

Socratic therapy for the criminal, the glutton, and the coward.

Pathemata in a Socratic account of action and education.

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by
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Dissertation Abstract

Why do we sometimes fail to do the right thing? Socrates is known for his intellectualistic answer to this question: Wrongdoers are ignorant. I argue that Socrates' longer explanation of wrongdoing also assigns importance to our non-rational mental states, i.e., our emotions, appetites, pleasures, and pains. In a Socratic account, non-rational states are felt evaluations that can influence our beliefs about what is best to do and, thereby, influence our actions. While someone who knows what is good and bad does not take her non-rational states to be true, the ignorant person takes them to be true, and so she fails to do the right thing.

Biographical Sketch

Freya Mobus received a Bachelor of Arts degree with a major in philosophy and a minor in German language and literature from the University of Bonn, Germany in September 2009. She then pursued a master's degree in philosophy. From 2011 to 2013, Freya attended the University of Toronto as a visiting graduate student. From 2013 to 2019, she was a doctoral student in the philosophy department at Cornell University. During her doctoral studies, Freya also spent one semester at Harvard University and one semester at King's College London.

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DISSERTATION SUMMARY

In my dissertation, I argue for new Socratic answers to the questions: what are non-rational states (emotions, appetites, pleasure, pain) and which role do they play in the life and actions of the virtuous person as well as the wrongdoer?

Chapter One: Pathemata in Early Plato. I propose the quartet of pleasure, pain, fear, and epithumetic desire (such as appetite) as the starting point for our investigation of non-rational states in Socratic psychology of action. Based on passages in the *Cratylus*, *Laches*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws*, I argue that Plato subsumes these states under the term *pathemata* and that *pathemata* does not match our class of emotions. By distinguishing between *pathemata* and emotions, I propose a new starting point for an investigation of non-rational states in Socratic psychology of action.

Chapter Two: Pleasure and Pain. Imagine that Socrates gets a cavity treatment. The drilling is painful, but he also knows that it is best to get it done and so he stays. Callicles is not so smart. Once the dentist starts drilling, Callicles takes off. I argue that this scenario presents a puzzle that interpreters have missed, namely: why does Socrates have an aversion to pain? To us, this might not be puzzling at all. Socrates, however, believes that we have an aversion to bad things only and that pain is not in fact bad. If Socrates knows that pain is not bad, why does he still feel aversive pain from drilling? I argue that the *Protagoras* and *Hippias Major* suggest that pain immediately appears to be bad to us and that is why even Socrates has an aversion to pain. Pain is a felt evaluation. I thereby present a new notion of Socratic pain (and pleasure).

Chapter Three: Appetites and Fear. Imagine that a glutton and a coward seek advice from Socrates. What kind of diagnosis and treatment can they expect? According to most interpreters, Socrates would diagnose both as ignorant and suggest that they sign up for philosophical discussions to learn more about a healthy diet or about things one ought not to fear. Based on my results from chapter two and further passages in the *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Gorgias*, *Euthyphro*, and *Protagoras*, I argue that for Socrates appetites and fear involve two kinds of evaluative appearances, what I call perceptual and higher order appearances, only the latter of which are responsive to reason. I further argue that depending on which kind of evaluative appearance is at the root of the patient's cowardice or gluttony, Socrates would in certain cases suggest additional, non-argumentative treatments.

Chapter Four: Painful Punishment. Does Socrates really believe, as many have argued, that we can turn *any* wrongdoer into a law-abiding citizen simply by explaining to him that wrongdoing is bad? I argue, against most interpreters, that Socrates is serious when he claims in the *Gorgias* that certain wrongdoers must experience painful punishment in order to epistemically improve. I propose that inflicting pain, a Socratic could argue, is a non-argumentative way of communicating value. Painful punishment can communicate that wrongdoing is bad and thereby improve those wrongdoers whose moral belief system is very much misguided by making them smarter.

PATHEMATA IN EARLY PLATO

The scope of my investigation

Why do we act as we do, and why do we sometimes fail to do the right thing? These two questions are at the center of the following investigation. My focus will be on explaining human actions, i.e., intentional acts, and not reflexes. For example, I am not interested in explaining the reflex of pulling one's hand away from a hot stove; but I am interested in explaining the action of going to the fridge to get ice after one's hand is burned. Different components contribute to the generation of human actions, specifically:

- (i) psychological components (e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions).
- (ii) physiological components (e.g., sickness, impaired vision).
- (iii) external, situational components (circumstances, context).

I am interested in the first group of components. How do our beliefs, desires, emotions and similar states contribute to the generation of actions? Though I focus on group (i), I do not mean to suggest that components in group (ii) and (iii) are less important. To see the importance of external, situational components, let us envision the following scenario. Imagine you are running late to give a talk. As you hurry over to the auditorium, you notice a man slumped in an alley. Something is clearly wrong with him, but it is not clear exactly what. Would you stop and help? Remember that you are running late for your talk. Most of us would probably say that of course I would help! Whether I am in a hurry or not does not have as much of an impact on how I act as, say, my empathy or belief that one ought to help others in need. Research suggests, however, that situational factors such as being in a hurry have much more impact on how we act than we think. The situation I described is the set-up for a study by Darley and Batson (1973). Their results show

that only ten percent of all speakers who were in a hurry stopped to help the man, whereas sixty-three percent of those who were not in a hurry stopped to help.¹

Let us consider another example that shows how situational and physiological components can influence psychological components. I am sick and decide to take some medicine. Part of the explanation for why I take the medicine is probably that I believe “taking the medicine is good for me.” Why do I hold this belief? It may be that this belief is, to some extent, the result of my physiological condition. My belief may also be the product of my particular situation—I am sick at home and my partner expects me to be a reasonable person and take the medicine. This example illustrates that physiological and situational components can be part of the etiology (i.e., the causal history) of the psychological components of our actions. While investigating the psychological components of our actions, I will, therefore, also consider physiological and situational components.

Our psychological components can further be divided into the following two groups:

- (i) psychological components
 - a. belief, judgment, thought, knowledge
 - b. desire, emotion, pleasure, pain

States in group (a) are sometimes subsumed under ‘rational mental states,’ ‘reason,’ or the ‘product of reasoning,’ while states in group (b) are sometimes subsumed under ‘non-rational mental states,’ ‘passions,’ or ‘feelings.’² I am particularly interested in investigating the states in group (b). My questions are: what exactly are desires, emotions, pleasure and pain, and how do

¹ The experiment is known as the *Good Samaritan Experiment*. In my summary and interpretation of it, I rely on Tiberius (2015: 117). Tiberius’ introduction to moral psychology (2015) has also helped me in approaching the topic of explaining human actions, formulating my central questions (why do we act as we do and why do we sometimes fail to do the right thing?), and disentangling the different components of human actions.

² Philosophers disagree on whether all states in group (b) fall under one generic term. For example, Descartes subsumes under ‘passions’ states we would call emotions (such as joy and sadness, love and hatred), and desires, but not pleasure and pain (*Passions of the Soul*). By contrast, Moss (2012b: 259) believes that „any modern philosopher would recognize [the following state] as paradigm passions: anger, fear, pleasure, pain, lust, *eros*, and the like.” Kenny (1963) subsumes perceptions, sensations, and emotions under ‘feelings’ (55-6). Pleasure and pain “are sometimes sensations and sometimes emotions” (55).

they influence our actions? What is the relation between reason and passions? Do they oppose one another and incline us to different actions, or is one of them (reason or passion) in charge, determining what we do?³

I will also question the usefulness of the distinction between emotions and non-rational mental states on the one hand and reason and rational states on the other. Does it make sense to distinguish emotions and desires from beliefs and judgments? Initially, it seems implausible that agents do not have *any* thoughts, beliefs, or judgments at all when they are angry and desire revenge or when they are hungry and desire food. By investigating desires, emotions, pleasure, and pain we will better understand what unites these mental states and how they differ from other mental states.

Let me further narrow down my focus historically: I am interested in what those states that we call desires, emotions, pleasure and pain are and how they influence our actions in ancient Greek philosophy, specifically in Plato. Investigating these states in ancient Greek philosophy faces the additional difficulty that our modern concepts do not clearly correlate with the ancient Greek ones, or so I will argue.

When searching the Platonic corpus for states we commonly refer to as desires, emotions, pleasure, and pain, we can notice an important difference immediately: instead of desires, emotions, pleasure and pain, Plato often presents the quartet of pain (λύπη), pleasure (ἡδονή),

³ Hume contrasts reason with passions and argues that passions are in charge: “Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavor to prove *first*, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and *secondly*, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (*Treatise of Human Nature* T 2.3.3.1). Kant contrasts Vernunft with Gefühl (which includes Lust und Unlust), Affekt, Leidenschaft, Begierde, and Neigung, and he argues that Vernunft ought to be in charge because, as Eisler (1930) explains, “Neigung ist blind und knechtisch” and Affekt is “stets unklug.”

epithumetic desire (ἐπιθυμία), and fear (φόβος).⁴ Here are some things we know about these states from the Platonic corpus:⁵




Fig. 1

⁴ *Laches* 191d, e; *Theaet.* 156b; *Symp.* 207e; *Rep.* 429d, 430a. We also get the following variations: (a) pleasure, pain, fears (*Phaed.* 69b), (b) anger (θυμὸν), pleasure (ἡδονήν), pain (λύπην), love (ἔρωτα), fear (φόβον) (*Prot.* 352b-c), (c) pleasures, pains, hardships (πόνους), fears (*Rep.* 502e), (d) appetites, pleasures, pains, anger (θυμοῦ), sex (ἀφροδισίων) (*Rep.* 606d), (e) pleasure, pain, appetites, love (ἐρώτων) (*Laws* 631e, 734a), (f) fear, pain, desire (πόθος), pleasure (*Laws* 633d), (g) anger (θυμοῦ), fear, pleasure, pain, envy (φθόνων), appetites (*Laws* 863e), (h) pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire (*Phaed.* 83b; *Soph.* 228b; *Rep.* 431b; *Laws* 732e, 788b).

⁵ While developing the following chart, I benefited greatly from Kloss’ investigation “Untersuchungen zum Wortfeld Verlangen/Begehren im frühgriechischen Epos.”

Interestingly, we get the same quartet of pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear in the Stoic corpus:




Fig. 2

Neither the Platonic nor the Stoic taxonomy, as I present them here, is supposed to be exhaustive (many more passages about pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear could be gathered), but they suffice for our purposes. At this point, I would like to direct our attention to two observations.

First, states we call ‘emotions’ do not form their own distinct class. Rather, they are attributed to different classes of psychological states. For example, today we would think of both fear and anger as emotions. But for Plato and the Stoics, fear (*phobos*) forms its own class, while anger (*thumos, orge*) is a kind of epithumetic desire. Why would Plato and the Stoics attribute fear and anger to two different psychological classes (instead of subsuming them both under ‘emotions’)? Let me give an initial reason on their behalf. Fear is an aversion to something, while

anger is an attraction to or desire for something, namely revenge (*SVF* 396, 397).⁶ Anger, therefore, falls under epithumetic desire. Like pain, fear is an aversion, and like pleasure, epithumetic desire is an attraction to something. Plato and the Stoics, therefore, distinguish between four kinds of states: two for aversion (fear and pain) and two for attraction (epithumetic desire and pleasure). If one of the criteria for distinguishing between psychological states is the distinction between attraction and aversion, then attributing fear and anger to two different categories instead of subsuming them both under ‘emotions’ is quite plausible.

The second observation is that it seems like we have a gap in our Platonic taxonomy; upon first glance, we lack the genus for pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear. In the Stoic corpus, *pathos* (pl.: *pathê*) is the genus under which pain (λύπη), pleasure (ἡδονή), epithumetic desire (ἐπιθυμία), and fear (φόβος) fall. Aristotle, too, repeatedly subsumes fear, epithumetic desire, anger under *pathos* and *pathema* (pl.: *pathemata*), a close cognate of *pathos*.⁷ In Plato, the case is not as clear. Yet, we have reason to believe that *pathemata* is the generic term under which pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear fall. In *Tim.* 69d, Plato subsumes ἡδονή, λύπη, θάρρος καὶ φόβος, θυμός, and ἐλπίς under *pathemata*. θυμός (anger) is a kind of epithumetic desire, or something like an epithumetic desire (θυμός belongs to the τὰ τοιαῦτα in “ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα,” *Crat.* 419e). The term *pathemata* then covers our quartet pain (λύπη), pleasure (ἡδονή), epithumetic desire (ἐπιθυμία), and fear (φόβος), plus confidence, the opposite of fear (θάρρος), and hope (ἐλπίς, *Prot.* 328d, which is sometimes used broadly as δόξα μελλόντων *Leg.* 644c). We

⁶ For the same definition of ‘anger’ in Aristotle see *Rhet.* 1378a30 (ἔστω δὲ ὀργὴ ὀρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας) and *DA* 403a30-b1.

⁷ *EE* 1220b10-14: μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἔξεων. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἡ αισθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ’ αὐτά. See also *EN* 1105b23-5, 1378a19-22, *De Motu* 702a2-5.

can therefore conclude that Plato subsumes pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear under the term *pathemata*. The scope of our investigation is then *pathemata*.

We can say a little bit more about Plato's *pathemata*. In *Laws* 896e8-897a2, Plato subsumes *pathemata* under the class of "motions of the soul" (κίνησις ψυχῆς). The states he calls 'motions of the soul' are βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλευέσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν λυπουμένην, θαρροῦσαν φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν στέργουσαν. The *pathemata* we already encountered in our Platonic taxonomy and that are included in this list are χαρὰ (joy), λύπη (pain), θάρρος (confidence), and φόβος (fear). The scope of our investigation is then a certain subclass of the motions of the soul. But what distinguishes *pathemata* such as χαρὰ, λύπη, θάρρος, and φόβος from the other motions of the soul such as βούλεσθαι (wishing), σκοπεῖσθαι (considering), ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (taking care), βουλευέσθαι (deliberate), and δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐψευσμένως (believing something correctly or mistakenly)?⁸

In *Tim.* 69c8, we learn that *pathemata* are strong and forceful (δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα) and that they are mixed with sense-perception that is *alogon* and eager desire (ἐπιχειρητῆ ἔρωτι). Epithumetic desires are even called most *alogon* (ἀλόγιστος) in the *Republic* (439d7). *Alogon* is commonly translated as 'without reason.'⁹ Plato further says that epithumetic desires have a

⁸ My proposal is that the *pathemata* we are interested in are a sub-group of motions of the soul. If this is correct, Socrates' progression of thought in *Cratylus* 419a-420c makes much more sense. There, Socrates investigates the etymology of the following three groups of terms: (i) τὸ διακοσμοῦν καὶ ἰὸν (what orders and moves: beneficial, profitable, gainful, good, advantageous, ...) and what ties down motion (δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν: hurtful); (ii) ἡδονή, λύπη, ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; (iii) δόξα, οἴησις, βούλεσθαι, βουλευέσθαι. The reader may be puzzled what motivates Socrates' move from (i) to (ii) to (iii). But if we are talking about states that move us in (i), and if the states in (ii) and (iii) are two kinds of motions of the soul, then the conversation progresses quite predictably. The two groups of 'motions of the soul' are: one that includes ἡδονή, λύπη, ἐπιθυμία, and another one that includes δόξα. What about μισοῦσαν (indignation) and στέργουσαν (being fond)? I will propose below that indignation and fondness are motions of the soul that are somehow in the middle between (ii) and (iii); they are like pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear, but not as disturbing as them.

⁹ This translation is, of course, awfully unsatisfying: what exactly does it mean that a certain mental state is 'without reason'? For a wonderful discussion of the problem and different translation options see Moss (2014b). Moss herself favors the translation of logos as 'explanatory account.' Accordingly, *alogon* would mean 'without explanatory account,' "something which, when grasped, transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one" (2014: 187).

tendency to become unruly. Epithumetic desires, therefore, require restraining (κολαστέον, *Gorg.* 492d5, 507e2) and ruling (ἄρχοντα, *Gorg.* 491d11); we need to re-direct and not give in to them (μεταβιβάζειν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, *Gorg.* 517b5-6). The wise men (τοὺς σώφρονας, *Gorg.* 491e2) are self-controlled (ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, *Gorg.* 491d11) in the face of epithumetic desires. But Plato also claims that sometimes we need to fight the other *pathemata* pleasure, pain, and fear (μάχεσθαι, *Lach.* 191e1). The courageous men (ἀνδρεῖοι, *Lach.* 191e4) are brave in in the face of epithumetic desires, pleasure, pain, and fear.¹⁰ We can find the idea that *pathemata* are in some sense *alogon* and excessive also in the Stoic corpus: *pathê* are motions of the soul that are irrational (Πάθος ἐστὶν ἄλογος ψυχῆς κίνησις) and excessive impulses or motions (ὀρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, *SVF* 378, 384, 391).¹¹

At this point, we have determined that the scope of our investigation is *pathemata*. *Pathemata* are certain motions of the soul (κίνησις ψυχῆς). Plato characterizes *pathemata* as *alogon*, and he claims that they provide an occasion for courage and may need to be fought. We then get the following taxonomy:

¹⁰ Socrates' claim is a bit odd: how does one display courage in the face of pleasure and epithumetic desires, such as appetites? Presumably, we display courage in the face of danger, but what is dangerous about being hungry? One might think that abstaining from food and drink can be courageous - think of a hunger strike, for example. But in this case, wouldn't it be more accurate to say that the agent is courageous in the face of potential death from hunger? The act of abstaining from food is not, at least not always, a courageous act. Rather, we display what may be called strength of will, and what Socrates seems to call perseverance. A better translation of ἀνδρεῖοι in this context might, therefore, be 'strong.' Some men are strong when facing pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear. The soldier who keeps his post, the hungry person who abstains from eating, the patient who endures a painful treatment, what all these cases have in common is that the agent is strong and persists. Gould follows this interpretative path and explains helpfully: "a situation calling for courage is one in which the agent has a belief that she ought to perform a given action, but that belief is challenged by her desire to avoid the adverse consequences she foresees as a probable result of doing that action. [...] With this in mind, it is less baffling as to why Socrates subsumes fighting desire and pleasure under courage. In battling a desire to succumb to temptation of some sort, one feels a conflict between the desire for the object of that temptation and the desire for some other object; the conflict arises from the understanding that possession of one of these objects probably precludes possession of the other" (1987: 270).

¹¹ I here follow Graver in translating '*alogon*' as 'irrational' in the Stoic context: "affective responses may be 'irrational' in the sense of being ill- advised or disorderly, but they are still the responses of reasoning beings" (Graver (2007: 8).




Fig. 3

Pathos and Pathema in Plato and Aristotle

Yet, we will have to revise our taxonomy and our understanding of *pathemata*. As it turns out, Plato uses *pathos* and *pathema* very broadly:

- a) understanding, thought, intellectual trust, and apprehension through images are *pathemata* (νόησιν, διάνοιαν, πίστιν, εἰκασίαν, Rep. 511d6-e2).¹²
- b) Prudence is a *pathema* (φρόνησις, Phaed. 79d6).¹³
- c) Waking and sleeping are *pathê* (καταδαρθάνειν, ἀνεγείρεσθαι, Phaed. 72b-c).¹⁴
- d) Wondering is a *pathos* (θαυμάζειν, Theaet. 155d3;¹⁵ Phaed. 58e1).
- e) Imagination is called a *pathos* (φαντασίαν, Soph. 264a5).¹⁶

¹² καὶ μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν.

¹³ Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὕσα αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῆ αὐτῆ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται;

¹⁴ εἰ γὰρ μὴ αἰεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα [...] οἴσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι; [...] οἷον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' ἂν λήρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ταῦτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν.

¹⁵ μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν·

¹⁶ Τί δ' ὅταν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ δι' αἰσθήσεως παρῆ τι, τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος ἄρ' οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;

- f) In the *Timaeus*, Plato refers to sense-perception (αἰσθήσεων, 77e5),¹⁷ respiration (ἀναπνοῆς, 79a5),¹⁸ and old age (γῆρας, 81d4)¹⁹ as *pathê*.
- g) Even being alive is called a *pathos* (ζῆν, *Leg.* 895c6).²⁰
- h) In many passages, *pathos* refers to states of cognitive insufficiency such as not being persuaded (οὐ πάνυ πείθομαι, *Gorg.* 513c5), believing something falsely (δοξάζειν ψευδῆ, *Theat.*187d3, 193d5; *Phaedr.*262b3), ignorance (τὸ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος, *Soph.*228e5, 243c3; *Alc.I* 118b4), being mistaken (*Phil.*49a1-5),²¹ not believing in the gods (*Leg.*908c5),²² or stupidity (βλακικόν, *Rep.*432d5).
- i) Further, situations that make people migrate, such as land shortage and war, are called *pathemata* (στενοχωρία γῆς, πολέμω, *Leg.* 708b5).²³

Plato's usage of *pathos* and *pathema* is not unusual. Aristotle, too, uses *pathos* and *pathema* very broadly. In Aristotle, the following states are called *pathos*:

- a) thinking (διανοεῖσθαι, *DA* 408b25-7),
- b) sense-perception (αἴσθησις) such as smell and flavor (*De Sensu* 436b8),
- c) everything that has been stamped on our soul, like a seal has been stamped on an envelope by a signet ring (*De Memoria* 450a25-32); for example, the images of imagination (φάντασμα, 450a10), and the impressions that contemplation (θεωρεῖν) leaves in the soul (450b32),
- d) waking and sleeping (ἡ ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὁ ὕπνος, *De Somno* 455a25-6), as well as dreams (*De Insomniis* 458b1-2),
- e) impregnation (ὀχείας, *Hist. An.* 637a7),

¹⁷ καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάθος ἴν' ἀφ' ἐκατέρων τῶν μερῶν εἰς ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα εἶη διάδηλον.

¹⁸ Πάλιν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ἴδωμεν πάθος, αἷς χρώμενον αἰτίαις τοιοῦτον γέγονεν οἷόνπερ τὰ νῦν ἐστίν.

¹⁹ φθίνει δὴ πᾶν ζῶον ἐν τούτῳ κρατούμενον, γῆρας τε ὀνομάζεται τὸ πάθος.

²⁰ {ΑΘ.} Ἐὰν ἴδωμέν που ταύτην γενομένην ἐν τῷ γήινῳ ἢ ἐνὺδρῳ ἢ πυροειδεῖ, κεχωρισμένῳ ἢ καὶ συμμιγεῖ, τί ποτε φήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πάθος εἶναι; {ΚΛ.} Μῶν ἄρα με ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ζῆν αὐτὸ προσερούμεν, ὅταν αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινή; {ΑΘ.} Ναί. {ΚΛ.} Ζῆν· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

²¹ {ΣΩ.} Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἄρ' οὐ σοφίας περὶ τὸ πλήθος πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ ψευδοῦς; {ΠΡΩ.} Πῶς δ' οὐ; {ΣΩ.} Κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἂν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι πάθος.

²² μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς ἀμφοῖν ἂν ἐνυπάρχουσι κοινὸν πάθος.

²³ στενοχωρία τινὶ γῆς ἢ τισὶν ἄλλοις τοιοῦτοις παθήμασιν.

- f) Aristotle also uses *pathemata* to refer to eye and hair color as well as the sound of voice (*Gen. An.* 778a16-20),²⁴
- g) and he says that speech is a symbol of *pathemata* in the soul (*De Interpr.* 16a3-4).²⁵

These passages show that Plato and Aristotle use *pathos* and *pathema* very broadly. I could not detect a difference in usage or meaning between *pathos* and *pathema*. In fact, many dictionaries do not distinguish *pathos* from *pathema* but instead give the same translations for both, as we will see below. We can, however, observe one trend: when talking about the kinds of states we are concerned with in this investigation—epithumetic desire, fear, pleasure, and pain—Aristotle (and the Stoics) tend to use *pathos*. In the Platonic corpus, we get only one passage (namely *Tim.* 69d) in which those states are subsumed under a general term, and that term is *pathemata*. Finally, we can observe that in both Plato and Aristotle, *pathos* is used more frequently than *pathema*.²⁶

I propose that we distinguish three different usages of *pathos/pathema*: (#1) in its broadest sense, *pathos/pathema* means situation, experience, or event. In this sense, land shortage (*Leg.* 708b4) and impregnation (*Hist. An.* 637a6) are *pathê/pathemata*. (#2) In a narrower sense *pathos/pathema* means motion of the soul (κίνησις ψυχῆς, *Laws* 896e8-897a2, *Rhet.* 1369b33). This includes thinking and apprehension (διανοεῖσθαι, *DA* 408b25-7; νόησιν, διάνοιαν, πίστιν,

²⁴ Περὶ δὲ τῶν παθημάτων οἷς διαφέρουσι τὰ μόρια τῶν ζώων θεωρητέον νῦν. λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα παθήματα τῶν μορίων οἷον γλαυκότητα ὀμμάτων καὶ μελανίαν, καὶ φωνῆς ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα, καὶ χρώματος [ἢ σώματος] καὶ τριχῶν ἢ πτερῶν διαφοράς. See also *Hist. An.* 486b5 for color as a *pathema*. For ‘boldness’ as a *pathema* see *Gen. An.* 782a19.

²⁵ Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα.

²⁶ In Aristotle: 68 instances of *pathema* and declined forms, 321 instances of *pathos* (not including declined forms). In Plato: 101 instances of *pathema* and declined forms, 122 instances of *pathos* (not including declined forms).

εικασίαν, *Rep.* 511d6-e2), as well as perceiving (αἴσθησις, *De Sensu* 436b8).^{27,28} (#3) In an even narrower sense, *pathos/pathema* means ‘motions of the soul that tend to be unruly and may need to be controlled and fought.’²⁹ The focus of our investigation is *pathos/pathema* in the third sense.

We can therefore revise our taxonomy as follows:




Fig. 4

When Plato and the Stoics distinguish epithumetic desire, fear, pleasure and pain from other motions of the soul, the important distinction is *not* between states that involve beliefs or thinking (or that are somehow more doxastic or cognitive) and those that are not. The important

²⁷ In *EN* 1175a18ff, Aristotle criticizes the view that pleasure is a motion. A motion is incomplete, he explains; it is completed when it reaches its goal (e.g., the motion of building a house is completed when it reaches its goal. i.e., when the house is built). Pleasure, by contrast, is complete at any moment it exists. How can we make sense of Aristotle’s description of pleasure as a motion of the soul in the *Rhetoric* and his criticism of that view in the *EN*? Does he use ‘motion’ in two different senses? Does he express his own view in the *EN*, and does he describe pleasure as a motion of the soul in the *Rhetoric* only to get Platonists on board? For these different strategies to solve the apparent contradiction see Gardiner (1919).

²⁸ My argument goes as follows: (i) Believing something falsely is a motion of the soul (δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐψευσμένως, *Laws* 896e8-897a2). (ii) Believing something falsely is a *pathos* (δοξάζειν ψευδῆ, *Theat.*187d3, 193d5; *Phaedr.*262b3), other forms of thinking are called *pathemata* (νόησιν, διάνοιαν, πίστιν, εἰκασίαν, *Rep.* 511d6-e2). (iii) Therefore, there is a group of *pathê/pathemata* that we may call *pathê/pathemata* of the soul that includes epithumetic desire, fear, pleasure, pain, but also various states of thinking.

²⁹ One could, of course, distinguish more senses of *pathos/pathema* and develop a more fine-grained picture. For example, sense #1 could further be distinguished into *pathê* internal and external to the living being; we may further distinguish *pathê* that affect the body from those that affect the soul.

distinction is between motions of the soul that disturb us and those that do not disturb us (either *pathemata* are disturbing motions of the soul or they cause such motions). Epithumetic desire, pleasure, pain, and fear tend to become unruly and disturb us; other motions of the soul (such as βούλεσθαι (wishing), σκοπεῖσθαι (considering), ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (taking care), βουλευέσθαι (deliberating), δοξάζειν (believing)) do not disturb us. Why?

The standard explanation might be that epithumetic desire, pleasure, pain, and fear tend to disturb us because they are in some sense less rational or cognitive. I can see three ways of spelling out this explanation:

Option 1: ***Pathemata tend to disturb us because they lack beliefs/thoughts.***

This explanation is unconvincing because fearing death, for example, is a *prosdokia*; fearing death is thinking about one's death. This thought disturbs us. For the Stoics, all *pathê* are beliefs. The explanation for why some motions of the soul disturb us, therefore, cannot be that they lack belief or thought.

Option 2: ***Pathemata tend to disturb us because they involve false beliefs/thoughts.***

This explanation is unconvincing, too. *Pathemata* may very well be or involve false beliefs, but that cannot explain why they disturb us. Take the two beliefs “2+2=5” and “death is a future evil to come.” Both are false (according to Socrates), but only the latter disturbs me.³⁰

Option 3: ***Pathemata tend to disturb us because the beliefs/thoughts they involve are brought about in a less rational way*** (not via calculation and deliberation).³¹

This explanation is unconvincing, too. Take one and the same belief (e.g., “death is a future evil to come”). Why would this belief disturb me if it were brought

³⁰ Maybe *false* beliefs about value disturb us, and that is why the belief “death is a future evil to come” disturbs us. This option is not quite convincing either since also *true* beliefs about value may disturb us (consider Socrates' belief that conducting an examination falsely is bad. This is a true evaluative belief, and accordingly Socrates is afraid of conducting an examination falsely (*Charm.* 175a9)). Neither is it the case that all evaluative beliefs are disturbing (neither ‘knowledge is good’ nor ‘ignorance is bad,’ for example, disturbs me).

³¹ Option 3 seems to be what Price (2009) has in mind: “the emotions of the appetitive life are non-rational since they arise from frustrations and satisfactions that are independent of any rational assessment of what is best.” (2009: 125).

about in a less rational way; but if it were brought about in a more rational way, it would not disturb me?

My proposal is that whether *pathemata* involve or lack beliefs or reasoning is *not* the crucial point when we distinguish *pathemata* from other motions of the soul, nor when we explain why *pathemata* disturb the calmness of our souls. This point does not seem to have been acknowledged in the secondary literature.³² If I am on the right track, the best way to explain what makes *pathemata alogon* is not that they are ‘without reason or without belief’ but that they are certain kinds of motions that tend to disturb us and need to be controlled.^{33, 34}

Pathemata in the Socratic Dialogues

I will further narrow down my focus on *pathemata* in Plato’s so-called Socratic dialogues.³⁵

Which role *pathemata* can play in the generation of actions is disputed among interpreters of the

³² The discussion in the secondary literature focuses on the question of how cognitive emotions and appetites are (do they involve belief or judgments?). See, for instance, Price (2009), Lorenz (2006).

³³ They need to be controlled, but not extinguished. Plato and Aristotle agree that we should fear certain things (such as ignorance). Even the Stoics claim that we should contemplate potential future evils so that we are not disturbed when they happen (Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* III, 14). The idea seems to be that we should put our soul in a state of small and controlled disturbance so that we are not heavily and uncontrollably disturbed when evils actually happen.

³⁴ But what would be a better explanation for why *pathemata* tend to disturb us? I can here only approach an answer to that question by drawing attention to two points. First, we feel *pathemata* about things that are evaluated by us: we fear things that we take to be bad, such as death, a bad reputation, or ignorance. We feel indignation about unjust actions. We have an epithumetic desire for something pleasant that fills our current unpleasant deficit (when we are hungry, we want food). Sometimes we get things right and then we fear, for instance, the right thing, but sometimes we get things wrong. Are those *pathemata* disturbing that inaccurately assess value? Not necessarily, it seems. One can imagine that fearing death to a small degree is less disturbing than an extreme fear of ignorance. Second, *pathemata* tend to be violent (δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκάϊα, *Tim.* 69c8). It seems, then, that we must prevent value assessments from becoming violent. How do we do that? Maybe it is at *this* point where thinking and deliberation enter the picture. The one who deliberates carefully about what is good and bad is more likely to have mild instead of violent *pathemata*. If he deliberates correctly, he will conclude, for example, that death is not an evil but that one should fear ignorance. Yet, one should not fear ignorance in an excessive way because that would impair one’s happiness. An additional possibility is that knowledge is (or brings about) a steady, harmonious motion of the soul. Then, we could explain nicely why knowledge is stronger (κρεῖττον) than *pathemata*, as Socrates claims (*Prot.* 357c). The motion that knowledge is or causes does not get distorted by other motions. Therefore, the knowledgeable person does not get distorted by *pathemata*. He still feels pleasure, pain, epithumetic desires, and fear, but his value assessments are correct and his *pathemata* do not become violent and unruly.

