LOCATING ATTITUDES: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND AFRICAN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION OPINION A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Casey James Radostitz August 2016 © 2016 Casey James Radostitz LOCATING ATTITUDES: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND AFRICAN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION OPINION Casey James Radostitz, Ph.D. Cornell University 2016 This dissertation seeks to understand the dynamics shaping public opinion over time and between localities by examining the puzzling response of African American elites towards the issue of immigration during two major waves of immigration to the United States: from 1883 until 1921 and from 1965 to 2009. Two questions animate this research: first, given the persistent social, economic, and political consequences of immigration for African Americans, why were black elites’ attitudes more hostile to immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries than the post-1965 period; and second, why did African American elite responses to immigration vary in different locations? Relying on content analysis of more than 2700 black newspapers—including greater than 30,000 unique newspaper sub-editorials—published over 80 years in Cleveland, Ohio and Savannah, Georgia, this dissertation utilizes a new dataset of black elite opinion to develop a theory of political preferences attentive to the institutional dynamics encountered by African Americans in specific times and places. In so doing, the dissertation argues that (1) variation in national laws regulating race relations influenced (2) the control local legal, political, and economic institutions had over the experiences, life chances, and possibilities of black citizens. The combination of blacks long entrenched position at the bottom of the racial hierarchy and the local institutional conditions in cities they resided in shaped (3) black elites sense of racial alienation; i.e., the level of racial subordination blacks felt. Varying racial alienation in turn affected what blacks believed was possible and thus shaped (a) the worldview through which they interpreted issues such as immigration, and (b) the level of hostility towards other groups in society including immigrants. Collectively, this dissertation brings a historical approach to public opinion research, challenges dominant interest driven theories of black public opinion, and ensures that important voices American history will not be lost. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Casey J. Radostitz hold a B.S. from the University of Oregon, a M.A., and, forthcoming, Ph.D. from Cornell University. His research interests include American politics, race and ethnic politics, American political development, immigration, and political behavior. In particular, Radostitz is interested in how the context in which individuals are embedded influences their attitudes and behaviors. Radostitz’s current research examines the varied reaction of black elites to the issue of immigration during two periods of immigration to the United States: from 1883 to 1921 and from 1965 until 2009. In his free time, Radostitz is an avid Oregon Ducks fan, a barbeque enthusiast, and enjoys spending time in the outdoors with his family, friends, and Labrador retrievers. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are many people who have had a hand in the completion of this dissertation. I would like to thank my dissertation committee for their helpful advice, mentorship, and support over the past six years. My dissertation chair, Michael Jones-Correa has been one of my strongest advocates—without your support and encouragement this project simply would not have been possible. Richard Bensel has continually pushed me to refine my writing, clarify my thinking, and strive to be a better scholar. I thank him for his dedication to this project, and for his kind words when I have needed them the most. In addition to serving on my dissertation committee, Suzanne Mettler provided an excellent example of being an accomplished scholar and great teacher. David Bateman graciously agreed to read my entire dissertation and provided valuable insights and suggestions. Before coming to Cornell, I was a political science undergraduate in need of direction at the University of Oregon. Without the mentoring and encouragement of Gerry Berk, and the support of Dan Tichenor, I would not have made it to Cornell. Thank you both for your help and advice. I would also like to thank the administrative staff in the Department of Government at Cornell. In particular, Tina Slater has been wonderful and incredibly helpful from day one. When I needed scheduling assistance, Stacy Kesselring came through in full force and I will always be grateful for her help. For research assistance, I am indebted to the staff of the Cleveland Public Library who graciously allowed me access to online newspaper archives on multiple occasions. I received financial support for this project from the American Studies Program at Cornell University. I presented pieces of this research at the Politics of Race, Immigration, and Ethnicity Consortium at the University of Oregon as well as the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, the Western Political Science Association, and the American Political vi Science Association. I would like to thank the panelists for their interest and helpful comments during the early stages of this project. My time at Cornell was so much more enjoyable because of the friends I made in Ithaca. I am grateful for my B-11 officemates Delphia Shanks-Booth, Steffen Blings, and Sarah Maxey, who were always there to offer advice, lighten the mood, and share baked goods. I would also like to thank Martha Wilfarht, Robert Braun, and Michael Dichio for their friendship, moving assistance, and contagious laughter. Mallory SoRelle and Carrie Baldwin-SoRelle became lifelong friends. Mal, I will always remember our lunches in the Ivy Room, lengthy discussions about college football, and our epic trip to Connecticut to find a ring. I feel lucky to have made such a great friend. The most difficult part of graduate school was being so far away from my family and friends. Words cannot express how thankful I am for the love, support, and encouragement of my closest family: Mari, Rita, Vince, Julie, Jeff, Lucas, Hanna, Sabella, Mia, Sam, Grandma Pete, along with those who are no longer with us Grandma Rad and Pop. I would also like to thank the Walker family for embracing me as one of their own and offering their support throughout this process. I met one of my closest friends, Brad, when I was just beginning college. I learned more from our time in the shop together than you’ll ever realize—you taught me what it means to work hard, how to always treat people with the utmost respect, and the importance of character building tasks. You, Tonda, Jake, and Katie fully embraced me when I truly needed it, and I am so lucky for your continued friendship. I am also thankful for my four legged companions, who provided a welcome distraction when I needed it most and sat patiently by my side for too many hours while I worked. vii The best part of my time in Ithaca was meeting my wife Alexis Walker. I am so lucky to have met you, and I would not have made it though this dissertation without your love, support, and encouragement. From the time we met you have made my life so much better and more complete. Not only am I thankful for your understanding of the long hours, late nights, and, at times, frustrated husband, but also our long substantive conversations that made this project so much better. We have had so many adventures together and I cannot wait for this next part of our lives together in Olympia. You are my best friend, I love you, and I am so happy that choosing graduate school at Cornell brought you into my life. Finally, I would like to thank my parents. My father passed away when I was young, but he taught me the importance of education, a strong work ethic, humor, and he unknowingly influenced my decision to pursue a Ph.D. There have been many moments in my life that I wish I could share with him and this is certainly one of them. My mother has always been my greatest cheerleader—a source of unconditional love, support, and comfort. You taught me the importance of never giving up and that there is always an alternative route from ‘A to B.’ Without your sacrifices and dedication to my wellbeing, I would not have made it to Cornell, and I certainly would not have finished this dissertation. I cannot thank you enough for all you have done for me. This project is dedicated to you. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Unlinking African American Opinion: The Heterogeneous Immigration Preferences of Black Elites in Cleveland and Savannah, 1883-1921 Chapter 3: Localizing Linked Fate: How Local Institutional Context Shaped Black Elite Opinion in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries Chapter 4: Black Elite Immigration Attitudes in Post-1965 Cleveland and Savannah Chapter 5: Rights Matter: An Explanation for the Temporal Change in Black Elite Immigration Opinion Chapter 6: Conclusion 1 31 80 117 183 222 ix LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: A Theory of Black Elite Opinion Figure 2.1: Cleveland Gazette Immigration Sub-Editorials, 1883-1921 Figure 2.2: Savannah Tribune Immigration Sub-Editorials, 1883-1921 Figure 2.3: Immigration Editorial Tone, 1883-1921 Figure 2.4: Cleveland Gazette Immigration Sub-Categories by Tone Figure 2.5: Savannah Tribune Immigration Sub-Categories by Tone Figure 2.6: Cleveland Gazette Sub-Editorial Tone by Immigrant Group Figure 2.7: Savannah Tribune Sub-Editorial Tone by Immigrant Group Figure 3.1: The Theory of Local Institutional Context Figure 4.1: Cleveland Call and Post Immigration Sub-Editorials, 1965-2009 Figure 4.2: Savannah Herald Immigration Sub-Editorials, 1965-2007 Figure 4.3: Immigration Editorial Tone, 1965-2009 Figure 4.4: Cleveland Call and Post Immigration Sub-Categories by Tone Figure 4.5: Savannah Herald Immigration Sub-Categories by Tone Figure 4.6: Cleveland Call and Post Sub-Editorial Tone by Immigrant Group Figure 4.7: Savannah Herald Sub-Editorial Tone by Immigrant Group 10 50 50 53 56 56 67 68 89 140 141 144 150 150 173 178 x LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: City Population, 1880-1930 Table 2.2: Immigration Editorial Tone, 1883-1921 Table 2.3: Topics Mentioned in Immigration Editorials, 1883-1921 Table 2.4: Number of Immigration Editorials About Specific Immigrant Groups, 1883-1921 Table 4.1: City Population, 1960-2010 Table 4.2: Immigration Editorial Tone, 1965-2009 Table 4.3: Topics Mentioned in Immigration Editorials, 1965-2009 Table 4.4: Number of Immigration Editorials About Specific Immigrant Groups, 1965-2009 38 54 58 65 128 147 152 170 xi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Throughout the final decades of the nineteenth century, and continuing into the early years of the twentieth century, leaders of Southern states campaigned for foreign immigrants to fill labor shortages in agriculture, and new industries, brought on by the emancipation of African Americans and their migration from the South to the North. Representatives from southern states met at conventions held across the South to address the issue of immigration to this region of the United States. For example, the Southern Immigration Association of America convened in Nashville in 1884, reuniting in New Orleans the following year; the Southern Inter-State Immigration Convention met in Montgomery in 1888 and again in Augusta in 1894; and the Southern Immigration Association assembled in Hot Springs, North Carolina in 1888 (Berthoff 1951). The push to bring foreign labor to the South continued in the early years of the twentieth century with public and private entities from states across the South sending recruiters overseas, creating and distributing pamphlets, and engaging in a widespread public relations campaign meant to entice immigrants to settle across the South (Berthoff 1951). African American elites used the South’s campaign for immigrants as an opportunity to raise their distinct objections to immigration as exemplified by rhetoric published in black newspapers across the United States. While black elites in both the North and the South opposed immigration,1 they understood the issue in different terms as exhibited by their reactions to southern immigration campaigns. Southern black elites viewed potential immigration to the South through an economic lens wherein they worried about economic displacement of African 1 For examples of research detailing African American attitudes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see: Hellwig 1974; Hellwig 1977; Hellwig 1981; Hellwig 1982; Shankman 1978; Shankman1980; Shankman 1982; Fuchs 1990; Diamond 1998; Tillery and Chresfield 2012. 