , pp. 108-10.
60. Nefis Publicatie no. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 in the Indies Col­ lection o f the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (hereafter IC-RVO), Amsterdam, p. 25.

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Up to A p r il 1946 th ere appears to have been p r a c t i c a l l y no attem pt on the c i v i l i a n l e v e l by the c e n t r a l r e p u b lic a n le a d e r s h ip to a s s e r t c o n t r o l ov er developm ents on Sumatra. No r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s o f the ce n ­ t r a l government v i s i t e d the is la n d u n t i l th a t month, and most o f the i n i t i a t i v e s e ith e r to fo llo w J a va f s example or to organ ize independent o r g a n iz a tio n s appear to have o r ig in a t e d from the Sumatran s i d e . 6 i
In the m ilit a r y f i e l d , how ever, attem pts to c o o r d in a te the Suma­ tran armed f o r c e s and t i e them in t o a TKR o r g a n iz a t io n 612 c o v e r in g both Java and Sumatra began b e fo r e the end o f 1945, and were to con tin u e throughout the r e v o lu t io n . In e a r ly November, Dr. Gani was app oin ted the f i r s t c o o r d in a t o r o f the TKR on Sumatra, which was to c o n s is t o f a t o t a l o f s i x d i v i s i o n s . A ft e r s e t t in g up a g e n e ra l headqu arters ( markets bes&r umurn) f o r the Sumatra command, Gani t r a n s fe r r e d a u th o r ity to Suhardjo H a rd jo w a rd o jo , a p p o in tin g him a m ajor g e n e r a l .63 In t h is i n i t i a l o r g a n iz a t io n D iv is io n s I and II were r e s p o n s ib le f o r South Sumatra (w ith t h e ir h ead qu arters at Lahat and P alem bang), D iv is io n I I I f o r C entral Sumatra ( B u k i t t i n g g i ) , D iv is io n IV f o r East Sumatra (M edan), D iv is io n V f o r A tje h (B ir e u e n ), and D iv is io n VI f o r T apanuli and Nias ( S i b o l g a ) . 64
The Banteng d i v i s i o n (D iv is io n I I I ) Ts area o f c o n t r o l was West Sumatra, Riau and the is la n d s , w h ile Djambi was a tta ch e d to the Gadjah d iv is io n o f South Sum atra.65 The Banteng d i v i s i o n ’ s p r in c i p a l command­ ers were form er members o f the Gyugun f o r c e s , Dahlan Djambek and Ismael Lengah, a s s is t e d by S j a r i f Usman.66 I t c o n s is t e d o f fo u r r e g i ­

61. There were two principal groups which visited Java before the end o f 1945. The fir s t consisted o f pemuda who attended the Pemuda Congress in November. Clearly, however, many o f the 166 Sumatrans who were reported to have attended the con­ ference were residents o f Java. (Departemen P.D. dan K., Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pemuda, p. 165.) The Atjehnese delegation consisted o f four Atjehnese students who were then studying on Java. Semangat Merdeka, November 17, 1945. The second group was a delegation from the provincial government o f Sumatra consisting o f Dr. Amir, Mr. Luat Siregar, Dr. Djamil, and Adinegoro, who traveled around Java and had a meeting with Sukarno and Hatta on December 29. Raliby, Documenta, pp. 170-71; PST, p. 102.

62. On January 25, 1946, the TKR became the Tentara Republik Indonesia (TRI), and on May 5, 1947, its name was again changed to Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). Pusat Sedjarah M iliter Angkatan Darat, Peranan TNI Angkatan Darat dalam Perang Kemerdekaan (Revolusi Pisik 1945-1950) (Bandung: Pussemad, 1965), p. 210.

63. Nasution, TNI, I, pp. 159-61; Pusat Sedjarah M iliter, Peranan TNI, pp. 207-8;
PST, pp. 550-51. Gani was appointed on November 5, 1945 (ib id . , p. 567). Suhar­ djo was born in Surakarta in 1901, and received military training in the Mangkunegaran Legion. Just before the war he moved to Lampung, and during the Japanese occupation was chief o f police for Tandjung Karang. T. B. Simatupang, Report from Banaran (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), pp. 66-67.

64. Nasution, TOI, I, pp. 159-60.

65. PST, p. 550.

66. Dahlan Djambek, son o f the famous West Sumatran Muslim scholar, was bom in 1917 and studied at a Christian high school in Djakarta for three years. He became an army o ffic e r in West Sumatra during the Japanese occupation. S ja rif Usman was bom in 1919 at Muara Panas, Solok. He was educated in an Islamic college in Padang, and fin a lly studied economics at the National Academy. He taught fir s t in Djakarta, then in Padang. He gained the rank o f Lt. I. under the

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ments67 under the o v e r a ll le a d e r s h ip o f the d i v i s i o n commander, Dahlan Dj ambek.
In a d d itio n , however, p a ra m ilita ry or p e o p le ’ s s e c u r ity fo r c e s were d e v e lo p in g o u ts id e o f the TKR s t r u c t u r e . The e a r l i e s t o f th ese groups was made up o f the members o f the PRI o f B u k ittin g g i and Padang who con tin u ed t h e ir o r g a n iz a t io n at a l o c a l d efen se l e v e l . 68 The im­ p orta n ce o f the PRI d e c lin e d a f t e r the e sta b lish m e n t o f o th e r ir r e g u la r units d ir e c t ly tie d to the p o lit ic a l p a r tie s , p a r tic u la rly the Islam ic o r g a n iz a t io n s , which began r e e s t a b lis h in g them selves from e a r ly Novem­ b er 1 9 4 5 .69 The two la r g e s t Isla m ic m ilit a r y o r g a n iz a t io n s were the H iz b u lla h , which was form ed at the in au gu ral m eeting o f the M a d je lis Islam T in g g i (MIT) as a p o l i t i c a l p a rty in December 1945. The MIT in F e b ru a ry ,o f the fo llo w in g y e a r was fu sed w ith the M asju m i.70* Less
Japanese in Central Sumatra. I can fine no information on Ismael Lengah before he entered Gyugun. Simatupang, Report, p. 100; Parlaungan, Tokoh2 Parlemen (Djakarta: C. V. Gita, 1956), pp. 187-88.
67. Regiments I, II and III under Lt. Col. S ja rif Usman, Lt. Col. Dahlan Djambek, and Lt. Col. Ismael Lengah were responsible for West Sumatra. Each was divided into three battalions. Regiment IV under Lt. Col. Hasan Basri was responsible for Riau and was divided into five battalions. (PST, p. 551.) At a meeting in mid-January Dahlan Djambek was appointed panglima o f the Banteng division (with Lt. Col. Jazid Abidin as his chief o f s t a ff), and his position as commander of Regiment II was taken by Lt. Col. Dahlan Ibrahim. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 210; 0. G. Roeder, Who’ s Who in Indonesia (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), p. 149, for biographical details on Ibrahim.
68. PST, p. 468. The PRI was incorporated into the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo) in 1946. Under the auspices o f Amir Sjarifuddin then Minister o f Information, a group o f pemuda had been sent from Java to Sumatra at the end o f October 1945. Kamal and Karim Halim headed an 80-man contingent which came to West Sumatra. ( Ibid. , pp. 94-95.) Kamal attended the Pemuda Congress in 1945 at Jogja, and he headed the Kongres Rakjat o f West Sumatra held in Padang Pandjang on November 2. PST, pp. 103-4; Semangat Merdeka, October 27, 1945.
69. Several o f these organizations were strengthened by the return in December o f prewar Minangkabau leaders who had been exiled to Digul and had spent most of the war in Australia. These included H. Ilja s Jacub and Djalaluddin Thaib, former leaders o f Permi (Persatuan Muslim Indonesia), the radical modernist Islamic party which had emerged in West Sumatra in the late 1920s; Hadji Datuk Batuah, the Islamic communistleader o f the 1920s who became one o f the leaders o f the PKI; and Dt. Singo Maradjo o f the PSII. OtherSumatrans returning from exile included Burhanoeddin and Datuk Bendaro. PST, pp. 106, 459; Tamar Djaja, Pusaka Indonesia (Bandung: Kementerian Pendidikan Pengadjaran dan Kebudajaan Republik Indonesia, 1952), pp. 370-72; Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Move­ ment in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 78, 156; Semangat Merdeka, November 3, 1945.
70. The Hizbullah was headed by Abdul Rasjid Sutan Mansur and was formed on November 25, 1945. The Sabilillah , which was half its size, according to Hamka, was under the nominal leadership o f Mohammad Djamil Djambek and Daud Rasjidi (re­ spectively eighty-five and six ty -fiv e years old at the time). A. R. St. Mansur was bom in 1895 at Manindjauo f an ulama family. He had been a follower o f Hadji Rusul and had taught in his school at Padang Pandjang. He became head of the Muhammadijah in Minangkabau in 1930, and pursued a policy o f making the organization increasingly nonpolitical. (See Abdullah, Schools and P o lit ic s ,

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im portant were the communist m ilita r y groups, the Barisan Merah, t ie d to the PKI, and the S a i f f u l l a h , a l l i e d w ith the PKI Lokal I s la m .71
The f i r s t h a l f o f 1946 was marked by armed d istu rb a n ce s in East and North Sumatra, where u p r is in g s a g a in s t the l o c a l ra ja h s le d to co n ­ s id e r a b le b lo o d sh e d and breakdown o f a u t h o r it y . The v io le n c e spread as fa r as T a p a n u li,72 but in West Sumatra the main r e p e r c u s s io n s were in the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . The reasons f o r t h is d iv e rg e n ce are perhaps o b v i ­ o u s, but are p ro b a b ly worth r e s t a t in g . The two p r in c i p a l d if f e r e n c e s were th a t, f i r s t , as has been n oted above, Indonesians in West Sumatra were under f a r le s s p re ssu re from the A l l i e d f o r c e s ; and the retu rn o f Dutch a d m in is tra to r s o u ts id e o f the immediate c o a s t a l e n cla v e o f Padang seemed much le s s im m inent.7374 Thus, a lth ou g h th ere was c o n s id e r a b le d is s a t i s f a c t i o n ov er the European p resen ce and the compromises with the Dutch b ein g made by the le a d e r s h ip o f the r e p u b lic , both on Sumatra and J ava, th e re was as y e t no sense o f s tro n g p re ssu re th a t demanded an immediate re sp o n se . More im portant at t h is sta g e was the d i f f e r e n t econom ic and s o c i a l environm ent in West Sumatra, where in d iv id u a l la r g e s c a le landow nership was ra re and s o c i a l i n e q u a li t ie s le s s pronoun ced, and where th e re were few o b v io u s t a r g e ts on whom hungry and d is p la c e d p e o p le co u ld ven t t h e ir w r a t h .71* M oreover, in c o n t r a s t to East Sumatra the Minangkabau p o p u la tio n was e t h n ic a l ly homogeneous and the system o f s o c i a l o r g a n iz a t io n in West Sumatra tended to make i t e a s ie r f o r d i s ­ s a t is fa c t io n s to fin d channels through n o n v io le n t means.
D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and p re ssu re f o r change were n e v e r th e le s s th ere but i t was w ith in the r e s id e n c y 's l e g i s l a t i v e b od y , the KNI Sumatera B arat, th a t moves were made to meet the demands. At i t s m eeting on March 14, 1946, the KNI s e t up a V o lk s f r o n t , m odeled on the Persatuan
pp. 65-69, 165-66.) He was one o f the organizers o f the Hizbullah as a military arm o f the Muhammadijah and was its fir s t commander. (Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 334-35.) He was to become head o f the Muhammadijah during the 1950s. By 1946 both the Hizbullah and Sabilillah were tied organizationally to the Masjumi party. Ibid . , pp. 334, 360; PST, pp. 474-75; Djaja, Pusaka Indonesia, pp. 285, 290, 308, 312; Raliby, Documenta, pp. 136-37; Abdullah, Schools and P o litic s , p. 166; Semangat Merdeka, December 1, 1945.
71. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 335. The leader o f the Saiffullah was Abdul Gani S ja rif.
72. Semangat Merdeka, March 13, 1946.
73. See, however, Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 66-67, where he stresses the relative weakness o f the Dutch in East Sumatra at this period.
74. This does not mean that poverty and hunger were not widespread in West Sumatra during the early months o f the revolution. There was a severe rice shortage there, which caused increasing dissatisfaction from the end o f 1945 (Nefis Publicatie, No. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 [IC-RVO], p. 24). In his travels around the region in the early part o f 1946 Hamka noted that the most hard-hit areas were near Solok and Alahan Pandjang, where many died o f hunger, and from his own observations he estimated that about 75 percent o f the population wore clothes o f tree bark (baju kulit kayu) as often occurred in Java. (Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 314.) The extent o f the hardship can be seen from the d e ficits in rice production from 1943-47. After a surplus in 1942, there was a d e ficit o f 28,815 tons in 1943; 47,539 tons in 1944; 160,468 in 1945; 154,475 tons in 1946, and 108,723 tons in 1947. There are no figures for the later years. PST, p. 651.