³⁵ By ‘Socratic dialogues’, I mean *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Protagoras*, *Ion*, *Hippias Minor* and *Major*, and *Gorgias*. What unifies this group of dialogues is that they are all pre-*Republic* dialogues, and that they have been taken to present the Socratic philosophy (with *Gorgias* and *Meno* potentially being transitional in parts; see e.g., Penner 1992: 124; Resthoko 2006: 11-3; Brickhouse and Smith 2010:

Socratic dialogues. The dispute arises because Socrates' moral psychology is known for being 'intellectualistic.' The following three claims have been taken to be at the core of Socratic intellectualism:

1. We all desire the good.³⁶
2. We always do what we believe is best to do.³⁷
3. All wrongdoing is due to ignorance; those who claim to have been overcome by pleasure, fear and other such states are in fact ignorant.³⁸

Around these three Socratic claims, interpreters have built the following short story about the generation of actions:³⁹ actions are caused by a belief-desire pair, the belief that a certain action is best to do and a particularization of our general desire for the good (i.e., our overall good, happiness). This particularization is brought about by our belief about what is best to do. Wrongdoing is never good for us; it always harms us.⁴⁰ Therefore, if an agent desires to steal his

18). Some have questioned whether the *Meno* and the *Gorgias* are Socratic dialogues, others have questioned whether there are any 'Socratic' dialogues. I will not get into these debates here (for an interesting and helpful discussion see Reshotko (2006: 9-14) and Rowe (2002)). I am interested in trying to extract a coherent moral psychology from these dialogues.

³⁶ See, for instance, "everyone desires the good" (Callard 2017), "human desire is for the good" (Barney 2010), "all desire is for the good" (Penner 2000, Reshotko 1992), "everyone desires the good" (Penner 2011: 266), "Plato's Socrates famously claims that we want (βούλεσθαι) the good, [...] he also claims that we desire (ἐπιθυμείν) things that we think are good" (Kamtekar 2006: 127). I will discuss this Socratic claim in more detail below.

³⁷ See for instance: "Socratic intellectualism requires that one always does what one believes is best for one" (Brickhouse and Smith 2015: 14), "on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us" (Rowe 2012: 305), "it is reasonable to interpret Socrates as claiming that: Whenever I do X, I believe that doing X is overall best for me" (Bobonich 2011: 311). I will discuss this claim in more detail below.

³⁸ This claim has a sibling claim, namely 'no one does wrong willingly' (πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχροῦ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες ποιοῦσιν, *Prot.* 345e3-4; *Gorg.* 509e5-7). I take those claims to be related in the following way: Socrates believes that, wrongdoing is self-harm (as we will see below), and since no one wants to harm herself, no one can possibly want to do wrong. If someone does wrong he must have done so unwillingly. The wrongdoer must not know that wrongdoing is self-harm or that his action is an instance of wrongdoing. Therefore, all wrongdoing is due to ignorance. For a much more extensive discussion see Segvic (2006), Santas (1964).

³⁹ My short story is meant to be minimally controversial. I will not get into controversies about the precise relationship between the good, happiness, knowledge, and virtue. For an interesting and helpful discussion of these issues (is knowledge indeed sufficient for virtue? What is the relation between happiness and virtue?), I refer the reader to Bobonich (2011) and Rudebusch ((1999), especially chapter nine).

⁴⁰ Wrongdoing is in every way bad and shameful for the wrongdoer (ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὄν παντὶ τρώῃ). Therefore, one must never do wrong (Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν, *Crito* 49b).

neighbor's money, for instance, and he then acts on this desire, it is because he reasoned incorrectly and believed that stealing his neighbor's money is the best thing to do. However, if he were an expert on the human good (happiness), if, in other words, he knew what is good and bad for him, he would never do wrong. His knowledge would sufficiently motivate him to always act well.⁴¹ Socratic intellectualism comes down to the idea that if we are smart, we act well and lead a happy life; if we are ignorant, we act badly and are miserable.

What is missing in this short story of the Socratic generation of actions is any reference to any particular desires that are not brought about by our belief that a certain action is best to do. What is also missing is any reference to 'emotions,' pleasure, and pain. Many interpreters have, therefore, charged Socrates with erasing, ignoring, disregarding, or omitting our emotional, affective, or non-rational mental states:

Aristotle: "According to Socrates, all the virtues come about in the reasoning part of the soul (λογιστικῶν); from which it follows that in making the virtues pieces of knowledge (ἐπιστήμας), he does away with (ἀναιρεῖν) our non-rational part (ἄλογον), and thus **does away with** both *pathos* and the moral character (ἦθος). Clearly then this was not the right way to deal with the virtues." (MM 1182a15-23)⁴²

Fierro: "Esta circunstancia problematiza la posibilidad de una efectiva realización, al menos de modo absoluto, del racionalismo moral y en consecuencia, podemos conjeturar, de una **erradicación** total de factores irracionales que pueden interferir en el logro de una condición racional en forma absoluta." (2012: 60)

Boeri: "Sócrates [...] propone un caso extremo consistente en **ignorar o no tener en cuenta** los componentes emocionales o afectivos de la psicología humana o, lo que es lo mismo, en reinterpretar tales componentes en términos de un juicio que describe lo que es bueno o malo." (2007: 45)

Kahn: "We are immediately struck by the total **disregard** of emotional, affective, or otherwise non-rational factors in human motivation. The only

⁴¹ See, for instance, Horn (2004: 168): "Dem Intellectualismus zufolge ergibt sich das angemessene oder richtige Handeln einer Person präzise aus ihrer vernünftigen Einsicht. Das bedeutet: Jemandes vernünftige Einsicht garantiert sein individuelles Gutsein und gutes Handeln, und dies sowohl im Sinne einer notwendigen als auch im Sinn einer hinreichenden Bedingung".

⁴² Irwin seems to agree with Aristotle on that point (1995: 75).

emotive consideration in the relevant sections of the *Gorgias*, *Meno*, and *Euthydemus* is the desire for happiness or a desire for the good.” (1996: 227)

Penner: “We find what to the modern reader must seem an almost total **omission** of the role of the irrational, of emotion or of moral evil in human life. 'If only we could *discuss* things for long enough, if only we could *understand* what is best,' Socrates seems to say, 'all would be well, and all conduct would be virtuous!' For Socrates, when people act badly or viciously or even just out of moral weakness, that will be merely a result of intellectual mistake.” (2000: 165)

Admittedly, the short story of the Socratic generation of actions does not mention any *pathemata* but a longer version surely must, given that *pathemata* certainly play a role in some of the actions we encounter in the Socratic dialogues. In the *Euthyphro*, for example, Euthyphro plans on prosecuting his father for having killed a slave, who himself killed another slave in drunkenness and anger (ὀργισθεὶς, 4c5). Anger also plays a central role in Socrates' prosecution in the *Apology*. The Athenians are angry (ὀργίζονται) with Socrates because he embarrassed and annoyed them (*Apol.* 23d). Socrates appeals to the judges not to cast their vote in anger (θεῖτο ἄν μετ'ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον, *Apol.* 34c7-d1). Further, Socrates gets convicted, he claims, because he lacked “shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) and the willingness to say to you [the judges] what you would most gladly have heard from me, lamentations and tears” (*Apol.* 38d). Fear and shame also dominate the discussion between Crito and Socrates about whether it is right to flee prison. Crito suspects that Socrates refuses to flee because he is afraid (φοβῆ) that Crito and everyone else who helps him to escape will be punished (*Crito* 44e-45b). He then tries to shame Socrates into fleeing: I feel ashamed (αἰσχύνομαι) for both you and us, Crito claims (*Crito* 45e-46a). In the *Laches*, Socrates discusses over the course of an entire dialogue what it means to be courageous in the face of pain, pleasure, epithumetic desire, and fear (191d, e). Further, Plato devotes an entire Socratic dialogue, the *Lysis*, to the investigation of attraction/being friendly (φιλέω). Socrates himself experiences a variety of *pathemata* in the *Charmides*. Socrates admits that he is afraid (φοβούμενος, 166d1) of

falsely thinking to know something and of conducting the examination of temperance incorrectly (φοβοίμην μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοποῖμεν, *Charm.* 172e). He later admits that he feared rightly (εἰκότως ἐδεδοίκη, *Charm.* 175a9). Besides fear, Socrates also experiences love or erotic desire (τὰ ἐρωτικά) when facing the handsome young Charmides for the first time (*Charm.* 155c-d). Finally, Socrates also acknowledges that children avoid burning (cauterization) and cutting (surgery) because these treatments are painful (ὅτι ἀλγεινόν, *Gorg.* 479a) and bring about intense pains (ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, 354b2). Criminals avoid punishment because it is painful (*Gorg.* 479a-c).

Pathemata (what interpreters above called emotional, affective, or non-rational states) are clearly present in the Socratic dialogues. They also play some role in the generation of some of our actions. Since we are happy if we live well, and since we live well if we act well, according to Socrates, *pathemata* play some role in our quest for happiness. But given Socratic intellectualism, which role can *pathemata* play in the generation of actions and in our quest for happiness? What follows are three papers on *pathemata* (understood in sense #3 as defined above, namely as motions of the soul that tend to be unruly and may need to be controlled and fought) in the Socratic dialogues. I will focus on the quartet pleasure, pain, fear, and epithumetic desire. The questions that I will investigate are:

1. What are pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear?
2. How do pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear contribute to the generation of our actions?
3. What are the consequences of our investigation for Socratic education?

In the next paper, I will focus on pain (and by extension pleasure). In my third paper, I will investigate epithumetic desire (especially appetite) and fear. Paper three will also discuss a

Socratic education program for two particular kinds of wrongdoers: the glutton and the coward. In paper four, I will turn to another kind of wrongdoer: the criminal. My question in paper four is: how should we respond to wrongdoing, according to Socrates? Which educational tools does Socrates regard as efficacious in treating wrongdoers?

The Socratic Core Beliefs

We all desire the good

Before we move on, we must better understand the restrictions that the Socratic core beliefs allegedly impose on the role of *pathemata* in the generation of actions. I will, therefore, now turn to a discussion of the Socratic core beliefs. Let us first investigate the claims that ‘we all desire the good’ and ‘we always do what we believe is best to do.’ What *exactly* does Socrates mean by that? Take ‘we all desire the good.’ Does “we” refer to all human beings or all living beings? What exactly does “desire” mean? Should we understand “desire” broadly as referring to all conative pro-attitudes or more narrowly as referring to a certain group or very narrowly as referring to one kind of conative pro-attitude? What is “the good”? Why the definitive article? Wouldn’t it be more natural and intuitive to claim that we all desire what is good?⁴³

My aim here is not to provide an extensive analysis of the Socratic core beliefs and their interpretations.⁴⁴ Rather my aim is to arrive at what I call a working understanding; an understanding of the claims that we can work with in our investigation of *pathemata*. I believe that

⁴³ Vogt (2017) helpfully distinguishes the ways in which the notion of “the good” is puzzling (2017: 13-40). When we talk about “the good,” are we talking about: (a) a single good X (e.g., wisdom)? (b) The life of X (e.g., wisdom)? (c) A life that contains a certain mixture of ingredients (e.g. wisdom and pleasure)? (d) A good that is different for humans and for other living beings? (e) A property? (f) A generic term that subsumes all value or one value among several values? A primary value? (g) An activity or something the agent can possess (e.g., do we desire to swim or health)?

⁴⁴ For such analyses of ‘we all desire the good’ see Barney (2010); Callard (2017); Penner, Rowe (1994).

the most workable understanding is one that stays close to the text and is minimally controversial. With that goal in mind, let us take a look at the passages from which interpreters have concluded that ‘we all desire the good’:

- (i) Everyone (πάντες) desires (ἐπιθυμεῖν) good things (τῶν ἀγαθῶν) (*Meno* 77c).
- (ii) We do everything we do because we pursue (διώκοντες) the good (Τὸ ἀγαθόν) (*Gorg.*468b1-2).
- (iii) They do everything (ἅπαντα) for the sake of the good (Ἔνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) (*Gorg.* 468b7-8).
- (iv) Everyone wants to be happy (εὐδαίμονες εἶναι προθυμούμεθα πάντες, *Euthd.* 282a). Everyone wishes to do well (πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν, *Euthd.* 278e3). We do well (εὖ πράττομεν) if we have lots of good things (εἰ ἡμῖν πολλὰ κάγαθὰ εἶη, *Euthd.* 279a2-3).
- (v) No one (οὐδεὶς) wants (βούλεται) bad things (τὰ κακὰ) (*Meno*78a).
- (vi) No one goes (ἔρχεται) willingly towards bad things or things he takes (οἶεται) to be bad (*Prot.*358d).
- (vii) It is not in human nature (ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει) to want to go (ἐθέλειν ἰέναι) towards things want one takes (οἶεται) to be bad (κακὰ) instead of good (ἀγαθῶν) (*Prot.* 358d).

A couple of things may help us to answer some of the questions raised above: (a) Socrates says we desire “the good” only in the *Gorgias* passages (i.e. (ii) and (iii)). In all other passages, he says that we desire “good things.”⁴⁵ (b) Socrates uses various terms for ‘desire’ such as ἐπιθυμεῖν, διώκοντες, βουλόμεθα, ἐθέλειν ἰέναι.⁴⁶ (c) All humans are equipped with the desire for the good

⁴⁵ Interestingly, the *Gorgias* is considered to be a transitional dialogue by some of those interpreters (Penner, Rowe) who rely heavily on the claim that Socrates says ‘we all desire the good,’ namely ‘the real good.’ In response they might say that this part of the *Gorgias* is Socratic, while others are transitional.

⁴⁶ For the same observation but more elaboration, see Barney (2010: 36): “Though some interpreters detect a distinction between *epithumein* and *boulesthai* [...], Plato himself seems to vary his terminology in order to emphasize its indifference: [...] he speaks not only of wanting [*boulesthai*] and desiring [*epithumein*] the good but also of loving [*erân*], pursuing [*diôkein*, *Rep.* 505e1], choosing [*haireisthai*, *Prot.* 358d2–3], hunting for, aiming at [*thêreuein*, *ephiesthai*, *Phil.* 20d8], and “being willing to go toward” [*ethelein ienai epi*, *Prot.* 358c6–d2] it. This gratuitous variation is a strong signal that we should understand the Desire thesis as one about motivation across the board: thus, following Plato, I will, for the most part, use ‘want,’ ‘desire,’ and so forth interchangeably.”

and good things. It is part of our human nature. (d) The good is final, in the sense that we do everything else for its sake. I take it that ‘the good’ is ‘doing well’ and ‘being happy’ for the following reason: the good is our final goal (we do everything else for its sake) and we all want to be happy. So, either ‘being happy’ is ‘the good’ (or part of it), i.e., our final goal, or it is an intermediate goal. If it were an intermediate goal, we would choose ‘being happy’ in order to get the good. But what is ‘the good,’ if being happy and living well are mere means to it? Not only does it seem plausible that the good is happiness, but it is also textually supported, though admittedly by a later, not Socratic dialogue. In the *Symposium*, Plato will identify happiness as the final goal (205a). I conclude that ‘the good’ is ‘being happy.’⁴⁷

My working understanding of the Socratic claim ‘we all desire the good’ is therefore: *all human beings desire* (where I understand ‘desire’ broadly as encompassing many conative pro-attitudes) *the good* (i.e., our final goal, which is doing well, being happy, the good life) *and good things* (things we do for the sake of the good; happiness-promoting things). In other words, we all want our lives to go well, and we take means towards that end.

At this point, we know that humans are motivated by good things. Good things are things of value. When we are motivated to act, there is something about that action that looks valuable to us; it is valuable because it contributes in some way to our final end (living well and being happy). From this, two questions arise: (1) is goodness the only value? Do we desire the good and good things only? Are there other things that are desirable? (2) How do things become valuable to us? Why do we take some things to be good and others to be bad? I will provide a tentative answer to both questions below.

⁴⁷ I take it to be relatively uncontroversial that the good is doing well and being happy. See, for instance, Segvic (2006: 180): “We, humans, are hardwired to seek our own good. What we want is, ultimately, to do well for ourselves. The striving for this condition of doing well, which Socrates calls “the good,” is something that every human soul comes equipped with.”

Is goodness the only value?

We desire the good—living well and being happy—and we want things that promote this end. These things are good things. Do we want anything else besides the good and good things? Take *x* as a placeholder for a value other than goodness; the following options seem feasible:

- (a) we have two final goals: we desire *the good* and *x*.
- (b) we have differently oriented intermediate goals. We desire things that promote the good and things that promote *x*.

Option (a) and (b) seem to go hand in hand. Here is why it does not really make sense to believe (b) without (a): if I have only one big goal, say traveling the world, then everything I do is for the sake of traveling the world. *Everything!* If I, therefore, do anything that I do not take to contribute *in any way*, not even in the very, very long run to my traveling the world (i.e., if I have other intermediate goals), then I must value something else besides traveling the world (i.e., I must have another final goal). Here is why it does not really make sense to believe (a) without (b): if I have two big goals in my life, say traveling the world and writing a book, then it would be odd if I only wanted things that promote one of my big goals, say traveling the world. I am not saying that it would be odd if I never *did* anything to get closer to writing a book. There might be very good reasons for why I never acted on my desire to, for example, contact a publisher. I am saying that it would be odd if I never even wanted anything that would bring me closer to writing a book. Our question is then: does Socrates believe that we have more than one big goal in life besides being happy? Is there any evidence for Socrates' believing that we do some things because we take them to promote final goals other than the good?

Besides goodness, the protagonists in the Socratic dialogues also value justice, beauty, piety, and pleasure.⁴⁸ Do we value these things because we take them to be good/happiness-

⁴⁸ For the triad of goodness, justice, beauty see *Crito* 48b, *Euthyphro* 7d. For pleasure see *Charm.*167e; *Prot.* 353cff..

promoting, or do we value them for some other, happiness-unrelated reason?⁴⁹ Regarding justice and beauty, Socrates seems to believe that justice, beauty and the good are not competing goods, for he claims that the good life, the beautiful life, the just life are the same.⁵⁰ Piety, by contrast, seems to derive its value from goodness, as Vogt points out: “Gods evaluate actions as pious when they find them to be good/just, and humans think their actions merit being approved by the gods as pious if they are good/just and performed in a context that interests the gods.”⁵¹ Socrates allows a “plurality of values,” Vogt explains further, but goodness seems to be the most “fundamental value.” I conclude that justice, beauty, and piety are not values competing with the good. Justice, beauty, and piety are not final goals next to and independent from the good.

How about pleasure? Could pleasure be a final goal next to the good? Let me here sketch two reasons (which we will further explore in chapter two) for the claim that we value pleasure and want pleasant things because we take them to be good and happiness-promoting:

1. Socrates says that we do *everything* for the sake of the good (*Gorg.* 500a). If we do *everything* for the sake of the good, we cannot do *some things* for the sake of something else such as pleasure. Pleasure is sought for the sake of the good (*Gorg.* 506c).
2. If there were a plurality of final goals, we would risk psychological conflict in the knowledgeable person. The knowledgeable person may find herself desiring to do one thing that is pleasant and another thing that is good. Such a psychological conflict would make the soul disharmonious. But Socrates claims that the knowledgeable person’s soul is harmonious (*Prot.* 356d-e). We, therefore, cannot have a plurality of final goals.

Having two final goals is one too many, I argue. One might worry, though, about the opposite problem: for some agents, one final goal seems to be one too many. Consider, for example,

⁴⁹ Note that this other, happiness-unrelated reason must not make one miserable because no one wants to be miserable.

⁵⁰ Τὸ δὲ εὖ [ζῆν] καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει; (*Crito* 48b). Is the good the same as justice and beauty?

⁵¹ Vogt 2017: 87-8.

severely depressed or suicidal agents. Does it make sense to say that they, too, desire the good and want to live well and be happy? We do not know for sure what Socrates would say about these agents, but one plausible response is that Socrates has agents with a typical motivational set-up in mind. When he claims that we all desire to live well, he captures a “psychological typical” but not a necessary condition.⁵² Some agents may not care about how their lives go. But that is not our typical motivational set-up.⁵³

How do things become valuable to us?

Traditionally, interpreters of the Socratic dialogues have focused on two ways of accessing value, namely our fundamental desire for the good and deliberation (or reasoning). ‘The good’ is valuable to us because we come equipped with a fundamental desire for it. Other things are valuable to us because we believe that they are good. We have deliberated or reasoned—at least in a very basic way of which even animals are capable of—that they are means to the good; once they have been identified as means to the good, they are valuable to us.⁵⁴ Interpreters seem to have focused on

⁵² I here borrow Vogt’s explanation of depressed agents in Aristotle.

⁵³ “When Aristotle says that everyone desires his or her life to go well, he need not be taken to make a necessary claim, neither about rational agents nor about human agents. It is, or so we think today, possible not to want one’s life to go well. [...] The desire to have one’s life go well, though psychologically typical, is contingent rather than necessary. It is possible to be in a psychological state where characteristic patterns of motivation break down. In such a condition, say, severe depression, an agent may no longer care about the way her life goes” (Vogt 2017: 141)

⁵⁴ The deliberation process that some interpreters envision seems to be rather demanding. See, for instance, Penner (2011: 261-2): “The resulting Socratic psychology of action is a belief/desire theory, treating every motivated action as determined by the mutual interaction of two elements. First, we have the generalized desire for good (that is, for happiness), which is the prime mover of every human action whatever, and which in that capacity takes the form of a desire to do whatever particular action is best—that is, whatever particular action turns out to be the best means available in the circumstances to the maximum of the good, or end, of happiness. We may call this a “whatever” desire. Second, we have a belief about which particular action will best produce this good or end. This belief results from a synthesizing of the agent’s current beliefs and perceptions (about that final end, about the courses of action available in one’s particular circumstances, and about what kinds of things are means to what). The deliberative process (whether consciously articulated or not) may be represented as follows: Starting with the final end, happiness, one initially wants whatever action is the best means available to the greatest amount of such happiness as turns out to be available in the circumstances. This “whatever-desire” is the generalized desire to do what will be best for

belief and deliberation because they take Socrates to claim that ‘we always do what we believe is best to do’ in the following passages:

We all do what we ‘believe’ is best to do:

- (i) no one who knows/sees (εἰδὼς) or takes it (οἰόμενος) that he could do something better (βελτίω) than what he does, then does these things, when it was possible to do the better (things) (*Prot.* 358b7-8).
- (ii) if he is forced to choose between one of two bad things, no one will choose the greater if he is able to choose the lesser (*Prot.* 358d)

I am more cautious about extracting from these passages that we all do what we ‘believe’ is best to do for two reasons. First, ‘believe’ may not be an accurate translation of εἰδὼς or οἰόμενος. The verb εἰδὼς comes from οἶδα and may be translated as ‘seeing’ or more narrowly as ‘seeing with the mind’s eye.’ The verb οἴομαι comes from οἶω, which, according to Vox Griego, can not only be translated as creer (believe), pensar (think), suponer (suppose), sospechar (suspect), but also as presentir (feel), desear (wish), anhelar (long for). We can find a similarly broad spectrum of possible translations for οἴομαι in Bailey: penser (think), s’imaginer (imagine), avoir le pressentiment de quelque chose, de favorable/mauvais, d’ou espérer (have a presentiment, i.e., an intuitive feeling about something favorable or bad, about something that one hopes for). I cannot here provide a conceptual analysis of οἶδα and οἴομαι in order to determine which translation is most likely in those two passages quoted above. All I aimed to show was that we should not take for granted that ‘believe’ is the best translation of οἶδα and οἴομαι.⁵⁵

gaining this end, present as starting-point in every action whatever. [...] Once having arrived at the belief as to which is the best course of action, the agent integrates that belief into the “whatever” desire which set the whole process in motion, by substituting this particular course of action for the “whatever” in the generalized desire.”

⁵⁵ In support of my suspicion that ‘believe’ may not be the best translation, see Schwab and Moss (2019). They argue that our term ‘belief’ is a poor translation of any of Plato’s cognitive terms, especially of *doxa*: “at least up until his late dialogue the *Theaetetus* Plato shows no signs of using the concept of belief”. If Schwab and Moss are right, Socratic actions do not require a ‘belief’ about what is best to do; other, cognitively lower states may be sufficient.

Second, *even if* ‘believe’ is an accurate translation of οἶδα and/or οἶομαι, Socrates does not say anything about how beliefs about value are formed. Maybe it is true that every action requires that the agent holds the belief that this action is best to do. But that leaves room for there being non-deliberative ways to acquire beliefs. We may deliberate and reason about what is best to do, but we may also *avoir le presentiment* (have an intuitive feeling) about what is best to do.

In the next chapters, I aim to build a case for the hypothesis that a Socratic psychology of actions allows for different ways of accessing value and for things becoming valuable to us. A certain thing *x* may be valuable to us (and we then want it) because we come equipped with a *desire* for *x* (as in the case of the good); we may *see* that it is good (as in the case of beauty); we may *feel* that it is good through feeling pleasure, or feeling friendly (φιλεῖν) and we may feel that something is bad through feeling pain or indignation (μισεῖν); we may *deliberate* that something is good (as in the case of the prudent thing to do such as taking medicine).⁵⁶ Hence, I will modify the second Socratic core belief “we always do what we *believe* is best to do” to:

“all human beings do what they take to be best to do.”

I understand ‘taking to be’ broadly as encompassing many mental states such as belief, perception, appearances, imagination, *pathemata*. I propose that what I take to be best may not be the result of deliberation about happiness and what I want in life.

⁵⁶ For two contemporary defenses of perceiving or feeling value see Chappell and Helm. Chappell (2008) argues that we can perceive value: “Moral properties can be just what many other properties are: patterns in reality. And our knowledge of moral properties can be representational perception, in just the sense that [...] seeing that a cliff is dangerous can be representational perception.” I can see that something is bad, just like I can see that something is dangerous. Helm (2002) has argued that we can feel value (pleasure and pain are felt evaluations). See also Hume: “There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth examination, concerning the general foundation of morals; whether they be derived from reason, or from sentiment; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound judgment of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species” (*Principles of Morals* 1.3).

In what follows, I will maintain that we have only one big goal in life (or final desire, or fundamental value) namely the desire for the good, i.e., being happy.⁵⁷ We do everything we do because we take it to promote our happiness in some way. I will propose, however, that we can detect which things are happiness-promoting and valuable in many ways. Things become valuable to us not only via our fundamental desire and via reasoning or belief, but also via perception and *pathemata*.

If I am on the right track, then a Socratic program of education ought to include *pathemata* in the following two ways.

- (1) *Pathemata* can support the education progress by making us feel value. Pain and shame, for example, can make us feel that certain actions are bad.
- (2) *Pathemata* can impair the education progress. If our *pathemata* are not well-oriented (if, for example, I feel shame about helping others and pride in harming them), then they can prevent me from making intellectual progress and, thereby, they can keep me from being happy and leading a good life.

In my fourth paper, I will touch on the first way and show that a Socratic therapy of certain criminal wrongdoers ought to make use of their *pathemata*, specifically pain. In my third paper, I will touch on the second way and show that a Socratic therapy of the glutton and the coward needs to consider their wrongly-oriented *pathemata* appetite and fear. I will show that Socratic education

⁵⁷ I here cannot investigate what the good life is nor which things are happiness-promoting. Let me say only what I take to be uncontroversial: the only thing that *reliably* promotes our well-being is knowledge (*Euthd.* 282a, *Prot.* 356d-e; in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates switches from wisdom (σοφία) to knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)), more precisely the knowledge of what is good and bad for humans. One must become an expert on what it means to live well in order to live well. If you are an expert on human well-being, then you can use any other means (health, wealth etc.) such that it reliably promotes your well-being. Knowledge is, then, the only reliable good means, but that does not tell us much about what the good end consists in. Acquiring knowledge is presumably part of a happy life, but is it the only part? Further, Socrates only says that wisdom is good (*Euthd.* 281e4-5: ἡ σοφία ἀγαθόν), but not that it is ‘the good.’ It seems to me that it is all but obvious who is happy, according to Socrates. Does the awfully sick, but very knowledgeable person lead a happy life? Does the awfully lonely but very knowledgeable hermit lead a happy life? Does the one who is very knowledgeable about human well-being, but somehow remained ignorant about the basics of geometry lead a happy life?

includes non-argumentative means of education such as painful punishment (in the case of certain criminal wrongdoers) and de-sensitivity training (in the case of certain gluttons). Further, given that *pathemata* are motions of the soul, other plausible means of non-argumentative education are rhythmic activities, i.e., activities that influence the motions of our soul, such as music and repeating rhymes. Singing certain songs, for example, seems to make us less fearsome; repeating incantations can make desires less violent. I will have to leave an investigation of such rhythmic means of education for future investigations.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Let me add some thoughts that motivate moving into that direction: (1) On repeating beliefs like incantations see *Phaed.* 114d. (2) On music as a means of education in Plato and Aristotle see Woerther (2008), Cooper (2009). For gymnastics see Kamtekar (2010). (3) For an interesting passage in Aristotle see *Prior Analytics* 70b: “It is possible to infer character from physical features, if it is granted that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural affections (No doubt by learning music a man has made some change in his soul, but this is not one of those affections which are natural to us; but rather such natural motions as anger and desire.)”.

WHY DO ITCHES ITCH?

Bodily Pain in the Socratic Theory of Motivation

Abstract: Imagine that Socrates gets a cavity treatment. The drilling is painful, but he also knows that it is best to get it done and so he stays. Callicles is not so smart. Once the dentist starts drilling, Callicles takes off. I argue that this scenario presents a puzzle that interpreters have missed, namely: why does Socrates have an aversion to pain? To us, this might not be puzzling at all. Socrates, however, believes that we have an aversion only to bad things and that pain is not in fact bad. If Socrates knows that pain is not bad, why does he still feel aversive pain from drilling? I argue that the *Protagoras* and *Hippias Major* suggest that pain immediately appears to be bad to us. So even though pain is not in fact bad, it appears that way, and thus even Socrates has an aversion to it. Pain is a felt evaluation. My interpretation contributes to the debates in the literature in two ways. First, it fills an explanatory gap. Interpreters have acknowledged that a Socratic theory of motivation has room for pain aversions as “itches,” but they leave unexplained why we have an aversion to pain, i.e., why those itches itch. Second, I offer an alternative account of Socratic motivation by proposing that pain aversions can motivate some of our actions.

According to the Socratic theory of motivation, we all have one general, overarching desire for *the good*, which is happiness, and we all have one general, overarching aversion to *the bad*, which is misery.⁵⁹ We all desire happiness; no one wants to be miserable.⁶⁰ In addition to our two general, overarching motivations – our desire for the good and our aversion to the bad – we

⁵⁹ By ‘Socratic theory of motivation,’ I mean the theory we aim to reconstruct based on what Socrates says in the following dialogues: *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Protagoras*, *Ion*, *Hippias Minor* and *Major*, and *Gorgias*. What unifies this group is that they are all pre-*Republic* dialogues, and that they have been taken to present the Socratic philosophy (see e.g., Penner 1992: 124; Resthoko 2006: 11-3; Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 18, 248-258; though some have argued that parts of the *Gorgias* and *Meno* are un-Socratic). For a helpful discussion of which dialogues we should count as ‘Socratic’ see Rowe (2002).

⁶⁰ ‘Happiness’ should be understood as ‘objective well-being,’ i.e., ‘leading an objectively good life, living virtuously,’ and not in the modern sense of ‘subjective well-feeling’ (*Crito* 48b, *Gorg.* 497a). Socrates does not explicitly identify the good with happiness (but Plato will in *Symp.* 205a.), but he strongly indicates it when he says that “we all want to be happy” (εὐδαιμόνες μὲν εἶναι προθυμούμεθα πάντες, *Euthd.* 282a) or “do well” (εὖ πράττειν, *Euthd.* 278e), and that “the end of all action is the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), for the sake of which we do everything else” (*Gorg.* 500a). Arguably, happiness is our final goal, the thing for which we do everything else. For other, later passages see *Rep.* 505e, *Phil.* 20d, *Theat.* 175c-d).

also have desires for and aversions to specific things. For example, sometimes we desire to socialize with friends, finish an essay, or eat a sandwich. The question that is at the center of this paper is: how do desires for and aversions to specific things or actions come about in Socratic psychology?

Socrates believes that the objects of our particular desires are things or activities we take to be good: “all men want good things” (τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν), as he argues in the *Meno* (77c). The connection between particular things and our overarching desire for the good (happiness) seems to be that those particular things are good—i.e., that they promote our happiness. As Socrates explains to Meno:

Is there anyone who wants to be miserable and evil-spirited (βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι)? – No, it doesn’t seem to me, Socrates. – No one then wants bad things (βούλεται τὰ κακὰ), Meno, if he does not want to be such. For what else is being miserable but to desire bad things (ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν) and possess them? – You are probably right, Socrates, and no one wants bad things (οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακὰ, *Meno* 78a4-b2).^{61,62}

For Socrates, we are motivated by things that are of value to us.⁶³ Particular things become the object of our desire if we take them to be good. For my purposes, “taking to be good” can mean believing that something is good, but it also encompasses other mental states such as noticing or perceiving. I therefore propose the following *Socratic Principle of Motivation*: I want *x* because I take *x* to be good, i.e., happiness-promoting; I have an aversion to *y* because I take *y* to be bad, i.e., happiness-diminishing.⁶⁴

⁶¹ All translations are mine, though I consulted the those in Cooper (1997).