1 Americans that might coincide with increased immigration. Despite the confidence displayed in the Savannah Tribune that “colored laborers have nothing to fear from this movement” (4-61907) and in The Nashville Globe that experiments to replace black labor in Louisiana with immigrants “have not proved the unqualified success that this section had been led to expect…” (2-27-1907), African American elites still cautioned: “Some day, we fear, the South will awake to the fact that while chasing the chimera of immigration and low wages and going into spasms over the fear of social equality, it has allowed the best labor in the world to drift from its confines” (The Nashville Globe, 4-26-1907). Thus, southern black elites resisted immigration to the South on the grounds that these newcomers would compete economically with African Americans. Black elites in the North, on the other hand, took this campaign as an occasion to oppose immigration while drawing attention to the rights and conditions faced by blacks and immigrants in the South. Northern black elites saw immigrants not as economic competitors, but instead, understood this group through a rights based lens, in which immigrants expected greater rights and privileges than southern states would provide. For example, The Freeman, a black newspaper in Indianapolis opined that the South would have difficulty recruiting immigrants because, “the section is not in touch with his up-to-date methods, political and social breadth or humane ideals” (3-16-1907). The Freeman was not alone, as other northern black newspapers reported similar sentiments. The Cleveland Gazette, for example, argued “The south will have to largely discontinue its mob violence and lynching before it will ever be successful in encouraging immigration” (5-4-1907) while The Topeaka Plaindealer confirmed “The South can never expect to get any great number of industrious foreigners until their system of laws and customs is changed” (11-16-1906). Thus, northern black elites took this event as an opportunity 2 to elevate the discussion beyond economic competition to the rights afforded to African Americans and immigrants in the South. These passages responding to southern states’ immigration recruitment underscore differences in the ways northern and southern African Americans conceived of immigration between 1883 and 1921: in the South, immigrants were viewed as economic competitors, while in the North, blacks contemplated immigration through a rights based lens. Unlike the hostile attitudes characteristic of African American elites’ response to southern campaigns for immigration at the turn of the twentieth century, black elite opinion on immigration in the decades following the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was overwhelmingly positive (Fuchs 1990, Diamond 1998). The reaction of black elites in 1994 to California Proposition 187—a ballot initiative restricting access to state social service programs, healthcare, and public education for undocumented immigrants—is emblematic of their feelings towards immigration in the United States between 1965 and 2009. Across the United States, African American newspapers referred to the proposition as a “lamentable situation,” (Pittsburgh Courier, 11-26-1994) calling the ballot initiative “racist” (Chicago Defender, 11-12-1994) and suggesting that, “the California initiative, doesn’t just affect illegal aliens, it may also signal the beginning of the demise of African Americans” (Philadelphia Tribune, 11-18-1994). These passages are indicative of black elite opinion in the post-1965 era and highlight that black elites empathized with immigrants as a fellow marginalized group in American society, saw the two groups as linked in their struggles to be recognized as full citizens, and thus, viewed immigration through a dual lens of commonality and rights. The distinct responses among black elites in the examples above raise important questions. First, why have African American elites responded in unique ways to the issue of 3 immigration during different eras in American history? That is, why did African American elites hold hostile immigration attitudes during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but have positive opinions about immigration in the post-1965 period? Second, why has black elite immigration opinion, at some points in time, varied regionally? In particular, why did northern African American elites view immigration through a rights based lens and resent the advantaged position of immigrants when immigrants were arguably more privileged and placed above blacks on the racial hierarchy in both sections of the country. Moreover, why did economic considerations come to the minds of African American elites located in the South when so many more immigrants located and competed with blacks in the North? More generally, what factors shape political preferences and why do preferences change over time and between places? These questions are particularly puzzling because, as Michael Dawson (2001) explains, “The relative homogeneity of black public opinion has been generally considered one of the few certainties of modern American politics” (Dawson 2001, 44; see also Dawson 1994, Harris 2011). However, as the passages above illustrate, African American opinion on immigration has varied both regionally and temporally. To explain this variation, I develop a theory of political preferences that is attentive to the institutional dynamics encountered by African Americans in specific times and places. In so doing, the dissertation argues that (1) variation in national laws regulating race relations influenced (2) the control local legal, political, and economic institutions had over the experiences, life chances, and possibilities of black citizens. The combination of blacks long entrenched position at the bottom of the racial hierarchy and the local institutional conditions in cities they resided in shaped (3) black elites sense of racial alienation; i.e., the level of racial subordination blacks felt. Varying racial alienation in turn affected what blacks believed was possible and thus shaped (a) the worldview through which they interpreted 4 issues such as immigration, and (b) the level of hostility towards other groups in society including immigrants. This dissertation, thus, provides needed amendments to our understanding of black public opinion. Foremost, the arguments presented in the following chapters suggest that research on black public opinion has too often homogenized blacks’ views, ignoring important spatial and temporal variation. Leveraging evidence from two cases—Savannah, Georgia and Cleveland, Ohio—the dissertation provides evidence that, on a key policy issue, African American elite opinion is more varied than existing theories would predict. The primary explanation put forth in the following pages—that variation in racial alienation across space and time influences black elite’s immigration preferences—challenges purely economic explanations for African American views of immigration, which focus on economic competition as the primary driver of black public opinion on immigration policy.2 By providing evidence that blacks have experienced their race differently in unique ways at specific times and places as evidenced by varied racial alienation, this dissertation also suggests that black elite opinion is first formulated at the local, rather than national level, which further clarifies the theoretical antecedents of the linked fate model of black public opinion (Dawson 1994). The second key contribution of this dissertation is methodological. This dissertation relies on an analysis of newspaper editorials as an alternative to non-existent survey data to capture variation in black elite opinion at the local level in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. With this novel methodological approach, the dissertation argues that behavioral approaches are too dependent on survey data to answer important longitudinal questions beginning before widespread public opinion surveys. Moreover, political development approaches that utilize 2 For examples of research that suggests economic competition influences black public opinion on immigration see: Johnson Jr. et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Doherty 2006; McClain et al. 2007; Morris and Gimpel 2007; Nteta 2012; Hutchings and Wong 2014; and Nteta 2014. 5 time, sequence, and institutional change as important explanatory variables have yet to fully examine shifts in public opinion over time. Thus, this dissertation takes a step towards bridging this methodological division between scholars of political behavior and historical institutionalism. Linked Fate is Limited The central theory for understanding black public opinion is linked fate. As Harris (2011) explains in his extensive review of black public opinion research “there are virtually no rival conceptual frameworks to compete with the theory of linked fate that explain how black public opinion is formed or understood” (499). However, although linked fate is the most comprehensive theory for comprehending black public opinion, it makes the unwarranted assumption black public opinion is homogenous, underspecifies key theoretical principles, and thus, is incomplete for addressing the varied reaction of African American elites towards immigration. In his seminal text Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics, Michael Dawson argues that African Americans have unique group interests stemming from a shared historical experience wherein their individual life chances have been overwhelmingly shaped by their race (Dawson 1994). Because blacks are rational actors with this shared experience, Dawson argues that it is simpler, more efficient, and less costly for individuals within this group to develop individual political orientations based on their understanding of what is beneficial for the larger racial group (Dawson 1994, 57-59). Thus, the homogeneity in black public opinion emerges from a perceived linkage between the interests of individual African Americans and the interests of African Americans as a larger racial group where 6 individual blacks relying on their rationality and shared racial experiences often support what is ideal for the group even if it is not optimal for them individually. Indeed, linked fate has proven itself as an unrivaled explanation for black public