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Perdjuangan form ed by Tan Malaka on Java in January o f th a t y e a r . 75 A lthough the f r o n t 's le a d e r s were m ostly drawn from the KNI i t s e l f , they were a l l from the more r a d ic a l com ponent, c o n s is t in g o f members o f the youth and la b o r g ro u p s, and s o c i a l i s t and communist p a r t i e s . 76 The o r g a n iz a t io n was d iv id e d in t o a s e r i e s o f c o u n c ils re p r e s e n tin g the d i f f e r e n t luhak (th e t r a d i t i o n a l Minangkabau d i v i s i o n s ) and d i s t r i c t s o f West Sumatra. C on trol o v er the "Fonds Kemerdekaan" and o v er the r e g i o n 's economy was t r a n s fe r r e d from the KNI to the V o lk s f r o n t . 77
In the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d , the V o lk s fr o n t's a ctio n s were immediately marked by an in t r a n s ig e n t sta n ce toward the A l l i e d f o r c e s . Demands v o ic e d by the body on March 24 p a r a l l e l e d th ose b e in g is s u e d by fr o n t s in o th e r p a r ts o f In d o n e s ia , p a r t i c u l a r l y in East Sum atra,78 nam ely: (1) th a t " a ll Dutchmen under p r o t e c t i o n o f the B r it is h sh ou ld be s u r ­ rendered to the TRI; (2) a l l Indonesians a rrested by the B r itis h should be su rren d ered to the r e p u b lic a n p o l i c e f o r c e ; (3 ) the B r it is h must r e ­ q u est from the In don esian r e s id e n t in Padang any s u p p lie s they needed from West Sumatra; (4) the o f f i c e b u ild in g o f the re s id e n t o f the R epu blic o f Indon esia in Padang shou ld be retu rn ed by the B r it is h ; (5) the s a f e t y o f B r it is h s o l d i e r s and v e h ic l e s o u ts id e o f Padang co u ld no lo n g e r be gu a ra n teed ; and (6 ) the r e s id e n t sh ou ld is s u e an o rd e r th a t a l l a cco m p lice s and h e lp e r s o f the NICA be rem ov ed .79
The V o lk s f r o n t 's p r in c i p a l a c t io n s , how ever, were in the econom ic f i e l d , in a d r a s t ic attem pt to curb the i n f l a t i o n th a t was ra g in g in the r e g io n . But the chaos r e s u lt in g from th ese ste p s le d the r e s id e n t to o v e r r id e t h e ir o rd e rs and d is s o lv e the fr o n t l i t t l e more than a month a f t e r i t had been e s t a b lis h e d . The i n f l a t i o n in West Sumatra was b ein g e x a ce rb a te d by the number o f 100 rupiah Japanese n o te s which the Dutch were r e p o r t e d ly f lo o d in g in t o the a re a , and i t was around the problem o f th is paper currency that the V olk sfron t centered it s a ctio n s . On A p r il 1 i t d e c la r e d th a t w ith in a month the 100 rupiah n ote would no lon g er be le g a l cu rre n cy , and th at b e fo r e the end o f that p e rio d a l l 100 rupiah n o te s sh ou ld be exchanged at the banks f o r n o te s o f sm a lle r d en om in ation s. As r e p u b lic a n cu rre n cy had not y e t been c i r c u l a t e d , t h is le d to an in s u p p o rta b le demand f o r the s m a lle r den om in ation al n o t e s , which the banks co u ld not m eet. The s it u a t io n was fu r t h e r ag­ g ra v a ted by two o th e r f a c t o r s : news o f the r e g u la t io n reach ed the towns b e fo r e the c o u n t r y s id e , so th a t many o f the unwanted n o te s g ot d e p o s ite d in ru ra l a re a s; the r e g u la tio n a p p lie d on ly to West Sumatra so that sp ecu la tors from other a rea s, p a r tic u la r ly the southern part o f T apan uli, c a p it a liz e d on the s it u a t io n . This le d to a fu rth e r regu ­
75. Sumatran Governor Hasan was present at the meeting. Semangat Merdeka, March 20, 1946.
76. The seven-man leadership council was made up o f Barium A.S. (PBI), Bachtaruddin (PKI), Chatib Suleiman (Partai S o s ia lis ), Iskandar Tedjasukmana (Partai Sosial i s ) , Suleiman (PRI), Basjrah Lubis (SOBSI), and a high o ff ic ia l whose name was not published. PST, pp. 113, 479.
77. Their fir s t action was to forbid the collection o f taxes by any body other than the Volksfront.
78. Nefis Publicatie no. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 in IC-RVO, p. 10.
79. PST, pp. 115-16.

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l a t i o n , banning a l l t r a f f i c w ith T a p a n u li, and a law by which no one co u ld p o sse ss more than 500 rupiah in c a s h .80
The immediate econom ic chaos r e s u lt in g from th ese measures le d the r e s id e n t to o v e r r u le the V o lk s fr o n t , is s u in g a r e g u la t io n as e a r ly as A p r il 5 th at the 100 rupiah n ote was s t i l l le g a l cu r re n cy . C o n f lic t in g o rd e rs were is s u e d by the r e s id e n t and the fr o n t through most o f A p r i l, w ith the p o p u la tio n unsure which o f the two had le g a l a u t h o r i t y .81 F in a lly a ft e r a m eeting o f a l l the Sumatran r e s id e n t s , atten ded by a d eleg a tion from the cen tra l government in J o g ja , the leaders o f the V o lk s fr o n t were a r r e s t e d on A p r il 2 4 .82
This se v e re a c t io n , how ever, appears to have had l i t t l e in the way o f rep ercu ssion s, p o s s ib ly because o f the homogeneity between the lea d ­ ers o f the V o lk s fr o n t and the KNI. The s i x men were r e le a s e d a month l a t e r on May 22, were g iv en an o p p o rtu n ity to a ir t h e ir g rie v a n ce s b e ­ f o r e the f u l l KNI, and were r e in c o r p o r a te d in t o i t s l e a d e r s h i p .83
The v a r ie g a te d d is tu rb a n ce s in the d i f f e r e n t p a rts o f Sumatra d id , how ever, have lo n g -te rm e f f e c t s on the a d m in is tr a tiv e o r g a n iz a t io n o f the is la n d , a le r t in g the p r o v in c ia l and c e n t r a l governments to the dangers o f the s it u a t io n th e r e . They le d to the f i r s t v i s i t by a cen ­ t r a l government d e le g a t io n to the is la n d 84 and to attem pts to r e s t r u c ­ tu re the Sumatran a d m in is tra tio n in a way b e t t e r s u it e d to the r e a l i ­ t i e s o f the l o c a l s it u a t io n on the is la n d . These changes were made at a l l le v e l s from the p ro v in ce down to the n e g e r i. In an attem pt to i n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l i z e t i e s between Sumatra and Java, the c e n t r a l government
80. A fu ll account o f the economic situation in March-April 1946 can be found in ib id ., pp. 116-21, 125.
81. On the influence o f the Volksfront, see ib id . , pp. 479-80; Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia (Djakarta: n .p ., n .d .), II, p. 97. He does not, however, mention the arrest o f the fron t's leaders and attributes its failure to differences amongst its members. See also Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 337; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 235-37.
82. The central government delegation arrived in Bukittinggi on April 17 and attend­ ed the inaugural meeting o f the KNI Sumateri April 17-20. (Raliby, Documenta, pp. 296-99.) At a meeting with the governor, the residents and the central gov­ ernment delegation, the Volksfront, on April 21, promised to stand behind the government and take no steps without its agreement. However, "the co n flict and problem o f prestige between the government and the Volksfront" led the West Sumatran government on April 24 to arrest a ll six o f its leaders. (The "high o ffic ia l whose name was not published" was apparently not arrested.) PST, p. 125. To meet the problems o f the m ilitary's food supplies, a 10 percent tax was imposed on a ll crop yields. In addition, the central government promised development money, providing in itia lly 250 million rupiah to Sumatra as a whole, and later 500 million rupiah. Ibid. , p. 127.
83. Ibid. , pp. 386-88, 481.
84. The delegation (including Minister o f Defense Amir Sjarifuddin, Minister o f In­ formation M. Natsir, Minister o f Religion H. Rasjidi, and Mr. Hermani, repre­ senting the Ministry o f Internal A ffairs) went fir s t to East Sumatra, and arrived in Bukittinggi on April 17, leaving there probably on April 21. Ibid . , p. 121; Raliby, Documenta, pp. 296-97; Semangat Merdeka, April 10, 1946.

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d e le g a t io n oversaw esta b lish m e n t o f a Sumatran KNI, whose d e le g a te s would re p re s e n t the is la n d in the KNI Pusat on J a v a .85
At the p r o v in c e l e v e l a 100-member Dewan Perw akilan Sumatera was c r e a t e d , made up o f KNI r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s from each o f the r e s i d e n c i e s . 86 At the same time Governor Hasan, f i n a l l y r e c o g n iz in g the i m p o s s ib ilit y o f e f f e c t i v e l y a d m in isterin g Sumatra as a s in g le u n it , agreed to the e sta b lish m e n t o f th ree s u b p r o v in c e s , N orth, C entral and South Sumatra, each w ith a deputy g o v e rn o r. The su b p ro v in ce o f C en tral Sumatra i n c o r ­ p o ra te d the r e s id e n c ie s o f West Sumatra, Djambi and R ia u .87 C rea tion o f the su bprovin ce o f C entral Sumatra le d to the fo u rth change o f r e s i ­ dent in West Sumatra s in ce the Independence P roclam ation . Dr. Djamil (who had re p la c e d P e rp a tih B aringek on March 18 when the l a t t e r was r e ­ c a l l e d to Medan to take ov er an a d m in is tr a tiv e p o s t th e re ) was a p p oin ted deputy g ov ern or o f C en tral Sumatra, and h is p la c e as r e s id e n t o f West Sumatra was taken by Mr. S t. M. R a s jid on J u ly 2 0 .88
T ogeth er w ith th ese ch an ges, Dewan Pertahanan Daerah (R e g io n a l De­ fense C ouncils) were crea ted in each o f the r e s id e n c ie s . These coun­ c i l s complemented the Dewan Pertahanan Negara at the n a t io n a l l e v e l , and t h e ir aim was to c o n s o lid a t e the le a d e r s h ip o f the c i v i l a dm in is­ t r a t i o n , the army, and the Mp e o p le M in t o a s in g le b od y . In West Suma­ t r a the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah was headed by R esid en t R a s jid , w ith Army D iv is io n a l Commander Dahlan Djambek as h is d e p u t y .89
85. Raliby, Documenta, pp. 297-98; G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 181-83.
86. Representatives from West Sumatra were: Chatib Suleiman, Aziz Chan, Darwis Ma*roef, Rangkajo Rasuna Said, Bariun A.S., Sidi Bakaruddin, Bagindo M. Tahir, Abdullah, Dt. Simaradjo, Bachtaruddin, Mr. M. Nasroen, Jacoeb Rasjid, S ja rif Said, Sultani St. Malako, Mr. Nazaruddin, Marzuki Jatim, H. M. Joenoes, Roestam Thaib, A. Gafar Djambek. (PST, pp. 122-23.) The body met only three times be­ fore it was dissolved in the reorganization o f 1948.
87. Governor Hasan had decided to move the Sumatra capital from Medan to Pematang Siantar on March 22. Semangat Merdeka, March 29, 1946. The levels below the residency were kabupaten (luhak); kewedanaan; ketjamatan (demang muda); and desa (negeri). Raliby, Documenta, pp. 296-99; PST, p. 123.
88. On the succession o f residents o f West Sumatra, Hamka writes that "the govern­ ment fir s t appointed S ja fei, but apparently the violent situation caused by the A llied landing and the kepanasan ra'ayat could not be overcome by that gentle soul. Then the Komite Nasional decided to appoint Dt. Perpatih Baringek. An old man who during the Dutch period had only the soul o f a clerk (mengenal jiwa kantor) , he was also unable to deal with the situation. He then was replaced by Dr. M. Djamil. Then Dr. Djamil was appointed subgovernor o f Central Sumatra, and Mr. St. Mohd. Rasjid was named resident. He lasted a long time." Hamka, Kenang^kenangan, p. 337. Rasjid was born in 1911 in Pariaman, fin a lly graduat­ ing from the Sekolah Hakim Tinggi in Djakarta in 1938. From 1939-41 he was a lawyer in Bukittinggi and Padang. He was in Djakarta from 1942 until 1944 when he again returned to West Sumatra. Kementerian Penerangan, Kami Perkenalkan. p. 59.
89. PST, pp. 131-32. Its other members were Dr. A. Rahim Usman, Duski Samad, Bach­ taruddin (formerly o f the Volksfront) and Abdullah. (On Duski Samad, who was a younger brother o f A. R. Sutan Mansur and had been a Permi leader in the early 1930s, see Abdullah, Schools and P o litic s , pp. 124, 168; Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 156; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 313.

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Plans f o r e s t a b lis h in g Dewan Perw akilan (R e p re s e n ta tiv e C o u n cils) at the n e g e ri le v e l were f i r s t put forward at the mid-March s e s s io n o f the KNI a f t e r the d e c is io n to form the V o lk s fr o n t . The move was aimed at removing lo c a l power from the s o le hands o f the t r a d it io n a l adat group and r e a p p o r tio n in g i t among r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s o f v a rio u s o r g a n iz a ­ t io n s and p a r t i e s . 90 E le c t io n s were h e ld in West Sumatra on June 25 f o r the Dewan P erw akilan N egeri and on J u ly 10 f o r the w a li n e g e r i . 91 It is with respect to these e le ctio n s that the account in the Propinsi sta te s:
In these fifteen h istoric days there were great efforts in the direc­ tion o f democratizing the administration o f the negeri, so that auton­ omy reached down in West Sumatra, connecting directly with the people. And with this great step, that was carried out without any instruc­ tions from the Central Government, R .I., clashes and sp illin g o f blood were prevented, and the great revolution went forward safely and peacefully.92
However, in an a d m in is tr a tiv e sense th e se n e g e r i were to o sm all to assume the r o le s en v isa g ed f o r them: o f c o n t r o l l i n g t h e ir own economy and d e a lin g w ith t h e ir own a f f a i r s . Over the n ext y e a r , they were g r a d u a lly grouped in t o wilajah a u t o n o o m , and by November 1948, the o r i g i n a l 542 n e g e r i formed 21 autonomous n e g e r i b e s a r .9394
There was a ls o a r e o r g a n iz a t io n o f the Sumatran m ilit a r y command p u b lish e d on Ju ly 3, 1946, whereby Sumatra was d iv id e d in t o th re e su b ­ commands: Subcommand I f o r South Sumatra, headed by A. K. Gani; Sub­ command II f o r C en tra l Sumatra under Dahlan Djambek; and Subcommand I I I f o r North Sumatra under Teuku Mohd. Daud S ja h .9lf Subcommand I co n ­ s i s t e d o f Garuda D iv is io n I under B a r lia n , and Garuda D iv is io n II under Bambang U t o j o .95 (In December 1946 Sim bolon r e p la c e d Gani as head o f
90. One-fifth o f the candidates for election were to be nominated from each o f the following five groups: (1) the penhulu and alim ulama; (2) the negeri branch o f the KNI (mostly adat leaders); (3) a meeting o f the local branch o f the KNI that was to be attended by at least 100 male members o f the electorate; (4) a meeting o f at least 100 female electors; (5) the p o litica l parties. PST, p. 339. The MTKAAM at its congress o f April 15 objected to the resident about the new measures, but he supported the KNI decision. Ibid . , p. 330.
91. The election law o f May 21 appears in PST, pp. 331-36. There were to be nine representatives for the fir s t thousand members o f a negeri and two representa­ tives for each additional thousand. Thus a negeri with a population o f 7,000 would have a DPN o f twenty-one members. These DPNs were then to nominate four candidates for the position o f wali negeri to be voted on in the July 10 elections. Ibid. , pp. 338-40.
92. Ibid. , p. 340. It should be remembered that this was written in the early 1950s when there was considerable tension between West Sumatra and the central govern­ ment over the matter o f local autonomy.
93. Ibid., pp. 340-42.
94. Ibid. , p. 568. The reorganization was apparently not completed until February 1947 (Pusat Sedjarah M iliter Angkatan Darat, Sedjarah TNI Angkatan Darat 19451965 [Bandung: Pussemad, 1965], p. 25), but the subcommands in at least Central and South Sumatra came into existence by mid-1946.
95. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 319.