⁶² See also: “We become happy by getting good things” (*Euthd.* 178e), and *Prot.* 358c-d, *Gorg.* 468b-c.

⁶³ I use ‘motivation’ to refer broadly to conative attitudes (such as desire, aversion, attraction, wanting), I will use ‘aversion’ to refer to conative con-attitudes, and I will use ‘desire,’ ‘attraction,’ and ‘wanting’ interchangeably to refer to conative pro-attitudes.

⁶⁴ What I call *The Socratic Principle of Motivation* is known, in contemporary philosophy, as *The Guise of the Good* doctrine (see Orsi 2015: 714).

How do things become of value to us? Why do we take some things to be good and others to be bad? Sometimes things become valuable to us because we reason that they will help us meet a particular end (i.e., they become valuable to us through means-end reasoning). I may deliberate, for example, about whether socializing with friends tonight would promote or diminish my happiness. If I conclude that it would promote my happiness, I label “socializing with friends” as “good,” and then I desire it. If I conclude that it would diminish my happiness, I label it as “bad,” and then I have an aversion to it. Consider also the example of wanting to take foul-tasting medicine. I want to take medicine because I have reasoned that taking it is good.⁶⁵ My reasoning process is likely to include comparing and measuring goods and bads (*Prot.* 358d): the taste the medicine is undesirable, but it will make me feel better, and thereby it will promote my overall happiness rather than diminish it. Socrates would probably also acknowledge that many things have value to us because we remember them to be good.⁶⁶ Means-end reasoning, measuring, and remembering are three ways for things to become valuable to us.

Now consider the experience of current pain from drilling at the dentist. Most people have an immediate aversion to pain, i.e., they do not want to be in pain.⁶⁷ Given the *Socratic Principle of Motivation*, if we do not want to be in pain, pain must be of negative value to us. But how does pain become of negative value? How does pain receive the label “bad”? It is not, I believe, because we concluded that pain is bad after having reasoned about whether bodily pain promotes or diminishes our happiness. Reasoning—even the most simple and basic kind of reasoning—cannot account for our aversion to bodily pain because our aversion arises *immediately*. There is simply

⁶⁵ In the *Gorgias*, Socrates claims that we do not want (βούλεται) means but only ends (467c-e). Accordingly, we would not want to take medicine but to be healthy. This claim is quite puzzling because there is surely a sense in which we want means. Kamtekar suggests that we understand ‘want’ here as ‘prefer’: “one prefers the end [...]. [W]anting the end is the basis for a derivative desire, to do actions which are means to the end” (2018: 85).

⁶⁶ As Plato will say in *Phil.* 35c-d.

⁶⁷ Some people may not have an immediate aversion to pain. More about those people later.

no time for reason to figure out whether bodily pain diminishes our happiness. Further, the immediacy of our pain aversion cannot be explained through memory. One may say that we concluded in the past that pain diminishes our happiness, and that is why we have an immediate aversion when we now experience painful drilling. But that explanation is implausible since our very first pain experiences were already aversive.

Interpreters of Socratic psychology acknowledge that we have an aversion to pain. They also acknowledge that pain aversions, along with emotions, appetites, and desires for pleasure, do not arise out of reason. Instead, interpreters classify these states as “hankerings, itches, or drives,”⁶⁸ “longings, drives, urges, and raw desires,”⁶⁹ or simply as “attractions and aversions.”⁷⁰ They distinguish these kinds of “itches” from desires “to do some particular thing,” i.e., from action-causing desires, and they reserve the term “motivation” for these action-causing desires. Action-causing desires, unlike pain aversions and other “itches,” do arise out of reasoning about what is best to do.⁷¹ First, we reason about what is best to do; then we form a belief that a certain action is best, and this belief gives rise to a desire which motivates an action.

According to this account, when someone experiences painful drilling at the dentist and deliberates about what to do, she entertains all kinds of information such as that leaving the office would be easy because the door is right there and wide open; but also that the procedure is already paid for. Her pain-itch, her aversion to the painful drilling, is simply another piece of information she entertains when deliberating about what to do. Our pain-itches may influence or, according to some interpreters, even cause some of our beliefs, but they do not motivate actions. All interpreters

⁶⁸ Penner (1991: 201, n.45).

⁶⁹ Reshotko (2006: 76-7, 84-8).

⁷⁰ Singpurwalla (2006: 249), Brickhouse and Smith (2015: 14).

⁷¹ Penner (1991: 201, n. 45; 2011: 261-2), Rowe (2012: 305-7), Reshotko (2006: 33-34, 39-40, 86).

seem to agree that the agent's motivation for either staying at the dentist or taking off results from reasoning about what is best to do.⁷²

I see two problems with these existing interpretations. First, they leave an explanatory gap. In the existing accounts, pain aversions are not full-fledged motivations. Yet, they have motivational flavor – after all, they are “itches,” and what is an itch if it does not make us want to scratch it?⁷³ I believe that we should try to give a Socratic explanation for why pain has any motivational flavor, i.e., we should try to explain why pain is aversive or why pain-itches itch. Second, it seems implausible that pain is merely an itch, and that this itch contributes to the generation of our actions just as one piece of information among many. What is it about pain that renders it motivationally deficient? What justifies its classification as merely an itch? It seems to me that pain aversions can play a more motivationally robust role in the generation of actions. I argue that, sometimes and for certain agents, pain is not just an itch, but it is actually a motivation for action. Some people leave the dentist because they do not want to be in pain, and this immediate motivation precedes any further deliberation about what would be best to do.

Interpreters worry that if we classify pain as motivational and thus as more than just an itch, pain would then compete with those desires that arise out of reasoning. This competition between our reasoned desire and our pain aversion would be troublesome because it would violate the following four Socratic core beliefs:

⁷² Penner, Rowe, and Reshotko on the one hand, and Brickhouse and Smith on the other are usually taken to argue for opposing interpretations. It is worth noting, though, that Brickhouse and Smith agree with Penner, Rowe, and Reshotko that attractions and aversions are not action-causing motivations (see Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 52, n.6; 2012: 238). They disagree over how influential attractions and aversions are. Brickhouse and Smith argue that our attractions and aversions can *cause* beliefs (2010: 71, 80; 2015: 11), while Penner (2011) and Reshotko (2006: 85-6) deny that. Thanks to Nicholas Smith for many helpful discussions of those interpretative differences.

⁷³ I borrow “motivational flavor” from Emily Fletcher (in her comments on an earlier version of this paper for the Central APA 2018).

4. We always desire the good (*Gorg.*468b) and things we take to be good (*Prot.* 358d; *Meno.* 77c-78b).⁷⁴
5. We always do what we believe is best to do (*Prot.* 358b-d).
6. All wrongdoing is due to ignorance (*Prot.*357c-e, 360c-e; *Lach.* 194d).
7. The knowledgeable person's soul is harmonious (*Prot.* 356e).

If pain were more than an itch, it seems that we would not always desire good things and have an aversion to bad things; instead, sometimes we would desire pleasure and have an aversion to pain, regardless of any consideration of the good. This violates the first Socratic core belief. Further, it would be possible that pain causes us to act against our beliefs about what is best to do (thus violating the second core belief). In that case, some wrongdoing may not be the result of ignorance, but instead of a strong aversion to pain (a violation of core belief three). Finally, a competition between reasoned desire and pain aversion could potentially render the knowledgeable person's soul disharmonious (a violation of belief number four).⁷⁵

I agree that it may seem problematic to make room for pain aversions that are motivationally more robust while holding on to the four Socratic core beliefs. But I argue that this problem only arises if we give pain a motivational force that is independent of badness. There are two general strategies one could use to explain pain aversion: (1) we might say that pain is aversive because it has a relation to our general, overarching aversion to badness. Or (2) one might instead argue that we have an intrinsic aversion to pain which is independent of badness. This second

⁷⁴ Interpreters disagree on what exactly Socrates means when he says 'we all desire the good or good things.' Does Socrates mean that (i) we all desire what *seems* or what we *take* to be good, or (ii) we all desire the *real* good, or (iii) both? Option (i) is best supported in *Meno* 77-8, option (ii) in *Gorg.* 466dff. I believe that a version of (iii) is right. My tentative interpretation is that our general, overarching desire is for the *real* good, but our particular desires are for what we *take* to be good, which may not be what is actually good. For a helpful discussion of the different interpretative options see Barney (2007), Callard (2017), Wolfsdorf (2008: 29ff).

⁷⁵ For some of these worries see Penner (1991: 201, n.45): "So long as (a) the ἐπιθυμία for pleasure in the *Charmides* is only a hankering, itch, or drive for pleasure, and (b) mere hankering, itches, or drives cannot automatically result in action when put together with a belief, then it will remain true for Socrates that all desires to do some particular action will be the product of desire for good." See also Irwin (1977: 128), Carone (2004: 89), Singpurwalla (2006: 244).

explanation indeed violates the four core Socratic beliefs: if we have an intrinsic aversion to pain, then we do not have one overarching, final aversion to badness; instead we have two aversions, one to pain and one to badness. This would also mean that we do not have one overarching, final desire for goodness, but two separate desires, for pleasure and for goodness. An intrinsic aversion to pain is thus inconsistent with Socratic thought. But I will argue that the first explanation offered above—that pain is aversive because it relates to our general, overarching aversion to badness—is in fact compatible with the four Socratic core beliefs. This argument allows us to understand how pain can have a motivational flavor and how pain can be more than just an “itch.”

My interpretation has two parts, based on the two problems with existing interpretations that I have identified above. First, I will fill the explanatory gap. I will offer a Socratic explanation for why we have an immediate aversion when we experience bodily pain.⁷⁶ In other words, I will offer a Socratic explanation for why our pain-itches itch. I will argue that bodily pain is immediately aversive because it immediately appears to be bad; we are hard-wired to perceive pain as bad. I take this part to be compatible with many existing interpretations. Second, I aim to offer a more plausible Socratic account of motivation. I will argue that bodily pain can be more than an itch. Pain can play a more robust motivational role in the generation of intentional actions because it can be the final motivation of an action.⁷⁷ Here, I depart from existing interpretations.

⁷⁶ I aim to give an account of *bodily* pain only, but I believe that we can apply parts of my account to *psychological* pain as well. I will outline some potential applications below.

⁷⁷ My focus will be on intentional actions (e.g., going to the freezer to get some ice after having burned my hand) not reflexes (e.g., reflexively withdrawing my hand from the hot stove).

Part one: Why do most people not want to be in pain?

It is an empirical fact that most people do not want to be in pain. But there are some exceptions, the so-called asymbolics. Asymbolics are people for whom pain is not aversive. When the asymbolic experiences drilling at the dentist, for example, she does not have an immediate aversion, and yet she refers to her experience as ‘pain.’ Contemporary philosophers have responded to the existence of pain asymbolia in two ways. Some have concluded that pain and motivation (aversion, disagreeableness, unpleasantness) can come apart. ‘Pain’ refers only to the perceptual, sensory information of bodily damage. Motivation is separable from pain. Others have concluded that asymbolics falsely refer to their motivationally neutral experience of bodily damage as ‘pain.’ ‘Pain’ implies a motivational component. Consequently, those who receive cavity treatment and do not have an aversion are not in pain.⁷⁸

In this paper, I am not concerned with the *conceptual analysis* of ‘pain,’ i.e., I will not investigate whether the term ‘pain’ necessarily refers to a motivational state in the Socratic dialogues.⁷⁹ Instead, I will focus on the *empirical* fact that most people do not want to be in pain. Socrates, I take it, acknowledges the empirical connection between pain and motivation when he says that children avoid burning (cauterization) and cutting (surgery) because those treatments are painful (*Gorg.* 479a9: ὅτι ἀλγεινόν) and bring about the most intense pains (*Prot.* 354b2: ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας καὶ ἀλγηδόνας), and criminals avoid punishment because it is painful (*Gorg.* 479a-c).

⁷⁸ For a helpful discussion of the two accounts see Bain (2013).

⁷⁹ The textual basis for a conceptual analysis of ‘pain’ (the Greek terms translated as ‘pain’ are λύπη, ἀνία, ἀλγηδών, ὀδύνη, ἀχθηδών) in the Platonic corpus is very slim. The etymological investigations in the *Cratylus* (419b ff.) give some insight, though not on whether ‘pain’ implies motivation: λύπη comes from the dissolution of the body (τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος), ἀνία is the hindrance of motion (ἐμποδίζον τοῦ ἰέναι), ἀλγηδών comes from painful (ἀλγεινοῦ), ὀδύνη from the entry of pain (ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης), and ἀχθηδών from carrying a weight (τῷ τῆς φορᾶς βάρει).

It is an empirical fact that pain is aversive for most people and that our aversion to pain can influence our actions.⁸⁰

How could Socrates explain our aversion to pain? Earlier, I proposed an argument along the following lines: (i) we are motivated only by things that are of value to us; (ii) pain is aversive (has motivational flavor); (iii) therefore, pain is of value to us. Let me now point to some initial evidence for the idea that bodily pain has some relation to badness. It seems reasonable that pain is connected to badness because bodily pain indicates a physical disturbance or damage, and Socrates believes that physical health is good (ὕγεια ἀγαθόν, *Lys.* 219a4) and disease is bad (νόσος κακόν).⁸¹ Health is a good or excellent state of the body (εὐεξία τῶν σωμάτων, *Prot.* 354b3-4; ἀρετὴ σώματος, *Gorg.* 479b4).⁸² If our body is in a terrible condition, our life is bad (*Gorg.* 505a) and in some cases not even worth living (*Crito* 47e). It seems, then, that bodily pain is connected to badness in virtue of diseases being bad. Correspondingly, bodily pleasure is connected to goodness in virtue of bodily health being good.

Our central question is: how does pain become of negative value to us? Which mental state establishes the relation between pain and badness? It cannot be reasoning, as I maintain, because pain is *immediately* aversive. When we experience drilling, we immediately feel aversive pain. There is no time for reason to figure out whether pain promotes or diminishes our happiness. What we need is a mental state that can account for pain's being *immediately* motivational. I propose the following two mental states as candidates for establishing the relation between pain and badness:

⁸⁰ See also *Charm.* 156b, *Lach.* 191 d-e.

⁸¹ *Charm.* 164a9-b1; *Gorg.* 467e4-5.

⁸² See also *Gorg.* 504c.

- (a) *Immediately Evaluative Perceptual Appearances*: when I experience pain, pain is immediately represented as bad. I have the immediate appearance of it's being bad, and that is why pain is aversive.⁸³
- (b) *Immediately Evaluative Beliefs*: when I experience pain, I immediately form the belief that pain is bad, and that is why pain is aversive.

I will argue that we have textual and philosophical support for option (a), which says that pain is motivational because it immediately appears to be bad to us. Option (a) is textually supported by the *Hippias Major* and the *Protagoras*; its philosophical support stems from its being more plausible, as I will show. My interpretation maintains the *Socratic Principle of Motivation*, that we only desire that which we take to be good. I will propose that there are different ways of 'taking something to be good'; reasoning is not the only way for things or actions to become of value to us. Some things are immediately evaluated because they appear good or bad when we perceive them.

Immediately Evaluative Perceptual Appearances

How does bodily pain become evaluative? I propose that the agent first has a disturbance of the natural state of her body. In the later dialogues, Plato will explicitly say that pain arises when we notice that the good state of our body is disrupted, and that pleasure arises when we notice that the good state is restored.⁸⁴ We can find traces of that view already in the Socratic dialogues when

⁸³ I call the kind of appearances I am interested in "perceptual appearances" to avoid confusion with what I call "higher order appearances." "Perceptual appearances" arise from perception; "higher order appearances" involve cognitively states higher than perception such as beliefs or memories. In the *Gorgias*, for example, confiscating the citizens' property appears to be good (ἂ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς, 467a3, a5; 468d4) or best (αὐτοῖς δόξη βέλτιστον εἶναι, 466e2; 467b3-4) to the tyrant probably because he believes that owning property is good.

⁸⁴ *Phil.* 31d, *Rep.* 585d.

Socrates says that health is a good or excellent state of the body (*Prot.* 354b3-4; *Gorg.* 479b4), and that we must like what belongs to us by nature (φύσει οἰκεῖον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν φιλεῖν. *Lys.* 221e-222a). A Hippocratic might further describe this natural, good state of the body as the balance of bodily fluids.⁸⁵ We have good evidence that Plato was influenced by Hippocratic explanations, most notably in the *Timaeus*, where he explains that sexual intemperance is caused by a particular fluid that renders the body moist (*Tim.* 86d-e).⁸⁶ Unfortunately, Socrates does not explicitly support Hippocratic theories in the early dialogues. However, we know that Socrates was familiar with them – he mentions Hippocrates, for example, in *Prot.* 311b – and therefore we have some reason to believe that his account of pleasure and pain may have been influenced by physiological explanations à la Hippocrates.

After there has been a disturbance of the natural state of the body, this disturbance must be perceived in order to give rise to pain. Some disturbances of our body remain unnoticed, in which case we do not experience pain. Again, our best textual support for this comes from the later dialogues,⁸⁷ but we can find traces of that view already in earlier dialogues. In *Hippias Major* 198d-299a, Socrates and Hippias discuss sensory pleasures and things that are pleasant according to the senses (κατὰ αἰσθήσεις). They have just established that ‘fine things’ are fine because they are pleasant according to the senses of hearing and sight. Socrates imagines their opponent saying:

⁸⁵ We can find at least three different explanations of pain in the Hippocratic writings. Some believe that we are in pain when (a) breath (φύσαζ) pierces the flesh (*On Breaths*: 9.1-12); (b) others when one of our bodily fluids gets separated from the others (*Ancient Medicine*: 14.23-28); (c) and others again when we have an excess or deficiency of hot or cold (*Places in Man*: 42.1-10). According to all three explanations, pain is caused by certain physiological conditions. As Longrigg explains, this idea was progressive at Socrates’ time. Before Hippocrates, diseases and pains were explained with reference to gods and divine intervention, and supernatural practices were thought to cure patients. Hippocrates revolutionized the history of medicine with his “entirely rational outlook towards disease” (Longrigg 1989: 3). I propose that we attribute such a “rational outlook” to Socrates.

⁸⁶ I take Plato’s explanation to be in the Hippocratic spirit because it provides a physiological cause for sexual overindulgence. However, I also believe that the Hippocratics may disagree with Plato on the details of his explanation since they believe that old (and presumably sexually less active) bodies are moist (*Regimen in Health* 2). For more passages in which Plato seems to echo Hippocrates see *Symp.* 185d-188e, *Phdr.* 270c, *Charm.* 156b-e. For an interesting discussion of these passages see Demont (2008) and Candiotta (2016).

⁸⁷ *Phil.* 43b, *Tim.* 65a.

“What, Hippias and Socrates? Do you distinguish the sort of pleasant you call fine [καλὸν, i.e., pleasures from hearing, sight] from the pleasant, and do you say that what is pleasant *according to the other senses* [κατὰ αἰσθήσεις; the other senses being touch, taste, smell] is not fine – food and drink, what comes with making love, and all the rest of that sort of thing?”
(*Hippias Major* 298d6-298e2)

Fine pleasures arise from hearing and sight, while other pleasures arise from touch, taste, and smell. Whether fine or not, all pleasant things such as music, paintings, sex, food, and flowers are pleasant *according to the senses* (κατὰ αἰσθήσεις). If such things are pleasant according to the senses, then, their corresponding opposites are presumably painful according to the senses. For example, if food is pleasant according to the senses, then presumably the lack of food is painful according to the senses. The lack of food—a disturbance of the natural state of our body—must be perceived in order to give rise to pain; similarly, food and the restoration of our natural state must be perceived in order to give rise to pleasure.

Our perception is, however, not always accurate. In the *Protagoras*, we learn that perception represents things of the same size as being large when they are closer, and small when they are further away (*Prot.* 356c). For example, a tower appears to be small when seen from a distance but large when we are right in front of it. The same applies to pleasure and pain, Socrates explains (*Prot.* 356a-c). Pain close in time appears to be more painful, just as objects close in space appear to be larger; pain anticipated far in the future appears to be less painful, just as objects further away appear to be smaller. From Socrates’ explanation it follows that *present pain* appears to be very painful just as very close objects appear to be very large.

At this point, we know that sense perception is involved when we experience bodily pain and that our sense perception is not always accurate. In order to understand why pain is aversive we now need to understand how evaluations enter the picture. Another passage in the *Protagoras* provides a crucial clue. There, Socrates believes that the present pain appears to be very painful to

both the ignorant and the knowledgeable person. The ignorant person, however, is fooled by her appearances, while the knowledgeable person is not:

While the power of appearance (ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις) often makes us wander (ἐπλάνα) all over the place (ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω), often changing (μεταλαμβάνειν) [our minds about] the same things and regretting (μεταμέλειν) our actions and choices about things large and small, the art of measurement [ἡ μετρητική, i.e., knowledge], would make this appearance (φάντασμα) powerless (ἄκυρον) by showing us the truth, and it would make our soul have harmony (ἡσυχία) standing by the truth (μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ) and it would save our life. (*Prot.* 356d4-e2)

When the ignorant person receives cavity treatment, for example, the present pain appears to be so painful to her that she might jump off the chair and run home. Afterwards, she regrets having acted on her appearance. The knowledgeable person, by contrast, is not fooled by her appearances. She knows that the present pain from cavity treatment is not as painful as the potential future pain that would arise if she left her cavities untreated. How exactly do appearances of pleasure and pain fool the ignorant person? How do they make the ignorant person “wander all over the place”?

Socrates seems to believe that appearances can play a role in the generation of actions similar to the role of knowledge. The ignorant person acts on appearances, the knowledgeable person acts on knowledge. What kind of knowledge and appearances can bring about an action? In the case of knowledge, Socrates specifies that it is the *knowledge of what is good and bad* that can bring about actions:

If someone knew (γινώσκῃ) which things are good and bad, then he would not be forced by anything, so that he wouldn't do anything but what knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) orders to do. (*Prot.* 352c4-6).

Since Socrates believes that *knowledge of what is good and bad* brings about actions in the knowledgeable person, I infer that *appearances of what is good and bad* bring about actions in the ignorant person. Both knowledge and appearances can bring about actions in virtue of being evaluative. We can also give the following deductive argument for the same conclusion:

- (i) The power of appearances moves us to wander all over the place (*Prot.* 356d4-7).
- (ii) We are moved (attracted/averted) only by evaluations (*Socratic Principle of Motivation* established in the beginning).
- (iii) Therefore, the power of appearances to move us lies in their being evaluative.

I propose that appearances fool the ignorant person and make her wander all over the place in confusion because they are evaluative. Pleasure appears to be good and pain appears to be bad, at least to most people. Our perceptual apparatus is simply built in this way. Similarly, our perceptual apparatus is built in such a way that the far-away sun appears to be small and the stick in the water appears to be bent. How bad something appears to be usually depends on how painful the experience is; how painful the experience is usually depends on how intensely our perceptual apparatus is affected; how intensely our perceptual apparatus is affected usually depends on how severely or abruptly the natural state of our body is disrupted. Therefore, if our natural state is disrupted severely or very abruptly and our perceptual apparatus is affected intensely, we usually have a very painful experience, and this pain appears to be very bad.⁸⁸

If this is indeed why bodily pain is aversive, we are also in the position to explain why states we would call ‘emotions,’ such as fear and anger, are likewise aversive. When we are afraid, for instance, we expect that a future evil will happen to us.⁸⁹ This expectation disturbs our psychic harmony. Since we are hard-wired to perceive *any* disturbance of our natural state – physiological and psychological – as being bad, fear, shame (i.e., the fear of a bad reputation, *Euthyph.* 12b10-

⁸⁸ I have benefited from Moss’ work on evaluative appearances. While Moss and I both argue that pleasure appears to be good and pain appears to be bad, I further distinguish between *experiences* and *anticipations* of bodily pain and pleasure, and I explain why pain *experiences* are motivational. Moss seems to focus on *anticipations* of pleasure and pain (Moss 2006: 513).

⁸⁹ *Prot.* 358d6-7, *Def.* 415e5, *Lach.* 198b8-9, *Laws* 644c10-d1.

c1), anger etc. are all aversive.⁹⁰ I propose that pain, fear, and other pathemata are immediately aversive, and thus they allow us to evaluate things or actions in a non-deliberative way.⁹¹ When we feel pain, fear, or shame we *perceive* value and *feel* that something is bad. The gods, too, experience felt evaluations.⁹² When the gods see beauty and justice, they feel friendly (φιλοῦσιν), and then they feel that beauty and justice are good (*Euthyph.* 7e). But when they see injustice, they feel indignant (μισοῦσιν), and then they feel that injustice is bad.⁹³

Immediately Evaluative Beliefs

I have argued that pain is aversive because it immediately appears to be bad. Immediately evaluative perceptual appearances establish the relation between pain and badness. Another possible explanation for pain's aversiveness is that we immediately believe that pain is bad. Let me now explain why the 'immediately evaluative beliefs' account is inferior to the 'immediately evaluative appearances' account. In both cases, we have an immediate, spontaneous, pre-reasoning evaluation of pain as being bad. However, the 'immediately evaluative beliefs' account leads to an unfortunate dilemma: either we can abandon immediately evaluative beliefs, in which case we could reason ourselves out of feeling aversive pain, or we cannot abandon immediately evaluative beliefs, in which case the knowledgeable person holds false beliefs.

⁹⁰ Thanks to Rachel Singpurwalla for discussing with me this extension of my account.

⁹¹ *Pathemata* such as pain, fear are motions of the soul, or at least they cause motions of the soul (*Laws* 896e8-897a2) that are strong and forceful (δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, *Tim.* 69c8), that need to be fought (μάχεσθαι, *Lach.* 191e1), and that provide an occasion for courage (*Lach.* 191e).

⁹² In contemporary philosophy, Helm (2002) has argued that pleasure, pain, and emotions are "felt evaluations."

⁹³ Some evaluations may rely on beliefs or memory: I fear *x* (for instance corporal punishment or death) because I have experienced *x* as painful in the past or because I believe that *x* is bad. However, feeling value through pain does not necessarily involve beliefs or memory, as I argued above. These evaluations can be correct or incorrect, and some can be corrected (such as feeling that death is bad), while others cannot (such as feeling that pain is bad).

To explain the first horn of the dilemma, imagine again that you are getting cavity treatment at the dentist. The dentist starts drilling, you perceive the disturbance of the natural state of your body, and you now experience aversive pain because you immediately *believe* that this pain is very bad. However, you were also convinced by Socrates' argument in the *Euthydemus* that only ignorance is bad in itself (281d). Pain, as you know, is in not always bad. Pain is only bad if it prevents you from becoming knowledgeable, but that does not seem to be the case in our dentist scenario. In fact, if you endure the present painful drilling, you can philosophize more in the future, and that will get you closer to leading a knowledgeable, virtuous life. Since you believe that pain is neither in itself bad, nor, in this situation, bad for some external reason, you believe 'this pain is not bad.' According to a widely accepted understanding of 'belief,' beliefs are states that aim to fit the world, meaning that: a belief that *p* will tend to be eliminated by a belief that *not-p*.⁹⁴ It seems, then, that you should be able to override the belief 'this pain is very bad.' But since this evaluative belief made your pain aversive in the first place, the pain should stop being aversive as soon as you believe that it is not bad. In other words, you should be able to make yourself stop feeling *any aversion* to the present drilling.

I believe that this 'evaluative belief account' is implausible and textually unsupported. It is implausible because it assumes that we can reason ourselves *entirely* out of feeling aversive pain. Once I conclude that 'this pain from drilling is not in fact bad,' I should stop feeling any aversive pain. Yet, it seems that, while reasoning about the benefits of the dental treatment can make the pain from drilling milder, it cannot entirely neutralize the pain. Here, I see a clear advantage of the 'immediately evaluative appearance' account: pain can continue to be aversive, due to its appearance of being bad, despite our belief that it is in fact indifferent.

⁹⁴ Anscombe (1963).

A skeptic might respond, however, that we must distinguish between us ignorant people and the knowledgeable person. It may be implausible that *we* can reason ourselves out of feeling aversive pain, but it is quite plausible that the knowledgeable person can. On the skeptic's proposal, the knowledgeable person can reason herself out of feeling aversive pain. She is like someone with pain asymbolia, i.e., someone for whom pain is not aversive. I believe that this portrait of the knowledgeable person is textually unsupported. In fact, some passages in the later dialogues suggest that even the knowledge person experiences aversive pain. Socrates himself, for example, experiences aversive pain (*Phaedo* 60b-c), though it is uncertain, of course, whether Socrates is in fact knowledgeable.⁹⁵ In the *Laws*, the Athenian claims that the wise man (σοφὸν) "has acquired pleasures and pains that are harmonious with and follow right reasons (λόγοις)" (696c8-10), though it is unclear whether that includes bodily pleasures and pain. Since we do not have any textual evidence for the rather implausible view that the knowledgeable person can reason herself entirely out of feeling aversive pain, I suggest that we reject it.

To avoid the first horn of the dilemma, which was that we *can* abandon our belief that pain is bad and then do not feel any aversion to pain, one may respond that we *cannot* abandon immediately evaluative beliefs. Not even the knowledgeable person can abandon the belief 'this pain is very bad' when experiencing drilling. Therefore, she will continue to experience aversive pain. This response brings us to the second horn: if the knowledgeable person cannot abandon the evaluative belief that makes her feel aversive pain, she holds two incompatible beliefs at the same time, namely 'this pain is bad' and 'this pain is not bad.'⁹⁶ One of those two beliefs must be false.

⁹⁵ For Socrates' repeated disavowal of knowledge see *Apol.* 20e, 21b, d. However, Socrates also claims to *know* that doing wrong, disobeying a superior (*Apol.* 29b), and a life without philosophy are bad (*Apol.* 37e-38a).

⁹⁶ I argue that if pain is aversive because we immediately believe that pain is bad, then the knowledgeable person holds false beliefs. The belief 'this pain is bad' is false because, for Socrates, pain is neither in itself bad, nor, in the dentist scenario, bad for some external reason. But what if Socrates genuinely believes what he argues for in *Prot.* 351b ff., namely that pleasure is the good and pain is the bad? Wouldn't then the belief 'this pain from drilling is bad' be true because (i) the bad is bad in itself, (ii) pain is the bad (Hedonism), (iii) so, pain from drilling is bad in itself?

The ‘immediately evaluative beliefs’ account, therefore, leads to the unfeasible conclusion that the knowledgeable person holds false beliefs. The ‘immediately evaluative perceptual appearances’ account, by contrast, avoids such a contradiction; it is perfectly feasible for the knowledgeable person to have the appearance of the present pain being bad, while having the belief that pain is indifferent. Similarly, it is problematic to *believe* both that the sun is small and that it is big; but it is unproblematic to have the *appearance* of the sun being small, while believing that it is big.⁹⁷

Part Two: The ignorant and the knowledgeable at the dentist

I will now move on to the second part of my interpretation and propose how bodily pain can play a more robust motivational role in the generation of actions. Let us imagine that the ignorant and the knowledgeable person both undergo cavity treatment at the dentist. When the dentist starts drilling, both immediately have the perceptual appearance of the present pain being very bad, and they both have an aversion to the present pain; but they differ in what happens next.

It seems to me that the belief ‘this pain from drilling is bad in itself’ is false because even hedonistic Socrates does not believe that bodily pains are bad in themselves (or that bodily pleasures are good in themselves). To see this, consider the following argument: (i) the scratcher and glutton in *Gorg.* 493a-494d live pleasant lives. (ii) The pleasant life is the good life (Hedonism). (iii) So, the scratcher and glutton lead good lives. (iv) But Socrates denies (iii). (v) So, the pleasures of the scratcher/glutton, i.e., bodily pleasures, do not constitute a good life. (vi) So, the good life is constituted by other pleasures; presumably the pleasure of virtuous activity (here I agree with Rudebusch (1999) and Moss (2014)). If Socrates is a hedonist, not any kind of pleasure will do. Bodily pleasure is not the good, and the life of bodily pleasures is not a good life, therefore bodily pleasure is not good in itself. This way, Socrates could be a hedonist while maintaining that only virtue (knowledge of what is good and bad) is good in itself. Note also that, presumably, not all psychological pleasures are good in themselves either (consider *Schadenfreude*), nor will it be true that all psychological pains are bad (consider fear of ignorance).

⁹⁷ The ‘immediately evaluative perceptual appearance’ account has another advantage over the ‘immediately evaluative beliefs’ accounts: it keeps the cognitive bar for experiencing bodily pleasure and pain low. The only mental state we need in order to experience aversive pain is an appearance, and this allows us to explain pain aversions in babies and animals. In the ‘immediately evaluative beliefs’ account, by contrast, one needs to be able to form beliefs to experience aversive pain.