opinion (Dawson 1994; Davis and Gandy Jr. 1999; Dawson 2001; Brown and Shaw 2002; Krysan and Farley 2002; Tate 2003; etc.). Though linked fate has been an unmatched explanation of black public opinion, it is insufficient for tackling the puzzles at hand. First, at its core, the theory of linked fate assumes that—and attempts to explain why—African American opinions are homogenous. However, as the introductory examples illuminate, blacks’ opinions are not always consistent across space and time and our theoretical models must be just as proficient at explaining variation in opinions as homogeneity. Theoretical accounts must, therefore, clarify why black elites in one era viewed immigrants with hostility while black elites in another era willingly accepted immigrants. This is particularly surprising because scholars have consistently explained the social, economic, and political effects of immigration for African Americans in both time periods.3 Thus, it would have, seemingly, been in the best interest of African Americans to oppose immigration in both periods, but again, this is not what we observe. Additionally, if group interests alone were the primary influence of African American opinions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we would expect black elites in both the North and the South to be upset about the economic competition that might accompany increased immigration. Presumably it would have been in the best interest of all African Americans to limit economic competition from immigrants, not just those in the South where 3 For examples of economic competition between blacks and immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see: Lieberson 1980, Fuchs 1990, and Diamond 1998; and for economic competition between these groups in the second half of the twentieth century, see: Borjas 1998, Bean et al. 1999, Briggs Jr. 2004, Johannsson and Shulman 2004, Shulman and Smith 2005, and McClain et al. 2007. For examples of immigrants discriminating against African Americans see: Libman-Rubenstein 1979, Ignatiev 1997, Diamond 1998, Jacobson 1998, Waters 1999. For examples of the effects of political discussions about immigration on African Americans, see Smith 1997, King 2000, King and Smith 2005. 7 immigrants arguably posed less of an economic threat to African Americans simply because most immigrants settled in the North (Lieberson 1980). While the southern black masses could have faced stiff competition from immigrant agricultural workers, it is unlikely that black elites would have been directly displaced because they were largely employed in other professions. If black elites in the South were concerned about the effect of immigration on the black masses, we would expect this kind of group interest to manifest in all regions of the United States. Moreover, according to a group interest based explanation, we would expect African Americans in both sections of the United States to be concerned that immigrants were passing over blacks for full rights of citizenship. To be sure, African American elites in the North were more advantaged than their southern counterparts, and the gap in rights and privileges between blacks and immigrants was arguably smaller in the North simply because southern blacks were so oppressed during this period in America history. Empirically, black elites in the South had more cause to be upset over the rights afforded to immigrants, yet again, this is not the sentiment most reflected in their responses above. Thus, the immigration preferences highlighted above suggest that the theory of linked fate alone is insufficient for understanding the varied attitudes of African American elites on the issue of immigration. The second limitation of the linked fate approach is the model fails to adequately specify the reference group that African Americans use when formulating their opinions, thus implicitly assuming that this reference group is national and the same in all times and places. Individual African Americans may be imagining what is in the best interest of the larger racial group, yet if the group of individuals they are thinking of is locally or temporally defined and has unique needs, then we might expect their attitudes to be heterogeneous, not homogenous. Moreover, if black elites think of different groups when evaluating racial group interests, they are likely 8 imagining their black neighbors, community members, or fellow state residents, not an amorphous national group of African Americans. When southern black elites formulated their immigration preferences, it is likely that they would have thought of other African Americans existing in a similar context and undergoing comparable experiences, rather than their counterparts in the North or the West who had different experiences of their race. Thus, to the extent that “national” and homogenous black opinions do exist, they are an amalgamation of local opinions from specific times and locations conveyed by African Americans living in similar environments and understanding their racial group in an analogous way. Finally, the theory of linked fate does not adequately identify how African Americans understand what is best for their racial group, and if individual blacks assess the ideal course for the larger racial group similarly. The assumption that African Americans consistently assess what is optimal for the larger racial group is dubious, as individuals have likely experienced their race in different ways leading them to understand what is optimal for their race based on their local and temporal context. While it may seem obvious that individual African Americans are not considering what would be ideal for previous generations of blacks when formulating their opinions, it is possible that some elites contemplate what is ideal for African Americans in the present while others strategize for the future, guiding them to different perceptions of their racial group interests. Moreover, why would we expect black elites in the North and black elites in the South, experiencing their race through different encounters with unique social, economic, and political institutions, to assess what is best for blacks in the same way? How would blacks in each respective region have even known what the optimal immigration stance was for their counterparts across the United States? 9 Collectively, these central shortcomings make the theory of linked fate inadequate for explaining the temporal and regional variation in African American elites’ immigration opinions. Thus, in the following section, I provide a theory of black elite opinion that incorporates the local and temporal contexts individual African Americans encountered. A Theory of Black Elite Opinion To explain the regional and temporal variation in black elite opinion, I develop the theory described in Figure 1.1 that is attentive to the unique institutional dynamics encountered by African Americans at specific points in time and in particular places across the county. In doing so, I argue that the institutional context—meaning the specific legal, political, and economic institutions—encountered by blacks in certain locations across the country at particular points in time matters for the formation of African American’s political attitudes. Because these key institutional dynamics vary temporally and regionally, and are important influences of African American’s political preferences, black elite opinion is less stable over time and between places than previously thought. By taking seriously the way institutions shape black elite opinion, this research moves beyond group interests as a singular force shaping African American attitudes and deepens our theoretical framework of black elite opinion. Figure 1.1: A Theory of Black Elite Opinion National Laws Local Institutional Context Racial Alienation Other Groups in Society Worldviews Opinions 10 The Racial Hierarchy in America One cannot fully understand black politics generally, or black public opinion more specifically, without considering the structure and experience of race in American politics and society. The initial denial of freedom and citizenship beginning with the enslavement of African Americans and the U.S. Constitution codifying and institutionalizing inequality communicated a strong message of inferiority to blacks. Subsequent laws and practices reinforced this initial inequality. For example, electoral institutions determined if blacks could participate in politics, how they could participate, and the choices available when participating. Economic institutions supplied the marketplace necessary for commerce, and provided the guidelines for transactions in the market, yet these were often set up to advantage whites. Combined, the legal, political, and economic institutions signified to individuals their position on the racial hierarchy in America. The racial hierarchy in America is largely unspoken in popular discourse; nevertheless, it is widely understood “as a framework that ranks the desirability of groups and delineates who is a full member [of society] and who must continually fight to be perceived as one” (Masuoka and Junn 2013, 4). While race is a socially constructed concept (Omi and Winant 1994) wherein individuals can occupy different categories at specific points in time, the stakes of racial classification are high; race is not “simply a demographic characteristic or a product of personal preference but a structural attribute imposed on an individual with important consequences for individual life chances and political experiences” (Masuoka and Junn 2013, 5). Quite simply, race matters for educational attainment, civil and political rights, economic well-being, and a long list of other important indicators of life chances. Whites and blacks anchor the poles of the racial hierarchy with whites securely at the top and blacks anchored at the bottom. Higher status on the racial hierarchy—embodied by whites— 11 entails more power in American politics and society and default status as the in-group to which other groups are compared (Masuoka and Junn 2013). Immigrants and other minority groups have consistently occupied a middle ground on the racial hierarchy. For example, northern and western European immigrants were not initially considered “white,” though they still held a higher status on the racial hierarchy than blacks (Ignatiev 1995). Later groups of southern and eastern European immigrants fell lower on the racial hierarchy than earlier northern and western European immigrant groups, yet the boundary between their position and whites was never as recognized or institutionalized as the line between blacks and whites (Fox and Guglielmo 2012). By the mid-twentieth century, when ideas of race and national origin began to merge, both of these immigrant groups were subsumed into the white category, thus further demonstrating the socially constructed and mutable concept of race. Asian and Mexican immigrants complicate our understanding of a one-dimensional racial hierarchy based on superiority. For example, Kim (1999) argues that the experience of Asian Americans is best comprehended by envisioning ‘racial fields’ in which groups are evaluated on two dimensions: the familiar dimension of superior and inferior, and the additional dimension of whether a group is viewed as an insider or outsider. On these two dimensions, Asian Americans were valorized as superior to blacks, while at the same time, ostracized as foreign and inferior when compared to whites giving Asians a unique position in American society (Kim 1999). Masuoka and Junn (2013) echo this characterization of Asian Americans while adding that Latinos should also be understood in the context of a multidimensional racial ordering. Though the exact placement of Asian Americans and Latinos within the racial fields is constantly evolving, these groups represent a middle ground between blacks and whites on the racial hierarchy. 