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Subcommand I , ) 96 Subcommand I I I was d iv id e d in to Gadjah I (A tje h under Husin Ju su f) and Gadjah II (E ast Sumatra under Ahmad T a h ir ). Subcom­ mand II was d iv id e d in to Banteng I (T apanu li under Pandapotan Sitom pul) and Banteng II (West Sumatra) under Ism ael L engah.97 The Banteng d i v i ­ s io n i t s e l f now became D iv is io n IX Banteng TRI Sumatra Command.98
The Return o f the Dutch and the March 3 A f f a i r
These org a n iza tion a l changes were taking p la ce against a back­ ground o f the gradual d isp la cem en t o f B r it is h and Indian f o r c e s in and around the town o f Padang by th ose o f the D u tch .99 Clashes between the Indonesians and A llie d fo r c e s in cre a se d sh a rp ly in J u ly , rea ch in g a peak a fte r the takeover o f republican adm in istrative o f f ic e s in the c i t y by B r it is h and Dutch f o r c e s . 100 This v i o l e n t In don esian r e a c t io n caused the A l l i e s to a r r e s t the West Sumatra r e s id e n t Mr. R a s jid , and the head o f the Padang p o l i c e , Johnny Anwar, r e le a s in g them o n ly in resp on se to the p r o t e s t s o f Deputy Governor D ja m il.101 From the m iddle o f March B r it is h f o r c e s in Padang had c o n s is t e d o f o n ly one sm all b r i ­ gade, and t h e ir m ilit a r y p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y around the a i r f i e l d and the p o r t o f Teluk B a ju r, was ex trem ely te n u o u s .102 However, the Indon e­
96. Ibid., p. 321.
97. Ismael Lengah replaced Djambek, who was promoted to head Subcommand II (Nasution, TNI, I, p. 327). There was a reorganization within the Banteng division during 1946. The headquarters o f Regiment II was moved from Sawah Lunto to Sungai Penuh, later under command o f Lt. Col. Thalib who replaced Dahlan Ibra­ him who now became the Banteng division chief o f s ta ff. Its responsibility was for the southern front, with battalions at Sungai Penuh and Painan. The head­ quarters o f Regiment III was moved from Lubuk Alung to Solok, under Lt. Col. A. Husein, with responsibility for the eastern front. Its battalions were at Indarung, Bukit Kompong and Pajakumbuh. Regiment I maintained its headquarters at Bukittinggi, with responsibility for the northern front. It was now under A. Halim, as S ja rif Usman had been named to a s t a ff position with the central command. Its battalions were at Bukittinggi, Padang Pandjang and Pariaman. A battalion "Teras" was formed from elements o f the lasjkar rakjat around Padang and it became Battalion 4 o f Regiment III (East) under command o f Maj. Sjuib in November 1946. Ibid . , p. 323; PST, pp. 564, 568; Tokoh2 Parlemen, p. 188; Simbolon, Report, p. 162.
98. PST, p. 569.
99. The fir s t two months o f 1946 were relatively quiet in Padang, so some o f the Allied forces were transferred to Palembang. On a v is it to Sumatra in April 1946, Adm. Mountbatten ordered a ll SEAC forces to be withdrawn as soon as A llied prisoners o f war and the remaining Japanese could be evacuated. It was estimated that this would take about two months, with authority to be trans­ ferred to the Dutch in both Java and Sumatra by July 1. (Mountbatten, Post Surrender, pp. 300, 309.) The transfer, however, took over four months longer.
100. Raliby, Documenta, p. 367.
101. PST, pp. 133-34. According to Raliby (Documenta, p. 370), they were released on August 9 after several days* detention.
102. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 322. He states that the a irfie ld was pock-marked by fire from Indonesian arms, and that both it and the port could have been overrun had

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sia n a tta ck s were a p p a ren tly g e n e r a lly spontaneous and u n co o rd in a te d , bein g launched la r g e ly by the non-TNI f o r c e s , w ith the e x ce p tio n o f one m ajor b a t t le in Padang at the end o f A ugust, le d by Dahlan D jam bek.103
In response to the ta k eover o f the Padang a d m in istra tio n o f f i c e s by the Dutch, most o f the remaining lea d ers o f the resid en cy adm inis­ t r a t i o n , to g e th e r w ith t h e ir o f f i c e s were withdrawn to Kajutanam and B u k ittin g g i. A republican presence was, however, maintained in the town, w ith A ziz Chan assuming the p o s t o f mayor in the m iddle o f A u g u st.104 At the b e g in n in g o f September the A l l i e s announced th a t SEAC fo r c e s would f i n a l l y be withdrawn from In d on esia by November 30 and that a u th o rity would be handed over to the N etherlands In d ies C iv il Ad­ m in is t r a t io n . 105
The month fo llo w in g the i n i t i a l l i n g o f the L in g g a d ja ti Agreement on November 15, a c e n tr a l government d e le g a tio n c o n s is t in g o f Amir S ja r ifu d d in , A. K. Gani and L t. Gen. O erip Soem ohardjo came to West Sumatra to work out i t s im plem entation t h e r e . 106 A s e r i e s o f m eetings were h e ld from December 11 to 31, between t h is d e le g a t io n , West Sumatra m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n le a d e r s , and r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s from the Dutch s i d e , con cern in g the m o d a litie s o f a c e a s e - f i r e and establish m en t o f a demar­ c a t io n li n e between Dutch and In don esian f o r c e s . M ajor disagreem ent arose over the issu e o f Dutch r e fu s a l to retu rn Indonesian p r is o n e r s , and ov er the In don esian in s is t e n c e on m a in tain in g a r e p u b lic a n town a d m in istra tio n in Padang su pported by a s iz e a b le Indonesian p o l i c e f o r c e to m aintain s e c u r i t y . 107 N e g o tia tio n s broke down o v e r th ese i s ­ sues on December 31, and h o s t i l i t i e s were b r i e f l y resumed, but a g r e e ­ ment was f i n a l l y reach ed in the m iddle o f January w ith the Dutch a c c e p tin g the p re se n ce o f 500 armed re p u b lic a n p o l i c e w ith in the town. From t h is p o in t r e la t io n s between the Dutch and the r e s id e n c y a dm in is­ t r a t i o n appear to have im proved, w ith many elem ents o f the government t o g e th e r w ith armed p o l i c e re tu rn in g from B u k itt in g g i to Padang by A p r i l . 108
However, th ere was e v id e n t d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n in West Sumatra w ith the l o c a l and n a t io n a l le a d e r s h ip and the compromises they were rea ch in g

there been an organized attack by the combined lasjkar and TRI forces. After the departure o f the 71 Indian Brigade and 1 Lincolns, the main SEAC force in Padang until August appears to have been the 8/8 Punjab Regiment. Singh, PostWar Occupation Forces, pp. 243-44.

103. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 323; PST, pp. 136-37. With his assumption o f command o f the Banteng division Ismael Lengah attempted to coordinate and direct the scat­ tered attacks. Some had clearly been directed against the Chinese community which had formed a Barisan Poh An Tui to safeguard its security (PST, p. 138). It appears that the Poh An Tui had been formed in Padang during the early spring o f 1946. Nefis Publicatie no. 16, JCS June 15, 1946, Doc. No. 061289 in IC-RVO, p. 28.

104. PST, pp. 132-35.

105. Ibid., p. 137.

106. Ibid. , p. 139. Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 240. On interpretations o f the Lingga­ d ja ti Agreement see Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 28-34.

107. PST, pp. 144-46.

108. Ibid. , pp. 150-51. Cease-fire lines were only fin a lly agreed on in May.

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w ith the Dutch. An atmosphere o f s u s p ic io n a p p a ren tly grew up in the e a r ly months o f 1947, w ith charges launched th a t le a d in g members o f the r e s id e n c y were a c tin g as anjing NICA.1^ At the b eg in n in g o f March w h ile a storm y KNIP was m eeting at Malang, w ith a number o f the West Sumatran le a d e rs p r e s e n t ,10910 and was f i n a l l y a g re e in g to r a t i f y the L in g g a d ja ti Agreement, a group c a llin g i t s e l f the Pembanteras Anti Kemerdekaan In d on esia (PAKI) launched an attem pted coup in B u k it t in g g i.
This a c t io n , which became known as the March 3 A f f a i r , aimed at kidnapping the West Sumatra r e s id e n t and Banteng d i v i s i o n commander; but the a tta ck s on both t h e ir r e s id e n c e s were r e p e lle d by gu ard s. The PAKI d id , how ever, su cceed in kidnapping Eni Karim, A. G a ffa r Djambek and Anwar S t. S a i d i ,111 to g e th e r w ith s e v e r a l o th e r members o f the ad­ m in is t r a t io n and armed f o r c e s , and in the a tta ck s one government s o l ­ d ie r was k i l l e d and one o f the a tta c k e r s wounded. The government r e a s s e r te d c o n t r o l the fo llo w in g day, fr e e in g the p r is o n e r s and a r r e s t ­ ing the PAKI le a d e r s . P r in c ip a l among th ese were Saalah Jusu f S t. Mangkuto and D t. Radjo Mangkuto, and the group in clu d e d elem ents from the H izb u lla h and S a b i l i l l a h f o r c e s , as w e ll as some young members o f the Sumatra M ilit a r y Command S e c r e t a r i a t .112
109. Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 243. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 338. He writes: "Mem­ bers o f the administration accused party leaders o f being NICA. Party leaders accused government o ffic ia ls o f being NICA. Mr. Rasjid, NICA; Ismael Lengah, Divisional Commander, NICA. Aziz Chan who had become Mayor o f Padang, which was occupied by the Dutch m ilitary, NICA; Johnny Anwar, Head o f Padang police, because his father was formerly a Demang, NICA. And those who made these accu­ sations were themselves accused by others as NICA."
110. There was a total delegation from Sumatra o f 50, which included 15 representa­ tives from West Sumatra. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 97; PST, p. 388. The five Sumatran delegates elected at Malang to the KNIP working commit­ tee on March 3 were I. Tedjasukmana (PSI), Zainal Baharudin (PSI), Luat Siregar (PKI), Njonja Rasuna Said, and Zainal Abidin Achman. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 205-6. (Rasuna Said had been a member o f the women*s branch o f Permi in the 1930s, Abdullah, Schools and P o litic s , pp. 194, 196-98.)
111. PST, p. 148; Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 244; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 343. Eni Karim was a member o f the residency secretariat; A. Gaffar Djambek was bupati o f Pajakumbuh and a leading member o f the KNI, and Anwar St. Saidi a former director of the National Bank in Bukittinggi and a member o f the KNI.
112. Amongst others arrested in the a ffa ir Hamka names: Guru Adam, BB; Sjamsuddin Ahmad; Hadji Marusin; Kapten Anwar; Sersan Mayor Julius (military p o lice ); Saibi Ismail; Burhanuddin St. Larangan; Tarok; a military policeman from Paja­ kumbuh; and Harun Rajo Sampono, a member o f the PKI from Silungkang. Ibid. , pp. 339, 363. S. J. Sutan Mangkuto, who is referred to in a ll accounts as a former bupati o f Solok, was a leading member o f the Muhammadijah in the 1920s and 1930s, and o f the KNI Sumatera Barat since its formation. He must there­ fore have been a member o f the H5kokai during the Japanese period. On the im­ portance o f his role during the 1920s and 1930s see Abdullah, Schools and P o litic s , pp. 60, 66, 84-85, 90-95. Datu Radjo Mangkuto was a member o f the BPPI in Padang at the end o f August 1945, and had led efforts to merge this group with the PRI. Sjamsuddin Ahmad was one o f the founders of the Hizbullah in 1945, and was commander o f its Central Sumatra division in February 1946. (PST, pp. 553-54.) Captain Anwar was possibly the Muhammad Anwar who commanded Regiment IV o f this division. H. Marusin appears later in Hamka*s memoirs as a member o f a dissatisfied Hizbullah group in a village outside o f Padang Pandjang during the second Dutch action. (Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 409.) I have been unable to find references to the others.

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This a f f a i r r a is e d alarm p a r t i c u l a r l y amongst the Masjumi and army le a d e r s . I t may a ls o have r e in f o r c e d the d i s p o s i t i o n o f Sumatra le a d ­ ers to fo llo w the i n i t ia t iv e launched on Java to b rin g m ilita ry e l e ­ ments o u t s id e o f the TNI in t o i t s o f f i c i a l s t r u c t u r e .11314 E arly news rea ch in g the KNIP in Malang on the in c id e n t re p o r te d th a t i t had been the West Sumatra Masjumi le a d e rs h ip which had i n i t i a t e d the cou p, so th a t N a ts ir im m ediately o rd e re d Masjumi le a d e r s Marzuki J a tim , A. R. S t. Mansur (head o f the H iz b u lla h ) and Udin back to B u k itt in g g i to i n ­ v e s t i g a t e , a n d .h im s e lf le d a d e le g a t io n to the area on March 2 3 .111* D e s p ite , or because o f , t h is con cern th ere seems to have been c o n s id e r ­ a b le u n derstan d in g o f the m otives o f the PAKI, and because the i n v e s t i ­ g a tio n dragged out in t o the summer the le a d e r s ' m isg iv in g s re g a rd in g L in g g a d ja ti appeared borne out by the f i r s t Dutch " p o lic e a c t io n " launched on J u ly 21. When th ey were f i n a l l y se n te n ce d at the end o f A ugust, o n ly D t. Radjo Mangkuto was sen t to j a i l f o r a y e a r , w ith the o th e r r e c e iv in g e it h e r suspended se n te n ce s o r b ein g fr e e d d i r e c t l y . 115
Attem pts to U nify Sumatran R e s is ta n c e : 1947
Whatever impetus they r e c e iv e d from the March 3 A f f a i r , th ere were m ajor attem pts on Sumatra begin n in g in the sp rin g o f 1947 to e s t a b lis h u n if ie d o r g a n iz a t io n s - - b o t h m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n - - w h i c h would i n c o r ­ p o ra te the d is p a r a te groups and p a r t ie s th a t had p r o l i f e r a t e d s in c e the la t t e r part o f 1945. It appears c le a r that the prime m ission o f V iceP resid en t Hatta during h is extended sta y in Sumatra begin n in g in June o f th a t y e a r , was to u n ify the d iv e r s e a n ti-D u tch movements on the is la n d , and to b rin g the s t r u g g le in Sumatra as a whole in lin e w ith the p o l i c i e s o f the re p u b lica n government on Java. Although th ese u n i­ f i c a t i o n ste p s began during the s p r in g , i t was the f i r s t Dutch " p o l i c e a c t io n " o f J u ly 21 which p ro v id e d the needed stim u lu s f o r the l o c a l groups them selves to c o o p e ra te w ith the government and army le a d e r s h ip towards such an end.
In t h e ir a tta ck the Dutch employed sm a ller fo r c e s on Sumatra than on J a v a ,116 and in West Sumatra i t was t h e ir B rigade U which moved out from Padang a tta c k in g a lon g the th re e main roads to the n o r th , e a s t and sou th o f the c i t y . 117 A ll th ese o p e r a tio n s were e it h e r n o ta b ly lim it e d
113. A decision had already been reached on November 26, 1946, between the Hizbullah and Sabilillah to unify their forces. PST, p. 560.
114. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 338-39. They decided that the Masjumi leadership had not initiated the a ffa ir. N atsir's stated opinion o f the attempted coup was that it was a mixture o f good and bad. PST, p. 149.
115. Hamka was appointed to defend a ll the accused leaders. Their tria l was to have begun on July 17, but Hamka gained a postponement because the fasting month was to start on July 20. The defendants were on bail until their tria l at the end o f August. Hamka's account o f the a ffa ir is found in Kenang-kenangan, pp. 33845, 362-69.
116. Three Dutch brigades were employed on Sumatra as opposed to three divisions on Java. (Nasution, TNI, II [Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1968], p. 89.) Brigade Z attacked from Medan, and Brigade Y from Palembang. (Ibid . , p. 90.) See also Charles Wolf, The Indonesian Story (New York: The John Day Co., 1948), p. 132.
117. Two days before the attack the mayor o f Padang, Aziz Chan, was k ille d , appar­ ently by the Dutch, though they blamed an Indonesian "extremist group." It is

Results of the First Dutch Military Action

Medan
*
Padang

Dj akarta Tjirebon
Bandung
Jogj akarta

Surabaya

T e rrito ry co n tr o lle d by the Dutch b e fo re July 21, 1947.
T e rrito r y occupied by the Dutch a ft e r the f i r s t m ilita ry action (July 21, 1947).
T e rrito ry held by the Republic up to the second m ilita ry a ctio n (December 18, 1948).