In the case of the knowledgeable person, knowledge blocks the appearance of pain as bad from leading to the belief that pain is bad.⁹⁸ The knowledgeable person does not form the belief ‘the present pain is bad,’ but she may believe ‘cavities are bad’ (because they keep her from doing philosophy in the long run). The belief ‘cavities are bad’ now triggers a reasoning process about what would be best to do. The goal of this reasoning process is to identify the best means to the end ‘no cavities.’ The result of this reasoning process may be that ‘staying at the dentist and receiving the treatment is the best thing to do.’ This belief brings about a desire to stay, and so the knowledgeable person stays. Note that we can identify three motivations at play: (i) aversion to pain; (ii) aversion to cavities, which functions as the *final motivation* of her action; (iii) desire to stay, which functions as an *instrumental desire*, i.e., a desire to achieve a further end, namely to get rid of her cavities.

In the case of the ignorant person, by contrast, nothing blocks the appearances from leading to a belief. The ignorant person not only has the appearance of the present pain being very bad, but she also believes that the present pain is very bad. This belief triggers a reasoning process about the best way to make the present pain stop. *What she wants is already set* (no pain!), all she does now is to come up with an *action plan*. She may conclude that fleeing the dentist is the best way to make the present pain stop. This belief brings about an instrumental desire to flee, and so she takes off. Note that we can identify two motivations: (i) aversion to pain (final motivation); (ii) desire to flee (instrumental desire). It follows that belief and reasoning may be required to bring about many or maybe even all of our instrumental desires, but they are definitely not required to bring about all final motivations. My proposal can be visualized as follows:

⁹⁸ I agree with Carone and Singpurwalla that a step like “assent” (Carone 2005) or “endorsement” (Singpurwalla 2006) is part of the Socratic generation of actions.




Fig. 5

Knowledge does not erase the appearance that the present pain is bad, nor does it erase, for example, the appearance that the stick in the water is bent. But the knowledgeable person is not fooled by those appearances, meaning that she does not believe them to be true.⁹⁹ Since she does not believe that the present pain is very bad, she does not act on her appearance; she does not try to make the pain stop. Knowledge blocks the appearances from becoming the final motivation of her action, and I propose that this is precisely how knowledge makes appearances “powerless” (ἄκυρον, *Prot.* 356d8). Knowledge can make appearances powerless because it is stronger (κρεῖττον, *Prot.* 357c3) than them. Knowledge is stronger, I suggest, because it is more stable.¹⁰⁰

My Socratic explanation of actions assigns a motivationally robust role to our aversion to bodily pain. The ignorant person flees because she does not want to be in pain. Her pain aversion

⁹⁹ Others have also proposed that knowledge does not erase what I call ‘perceptual appearances,’ but that it prevents the knowledgeable man from being governed by them (see e.g., Boeri 2007: 62).

¹⁰⁰ The stability of knowledge brings about psychic harmony. For the connection between strength and stability or harmony, and weakness and instability or disharmony see *Meno* 97e-98a, *Rep.* 411b, 503c.

serves as the *final motivation* of her action in this particular situation. It is not the overarching final motivation, since this is always a desire for the good (happiness) and an aversion to the bad (misery). But I argue that in a given, limited sequence, our pain aversions can function as the final motivation of particular actions. In this case, the ignorant person's reasoning process brings about an instrumental desire, a desire for something that she needs to do in order to get what she already wants (no pain!). What the ignorant person lacks when she experiences aversive pain is not a motivation, I argue, but an *action plan*. Her pain aversion is not *practically sufficient* to produce an action – she still needs to figure out how to make the pain stop.¹⁰¹ But in a sense her pain aversion is *motivationally sufficient*: her pain aversion can be the final motivation of an action, if endorsed and combined with an action plan.¹⁰² In my interpretation, there is nothing motivationally deficient about pain aversions that would justify degrading them to the motivationally lower class of “itches.”

Compatibility with the Socratic Core Beliefs

Let me now show that my interpretation is compatible with all four Socratic beliefs. In my interpretation, it remains true that **(1)** we always desire the good (happiness) and things we take to be good (happiness-promoting); we have an aversion to the bad (misery) and things we take to be bad (happiness-diminishing). Pain is aversive because it appears to be bad. **(2)** We always do what

¹⁰¹ Note that, for example, knowing that an injustice has occurred is not practically sufficient for action either. The agent may know that an injustice occurred, and that injustice is bad. She therefore has an aversion to the present occurrence of injustice and she wants the injustice to stop. However, this aversion is not practically sufficient to produce an action. She also needs to figure out whether to stop the injustice is the best thing to do right now, and if so, how to best achieve her end (i.e., to stop the injustice).

¹⁰² Thanks to Tad Brennan for the useful distinction between ‘practically sufficient’ and ‘motivationally sufficient,’ and thanks to Rachana Kamtekar for pointing out to me that the label ‘instrumental desire’ captures well which role I take our reasoned desires (i.e., our desires that arise out of reasoning) to play.

we believe is best. I argued that our aversion to pain is not practically sufficient to produce an action; we also need a plan for how to make the pain stop. This plan may arise out of careful deliberation, or it can arise immediately via association or memory. The belief that a certain action is best is our action plan. Therefore, it remains true that we always do what we believe is the best thing to do.¹⁰³ Next, it remains true that **(3)** all wrongdoing is due to ignorance. Knowledge is stronger than appearances, and in virtue of being stronger, it can block them from becoming final motivations. Only the ignorant person believes her appearances to be true, and then she acts on them.

Finally, let me explain how in my interpretation **(4)** the knowledgeable person's soul stays harmonious. Other interpreters have worried that if pain were more than an itch, the knowledgeable person would experience a psychological conflict between two competing motivations that would threaten her psychic harmony: her aversion to pain would compete with her reasoned desire. For example, when the knowledgeable person experiences painful drilling, she would experience a motivational conflict between her aversion to pain and her desire to stay in the chair. I propose that her aversion to pain poses a threat to her psychic harmony, *only if* this aversion to pain is part of a second set of overarching final ends. If her present pain from drilling were aversive because she had a general, overarching aversion to pain (in addition to her general, overarching aversion to the bad), then she would indeed experience a harmony threatening motivational conflict. This motivational conflict would be harmony threatening because it is *unsolvable*; it is unsolvable because it is a competition between two different overarching final ends, namely badness and pain.

¹⁰³ I followed the common translation of οἴομαι as 'believe' in 'we always do what we believe is best to do,' but I take it to be an open question whether that is a good translation. If Schwab and Moss (2019) are right in that "at least up until his late dialogue the *Theaetetus* Plato shows no signs of using the concept of belief," Socratic actions do not require a 'belief' about what is best to do. In that case, every action requires an action plan, but not every action plan requires a belief.

In that scenario, when the knowledgeable person feels aversive pain at the dentist and reasons about what to do, she would compare apples to oranges – pain to badness.

In my interpretation, however, pain does not compete with badness, nor does pleasure compete with goodness. Pain is aversive in virtue of appearing bad. We only have one set of overarching final ends, namely a desire for the good and an aversion to the bad. Since pain is immediately converted into the currency of evaluation, the knowledgeable person can easily compare different goods and bads; she compares apples to apples – something of value (pain) to another thing of value (dental health). Therefore, my interpretation of pain aversions does not threaten the psychic harmony of the knowledgeable person.

At this point, let me summarize our interpretative options. Do we want to say that even the knowledgeable person has an immediate aversion to pain?

Option 1: No! The knowledgeable person does not have an immediate aversion to pain. Those who take this option should not call pain an “itch” because, on this view, pain does not have any motivational flavor whatsoever. The knowledgeable person is like someone with pain asymbolia (pain is not aversive to her). The advantage of this view is that there is absolutely no risk of motivational conflict. The big disadvantage is that it is implausible and textually unsupported.

Option 2: Yes! Even the knowledgeable person has an immediate aversion to pain. Those who take this option must explain why pain is aversive. I suggested that pain is aversive because pain immediately appears to be bad. The potential problem with this view is that it may seem to invite a harmony threatening motivational conflict. A ‘harmony threatening motivational conflict’ is an unsolvable conflict, and I propose that pain aversions do not bring about such a conflict.

I am not aware of anyone in the secondary literature taking the first option. We all seem to agree that pain is aversive in Socratic moral psychology. But then, we all have to explain *why* pain

is aversive, and we have to provide an explanation that renders the soul of the knowledgeable person harmonious. I here proposed one such explanation that is plausible and textually supported.

Conclusion

I have argued that our aversion to bodily pain poses a question for Socratic psychology that has been overlooked, namely: why is pain aversive? In the first part of my paper, I aimed to answer this question and thereby fill the explanatory gap in the secondary literature. I proposed that pain is aversive – pain-itches itch – because pain immediately appears to be bad. We are hard-wired to perceive pain as bad.¹⁰⁴ In the second part of my paper, I argued that we can assign a more robust motivational role to pain aversions. Pain aversions can be the final motivations of our actions if they are endorsed and combined with an action plan. I believe that this interpretation renders Socratic psychology of action more plausible. We do not have to attribute the rather implausible claim to Socrates that pain aversions are mere “itches” that contribute to the generation of actions just as another piece of information.

¹⁰⁴ I am very grateful to Tad Brennan, Rachana Kamtekar, Emily Fletcher, Rachel Singpurwalla, Leigh York, the audience at the *Central APA* 2018, the participants of the *Ancient Philosophy Workshop 2018* at the University of Florida, and the attendees and organizers of *Emotions in Plato* at the University of Edinburgh for many helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

A GLUTTON AND A COWARD WALK INTO THE SOCRATIC THERAPY OFFICE...

Appetite and Fear in the Socratic Psychology of Action

Abstract: A glutton and a coward seek Socrates for advice. Which diagnosis and treatment can they expect? Most interpreters of Socrates would probably say that they can expect to be diagnosed as ignorant and that their treatment consists in philosophical conversations and arguments. I will propose that Socrates would distinguish more carefully between the glutton and the coward and that dependent on the diagnosis, he may propose treatments other than philosophical conversations. If you are a glutton, sit tight! Though you may not have to go through many (or any) sessions of philosophical conversation, your treatment will still take a while, as you might have to train your body and desensitize your soul. If you suffer from cowardice, sign up immediately for traditional Socratic therapy sessions, i.e., philosophical conversations. I will arrive at this conclusion by investigating what kind of states appetites and fear are and how they influence our actions.

In chapter one, I established that the scope of my investigation is pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear in the Socratic dialogues. Plato calls these states *pathemata*. I proposed that *pathemata* can be understood as states that are or cause motions of the soul (*Laws* 896e8-897a2), that are strong and forceful (δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, *Tim.* 69c8), that need to be fought (μάχεσθαι, *Lach.* 191e1), and that provide an occasion for virtue, such as courage (*Lach.* 191e) and moderation (*Gorg.* 507e). I further suggested that the meaning of *pathemata* is similar to the German term ‘Gemütsbewegungen.’ In chapter two, I investigated bodily pain (and touched a little bit on bodily pleasure as well as psychological pleasure and pain). In this chapter, I will investigate the two remaining *pathemata*: epithumetic desire and fear. More precisely, I will focus on fear and a particular kind of epithumetic desire, namely appetitive desires such as hunger and thirst.

My approach differs from existing ones in at least two ways. First, I believe that distinguishing the different *pathemata* from each other is important – that is, distinguishing between pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear. Most interpreters, by contrast, subsume these states under the term of non-rational desires and focus on distinguishing them from rational desires.¹⁰⁵ I will show that the rational/non-rational distinction is too general.

Second, those interpreters who are more specific introduce the category of emotions; they then distinguish emotions from appetites.¹⁰⁶ I believe that this distinction is troublesome because Plato does not recognize a separate class of states that we would call emotions (as I argued in chapter one). Accordingly, Plato does not distinguish between appetites and emotions. Instead, he distinguishes between epithumetic desires and fear. I therefore proposed that if we want to distinguish between different so-called non-rational states, we should focus on the quartet pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear (and not on appetites and emotions).

In the previous chapter, I reached two goals: I explained *why* bodily pain (and pleasure) has motivational flavor, and I proposed an account of *how* bodily pain (and pleasure) can influence our actions. In this chapter, I will reach the same goals for epithumetic desire and fear. First, I will

¹⁰⁵ Penner (2011), Rowe (2012), Reshotko (2006), Lorenz (2006), Brickhouse and Smith (2010, 2015). These desires are sometimes also called ‘good-independent’. The terms ‘non-rational’ and ‘good-independent’ have been used in different and often confusing ways in the secondary literature. The term ‘non-rational’ has been taken to mean: good-independent, belief-independent or not responsive to beliefs (Brickhouse and Smith 2015: 27, n.3; Reshotko 2006: 16; Rowe 2012: 309; Penner 2011: 129), reason-independent or not responsive to reason (Rowe 2012: 314; Carone 2004: 89; Singpurwalla 2006: 243, n.1; 249), and uncritical (Moss 2008: 37). The term ‘good-independent’ is sometimes used to capture that a state is (i) independent of beliefs about goodness, or (ii) independent of deliberation and beliefs about the overall good; others use it to capture that a state is (iii) independent of the desire for the overall good. Others again do not explicitly use the label ‘good-independent’, but instead take ‘non-rational’ to mean (i), (ii), or (iii). For (i), see Moss (2008: 34-7). For (ii), see Singpurwalla (2006), Carone (2005: 377, n.37). For (iii), see Reshotko (2006: 54-5).

¹⁰⁶ See Brickhouse and Smith (2015). They argue that Socrates is a cognitivist about emotions but not about appetites. Emotions such as fear are beliefs that are created by our “natural attractions and aversions” (2015: 15); “insofar as something seems to be painful, detrimental, or ugly, the agent will be naturally inclined to believe it to be something bad” (2015: 14). The idea seems to be, I take it, that if something appears to be dangerous, we are naturally inclined to believe that it is bad, and then we experience fear. I have argued in chapter two that this interpretation leaves an explanatory gap, namely: How exactly do evaluations enter the picture? Why exactly do I move from an appearance of danger to a belief about value?

fill an explanatory gap: while other interpreters acknowledge that epithumetic desire and fear have some motivational flavor, they do not explain *why* these states are motivational. I will argue that appetite and fear are motivational because they involve appearances of value. Second, I want to offer an alternative Socratic explanation of *how* epithumetic desire and fear can influence our actions. We will see that my explanation of why and how epithumetic desire and fear are motivational relies in part on my explanation of why pleasure and pain are motivational in chapter two.

Epithumetic Desire and Appetites

The Greek term that I have been translating as ‘epithumetic desire’ is ἐπιθυμία (*epithumia*; pl. *epithumiai*). Plato uses *epithumia* as broadly as we use the terms ‘to want’ and ‘wanting.’ On the one hand, we can ‘want’ pretty much anything in the Socratic dialogues. We can want to hear an argument or listen to a conversation (*Apol.* 33a7, *Euthyd.* 278d4, *Prot.* 328d5, 336a5, *Gorg.* 447b4), to investigate (*Crito* 46d4, *Hip. Min.* 373c6), to know or understand something (εἰδέναι, *Crito* 52b7; *Hip. Maj.* 297e3, *Gorg.* 474c2), to learn (μαθεῖν, *Hip. Min.* 369d4), to become happy (γενέσθαι εὐδαίμονα, *Lys.* 207e4), to become better (*Hip. Maj.* 283c8) or to become as good as possible (*Lach.* 186c2, *Euthyd.* 175a9); we can want goodness (*Lys.* 217e9), wisdom (σοφία, *Euthyd.* 272b10, 301b2), virtue (*Men.* 91a2), but also money, fame, and owning horses or dogs (*Lys.* 211e). Even inanimate things can *epithumein* something: Socrates explains that opposites – like dry and wet, cold and hot, bitter and sweet – all *epithumein* each other (ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἕκαστον, *Lys.* 215e4-6). In this passage, we may translate *epithumein* as ‘attract’ instead

of ‘want.’¹⁰⁷ Opposites attract (not want) each other. So, on the one hand, *epithumia* means ‘wanting’ in a very broad sense that we might better translate as ‘attraction.’

On the other hand, there are many passages in which Socrates seems to use *epithumia* in a restricted sense to refer to a certain group of ‘wants’ or ‘attractions’ that require restraining (κολαστέον, *Gorg.* 492d5, 507e2), ruling (ἄρχοντα, *Gorg.* 491d11), and that we need to fight (μάχεσθαι, *Lach.* 191e1), re-direct and not give in to (μεταβιβάζειν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, *Gorg.* 517b5-6). In the face of these *epithumiai*, wise men (τοὺς σώφρονας, *Gorg.* 491e2) are self-controlled (ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, *Gorg.* 491d11) and courageous (ἄνδρεῖοι, *Lach.* 191e4). Here, Socrates does not talk about wanting to learn or wanting to own horses, but wanting to eat and drink, i.e., appetites.¹⁰⁸ The virtuous man has his appetites in check. I will use ‘appetite’ to refer to this particular group of *epithumiai* to which hunger, thirst, and presumably also sexual wants belong.^{109,110} In this paper, I will focus on two specific appetites, namely hunger and thirst.

Let us first understand what these appetites are for Socrates; then, we can better understand how they influence our actions. From the Socratic dialogues, we know the following things about *epithumia* and their sub-class of appetites:

¹⁰⁷ Wolfsdorf (2008: 60).

¹⁰⁸ *Gorg.* 494c2, 497c7, 505a6.

¹⁰⁹ Socrates explicitly refers to hunger and thirst as *epithumiai* in *Lys.* 221a. In the *Republic*, Plato will call hunger and thirst the clearest (ἐναργεστάτας) examples of *epithumiai* (437d2-4). For the triad food, drink, sex see e.g., *Prot.* 353c.

¹¹⁰ I do not attempt to give a clean-cut distinction between *epithumia* and other kinds of desires (such as *boulesis*, *Prot.* 340a7–b2, *Charm.* 167e), if Plato distinguishes different conative attitudes at all. (For the view that Plato distinguishes different conative attitudes, see Kamtekar (2006). For the view that he does not, see Barney (2010)). My hypothesis is that all conative pro-attitudes are for something good, but the good things *epithumiai* strive for appear good in virtue of being pleasant. Further, I here do not aim to distinguish different kinds of *epithumia*. The *Cratylus* gives some reason to believe that θυμός, ἕμερός, πόθος, and ἔρωξ are different kinds of or states similar to *epithumia* (*Crat.* 419d-420a). The passage is, however, not very informative. Socrates reports the etymology of *epithumia* and other such things (τὰ τοιαῦτα), but he is far from providing a full conceptual analysis of these terms. We also do not know whether he endorses the meanings of the terms derived from etymology. If we assume that he does, then the *Cratylus* passage reveals something interesting about ἕμερός, πόθος, and ἔρωξ: *pothos* is for what is absent (οὐ τοῦ παρόντος), *himeros* is for what is present (παρῆ), and *eros* comes about from a stream (ἡ ροῆ) that reaches the agent from the outside through his eyes (*Crat.* 420a-b). From the *Charmides*, we further know that *eros* is for beauty or the fine (καλοῦ, 167e8). In the *Phaedrus*, Plato will explicitly say that *eros* is an *epithymia* ἄνευ λόγου that goes towards pleasure from the fine/beauty (πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους, 238b-c).

- (i) We *epithumein* what we lack (ἐνδεές).¹¹¹
- (ii) Lacks and *epithumiai* are painful (ἀνιαρόν).¹¹² Hunger itself is painful.¹¹³
- (iii) *Epithumiai* are for pleasure.¹¹⁴ The one who has an *epithumia* wants something pleasant.
- (iv) Filling the lack is a pleasure.¹¹⁵

Socratic appetites, such as hunger and thirst, are compound phenomena: the hungry person has a painful lack and wants a pleasant filling. Let us look at the different components of appetites step by step.

(1) *We have a lack.*

It is noteworthy that, according to Socrates, we can only want what we lack. He seems to exclude the possibility that we can ever want something that we already have.¹¹⁶ This claim is intuitive in some cases: if I am full right now, I do not want food. But it seems questionable in other cases: I feel perfectly satisfied right now and want to stay perfectly satisfied. I want my present state to continue in the future. Isn't that an instance of wanting something that one already has? Socrates could respond that this, too, is an instance of wanting what one lacks; the lack is the future satisfaction (future satisfaction is something the agent does not have now).¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ *Lys.* 221e1 (τό γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὗ ἂν ἐνδεές ᾗ, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ).

¹¹² *Gorg.* 496c6-d5: every deficiency and appetite is painful ἅπασαν (ἐνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρόν εἶναι). *Gorg.* 494a: ἀναγκάζοιτο δ' αἰεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας.

¹¹³ *Gorg.* 496d1: Hunger itself is painful (πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν).

¹¹⁴ *Charm.* 167e1-9: Ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμία δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι, ἥ τις ἡδονῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; Οὐ δῆτα.

¹¹⁵ *Gorg.* 496d: Wouldn't you say that for a thirsty person to drink is pleasant (διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ). Drinking is filling of the lack and a pleasure (Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσις τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή).

¹¹⁶ Socrates will say more explicitly in the *Symposium* that we desire what we lack and that if we don't lack something we don't desire it (*Symp.* 200a9-10: τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν οὗ ἐνδεές ἐστίν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐνδεές ᾗ. Socrates feels strongly about that: "It seems astonishing to me," Socrates says, "how necessary that is" (ὡς ἀνάγκη εἶναι, 200a9-b2). Someone who is tall, for example, cannot want to be tall, Socrates explains.

¹¹⁷ This seems to be Socrates' answer in the *Symposium*: To desire the preservation of what one now has is desiring what one lacks (*Symp.* 200d-e).

When we are hungry, we lack food. I propose that this lack of food can further be described as a disturbance of our natural, bodily state. Disturbances of our natural bodily or psychological state give rise to pain; restoration of our natural state gives rise to pleasure. In chapter two, I explained that Plato will explicitly propose the disturbance/restoration view in the later dialogues, and I suggested that we can find traces of this view already in the earlier dialogues.¹¹⁸ I further suggested that the disturbance of our natural bodily state can be understood in a Hippocratic way as the imbalance of bodily fluids. For a Hippocratic explanation of appetite, see the following passage from *Diseases*:

“Now if we are in need of food or drink, then the body will draw from the sources [that store the various humors] until the [quantities of the] humors [in these sources] are reduced below what is fitting. At that point a man has a desire to eat or drink something of a nature to fill up that [deficient] portion and make it equal to the others. [...] But when we have eaten and the humor in the sources [that is, those parts of the body in which the humor is stored] and in the body is equalized as far as possible, then the desire ceases.”¹¹⁹

The Hippocratics believe that a deficit of a certain humor (bodily fluid) causes appetites. Plato’s explanation of strong sexual desires in the *Timaeus* is remarkably similar to the Hippocratic explanation of appetite: a surplus of a certain bodily fluid renders the body moist and causes sexual intemperance (*Tim.* 86d-e). Both the Hippocratics and Plato explain states with motivational flavor (appetites and sexual intemperance) through a deficit or surplus of certain bodily fluids. I propose that Hippocratic explanations may have already been part of Socrates’ (or Plato’s earlier) account of appetites (and pleasure, and pain) for three reasons: first, Socrates was familiar with the Hippocratic theory (*Prot.* 311b); second, the Hippocratics revolutionized the field of medicine during Socrates’ time. They explained diseases, appetites, pleasure, and pain through physiological

¹¹⁸ For textual evidence in the later dialogues, see *Phil.* 31d, *Rep.* 585d. For traces in the earlier dialogues, see *Prot.* 354b (health is a good state of the body), *Gorg.* 479b (health is bodily excellence), and *Lys.* 221e-222a (we must love/like/want what belongs to us by nature).

¹¹⁹ *Diseases* IV, 39.5; translation by Wolfsdorf (2013: 35).

states and not divine intervention. This “rational outlook” on medicine and marked the end of an era of magic and superstition in medicine.¹²⁰ Third, Plato adopts such a rational outlook on medicine in his later dialogues.¹²¹

(2) *The lack is perceived.*

What happens after we have a lack, i.e., a disturbance of our natural bodily state? Below, I will argue that lacks must be perceived to give rise to pain. However, others have argued that, for Socrates, pains are *identical* to lacks. If pains are identical to lacks, then we would not have to perceive lacks to have pain. I will first present Evans’ argument that pain is identical to lacks and then three counterarguments, the last of which I take to be the decisive one.

In *Philebus* 32b Socrates says that “whenever [the harmony in organisms] is destroyed, the destruction is a pain.” Evans understands the “is” in this quotation is an “is” of identity. In other words, Evans argues that Socrates here suggests that bodily destructions are “identical to pains.”¹²² But if Evans were right that “destruction is pain” means “destruction is identical to pain,” then we would have strong reason to believe that, in the *Gorgias*, “filling is pleasure” (ἡδονή, 496d) means “filling is identical to pleasure.” From that, we would have reason to conclude that “lack is pain.” Let me repeat what is at stake here: if pain were identical to a bodily lack, we would be in pain every time our body is in a state of lack, whether we perceive the lack or not.

Counterargument #1: *The identity claim is implausible.* If pain was a bodily lack, whether perceived or not, we would have pains without feeling them. But it is absurd to say that we have pain without feeling pain. Therefore, pain cannot be a bodily lack; the bodily lack must in addition

¹²⁰ Longrigg (1989).

¹²¹ My interpretation does not rely on Socrates’ adopting Hippocratic explanations. I believe that we have some reason to attribute a Hippocratic explanation of bodily disturbances to Socrates, and that that such explanations would render his account progressive, but Hippocratic explanations are not load-bearing in my interpretation; they are merely a plausible way to fill in the gaps.

¹²² Evans (2007: 75).

be perceived, noticed, or felt.¹²³ The very concept of pain, one could explain further, implies the feeling of pain. ‘Unnoticed pains’ is a contradiction in terms, such as ‘dry rain.’ Consider also someone under anesthesia. It is not the case that the anesthetized person has unnoticed pains, but that he has no pain at all. If you think there are ‘unnoticed pains,’ someone might argue, you are either utterly wrong about what pain is, or you misuse the term pain.¹²⁴ “An unfelt pain is not a pain at all.”¹²⁵ Therefore, it is implausible that pains are identical to bodily lacks.

While this first counterargument seems plausible, it is not decisive because the idea that we can have pain without feeling pain was not considered to be entirely absurd among Socrates’ contemporaries. According to Anaxagoras, for example, every perception is accompanied by pain (πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι μετὰ λύπησιν).¹²⁶ In order to rebut the obvious counterargument that this cannot possibly be right because we do not feel pain every time we perceive something, Anaxagoras argues that sometimes the pains that accompany perception remain unnoticed.¹²⁷ We are in pain every time we perceive something, but we do not always feel those pains. For Anaxagoras, the idea of unfelt or unnoticed pains is not absurd at all. Further, it may seem rather plausible even to some modern interpreters that some pains remain unnoticed. Imagine, for instance, having a headache without noticing it for a while because you are so absorbed in your work. I therefore conclude that counterargument #1 is not strong enough to reject the claim that bodily pain is identical to bodily lacks.

¹²³ For now, I will use ‘to perceive something’ interchangeably with ‘to be aware of something’ or ‘to notice something.’ However, we should point out that perception does not *per se* imply awareness or attention; at any given moment, I perceive many things, but I consciously notice only very few of them.

¹²⁴ Warren (2007: 52).

¹²⁵ Warren (2007: 36; 47, n. 42).

¹²⁶ Theophrastus, *De Sensibus* 17.2.

¹²⁷ Maybe the pains that accompany perception remain unnoticed because we got used to them (as Aristotle seems to suggest on Anaxagoras’ behalf in *EN* 1154b8-10). Anaxagoras compares perceiving pain to perceiving color. Something might look purely white, but in fact it contains some black particles which remain unnoticed to us (Theophrastus, *De Sensibus* 29). Similarly, every perception might be to some extent painful, but sometimes the pain remains unnoticed (Warren 2007: 35).

Counterargument #2: *Identity is not the only possible reading.* ‘Filling is pleasure’ can mean: (i) identity: filling is identical to pleasure, but it can also mean (ii) predication: filling is a kind of pleasure, or filling is pleasant. I therefore conclude that we do not have decisive textual evidence for attributing the identity thesis to Socrates (neither in the *Gorgias* nor in the *Philebus*). Counterargument #2 does not determine whether Socrates takes lacks to be identical to pains.

Counterargument #3: *Lacks must be perceived.* I will now argue that we have textual evidence for the claim that the disturbance of our natural state must be perceived to give rise to pain. Some lacks remain unperceived and then they are not experienced as painful. As I argued in chapter two, our best textual support comes from the later dialogues (*Phil.*43b, *Tim.* 65a), but we can find traces of that view already in the earlier dialogues. In the *Hippias Major* (198d-299a), Socrates explains that food, drink, and sex are pleasant *according to the senses* (κατὰ αἰσθήσεις). If such things are pleasant according to the senses, then, their corresponding opposites are presumably painful according to the senses. For example, if food is pleasant according to the senses, then presumably the lack of food is painful according to the senses as well. The lack of food – a disturbance of the natural state of our body – must be perceived in order to give rise to pain; similarly, food and the restoration of our natural state must be perceived to give rise to pleasure. I conclude that counterargument #3 provides a good reason to reject the thesis that bodily lacks are identical to pains.

(3) *Filling the Lack is anticipated as pleasant.*

Appetites involve both pain and pleasure for Socrates. Let us now distinguish more carefully the two kinds of pleasure and pain that are involved in appetites. The pain or unpleasantness we feel when we are hungry is a present *experience*, and the pleasure we expect from eating in the future

is an *anticipation*.¹²⁸ Socrates implicitly distinguishes between experiences and anticipations in the *Protagoras*, when he explains that food, drink, and sex are pleasant in the moment (*παραχρήμα*, 353d1, 356a6) and that they can also be pleasant at a later time (*ὕστερον χρόνον*, 356a6-7). We can experience and anticipate food as pleasant. Let us hold fixed that appetites involve both pain experiences and pleasure anticipations:

- (a) *Pain experience*. When we have an appetite, we perceive a lack, and lacks are painful.
- (b) *Pleasure anticipation*. When we have an appetite, we anticipate a pleasant filling.

What exactly do we anticipate when we anticipate a pleasant filling? In other words, what do we want to get (*Men.* 77c: desire is to want to get something) when we are hungry? Do we want food (unspecific), or a sandwich (a bit more specific), or the turkey sandwich from my favorite sandwich shop (very specific)? We can, of course, in a sense want and anticipate all of these items. But the question is which level of specification is necessary in order to have an appetite. The *Lysis* might help us to answer this question.

In the *Lysis*, Socrates explains that we want (*epithumein*) things that have been taken away from us (*ἀφαιρήται τι*, *Lys.* 221e2-3), that are our own (*Τοῦ οἰκείου*, *Lys.* 221e3), and that belong to us by nature (*φύσει*, *Lys.* 221e6). Given this description, Wolfsdorf has argued that the thing we want must be something unspecified; appetite is for a type (such as food), and not for a token (such as a turkey sandwich):

“The reason for this is simply that the alternative is absurd. Menexenus’ desire for the particular fishcake he sees is caused by a deficiency of some sort. But this cannot be a deficiency of the particular fishcake that Menexenus sees. So it cannot be that belongings principally are the particular objects of every desire. Assuming that Socrates’ belongings principally are types, desire for tokens can be explained. Desire for a token is governed by desire for a type of which that token is a member. For example, Menexenus’ desire for this particular fishcake is governed by Menexenus’ deprivation of fishcake, fish, or food and so desire for fishcake, fish,

¹²⁸ Plato in the *Republic* will explicitly call those pleasures ‘pleasures from anticipation’ (*ἐκ προσδοκίας*, 584c9).

or food. Accordingly, then, particular objects of desire may be belongings, but only in that they instantiate types” (2008: 66).

Socrates claims that we have an appetite for what we lack, but it would be absurd, according to Wolfsdorf, if we lacked particular items such as a turkey sandwich. We can add to Wolfsdorf’s argument another point: it would be odd to claim that turkey sandwiches belong to me “by nature.” I therefore propose that, in the Socratic account, we lack, anticipate, and want food (unspecified) when we are hungry.¹²⁹ We may further develop desires for particular food items (more on that below), but the initial appetite does not involve such a desire for particular food items.