12 African Americans, on the other hand, are firmly planted at the bottom of the racial hierarchy and have been consistently treated as second-class citizens subject to discrimination, segregation, poverty, and other unequal conditions. When civil and political rights have been expanded for blacks, they have quickly been curtailed by new forms of suppression—the early abolitionist movements among some of the thirteen colonies were followed by the drafting of the U.S. Constitution that institutionalized inequality for blacks; Reconstruction and Jim Crow cast a dark shadow on the advances made with the Civil War amendments; and even after the Civil Rights Movement, blacks still lag behind other groups on many markers of progress and equality (Masuoka and Junn 2013). Even seemingly unrelated policymaking, such as discussions over immigration policy have had the “unintended” consequence of further cementing blacks’ position at the bottom of the American racial hierarchy (Smith 1997, King 2000, King and Smith 2005). For example, the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 strengthened political alliances between the South and the West dedicated to maintaining the white supremacist racial order (King and Smith 2005). Moreover, reports in 1911 from the Dillingham Commission on immigration implied to many Americans “that American blacks were even more undesirable sources of disease and degradation than the most objectionable immigrants” (King and Smith 2005, 89). Thus, while blacks have been “insiders” relative to immigrant and other minority groups, the presence of immigrants has still frequently reinforced America’s white supremacist racial order and pushed blacks into the least enviable position on the racial hierarchy However, the way individuals, and groups, have experienced their position on the racial hierarchy varies temporally and regionally. That is, while blacks have consistently occupied the bottom of the racial hierarchy, the realities of this position have varied based on key institutional 13 features in specific times and places. Thus, though institutions set and enforce the rules governing the behavior of members of society, African Americans are well aware that they rarely establish equal rules for every group. In particular, institutions at the federal level have historically set off a series of reactions that influence the experiences, and ultimately, the opinions of African Americans. Nationalizing Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Federal institutions—particularly federal laws—have consistently communicated to individuals their place in American society, and they have shaped African American’s experience of their race. By guaranteeing the full protection of the civil rights and civil liberties of all members of society, these institutions have sent signals of inclusion and acceptance, or conversely, messages indicating members of some groups were not full citizens. In practice, laws—or lack thereof—at the federal level establishing African Americans civil rights and civil liberties influence the degree of local institutional control over the life chances and possibilities of black citizens, thus defining the reality at the bottom of the hierarchy. When federal laws are established, and enforced, to guarantee African Americans’ civil rights and civil liberties, there is less variation in the control local legal, political, and economic institutions, have over individual African Americans. For example, when federal laws are established that supersede state laws, these equalize the rights and liberties of African Americans living in different states and localities.4 On the other hand, when federal laws fail to guarantee blacks their full citizenship rights and liberties, either because the laws do not exist, or because they are not enforced, there 4 Of course there can still be variation in the implementation of federal policies. That is, federal laws can mandate that all individuals have an equal right to an education without ensuring that all educational experiences are equal. The point, however, is that federal guarantees are, overall, more likely to result in similar and equal opportunities than in their absence. 14 will be greater variation, and thus, inequality across the United States in the actual civil rights and civil liberties blacks experience. Thus, laws at the national level either empower local institutions by giving them wide discretion over the civil rights and civil liberties African Americans actually experience, or they rightfully act as the supreme laws of the land, overriding local regulations and practices, to guarantee blacks full citizenship. Local Institutional Context Local institutions are the overriding factor shaping African American’s experience of their race, particularly in the absence of federal protections for civil rights and civil liberties. When federal guarantees of civil rights and civil liberties are not in place, local legal, political, and economic institutions are a primary source of information for blacks about their place in society; what is possible for them as individuals and a group; and ultimately, affect feelings of racial alienation. Thus, when these local institutional arrangements are allowed discretion over the experiences of African Americans, they also have important implications for black elites’ attitudes. Local legal institutions refer to the explicit laws—or those practices tacitly allowed in the absence of specific laws—encountered by black in their state or locality. When local legal institutions have enacted discriminatory laws and practices against African Americans, they have sent signals to blacks about their inclusion in the local community. Accordingly, these institutions advance and codify measures of segregation, deny coexistence between blacks and whites in public institutions; refuse to grant and/or acknowledge the marriage of two individuals because they are different races; and/or forbid African Americans from their right to serve on juries, they send absolute messages to blacks that they are not full citizens, but instead, lesser 15 members of the community.5 In fact, interactions such as these stigmatize African Americans as a subordinate group in society not worthy of the rights and liberties of other groups. On the other hand, local legal institutions during certain times and at specific places, may provide opportunities for blacks to intermarry, advance less rigid forms of segregation in spheres of public life, or allow blacks their rightful place on juries, thus sending messages of inclusion, equality, and opportunity to African Americans. Local political institutions encompass the local electoral institutions used for electing public officials as well as the local political party system that these officials represent. Local electoral institutions fundamentally communicate messages about a group’s inclusion and opportunities in local politics. When states and local governments fail to enforce rights to universal suffrage, or worse, enact measures designed to systematically disfranchise certain groups of voters, they communicate to these groups that they are not full citizens. Instead, practices like grandfather clauses, literacy tests, Constitution tests, poll taxes, all white primaries, residency requirements, property requirements, elaborate registration systems, and other techniques used to disenfranchise African American voters, tell blacks that they are inferior and subordinate groups not fit to have a voice in the political process. Similarly, when an African American’s interests fail to gain representation from elected officials it signals to these groups that they are less important members of the community. Moreover, when blacks are restricted in law or practice from pursuing political office, their opportunities to change the dynamics of local political arrangements are severely limited, and this lack of political incorporation makes blacks even more subordinate members of society. On the other hand, local political institutions can empower groups, communicating feelings of inclusion and respect, by allowing widespread 5 For a detailed account of African Americans second-class citizenship including segregation in public institutions, the refusal of states to grant or recognize marriages, and denying blacks their right to serve on juries, see Smith 1997. 16 participation in the electoral process, providing opportunities to run for political office, and creating an environment where elected officials represent African Americans’ interests. These measures translate into feelings of full citizenship in the local polity. Local economic institutions create local marketplaces, subsidize local commerce, and regulate both. These institutions can signal the value of certain groups by providing differential opportunities to some individuals and groups affecting their economic clout in the community. When local economic institutions discriminate against African Americans by forcing them to work for little or no wages; forbidding them from openly selling their goods; and/or controlling where and when certain individuals can engage in commerce, they designate these individuals as inferior members of the community and severely limit the economic opportunities of these groups (Marable 2007). Additionally, when employment opportunities are limited by an unequal education system, discriminatory lending practices, and prejudice in hiring decisions, economic opportunities for members of these disadvantaged groups are slim, which places them in a weaker and more subordinate place in the local economy and society. Conversely, when individuals can freely engage in commerce, are provided equal and requisite education, allowed to borrow money to engage in business, and/or afforded a fair shot a being hired, they are much more economically empowered. Thus, local economic institutions can shape the opportunities available to members of specific groups while communicating strong messages of acceptance and inclusion, or of inferiority and subordination. Though local legal, political, and economic institutions set rules for members of society, extralegal practices have also been used to enforce and reinforce the messages conveyed by these formal institutions. Violence, intimidation, and coercion from other members of a community could be used in conjunction with: legal institutions to further enforce measures of segregation in 17 public life, maintain the status quo of same race marriages, and keep blacks from making it to the courthouse for jury service; with political institutions to further persuade some groups to abstain from political office and participation; and with economic institutions to keep individuals from participating in the marketplace, reinforce separatism in education, discrimination in employment practices, and generally further limit the economic possibilities for some groups in the local economy. Quite simply, when practices such as lynching or other means of violent intimidation and coercion were used against African Americans to enforce the rules set forth by legal, political, and economic institutions, blacks were further reminded of their subordinate and inferior status in the local community. Institutional Context and Racial Alienation Varied institutional arrangements in specific times and places sent unique signals about African Americans’ place in society, shaping their level of racial alienation. The