The West Sumatra Residency
1. K ototinggi
.2 Matur .3 Padang Pandjang .4 Paj akumbuh .5 Sawahlunto
.6 Sol ok .7 Painan .8. Tarusan
9 Kota Sungaipinang 1 0 . Muara Labuh
.1 1 Indarung .1 2 Mt. K e rin tji .1 3 Sungai Penuh .1 4 Alahan Pandjang .1 5 Sungai Dareh .1 6 Sidjundjung .1 7 Situdjuh Batur .1 8 Lubuk Alung .1 9 Pariaman
20. Kajutanam

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o r u n s u c c e s s fu l. The Dutch advanced fu r t h e s t on the n orth ern f r o n t , where they were i n i t i a l l y h a lte d about fo r t y k ilom eters from the c it y and f i n a l l y r e t i r e d to e s t a b lis h p o s it io n s at Lubuk A lung, 23 k ilo m e ­ t e r s n orth o f Padang. On the e a s te rn fr o n t they advanced o n ly as fa r as Indarung (r e t r e a t in g by the end o f the month to Padang's e a ste rn b o u n d a r ie s ), and to the south they were stop p ed s h o r t o f S igun tu r Tua, b oth towns w ith in f i f t e e n k ilo m e te rs o f Padang.*118
I t i s p o s s ib le th a t the Dutch command d id not employ as la r g e a f o r c e in West Sumatra as i t d id in East and South, and th a t i t s aim th ere was m erely to se cu re c o n t r o l o v e r the Padang p l a i n . 119 The la c k o f econom ic p r i z e s , such as the p la n t a t io n area around Medan and the o i l f ie ld s near Palembang, that cou ld be gained by a w ider occu p a tion would argue fo r t h is . C le a rly , the geography o f the area played a r o le in t h e ir lim it e d advance, w ith the Dutch f o r c e s b e in g h a lte d as soon as they approached the mountains, th is probably accounting fo r the greater e x te n t o f t h e ir p r o g r e s s to the n o r t h .120 Whatever the re a s o n s , the fa c t that a ft e r th is a c tio n the Dutch occu p a tion fo r c e s were s t i l l con ­ fin e d to an area o f about 15 k ilo m e te rs around the town o f Padang, and p a r tic u la r ly that a l l oth er towns, n ota b ly B u k ittin g g i, remained in re p u b lica n hands, must have had an e f f e c t on the a t t it u d e s o f the p e o p le o f West Sumatra. These f e e l i n g s would have been a cce n tu a te d by the f a c t th a t the Dutch f o r c e s in North Sumatra had o ccu p ie d Pematang S ia n ta r , u n t il then c a p it a l o f the Sumatran a d m in is tra tio n . This fo r c e d G over­ nor Hasan and h is c h i e f o f f i c i a l s to eva cu a te to B u k itt in g g i where they e s t a b lis h e d the Sumatran c a p it a l on August 6. With V ic e -P r e s id e n t H a tta 's presence there from ju s t a ft e r the Dutch a tta c k , B u k ittin g g i came to be term ed, at le a s t among the Minangkabau, "th e secon d c a p i t a l " o f I n d o n e s ia . 121
An agreement had a p p a re n tly been reach ed between Sukarno and Hatta in the sp rin g o f 1947 whereby th e re was a s e p a r a tio n o f command, w ith
unclear whether this had any connection with their imminent attack. See Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 347-49; Sumatera Tengah Special Number August 10, 1954, pp. 34-35, 37; PST, pp. 155-56.
118. Ibid ., pp. 575-76; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 246-47; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 351. Hamka, who emphasizes the gains o f the Dutch in the face o f the disunity and retreat o f the Indonesian forces, appears to agree with the extent o f the advance, but observes that to the east the Dutch were not far from Solok, and to the south not far from Tarusan. Siguntur Tua is not marked on Map 3, but i t is north o f Kota Sungeipinang, against which the Dutch launched an unsuccess­ ful attack. For a comparison with their advances elsewhere in Sumatra and Java, see Map 2.
119. However, I have seen no indication that the Dutch U Brigade was smaller than Y or Z. It is also clear that they were hoping to occupy Bukittinggi and Solok. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 351.
120. Because o f the vulnerability and breadth o f this northern front, TNI forces there were augmented by three battalions o f the Legium Sjahid in early 1948 (see below, p. 102). Its headquarters was at Padang Pandjang. The region around Pariaman came under command o f the navy. PST, pp. 575-76.
121. From the Isana in Bukittinggi Hatta directed both the military and p o litica l affairs o f Sumatra, through constant meetings with the governor and panglima o f Sumatra. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 373.

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Sukarno to le a d the s t r u g g le on Java and H atta th a t on Sumatra.122 From June 10 when he a r r iv e d in Medan H atta had been e x h o r tin g Sumatran le a d e rs on the need f o r u n ity in t h e ir common s t r u g g le a g a in st the Dutch, and im m ediately a f t e r the Dutch a tta c k he encouraged fo rm a tion o f a Front Pertahanan Nasional (n a tion a l Defense F ron t), in corp oratin g the d iv e r s e m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n o r g a n iz a t io n s on the is la n d . This body was to work c l o s e l y w ith the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah e s t a b lis h e d a y ea r p r e v io u s ly . Both c i v i l i a n and m ilit a r y le a d e r s were p re se n t at a m eeting in B u k itt in g g i on J u ly 29 in which a t o t a l o f 56 groups agreed to j o i n t o g e th e r in t o the f r o n t under the le a d e r s h ip o f ’ Hamka, and w ith Chatib Suleiman as s e c r e t a r y . 123124 This fr o n t was to s e t up a l o c a l d efen se o r g a n iz a t io n w ith BPNK (B arisan Pengawal N egeri dan Kota) which was to m o b iliz e a l l young men between the ages o f sev en teen and t h i r t y - f i y e . 12lf
At the same time moves were underway to implement the P r e s id e n t 's May 5 o rd e r th a t a l l la s jk a r groups sh ou ld be in c o r p o r a te d in t o the TN I.125 The f i r s t ste p toward th a t o b j e c t i v e was the c r e a t io n on J u ly 1 o f a Dewan K ela sjk a ra n Sumatera Tengah under C o l. S j a r i f Usman.126 In August the la sjk a r groups were co n so lid a te d in to a Legiun S ja h id , again under S j a r i f Usman.127 The fo llo w in g month Hatta named the H iz b u lla h commander, A. R. S t. Mansur, as t i t u l a r m ajor g e n e ra l in charge o f step s to in c o r p o r a t e t h is f o r c e in t o the TNI, and in November i t s name was changed to TNI Resimen Istim ewa Komandemen Sumatera, t h is regim ent b e in g fu se d in to D iv is io n IX Banteng on February 2 o f 1 9 4 8 .128 These m oves, how ever, r a is e d resentm ent among the la s jk a r f o r c e s , many o f whom sen t demands and re q u e sts f o r a degree o f autonomy to the Sumatran panglima. A fter d iscu ssion s with D iv ision IX, they were allow ed to form th ree b a t t a l i o n s , but n ot t h e ir own regim ent w ith in the d i v i s i o n . P a r t ic u l a r ly d i f f i c u l t f o r the la s jk a r groups to a cce p t was the r e p la c e

122. Ibid. , p. 353; PST, p. 157; Kami Perkenalkan, p. 43; Wolf states that "At the mountain stronghold o f Bukit Tinggi in the Menangkabau area o f West Sumatra Vice-President Hatta was commissioned by the Indonesian Cabinet and the KNIP to set up a new capital in the event o f an attack on Djokja. Hatta himself was delegated to assume formal leadership o f both the c iv il government and the armed forces in case President Soekamo and Prime Minister Sjarifoeddin should be unable to leave Djokja." Indonesia Story, pp. 139-40.

123. The 56 component groups included the Masjumi, Partai S osialis, PNI, PKI, Pesindo, Perti, Muhammadijah, PSII, MTKAAM, Barisan Hizbullah and Barisan Sabilillah Other leaders were Karim Halim, Rasuna Said, and Udin. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 359-60.

124. PST, p. 158.

125. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 83.

126. Former commander o f Regiment I o f the Banteng division. Its deputy head was Agus Salim Murai (commander o f Hizbullah), its secretary Anwar Mulin (commander o f S a b ilillah ), and its members Sofjan Siradj (commander o f Lasjmi), Gazali Ismy (commander o f Barisan Hulubalang), and Rasroel (commander o f Kesatria Pesindo). PST, p. 154.

127. This included the Hizbullah, Lasjmi, Barisan GPU, Sabilillah , Barisan Merah, Sjaifullah, Tentera Allah, Barisan Hulubalang, Barisan Istimewa and others. Ibid ., p. 577.

128. On the formation o f the Resimen Istimewa see ib id . , pp. 161, 577-78; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 250-51; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 376-77.

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ment o f most o f t h e ir o f f i c e r s by TNI commanders from the Banteng d i v i ­ s io n . 129
A fte r th is in co rp o r a tio n the Banteng d iv is io n c o n s is te d o f s ix reg im en ts, f o r in August Hasan B a s r i! s Regiment IV in Riau had been r e ­ o rg a n ize d in t o two re g im e n ts. B asri con tin u ed to command Regiment IV and Regiment V was under M ajor Toha H a n a fi. The new Regiment VI was commanded by Major Kemal M ustafa, and i t a s s is t e d Regiment I on the n orth ern f r o n t . 130
Whatever chance e x is t e d o f an a ctu a l in t e g r a t io n o f the m ilit a r y and p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s on Sumatra d isa p p ea red in e a r ly 1948. By th a t time the TNIf s heavy-handed approach had a lre a d y a lie n a t e d many o f the la s jk a r g ro u p s . But i t was the R e n v ille Agreement and the d ep a rtu re o f Hatta to Java, 131 which le d to the fra g m en ta tion o f the FPN. The Ren­ v i l l e Agreement again brought to the su rface the d issen sion between many o f the FPN's component groups w ith rega rd to the path b e in g p u r­ sued by the c e n t r a l governm ent, and during the f i r s t months o f 1948 the o r g a n iz a t io n was no lo n g e r p re te n d in g to the fu n c t io n o f u n ify in g the s tr u g g le in West Sumatra. The in d iv id u a l p a r t ie s in c re a s e d in s tr e n g t h , drawing away many o f the le a d e rs from a body which no lo n g e r r e p r e ­ sen ted t h e ir v ie w s .13213 The o n ly r o le which the FPN r e ta in e d was i t s assignment to conduct the p r e b is c it e in the D utch-occupied region s around Padang, as s t ip u la t e d in the R e n v ille Agreement. The d i s a f ­ f e c t e d members o f the la s jk a r groups withdrew from the TNI, re tu rn in g to t h e ir homes, w ith many o f them jo in in g the l o c a l s e c u r it y f o r c e s o f the BPNK o r reform in g t h e ir o ld u n i t s . 139
129. PST, pp. 477-78. Another reason for dissatisfaction could well have been the distribution o f arms which was on the ratio o f 1:4 to the number o f soldiers. Apparently the Mizbullah in particular had previously been well equipped with arms because they had been able to capture many during the time o f the British occupation. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 377.
130. Regiments I, II and III were s t i l l under A. Halim, Thalib and A. Husein. See above footnote 97. The TNI commands on Sumatra at the time were Division VIII, South Sumatra; Division IX, Central Sumatra; and Division X, Atjeh and East Sumatra, with several autonomous brigades. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 158.
131. After leaving the ’’Renville" on January 9, 1948, Sjarifuddin went fir s t to Singapore to consult with Sjahrir, and then proceeded to Bukittinggi. He and Hatta traveled on to Java for discussions with the government concerning the Dutch demands that appeared to them to be an ultimatum. After the fa ll o f the Sjarifuddin cabinet on January 23 as a result o f the Renville Agreement, Hatta was appointed to lead the new government. Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 88-90; Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 231-32; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 378.
132. Ibid. , pp. 386-88. According to him the communists and some socia lists joined Sjarifuddin’ s Front Demokrasi Ra’ ayat. The Masjumi strengthened its organiza­ tion. The opposition to Sjarifuddin in the so cia list group followed Sjahrir into his Partai Sosialis Indonesia. Amongst the leaders o f the FPN who joined this latter party were Chatib Suleiman, Juir Muhammad and several Pesindo pemuda. Both Sjarifuddin and Sjahrir accompanied Hatta on a trip to Bukit­ tinggi on February 5. PST, p. 164.
133. Ib id ., p. 579. According to Nasution, there were reports from the Sumatra com­ mand o f former lasjkar groups in West Sumatra, Tapanuli, and Atjeh attacking and disarming TNI units in these regions. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 235.