In order to anticipate food, we must have experienced food as a pleasant filler in the past, and we have to remember that food is a pleasant filler. Anticipations of fillings, therefore, depend on memory and the ability to recall which things fill particular lacks.¹³⁰ This ability to match fillers with particular lacks (food with hunger, drink with thirst) is what I call ‘basic means-end reasoning.’ This kind of reasoning is basic in the sense that it merely connects previously experienced means with ends. By keeping the means-end reasoning basic, we keep the cognitive bar for the ‘reasoning’ involved in appetites low, and that way we can accommodate appetites in animals and children. Socrates says that both humans and animals can be hungry and thirsty (*Lys.* 221a), but presumably animals lack some of our higher cognitive skills (e.g., the ability to form

¹²⁹ The *Lysis* passage is quite puzzling. In a sense, one could say that when we want food, food has been taken away from us, food is something that is our own and that belongs to us by nature. However, it sounds odd to say that when we want to own horses, horses have been taken away from us, horses are things that are our own and that belong to us by nature. Two interpretive options seem to be available: either Socrates takes his description of wants and lacks to apply to *all* wants and lacks (wanting to own horses included), or he takes it to apply to *certain* wants and lacks only. Reshotko (1997) seems to argue for the first option: “Socrates is specifying general terms that would cover all cases of attraction (not just friendship) between all kinds of attractants (not just humans). [...] Whatever is being attracted (humans, physical objects, plants, cosmic entities), Socrates uses the same theory of attraction to describe why one object is drawn to another” (1997: 2). “Why are plants attracted to light? — because one has something that the other lacks. Why are animals in the desert attracted to water? — because the water fulfills a deficit which the animals are experiencing” (1997: 5). I doubt that Socrates intends to include all instances of wanting something. Instead, he must have a subgroup of *epithumia* in mind.

¹³⁰ As Plato will explain in *Phil.* 21c ff.

beliefs and to calculate long term benefits). However, Socrates would probably agree that animals can perceive, remember, and anticipate things. In order to be hungry, it may therefore be sufficient to *perceive* the current lack, *remember* a pleasant filler, and *connect* lacks with fillers.¹³¹ Let us summarize that appetites are compound states that involve the following cognitive skills:

- (a) Pain experiences require perception. I perceive a bodily lack.
- (b) Pleasure anticipations require memory and basic means-end reasoning.
I remember and anticipate a pleasant filling (food, drink).

To sum up: when I perceive a bodily lack, I experience pain or unpleasantness. That by itself is not yet hunger. I am hungry, if in addition I also have the anticipation of a filler, if I remember something that restored my natural state in the past and then mentally reach out to it (via belief, imagination, or other mental states). Both an experience of a lack and an anticipation of a filler are necessary to have an appetite. According to Socrates, appetites are wants for things that fill bodily lacks; appetites also have a tendency to become unruly and may need to be controlled.

HOW DO APPETITES INFLUENCE OUR ACTIONS?

According to the *Socratic Principle of Motivation* (that I established in chapter two), we are motivated by things that are evaluated by us: we are attracted to the good (happiness) and to good things (happiness-promoting things), and we have an aversion to the bad (misery) and to bad things

¹³¹ Alternatively, one could argue that appetites require totally different cognitive skills in animals and children than in adults. However, I have not seen anyone defending that view. See, for instance, Penner: human adults have “animal desires,” i.e., humans share with animals “desires for food, drink, and sex” (2011: 263, n.6).

(happiness-diminishing things). Appetites are motivational. So, they must be evaluative in some way. How do evaluations enter the picture when we are hungry and thirsty?¹³²

In chapter two, I proposed that when we perceive bodily disturbances and experience bodily pain, pain immediately appears to be bad to us. We have the immediate, perceptual appearance that the present bodily pain is bad. When we are hungry, for example, we experience a painful bodily lack of food and this bodily pain appears to be bad to us. I now propose that when we anticipate pleasure, the anticipated pleasure can appear good on two levels. First, an anticipated pleasure can appear good because we remember, imagine, or believe it to be good. The anticipated sandwich appears to be good, for example, because I remember it was good the last time I ate it. I call this kind of evaluative appearance ‘higher-order appearance’ because they require cognitive states higher than perception (such as memory, imagination, and belief). Second, an anticipated pleasure can appear good because anticipating pleasure itself is pleasant. Simply thinking about eating a sandwich when we are hungry is pleasant, and this pleasure immediately appears to be good to us. When we anticipate pleasure (e.g., when I am hungry and think of a sandwich), we experience pleasure (because anticipating pleasure is pleasant), and we then have the immediate perceptual appearance that the present pleasure is good.¹³³

I therefore suggest that we distinguish between two kinds of evaluative appearances: perceptual and higher-order appearances. Experienced pain immediately appears to be bad, and experienced pleasure immediately appears to be good (these are perceptual evaluative

¹³² See Wolfsdorf: “Plato’s interest in the deficiency conception of desire may be twofold. First, the subjectivist conception of desire does not explain the cause of desire. Precisely, it does not explain why a subject, upon the evaluation of an object as good, desires that object. The evaluation of an object as good is insufficient for desire. For instance, when one is sated in the relevant respect, one may evaluate an object as good, but not desire it. Fundamentally, desire is conceived as a response to deficiency and deprivation.” (2008: 73). I am inclined to say instead: we have an aversion to any disturbance of our natural state (psychological and physiological). Deficiency is one kind of disturbance. This way, we can explain why pleasure and pain (and not only appetites) are motivational.

¹³³ What if you are hungry but there is no hope of getting any food? In the *Philebus*, Socrates explains that, in this case, one experiences a double pain. Anticipating a pleasant filling is only pleasant if there is hope of attaining it (36b).

appearances). Anticipated pain and pleasure can appear bad and good to us on a higher level (these are higher-order evaluative appearances). Take, for instance, the tyrant in the *Gorgias*. When killing people or confiscating their property appears to the tyrant to be good (ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς, *Gorg.* 467a3, a5; 468d4) or best (αὐτοῖς δόξη βέλτιστον εἶναι, *Gorg.* 466e2; 467b3-4), he has the higher-order evaluative appearance that killing people and confiscating their property is good, presumably because he has the background belief that these actions are beneficial for him.

I therefore propose that when we are hungry, evaluations enter the picture first via appearances: pain appears to be bad, pleasure appears to be good. Next, we deliberate about whether eating right now would be a good thing to do and if so, what would be good to eat. Eating during a funeral service, for example, might not be a good thing to do, neither is eating donuts while trying to lose weight. The conclusion that it is good or bad to eat right now can be the result of a more complex means-end reasoning process, during which we carefully weigh different options against each other and then finally decide what would be best to do. But this conclusion can also be the result of a less elaborate, rather immediate decision-making-process.

After having decided that it is good or best to eat right now, I must decide what I want to eat. Again, my decision can be the result of a more complex means-end reasoning process. I might deliberate that the sandwich would fill me for a longer time, but the salad has less calories. The soup is the cheapest option, but it's also furthest away. On the other hand, my decision can instead be the result of a less elaborate, rather immediate decision-making-process. I might settle on the salad, mainly because it is closest. If I am hungry and the salad is right in front of me, I might immediately take the salad to be the best thing to eat right now. Socrates, in fact, provides an explanation for this phenomenon. In the *Protagoras*, he explains that pleasures in the near future appear to be more pleasant than those in the distant future; similarly, the same tower looks bigger

when close by, and smaller when further away (356a-c). Proximity in space often corresponds to proximity in time; if the salad is the closest in space of all food options, it is also likely to be the one that is closest in time, i.e., that I could eat the soonest. So, a Socratic explanation for why I settle on the salad may be that the salad appears to be more pleasant than the soup and the sandwich because it is right in front of me. Proximity is, of course, only one of many possible explanations for why we sometimes immediately settle on certain fillers.

Now that I have settled on the salad, I need to figure out how to get it, i.e., I need to come up with an action plan. This process, again, can be complex and take some time, but it can also be rather simple and happen quickly. If the salad is right in front of me, then reaching for it may be all I have to do. In order to get the far-away soup, by contrast, I may have to come up with a more elaborate action plan (get up, put on shoes, get into the car, drive to the soup place). The succession of events, then, seems to be as follows:




Fig. 6

I propose that when I am hungry and reach for the salad, two motivations are at play, namely my appetite for food and my desire for a particular kind of food. In the chain of events, my appetite for food is what I called in the previous chapter my *final desire*, i.e., the desire that I eventually aim to satisfy by performing a particular action. My desire for a particular kind of food is what I called an *instrumental desire*, i.e., a desire to get something that I already want (food!). When I distinguish between instrumental and final desires, I am merely labeling a distinction that is already at work in Socratic psychology. We have seen this distinction, for example, when Socrates differentiates between our desire for happiness and our desires for things that promote our happiness (*Gorg.*468b, *Euthd.* 278e-9a, 282a), or between our desire to be healthy and our desire to take medicine (*Gorg.*467d-468b). The former desires are final desires, the latter are instrumental desires.

With our distinction between final and instrumental desires, the Socratic can explain more clearly what happens in cases like the following: imagine that you are hungry. You believe that eating right now would be good, and you settle on having a turkey sandwich from your favorite sandwich shop. But just when you are about to leave, your friend tells you that your favorite sandwich shop shut down after a huge hygiene scandal (envision mice under the fridge and cockroaches on the countertops). You immediately lose your desire for your favorite turkey sandwich, but you are still hungry. In other words, your instrumental desire for the turkey sandwich disappears, but your final desire persists (you are still hungry).

Consider another example: you are attending a funeral, and you are hungry. But you know that it would be bad to eat during the service. You therefore do not develop a desire to eat anything in particular (nor do you come up with a plan of how to get any particular food item), but you are

nevertheless hungry.¹³⁴ In other words, you do not develop an instrumental desire, but you nevertheless retain your appetite. These two examples—the hygiene scandal example and the funeral service example—show that instrumental desires (for particular food items) are reason-responsive; they arise out of reasoning and can perish in the light of new information. Appetites, however, can persist; they are not as reason-responsive as instrumental desires.¹³⁵

I would like to stress a few specific points:

- (a) Appetites are not for particular food items; they are not the result of an elaborate deliberation process. They require very basic means-end reasoning only.
- (b) Desires for particular food items are instrumental desires, and they may or may not be the result of a more elaborate deliberation process, i.e., a process in which we carefully compare options and weigh them against each other.
- (c) Appetites can be the final desires; they can motivate actions (I go to the fridge to get a turkey sandwich because I want food). Instrumental desires are specific desires that fulfill a general appetite. In other words, I desire a turkey sandwich in order to get something that I already want (e.g., food).
- (d) Appetites can persist; instrumental desires are more reason-responsive.

Let us now see how my interpretation differs from existing ones. Penner has argued that all desires “to do something,” i.e., all action-causing desires, are generated and extinguished by our beliefs about what is best to do:

“According to this theory [Socrates’ theory of desire], all desires to do something are rational desires, in that they always automatically adjust to the agent’s beliefs about what is the best means to their ultimate end. If in particular circumstances I come to believe that eating this pastry is the best means to my happiness in the circumstances, then in plugging this belief into the desire for *whatever is best in these circumstances*, my (rational) desire for whatever is best becomes the desire to eat this pastry. [...] if I come to believe that it would be better to abstain, then once again my desire for whatever is best will become the desire to abstain”. But “if my desire to eat the pastry

¹³⁴ See also Lorenz: “Eating something now will give a hungry person pleasure regardless of whether or not they think it is now overall best to eat.” (2006: 2)

¹³⁵ We can, of course, also lose our appetite. What happens in that case is, I suggest, that a competing aversion is dominant. For example, I might lose my appetite because my disgust about the mice and cockroaches dominates and is stronger than my appetite.

is an irrational desire, then even if you convince me that it would be better for me not to eat it, the desire does not go away and I may in fact act on that desire” (Penner 1992: 128- 129).

In my interpretation, the desire for a particular pastry is an instrumental desire, and I agree with Penner that instrumental desires are reason-responsive, though changing them might be harder than Penner envisions (more on that point below). But what kind of desires are appetites? If appetites are “desires to do something,” i.e., if they are action-causing desires, then according to Penner they “automatically adjust to the agent's beliefs about what is the best means to their ultimate end.” But it seems that appetites do not automatically adjust to beliefs (remember the hygiene scandal example and the funeral service example). Accordingly, they would not be “desires to do something.” However, that would be an odd result because our appetites do seem to motivate some of our actions. Penner anticipates this objection and explains:

“Some might object [...] “Does desire for drink never generate an action? How can that be? Is it being denied that we have these desires?” No, the desire for drink does occur, but the way it gets us to act is to present itself to our desire for happiness, which turns to the belief-system to produce an estimate of the possible gains from various choices for fulfilling this desire. So the desire for drink operates not by its generating any action, but by leading to a belief as to the advantages of fulfilling the desire; that belief is then fed into one’s all things considered judgment as to which particular action is best; that judgment is integrated into the “whatever” desire (by substitution); and the resulting executive desire to do this particular action then brings about the action. At this point, we see that it is, after all, as claimed, precisely this one desire for the good which generates the action.” (2011: 263-4).

The chain of events, according to Penner, seems to be as follows: I am thirsty and desire drink (Penner calls this desire an “itch” and “hankering”). This desire presents itself to my belief-system. I then deliberate about what is best to. I decide that drinking is best. This belief brings about another desire for drink (which is a particularization of our desire for the good/happiness), and so I drink. A couple of things seem odd about this explanation.

It seems odd that I start off with *one* desire for drink and end up with *two* desires for drink (if I conclude that drinking is best right now). My initial desire for drink presents itself to my belief-system – *that’s all it does*. This desire does not motivate an action. I then deliberate about what is best to do, and if I conclude that drinking is best, a second desire is generated: a desire for drink, and *this* desire now motivates my action. But what happened to my first desire for drink after it presented itself to my belief-system? Either it perishes, or it continues to exist, but both options seem odd.¹³⁶ We can visualize the contrast between my interpretation and Penner’s as follows:




Fig. 7

¹³⁶ Singpurwalla’s and Carone’s accounts seem to imply the same two oddities as Penner’s account. They also seem to believe that our initial appetites are different from our action-causing motivations. See Singpurwalla: “What, then, does it take for an appearance (an attraction) to lead to a desire? The obvious answer is that the appearance must be endorsed as true, and so give rise to a belief. Again, since the move from appearance to belief can be instantaneous, appearances can, especially for one whose views on value are undeveloped and uncertain, bear an almost direct relation to belief and thus to motivation. [...] Non-rational desires are evaluative beliefs that are based on appearances and so may conflict with our other, well-reasoned beliefs about goodness” (2006: 252). I agree with Singpurwalla that endorsement is part of the Socratic explanation of actions (Carone uses “assent” instead of “endorsement”). But it seems implausible to me that endorsement (or assent) generates a *new* desire and that we then have *two* motivational states for the same thing, e.g., food.

I propose, against Penner, that appetites can be “desires to do something,” i.e., final desires, without being the result of deliberation and without being reason-responsive.¹³⁷ Appetites can become “desires to do something” if we give them a mental thumbs-up. When I am thirsty and give my appetite a mental thumbs-up, I endorse it: “yes! The present pain is bad, and yes, eating would be pleasant!” However, I believe that it is implausible that my mental thumbs-up gives rise to a new desire. My mental thumbs-up gives way to my appetite; I then move on to deliberate about whether eating would be the best thing to do right now. My mental thumbs-down blocks my appetite; I then do not move on to deliberate about whether eating would be the best thing to do right now. My mental thumbs-up initiates a deliberation process that can lead to an action plan (which includes an instrumental desire for a particular drink and a plan for how to get that drink). If I believe that drinking would be best, my appetite moves on to becoming the final desire of my action.

I have proposed a Socratic account that assigns a more motivationally robust role to appetites in the generation of actions: they arise independently of deliberation, and they can be the final motivation of an action. When I am thirsty (when I experience a lack of drink, feel pain, and anticipate a pleasant drink) I cannot help but have the impression that something bad is happening to me. I have an aversion to the current lack and an attraction to the future filling. I want drink. At this point, I have not deliberated about whether drinking is the best thing to do. Appetites, then, arise independently of deliberation. My appetite becomes the final motivation of my action if I give it my mental thumbs-up and further

¹³⁷ I am not sure whether Reshotko agrees with Penner. Reshotko (1997: 9): “How do we explain why a mouse that has been lying quietly in a corner of his cage for several hours suddenly stands and walks to get a drink of water? How do we explain why a plant that has been facing forward for days suddenly turns to the right? In each case we say that the organism was in a stable (neutral) state for some time, and then, due to its internal metabolic processes, acquired a deficit (was afflicted by bad) so that it came to desire the good (that which would fulfill the need caused by its deficit), and that this desire for the good motivated its behavior.” When explaining animal and plant behavior, Reshotko seems to suggest that appetitive desires can be action-causing desires.

conclude that drinking right now is the best thing to do. I believe that my interpretation renders the Socratic account more plausible. For in my interpretation, a Socratic can say that some of our actions are motivated by appetites (“he did *x* because he was hungry”) and that appetites often do not automatically adjust to beliefs.

My interpretation also fills what I have called an explanatory gap in the secondary literature, namely: why is my initial appetite motivational at all – why does it have *any* motivational flavor? All interpreters agree that appetites have motivational flavor – Penner and Reshotko call appetites “desires,” Sinpurwalla and Carone call them “attractions and aversions.” I have proposed that appetites are motivational because they are evaluative—the experienced pain immediately appears to be bad, the anticipated pleasure appears to be good. Since we have an attraction to goodness and an aversion to badness, we have an aversion to the present lack of food and an attraction to the future meal.

Fear

After having discussed pleasure and pain in chapter two and appetites in the beginning of this chapter, let us now move on to our last *pathemata* under investigation: fear. In the *Laches* and the *Protagoras*, Socrates defines fear (δέος, φόβος) as the anticipation (προσδοκίαν) of a future bad thing (κακοῦ).¹³⁸ All things we fear are anticipated as being bad, but we anticipate them as being

¹³⁸ δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ (*Lach.* 198b8-9); προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε (*Prot.* 358d6). Are δέος and φόβος different? Prodicus believes that Socrates’ definition applies to δέος but not to φόβος (358d-e). Price points out that Ammonius distinguishes δέος as a ‘lasting anticipation of evil’ from φόβος as ‘immediate excitement.’ Price suggests that one of them is less cognitive than the other one (2009: 122). I am not sure how Price arrives at this suggestion. For the Stoics, φόβος is an expectation of an evil, and it is the genus under which δέος falls; δέος is a φόβος δεινοῦ.

bad for different reasons: some people anticipate corporal punishment as being bad because it is painful (*Gorg.* 479b-c); others anticipate doing injustice as being bad because it is vicious (*Gorg.* 522e). We can fear bodily pain, e.g., from beatings, but also psychological pain, e.g., from a bad reputation. Fearing a bad reputation is shame (*Euthyphr.* 12b-c).¹³⁹ Shame is a kind of fear.

Below, I will discuss four important points in a Socratic account of fear: we should fear certain things; fear can be conducive to moral progress; being afraid is unpleasant; animals and children also experience fear.

We should fear certain things. Socrates distinguishes fears we should not have from those we should have. We should not be afraid of death (*Apol.* 29a-b, 40c-41b), for example, but we should be afraid of acting unjustly (*Gorg.* 522e) and of the opinion (δόξη) of the one who has knowledge (*Crit.* 47d).¹⁴⁰ We should be afraid and feel shame (αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι, *Crit.* 47d2) in front of the knowledgeable person. Socrates in the *Charmides* says that he himself is afraid (φοβούμενος, 166d1) of thinking that he knows something that he does not know and of conducting an examination incorrectly (φοβοίμην μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοποῦμεν, *Charm.* 172e). He later admits that he feared rightly (εἰκότως ἐδεδοίκη, *Charm.* 175a9).

Fear can be conducive to moral progress. In Socrates' case, fear seems to be conducive to a correct investigation because fear makes Socrates a more cautious investigator. It makes him more attentive to potential mistakes. Besides fear, Socrates also experiences other *pathemata* such

¹³⁹ πεφόβηται τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας (*Euthyphr.* 12b10-c1). Φοβούμεθα δόξαν, ἡγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοί, πράττοντες ἢ λέγοντές τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν (*Laws* 647e10-a2). The *Protagoras* gives reason to believe that Socrates was familiar with the distinction between bodily and psychological pleasures when Prodicus says: "To be cheered (εὐφραίνεσθαι) is to learn (μανθάνοντά) something, having share in some φρονήσεως by διανοία itself, but to be pleased (ἡδεσθαι) is about eating something or experience (πάσχοντα) some other pleasure (ἡδὺ) in the body itself (αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι)" (*Prot.* 337c2-4).

¹⁴⁰ Socrates: "should we follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one, if there is one who has knowledge of these things and before whom we feel fear and shame more than before all the others. If we do not follow his directions, we shall harm and corrupt that part of ourselves that is improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions" (*Crit.* 47d).

as love (or erotic desires: τὰ ἐρωτικά). When Socrates faces the handsome young Charmides for the first time, he felt like he “caught on fire” (ἐφλεγόμην) and “not in [him]self/quite beside [him]self” (οὐκέτ' ἐν ἑμαυτοῦ ἦν, *Charm.* 155d). Socrates also reports that other people were equally impressed by Charmides’ physical beauty. They were astonished (ἐκπεπληγμένοι) and confused (τεθορυβημένοι, *Charm.* 154c) when Charmides walked in. It is interesting that Plato in the *Phaedrus* describes the experience souls have when they see an image that reminds them of the forms—in particular, when they see a beautiful boy who reminds them of true beauty—in the same words: they are besides themselves (οὐκέτ' ἐν αὐτῶν γίγνονται, 250a7), astonished (ἐκπλήττονται, 250a6), and confused (θορυβουμένη, 248a4, b1). Love or erotic desire, then, may play an important role in our intellectual progress: it alerts us! We can find the same idea in the *Euthyphro*. There, Socrates explains that we get angry and feel indignation when we disagree with someone about matters of justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness, and good and bad. The gods “like (φιλοῦσιν) what each of them considers beautiful, good, and just, and feel indignation about (μισοῦσιν) the opposite of these” (*Euthyph.* 7e).

Fear, anger, indignation, friendliness, and love alert us about what is good and bad. We get angry when someone disagrees with us on those matters because *we feel that something is good or bad*. *Pathe* like fear, anger, indignation, friendliness, and love are, I propose, *felt evaluations*.¹⁴¹ I therefore propose that our *pathē* can be conducive to our moral and epistemic progress – an idea we are familiar with from the *Symposium*. There, the love of beautiful bodies is the starting point for a progression that can culminate in the love of the forms.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ I borrow the expression “felt evaluations” from Helm (2002).

¹⁴² Socrates recognizes that anger, shame (*Charm.* 169c; *Gorg.* 482c6), envy (*Euthyph.* 3c; *Euthd.* 297d), love (*Gorg.* 481d1), hatred (*Phaed.* 90c8-d7), and competitiveness (φιλονικία, *Gorg.* 457d-e) can affect discourse by making a person more or less willing to accept an argument. What should guide us is, of course, not the desire to ‘win an argument’ but the desire to ‘find the truth’ (*Gorg.* 458b-d). Carone (2004) has proposed that Socrates, therefore, puts his interlocutors “in the right emotional mind-set” before he starts a conversation. Discussion and teaching, Carone argues, is only effective if “one’s emotions have been put in the right place”. The student should “first, [have] a

Being afraid is unpleasant. A Socratic explanation for why fear is unpleasant, I propose, is that anticipating something bad is psychologically disturbing. Any disturbance, whether physiological or psychological, is a deviation from our natural state and is experienced as painful or at least unpleasant. Pain or unpleasantness appears to be bad.¹⁴³ Plato in the *Philebus* will explicitly say that anticipating pain is painful (*Phil.* 32c). Like appetites, fear involves both an experience and anticipation. In the case of appetites, we experience pain and anticipate pleasure. In the case of fear, we experience pain and anticipate pain (or something else we take to be bad). The anticipation of a future bad thing is psychologically disturbing, and perceiving this disturbance causes the experience of pain or unpleasantness. Pain immediately appears to be bad.

Animals and children also experience fear. Animals and children can feel fear, I propose, because they are capable of anticipation (*prosdokia*). They are capable of anticipation because:

- (i) animals and children can be thirsty and hungry (*Lys.* 221a).
- (ii) thirst and hunger require anticipation (e.g., of drink).
- (iii) Therefore, animals and children are capable of anticipation.

One might say that the kind of anticipation involved in thirst and hunger is different from (maybe cognitively lower than) the one involved in fear. But there is no textual support for that. In fact, Plato uses the same term—*prosdokia*—when talking about anticipations in fear (*Lach.* 198b8-9; *Prot.* 358d6) and appetites (*Rep.* 584c).¹⁴⁴ If I am right that Socrates believes that animals and children can be afraid, then we should keep the cognitive bar for fear low. In particular, we

willingness to be instructed and second, a proper pleasure in the discovery of truth.” Austin has argued that in the *Gorgias*, Callicles’ fear of death “leaves him beyond the reach of Socratic argument” (2013:1).

¹⁴³ Thanks to Rachel Singpurwalla who pointed out to me that fear may be unpleasant or aversive because it brings about a psychological (and maybe even physiological) disturbance.

¹⁴⁴ We know that animals and children do not fear what ought to be feared, and therefore they cannot be courageous (*Lach.* 197a-b). They are not brave but fearless and mad (ἄφοβον καὶ μῶρον, *Lach.* 197a8) because they are fools (δι’ ἄνοιαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν, *Lach.* 197b1; ὑπὸ ἀνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, *Lach.* 197a7). I take it that these passages deny bravery but not fear to animals and children.

should not restrict *prosdokia* to belief.¹⁴⁵ I propose that when we anticipate something as being bad, we might imagine, believe, or know that it is bad.

HOW DOES FEAR CONTRIBUTE TO THE GENERATION OF OUR ACTIONS?

Socrates acknowledges that fear influences some of our actions because we avoid things we are afraid of:

“will any man be willing to go for what he fears, when he can go for what he doesn't fear? Or is that impossible, according to what we have agreed? For if anyone fears something, it was agreed that he thinks it bad; and no one who thinks anything bad goes for it or takes it of his own free will”
(358e2–6).

Take, for example, a criminal who flees the city to avoid punishment. How does fear influence the criminal's action, according to Socrates? I propose the following succession of events:

- (1) **Fear:** he anticipates punishment as a future bad thing; that anticipation is disturbing, and the disturbance appears to be bad. He is afraid of punishment (he takes punishment to be bad) and his fear is unpleasant/painful (and appears bad). He has an aversion (no punishment!).
- (2) **Deliberation.** Is punishment indeed a future bad thing, and if so, how can I best avoid it? Action plan: he concludes that punishment is indeed bad and decides that running away is best.
- (3) **Action:** he runs away.

Notice that his fear of punishment functions as a *final motivation*. The criminal runs away because he wants to avoid punishment; he has an aversion to punishment. The deliberation that happens under step two brings about an *instrumental desire* to run away (running away is

¹⁴⁵ Brickhouse and Smith (2015) have argued that an anticipation is a belief (because ‘*prosdokia*’ contains ‘*doxa*,’ and ‘*doxa*’ is belief). They believe that Socrates is a cognitivist about states we would call emotions.

instrumental to avoiding punishment). But what he wants (no punishment!) is already set before he starts deliberating. The distinction between final and instrumental desire is also helpful when explaining cases like the following: imagine that the criminal's friend convinces him that running away and avoiding punishment is in fact not the best thing to do right now (if he runs away, the risk of getting caught is very high and the subsequent punishment will be even worse). The criminal, then, does not act on his fear—he does not run away in order to avoid punishment. He loses his instrumental desire to run away, but he nevertheless is still afraid of the punishment.

The Glutton and the Coward – Socratic Diagnosis and Treatment

Now that we have a better understanding of what kind of states appetites and fear are and how they can influence Socratic actions, let us investigate two kinds of agents that are particularly troubled by these two *pathe*: the glutton and the coward. I have two goals in this section. First, I will challenge the dominant view that a Socratic treatment program focuses exclusively on philosophical conversations. Second, I will explain in more detail how exactly philosophical conversations can improve the glutton and the coward.

Let us understand the glutton as an agent who is constantly hungry and who acts on his appetites. Let us understand the coward as an agent who is constantly afraid and acts on his fear. Socrates claims in various places that gluttony and cowardice are vices (bad traits) and that the vicious person is ignorant.¹⁴⁶ It follows that the glutton and the coward are ignorant. Accordingly,

¹⁴⁶ Courage is knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) of what ought to be feared (*Lach.* 198c). Courage is wisdom (σοφία, *Prot.* 350c4). So, cowardice is ignorance of what ought to be feared. The glutton is foolish and undisciplined (ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος, *Gorg.* 507a7).

most interpreters suggest that the Socratic treatment of the glutton and the coward consists in making them less ignorant, and the most obvious way to make someone less ignorant is by teaching them.¹⁴⁷ The glutton should learn about healthy diets and the risks of gluttony; the coward should learn about what ought and ought not to be feared. A Socratic sales pitch would then read something like this: *do you suffer from gluttony or cowardice? Become courageous and moderate through knowledge! Sign up for philosophical treatment today!* Now, imagine that our glutton signed up and wants to know more about the Socratic treatment. Imagine the glutton saying:

*Socrates, you keep saying that knowledge is the solution to my gluttony problem. Right now, my problem is that I **have** crazy appetites and that I **act** on them. Did I understand you correctly that you believe that*

*(1) If I had knowledge, I would not **act** on my crazy appetites,¹⁴⁸ and*

*(2) If I had knowledge, I would not **have** crazy appetites?¹⁴⁹*

I sort of understand the first point. Knowledge is some kind of motivational super power that can block all other motivations from becoming action-causing. If I have knowledge, I know what's best to do and will always want to act on this knowledge.

But I do not quite understand the second point. Do you think that if I had knowledge, I would not have crazy appetites because...

(i) Knowledge makes my crazy appetites go away, or because

*(ii) Something other than knowledge makes my crazy appetites go away? And this has to happen so that I can acquire knowledge?!*¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ See, for instance, Penner: Socrates believes that “[i]f only we could *discuss* things for long enough, if only we could *understand* what is best,’ Socrates seems to say, ‘all would be well, and all conduct would be virtuous!’” (2000: 165).

¹⁴⁸ As Socrates suggests in *Prot.* 351b-360d. Note, though, that this passage does *not* suggest that knowledge makes crazy appetites go away. In fact, it suggests that false appearances and knowledge can co-exist.

¹⁴⁹ Being knowledgeable seems to be incompatible with having crazy appetites: (i) Knowledge makes the soul harmonious (ἡσυχίαν, *Prot.* 356d); justice and wisdom (δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη) give the soul harmony and order (τάξις, κόσμησις; *Gorg.* 504d1-3). (ii) Crazy appetites presumably disturb harmony and order. (iii) So, having knowledge, justice, and wisdom is incompatible with having crazy appetites.

¹⁵⁰ I take it that this option is compatible with Socrates’ belief that knowledge is sufficient for virtue because: even if something else is needed to get rid of crazy appetites and to acquire knowledge, it can remain true that knowledge is sufficient for virtue – once I have knowledge, I am virtuous. Note that interpreters disagree on whether knowledge is in fact sufficient for virtue. Take, for instance, Socrates’ definition of courage as wise perseverance. Is perseverance an additional, non-intellectual element that is required to be courageous although the agent knows what ought to be feared? For an interesting discussion of this question see Gould (1987) and Carelli (2015). Gould suggests that we need strength of will in addition to knowledge. Strength of will is “an auxiliary to belief in the victory over a desire to refrain from doing something we consider right or beneficial, but somehow disagreeable. For example, a person who tries to rescue a stranger from the assault of a mugger would seem to be drawing on something other than just the knowledge that it is right to do so. [...] Such actions are difficult and seem to require determination in addition to belief. It is this apparently extraintellectual element that the Socratic Plato, I submit, tries to accommodate in the

I suggest that Socrates is likely to respond: *that depends! Let's look more closely at your gluttony problem!*

The Glutton. Socrates acknowledges that only some instances of eating and drinking are good, namely those that produce health and bodily excellence:

“Now, do you mean pleasures like the ones we were just now mentioning in connection with the body, those of eating and drinking? Do some of these produce health in the body, or strength, or some other bodily excellence, and are these pleasures good, while those that produce the opposites of these things are bad?” (*Gorg.* 499d)

Only fillings that restore our naturally good state and promote bodily excellence (health) are good. So, what shall we do with someone who is constantly hungry? I suggest that in the case of the glutton, we ought to make the following distinctions: is his main problem that he constantly *anticipates* pleasure from eating, or his main problem that he constantly *experiences* pain from a lack of food?¹⁵¹ If his main problem is that he constantly anticipates pleasure from eating (he constantly thinks about cake, for example, envisions Sachertorte, constantly believes that eating Sachertorte would be best), he is ignorant. Teaching and gaining more information about diet and bodily health can, theoretically, change the fact that he constantly anticipates pleasant food. If, however, his main problem is that he constantly experiences painful bodily lacks, i.e., if he constantly feels a lack of food, then teaching won't help him. In that case, either his body constantly sends the perceptual information that it is in a state of lack, or his perceptual apparatus

Laches.” It seems “that something in addition to knowledge – namely an active will – is also needed for the virtue of courage.” Carelli also argues for “some sort of non-intellectual attribute” in courageous actions. The “dispositional conception of courage is not itself an excellence but is instead a preliminary state of the soul that is necessary for the acquisition of excellence.” “[J]ust as physical strength comes ‘from nature and the appropriate nurture of bodies’, so courage comes ‘from nature and the appropriate nurture of souls.’”