concept of racial alienation stems from Blumer’s (1958) “group position model,” which was developed to explain relations between whites and blacks. Blumer (1958) suggested that individuals classify their group (in-group) and other groups (out-groups) into distinct categories, thus forcing scholars to conceive of group relations in terms of relative group position; i.e., how members of one group see themselves in relation to other groups. Blumer further argued that a group’s material conditions and objective position in society were not enough to shape their feelings towards other groups, but rather, subjective perceptions of relative group position also pivotally influenced attitudes towards other groups. For Blumer, the position of a social group emerged from a combination of four factors: the first is a preference for members of one’s own group; second, is a feeling that out-group members are foreign or other; third, that the group is entitled 18 to certain rights, privileges, or resources; and fourth, that out-groups desire access to the zerosum resources, status, power, and position of the in-group. These four conditions together create a perception of where the in-group should be positioned in society and how they will respond to out-groups (Blumer 1958). Bobo and Hutchings (1996) extended Blumer’s (1958) group position model by maintaining that group relations in a multiracial context are shaped by racial alienation. Racial alienation emerges from a combination of the objective material conditions group members experience and their subjective perceptions of the current political, social, and economic opportunity structure available to members of their racial group. Racial alienation is fundamentally influenced by the material conditions individual members of social groups historically and currently experience, for “the greater the degree of racial subordination, the greater the feeling of racial alienation” indicating that more oppressed and subordinate groups are also more likely to feel racially alienated (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, 956). Moreover, racial alienation corresponds “to a group’s historical position in the social structure. With their institutionalized privileges, members of the dominant racial group rarely feel alienated in this sense. Indeed, the more secure the relative power, economic, and status advantages of the dominant group, the less alienated and threatened they will feel. Members of subordinate racial groups, with their institutionalized disadvantages, will often feel such alienation” (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, 956). Similarly, groups that experience a “profound sense of group disenfranchisement and grievance” are most likely to feel racially alienated; whereas groups who experience full “group enfranchisement and entitlement” rarely feel racially alienated (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, 956). Thus, African Americans can encounter objective discriminatory institutional arrangements that send them messages about their level of subordination, 19 disenfranchisement from society, actual power in society to affect changes in their position, which in turn affects their feeling of racial alienation. When federal institutions guarantee and protect African American’s civil rights and civil liberties, there is less leeway for local institutional variation and inequality in the objective material conditions African Americans experience. This means that local legal, political, and economic institutions have less latitude to enact discriminatory practices aimed at oppressing African Americans while communicating messages of inferiority, subordination, powerlessness, and ultimately, leading to feelings racial alienation. Conversely, in the absence of federal assurances, local legal, political, and economic institutions may pursue measures that make African Americans feel more oppressed, powerless, and having few opportunities. For example, when legal institutions permit segregation in all aspects of public life, political institutions disenfranchise would be black voters, and/or economic institutions restrict the economic opportunities of African Americans, these local institutional conditions lead to greater feelings of racial alienation. Importantly, racial alienation is not reducible to economic competition or simple self-interest. Insofar as economic factors impact feelings of racial alienation, it is the broader economic opportunity structure available to African Americans and the racial economic discrimination—or lack thereof—behind specific institutions and policies that leads to feelings of alienation, not specific instances of competition from other groups. If, even in the absence of federal protections, local institutions permit integration, free and fair elections, and/or equality in the marketplace, blacks will feel less racially alienated. Notably, on the continuum of racial alienation, even the worst experiences when African Americans are extended full civil rights and civil liberties results in less alienation than the level of racial alienation under the best local 20 conditions in the absence of national civil rights and civil liberties because the denial of these rights and liberties stigmatizes blacks as inferior second-class citizens. Racial alienation is also derived from subjective perceptions of an individual’s environment, experiences, and interactions in the world. Though these subjective perceptions are related to, and presumably influenced by, objective material conditions, they are not synonymous with such conditions. Perceptions of discrimination leading to racial alienation may stem from “blatant acts of avoidance, verbal harassment, and physical attack[s] combine[d] with subtle and covert slights [that] accumulate over months, years, and lifetimes [to] impact … a black person … far more than the sum of the individual instances” (Feagin 1991, 114-15). Thus, events, interactions, and micro-aggressions that may be innocuous to white observers—and even other African Americans—can be perceived as discriminatory to some blacks. As Hutchings and his colleagues (2011) explain, racial alienation means “some racial group members were more likely to feel a sense of racial group entitlement even as others were more apt to feel that their group had been disenfranchised and discriminated against” (57). Institutional changes, new laws and/or policies benefiting or excluding certain groups, and other objective events may also activate latent feelings of discrimination, or conversely pacify alienated individuals if they are perceived to enfranchise members of previously disadvantaged groups. Besides perceived discrimination, individual’s perception of their group’s power and opportunities available to members of their racial group influences the degree of racial alienation they feel. When individuals feel socially and politically powerless with limited opportunities to affect change in these arenas, they are more racially alienated than when they are socially and politically empowered. Like feelings of discrimination, perceptions of political and social powerlessness can be activated or pacified by institutional change, new law or policy, and other 21 objective conditions. While some may argue that feelings of discrimination and powerlessness are not distinct features of racial alienation, Wilkinson and Bingham (2016) remind us: “to feel discriminated against does not necessarily mean that one feels powerless and vice versa” (222). Moreover, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) sum up the concept of racial alienation nicely: “feelings of racial alienation reflect the accumulated personal, familial, community, and collective experiences of racial differentiation, inequality, and discrimination” (956). Racial alienation, thus, influenced black elite opinion on immigration in several ways. Racial Alienation and Attitudes Toward Other Groups Racial alienation, in turn, influenced individual’s perception of other social groups in society. Because access to political and economic resources is zero-sum proposition, and greater oppression coincides with feelings of insecurity, alienated individuals and groups worry about their position relative to other social groups. If black elites are more alienated they will feel more threatened by advancements and the opportunity structure available to other social groups because these opportunities may result in other groups attaining a greater share of resources. Put simply, when individuals, or groups, feel racially alienated they “are more likely to regard other racial groups as competitive threats to their own group’s social position” (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, 956). Conversely, less alienation denotes a more advantaged position, which means individuals and groups may already possess, or have access to, limited resources. Therefore, when groups are less alienated, they will be less concerned about other groups in society. Though African Americans have existed at the bottom of the racial hierarchy throughout American history, their level of racial alienation has by no means been constant, and scholars have found this variation useful for explaining black public opinion towards other social groups. 22 Masuoka and Junn (2013), for example, find that perceived discrimination—a leading measure of racial alienation—in fact varies amongst African Americans. Moreover, Hutchings and his colleagues suggest, “a sense of racial alienation is overwhelmingly embraced by racial minorities and contributes mightily to perceptions of intergroup conflict” (Hutchings et al. 2011, 71). More specifically, using data from the 2012 American National Election Study, Wilkinson and Bingham (2016) find that feelings of political powerlessness lead Southern blacks to see immigrants as more threatening, and that experiencing discrimination make Southern blacks view Hispanics less favorably. Put simply, “Even when accounting for leading determinants of blacks’ immigration attitudes, Southern blacks’ sense of political power and experienced discrimination play a key role in shaping their views toward immigration and immigrant groups.” (Wilkinson and Bingham 2016, 226). In her observation of intergroup relations in South Carolina, McDermott (2011) suggest that class differences influenced blacks’ immigration beliefs with upper-class blacks feeling discrimination and disadvantaged in the face of new immigration and taking a negative view of immigrants. For black elites’ perception of immigration, the implications of varied racial alienation are clear: when black elites are more alienated, they will perceive other minority groups, including immigrants, as more threatening; however, when black elites are less alienated, other minority groups such as immigrants will be seen as less threatening. Racial Advancement in Response to Racial Alienation The level of racial alienation black elites felt also affected their understanding of what was optimal for the betterment of their race, determining the worldview they adopted for advancing the status of African Americans. Though black elites have rarely been content with 23 African Americans place in society, they have also rarely agreed on the optimal course of racial advancement. Indeed, as Dawson (2001) notes, “The fact that two African Americans can believe that their fate is linked to that of the race does not mean that they agree on how best to advance their own and racial interests. Black ideological conflict occurs precisely over what constitutes the best political path for the race” (Dawson 2001, 11). Because leaders of the black community have vied for support while advocating different ideological principles, local black elites at specific historical moments have had alternative worldviews available to them. Local black elites, in turn, have chosen varied worldviews, complete with different strategies for racial progress, in response to their specific level of racial alienation. The exact worldviews black elites held were contingent on historical timing and location, yet consistent principles emerge according to particular levels of racial alienation. When racial alienation was higher—denoted by segregation, restricted political rights, and limited economic opportunities—black elites recognized their more limited possibilities as well as the high cost of challenging the status quo, thus adopting more pragmatic approaches to racial advancement. Rather than pursuing widespread equality and integration in social, political, and economic institutions that might provoke vitriolic reactions from the dominant white establishment, black elites instead chose worldviews espousing independence. These worldviews of independence, though uniquely situated in their historic context, prized African American autonomy, selfreliance and self-determination, and supported establishing separate black cultural, social, economic, and political institutions. Racial solidarity among African Americans was, thus, a key tenet of independent worldviews, for black elites believed in looking inward to the black community while pursuing incremental strategies of advancement within the confines of the current racist institutional arrangements. 