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R a tio n a liz a tio n and D e c e n tr a liz a tio n
The R e n v ille Agreem ent, apart from the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i t caused the c e n t r a l r e p u b lic a n le a d e r s h ip , d id not have as g re a t an impact on Sumatra as i t d id on Java. Dutch a u t h o r it y remained lim it e d to an area o f on ly about o n e - f i f t h o f the is la n d , c o n t r o l being most e x ten siv e on the e a st and so u th e a ste rn c o a s t s , w ith o n ly a p o ck e t around Padang.134 Thus, at le a s t in West Sumatra, th ere was no need f o r any s u b s t a n t ia l w ithdraw al o f In don esian tro o p s from the D u tch -o ccu p ie d t e r r i t o r y . 135
On ta k in g o v e r c o n t r o l o f the c e n t r a l governm ent, H atta in a u g u ra t­ ed a b a s ic r e o r g a n iz a t io n o f b oth m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n a f f a i r s aimed at a ch ie v in g g r e a t e r coh eren ce o f the re p u b lic a n f o r c e s in the more lim it e d areas they now c o n t r o l l e d . He attem pted to ca rry out p o l i c i e s o f r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n and r e c o n s t r u c t io n o f the armed f o r c e s , and d ecen ­ tr a liz a tio n o f the c iv ilia n adm inistrative organ ization .
In the m ilit a r y f i e l d , the aim o f r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n was to stream ­ lin e the army s t r u c tu r e by m assive d e m o b iliz a t io n , and to c r e a te '"m ob ile o ffe n siv e system s' o f s h iftin g p ockets" o f highly train ed , more f u l l y armed r e g u la r f o r c e s , su p p orted by t e r r i t o r i a l m i l i t i a s . 136 In Sumatra N asution en visaged fo u r s u b t e r r i t o r i e s (corresp on d in g to the fo u r p r o je c t e d autonomous a d m in is tr a tiv e r e g i o n s ) , South Sumatra, Cen­ t r a l Sumatra, T a p a n u li-E ast Sumatra, and A tje h . Each o f th ese s u b t e r r i ­ t o r i e s would have an in fa n t r y b rig a d e made up o f s e v e r a l m obile b a t t a l ­ io n s , and t e r r i t o r i a l u n its d is t r ib u t e d amongst the kabupaten. 137
To convey th ese i n s t r u c t i o n s , N asution accom panied H atta to West Sumatra in A p r il 1948. T h e ir p lan s were c o l d l y r e c e iv e d by the Suma­ tra n panglim a, w ith Major G eneral Suhardjo s t a t in g th a t the commanders who had been f ig h t in g in t h e ir own r e g io n s would not be w i l l i n g to be moved nor t h e ir u n its to be r e o r g a n iz e d . The army in Sumatra, he s t a t e d , was e s s e n t i a l l y an army dependent on the l o c a l p o p u la t io n , and in th ose circu m sta n ces the government on Java was in no p o s i t i o n to impose i t s w is h e s .138* I t was thus n ot u n t i l November when C o lo n e l H id a ja t was sen t to r e p la c e M ajor G eneral Suhardjo as PTTS (Panglim a Tentara dan T e rrito r iu m Sumatera) th a t any e f f o r t was made to implement the r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o rd e rs f o r Sum atra.133 I t was p o s s ib ly because o f t h is d ela y th a t th e re appear to have been no ech oes o f the Madiun r e ­ b e l l i o n in West Sum atra.140 Im m ediately a f t e r the r e b e l l i o n Sumatran

134. Of the three Dutch brigades on Sumatra, Brigade Y controlled the residency o f Palembang, U Padang and its surroundings, and Z East Sumatra, with an additional force at Tandjung Pinang for the islands o f Bangka, Belitung and Riau. Ib id ., p. 158.

135. This contrasted with the situation in East Sumatra, where the republican forces had to retreat into Tapanuli from the plantation area around Medan. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 134.

136. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 263.

137. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 158.

138. Ibid., p. 159.

139. After taking over command, Col. Hidajat sent Lt. Col. Askari to Atjeh, Maj. Akil to Riau, Lt. Col. Kawilarang to Tapanuli, and Maj. S. Tjakradipura to West Sumatra. Ibid. , pp. 159, 256.

140. There was clearly suspicion that the armed clashes between TNI and lasjkar

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branches o f the PKI met w ith the g ov ern or to s t a t e t h e ir firm su p p ort o f the re p u b lica n govern m en t.141
S h o rtly a f t e r Suhardjo was t r a n s fe r r e d to army h ea d qu arters in J o g ja , Ismael Lengah was a ls o removed from h is command to become an in s t r u c t o r at the J o g ja M ilit a r y Academ y,142 h is p la c e as head o f the Banteng d i v i s i o n b ein g taken by L t. C o l. Dahlan Ibrahim , who had been s e rv in g as d i v i s i o n c h i e f o f s t a f f . 143 The Banteng d i v i s i o n was then d iv id ed in to s u b t e r r it o r ie s , w ith the Banteng brigade sta tio n e d at B u k ittin g g i r e s p o n s ib le f o r the West Sumatra s u b t e r r i t o r y , and a u n it (u n d efin e d ) under Hasan B asri f o r the s u b t e r r it o r y o f R i a u /I n d r a g i r i, w ith headqu arters at P akanbaru.144145 D iv is io n IX f o r c e s were d iv id e d in to a t e r r i t o r i a l s e c t io n and m obile t r o o p s , w ith the tr a in e d s o l d i e r s en­ terin g the la t t e r group. C olonel H id a ja t's attempts at r a t io n a liz a ­ t i o n , how ever, were o n ly in t h e ir p re lim in a ry sta g e s when they were overturned by the second Dutch m ilit a r y a ctio n o f December 19, 1948.
A lso during 1948 a b a s ic re o r g a n iz a tio n o f the a d m in istra tiv e s tr u c tu r e o f government on Sumatra was i n s t i t u t e d . The p r o v in c e o f Sumatra was d is s o lv e d under Law No. 10 o f A p r il 15, and i t was re p la c e d by the p ro v in ce s o f North Sumatra (in c o r p o r a tin g the r e s id e n c ie s o f A tje h , East Sumatra and T a p a n u li), and South Sumatra (in c o r p o r a t in g Bengkulen, Palembang, Lampung, and B a n g k a -B e litu n g ),14^ The deputy
forces in Tapanuli were tied in with the Madiun rebellion. The clashes were between Tapanuli TNI units and regular and lasjkar forces withdrawn from East Sumatra. In a further v is it to the area at the beginning o f December Hatta helped bring the clashes to an end, and Kawilarang took over command there, with Ibrahim Adjie as his deputy. The southern part o f East Sumatra and Tapa­ nuli became Subterritory VII. See "Pengalaman Gerilja di Sumatera (Tapanuli Utura)" in Madjalah Sedjarah M iliter Angkatan Darat, No. 22 (1965), pp. 14-19.
141. Suripno and Musso had stopped over for two days in Bukittinggi on their way to Java. Although the two held meetings in Bukittinggi, the identity o f Musso does not seem to have been revealed until after he arrived in Java. PST, p. 166.
142. In April 1948, at the request apparently o f Suhardjo, the Siliwangi had agreed to send Lt. Col. Kawilarang and Lt. Col. Daan Jahja (a Minangkabau) to Suma­ tra. The defense minister had planned that Kawilarang would become brigade commander o f Tapanuli/East Sumatra, and Daan Jahja head o f the operations sta ff o f the Sumatra command. However, Ismael Lengah had already been appointed by Suhardjo to the latter position, his appointment being confirmed by the panglima besar. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 159. It was possibly because o f this that Ismael Lengah was removed to Java after Hidajat's assumption o f command. His transfer took place on December 3. Iwa Kusuma Sumantri implies that i t was a matter o f personal dislike on Hattafs side. Sedjarah Revolusi, II, p. 191.
143. PST, p. 582; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 404.
144. The head o f the Banteng brigade, Dahlan Ibrahim, had A. Halim as his chief o f sta ff. Regiments IV and V o f the Riau command were reformed into three battal­ ions. There does not seem to have been similar reorganization o f the West Sumatra regiments. PST, p. 583.
145. Such a division had been advocated by Hatta as early as 1945, see above, n. 34. His view o f this appears to have been strengthened by his stay in Sumatra during 1947, for in his report on the situation there after he returned to Jogja he

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g ov ern or o f C en tral Sumatra, Mr. Nasrun, was a p p oin ted g ov ern or o f the new p r o v in c e . 11+6 The Dewan P erw akilan Sumatera was r e p la c e d by a Dewan Perw akilan R akjat in each o f the th ree p r o v i n c e s .14647
The R ep u b lic o f In d o n e sia Law No. 22 o f August 1948 en v isa g ed a greater degree o f d ecen tra liza tion fo r Indonesia, with considerable autonomy being assumed by lo c a l a d m in istra tiv e u n its . I t la id out th ree l e v e l s o f l o c a l governm ent: the p r o v in c e , the kabupaten and the d esa , w hich were Mto become ’ s e lf - g o v e r n in g r e g i o n s 1 (daerah s w a t antra) p o s s e s s in g wide powers o f autonomy ov e r t h e ir own a f f a i r s . " lh8
This law was welcomed in C en tra l Sumatra, w ith the DPR on Septem­ b er 30 a p p o in tin g a com m ittee to speed moves toward d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .149 The D e c e n t r a liz a t io n Committee p rop osed th a t the th re e r e s id e n c ie s o f C entral Sumatra be re p la c e d by e le v e n kabupaten made up o f 118 w ila ja h (which corresponded to the desa le v e l envisaged in the cen tra l govern­ ment l a w ) . 150* U n til new e l e c t i o n s co u ld be h e ld , the DPR f o r the
stated: ffln the two years after the proclamation the Central Government seemed to neglect Sumatra and many powers were given to the Governor, so that he be­ came the so-called small President (his position is considered higher than that o f a m inister). However in practice the Governor o f Sumatra is only the Gover­ nor o f Pematang Siantar, because o f the lack o f communication with the Resi­ dents. The Residents continue to function like their predecessors in the Japa­ nese period. The position o f the Sub-Governor is not clear. The regencies have been established, but nobody knows what their duties are." English trans­ lation made available to the Committee o f Good Offices o f an "Outline o f Vice President’ s Statement on the Situation in Sumatra" at a meeting in Jogjakarta, January 17, 1948.
146. Mr. Djamil had been appointed to head a Committee on Higher Education on April 29, 1947, when Mr. Nasrun had replaced him as deputy governor o f Central Sumatra. PST, p. 151.
147. Members from West Sumatra in this body were H. Ilja s Jacoeb (Masjumi), Marzoeki Jatim (Masjumi), Sultani St. Malaka (Murba), A. Gaffar Djambek (no party), Saadoeddin Djambek (n .p .), Usman Keadilan (PKI), Anwar St. Saidi (n .p .), Dt. Simaradjo (MTKAAM), S. J. St. Mangkuto (Masjumi), Ahmad Sjuib (Murba), Abdullah (Murba), Bachtaroeddin (PKI), R. S. Suriapradja (PKI), Zainal Zainur (Pemuda), Dr. A. Rahim Usman (Partai S o s ia lis ), Damanhoeri Djamil (PSII), Tan Tuah Bagindo Ratu (PBI), H. Siradjudin Abbas (P e rti), Chatib Suleiman (SPI), and H. Mahmud Janus (n .p .). Members o f the fir s t executive were Dt. Mangku (PKI) from Riau, Dr. Sjagaf Jahja (PBI) from Djambi, and A. Rahim Usman, S. J. St. Mangkuto, and Abdullah from West Sumatra. H. Ilja s Jacoeb headed the body. Ibid . , p. 394.
148. John D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 28. He examines the law on pp. 28-40.
149. PST, pp. 347-48.
150. There would be five kabupaten formed in West Sumatra, four in Riau, and two in Djambi, with correspondingly 76, 28, and 14 wilajah. The former seven kabu­ paten o f West Sumatra would become: (1) Singgalang Pasaman (formerly Agam) with its capital at Bukittinggi (16 wilajah); (2) Sinamar (formerly Limapuluh Kota), capital at Pajakumbuh (14 wilajah); (3) Talang (Tanah Datar), capital at Solok (19 wilajah); (4) Samudera (Padang Pariaman), capital at Pariaman (17 wilajah); (5) Pesisir Selatan and Kerintji (Balai Selasa), capital at Sungai Penuh (10 wilajah). Details o f the proposals can be found in ib id . , pp. 34660, 363-66.

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w ila ja h o f West Sumatra would c o n s is t o f the members o f the DPN s e t up two y ea rs p r e v i o u s l y .151 This p r o p o s a l was a cce p te d by the government o f C en tral Sumatra, and on November 30 i t o rd e re d th a t the r e o r g a n iz a ­ t io n be c a r r ie d out by the end o f D ecem ber.152 The secon d Dutch m i l i ­ ta ry a c t io n o f December 21, how ever, brought th ose p lan s to a h a l t , and com p elled the g ov ern or to r e v iv e the r e s id e n c ie s o f Djam bi, Riau and West Sumatra.

Impact o f the Second Dutch A ction
The c h a r a c te r and scop e o f the second Dutch " p o l i c e a c t io n " in Sumatra, which was launched at dawn on*December 19, 1948, fa r exceed ed th a t o f t;he o f f e n s i v e e ig h te e n months p r e v io u s ly . Again Dutch tro o p s moved out from Padang to the n o r th , e a s t and so u th , but t h is time they a p p a ren tly commanded much g r e a te r f o r c e s and fir e p o w e r , mounting amphib iou s la n d in g s and l a r g e - s c a l e bombing and a r t i l l e r y a t t a c k s . To the n orth t h e ir f o r c e s d iv id e d at Lubuk A lung, w ith one group moving up the c o a s t to Pariaman, and the o th e r p r e s s in g on to Padang Pandjang, and from th ere to B u k it t in g g i. From B u k itt in g g i they launched o f f e n s iv e s a g a in st the re p u b lic a n f o r c e s which f i n a l l y s e t up t h e ir n orth ern fr o n t subcommand at Matur. To the e a s t , the Dutch co o r d in a te d in fa n t r y a tta ck s w ith an amphibious la n d in g on Lake Singkarak from where they advanced to occupy S olok on December 20. To the south they moved more s lo w ly , lau n ch in g t h e ir main a s s a u lt on January 6 a f t e r la n d in g tro o p s at Painan. Throughout the sp rin g they extended t h e ir c o n t r o l, making fu r t h e r la n d in g s down the c o a s t and advancing in t o the i n t e r i o r . 153
By e a r ly 1949 they had o c c u p ie d most o f the towns and m ajor v i l ­ la g e s o f West Sumatra, and from th ese o u tp o s ts d isp a tch e d u n its to p a t r o l the surrounding c o u n tr y s id e and a tta c k s u s p e ct v i l l a g e s . During the Dutch advance the r e p u b lic a n f o r c e s appear to have put up l i t t l e r e s is ta n c e , in gen eral evacu atin g the towns as the Dutch approached, and r e t r e a t in g , sometimes in d is o r d e r , to more d e f e n s ib le p o s it io n s c h i e f l y in the f o o t h i l l s and on the mountain s lo p e s .
The shock o f the Dutch a t t a c k , p a r t i c u l a r l y the bombing o f B u k it­ t in g g i and o th e r tow ns, seems to have thrown the In don esian s in t o com­ p le te d iso rd e r. A group from the ce n tra l government, in clu d in g the R epu blican M in is te r o f Economic A f f a i r s , S ja f r id d in P raw iranegara, was ga th ered in B u k ittin g g i from December 18 to g e th e r w ith l o c a l m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n le a d e r s , a w a itin g the a r r iv a l o f Su karno's pla n e which was sch ed u led to sto p o v er th e re on i t s way to In d ia . 15** P anic seems to have been w idespread as news a r r iv e d o f the f a l l o f J o g ja k a rta and u l t i m ately o f the a r r e s t s o f Sukarno and H atta and o th e rs o f the r e p u b lica n l e a d e r s h ip .155 In a s e r i e s o f h u r r ie d m eetings S ja fru d d in arranged to

151. See above, p. 94.

152. PST, p. 359.

153. Ibid. , pp. 169-70, 585-91; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 254-57.

154. PST, p. 169; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 403. Hamka writes that when they heard the sound o f a plane they thought i t was carrying Sukarno, only to discover that it was the beginning o f the Dutch attack.