¹⁵¹ I say “main problem” because in order to have an appetite (to feel hungry), we need to have both a pain experience and a pleasure anticipation.

is oversensitive and recognizes even minor lacks of food (i.e., those lacks that do not need to be filled in order to maintain bodily health). We cannot change the fact that perceived lacks are disagreeable; if the body reports a lack and we perceive it, we have a disagreeable or even painful experience. However, we can both desensitize our perception so that we do not perceive minor bodily lacks, and we can train our body and influence how often it reports a lack.

One might be skeptical about my interpretation and raise the following challenge: Socrates seems to believe that learning is sufficient to make the glutton's crazy appetites go away because

- (i) Socrates in the *Gorgias* claims that a man who has learned (μεμαθηκώς, 460b7) about justice is a just man, and a just man *wants* to do just things (ἀνάγκη δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν, 460c1-2); he will never *want* to do what's unjust (Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν, 460c).
- (ii) So, if I learn about moderation, I become moderate, and a moderate person wants to do moderate things; he will never want to do immoderate things, i.e., we will not have crazy appetites.

Yet, Socrates also claims that we must influence how often we have an appetite by 'disciplining' and 'restraining' the appetites (κολαστέον, *Gorg.* 492d6, 493d), by not providing a filling (πλήρωσις, *Gorg.* 492d7) for the lack. If learning were sufficient to get rid of crazy appetites, why would we have to restrain them? I suggest that in some cases of gluttony, learning is not sufficient. Some gluttons must discipline and restrain their appetites, and the goal of disciplining and restraining is, I propose, training of our body and desensitization of our perceptual apparatus. Desensitizing our perception and training our body is crucial for becoming virtuous, for if someone constantly perceives even minor bodily lacks, he is constantly disturbed by pain. If he keeps filling those apparent lacks, his body will report more and more lacks; his 'holes will become bigger' as Socrates says, and he will experience extreme pains (ἐσχάτας λύπας, *Gorg.* 494a1). In order to become virtuous, we should only fill those lacks that make us better when filled (αἱ μὲν τῶν

ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιῶσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον) but not those that make us worse (αἱ δὲ χεῖρω, μή, *Gorg.* 503c).¹⁵² The virtuous person will have trained his body and desensitized his soul in such a way that he only perceives lacks that need to be satisfied in order to maintain bodily health. That being said, I take it that certain bodily conditions can prevent us from becoming virtuous.¹⁵³

Let us then summarize what can go wrong when we are hungry. We can have different misleading experiences: (a) our body can send wrong information about being in a state of lack (e.g., due to illness), or (b) our perceptual apparatus can be oversensitive to bodily lacks. We can also have false anticipations due to: (c) ignorance (we incorrectly believe, for example, that cake is always a good filler, or we constantly envision pleasant fillings). We can change false *anticipations* by altering beliefs, re-analyzing memories, or becoming a more competent measurer, but false *experiences* can only be changed by altering the body or the sensitivity of our perception.¹⁵⁴ We can conclude that someone who suffers from false experiences needs medication

¹⁵² I propose that not filling lacks may have two effects on someone who constantly experiences painful lacks: (1) training the body: not filling lacks changes the body. The body won't have/report as many or as intense lacks anymore. (2) Desensitizing the soul: not filling lacks directly changes the soul. The soul won't perceive as many lacks or it won't perceive them as being as violent or pressing. A combination of both effects is probably best (if (2) without (1), we still have lacks, we just don't perceive them anymore); if (1) without (2), minor lacks may still be perceived as being major lacks). Since the leaky jars are in the soul (*Gorg.* 493a), not filling the jars seems to have an immediate effect on the soul, which supports (2).

¹⁵³ For the idea that bodily conditions can prevent us from becoming virtuous in the later dialogues see *Tim.* 86c-d. Sexual intemperance, for instance, is a disease of the soul that is caused by a condition of the body. In the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus*, we will learn that pleasure and pain arise out of motions of the body (*Phil.* 33d-34a; *Tim.* 64c), which is reminiscent of the Hippocratic idea that pain arises out of an imbalance of bodily fluids. Both Hippocratic writers and Plato believe that certain bodily changes give rise to pleasure and pain. We therefore have to care for our body in order to live undisturbedly. Teachings and arguments might affect our bodily condition (if Socrates in the *Charmides* is at least to some extent serious about curing Charmides' headache with conversation). Note, though, that Socrates' therapy also includes medical leaves, not only arguments.

¹⁵⁴ I therefore argue against Penner (2000) who claims that “[f]or Socrates, when people act badly or viciously or even just out of moral weakness, that will be merely a result of intellectual mistake. As if what moderns call the *will* were not at issue in questions of conduct - nor indeed base or irrational desires or emotions - but rather solely knowledge (science, one's intellectual understanding)!”

or de-sensitivity training; someone who suffers from false anticipations needs teaching.¹⁵⁵ Let's go back to the question that our glutton raised:

Socrates, do you think that if I had knowledge, I would not have crazy appetites because...

(i) Knowledge makes my crazy appetites go away, or because

(ii) Something other than knowledge makes my crazy appetites go away? And this has to happen so that I can acquire knowledge?!

I propose that Socrates' response is likely to be: if your main problem is false anticipations, then knowledge will make your crazy appetites go away (but it might take a while); if your main problem is false experiences, then something other than knowledge (namely medication or de-sensitivity training) will be necessary.

The Coward. The coward is someone who is constantly afraid and who acts on his fears. If he were smart, he would not *act* on his fears. His knowledge would block his fear from becoming an action-causing motivation. What the coward wants to know, though, is what would make him stop *having* crazy fears. In order to answer this question, we have to investigate why the coward is afraid in the first place. We know that the coward is afraid because he incorrectly anticipates a future evil. The coward's anticipation is incorrect either because the thing he anticipates is not bad, or because the bad thing he anticipates is not actually imminent.

Whereas the glutton might suffer from an overly sensitive perceptual apparatus or a defective body, the main explanation for why the coward is constantly afraid is that he is ignorant.

Imagine our coward asking:

¹⁵⁵ We can distinguish three states: (1) my painful experience of a lack, (2) my anticipation of food (unspecified), both together constitute appetite, and (3) my anticipation of a specific food (instrumental desire). I proposed that I can make myself stop anticipating Sachertorte as a pleasant filler; that means that we can get rid of (3). How about (2)? Can I make myself stop anticipating food when I recognize a lack of food? If so, I can stop feeling hungry (because hunger needs both an experience and an anticipation).

*Socrates, do you think that if I had knowledge, I would not have crazy fears because...
(i) Knowledge makes my crazy fears go away, or because
(ii) Something other than knowledge makes my crazy fears go away? And this
has to happen so that I can acquire knowledge?!*

I take it that Socrates is likely to respond that (i) knowledge will make your fears go away because it will make you stop falsely anticipating future evils. Socrates seems to believe that we can get rid of our fears and become knowledgeable through philosophical conversation and argument – at least theoretically. We can see him trying to convince people that death and just punishment, for example, are not bad and should therefore not to be feared. It is striking, though, that Socrates is awfully unsuccessful in talking his interlocutors out of their fears. He does not, for example, convince Callicles that painful punishment is beneficial for the wrongdoer. Callicles says that he is “not entirely persuaded” by Socrates. Yet, Socrates remains optimistic: “if we closely examine these same matters often and in a better way, you’ll be persuaded” (*Gorg.* 513d). Socrates is also unsuccessful in convincing Crito, Phaedo, and Apollodorus that death is not bad and ought not to be feared (*Phaed.* 117c-e). Why is Socrates so unsuccessful? Why is it so hard to get rid of fears?

Let’s compare being afraid of painful punishment to other false anticipations. Take my anticipation “it will be sunny tomorrow.” You can easily talk me out of that. What’s the difference between “I anticipate it to be sunny tomorrow” and “I anticipate punishment as a future bad thing”? The latter is evaluative and about something that will happen to me; it concerns me. Fear of punishment is a combination of anticipating that punishment is going to happen to me (or someone close to me) and evaluating punishment as bad. I need both anticipation and evaluation to experience fear. I may believe, for example, that punishment is bad, but if I do not think it is going to happen to me, I am not afraid (and thereby not disturbed). Note that you can more easily talk me out of the idea that ‘punishment is going to happen to me,’ but it is difficult to convince me

that punishment is not bad (the coward might respond: *but I feel that painful punishment is bad*). That is why it is hard to talk someone out of fearing punishment and pain in general. Callicles, for example, may say after having listened Socrates' arguments:

*ok Socrates, I kind of get it that punishment is not bad; however, it feels bad.
I also get it that a life of bodily pleasure is not good; however, it feels good.
So, I guess, I am not entirely convinced by you.*

My proposal is that Callicles is convinced *on some level, but not entirely* because appetites, fear (and other states we would call 'emotions') are felt evaluations; they make us feel that certain things are good or bad. Therefore, it is really hard to convince someone otherwise.^{156,157} Let us consider one more example: fearing shame. When I am afraid of embarrassing myself, you might convince me that I won't embarrass myself, but it would be very hard for you to convince me that shame is not in fact bad. While anticipating shame, I *already feel* the pain from the future embarrassment; I already feel that shame is bad. All things we fear are bad, and all bad things are, to some degree aversive. Anticipating aversive things is itself aversive. Therefore, fear itself is aversive, and that is why it is very hard to talk someone out of fearing something.

We can now see that fear and appetite differ and that the glutton and the coward may require different therapies. Socrates can theoretically talk me out of (and into) fears, but he cannot simply talk me out of (and into) having an appetite. Without my having a lack, he can talk all he

¹⁵⁶ I take it that it is really hard, but not impossible. Austin, by contrast, seems to think that it is impossible for Socrates to talk Callicles out of fear. She argues that Callicles fears death and that his fear of death is "beyond the reach of rational argument" (2013: 2). She criticizes the Penner account: "According to the traditional conception of Socratic intellectualism, however, fears respond to alterations in belief. When one is rationally convinced by a particular argument, then the fear should subside and lose motivational force. Target the belief, alter the belief, and one will no longer act at the behest of the fear." (Austin 2013: 8). When Austin says that 'fear loses its motivational force,' I am not sure whether she means that (a) I am not afraid anymore, or (b) I am still afraid, but my fear will not cause an action. I argued that it is fairly easy for beliefs and reasoning to make me stop acting on my fear, but it is much harder for them to make me stop being afraid.

¹⁵⁷ Another explanation for why Socrates is so unsuccessful in talking people out of fear might be that some people's physiological condition makes them more prone to being afraid. In the *Timaeus*, Plato will claim that cowardice is the result of a physiological condition, namely of humors "wandering up and down the body without finding a vent" (86e-87a). For physiological explanations of cowardice in Aristotle see *De Part. An.* 667a13-23. There, Aristotle explains that animals with large hearts are cowardly (and those with small and medium sized ones courageous) because a large heart leads to cold blood, and cold blood apparently makes people more timid.

wants about cake, I still won't be hungry. He may convince me that, for instance, Sachertorte (a delicious Austrian chocolate cake) is the greatest food, but he won't convince me that I am hungry.¹⁵⁸ Similarly, if I keep experiencing a painful lack, his arguments for why I shouldn't feel hungry right now (you just ate 20 minutes ago!) won't make me stop feeling hungry.¹⁵⁹

The glutton eats, and the coward flees. The explanation for why some agents *act* on their appetites and fears is, I propose, the same: they deliberate incorrectly. For example, the glutton deliberates incorrectly that the current lack of food is indeed bad and that eating would be best, and the coward deliberates incorrectly that death is indeed a future evil, and that avoiding death at all costs would be best. But when it comes to explaining why the glutton is always hungry and why the coward is always afraid, the explanations differ, as I hope to have shown. Accordingly, in order to cure such patients, the treatment has to be twofold:

- (i) tackle their poor deliberation ability: make them better deliberators so that knowledge can block appetites/fear from becoming action-causing.
- (ii) tackle their appetites and fears: erase false appetites and fears

I conclude that both the glutton and the coward are ignorant and that is why they *act* on their appetites and fears. Further, if they had knowledge, they would not *have* crazy appetites and fears. However, it is not true that both the coward and the glutton have crazy appetites *because* they are ignorant – ignorance causes fears but not of all appetites. Therefore, certain gluttons, namely those

¹⁵⁸ Maybe a conversation about cake will make me more sensitive about my bodily lacks, and then I feel hungry. However, if I am totally full, he won't be able to talk me into feeling hungry.

¹⁵⁹ *The wrathful person*. How about someone who is pathologically angry? Socrates does seem to believe that we can talk people out of feeling angry (he tries to talk the jurors out of their anger for him: “don't cast your vote in anger” *Apol.*34c). Talking someone out of feeling angry seems easier than talking someone out of fear or hunger because we are angry at someone for a particular reason, and when that reason disappears, usually our anger disappears, too. Some of the jurors, for example, may be angry at Socrates because they believe that he is a self-righteous know-it-all, but after Socrates has explained to them that he acted on the oracle's order, their anger might disappear. Note that anger is, for Socrates (as well as for the Stoics), an *epithumetic* desire. If anger is an *epithumia*, and if all *epithumiai* involve experiencing painful lacks and anticipating pleasant filler, then anger involves a painful lack (maybe lost dignity) and an anticipation of a pleasant filler (revenge; restore dignity).

who constantly experience painful lacks, cannot be cured by making them less ignorant. Making such agents less ignorant only solves part of the problem: it turns them into *enkratic* agents (i.e., agents who experience strong desires that oppose reason). But if we want to get to the root of their problem, we must make them stop experiencing crazy appetites. Part of their therapy is, therefore, disciplining and restraining their appetites.¹⁶⁰

COMPATIBILITY OF MY INTERPRETATION WITH SOCRATIC CORE BELIEFS

I will now show that my interpretation is compatible with all four Socratic core beliefs (as established in chapter two). **(1)** *We always desire the good (Gorg.468b) and things we take to be good (Prot. 358d; Men. 77c-78b)*. Appetites and fear are motivational in virtue of being evaluative. We have only one overarching, final goal, namely the good (happiness). We do everything else (eating a sandwich, fleeing the battle field) because we take it to be good (happiness-promoting). **(2)** *We always do what we take to be best to do (Prot. 358b-d)*. I proposed that every action requires an action plan, i.e., an idea about what is best to do.

(3) *All wrongdoing is due to ignorance (Prot.357c-e, 360c-e; Lach. 194d) and knowledge is sufficient for virtue*. The glutton measures incorrectly that the present lack should be acted upon. If the glutton knew better, he would for example not eat a third piece of Sachertorte. Similarly, the coward measures incorrectly that an evil is imminent. If he knew better, he would not fear death, for example. In my interpretation, it remains true that all wrongdoing is due to ignorance. Knowledge can block our appetites and fear from becoming final motivations, i.e., knowledge can

¹⁶⁰ Among the treatments that Cicero proposes is desensitization, i.e., lessening emotional responses through exposure (“The prudent poet understands that the habit of enduring pain is a teacher that must not be condemned,” *Tusc. Disp.* II, XXI).

prevent us from acting on our appetites and fear. The knowledgeable person always calculates correctly whether eating right now is the best thing to do and whether something ought to be feared. Some physiological conditions may prevent one from becoming knowledgeable (and maybe those agents can only become *enkritic* at best), but once one has knowledge it remains true that your knowledge is sufficient for virtue.

Some interpreters have argued that knowledge remains sufficient for virtue only if appetites are beliefs. By turning them into beliefs, as they argue, we can explain why appetites can be altered by knowledge, and only if they can be altered by knowledge, remains knowledge sufficient for virtue.¹⁶¹ However, the alleged advantage of this interpretation comes at an obvious disadvantage: if appetites are beliefs, and if that makes it easier to explain why they can be altered by beliefs, then it makes it also more difficult to explain why sometimes they cannot be altered by beliefs. I argue that my distinction between experiences and anticipations explains better why appetites sometimes can be altered, and other times cannot. Anticipations of pleasure and pain are more responsive to reason because they are generated by beliefs, memories, or imaginations. We can convince someone that eating the cake will not be pleasant, though it might be difficult. Experiences, however, are not responsive to reason *at all* because they are perceived bodily lacks. We cannot talk anyone out of experiencing present pain. When I perceive a lack of food, I find the lack painful (if not full-fledged painful then at least disagreeable), and pain automatically appears to be bad. No argument can talk me out of that. Even if I learn that an evil scientist manipulates my body in such a way that it delivers the information of lack, I could still not stop feeling pain (except by taking an anesthetic, for example).¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ I take this to be Singpurwalla's (2006) and Carone's (2004: 89) argument.

¹⁶² In addition, I believe that the competing interpretation of 'appetites are beliefs' has the disadvantages that I presented in chapter two under the 'immediately evaluative belief' view.

(4) *The knowledgeable person's soul is harmonious* (Prot. 356d). In my interpretation, the knowledgeable or virtuous person experiences hunger. Sometimes she is hungry, but she also knows that eating is not the best thing to do right now (she believes it is best to keep working, for example). But I do not believe that the co-existence of her appetite and her reasoned desire to keep working constitutes a harmony-threatening motivational conflict. As I proposed in chapter two, a harmony-threatening motivational conflict is an *unsolvable conflict*, and an unsolvable conflict is a conflict between two competing ends (goodness and pleasure). But in my interpretation, there are no competing ends; we all have only one end, namely the good. Appetites and fear are motivational in virtue of being evaluative. It therefore remains true in my interpretation that the knowledgeable person's soul is harmonious.¹⁶³

I believe that a plausible Socratic account is one in which the knowledgeable person can be hungry, although she believes that eating right now is not the best thing to do. She wants to keep working. The Socratic, therefore, must explain how hunger and the reasoned desire to keep working can coexist without constituting a harmony-threatening conflict. I proposed one such explanation: it is not a harmony-threatening conflict because it is a solvable conflict; the knowledgeable person can easily figure out what is better to do by calculating and measuring the goodness of each action (eating and working). Often, multiple options are good, but some are better than others. Knowledge enables us to measure correctly which option is best.

¹⁶³ Is the knowledgeable person who is hungry but does not want to eat merely *enkratic* and not virtuous? If we want to maintain a difference between the virtuous and the *enkratic*, we could say that the knowledgeable person who experiences hunger but does not want to eat differs from the *enkratic* in that her hunger is not a what I called 'crazy desire,' i.e., a desire that involves false experiences or false anticipations. The knowledgeable person experiences only 'reasonable desires.' A reasonable hunger is, for instance, the experience of a lack of food that ought to be filled. A crazy hunger, by contrast, is the experience of a lack that ought not to be filled (as in the case of the glutton).

Conclusion

Let me summarize my results as follows:

- (1) In chapter one, I proposed that if we want to investigate states other than beliefs in Socratic psychology, we ought to investigate *pathemata*, in particular the quartet: pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear.
- (2) I have shown in chapter two and three that these states are worth distinguishing. They are different states that influence our actions in different ways.
- (3) *Pathemata* have motivational flavor. All interpreters agree on that. Yet, they do not explain *why* these states have motivational flavor. I called this an explanatory gap in the secondary literature. I aimed to fill this gap and proposed that *pathemata* are motivational because they are evaluative:
 - (a) Pleasure and pain are motivational because they involve *evaluative experiences*: pain is aversive because it immediately appears to be bad; pleasure is attractive because it immediately appears to be good. I called these appearances ‘immediately evaluative perceptual appearances.’
 - (b) Appetites and fear are motivational because they involve:
 - (i) *evaluative experiences*: hunger and fear are unpleasant, and the pain/unpleasantness we experience when we are hungry and afraid immediately appears to be bad.
 - (ii) *evaluative anticipations*: when we are hungry, we anticipate pleasure from eating, and pleasure appears to be good. When we are afraid, we anticipate that something bad is going to happen to us. I called the appearances involved in anticipations ‘higher order appearances’ because they require a cognitive skill higher than perception (such as memory, imagination, or belief).
- (4) I proposed that *pathemata* can play a more motivationally robust role in a Socratic account of actions. I suggested that they can become the final motivation of an action if they are endorsed and combined with an action plan.
- (5) I believe that my interpretation renders the Socratic psychology of action more plausible. In my interpretation, Socrates does not downplay the influence of *pathemata* on our

actions. He can acknowledge that sometimes even the virtuous person experiences aversive pain and hunger, albeit believing that pain is not bad or that he should not eat right now.

After having investigated two kinds of vicious characters—the glutton and the coward—we will now turn to another agent: the criminal. In the next chapter, my focus will not be on explaining *why* the criminal committed a crime, but rather on *how* to respond to wrongdoing. My main question will be: which responses does Socrates consider to be effective in dealing with wrongdoers? Specifically, I will argue that there is room for painful punishment in a Socratic education program. I will propose that when the criminal experiences painful punishment, he experiences badness (because pain immediately appears to be bad), and a skillful judge makes the wrongdoer connect badness with wrongdoing by inflicting painful punishment. Since painful punishment can make us connect wrongdoing with badness, it can make certain wrongdoers better.

CAN FLOGGING MAKE US SMARTER?

Socrates on Bodily Punishment

Abstract: Socrates famously claims that wrongdoers do wrong because they are ignorant about the fact that wrongdoing is always harmful to the agent. In order to improve wrongdoers and to prevent future wrongdoing, we must, therefore, make wrongdoers less ignorant. Wrongdoers must understand that wrongdoing is never in their own best interest. The typical, Socratic way to make someone less ignorant is via philosophical conversations. In the *Gorgias*, however, Socrates also claims that painful bodily punishment like flogging can improve certain wrongdoers. But how could flogging make anyone smarter? I will propose a Socratic answer to this question and argue against most interpreters that we can take Socrates' endorsement of painful punishment seriously. Painful punishment can make certain wrongdoers smarter by communicating the message that wrongdoing is bad for the wrongdoer which in certain cases cannot be communicated effectively through philosophical dialogue.

1. Bodily Punishment Now and Then

In Singapore in 1994, Michael Fay was sentenced to six strokes of the cane on accounts of theft and vandalism. In September 2018, two women in Malaysia were sentenced to six strokes of the cane for alleged attempted lesbian conduct. In March 2019, the sultan of Brunei announced that the country will punish homosexual conduct more rigorously by publicly whipping and even stoning the alleged culprit. While many Americans condemn the practice of flogging as barbaric and inhumane, bodily punishment such as “spanking” or “paddling” is still practiced in some public and private schools in several U.S. states.¹⁶⁴ Most alarming are several studies showing that

¹⁶⁴ At the time of writing, it is legal to spank students with paddles in nineteen states.

African-American students, students with disabilities, and students of low socioeconomic status are spanked more often than their peers. Marginalized “students [are] disproportionately on the receiving end” of bodily punishment.¹⁶⁵

Bodily punishment has a history of affecting marginalized groups disproportionately. In ancient Athens, bodily punishment was mainly reserved for slaves.¹⁶⁶ In Plato’s *Laws*, slaves and foreigners are flogged, while free citizens receive a different, non-corporal kind of punishment for the same crime.¹⁶⁷ One of the few ancient Greek texts that speaks to bodily punishment for adults other than slaves and foreigners comes from Demosthenes. Demosthenes encourages the physical punishment of women who have been charged with adultery. These women were considered to be impure and were consequently denied attendance at sacred rituals. If they tried to attend, “any person whatsoever may at will inflict upon them any sort of punishment, save only death.”¹⁶⁸

Justifying bodily punishment is difficult, but it becomes even more difficult if we consider who is most likely to be affected by it. How could anyone, let alone Socrates, one of the main founders of Western (moral!) philosophy, approve of intentionally inflicting bodily pain on someone? But Socrates does approve of bodily punishment: we will see below that Socrates believes that it can make certain wrongdoers less ignorant and, thereby, less miserable.¹⁶⁹ We will

¹⁶⁵ Northington (2007: 57). See also the 2018 report “Discipline Disparities for Black Students, Boys, and Students with Disabilities” by the Government Accountability Office (<https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690828.pdf>).

¹⁶⁶ Hunter (1992: 279).

¹⁶⁷ *Laws* 879d-e, 881b-c.

¹⁶⁸ Demosthenes 59.86.

¹⁶⁹ We can distinguish six justifications for punishment: (1) *Reformation or Rehabilitation*. Socrates’ account, we will see, comes closest to what contemporary philosophers call ‘reformatory punishment’ or punishment for the sake of rehabilitation. However, the terms ‘reformation’ and ‘rehabilitation’ suggest that the wrongdoer has *fully* recovered. For Socrates, as I will argue, painful punishment can make certain wrongdoers better, but in order to fully recover from viciousness, wrongdoers need to go through a more extensive education program. (2) *Deterrence*. Punishment can deter from wrongdoing by creating fear. Socrates approves of deterrence, as we will see below. (3) *Retribution*. Retributivists believe that the wrongdoer deserves punishment and that his suffering is “an end in itself” (Feinberg 1990: 646). As MacKenzie (1981: 226) has pointed out, Socrates in the *Gorgias* (523a7-b4, c1) mentions retributive punishment, but we do not know whether he would also approve of it. (4) *Revenge*. Socrates disapproves of revenge, since he believes that we should never return harm for harm (*Crito* 49b-d; *Apol.* 41d). (5) *Restitution*. Punishment functions as a compensation and is intended to restore the status quo. *Gorg.* 480c7 could suggest that Socrates approves

also see that, unlike Plato, Socrates does not restrict bodily punishment to certain marginalized groups. His approach is much more egalitarian: whoever exhibits the kind of ignorance that requires flogging ought to be flogged. Despite this, we know that historically bodily punishment has been unequally applied, and there are many other reasons that Socrates' approval of bodily punishment might make us uncomfortable. But in order to get a full account of Socrates' moral philosophy, we must acknowledge his claims about bodily punishment, no matter how objectionable we might find them.¹⁷⁰

Let me stress that this paper is interpretive and not evaluative. I aim to show that Socrates can and does approve of painful bodily punishment because he believes that it can improve certain wrongdoers. But I do *not* suggest that he (or anyone) *should* approve of bodily punishment. I will not discuss the legitimacy of the institution of punishment or whether we ought to punish (let alone flog) wrongdoers at all. Instead I will focus on the question of whether, given Socrates' particular assumptions about the human soul and the generation of actions, bodily punishment can improve anyone.

2. The Passages

For many of us, bodily punishment is hard to justify because it is painful and because we believe that pain is harmful. Anyone who endorses bodily punishment, therefore, must justify intentionally

of restitutive punishment. (6) *Deprivation or Incapacitation*. Punishment can deprive of means that facilitate wrongdoing. Paying a fine, for example, deprives of money, exile deprives of friends, and the death penalty deprives of life; money, friends, and being alive enable an agent to do wrong. Socrates has good reason to approve of deprivation, since certain goods tempt people to commit crimes (*Gorg.* 525d). For a more detailed discussion of the different purposes of punishment see Berman (2012) and Feinberg (1990); for a detailed discussion of Platonic penology see MacKenzie (1981).

¹⁷⁰ Interestingly, we do not condemn incarceration as harshly as bodily punishment, although the effects of incarceration are often more damaging and long-lasting than those of bodily punishment (Brennan 2017).

harming another human being. For Socrates, however, the situation is different. Socrates believes that the only true harm is ignorance (*Euthyd.* 281d). Pain itself is not harmful; it is only harmful if it prevents us from becoming more knowledgeable (we cannot think when we are in pain). In fact, Socrates believes not only that painful punishment is not harmful; but he also believes that it can benefit certain wrongdoers, or so I will argue. Consider the following passages in which Socrates endorses painful punishment:¹⁷¹

(T1) Socrates: Those who flee punishment [...] look to its painfulness (τὸ ἀλγεινὸν) but are blind to its benefit (τὸ ὠφέλιμον) and they are ignorant of how much more miserable it is to live with a soul that is not healthy, but unsound, unjust, and impious, than with an unhealthy body (*Gorg.* 479b5-c1).

Here, Socrates says that punishment is painful but beneficial, and he seems to suggest that painful punishment makes the soul healthier. But how does painful punishment make the soul healthier?

(T2) Socrates: The benefit comes to them [the wrongdoers], both here and in Hades, through pain and suffering (δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν), for (γὰρ) there is no other way to get rid of injustice (οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, *Gorg.* 525b4-c1).

In (T2), Socrates claims that painful punishment improves the soul by making it less unjust. Given that Socrates defines injustice as ignorance (*Rep.* I 351a), we can conclude that painful punishment can make the soul less ignorant. We can find the same idea in (T3):

(T3) Socrates: The one being punished (ὁ δίκην διδούς), therefore, experiences good things? Polus: It looks like it. S: Hence, he benefits (ὠφελεῖται)? P: Yes. S: Is the benefit the one I take it to be? Does his soul become better (βελτίων) if he's punished justly (δικαίως κολάζεται)? P: It looks like it at least. S: Hence, the one who gets punished gets rid of something bad in his soul (κακίας ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται)? P: Yes. S: Now, is the bad thing he gets rid of the most serious one? [...] don't

¹⁷¹ Translations are mine, though I consulted those in Cooper "Plato. Complete Works". The Greek terms for 'punishment' are τιμωρία (*Gorg.* 525b1, 472d7-8, 472e5-6), κόλασις (*Euthyph.* 8b2; *Prot.* 323d2, 324a4, a6; *Gorg.* 476a7, e1; 477a6; 479a1), and δίκην δίδοναι (*Euthyph.* 8c2, c7; *Gorg.* 476a7-8, 477a7-8; 479a1, a7, b5, d2). The term κόλασις can also be translated as 'disciplining'; δίκην δίδοναι means most literally 'to pay what is due.' As we will see, Socrates uses τιμωρία, κόλασις, and δίκην δίδοναι to refer to actions we would commonly consider as punishments. 'Paying what is due,' for instance, might involve flogging, imprisonment, paying fines, exile, or execution (see (T4) below). We 'discipline' or 'restrain' someone by means of whipping and putting him in chains (*Laws* 764b4-5).

you call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, (ἀδικίαν, ἀμαθίαν, δειλίαν) and the like? P: Yes, certainly (*Gorg.* 477a2-b8).

Socrates claims that the wrongdoer gets rid of ignorance through punishment.¹⁷² In (T4), he specifies that bodily punishment such as flogging is among the kinds of punishment that can make certain wrongdoers less ignorant:

(T4) Socrates: Wrongdoing should not be kept hidden but brought into the open, so that [the wrongdoer] gets punished and gets healthy (ὕγιης γένηται); he should force himself [...] and present himself courageously as to a doctor for cauterization and surgery, pursuing the good and admirable thing without taking into account the pain (τὸ ἀλγεινόν). And if he is so unjust (ἡδίκηκῶς) that he deserves flogging (πληγῶν), he should present himself to be beaten (τύπτειν); if he deserves imprisonment (δεσμοῦ), to be imprisoned; if a fine (ζημίας), to pay it; if exile (φυγῆς), to be exiled; and if death (θανάτου), to die (*Gorg.* 480c3-d3).

From these passages, I conclude that Socrates approves of painful bodily punishment like flogging because it benefits certain wrongdoers. These wrongdoers benefit because they psychologically improve, and this improvement is epistemic: they become less ignorant. Most interpreters, however, have argued that Socrates in the early dialogues cannot and in fact does not approve of painful punishment.¹⁷³ They argue that in (T1) to (T3), the ‘punishment’ Socrates has in mind is not bodily punishment but teaching; and the pain that he talks about is simply the pain of refutation.¹⁷⁴ In (T4), Socrates says that a wrongdoer should be flogged *if* he is so unjust that he deserves to be flogged. But this condition is never met.¹⁷⁵ Why do interpreters take such great pains to explain away Socrates’ approval of painful bodily punishment?

¹⁷² Remember that cowardice is also a kind of ignorance for Socrates (*Lach.* 192cff.).

¹⁷³ Rowe has argued that we do not have *any* textual evidence for Socrates’ endorsement of “flogging, imprisonment, or any vulgar kind of punishment” (2007: 36). Shaw has argued that “none of the evidence shows that Socrates endorses corporal punishment in the *Gorgias*” (2015: 83).

¹⁷⁴ Rowe (2007), Shaw (2015: 94-5). I find it especially unlikely that Socrates has the pains from teaching in mind in (T1) because the implication is that painful punishment affects the wrongdoer’s *bodily* well-being. In (T2), Socrates goes on to give examples of painful *bodily* punishment such as being hung up (ἀνηρτημένους, *Gorg.* 525c7) in Hades. For the claim that teaching is the only kind of ‘punishment’ that Socrates approves of see also Penner (2000, 2011).

¹⁷⁵ Shaw (2015: 79).