24 Alternatively, when racial alienation moderated, black elites, advantaged by their greater social and economic possibilities, gravitated toward inclusive worldviews. Inclusive worldviews, though also situated in their unique historical contexts, shared a common distain for racism in American society, and proposed more disruptive approaches for racial advancement. Indeed, black elites holding these worldviews believed America must be made to live up to its values of democracy and equality, supported a strong central state, and were wary of economic markets and sub-national governments, which they rightfully believed discriminated against African Americans. Racial advancement, in turn, emerged from agitation, protest, and bottom-up pressure that could impel social, economic, and political institutions to present blacks with equal opportunities and their full rights of citizenship (Dawson 2001). Thus, black elites believed that equality was vital, and agitation was the means to achieve it. Although black elites have existed at the bottom of the racial hierarchy since the founding of the United States, they have encountered unique institutional contexts at specific times and places, thus shaping their experience of race as evidenced by varied levels of racial alienation. Varied levels of racial alienation, in turn, shaped (a) how threatening black elites found other groups in society; and (b) the worldview they used to pursue racial advancement. Through these distinct worldviews, black elites interpreted issues and events in the world, including immigration. Thus, attitudes on immigration have been highly influenced by the institutional context encountered by black elites, and because institutional arrangements vary temporally and regional, so have black elites’ immigration preferences. 25 An Old Approach Applied in a New Way To evaluate this theory of black elite opinion, this project brings a historical approach to the study of political preference formation and expression. In so doing, this research continues the long tradition of American political development (APD) that “brings the state back in” to political science research (Skocpol 1985). Indeed, APD scholars provide rich accounts of how time, historical context, and broader political processes have affected: the very development and capacity of the American state; key institutions at the national level in American politics such as the presidency, bureaucracy, Congress, courts, public policies; and the organization and behavior of groups such as social movements, political parties, and civic organizations.6 Our understanding of racial politics throughout American political history has also benefited greatly from historical institutionalist approaches (Lowdnes et al. 2008). For example, Desmond King (2007) marshals an impressive array of evidence, including previously unearthed primary source documents from the NAACP and National Urban League, to show that the Federal government was an active and willing participant in the creation and maintenance of segregation within the Federal bureaucracy and American society more broadly from the Progressive Era through the mid-twentieth century (King 2007). Similarly, Megan Ming Francis (2014) excavated historical NAACP documents to show how the organization’s campaign against lynching during the early twentieth century was pivotal for later civil rights victories and 6 For examples of APD scholarship on: state capacity, see Skowronek 1982, Bensel 1990, Ming Francis, 2014; the American presidency, see Skowronek 1994; the bureaucracy, see Carpenter 2001, Carpenter 2010; Congress, see Bensel 1984, Schickler 2001; the judiciary, see Kahn and Kersch 2006; Whittington 2007; social welfare policies, see Skocpol 1992, Hacker 1998; Hacker 2002; Campbell 2003; Mettler 2005; for immigration policy, see Tichenor 2002; social movements, see McAdam 1982, Morris 1984; Chen 2009; political parties, see Skowronek 1982; Shefter 1994; Frymer 1999; civic organizations, see Skocpol (2003) and Skocpol et al. (2006) for African American civic organizations. 26 played a central role in building the twentieth century American state (Francis 2014).7 Despite these excellent examples of how an institutionalist approach can illuminate hidden aspects of American politics, this “political tradition” has too rarely been brought to bear on explaining individual’s political preferences (Mettler and Soss 2004; Mettler 2010-2011).8 Moreover, scholars have yet to use an APD approach to systematically measure how the formation and expression of individual preferences vary across historical contexts and between local institutional arrangements, especially among African Americans. A historical institutionalist approach is a valuable and greatly needed addition for understanding political preference formation, expression, and change. Public opinion scholarship, which details how preferences are formed and expressed, generally pays little attention to how rules, institutions, procedures, and policies influence individual political opinions. Notwithstanding a few important exceptions, most public opinion research relies on national surveys taking snapshots of opinions at specific points in time, thus presenting a largely static view of political attitudes.9 In addition to the static view presented by research relying exclusively on surveys, there are a number of common pitfalls associated with this approach such as sensitivity to question wording, response categories, survey timing, and/or pressure to conform to socially acceptable views (Achen 1975; Berinsky 1999). At the same time, even survey research that takes a longer time horizon frequently omits blacks or conflates their opinions with whites (Page and Shapiro 1992). Christopher Parker provides an important exception with his study of African American veterans in the South, which utilizes survey data of 7 For additional work on race and American political development see: Smith 1997; Lieberman 1998; Marx 1998; Mettler 1998; Klinker and Smith 1999; King 2000; Valelly 2009; King and Smith 2005; Katznelson 2006; Lowndes 2008; Lowndes et al. 2008. 8 For exceptions to this generalization see Mettler and Welch 2004; Skocpol 2003; Bensel 2004; Mettler 2011; Schickler and Caughey 2011. 9 For exceptions, see Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson et al. 2002; Berinsky 2009. 27 blacks from the early 1960s, as well as interviews, to show how military service influenced the attitudes and behaviors of black veterans (Parker 2009). Unfortunately, Parker’s work is an exception to the rule, as it understandably difficult to gather survey data on African Americans— especially before the 1960s—and it may be outside the author’s purview to disaggregate their study by race. However, this does not allay the larger issue that whites and blacks have had very different historical experiences complete with diverse interactions with economic, political, and legal institutions that make theoretical generalizations from one group to the other dubious. Thus, without a unique way of conceptualizing and measuring attitudes, such as Taeku Lee’s use of constituent mail during the Civil Rights Movement, there are simply too many questions that cannot be answered using standard public opinion models, particularly for groups underrepresented in public polls such as African Americans, and/or for time periods where surveys did not exist (Lee 2002). This project, thus, takes a step towards merging these two seemingly disparate traditions by applying a historical institutionalist approach to study black elite opinion. Using a content analysis of more than 2,700 historical African American newspaper issues in two cities—one northern and one southern—as a longitudinal measure for black elite opinion, this research systematically captures, evaluates, and compares the attitudes of black elites for over eighty years, thus filling a void in the historical record and bringing to life the opinions of a group that is traditionally underrepresented in public opinion surveys and research. In so doing, this research heeds the call of recent scholarship urging more longitudinal analysis of black immigration attitudes (Waters et al. 2014) using diversified measures of opinions (Nteta 2014). Theoretically, I use this often overlooked measure of political preferences to show how national institutions give rise to variation in local experiences of race relations, structuring feelings of 28 racial alienation, which affect strategies for racial advancement, thus shaping interpretations of political events such as immigration. Importantly, this work brings a historical approach to bear on public opinion research revealing the importance of understanding past opinions and experiences when evaluating present day attitudes; shows how the interplay of national and local institutions in different time periods affect political preferences; and fills a significant void in the historical record by bringing unheard voices of African Americans to the forefront. An Overview of the Chapters Ahead The following chapters will advance, contextualize, and evaluate the theory developed in the preceding paragraphs. Chapter 2 uses a content analysis of two African American newspapers—the Cleveland Gazette and the Savannah Tribune—to systematically document the response of black elites to the issue of immigration between 1883 and 1921. While black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah opposed immigration, their attitudes in Savannah were even more restrictionist. Moreover, the images that came to mind when black elites in each city contemplated the issue of immigration differed significantly: in Cleveland, black elites were upset over the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants, while black elites in Savannah worried about the economic competition that might accompany increased immigration. The following chapter picks up where Chapter 2 leaves off and evaluates why opinions on the issue of immigration varied regionally in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This chapter argues that the absence of national