155. Ibid. , pp. 403-404. The Propinsi states that before withdrawing from Bukit­ tinggi, the Banteng division issued a bulletin that the presidential party had arrived safely in India, "which even though i t was not true, had a great in flu ­ ence in dispelling the panic caused by the Dutch broadcasts concerning the
arrests o f Sukamo-Hatta." PST, p. 169.

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s e t up and le a d a Pemerintah Darurat R epu blik In d on esia (P D R I)156 which was p rocla im e d on December 22 a f t e r o f f i c i a l news was r e c e iv e d o f the a r r e s t s on Java. By t h is time members o f the Emergency Government had eva cu a ted to a Mp la c e in S u m a tra ."157 S h o r tly b e fo r e the a r r iv a l o f the Dutch fo r c e s the West Sumatran le a d e rs h ip had a ls o r e t ir e d to e s t a b lis h them selves in K o t o t in g g i. 158
The d is o r d e r in the armed f o r c e s was d o u b t le s s ly la r g e ly the r e ­ s u lt o f the s c a le o f the Dutch o p e r a t io n s , and the w idespread use o f ta n k s, bom bing, s t r a f in g and a r t i l l e r y in t h e ir advance. In a d d it io n , how ever, i t was a p p a re n tly the s t r a t e g y o f the new Sumatran commander, C olon el H id a ja t, n ot to engage the Dutch d i r e c t l y but to withdraw and p rep a re f o r g u e r r i l l a w a rfa re . As t h is r e t r e a t fo llo w e d so c l o s e l y on C olon el H id a ja t 1s assum ption o f command, and the t r a n s fe r o f Suhardjo and Lengah, i t can have done l i t t l e to enhance the p o s i t i o n o f the new commander.159 There was a p p a re n tly c o n s id e r a b le d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w ith the p o l i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y among the younger members o f the form er in d e ­ pendent u n i t s . 160 The f a c t th a t Hamka r e p o r t s Dahlan Djambek, one o f the h ig h e s t-r a n k in g o f the e a r ly l o c a l commanders, as b ein g the l a s t p erson to le a v e B u k it t in g g i, su g g e sts th a t th e re may have been d is a g r e e ­ ment even among the upper e ch e lo n s o f the Banteng command w ith regard to the p o l i c y b ein g pursued by H id a ja t .161
156. Sjafruddin had accompanied Hatta to Sumatra earlier in the year to organize a resolutionary leadership there that could function in case the Dutch attacked Jogja. (Interview, February 21, 1971.) Apart from this general mandate from Hatta, he apparently did not recieve sp e cific instructions from Java at the time o f the Dutch attack. (See Kahin, Nationalism, p. 392; Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 154.) Members o f the Emergency Government were Sja­ fruddin, Mr. A. A. Maramis, Mr. Teuku Moh. Hasan, Mr. Lukman Hakim, Mr. S. Md Rasjid, Ir. Sitompul, and Ir. Inderatjaja. PST, pp. 170-71.
157. Ibid. The seat o f the PDRI moved principally between Muara Labuh and Sungai Dareh. Ibid. , p. 589.
158. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 414; PST, p. 171.
159. Reid writes: "Another competent young Dutch-trained o ffic e r from Java, Colonel Hidajat, had earlier taken overall command o f Sumatra from the ageing and in­ effective General Suhardjo." Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 151. But i t seems unlikely that the local commanders in West Sumatra viewed the changeover in this ligh t. The Sumatran command headquarters divided into sec­ tions with several o f them in pockets between Padang Sidempuan and Bukittinggi. Hidajat, however, le ft West Sumatra almost immediately for Atjeh and appears to have spent most o f his time at Kota Radja. Nasution, TNI, III (Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971), pp. 41-42.
160. Hamka reports a confrontation between members o f the Hizbullah and Maj. Kemal Mustafa (deputy commander o f Subcommand A [see n. 162 below]) at a small v i l ­ lage outside o f Padang Pandjang, where they accused him o f cowardice and ne­ glect o f duty, and urged immediate attacks on the Dutch positions in Padang Pandjang. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 409-412. Hamka also recalls that imme­ diately before the Dutch attacked Padang Pandjang they gathered there with several others to listen to Tan Malaka's speech from Kediri. Ibid. , p. 405.
161. According to Hamka, Djambek destroyed the radio station before he le f t , and later personally led attacks on Dutch forces in Bukittinggi from his positions just outside the city . Ibid. , pp. 420, 428-29.

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A ft e r the i n i t i a l trauma o f the r e t r e a t when com m unications were broken between most o f the armed u n it s , the command s tr u c tu r e was s lo w ly b u i l t up, but i t was now e s s e n t i a l l y both f l e x i b l e and m o b ile . Dahlan Djambek soon r e p la c e d L t . C o l. M. Dahlan Ibrahim as head o f the Banteng command, and he was a ls o p r i n c i p a l l y r e s p o n s ib le f o r m ilit a r y o p e r a tio n s in the re g io n s o f Agam and Lima Puluh K ota, w ith M ajor T h a lib as h is c h i e f o f s t a f f . Under the c e n t r a l command th e re were th ree subcommands, corresp on d in g to the e a r l i e r n o rth , ea st and south f r o n t s , but w ith t h e ir h ea d qu a rters u s u a lly fa r in t o the m o u n ta in s .162
The le a d e r s h ip o f West Sumatra su s ta in e d se v e re blows during the e a r ly p a rt o f 1949. A few days a f t e r they had s e t up t h e ir headquar­ te rs in K o to tin g g i, the Dutch overran the v illa g e on January 10, in ­ f l i c t i n g , c o n s id e r a b le damage though n ot fin d in g the tr a n s m itte r by which R a s jid m aintained c o n t a c t w ith the S ja fr u d d in g ov ern m en t.163 More d is a s t r o u s was the in c id e n t at S itu d ju h B atur, where a m eeting had been arranged f o r January 14 between many o f the top West Sumatra le a d e r s to attempt to work out a stra te g y fo r con fro n tin g the d r a s t ic a lly changed s it u a t io n in the r e g io n . Many o f the p a r t ic ip a n t s had t r a v e le d lon g d ista n ces on fo o t to reach the sm all v illa g e at the fo o t o f Mt. Sigung, about tw elve k ilo m e te rs from the Dutch o u tp ost at the town o f Pajakumbuh. The Dutch, how ever, had o b ta in e d i n t e l l i g e n c e o f the m eetin g , and they a tta ck e d the v i l l a g e b e fo r e dawn on the 1 5 th , k i l l i n g 49 o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s , in c lu d in g Chatib S u le im a n .164
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Im m ediately f o llo w in g the la u n ch in g o f the Dutch a tta c k on Decem­ ber 19, the Sumatran le a d e rs then m eeting in B u k ittin g g i had d e cid e d to d is s o lv e the p r o v in c e o f C en tral Sumatra and i t s governm ent. Power was to be t r a n s fe r r e d to the re s id e n c y l e v e l , where the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah (DPD) was g iv en f u l l a u t h o r it y to le a d the m ilit a r y and c i v i l a d m in is tr a tio n . The cu rre n t C en tral Sumatra g o v e rn o r, Nasrun, was to
162. Subcommand A (formerly Regiments I and VI) which covered the northern front and which had retreated to Matur, was commanded by Lt. Col. A. Halim, supported by Maj. Kemal Mustafa. On the eastern front after the Dutch occupied Solok, Sub­ command B (former Regiment III) divided, with one section under Dep. Cmdr. Anwar Badu at Sidjundjung, and Cmdr. A. Husein at Alahan Pandjang. When the Dutch overran both these towns, the headquarters was transferred to Muara Labuh, until i t too was occupied by the Dutch in April, after which it was mobile. Fighting in this region continued until August 1949. Subcommand C Con the southern front, formerly Regiment II) was now under the command o f Maj. Alwi St. Maradjo. Its former commander Maj. Thalib had been put in charge of personnel and organization in the Banteng central command during the 1948 rationalization, and in 1949 was Djambek's chief o f s ta ff. This subcommand established its headquarters at Sungei Penuh on December 24; after the Dutch attacked there on April 22, its headquarters moved several times until the fighting ceased in September. PST, pp. 582-90.
163. Ibid . , p. 191; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 416, 420.
164. Among the others k illed were Bupati Arisun St. Alamsjah o f Lima Puluh Kota, Capt. Zainuddin and Maj. Munir L atif. Lt. Col. Dahlan Ibrahim and Lt. Col. Thalib managed to escape, though Thalib was wounded. The fu lle st account o f the incident appears in Sumatera Tengah No. 123/4, January 25, 1954, pp. 37-40. Other accounts are in PST, pp. 196-97; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 421, 426; Mansoer, Sedjarah, pp. 262-64.

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c o o r d in a te th ese DPD o f West Sumatra, Riau and D ja m b i.165 The r e s id e n t was to head the DPD w ith h is deputy to be a p p oin ted by the m ilit a r y commander o f the r e g io n . Thus in West Sumatra, S. Mohd. R a s jid headed the DPD, w ith Dahlan Ibrahim as h is i n i t i a l d e p u ty .166 On January 2, 1949, each r e s id e n c y became a m ilit a r y r e g io n , w ith the r e s id e n t now
a p p oin ted i t s m ilit a r y g o v e r n o r .167 I t was s t r e s s e d th a t t h is move was an emergency m easure, and most o f the b u p a ti and low er o f f i c i a l s r e ­
ta in e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , though they were now c la s s e d as " m ilit a r y b u p a t i . " 168

At the b e g in n in g o f May th e re was a fu r t h e r r e o r g a n iz a t io n whereby West Sumatra and Riau were again jo in e d in t o the p r o v in c e o f C en tra l Sumatra, w ith R a s jid as i t s m ilit a r y g o v e r n o r ,169* w h ile the r e s id e n c y o f Djambi came under the a u th o r ity o f the South Sumatra m ilit a r y g o v e r ­ n o r .170 This arrangement co n tin u e d u n t i l the b e g in n in g o f the f o llo w in g y e a r , when a f t e r the t r a n s f e r o f s o v e r e ig n t y the p r o v in c e o f C en tral Sumatra (now a ls o to in c lu d e Djambi and the Riau a r c h ip e la g o ) was r e a c ­ t iv a t e d under a c i v i l i a n govern m en t.171 When S. Mohd. R a s jid was t r a n s ­ fe r r e d to the L oca l J o in t Committee in O ctob er o f 1949, h is p la c e as m ilit a r y g ov ern or was taken by Mr. Nasrun, who r e t a in e d the p o s i t i o n o f g ov ern or a f t e r the t r a n s fe r o f s o v e r e i g n t y .172

ifc *

jfe

In the e a rly part o f 1949, having occu p ied a l l the major towns o f West Sumatra, the Dutch made moves towards c r e a t in g a "Negara MinangkabauM which they hoped would become one o f the fe d era ted s ta te s ou tsid e o f the r e p u b lic . As e a r ly as December, ju s t a f t e r they launched t h e ir a tta c k , they had sen t co n ta c ts to S j a f e i , then in h id in g in Padang Lawas, i n v it in g him to le a d the p r o je c t e d s t a t e . 173 He r e fu s e d .
Any e a r l i e r attem pts to d eta ch elem ents in West Sumatra from the r e p u b lic had been lim ite d by the fa c t that Dutch c o n tr o l extended only to the immediate area around Padang. N everth eless in 1946 they had c r e a te d in the town a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n iz a t io n , the Persatuan Umum, w ith

165. PST, p. 170.

166. Ibid. , p. 172. In the West Sumatra DPD the members from the executive were Dr. Ali Akbar and Orangkajo Ganto Suaro, and from the peoples* organizations, Ab­ dullah, Bachtaruddin, and Hadji Siradjuddin Abbas.

167. Ibid., pp. 180-81.

168. Ibid. , pp. 181, 196, 204-5. In a few cases, military o ffice rs were appointed d istrict heads, particularly on the eastern front, where they led the local administrations for Muara Labuh, Solok, Sawah Lunto and Sulit Air. (Ib id . , p. 589.) See also Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 154-55, where he con­ trasts the form o f military government on Sumatra with that on Java.

169. This was apparently because o f uncertain lines o f authority, caused by the head o f the DPD also being the military governor. Under the new system, the DPD o f West Sumatra was headed by Eni Karim and that o f Riau by R. M. Utojo (the former military governor). PST, p. 211.