I will present and respond to what I take to be the two main objections to Socrates' approval of painful bodily punishment. The first objection is that bodily punishment cannot make anyone think better. The second objection is that bodily punishment cannot improve wrongdoers; instead, chances are that it will make them worse. I will respond to both objections and argue that we can take the passages at face-value: Socrates approves of painful bodily punishment such as flogging because it can make certain wrongdoers less ignorant.

3. THE OBJECTIONS

(3.1) PAINFUL PUNISHMENT CANNOT MAKE ANYONE THINK BETTER.

Socrates believes that wrongdoing is always harmful to the wrongdoer (*Crit.*49a-b, *Apol.*30d, *Gorg.*469b). He also believes that wrongdoers are ignorant about this fact; they think that wrongdoing is good and beneficial to them (*Prot.*357c-e, *Gorg.*466d-468e). The thief, for example, reasons incorrectly that stealing money will benefit him. It is this incorrect reasoning and the subsequent false belief 'stealing money right now is the best thing to do' that brings about the crime. In order to improve wrongdoers and to prevent future wrongdoing, we must, therefore, make wrongdoers less ignorant. Given this explanation of wrongdoing, some interpreters have argued that for Socrates in Plato's early dialogues "only philosophical dialogue can improve one's fellow citizen."¹⁷⁶ After all, "how can making people suffer – fining, imprisoning, flogging,

¹⁷⁶ Penner 2000: 164. For the same thesis see also Rowe (2007) and Shaw (2015). By early dialogues I mean *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Protagoras*, *Ion*, *Hippias Minor* and *Major*, and *Gorgias*. What unifies this group of dialogues is that they are all pre-*Republic* dialogues and that they have been taken to present the Socratic philosophy (with *Gorgias* and *Meno* potentially being transitional in parts; see e.g., Penner 1992: 124; Resthoko 2006: 11-3; Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 18). One of the reasons for why some believe that the *Gorgias* is 'transitional' instead of 'Socratic' is precisely that Socrates in the *Gorgias* endorses punishment. I hope to show that the *Gorgias* fits in nicely with the other early dialogues. There may be other reasons for thinking that the *Gorgias* is transitional, but I propose that Socrates' approval of punishment is not one of them.

exiling, executing them—how can any of *that* make them *think* better?”¹⁷⁷ This is the first objection that some interpreters use to argue that Socrates does not approve of painful punishment.

One response to this objection is that painful punishment could in fact make wrongdoers think better, particularly those who committed a crime because of a strong desire.¹⁷⁸ Let’s assume that a thief stole because he had a strong desire for money. His desire for money, one could argue, hijacked the thief’s deliberation process and made him believe that stealing is the best thing to do. If such a wrongdoer experiences flogging, the painful experience may erase or decrease his strong desire for money. Alternatively, it may bring about a strong counter-desire such as a strong desire to avoid punishment. On this proposal, painful punishment fixes the wrongdoer’s misguided desire; it brings about a *conative* improvement. This conative improvement brings about an *epistemic* improvement: the misguided desire does not lead the agent astray anymore, and so he does not erroneously conclude that stealing is the best thing to do.

Those interpreters who argue that Socrates does not approve of painful punishment reject this proposal. They argue that, for Socrates, all desires for particular things arise out of belief and reasoning. The thief’s strong desire for money must, therefore, also be the result of beliefs and reasoning. At some point, the thief concluded that money is very valuable, and that is why he now has a strong desire for money.¹⁷⁹ So, again, if we want to change his desire for money, the best way to do that is to talk to him, not to flog him. Painful punishment can only improve what is sometimes called ‘non-rational desires,’ i.e., desires that arise independently of our beliefs and

¹⁷⁷ Rowe (2007: 28).

¹⁷⁸ Some version of this first proposal seems to be what Brickhouse and Smith have in mind (2010: 15, 131).

¹⁷⁹ Why does the thief’s strong desire for money have to be the result of reasoning? Socrates believes that all wrongdoing is due to ignorance and that knowledge is sufficient for virtue (*Euthyd.* 278d-282a; *Lach.* 194d; *Men.* 87e-89a; *Prot.* 357c-e, 360c-e). If our thief just happened to have a strong desire for money, if his desire for money were a non-rational desire that did not arise out of reasoning, in that case his wrongdoing would not be due to ignorance and knowledge would not be sufficient for virtue. For this argument, see Irwin 1977: 87; Penner 2011: 279; Carone 2004: 89.

reasoning and that can make us act in a certain way. Plato will introduce non-rational desires in the *Republic*, but since there are no such desires for Socrates, painful punishment cannot bring about a conative improvement and, therefore, it cannot make anyone think better either.¹⁸⁰ In the Socratic dialogues, interpreters have concluded, wrongdoers need talk and not punishment.¹⁸¹

I will not take a stand on whether Socratic psychology includes non-rational desires. Instead, I would like to propose a second response to the objection “how can painful punishment make anyone think better?” The first response was that painful punishment can bring about a *conative* improvement by altering the wrongdoer’s misguided desire (e.g., his strong desire for money). This conative improvement may bring about an *epistemic* improvement: the thief is less inclined to believe that stealing is the best thing to do. I will propose that painful punishment can bring about an *immediate epistemic* improvement (not via altering non-rational desires) by erasing false beliefs and communicating new, true ones. The advantage of this proposal is that we can accommodate Socrates’ endorsement of painful punishment without having to take a stand on whether Socratic psychology includes non-rational desires.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Rowe (2007: 28-9): “The problem [...] is that this kind of view of punishment [i.e. the view that painful punishment can improve wrongdoers] seems already to take us most of the way over to a *Republic IV* psychology—one where it is not just the state of our beliefs that determines the way we behave, as on the Socratic model, but the state of our beliefs *and* of our desires; because our desires, so to speak, can cause as much trouble as our beliefs. On the Socratic model, the desire that lies behind every action [...] is the desire for the real good; on this new, *Republic*-type model, we have non-good directed desires which are themselves capable of causing us to act—so that our *desires as well as our reason needs persuasion, education, direction*. That is where punishment comes in, as a suitably irrational way of dealing with irrational drives.”

¹⁸¹ Penner: “‘If only we could *discuss* things for long enough, if only we could *understand* what is best,’ Socrates seems to say, ‘all would be well, and all conduct would be virtuous!’” (2000: 165). Rowe: in Socratic psychology, “nothing apart from talking and reasoning with us will be necessary because there is nothing apart from what we think and believe that is even in principle capable of causing us to go wrong” (2006: 166).

¹⁸² Some interpreters also argue that painful punishment can improve wrongdoers, but they do not explain how exactly punishment accomplishes that. According to Vigo (2002), the wrongdoer experiences self-deception (“autoengaño”) when he commits a crime. Punishment allows him to experience self-distance (“autodistanciamiento”). Vigo seems to envision a Hegelian, dialectical process during which the wrongdoer sees his error for the first time as an error and, thus, escapes self-deception (89, n.15). He further argues that the experience of self-distancing is *necessary* for moral progress (82), and that refutation has the same effect (77). Boeri (2007) proposes that the suffering from punishment is the condition for the criminal’s improvement (“su sufrimiento es la condición para regresar su alma a un estado correcto o sano”, 55), but he does not explain how exactly suffering improves wrongdoers.

We generally accept that *experiences* and *perceptions* can erase old beliefs and give rise to new ones. For example, presumably no one would wonder “how can my traveling to Iceland give rise to the belief that Iceland is a great country for outdoor enthusiasts?” Such beliefs can make me ‘think better,’ if they are true. If they are false, they can lead me astray. I will suggest that painful punishment is – just like my traveling to Iceland – an experience that can erase old, false beliefs and give rise to new, true ones.¹⁸³ Let’s take the example of a wrongdoer who experiences painful punishment for having committed a crime. We can give the following formal (and idealized) model of the deliberation process in this agent:

- (i) Pain is bad.
- (ii) Flogging causes pain.
- (iii) Wrongdoing leads to flogging.
- (iv) So, wrongdoing leads to pain.
- (v) So, wrongdoing is bad for me.

Since wrongdoing leads to painful punishment, and since our wrongdoer believes that pain is bad, he concludes that wrongdoing is bad for him. Since our wrongdoer now believes that wrongdoing is bad for him, he is more likely to refrain from wrongdoing in the future because, for Socrates, we do what we take to be best to do (*Prot.* 358b7-8). The only psychological states that we need in order to explain why the wrongdoer’s beliefs changed from ‘wrongdoing is good for me’ to ‘wrongdoing is bad for me’ are perception, belief, and basic reasoning: our wrongdoer *perceives* the flogging and feels pain, he *believes* that pain is bad, and since the punisher tells him that the flogging is a response to his wrongdoing, he now *connects* wrongdoing with its being bad for himself. He has gained a new true belief: ‘wrongdoing is bad for me.’ Our wrongdoer did not (yet) acquire the true explanation for why wrongdoing is bad, nor can he consistently identify

¹⁸³ Kamtekar agrees that the goal of punishment in the *Gorgias* is soul correction (2016: 4); however, she believes that punishment cannot teach new true beliefs (2016: 7).

particular instances of wrongdoing. For now, he probably believes ‘wrongdoing is bad for me because it leads to pain.’ Painful punishment cannot communicate the true Socratic explanation that wrongdoing is bad for me because it harms my soul. To achieve such a more comprehensive improvement, extended philosophical conversations will be necessary. Nevertheless, painful punishment accomplishes an important first step towards a more comprehensive improvement: the wrongdoer associates wrongdoing with its being bad for himself. Some wrongdoers may not be capable of taking this first step. Such incurable wrongdoers should be executed for their own good, as Socrates believes.¹⁸⁴

Why not simply instill the belief ‘wrongdoing is bad’ through teaching and instruction? To make plausible Socrates’ endorsement of painful punishment I propose that some wrongdoers (we will talk more about them below) need to experience a more persuasive argument than the one verbal teaching and instruction can communicate. They do not only need to hear that wrongdoing is bad, but they need to *feel* it. When wrongdoers experience painful punishment, they *feel badness*. They feel badness when they experience painful punishment because they believe that pain is bad. Making wrongdoers feel badness through pain and explaining to them that they feel pain because of their wrongdoing aims to communicate the message that wrongdoing is bad.¹⁸⁵ In my interpretation, we can take Socrates seriously when he says in (T2) that some wrongdoers become better *through* pain (δι' ἀληθδόνων καὶ ὀδυῶν, *Gorg.* 525b4-c1).

Socrates claims that painful punishment can epistemically improve wrongdoers. I have argued that we can make sense of his endorsement of painful punishment without introducing non-

¹⁸⁴ See (T4) above. More on the different kinds of wrongdoers in the final section of this paper.

¹⁸⁵ This way, painful punishment may even communicate the *moral* belief that wrongdoing is bad, rather than merely the *prudential* belief that wrongdoing is bad for me. In contemporary philosophy of punishment, Morris (1981: 264, 268) and Hampton (1984) have proposed that painful punishment can communicate moral beliefs. Unfortunately, they do not explain how exactly painful punishment accomplishes that. I proposed a possible explanation above.

rational desires into Socratic psychology. Like other experiences, painful punishment can lead to an immediate epistemic improvement by erasing false and by establishing (or reinforcing) true beliefs.¹⁸⁶

(3.2) PAINFUL PUNISHMENT WILL MAKE WRONGDOERS WORSE AND NOT BETTER.

The second objection to Socrates' approval of painful punishment is that painful punishment will not generate a new true belief, but instead it will

- (a) enforce what Socrates holds to be a false belief, namely 'pain is bad,' or even
- (b) create a new false belief, namely 'getting caught is bad.'

In both cases, painful punishment would make the wrongdoer worse and more ignorant, not better and less ignorant. Let us look at (a) first. Some might worry that painful punishment makes wrongdoers more ignorant because it relies on and enforces what Socrates holds to be a false belief, namely 'pain is bad.'¹⁸⁷ I agree that, for Socrates, the belief 'pain is bad' is indeed a false belief. The only thing that Socrates considers to be bad in itself is the ignorance (*Euthyd.* 281d). Pain can only be bad derivatively, namely if it stands in the way of my becoming more knowledgeable;¹⁸⁸ in itself, however, pain is indifferent. In our scenario, pain is not derivatively bad either; in fact, pain helps the wrongdoer to become less ignorant. Therefore, when our

¹⁸⁶ When discussing divine inspiration (another non-argumentative means of education) Ariza helpfully distinguishes between (i) divine inspiration provides new content, and (ii) it makes existing beliefs more stable (2012: 49). I borrow Ariza's helpful distinction and propose that if the wrongdoer already believed that wrongdoing is bad, painful punishment can make his belief more stable. If he did not already believe that wrongdoing is bad, painful punishment can give rise to this new belief.

¹⁸⁷ Kamtekar raises this worry (2016: 6, n. 13).

¹⁸⁸ Accordingly, if our body is in such a bad condition that it prevents us from thinking, our life is bad (*Gorg.*505a) and in some cases not even worth living (*Crit.* 47e).

wrongdoer believes ‘pain is bad,’ meaning either ‘pain is bad in itself’ or ‘this pain from flogging is derivatively bad,’ he indeed holds a false belief.

Given that painful punishment reinforces a false belief, one may legitimately wonder how painful punishment can epistemically improve anyone. I propose that our wrongdoer *overall* epistemically improves because he ends up believing that ‘wrongdoing is bad for me.’ This new belief is worth a lot! For Socrates, we always do what we take to be in our best interest (*Prot.* 358b7-8). Wrongdoing, however, is never in our best interest. Wrongdoing “is the worst thing there is” for the agent (*Gorg.* 469b8-9) because it corrupts the soul, and a corrupt soul is miserable (*Gorg.* 472e).¹⁸⁹ Wrongdoing is so harmful to the agent that those who have proven to be incurable wrongdoers should be executed for their own good. As justification, Socrates explains that “for the corrupt (μοχθηρῶ) person it is better not to be alive, for it is necessary that he lives badly” (*Gorg.* 512a). When the wrongdoer experiences painful punishment and adopts the belief that wrongdoing is bad, he gains a lot (he connects wrongdoing with badness), at a fairly low cost (a false belief he already held got reinforced). Presumably, such a calculus is at play in those passages in the *Republic* in which Plato claims that falsehoods can be useful. Imagine, for example, that your friend wants to borrow your weapon. You notice quickly, however, that your friend is out of his mind. In this scenario, Plato claims, it would be best to lie to your friend and to not give him your weapon (*Rep.* 382c-d, 331c).¹⁹⁰ Similarly, the false belief ‘pain is bad’ might be useful when it comes to improving certain wrongdoers.

Painful punishment might reinforce the false belief ‘pain is bad.’ Therefore, it might not cure the wrongdoer of all ignorance. However, this is not a good reason for dismissing painful

¹⁸⁹ Socrates also seems to believe that repeatedly performing the right actions improves the soul because he claims that unless one learns and *practices* (ἄσκησις) one will commit injustice (*Gorg.* 509e).

¹⁹⁰ Consider also Plato’s ‘noble lie’ (*Rep.* 414c-416a).

punishment. To see this, let us compare psychic diseases (i.e., ignorance, for Socrates) to bodily diseases. Consider a patient with a cold whose doctor advises him to abstain from exercising. Unfortunately, our patient is also overweight. After two weeks, our patient does not have a cold anymore, but he has gained a couple of pounds. Should the doctor not have treated him? The treatment targeted the cold and it was successful in that respect; however, it also made an already existing condition worse. Like the doctor who may not cure the patient of all diseases, the judge may not cure the wrongdoer of all ignorance. Further, treating one disease might give rise to another one. Nevertheless, we would not claim that the doctor should not treat at all. Analogously, painful punishment might reinforce the false belief ‘pain is bad,’ while treating the false belief ‘wrongdoing is good.’ Since painful punishment successfully treated the false belief ‘wrongdoing is bad,’ a Socratic could respond, it made the wrongdoer better/healthier overall.

Let us now look at objection (b), which is that painful punishment does not make the wrongdoer better but worse because he does not gain the belief that *wrongdoing* is bad but that *punishment* or *getting caught* is bad.¹⁹¹ He will therefore become a sophisticated wrongdoer, someone who tries to avoid punishment at all costs. Such a wrongdoer has become worse because he has acquired a new false belief (‘getting caught is bad’).

In response to this objection, we should notice first that Socrates stresses that punishment *done wisely*, i.e., correctly (*Gorg.* 476d8, 478a7, 525b1) and justly (*Gorg.* 476a8, 476e1, 477a6), can make wrongdoers better. In other words, the judge must be *skillful* in order to instill the true belief that wrongdoing is bad. The idea that punishment ought to be inflicted by an expert judge is crucial and cannot be taken for granted. In ancient Athens, judges were citizen-amateurs, and in the ancient Greek tragedies, painful punishment lies in the hands of private, revengeful citizens.

¹⁹¹ Shaw raises this objection (2015: 76-77).

In Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, for instance, Clytaemestra kills her husband Agamemnon to take revenge for him having sacrificed their daughter Iphigenia. Orestes kills his mother Clytaemestra to take revenge for the murder of his father. The agents believe that justice "cannot come from others outside, but from a member of the house [i.e., family] itself, through cruel, bloody Strife."¹⁹² Against this do-it-yourself punishment for the sake of revenge, Socrates sets his expert punishment for the sake of the betterment of the wrongdoer.¹⁹³

My second response to the objection that painful punishment can make wrongdoers worse, is that this is not a problem for painful punishment alone but rather for education in general. Both painful punishment and philosophical instruction can make people worse instead of better. Let us consider two cases in which a student turns out worse. In case #1, the student uses the rhetorical tools he learned to express his falsehoods more eloquently and persuasively.¹⁹⁴ He becomes a sophisticated wrong-talker. In case #2, the student feels embarrassed about his ignorance and avoids philosophical discussions from then on. He becomes an argument-, or discussion-hater (*μισόλογος*, *Lach.* 188c6, e4). In both cases, the student became worse. Instruction, therefore, is not necessarily a more reliable way to improve people.¹⁹⁵ The perfect teacher can probably prevent her student from becoming an argument-hater; similarly, the perfect judge can prevent the flogged

¹⁹² Aeschylus: *Libation-Bearers* (472-474). At the end of Aeschylus' trilogy, revenge in its original form as a desire for "cruel, bloody Strife" is rejected and substituted with a more civilized form of revenge that is conducive to peace and justice (*Eumenides* 976-986).

¹⁹³ A further comparison reveals how progressive Socrates' account is. Punishment for the sake of revenge (i) is backward-looking (it looks back at the crime); (ii) its goal is anti-humanitarian (the avenger wants to make the wrongdoer more miserable), and (iii) it does not consider why someone has committed a crime. Revenge does not try to cure the disease; instead, it further spreads the disease. Socrates rejects revenge (*Crit.* 49d-e). His own account of painful punishment for the sake of improvement is (i) forward-looking (it looks at how to prevent crimes in the future); (ii) its goal is humanitarian (the judge wants to make the wrongdoer less miserable and psychologically healthier), and (iii) the judge does consider why someone committed a crime; he treats the disease, i.e., ignorance, not merely the symptom, i.e., wrongdoing.

¹⁹⁴ See, for instance, Critias who received dialectical education, but "turned out bad" (Morrison 2010: 204) and put the dialectical skills he learned from Socrates to evil ends (206) when he joined the Thirty Tyrants.

¹⁹⁵ Against Rowe (2007: 29, n.31): "To put it in a nutshell: according to the Socratic model, as I represent it, the only reliable way of changing people's behaviour is by talking to them—because their behaviour is determined by their beliefs, and punishment will not reliably help change beliefs".

wrongdoer from becoming a sophisticated wrongdoer.¹⁹⁶ But until we find such perfect educators, Socrates could say, we should not stop instructing or punishing people just because some become worse.

Someone might object, however, that instruction differs significantly from painful punishment in that painful punishment is intended to be painful while instruction is not. If the student feels discomfort or pain, he is more likely to become an argument-hater, but a skillful teacher will never intentionally make her students feel discomfort or pain. Similarly, a wrongdoer who experiences pain is more likely to become a sophisticated wrongdoer. Therefore, a skillful judge will never intentionally make wrongdoers feel pain.

I believe that Socrates would reject the claim that a good teacher will never intentionally make her students feel discomfort or pain because Socrates himself intentionally shames his interlocutors on several occasions.¹⁹⁷ Given that shame is painful (*Gorg.* 475a), Socrates intentionally makes his interlocutors feel pain for educational purposes. So, either Socrates himself does not strive to make his interlocutors better, or he believes that in certain cases pain and discomfort can make people better. I opt for the second option.

Shaming students and flogging wrongdoers are risky in very similar ways. Shame may turn someone into an *argument-hater* or *sophisticated wrong-talker* who falsely believes that ‘getting caught at contradicting myself is bad.’ Painful punishment may turn someone into a *sophisticated wrong-doer* who falsely believes that ‘getting caught at wrongdoing is bad.’ Both student and wrongdoer will then try to conceal their contradictions and wrongdoing, i.e., their ignorance

¹⁹⁶ Carone (2004: 60) proposes that students must have the right emotional mind-set to benefit from philosophical conversations. They need to find pleasure in obtaining truths. Envy or competitiveness, by contrast, stand in the way of intellectual progress. We can add to Caron’s point that, presumably, a very skillful teacher can put her students in the right emotional mind-set.

¹⁹⁷ Socrates shames, for example, Meletus into adapting a true belief (*Apol.* 24d). We can find further instances of Socrates shaming his interlocutors in *Euthyph.* 15d; *Apol.* 17b, 35b; *Crit.* 52c, 53c; *Gorg.* 494e. In the *Symposium*, Alcibiades admits that “Socrates is the only man in the world who can make me feel ashamed” (216b).

(remember that wrongdoing results from a false belief). If that happens, both student and wrongdoer have become worse, and it is even less likely that they will improve in the future because that would require for them to reveal their ignorance (see (T4)). Therefore, shame and painful punishment are both risky educational methods. Socrates, however, seems to be willing to take that risk given that he himself shames his interlocutors. If done skillfully, Socrates seems to believe, experiencing pain from shame and punishment can make certain people better.

Let us consider the worst-case scenarios one more time: the wrong-talker becomes worse because he adopts the false beliefs ‘getting caught at contradicting myself is bad’ and the wrongdoer becomes worse because he now believes ‘getting caught at wrongdoing is bad.’ I will argue that even this outcome is beneficial to the agent as well as to us, the fellow citizens. (Though the benefits would be greater, of course, if both wrong-talker and wrong-doer had adopted true beliefs). The wrong-talker and wrong-doer benefit even in the worst-case scenario, I propose, because their newly acquired false beliefs will prevent them from future wrongdoing and wrongtalking, at least sometimes. By preventing further wrongdoing and wrongtalking, we prevent a further worsening of their souls. So, even if painful punishment does not make all wrongdoers better, at least it deters from future wrongdoing and wrongtalking, and, thereby, it prevents their souls from becoming worse.

Further, one might think that if the wrongdoer believes that getting caught is bad, we, the fellow citizens, obviously benefit because the wrongdoer will abstain from wrongdoing, such as stealing. Within Socratic philosophy, however, it is not obvious why exactly theft, for instance, would harm the victim. Remember that, for Socrates, only ignorance is truly harmful. So, are you harmed at all if someone steals your car? I believe that, even for Socrates, wrongdoing is harmful to society but for a different reason than we commonly believe.

For Socrates, wrongdoing is a pollution (μίασμα) that requires a cleansing (*Euthyph.* 4c).¹⁹⁸ Those who associate with wrongdoers without bringing them to court risk contamination (*Euthyph.* 4c). In court, the judge can treat the wrongdoer like a doctor treats her patient (*Gorg.* 480c3-d3). Punishment is the treatment that can make the wrongdoer healthier (*Gorg.* 480c3-d3) and that can stop the pollution. The wrongdoer pollutes society, I propose, with his ignorance. Ignorance is a contagious disease, of which wrongdoing is the symptom.¹⁹⁹ But how exactly does wrongdoing spread ignorance? I propose that when the wrongdoer commits a crime, he communicates to others that he takes his action to be beneficial. This message may corrupt others. If one is surrounded by people who steal and cheat, one might be more likely to believe that stealing and cheating is beneficial to oneself. Deterring wrongdoers from future wrongdoing, and thereby making them hide their ignorance is, therefore, beneficial to us, their fellow citizens. So, even if painful punishment does not make all wrongdoers better, at least it deters from future wrongdoing and, thereby, it prevents ignorance from spreading through society.

I suggested that punishment aims to communicate the message that wrongdoing is bad by making the wrongdoer feel badness through pain and by explaining to him that he suffers pain because of his wrongdoing. However, it is up to the wrongdoer to accept or reject the message.²⁰⁰ We cannot force anyone (neither through punishment nor through instruction) to believe truths. The judge can help the wrongdoer to make the connection between ‘wrongdoing’ and ‘badness,’ if necessary through painful punishment, and he can provide arguments and skillfully engage him in conversations, but at the end of the day it is up to the wrongdoer to accept or reject the message

¹⁹⁸ In the *Oresteia*, too, wrongdoing is described in medical terms: wrongdoing is a pollution (μίασμα, *Agamemnon*: 1644-1645) and a blood-dripping wound (αίματοσταγές, *Libation-Bearers*: 840) that needs a plug (ἔμμοτος), a cure (ἔκος, *Libation-Bearers*: 472-474), and a treatment by a doctor (ιατρός, *Libation-Bearers*: 699).

¹⁹⁹ Ignorance makes the soul unhealthy (*Gorg.* 479b5-c1).

²⁰⁰ See Hampton (1984: 230-1).

that wrongdoing is bad. We must, to some degree, trust in the rationality of all agents—even of wrongdoers. This kind of trust is deeply Socratic. At no point in the dialogues does Socrates tell anyone what to do and how to think. Instead, he engages his interlocutors in open philosophical conversations. He trusts in their rationality, and at the same time he takes the risk that they may not improve or even become more ignorant.²⁰¹

To sum up: I have argued that we can take the passages at face-value: Socrates believes that painful punishment conducted skillfully can benefit wrongdoers. I suggested that a Socratic can argue that certain wrongdoers benefit from painful punishment in two ways: punishment can *epistemically improve* wrongdoers by communicating new true beliefs, and it can *prevent epistemic worsening* by deterring from future wrongdoing. I did not aim to argue that painful punishment is Socrates' preferred means of education; nor did I aim to show that painful punishment can make us virtuous (if we understand virtue as knowledge of *what* is good and bad and *why* it is good and bad). Painful punishment does not cure the wrongdoer of all ignorance. For now, I intended to show that there is room in Socratic psychology for pain as an educational means.²⁰² We will see below that in some cases painful punishment is a necessary means because

²⁰¹ Julian Nida-Rümelin (2013: 74): “Die literarische Form, die Platon wählt, der Dialog, ist Ausdruck eines umfassenden Vernunftvertrauens, der Erwartung, dass alle diejenigen, die sich auf das Argument einlassen, am Ende zu den richtigen Überzeugungen gelangen.“

²⁰² Jouët-Pastré presents a different version of the objection that bodily punishment makes wrongdoers worse. He argues that pain disturbs the soul, and that a disturbed soul cannot think and is disharmonious and unjust (2012: 65). The only way in which punishment may have a positive effect is *not* in virtue of being painful but in virtue of being shameful. Punishment can make us feel shame, and shame can make us “see what is ugly” (“Le châtimeⁿt physique fait voir à l'homme ce qui est laid, c'est peut-être sa seule justification 'éducative',” 68). In all other cases, the disorder that pain causes is problematic (68-9). I agree with Jouët-Pastré that bodily punishment may make the wrongdoer feel ashamed, especially if it is executed publicly. It might be for this very reason that, in ancient Athens, bodily punishment was reserved for slaves (Hunter 1992: 279). Hunter proposes that citizens were not flogged because of respect for their body (as being free and sacrosanct) and their honor. (Socrates, however, does not have great concern for the body, and that might be why he does not restrict flogging to slaves). However, I am not convinced by Jouët-Pastré's main argument that shame can make the soul better, while physical pain cannot because it disturbs the soul. This argument seems to rely on two assumptions, both of which I reject: (1) Jouët-Pastré seems to assume that shame does not cause a disturbance. But shame is the fear of a bad reputation (*Euthyph.* 12b-c), and fear is a psychological disturbance (at least in *Phil.* 50b-c). (2) Jouët-Pastré also seems to assume that we cannot make the soul better by temporarily causing it more disturbance. But Socrates employs other means of education that temporarily disturb the soul, such as shame and refutation. So, if temporary disturbances are problematic, then *both* shame and painful

some wrongdoers are so ignorant, a Socratic would say, that philosophical conversation cannot communicate the message that wrongdoing is bad.

4. The wrongdoers that benefit from punishment

In the *Apology*, Socrates argues that he should not be punished in court for having philosophized with young men because he either did not harm anyone, or he harmed unwillingly, i.e., he harmed people without knowing that he harmed anyone. He then argues that no one would ever harm his associates willingly or intentionally. A short version of the argument (*Apol.* 25d-26a) goes as follows: (i) No one wants to be harmed. (ii) If you harm your associates, they will harm you. (iii) So, you won't harm your associates willingly. Socrates then discusses two options that could apply to him: either he does not know that premise (ii) is true, or he harmed someone unwillingly, i.e., he did not know that he harmed someone (*Apol.* 25e6). He vehemently rejects the first option:

So what, Meletus? Are you so much wiser at your age than I am at mine that you understand that bad people always do some harm to their closest associates, while good people do them good, but I have come to be *ignorant to such an extent* that I do not know this, that if I harm one of my associates I run the risk of being harmed by him, so that I do such a great evil willingly, as you say? I am not persuaded by you, Meletus, and I believe that no one else will be. (*Apol.* 25d8-e6)

Socrates claims that he believes that harming others is bad for oneself because harmed people obviously harm in turn. This idea is crucial. What Socrates expresses here is, I propose, that he holds the fundamental belief that harming others is bad for oneself and an explanation of

punishment are problematic. If temporary disturbances are unproblematic, then *both* shame and painful punishment are unproblematic.

that principle, namely that harming others is bad for oneself because harmed people harm in turn.²⁰³

After having rejected the first option that could apply to him, namely that he does not know that premise (ii) is true, Socrates goes on to argue that, therefore, if he harmed someone, he harmed unwillingly, i.e., he did not know that he harmed someone. So, if indeed he harmed others, he needs instruction and not punishment:

If I corrupt them unwillingly, it is not the law to bring me here [to court] for such unwilling wrongdoings (ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων), but to instruct (διδάσκειν) and admonish (νουθετεῖν) me in private; for it is clear that if I learn (μάθω), I will stop what I do unwillingly. (*Apol.* 26a1-4)

Socrates argues here, I propose, that since he believes that harming others is bad for oneself, and since he can explain why that is the case (harmed people harm in turn), he could have failed only when it comes to identifying a particular instance of harming others. Application failure, Socrates claims, does not require punishment but instruction. Someone only needs to explain to Socrates that he harmed others, and that would be sufficient to make him stop philosophizing with young men.

If someone fundamentally believes that harming others is bad, and if this person can further explain why harming others is bad, then he will not do wrong willingly. If he does wrong, he acts unwillingly and should not be punished but instructed. Conversely, a wrongdoer who harms willingly should be punished. Since Socrates fundamentally believes that harming others is bad, painful punishment should not even be an option. Instead Socrates appeals to the court to show

²⁰³ For other occurrences of the fundamental belief ‘harming others is bad for oneself’ see *Crit.* 49b, *Gorg.* 469b. How could Socrates be so sure that everyone knows that harming others is bad for oneself? After all, many of his interlocutors would probably reject the claim that what goes around always comes around (see Thrasymachus and Glaucon in the *Republic*). I suggest that Socrates uses a shortcut to make Meletus agree to a truth that would otherwise take Socrates much more time to establish. Meletus might be more hesitant to object after Socrates has declared that it is *obviously* true that harming others is bad for oneself.

that he indeed harmed anyone. If that can be shown, Socrates has been instructed and will immediately stop philosophizing with young men (“if I learn, I will stop what I do unwillingly”).