guarantees of civil rights and civil liberties led to local institutional variation, which altered how African Americans experienced their race in Cleveland and Savannah. More specifically, the local institutional context was much worse in Savannah, leading black elites there to develop a greater sense of racial alienation, which in turn, made 29 them (a) more hostile to immigration, and (b) to interpret immigration through an economic based accommodationist worldview. Black elites in Cleveland, on the other hand, encountered a less oppressive local institutional context, leading to less racial alienation. Lower racial alienation meant that black elites in Cleveland (a) were less hostile to immigration than their southern counterparts, and (b) interpreted immigration through a rights based integrationist worldview. Chapter 4 also uses a content analysis of two black newspapers to systematically measure the opinions of black elites. The content analysis of the Cleveland Call and Post and The Savannah Herald reveals that black elites in both Cleveland, Ohio and Savannah, Georgia approved of immigration between 1965 and 2009. Moreover, black elites saw immigrants through a lens of commonality in which the two groups were linked in their struggle to overcome common challenges, and more specifically, to have American society realize their full civil rights and civil liberties. Chapter 5 examines black elites’ varied reactions to immigration during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the post-1965 period. This chapter argues that the nationalization of African American’s civil rights and civil liberties led to less racial alienation for black elites across the United States. Consequently, black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah held more approving views of immigration in the later period despite the similar social, economic, and political costs associated with increased immigration for African Americans. The final chapter offers predictions for African American immigration attitudes moving forward, the implication of these attitudes for interminority relations in a diversifying 21st century America, and identifies avenues for future research. 30 CHAPTER 2 UNLINKING AFRICAN AMERICAN OPINION: THE HETEROGENEOUS IMMIGRATION PREFERENCES OF BLACK ELITES IN CLEVELAND AND SAVANNAH, 1883-1921 Immigration to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century fundamentally altered the social, political, and economic landscape of America. Despite the pronounced effects of immigration on the United States and it’s political development, scholars have little systematic evidence of how groups of newcomers were perceived by a sizable portion of the American population—African-Americans generally,10 and black elites specifically. The studies we do have assume African Americans’ opinions towards immigration were similar across the United States: historians like Arnold Shankman and David Hellwig who provide the richest accounts of black’s immigration preferences take little effort to examine how these attitudes varied based on African Americans’ location within the United States. This approach is consistent with leading theories of black public opinion, which assume and seek to explain the homogeneity in African Americans’ political beliefs (Dawson 1994). However, taking for granted the similarity of African Americans’ immigration preferences is no small omission, as indicators of immigration attitudes—and black public opinion more generally—such as the relative group size of blacks and immigrants, the economic and political threat posed by immigrants, and the institutional environment faced by these groups varied significantly between different regions in the United States. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to challenge earlier research advocating a national immigration narrative among African Americans’ while filling a gap in the historical record by examining the opinions of black elites towards immigration in two cities—one northern, and one 10 See Hellwig 1974; Hellwig 1977; Hellwig 1981; Hellwig 1982; Shankman 1978; Shankman1980; Shankman 1982; Fuchs 1990; Diamond 1998; Tillery and Chresfield 2012 for exceptions. 31 southern—between 1883 and 1921. In so doing, I demonstrate that black public opinion was heterogeneous and lay the empirical groundwork for subsequent chapters which show the theoretical consequences associated with assuming that black public opinion is homogenous, that African Americans imagine the same larger racial group when located in different locations, and that blacks evaluate racial group interests similarly. To investigate the regional immigration preferences of black elites, I concentrate on Cleveland, Ohio, and Savannah, Georgia, as examples of a northern and southern city. Relying on content analysis of editorials from historic black newspapers—The Cleveland Gazette and The Savannah Tribune—I suggest that while black elites harbored negative immigration attitudes in both cities, there was variation in the way they perceived the issue of immigration: in Cleveland editorials on immigration noted sentiments that immigrants enjoyed more rights and privileges than blacks, while black elites in Savannah realized the potential for economic competition from immigration. Moreover, although black elites in both cities opposed immigration, African Americans in Savannah were even more hostile towards immigration than their counterparts in Cleveland. The Case for Regional Variation Arnold Shankman and David Hellwig are the leading authorities on African American attitudes towards immigration in the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Minor disparities notwithstanding, in combination, they provide an excellent outline of blacks reception of immigration during this period. However, their accounts overlook regional differences influenced black attitudes on immigration, which is particularly troubling given the vast literature suggesting that contact and context—which varied significantly across the United States—affect immigration attitudes (Oliver and Wong 2003; Gay 2006; McClain et al. 2007). 32 After surveying a collection of black newspapers across the country, Hellwig (1982) notes, “blacks clearly devoted more energy to criticizing than praising the immigrant” (86). In fact, based on a sampling of available black newspapers from many cities at different points in time throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, both Hellwig and Shankman, describe the tenor of black attitudes towards immigration as hostile and restrictionist (Hellwig 1974; Hellwig 1977; Hellwig 1981; Hellwig 1982; Shankman 1978; Shankman 1980; Shankman 1982; see also Appel 1966). Examining black newspapers and statements from prominent black leaders, Diamond (1998) suggests that “black opinion did appear to follow white opinion in becoming increasingly restrictionist” by the turn of the twentieth century (455). Still, in his analysis of proceedings from the national NAACP conferences throughout the 1920s, King (2000) describes black leaders’ uneasiness with the exclusionary racial discourse exemplified in the debates over national origins immigration legislation. Conversely, Tillery and Chresfield (2012) provide a notable exception to the trend of restriction in their analysis of four black newspapers in the early twentieth century finding that African Americans viewed West Indian immigrants with some affinity. However, in each of these arguments, there is an unwarranted assumption that blacks reacted to immigration similarly across the United States; instead, there is evidence that certain groups of southerners were more conflicted over the issue of immigration than their northern counterparts indicating that immigration preferences likely reflected groups’ local and regional interests (Flemming 1905; Berthoff 1951). While economic and political competition with immigrants as well as feelings of envy and resentment directed at immigrants based on the legal and institutional privileges they were afforded help us better understand the origins of African American immigration attitudes, all three of these explanations have important 33 regional variations. Thus, national black opinion on immigration may not have existed, as opinions in this era generally, were overwhelmingly shaped by their local contexts. One dominant explanation for African American immigration attitudes during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is economic competition, as many suggest that immigrants competing for positions in the labor market angered blacks (Appel 1966; Hellwig 1974; Shankman 1978; Hellwig 1981; Hellwig 1982; Shankman 1982; Diamond 1998; Jacobsen 1998; Ignatiev 1999; Briggs Jr. 2004; etc.). However, immigration and settlement patterns placed blacks and immigrants in predominantly different parts of the country as Lieberson (1980) suggests: “the new European immigrant groups did not locate in the same parts of the nation where blacks were concentrated” (Lieberson 1980, 39). While blacks were overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural South, new immigrants fled to the urban North with little overlap anywhere in between (Lieberson 1980). In fact, between 1880 and 1930, no state had both a foreign born and a black population over 10 percent (Wilcox 1931). Thus, to the extent that relative group size influences perceptions of other groups as economic threats (Bobo and Hutchings 1996), we would expect economic competition to influence immigration preferences quite differently in the North and the South. Northern blacks may have felt more threatened by immigration simply because immigrants were such an overwhelmingly larger group than African Americans. Similarly, southern blacks, who were entrenched in the local economy and existed in large numbers, may have been less concerned with the relatively smaller number of immigrants moving to the South. Conflict between blacks and immigrants also appeared in the political arena, particularly with immigrant groups who staunchly supported the Democratic Party, as most blacks in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era were Republicans and resented the Democratic Party (Frymer 34 1999). Hellwig (1981) notes, for example, that blacks “castigated newcomers for supporting the Democratic Party,” and, in particular, African Americans notoriously disliked the Irish for their strong allegiance to the Democratic Party (Hellwig 1981, 89; see also Hellwig 1974; Ignatiev 1995; Diamond 1998). However, politics is often local, and local context engendered different opportunities for political competition and political party make-up, specifically between the North and the South. Since blacks were consistently disenfranchised in the solidly Democratic South, they were naturally a less potent political force in this part of the United States (Lieberson 1980). Moreover, in many southern locations, the foreign born population was small suggesting they were a weaker political group in the South than in the North. Thus, to the extent that political competition influenced black immigration opinions, it was likely the opinions of northern blacks embedded in a competitive multiparty political environment with a large immigrant population also vying for political resources. Besides conflict over scarce economic and political resources, Hellwig (1981) suggests that blacks “dislike of the foreign born, unlike that of most whites, was rooted in envy and resentment” (90; see also Shankman 1982). Immigrants, unlike blacks, were allowed to vote, hold public offices, have their children attend schools with whites, and generally, were afforded legal protection in