170. Ib id ., p. 181.

171. Ib id ., p. 229.

172. Ibid ., p. 223.

173. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 413

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a m ilit a r y arm, the S e rik a t K u tjin g H ita m .174 In 1947 the Persatuan Umum form ed i t s e l f in t o a Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Barat (DISBA) in Padang,175* and a f t e r the secon d Dutch m ilit a r y a c t io n branches o f t h is o r g a n iz a t io n were s e t up in o th e r tow ns, such as Padang Pandjang and B u k it t in g g i, under the name B a la i Permusjawaratan Sementara (B P S ).175
From th ese o r g a n iz a t io n s grew a movement, weak and s h o r t - l i v e d , to cre a te a Negara Minangkabau (Minangkabau S ta te) as p art o f the impend­ ing F ed eral R e p u b lic o f In d o n e sia . The f i r s t ste p was the e s t a b l i s h ­ ment on March 20, 1949, o f a "com m ittee to determ in e the s ta tu s o f the Minangkabau" which a d v oca ted s e p a r a tio n from the r e p u b lic so th a t West Sumatra would become one o f the fe d e r a te d s t a t e s . 177 B r ie f ly i t a t t r a c t ­ ed to i t s s id e the form er r e s i d e n t , Dt. P e rp a tih B arin gek , who to g e th e r w ith Mr.<Harun A. R a s jid , b ro a d ca st the view th at c o n tin u a tio n o f the s t r u g g le would o n ly fu r t h e r hurt the p e o p le o f West Sumatra, and th a t in o rd e r to a ch ie v e independence i t was n e ce s sa ry to co o p e ra te w ith the D u tch .178 B aringek a ls o o rg a n iz e d a m eeting in la t e A p r il to "re a ch com plete un ity to fa ce the cu rren t s itu a tio n in the Minangkabau," at which speakers from DISBA were prom in en t. At t h is m eeting he d is cla im e d any am bition to head a "Negara M in an gk abau ."179
The re p u b lic a n le a d e rs in West Sumatra com batted the movement by sending l e t t e r s to Bangka and D ja k a rta , s t a t in g th a t the v o ic e s o f the DISBA d id not re p re s e n t the Minangkabau p e o p le , and demanding th a t e l e c t i o n s be h e ld in th o se p a r ts o f West Sumatra under Dutch c o n t r o l . 180 By June P e rp a tih B aringek had d is ta n c e d h im s e lf from the DISBA, not appearing at a m eeting i t h e ld in Padang, and sen din g a l e t t e r s t a t in g th a t the movement was sowing d i s c o r d .181 Most o f i t s o th e r le a d e rs had accommodated w ith the r e p u b lic by the summer, and the BPS branch in B u k ittin g g i passed a r e s o l u t io n on August 29 r e c o g n iz in g th a t West Sumatra was p a rt o f the r e p u b l i c . 182

174. PST, pp. 229-30. The Persatuan Umum was headed by Sidi Nan Putih and A rif Lubis. It published a newspaper called Suara Umum. The Serikat Kutjing Hitam was headed by Sidi Sjamsuddin. According to Mansoer, Sedjarah, p. 266, members o f the Chinese community o f Padang who had formed the "Poh An-tui" defense force in 1946 joined the Persatuan Umum.

175. Waspada, May 9, 1949.

176. PST, pp. 230-31.

177. Waspada, May 24, 1949. This committee consisted o f: Dr. Rusma (who resigned on March 23); Amadin g lr. Dt. Berbangso; Daud g lr. Dt. Bagindo Sati; Zakir glr. St. Maharadjo Lelo; Dr. Ilja s Amirudin; Sjahfiri g lr. Sutan Pangerang; Adnan, and Bermawi Glr. St. Radja Mas.

178. PST, p. 231. This account and also Merdeka, March 25, 1949, cite these two men as the promoters o f the movement.

179. Waspada, May 9, 1949.

180. Waspada, May 24, 1949. They stated their opinion that, while awaiting results o f the discussions between the Dutch and the republic, West Sumatra should be­ come a daerah otonomi within the republie.

181. Waspada, June 2, 1949. The journalist contrasted this meeting (with fifteen people present) with a concurrent meeting o f the Muhammadijah attended by 2,000.

182. PST, p. 232.

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From then u n t il the t r a n s fe r o f s o v e r e ig n ty at the end o f 1949 on ly the area im m ediately surrounding the town o f Padang s t i l l remained as a daerah i stimewa.l8i In December the r e s id e n t o f Padang su rren d ered h is a u th o r ity to the g ov ern or o f C en tral Sumatra. This de f a c t o co n ­ t r o l was con firm ed in March 1950 when Padang was o f f i c i a l l y in c o r p o ­ ra te d w ith in the r e s id e n c y o f West Sum atra.181*
A fte r the Trans-fer o f Sovereignty
The r e c o n s t it u t i o n o f a c iv ili a n - a d m in is t e r e d p ro v in ce o f C en tral Sumatra, now in c lu d in g the Riau a r c h ip e la g o and Djam bi, was com pleted by the m iddle o f 1950 . 183485 I t was to be headed by a g ov ern or who would share a u th o r ity w ith a Dewan Perw akilan R akjat Sumatera Tengah, co n ­ s i s t i n g o f twenty members from West Sumatra, f i v e from Riau and fo u r from D ja m b i.186 Almost im m ediately i t became c le a r th a t th ere was a fundamental c o n f l ic t between the view o f th is lo c a l a d m in istra tion , p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s West Sumatra com ponent, and th a t o f the c e n t r a l g ov ­ ernment o v er the amount o f power to be d e le g a te d to the re g io n s making up independent In d o n e sia . The c e n t r a l r e p u b lic a n governm ent, p a r t ic u ­ la r ly a ft e r form ation o f the u n ita ry s ta te in August 1950, appeared no lo n g e r w i l l i n g to a llo w any r e a l measure o f l o c a l autonomy such as had been g ran ted most e x p l i c i t l y in Law No. 22 o f 1948. In c o n t r a s t , d e ­ c e n t r a liz a t io n o f a u th o r ity had been an assum ption b a s ic to the co n ­ tinuum o f p o l i t i c a l developm ents in West Sumatra during the r e v o lu t io n , where th ere had grown up a c l e a r e x p e c ta t io n th a t the r e g io n would be la r g e ly autonomous in co n d u ctin g i t s in t e r n a l a f f a i r s under an o v e r a ll central adm inistration.
These con trary views found exp ression in a fundamental c o n f l i c t between the DPRST (w ith i t s e x e c u t iv e b od y , the Dewan Pem erintah Daerah [DPD]) and the c e n t r a l government which was con d u cted throughout 1950. The d isp u te fo cu s e d on the is s u e o f the degree o f power p o s s e s s e d by the reg ion a l a u th ority with regard to appointment o f the governor (kepala daerah). In A p r i l , the DPR demanded the rem oval o f Governor Nasrun, and subm itted names o f i t s own nominees f o r h is r e p la c e m e n t.187
183. There were also daerah istimewa in Riau (particularly the islands) and Djambi. Ibid . , pp. 302-3.
184. Ibid ., p. 304.
185. The Riau archipelago which had been under Dutch authority during much o f the revolution was incorporated into the province o f Central Sumatra at the begin­ ning o f May 1950. PST, pp. 305-6. There were several meetings concerning the status o f Djambi during the fir s t half o f 1950, for since the second Dutch mil­ itary action, it had been o ff ic ia lly tied to South Sumatra. It was finally, reincorporated into the province of Central Sumatra in the middle o f the year. Ibid. , pp. 306-8.
186. Most o f the membership o f this body was the same as in 1948 (see above, p. 108, n. 167). The two charges were that Thaher Samad had taken Chatib Suleiman's place, and H. Rusli A. Wahid replaced H. Siradjudin Abbas who had become a member o f parliament. Abdullah was also in Java. H. Ilja s Jacoeb headed the executive (DPD), with Gulmat Siregar as his deputy. (R. S. Suria Pradja and Marzoeki Jatim were acting members.) PST, p. 395.
187. It is unclear why the DPR wanted Nasrun's removal, the only reason given being that he had lost the confidence o f the people o f West Sumatra. The demand was

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While h is p o s i t i o n was b ein g debated Nasrun took a m onth's le a v e from o f f i c e , w ith the DPD a s s e r t in g i t s r ig h t to assume h is d u tie s in the in t e r i m .*188 A ft e r c o n s id e r a b le d e la y , the Hatta government f i n a l l y agreed to N asrun's rem oval, r e c a l l i n g him to D jak arta on August 1 , 1 9 5 0 .189
With h is d ep a rtu re, the c o n f l i c t s h i f t e d to the s e le c t io n o f h is re p la ce m e n t.190 A d e c is io n on t h is was i n i t i a l l y d ela yed by a change o f government in ,D ja k a rta , w ith N a tsir re p la cin g Hatta as prime m in ister o f the new u n ita r y governm ent. The I n t e r i o r M in is t e r , Mr. A ssa a t, him­ s e l f a Minangkabau, v i s i t e d C en tral Sumatra on September 29 to attem pt to rea ch an agreem ent, w h ile Deputy G overn or, S. J . Sutan Mangkuto, a cte d as p r o v is io n a l head o f the p r o v in c e . A pp aren tly unable to come to a compromise w ith the re g io n a l a d m in istra tion , the I n te r io r M in istry on November 9 a p p oin ted Ruslan M u ljoh a rd jo as a c t in g g o v e rn o r, ig n o rin g the names put forw ard by the DPR.191 The DPR r e fu s e d to a cce p t the g ov ­ ern m en t's a p p o in te e and resu b m itted t h e ir own ca n d id a te s f o r c o n s id e r a ­ t io n . D ja k a rta , how ever, in s is t e d th at Ruslan retu rn as governor to C en tra l Sumatra at the end o f December. The d e a d lo ck was f i n a l l y broken o n ly when in Law No. 1 o f 1951, which a p p lie d e x c lu s iv e ly to th is p r o v in c e , the N a tsir government on January 5 suspended both the DPR and DPD o f C en tral Sum atra.192 A u th o rity in the p ro v in ce was t r a n s ­ fe r r e d from th ese b o d ie s to the g ov ern or and a six-m an com m ittee ap­ p oin ted by the I n te r io r M in istry on h is recommendation. Although i t was d e c la r e d th a t t h is com m ittee would be r e p la c e d w ith in s i x months by a new DPR formed in a ccord a n ce w ith Law 22 o f 1948, t h is d id not
part o f many resolutions aimed at greater autonomy for Central Sumatra passed at the third plenary session o f the DPRST which was held April 3-12, 1950. Ibid. , pp. 395-97.
188. Ibid . , pp. 312, 400-402. Contradictory orders regarding who held legitimate authority were issued during this period by the Interior Ministry.
189. Ibid ., p. 407.
190. The in itia l choice for his replacement was H. Ilja s Jacoeb, head o f the DPR. He refused to be considered for the post, and during a v is it o f the Interior Minister Susanto to West Sumatra July 7-11, a lis t o f four candidates for governor was submitted by the DPR. This was in accordance with Paragraph 1, A rticle 18 o f the Law o f 1948 which stated: "The Regional Head o f a province is appointed by the President from at least two, and at the most four, candi­ dates nominated by the Provincial Representative Council." Legge, Central Authority, p. 256. The names submitted were H. Ilja s Jacoeb, Mr. St. M. Rasjid, Dr. M. Djamil, and Dr. A. Rahim Usman. PST, pp. 403-4.
191. In their o ffic ia l explanation o f the selection, the Interior Ministry stated: "To consolidate and develop the administration, i t is necessary to have a man who has sufficient general knowledge o f government. After we weighed the four candidates from the DPRST we were compelled to go outside o f those candidates, on the basis o f Paragraph 4, Section 26 o f Law No. 22, and in addition Mr. S. M. Rasjid was not w illing to become Governor o f Central Sumatra." Ibid . , p. 417.
192. For a fu ll text o f this law, see ib id . , pp. 418-20. With the exception o f Cen­ tral Sumatra, the provisional legislatures in the other provinces continued to function until July 1, 1956. G. S. Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia: Legislative Aspects (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1957), p. 50.

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happen, and the gov ern or and h is com m ittee co n tin u e d as the fu n c tio n in g p r o v in c ia l a u th o r ity o f C en tral Su m atra.193
There were several iro n ie s in th is s itu a tio n , p r in c ip a lly that the p o l i c y o f im posing D ja k a r ta 's own c h o ic e o f g ov ern or on C entral Sumatra was form u la ted and implemented by c a b in e ts headed by two prime m in is ­ te r s o f Minangkabau o r i g i n , H atta and N a t s ir . M oreover, Hatta had lon g been a stron g proponent o f autonomy f o r the r e g io n s , advocatin g c o n s id ­ erable d ecen tralization o f authority. It is also notable that this move was taken a g a in s t one o f the s t r o n g e s t bases o f r e p u b lic a n power throughout the stru g g le w ith the Dutch, ra th er than again st a region with a record o f co lla b o ra tio n with the co lo n ia l a u th ority.
I t i s . d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b lis h the r ig h t s and wrongs o f the c a s e . C le a r ly the l o c a l a u t h o r it ie s were a c t in g in an in t r a n s ig e n t manner v i s - i - v i s D jakarta. In a d d itio n , th ere are h in ts that both the o p p o s i­ t io n to Nasrun and the r e fu s a l to a cce p t M u ljo h a rd jo may w e ll have been c o n fin e d to the Minangkabau elem ents o f the C en tral Sumatran DPR, and th ere was c l e a r l y c o n s id e r a b le te n s io n between them and th ose from o th e r r e g io n s re p re se n te d in the c o u n c il. I t may w e ll have been th a t D jakarta f e l t that on ly by a p p oin tin g a non-Minangkabau as the govern or o f C en tral Sumatra c o u ld they m inim ize the fe a r s o f Djambi and Riau that the p rov in ce would be com p letely West-Sumatra dominated. At th is time a ls o the c e n t r a l government was t r y in g to e s t a b lis h uniform p o l i ­ c ie s fo r the whole o f Indon esia. Acceptance o f those p o lic ie s e ls e ­ where in the cou n try might have been th re a te n e d had a Minangkabau prime m in is te r and m in is t e r o f i n t e r i o r appeared to be y ie ld in g to Minangka­ bau o p p o s it io n . I t i s p o s s ib le to o th a t w ith in h is own Masjumi p a rty N a tsir did not wish to be c a lle d p a ro ch ia l by appearing to indulge in fa v o r it is m towards p e o p le from h is own home a rea .
N e v e r th e le s s , the la ck o f any r e p r e s e n t a t iv e l e g i s l a t i v e a u th o r ity in the p r o v in c e during the e a r ly 1950s was a co n s ta n t so u rce o f d i s s a t ­ i s f a c t i o n and r e c r im in a t io n . This was at le a s t p a r t ly h e ld in check by the p o l i c i e s and a t t it u d e s o f the new g o v e r n o r , M u ljo h a rd jo , who, a l ­ though a Javanese, attempted to reach accommodations w ith the lo c a l lea d ers and s tr o n g ly rep resen ted h is p r o v in c e 's econom ic g riev a n ces to Dj a k a r ta .
A lthough many o f the broad lin e s o f the independence movement in West Sumatra p a r a l le le d th ose on J a va , i t would be m isle a d in g to view the p a tte r n o f the r e v o lu t io n th e re as a mere copy o f the Javanese m odel. In f a c t , n ot o n ly was th e re l i t t l e s i m i l a r i t y between the ev en ts in Sumatra and th o se in J a va , but in Sumatra i t s e l f even ts assumed autonomous and d iv e r s e forms w ith in d i f f e r e n t r e g io n s . There were a number o f f a c t o r s r e s p o n s ib le f o r t h i s . Upon the base o f Suma­ t r a 's co n s id e r a b le e th n ic and g e o g ra p h ica l d iv e r s it y the Japanese e s ­ t a b lis h e d a d e c e n t r a liz e d a d m in is tr a tio n . This s it u a t io n was s u s ta in e d throughout the r e v o lu t io n , e s p e c i a l l y d u rin g i t s f i r s t months, as a consequence o f the republican c a p it a l's lack o f con trol over action s pursued by re v o lu tio n a r y lea d ers on that is la n d . Thus, d e sp ite the f a c t th a t in 1945 Sumatra was d e sig n a te d as a s in g le p r o v in c e w ith in the new R e p u b lic o f In d o n e sia , w ith a g ov ern or r e s p o n s ib le f o r the whole o f the is la n d , events in the d iffe r e n t region s were in fa c t la r g e ly autonomous o f each o t h e r , and t h e ir d i r e c t i o n was determ ined predom inantly by re g io n a l rath er than p r o v in c ia l fa c t o r s .
193. A summary o f the chronology o f the dispute is set out in PST, pp. 421-24.