The *Apology* passage suggests that we ought to distinguish different kinds of wrongdoers, and that we ought to punish or instruct them depending on the kind of epistemic failure that caused their wrongdoing. Only those who harm willingly, i.e., harm people while believing that they are harming them, ought to be punished.²⁰⁴ We can distinguish three epistemic elements in the generation of an action, and an agent can fail regarding one or all of them: (a) Believing that ‘harming others is bad.’ (b) Explaining why harming others is bad. Socrates provides at least two explanations: harming others is bad for oneself because harmed people tend to harm in turn, and harming others is bad for oneself because it worsens your soul. (c) Believing that a particular action harms others. Based on those three different epistemic elements that are involved in the generation of actions, we can distinguish four different kinds of wrongdoers:

- (1) *The Socrates*: this kind of wrongdoer believes that harming others is bad for oneself; he can further provide an explanation for this principle. He did wrong because he did not know that the particular action he was undertaking is an instance of wrongdoing. Such a wrongdoer needs to acquire the information that his action harms others and he will stop immediately. This wrongdoer does not deserve blame, nor would he benefit from painful punishment (though he might benefit from admonishments, *Apol.* 26a1-4).²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ In *Apol.* 26a1-6, Socrates claims that only the willing wrongdoer should be punished. Given the putative Socratic doctrine that no one does wrong willingly (*Prot.* 345e; *Gorg.* 509e5-7;), it looks like we must conclude that no one should ever be punished. The *Laws* may provide a strategy to solve this puzzle. There, too, Plato claims both that ‘no one does wrong willingly’ (*Laws* 860d1; 861c8) and that ‘some wrongdoers should be punished’ (*Laws* 731b5-7). He then raises precisely the question of whether we should punish anyone, given that all wrongdoing is done unwillingly (*Laws* 860e5). Plato responds that we must distinguish injustice (ἀδικία) from injury or harm (βλάβη) (861d-e). No one commits *injustice* willingly, but some people *injure* or *harm* others willingly. I take the distinction between injustice and harm to be a distinction between different kinds of wrongdoing or going wrong (ἀμάρτημα). My tentative proposal is: no one acts unjustly willingly because injustice is ignorance, and not one wants to be ignorant, but some people harm others willingly.

²⁰⁵ The intend to harm makes actions blameworthy (*Apol.* 41d); going wrong unwillingly deserves pity (*Rep.* 337a). Another example for this kind of wrongdoer is Crito, who agrees with Socrates that no one ought to harm anyone, but who does not realize that fleeing prison would be an instance of wrongdoing (*Crito* 49d).

- (2) *The Common Wrongdoer*: this person believes that harming others is bad, but he lacks the correct explanation.²⁰⁶ He did wrong because he thought that in that particular situation it was beneficial for him to harm someone. This is probably the most common kind of wrongdoer. Just pointing out to him that his action harmed someone is insufficient to convince him that his action was bad for him. He still thinks that he benefitted overall. This wrongdoer needs to understand that wrongdoing is *always* the most harmful thing for himself, i.e., he needs to understand that harming others worsens his soul and impairs his happiness. This wrongdoer deserves blame since he intentionally harmed others. Depending on the severity of his epistemic failure, instruction or admonishments might be sufficient to prevent further wrongdoing.
- (3) *The Curable Villain*:²⁰⁷ he lacks the fundamental belief that harming others is bad. His epistemic failure is of a high degree. He believes that harming others is beneficial.²⁰⁸ This wrongdoer does not feel regret;²⁰⁹ he deserves blame. His belief-set is so misguided that instruction and admonishments are ineffective. The message that wrongdoing is bad cannot be communicated to him in any other way but through painful punishment, such as flogging. He needs to feel badness to connect wrongdoing with its being bad for himself. The punished wrongdoer still cannot explain why wrongdoing is bad, and he might not be able to identify instances of wrongdoing, but the first step towards his improvement is taken—he associates wrongdoing with badness.
- (4) *The Incurable Tyrants*:²¹⁰ not even painful punishment can change those wrongdoers.²¹¹ They have committed “the most grievous and impious crimes” (*Gorg.* 525d); they do not feel remorse (*Gorg.* 471b) and should be sentenced to death (*Gorg.* 512a, 525c). The incurables are wrongdoers whose souls are damaged beyond repair.

²⁰⁶ Polemarchus in *Republic I* is a *Common Wrongdoer*, for he believes that doing harm is sometimes good, namely when we harm our enemies (*Rep.* 332d; 334b). Polemarchus’ ignorance appears to be rather easy to fix. After a short conversation he agrees with Socrates that it is never good to harm anyone (*Rep.* 335e).

²⁰⁷ Such as Thersites (*Gorg.* 525e).

²⁰⁸ See Glaucon in *Rep.* 359a-b.

²⁰⁹ One does not feel regret if one believes that one did the right thing (*Apol.* 38e).

²¹⁰ Such as Archelaus in *Gorg.* 525d.

²¹¹ *Gorg.* 525bff. See also *Laws* 731c.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that Socrates approves of painful punishment under three conditions: painful punishment should be inflicted (1) by a skillful, impartial judge (not by private, revengeful citizens), (2) for the purpose of epistemic improvement (i.e., psychological health), and (3) upon certain wrongdoers only, namely those who do not believe that wrongdoing is bad. Painful punishment may improve such wrongdoers by establishing (or reinforcing) the belief that wrongdoing is bad for oneself. Whoever lacks this belief will benefit from flogging.

While some wrongdoers might reject the message that painful punishment aims to communicate, I suggest that even in those cases a Socratic could argue that painful punishment is beneficial for wrongdoers because it deters them from further wrongdoing, at least sometimes. By deterring from future wrongdoing, it prevents a further worsening of their souls; it also prevents the false belief that wrongdoing is beneficial from spreading through society.

My interpretation has the following three advantages. First, we can take the passages in the *Gorgias* ((T1) through (T4)) at face-value. We do not have to explain away Socrates' approval of painful punishment. Second, we do not have to take a stand on whether Socratic psychology includes non-rational desires because, on my proposal, painful punishment improves our beliefs immediately and not via non-rational desires. Third, we can explain how *exactly* a Socratic could argue that painful punishment improves wrongdoers. When the wrongdoer experiences painful punishment, he experiences badness. For wrongdoers whose moral belief system is deeply misguided, this experience is more persuasive than philosophical arguments, and for such a wrongdoer feeling badness might be necessary to understand that wrongdoing is bad.²¹²

²¹² I am very grateful to Tad Brennan, Charles Brittain, Rachana Kamtekar, Nicholas Smith, Rusty Jones, and Joachim Aufderheide for many helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank the participants

APPENDIX

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HOW SHOULD WE TRANSLATE PATHOS AND PATHERMA?

Thus far, I left *pathos* and *pathema* untranslated. Let us now consider possible translations. Our first candidate is ‘emotion.’ The consensus among interpreters is that *pathos/pathema* can be translated as ‘emotion,’ at least in certain contexts:

“ancient Greek had a word that, at least in certain contexts, is customarily rendered in English as ‘emotion’. That word is ‘*pathos*’. [...] Among the *pathê*, the Greeks included a set of terms that are normally rendered into English by standard equivalents such as ‘anger’, ‘fear’, ‘love’, ‘pity’, ‘indignation’, ‘envy’, and so forth. The *pathê* thus appear to correspond broadly to the kinds of sentiments that we typically or at least sometimes classify as emotions.”²¹³

For such contexts, interpreters point to the following passages in Aristotle:

By *pathê* I mean epithumetic desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendliness, hating, longing, jealousy, pity, and in general those things which are accompanied by pleasure or pain (*EN* 1105b23-5).²¹⁴

Pathê are all those things through which, by undergoing change, people differ in regard to their judgments, and which are accompanied by pleasure and pain, like anger, pity, fear, and other such things, and their contraries (*Rhet.* 1378a19-22).²¹⁵

The list of examples in these passages, interpreters have argued, makes clear that *pathê* here means emotions.²¹⁶ However, the biggest problem for this translation and interpretation of *pathos* is that Aristotle (and Plato and the Stoics) count epithumetic desire (ἐπιθυμία) among the *pathê*. Epithumetic desire is a desire for pleasure.²¹⁷ The most common examples of epithumetic desire

²¹³ Konstan (2006: 3-4). See also Dow (2011: 47, n.3) and Leighton (1982: 155): our talk of emotions and Aristotle’s discussion of the *pathê* are about the same thing.

²¹⁴ λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη.

²¹⁵ ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργή ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία.

²¹⁶ See, for instance, Leighton: we speak of “ta *pathê* as the emotions. That is surely the right translation, given the examples Aristotle offers us” (1982: 158). Rapp: „Aristoteles fuehrt die Emotionen also durch eine Liste von Beispielen ein, ohne sie wirklich zu definieren.“ (2008: 49).

²¹⁷ *Rhet.* 1370a17, *DA* 414a5.

are appetites such as hunger and thirst.²¹⁸ Aristotle's inclusion of appetite among the *pathê* has troubled interpreters on both sides of the debate because no one conceives of hunger and thirst as emotions.²¹⁹ However, those who believe that emotions involve higher cognitive states such as beliefs are particularly troubled because the claim that hunger and thirst require beliefs is textually unsupported and rather implausible (presumably, animals and children lack beliefs but nevertheless experience hunger and thirst).

Leighton has proposed a solution to the problem of appetites as *pathê*. He notes that appetite is listed among the *pathê* only in the *Nicomachean Ethics* but not in the *Rhetoric*. Leighton proposes that Aristotle excludes appetite from the *pathê* in the *Rhetoric* because he there sharpens his notion of *pathê* by restricting it to states that can affect judgment.²²⁰ Since emotions affect judgment, but appetites do not, appetites are excluded from the *pathê* in the *Rhetoric*:

“My conclusion is that the characterization of ta *pathê* in the *Rhetoric* distinguishes emotions from other elements of our inner life: the pleasure/pain test setting emotions and certain desires [namely appetites] quite apart from the other elements [such as beliefs], the alteration of judgment setting emotion quite apart from *epithumia* [i.e., appetite].”²²¹

I find Leighton's interpretation unconvincing mainly because Aristotle in fact *does* count appetites consistently among the *pathê* not only in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (see (T1) and (T2)), but also in the *Prior Analytics* (70b10) and even in the *Rhetoric*:

(T4) By *pathê* I mean anger and appetite and all those about which we have talked earlier. (*Rhet.*1388b33).²²²

²¹⁸ DA 414b12, *Rhet.* 1370a19-23. For hunger and thirst as epithumetic desires in the Platonic corpus, see *Lys.* 220e6-221b3, *Rep.* 4.437d1-3.

²¹⁹ See, for instance, Leighton (1982: 162), Kenny (2003: 38), Price (1995: 190, n.15).

²²⁰ Leighton (1982: 168). Like Leighton, Konstan argues that “Aristotle came to restrict the term *πάθος* to something like what we by “emotion” today, excluding pain and pleasure (which are constitutive elements of emotion), and also, albeit inconsistently, appetites” (2006: 139).

²²¹ Leighton (1982: 165). Hunger or thirst “is not sufficiently complex” to alter judgment. “The changes of judgments are to be explained by emotions [e.g., anger, irritation, despair] or reflections upon these matters” (1982: 163). I am not convinced that hunger can change my judgment only via an emotion.

²²² Leighton believes that Aristotle is simply “uncareful” in (T4) (1982: 173, n.36).

I argue that Aristotle counts appetites consistently among the *pathê*.²²³ Moreover, I believe that Aristotle's inclusion of appetites in the category *pathos* is not unusual. Both the Stoics and Plato consistently count appetites among the *pathê*, too.²²⁴ I therefore conclude that epithumetic desire/appetite is a *pathos*. Since epithumetic desire is not an emotion, *pathos* should not be translated as emotion. I conclude that the term *pathê* does not mean emotions, not even in "certain contexts."

Is there another Greek term in the Platonic or Aristotelian corpus that could be translated as 'emotions'? Thus far, my investigation has not revealed any candidate, and I am not aware of other interpreters having proposed one. If we cannot find such a term, then there is no term in the Platonic or Aristotelian corpus that should be translated as 'emotions.' This does not necessarily mean that the Greeks did not have a term for emotions.²²⁵ But it does mean that even if there is such a term, neither Plato nor Aristotle saw any need to use it. Plato and Aristotle, it seems, did not need a term for emotions because they did not conceive of the phenomena that we call emotions as a distinct class.²²⁶

²²³ However, a skeptic might wonder: if appetite is indeed a full-fledged *pathos*, why does Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* not devote an entire chapter to appetite as he does to the other *pathê*. In response to this question, I propose that Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* does not discuss appetite in more detail because appetite is not a *pathos* that the rhetorician needs to learn about. If you want to become a skillful rhetorician who can persuade his audience of political policies, for example, you need to learn how to instill fear and anger but not hunger.

²²⁴ *SVF* 378, 386, 391, 392, 394.

²²⁵ Wolfsdorf (2013) argues that there is no Greek word for 'feeling' (9) or 'emotion' (92). He explains that the "noun 'pathos' is variously translated as 'affection', 'passion', and 'emotion'. There is some justification for each translation, and none is completely adequate." (184). Our investigation thus far only *suggests* that Wolfsdorf is right, but it does not prove it. We would prove that there is not Greek word for emotion, if we showed that other possible candidates also failed to be translated as emotions, and our investigation would have to go beyond the Aristotelian and Platonic corpus.

²²⁶ Price (2009) begins his essay with the (in my eyes correct) observation that Plato and Aristotle do not "separate [...] off emotions" (121). He further claims that "[t]he Greeks had no word equivalent to our Latinate 'emotion'" (ibid.). I agree with the first claim and am sympathetic to the second claim, though more texts would have to be covered to prove it. But Price's next claim is puzzling to me: the Greeks "commonly use" *pathos* in the place of 'emotion.' (ibid.). I am not sure how Price arrived at this conclusion. Price further says that he will translate *pathos* as 'affection,' but he does not explain why he prefers to translate *pathos* as 'affection' rather than 'emotion.' Over the course of his paper, Price switches back to 'emotion.'

Translating *pathos* and *pathema* as ‘emotions’ is, I conclude, misleading for the following reason: Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics do not conceive of states we would call emotions as forming a distinct class. The states that we call emotions belong to the class of *pathê/pathema*, and this class is broad; it includes states we do not conceive of as emotions, namely epithumetic desires such as hunger and thirst. Since “emotion” is a misleading translation of *pathos* and *pathema*, what would be a better translation? I suggest that a good translation of *pathos/pathema* should fulfill the following two criteria: (a) it conveys what is characteristic about these states, which is that they are motions of the soul that tend to be unruly and that may need to be fought, and (b) it plausibly includes epithumetic desire. Let’s look at the translations of *pathos* and *pathema* in the standard English (LSJ), Spanish (Vox Griego), French (Bailly), and German (Gemoll) dictionaries. I will highlight the translation options that are relevant for us:

LSJ:

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| <i>pathema</i> : | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) that which befalls one, suffering, misfortune (2) emotion, condition, affection, feeling (3) troubles, symptoms (4) incidents, happenings, changes |
| <i>pathos</i> : | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) that which happens to a person or thing, incident, (unfortunate) accident, misfortune, experience, death (2) of the soul: emotion, passion, sensation (incl. pleasure, pain) (3) state, condition, changes of things, happenings (4) properties, qualities |

Gemoll does not distinguish *pathema* from *pathos*, but gives the following translations for both:

- (1) was jemandem zustößt, Mißgeschick, Unglück, Leid
- (2) Leidenskampf, Schmerz, überhebliche Gemütsbewegung, Affekt, Empfindung, Begierde, Gefühl
- (3) Ereignis, Vorgang

Bailly distinguishes *pathema* from *pathos* as follows

- pathema*: (1) tout événement qui survient et affecte le corps ou l'âme.
(a) au physique: maladie
(b) affliction; malheur
(c) état du corps ou de l'âme, disposition physique ou morale
(2) tout événement qui se produit en dehors de nous. Accident.
(3) le fait de supporter, de souffrir

pathos: ce qu'on éprouve, tout ce qui affecte le corps ou l'âme, en bien ou en mal.

- (1) ce qu'on éprouve
(a) épreuve, expérience
(b) événement, conjoncture, infortune, malheur
(2) état de l'âme agitée par des circonstances extérieures, disposition morale, particul. disposition agitée
(a) sentiments généreux ou agréables, pitié, plaisir, amour etc.
(b) chagrin, affliction, tristesse, colère, haine
(c) διὰ πάθους: par passion
(3) de philos. ou de log. ou de science
(a) les événement où les changements qui se produisent dans les choses; ce qui se passe au ciel et sur la terre
(c) les propriétés des choses (nombres)

Vox does not distinguish *pathema* from *pathos*, but gives the following translations for both:

- (1) todo lo que uno experimenta o siente, prueba, experiencia
(2) suceso, coyuntura
(3) castigo, sufrimiento, desgracia, triste suerte, desastre
(4) enfermedad, muerte
(5) estado de alma, disposición moral (piedad, placer, amor, tristeza, odio, cólera, aflicción, pena)
(6) cambio, fenómeno
(7) pasión, afecto

Note that neither Vox nor Bailly nor Gemoll lists “emotion” (emoción, émotion, Emotion) as a translation for *pathos* or *pathema*. Gemoll even proposes ‘Begierde,’ which is one of the standard German translations for epithumetic desire, as a translation option for *pathos*. The problem that Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics include unemotional states such as epithumetic

desires among the *pathê* and *pathemata* might, therefore, be a problem in the English-speaking world only.

What, then, is a better translation for *pathos* or *pathema*? The most suitable English translation seems to be ‘passion.’²²⁷ ‘Passion’ bears an etymological connection to the Greek *pathos*, and philosophers seem willing to count desires among the passions.²²⁸ I will now argue that ‘passion’ is not a good translation for *pathos* because *pathê* includes the dis-passionate states friendliness and indignation.

Friendliness. Aristotle defines ‘being friendly’ (φιλεῖν) as “wishing good things for someone.”²²⁹ Wishing (βούλεσθαι) is a rational, reasoned desire. I am friendly towards you if I have the rational desire—a desire that arises out of reasoning—that good things happen to you.²³⁰ We usually feel friendly towards friends, i.e., people who value the same things as we do.²³¹ Friendliness is an affection that is based on reasoning about what is good and realizing that someone else, a friend, values the same thing as we do. Interpreters have noted that Aristotle characterizes friendliness as being rather unemotional and dispassionate. Friendliness appears to be rational, lasting, and not violent or disturbing, while other emotions and passions are non-rational, disturbing episodes.²³²

²²⁷ Moss (2012b) and Carone (2007) translate *pathemata* as ‘passions’ in *Tim.* 69d.

²²⁸ See, for instance, Descartes (*Passions of the Soul*): passions are “those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer particularly to it, and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the spirits.” Descartes lists five primary passions: gladness and sadness, love and hatred, and desire. The other passions are built up out of these: thus pride is compounded out of gladness and love.

²²⁹ ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαι τινὶ ἃ οἶεται ἀγαθὰ (*Rhet.* 2.4.1).

²³⁰ For friendliness as ‘wishing’ see also *Rhet.* 2.4.4 and *EN* 1157b31. For Aristotle’s distinction between rational desire (βούλησις) and the two kinds of non-rational desire (θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία), see *DA* 414b2 and *De Incessu* 700b22-23.

²³¹ *Rhet.* 1381a7.

²³² Frede: friendliness is not a disturbance (1996: 271). Cooper: “How can Aristotle think that friendly feeling is based in wishing and yet that it is a *pathos*, something essentially nonrational?” (1999: 413, n.9). Dow (2011: 53): friendliness “seems to be not a *pathos* at all, but a disposition to *pathe*, namely towards pleasure in relation to a friend.”

Indignation. Aristotle contrasts indignation with anger and characterizes indignation (ἔχθρα) and being indignant (μισέω) as follows (*Rhet.* 1382a): (i) indignation does not arise from concrete acts committed against us. A man can be indignant about another person without having been wronged by that person. (ii) Indignation is directed toward generic characters (e.g., thieves in general). (iii) Indignation is not curable over time. (iv) The man who is indignant does not care whether the evil person suffers in turn—he simply wishes (βούλεται) that evil did not exist (μὴ εἶναι). (v) The man who is indignant does not feel pity. (vi) Indignation is not painful. Anger, by contrast, *is* painful.²³³ Like friendliness, indignation seems dispassionate, unemotional, and more rational than other *pathê*.²³⁴ Both friendliness and indignation involve rational desire (i.e., wish, *boulesis*); both are *pathê* of the virtuous person;²³⁵ both appear to be long-lasting conditions rather than episodes.

We can observe some interesting similarities between Aristotle’s and Plato’s account of friendliness and indignation. For Plato, too, friendliness and indignation are noble *pathemata* that the virtuous person ought to feel. The gods, too, “are friendly towards (φιλοῦσιν) what each of them considers beautiful, good, and just, and are indignant about (μισοῦσιν) the opposite of these” (*Euthyp.* 7e). Plato sometimes also uses ‘being content’ (στέργειν) instead of ‘being friendly’ (φιλεῖν) in combination with ‘being indignant’: philosophers are content about truth but are indignant about falsehoods (*Rep.* 485c4). The virtuous person is indignant about what we ought to be indignant about (μισεῖν μὲν ἅ χρὴ μισεῖν) and is content about what we ought to be content about (στέργειν δὲ ἅ χρὴ στέργειν, *Laws* 653c1-2), such as just acts (*Laws* 732a3) and the just (*Laws* 908c1).

²³³ *Rhet.* 1382a10-3.

²³⁴ *Pol.* 1312b29-34: the person who is indignant calculates and reasons, but the person who is angry does not because it is difficult to reason when one feels pain.

²³⁵ *Pol.* 1340a15.

Indignation has troubled interpreters for two reasons. First, those interpreters who translate *pathê* as ‘emotions’ or ‘passions’ and who conceive of emotions and passions as non-rational disturbing states are troubled because indignation and friendliness appear to be rational and not disturbing at all. Cooper, therefore, considers that indignation might be “an emotion of the reason itself”²³⁶ or “no emotion or passion at all, but a fully reasoned, dispassionate rejection and dislike.”²³⁷ But if indignation is dispassionate, one might wonder, why does Aristotle include indignation among the ‘passions’? Cooper “confess[es] [him]self puzzled.”²³⁸ Moss explains:

“Aristotle’s characterization of hatred [i.e., indignation] makes it look very different indeed from the other passions, so much so that we might reasonably conclude that he includes it with the others in conformity with popular opinion but conceives of it in such a way that it really belongs in a different and more rational class (perhaps along with its opposite feeling (φιλία) [i.e., friendliness])”.²³⁹ “I mostly ignore them [indignation and friendliness] in what follows. What I aim to offer is an account not of everything that Aristotle lists as a passion, but of a natural class which lines up roughly with that list.”²⁴⁰

It seems to me that Aristotle’s characterization of friendliness and indignation is only puzzling if we understand *pathê* as emotions or passions, and if we take emotions and passions to be non-rational, disturbing mental states. Interpreters seem to have read a certain concept of emotions or passions into the term *pathos*. I suggest instead that we take Aristotle seriously: indignation and friendliness are *pathê* and it is important that our understanding and translation of *pathos* accommodates that.

Second, some have been troubled by Aristotle’s characterization of indignation in the *Rhetoric* because it seems to directly contradict his characterization of indignation in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.²⁴¹ Let us recall *EN* 1105b23-5 (T2 above). There, Aristotle says that “by

²³⁶ Cooper (1999: 418).

²³⁷ Cooper (1999: 419, n.22). Striker (1996: 301): indignation seems “unemotional rather than emotional.”

²³⁸ Cooper (1999: 417).

²³⁹ Moss (2012: p.81 n.27).

²⁴⁰ Moss (2012: 75).

²⁴¹ See, for instance, Dow (2011: 53-4).

pathê I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendliness, indignation, longing, jealousy, pity, and in general those things which are accompanied by pleasure or pain.” On one reading, all *pathê*—indignation included—are accompanied by pleasure or pain; and then Aristotle seems to say that indignation *is* painful and that indignation is *not* painful (*Rhet.* 1382a). On another reading, however, *pathê* are only *usually* accompanied by pleasure and pain; there are exceptions such as indignation. This second reading is supported by a passage in the *Eudemian Ethics*, in which Aristotle claims that *pathê* are *usually* or *for the most part* (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) accompanied by pleasure or pain.²⁴² I opt for the second reading because it avoids attributing a contradiction to Aristotle and it is textually supported. In a nutshell, I argue that (i) indignation is a *pathos* (*EN* 1105b23-5, *DA* 403a16-9, *MM* 1186a12-4). (ii) Indignation does not involve pleasure or pain (*Rhet.* 1382a10-3, *Pol.* 1312b29-34).²⁴³ (iii) So, *pathê* do not necessarily involve pleasure or pain (*EE* 1220bb12-4).²⁴⁴

Above, I explained that Aristotle’s characterization of indignation and friendliness is troublesome for those who conceive of *pathê* as passions, and who further conceive of passions as non-rational, disturbing states. One might wonder whether the solution to the problem of dispassionate *pathê* in Aristotle is to deny that emotions and passions are non-rational, disturbing states. However, this alternative interpretation—the so-called cognitivist or doxastic account of emotions—does not solve the problem of unemotional or dispassionate *pathê* either.²⁴⁵ Aristotle’s

²⁴² *EE* 1220b12-4. The second reading can be spelled out in two ways: (a) all *pathê* are for the most part accompanied by pleasure or pain; (b) some *pathê* are always accompanied by pleasure or pain, others are for the most part accompanied by pleasure or pain. Moss (2012: 81, n.27) opts for (b) and explains: “while most species of passion are essentially pleasurable or painful, hatred [i.e., indignation] – possibly along with some others, although Aristotle gives no further examples – is not.” Rapp explains that Aristotle does not say that all *pathê* are accompanied by pleasure or pain, but rather that everything that is accompanied by pleasure or pain is a *pathos* (2008: 49).

²⁴³ Note that while Aristotle believes that indignation is not painful, he believes that friendliness is pleasant (*Rhet.* 1371a21-22).

²⁴⁴ Dow (2011: 54), by contrast, concludes that indignation is not a *pathos*. Given the strong textual support for indignation’s being a *pathos*, this solution seems problematic to me.

²⁴⁵ The cognitivists or doxastics claim that emotions necessarily involve beliefs (Nussbaum (1986) and Leighton (1982) are doxastics). The opposing camp can be called ‘phantastics.’ They argue that perception and imagination are

list of *pathê* is troublesome also for those who believe that emotions are rational states that involve cognitively higher states such as beliefs, because Aristotle counts appetites among the *pathê*, as we already saw. Given that dis-passionate states (friendliness and indignation) as well as un-emotional states (appetites) are among the *pathê*, I conclude that neither ‘passion’ nor ‘emotion’ is a suitable translation of *pathos*.

Like *eudaimonia*, which we commonly and misleadingly translate as ‘happiness,’ *pathos* is a term for which we do not have a perfect translation. In English, ‘affect’ might be least misleading. In German, *Gemütsbewegung*²⁴⁶ comes closest because it fulfills our two criteria:

(a) *Gemütsbewegung* literally means a motion (Bewegung) of a certain aspect or part of the soul (Gemüt), and those motions tend to be disruptive.²⁴⁷

(b) *Gemütsbewegung* is broader and encompasses not only pleasure, pain, and fear but also epithumetic desire.²⁴⁸

Gemütsbewegung has two more advantages:

(c) it was originally used broadly to encompass epithumetic desire, pleasure, pain, and states we today would call emotions as well as thinking. Only later was it limited to non-thinking states.²⁴⁹ Originally, *Gemütsbewegung* encompasses *tout ce qui affecte l’âme* and *todo lo que uno siente*.

sufficient for emotions (Moss (2012, 2014) and Nieuwenburg (2002) are phantastics). Friendliness and indignation have particularly troubled the phantastics because Aristotle seems to conceive of them as states that involve more than perception and imagination. The doxastics are particularly troubled by appetites because neither Aristotle nor modern readers conceive of appetites as states that require higher cognitive states, such as beliefs.

²⁴⁶ ‘Gemütsbewegungen’ is a somewhat antiquated term. Stalfort explains that ‘Gemütsbewegungen’ got substituted with ‘Gefühle’ at the end of the 18th century, and eventually with ‘Emotionen’ in the 20th century (2009: 178-180). I have found Stalfort’s investigation very clear and helpful, and it made me realize the advantages (b), (c), and (d) of translating *pathos/pathema* as ‘Gemütsbewegung’, about which I will talk more below.

²⁴⁷ Stalfort: Gemütsbewegungen were considered to be disruptive and potentially hazardous (2009: 225).

²⁴⁸ Stalfort: „Begierde” (appetite, epithumetic desire) was considered one of the prototype Gemütsbewegungen (2009: 228).

²⁴⁹ These days, as Stalfort explains, we use „Gemüt“ to describe someone’s character (as in “Er hat ein ausgeglichenes Gemüt”), „jedoch ist diese Verwendung lediglich eine blasse Erinnerung an die Präsenz und Bedeutungsintensität von ‚Gemüt‘ im 17./18. Jahrhundert. [...] Von seinem Ursprung her bezeichnet ‚Gemüt‘ sowohl die Gesamtheit der seelischen Empfindungen und Gedanken wie auch den Ort ihrer Entstehung und Entfaltung“ (195). „Gemüt“ refers to „das Innere“ and „das Nicht-sichtbare einer Person“, „die Vollständigkeit und das Wirksamwerden aller inneren Elemente und Kräfte, die wir heute psychisch nennen“ (195-6). She demonstrates „große Bedeutungsüberschneidungen“ between „Gemüt“ and “Seele“. One of the difference is: the soul was

(d) The opposite to *Gemütsbewegung* is ‘Gemütsruhe’ or ‘Seelenruhe’—calmness of the soul—and that seems to be precisely how Socrates envisions the virtuous person who has his *pathemata* in check (ἡσυχίαν, *Prot.* 356e1).

I conclude that in certain contexts, Plato and Aristotle use *pathos* and *pathema* in a narrow sense to refer to *Gemütsbewegungen*. These *pathemata* are motions of the soul that differ from other motions in that they are *alogon* (yet to be explained), tend to be unruly, and may need to be controlled and fought. The scope of my investigation is then *pathemata* in the sense of *Gemütsbewegungen*, especially pleasure, pain, epithumetic desire, and fear.

At this point, let me summarize my results as follows. Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics share some interesting and, as I believe, not yet fully acknowledged views about states that we call emotions. The following four similarities are particularly striking:

- (1) ‘Emotion’ is not a good translation of *pathos/pathema*, neither in Plato nor Aristotle nor the Stoic corpus, because the ancient Greek authors count epithumetic desire/appetites such as hunger and thirst consistently among the *pathê*. Since epithumetic desires are not emotions, *pathê* should not be understood as emotions. I thereby argue against those who have assumed that *pathos/pathema* can be translated as ‘emotion’ at least in certain contexts (such as *EN* 1105b23-5 and *Rhet.* 1378a19-22; see Konstan 2006, Dow 2011, Leighton 1982, Moss 2012a). It is noteworthy that none of the standard Spanish, French, and German dictionaries (Vox, Bailly, Gemoll) lists “emotion” as a translation of *pathos/pathema*. The problem that the lists of *pathê/pathemata* include un-emotional states might therefore be a problem of the English-speaking world only.

considered to be immortal, the „Gemüt“ was not. “Gemüt“ refers to „die individualisierte bzw. personalisierte Seite der Seele [...], die diesseitige Wirkstätte der Seele [...], die sterbliche Seite der Seele“ (196). By contrast, „Gefühl“ did not have a psychological dimension at the beginning of the 17th century: “Noch Zedlers Lexikonartikel zu ‘Gefühlen, Fühlen’ aus dem Jahre 1735 beginnt mit dem Satz: «Fühlen, Gefühl, Lat. Tactus, Franz. Attouchement. Einer derer fünf äusserlichen Sinne, der sich über den ganzen Leib ausbreitet». Gemeint ist damit der Tastsinn. Auf eine weitere Bedeutung weist Zedler nicht hin, und seine näheren Ausführungen zu diesem Stichwort machen sofort klar, dass das Gefühl zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch keine seelische oder psychische Dimension bezeichnet“ (265). Later, Gefühl will refer to particular psychological states, namely to Empfinden and Wollen, but not to Denken and Verstand.

- (2) Plato and Aristotle (and maybe the Stoics) do not need a term for ‘emotions.’ Instead of a separate class of emotions, we find in Plato and the Stoics the quartet pain, pleasure, epithumetic desire, and fear. States we call ‘emotions’ such as fear and anger are not considered to belong to a distinct class. Fear forms its own class (shame, for example, is a kind of fear, namely the fear of a bad reputation), and anger is a kind of epithumetic desire (the desire for revenge). Plato and Aristotle do not use a term for ‘emotion,’ nor do they need such a term because they do not consider those states we call emotions as belonging to a separate class.
- (3) The class of *pathê/pathemata* to which our emotions belong is best understood as motions of the soul (κίνησις ψυχῆς) that tend to be unruly and may need to be controlled and fought. How shall we translate *pathos/pathema*? I believe that like *eudaimonia*, which we commonly and misleadingly translate as ‘happiness,’ *pathos* is a term for which we do not have a perfect English translation. In German, *Gemütsbewegung* comes close because (a) it literally means a motion (Bewegung) of a certain aspect or part of our soul (Gemüt), and (b) it encompasses not only pleasure, pain, fear and other such states, but also *epithumetic* desire. In the case of *eudaimonia*, we have to distance ourselves from our modern concept of ‘happiness’ in order to understand what *eudaimonia* is. In the same way, I propose, do we have to distance ourselves from our modern concept of ‘emotion’ in order to understand what kind of states anger, fear, pleasure, pain, and epithumetic desire are in ancient Greek philosophy.

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