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While West Sumatra's t ie s w ith the c e n tr a l government were c lo s e r than w ith the p r o v in c ia l government in Medan, the Minangkabau saw the r e la tio n s h ip as one between equal p artn ers in the stru g g le rath er than as one between su b o rd in a te and le a d e r . This f e e l i n g in p a rt stemmed from the im portant r o le o f a la r g e number o f Minangkabau le a d e rs in the c e n t r a l r e p u b lic a n government and was sy m b olized by the p la c e o f a West Sumatran in the Sukarno/Hatta duumvirate at the end o f the Indonesian s t a t e . This was, however, on ly p art o f the dual r o le which the Minang­ kabau p e o p le saw them selves p la y in g in the r e v o lu t io n . The r e g io n o f West Sumatra i t s e l f they p e r c e iv e d as an area o f in t e g r a l im portance to the r e v o lu tio n a r y s t r u g g le , making a m ajor c o n tr ib u tio n to i t s f in a l s u c c e s s . R elevan t to t h is p e r c e p t io n was the s ta tu s o f B u k ittin g g i as the second c a p ita l o f In don esia, ready to become the seat o f the repub­ lic a n government should J og ja k a rta f a l l to the Dutch. During 1947 B u k ittin g g i d id , in f a c t , re-em erge as the c a p it a l o f Sumatra where Hatta d ir e c t e d the i s l a n d 's a f f a i r s ; and from December 1948, although B u k ittin g g i i t s e l f was o c c u p ie d by the D utch, the Emergency Government o f the r e p u b lic was e s t a b lis h e d in West Sumatra a f t e r the f a l l o f J o g ja k a rta and the ca p tu re o f most o f the top r e p u b lic a n le a d e r s h ip .
The r o le which the West Sumatrans saw them selves p la y in g a f t e r the Independence P rocla m a tion was a ls o c o n s is t e n t w ith the im portance o f the reg ion as one o f the major cen ters o f r e v o lt a gain st Dutch au th or­ i t y during the e a r l i e r p a r t o f the c e n tu r y . The number o f Minangkabau le a d e r s e x i l e d by the Dutch as a r e s u lt o f a n t i c o l o n i a l movements th ere had probably combined w ith the g e n e ra lly a u th orita ria n nature o f Japa­ nese r u le on Sumatra to le a v e an apparent vacuum o f n a t i o n a l i s t le a d e r ­ sh ip in West Sumatra during the o c c u p a tio n y e a r s , w ith the o ld -tim e ed u ca to r S j a f e i and the more dynamic younger C hatib Suleiman a p p a ren tly holding a v ir tu a l monopoly o f the top p o s itio n s during th is p e rio d . But t h is s it u a t io n was an a r t i f i c i a l one and changed im m ediately a f t e r the c o n s t r a in t s imposed by the Japanese were removed. From the l a t t e r months o f 1945 p o l i t i c a l l i f e in the r e g io n again assumed an a c t iv e c h a r a c t e r , w ith a d iv e r s e group o f men ta k in g up r o le s o f le a d e r s h ip . These in clu d e d p o l i t i c a l le a d e r s o f the 1920s and e a r ly 1930s who r e ­ turned from t h e ir e x i l e in la t e 1945, prewar p a rty le a d e r s and minor o f f i c i a l s o f the c o l o n i a l a d m in is tr a tio n whose r o le had been minimal d u rin g the Japanese o c c u p a t io n , and a group o f younger men, n o ta b ly ju n io r m ilit a r y o f f i c e r s who had r e c e iv e d m ilit a r y t r a in in g in the Gyugun. A lthough S j a f e i 's r o le d im in ish ed in im portance a f t e r the e a rly months o f the r e p u b lic , Chatib Suleiman con tin u ed as one o f the most a c t iv e younger le a d e rs in the Minangkabau u n t il h is death at the beginning o f 1949.
A n o ta b le c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h is le a d e r s h ip group was th a t d e s p ite the apparent h e t e r o g e n e it y o f i t s p o l i t i c a l o r ie n t a t io n and e x p e r ie n c e , i t remained remarkably s ta b le throughout the re v o lu tio n a ry y e a rs. A l­ though th ere was a broad range o f view s re p re se n te d w ith in i t th e re was a p p a ren tly a s u f f i c i e n t common denom inator o f a t t it u d e s on s o c i a l , e c o ­ nomic and p o l i t i c a l m atters to perm it c o h e s io n and c o n t in u it y among i t s membership. This cannot be ex p la in ed m erely by in te r n a l s o l i d a r i t y im­ posed by o u t s id e p r e s s u r e s , f o r t h is f a c t o r was a ls o o p e r a tiv e in o th e r p a r ts o f In d o n e sia w ith ou t r e s u lt in g in the same degree o f co h e s io n and c o n t in u it y . More l i k e l y t h is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c owed much to the e t h n ic hom ogeneity o f West Sumatra and the lo n g Minangkabau t r a d i t i o n o f b a l ­ an cin g a p p a re n tly c o n f l i c t i n g b e l i e f s and id ea s among t h e ir members in a way th a t a v oid ed u p s e ttin g the c e n t r a l co h e s io n o f t h e ir s o c i e t y .
This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s in p a rt o b scu re d by the number and d i v e r ­ s i t y o f the p o l i t i c a l p a r t ie s and r e l i g i o u s and s o c i a l g ro u p s, t o g e th e r

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w ith t h e ir independent m ilit a r y u n it s , which sprang up and m u lt ip lie d w ith in West Sumatra from the end o f 1945. But d e s p ite the d i v e r s i t y o f t h e ir p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l o r ie n t a t io n s and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to c o a le s c e th ese in t o any u n if ie d fr o n t f o r more than a few months in the fa c e o f a common d an ger, the r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s o f th ese groups were a b le to work to g e th e r e f f e c t i v e l y in the KNI and l a t e r the DPR, and none o f them was ever excluded from rep resen ta tion th ere.
Thus, w it h .v e r y few e x c e p t io n s , the men who sto o d at the head o f the West Sumatra KNI at the end o f 1945 r e ta in e d t h e ir le a d e r s h ip p o s i ­ t io n s r ig h t through u n t il the t r a n s f e r o f s o v e r e ig n t y ; and although in tern al tension s developed, these apparently did not re su lt in the deep p o l i t i c a l clea v a g es th at were m an ifested in o th er p arts o f Sumatra and Java. ^Although the w idespread o p p o s it io n to r e p u b lic a n p o l i c i e s o f compromise w ith the Dutch found t h e ir e x p ression through the V o lk sfro n t o f 1946 and the March 3 A f f a i r o f 1947, n e it h e r o f th ese movements d e­ v e lo p e d in t o the armed c o n fr o n t a t io n s between op p osin g f o r c e s such as o c c u r r e d in s e v e r a l o th e r p a r ts o f the is la n d , and n e it h e r had any major long-term e ffe c t s in a lie n a tin g se ctio n s o f the lea d ersh ip . R ath er, b oth movements were ended through some d egree o f compromise and rein teg ra tion o f the d is s a t is fie d groups w ithin the ru lin g b od ies. A p a r tia l excep tion to th is appears to have occu rred with regard to the most c o n s e r v a tiv e s e c t io n o f the adat le a d e r s h ip , a group which saw i t s power being undermined by attem pts at re p re se n ta tiv e government wherein p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s groups would a ls o e x e r c is e a u th o r ity at the n e g e r i l e v e l . In the l a s t y ea r o f the r e v o lu t io n , th en , some o f the adat le a d e r s were w i l l i n g to reach an accommodation w ith the Dutch in an attem pt to sh ore up t h e ir t r a d i t i o n a l power and p o s it io n s w ith in the s o c i e t y . Here a g a in , how ever, the p e o p le in v o lv e d were few , and most o f them seem to have been a b le to make t h e ir peace w ith the r e p u b lic as soon as i t became c le a r that the Dutch e f f o r t s would f a i l .
The dynamic c h a r a c te r o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e in West Sumatra d u rin g the r e v o lu t io n owed much to the f a c t th a t between 1945 and the end o f 1948 most o f the re g io n sto o d o u tsid e the area o f stron g Dutch p re ssu re . (The o n ly c lo s e p a r a l l e l to t h is s it u a t io n was th a t o b ta in in g in A tje h , which m aintained i t s independence from Dutch c o n tr o l throughout the r e v o l u t i o n .) The p o l i t i c a l le a d e r s thus had a f r e e hand to experim ent w ith a d m in is tr a tiv e and l e g i s l a t i v e forms and d e v e lo p system s o f g o v ­ ernment which they f e l t were attuned to Minangkabau s o c i e t y . In th is process they grew from a r e la t iv e ly in exp erien ced group o f o f f i c i a l s into a body with a high degree o f p o lit ic a l s e lf-co n s cio u s n e s s , taking f o r gran ted t h e ir a b i l i t y to e x e r c is e an e f f e c t i v e governm ental c o n t r o l over the a ffa ir s o f th e ir reg ion .
One o f the m ajor themes in the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d was the co n tin u in g e f f o r t to reach a more re p re s e n ta tiv e form o f government w ith in the r e ­ g io n . The aim was in p a rt to end the com p lete dom ination o f l o c a l a f f a i r s by the t r a d i t i o n a l penghulu group and to put them in to the hands o f a w id er spectrum o f le a d e r s . As e a r ly as 1946 e l e c t i o n s f o r rep resen ta tiv e co u n cils at the n egeri le v e l were held to accom plish t h i s . E s s e n t ia l to th ese co n ce p ts was the id ea o f autonomy and s e l f s u f f i c i e n c y at each l e v e l o f governm ent, and f o r t h is reason th e re were c o n s id e r a b le e f f o r t s during the n ext two y ea rs to make the v i l l a g e ad­ m in is tr a tio n s la rg e enough and to t r a in t h e ir o f f i c i a l s s u f f i c i e n t l y fo r these u n its to re ta in a con sid era b le degree o f independence from the h ig h e r l e v e l s o f the a d m in is t r a tio n . I t was f o r t h is rea son to o th a t the C en tra l Sumatran KNI moved so r a p id ly in 1948 to implement the d e c e n t r a liz a t io n law passed by the J og ja k a rta government w ith regard to

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autonomous le v e ls o f a d m in istra tio n at the p r o v in c ia l, kabupaten and w ila ja h l e v e l s . And i t is n o ta b le th a t in com batting the Dutch attem pts to s e t up a Minangkabau s t a t e in e a r ly 1949, the re p u b lica n le a d e r s in West Sumatra, w h ile la y in g s t r e s s on t h e ir lo y a lt y to the r e p u b lic , ad­ v o ca te d an autonomous sta tu s f o r the Minangkabau r e g io n w ith in the R ep u b lic o f In d on esia ra th e r than i t s com plete and u n q u a lifie d i n c o r ­ p o ra tio n .
At the p r o v in c ia l le v e l the d iv is io n o f Sumatra in to th ree sepa­ ra te p rov in ces in 1948 m erely acknowledged the fa ilu r e o f e f f o r t s to c r e a te a s in g le p r o v in c e on the is la n d and r a t i f i e d the broad lin e s o f the s it u a t io n which had e x is te d there sin ce 1945. However, the group­ ing o f the th re e r e s id e n c ie s o f West Sumatra, Riau and Djambi in t o the p r o v in c e o f C en tral Sumatra h e ld the d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y th a t the more co h e s iv e ‘p o l i t i c a l le a d e r s h ip and e t h n ic hom ogeneity o f West Sumatra would le a d to i t s dom inating the new p r o v in c e .
The a c t io n s o f the c e n t r a l government in 1950-51 appeared to n e­ gate much o f the p ro g re s s which had been a ch ie v e d in West Sumatra during the r e v o lu t io n a r y y ea rs towards autonomy in l o c a l a f f a i r s and some form o f r e p r e s e n t a t iv e governm ent. I t must have appeared to many o f the Minangkabau th a t t h e ir p o s i t i o n in the In don esian s t a t e had now n ot m erely r e v e r te d to th a t o f 1945 but in some ways c l o s e l y resem bled th a t o f the l a s t y ea r o f Dutch r u l e . In 1950 Sumatra was d iv id e d m i l i ­ t a r i l y in t o two r e g io n s w ith h ead qu arters r e s p e c t iv e ly at Medan and Palembang and the c i v i l i a n government o f the p ro v in ce o f C en tra l Suma­ t r a was removed from the hands o f l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s to th ose o f appointees o f the In te rio r M inistry in D jakarta.
The l o y a l t y o f West Sumatra t o the re p u b lic a n government th rou gh ­ out the r e v o lu tio n had c le a r ly been strengthened by the p resen ce o f so many Minangkabau in i t s c e n t r a l le a d e r s h ip . However, the men whom the West Sumatrans had regarded as t h e ir r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s on Java c le a r ly d id not view t h e ir re g io n o f o r ig in as having claim s on t h e ir lo y a lt y that could be perm itted to in flu en ce th e ir approach to n ational p o l i ­ cies arrived at in Djakarta. It is p o ssib le that they were, in fa c t , w i l l i n g to move the more r e s o l u t e l y a g a in s t West Sumatra because o f t h e ir c e r t a in t y o f i t s adherence to the r e p u b lic and becau se they w ished to s e t an example f o r o th e r r e g io n s on whom they co u ld not so c o m p le te ­ ly r e l y . The im portant r o le which the Minangkabau in West Sumatra saw them selves p la y in g in the s t r u g g le w ith the Dutch was never re c o g n iz e d by the c e n tr a l government as having such m ajor relev a n ce to the outcome o f the r e v o lu tio n a r y s tr u g g le as to w arrant t h e ir b ein g p erm itted a degree o f autonomy which i f granted to oth er reg ion s might th reaten the co h e s io n o f the new u n ita ry s t a t e .