the courts (Hellwig 1981). Even though most blacks were native born citizens, American racism too often denied them these fundamental rights and privileges, particularly in the South. Lynchings, low literacy, and voter registration rates are emblematic of the denial of full citizenship rights and protections of blacks in the South (Lieberson 1980). Thus, it angered African Americans that newcomers were awarded rights they so deeply desired simply because most immigrants were not black. Nevertheless, like economic and political competition, the racism and institutions privileging immigrants varied significantly across the United States. The 35 right of suffrage, for example, was withheld from southern blacks through poll taxes, white primaries, grandfather clauses, and intimidation at the polls. In contrast, free from legal barriers, northern blacks registered and voted in high numbers despite occupying a small percentage of the population in many northern urban centers (Lieberson 1980). Immigrants, on the other hand, faced fewer barriers across the country. Even immigrants who had yet to naturalize were allowed to vote in some southern states like Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and Texas (Motomura 2006). Hence, in the case of voting rights, southern blacks had greater reason to resent the rights afforded to immigrants simply because blacks were so poorly treated in this region. Again, the local context encountered by African Americans created different political, economic, and legal arrangements for blacks and immigrants between the North and the South, which has important implications for African American’s immigration preferences. Location Matters: Black Immigration Attitudes in Cleveland and Savannah Since the social, economic, and political realities of blacks differed so significantly between the North and the South, exploring the immigration attitudes of African Americans must necessarily include the variation between these two regions. At the same time, one cannot simply study “the North” and “the South” lest she fall victim to the same imprecision befitting earlier work studying “black public opinion” without attention to the context individuals were located in. To fully capture the context that individuals are embedded in without sacrificing larger implications, cities are used as the level of analysis. Two cities offer locations for examining African American attitudes towards immigration: Cleveland, Ohio and Savannah, Georgia. 36 Description of Cleveland and Savannah Cleveland, Ohio and Savannah, Georgia are useful cases for delving into the distinct regional narratives because they vary in theoretically important ways, yet these two cities are still similar enough for fruitful comparison. Foremost, both cities were large and expanding between 1880 and 1921 with sizeable black and immigrant populations, as described in Table 2.1. While Cleveland had a greater total population—rising from160,000 in 1880 to over 900,000 residents by 1930—one must remember that Cleveland was smaller than many northern industrial cities. Moreover, Savannah was one of the ten largest Southern cities with a population of just over 30,000 in 1880 and more than 85,000 in 1930 (Acker 2012). Importantly, in both cities, but particularly in Cleveland, the percent of blacks and immigrants remained relatively stable over the 1880 to 1921 period. Moreover, Savannah’s small immigrant population described by the census figures in Table 2.1 somewhat understates the size of ethnic communities in Savannah as many from the second generation identified ethnically with their parents heritage, but are not officially counted among the foreign born (Acker 2012). Thus, each city harbored a sizable number of blacks and immigrants, which, as described above, many cities did not, and this is important for gauging African American’s opinions about immigration. Besides simply existing in each city, it is likely that blacks and immigrants were aware of one another. Blacks in Cleveland, unlike their compatriots in other cities, were relatively well disbursed throughout the city. For example, in 1910, all but 17 of the 155 census tracts contained black residents indicating that blacks were less strictly segregated in Cleveland and likely encountered immigrants in their daily lives (Kusmer, 1976). While blacks and immigrants were less integrated in Savannah with each living in specific parts of the city, it is still likely that blacks were aware of immigrants because immigrants engaged in community life in Savannah. 37 Table 2.1: City Population, 1880-1930 Cleveland Year Group Number of Percent of Total People Population 1880 Total 160,416 100% Population Blacks 2,062 1.3% Foreign Born 59,409 37% 1890 Total 261,353 100% Population Blacks 3,035 1.2% Foreign Born 97,095 37.2% 1900 Total 381,768 100% Population Blacks 5,988 1.6% Foreign Born 124,631 32.6% 1910 Total 560,663 100% Population Blacks 8,448 1.5% Foreign Born 196,170 34.9% 1920 Total 796,841 100% Population Blacks 34,451 4.3% Foreign Born 240,173 30.1% 1930 Total 900,429 100% Population Blacks 71,899 8.0% Foreign Born 230,946 25.6% Source: United States Census Bureau, 1880-1930 Savannah Number of Percent of Total People Population 30,709 100% 15,654 2,994 43,189 51% 9.8% 100% 22,963 3,408 54,244 53.2% 7.9% 100% 28,090 3,434 65,064 51.8% 12.2% 100% 33,246 3,448 83,252 51.1% 5.3% 100% 39,179 3,336 85,094 47.1% 4% 100% 38,896 2,531 45.7% 3% As Acker (2012) notes, “German Jews, Irish Catholics and other men outside the traditional elite… were well integrated into Savannah’s city government, commercial and civic societies, and social organizations…” (Acker, 52). Since context and contact with immigrants, or other minority groups can affect attitudes towards immigration (Hellwig 1974; Gay 2006; McClain et al. 2007), it is important that blacks in each city interacted with the immigrant population. However, Cleveland and Savannah also differ in important ways that influence our expectations for black’s immigration preferences. The relative group size of blacks and immigrants varies between these two cities. According to Table 2.1, blacks held a significantly 38 larger share of the population in Savannah than immigrants, whereas, in Cleveland, immigrants were the larger group. Two distinct expectations can be derived from the relative size of the black and immigrant populations. On one hand, blacks encountering a high number of immigrants might feel more threatened by this group and see them as economic or political competitors. Therefore, blacks in Cleveland should exhibit more hostility than those in Savannah because they confronted a much larger group of immigrants. On the other hand, some research suggests, instead, that larger out-groups temper feelings of animosity (Hood and Morris 1998; Oliver and Wong 2003) indicating that blacks in Cleveland may greet immigrants with less hostility than their compatriots in Savannah. The forthcoming analysis will help sort out these competing expectations. Cleveland and Savannah exist in two distinct regions of the United States—the North and the South—which has implications for the politics and political competition between the two groups in each city. From the 1880s to the 1920s, the Democratic Party dominated politics in the South with institutions devoted to maintaining the Democratic status quo, and Savannah was no exception. In fact, to the extent that political competition existed in Savannah, it was between factions within the Democratic Party. As solid Republicans shut out of all white primaries, blacks had little political party choice when they were allowed to exercise political rights. However, because groups were concentrated in certain precincts within the city, the small portion of blacks who did vote became an increasingly important political constituency (Acker 2012). Immigrants in Savannah—particularly Irish and German immigrants—were well integrated into the political establishment and served in forms of city governance throughout this period. Moreover, these groups lived in ethnic enclaves within certain precincts, which made their influence more pronounced (Acker 2012). Cleveland blacks, on the other hand, existed in 39 an environment of Northern Republican political competition, and a few select individuals held political positions in the Ohio state legislature. Political power for blacks in Ohio, more generally, came from being tied to Mark Hanna and the Republican Party. Irish immigrants as well as eastern and southern European immigrants, on the other hand, supported the Democratic Party quite strongly (Flinn 1960). Thus, in both cities, blacks and immigrants supported different factions, yet fierce political competition was more likely in Cleveland because immigrants, coalesced into a larger group, posed a greater threat to the political ends of blacks. In the South, the greatest threat to the political possibilities of African Americans was not immigrants, but rather southern racism and disenfranchisement imposed by southern whites. Collectively, this is to say that Cleveland and Savannah are similar enough for comparison and to offer a representative lens into the relationship between blacks and immigrants, yet, at the same time, these two cities existed in distinct regions within the United States, which generates unique expectations for the reaction of blacks to immigration in each city. Measuring Attitudes: The Case for Black Elites There are number of hurdles to analyzing public opinion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The absence of public opinion polling, high rates of illiteracy among blacks, and discriminatory practices, make it difficult to gauge black public opinion generally, and working class opinion specifically. Thus, this chapter focuses on elite level opinion on both practical and theoretical grounds. Theoretically, the importance of elites for public opinion is well documented, as much of the public opinion literature posits a top-down relationship in which elites play a pivotal role in shaping broader public opinion. John’s Zaller’s “Receive Accept Sample” model of public 40 opinion, for example, suggests that elites perform a disproportionately significant role in providing the information that forms the basis of considerations used by most individuals when expressing their preferences (Zaller 1992). Besides information, elites also supply the issue frames through which the public assesses policies including those policies with racial implications like immigration (Kinder and Sanders 1996).11 Since elites deliver vital information and the frames used for interpreting political information, they are fundamentally important to the process of attitude formation and expression. On a practical level, elites’ attitudes are simply more likely to be expressed and recorded. Prominent blacks edited newspapers, gave speeches or sermons, kept diaries, wrote correspondence, and participated in other public acts. Moreover, previous literature that examines black public opinion on immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is, even if the author does not specify, actually measuring elite level opinion. For example, those who measure opinions with black newspapers (Hellwig 1974; Hellwig 1981; Hellwig 1982; Shankman 1978; Shankman 1982; Tillery and Chresfield 2012) are capturing elite level opinion, as those writing for and editing black newspapers were unequivocally black elites. Scholars utilizing NAACP meeting notes (King 2000) or elite speeches and correspondence (Diamond 1998) are also measuring elite opinion as a proxy for black public opinion more generally. Quite simply, researchers have yet to discover a way of measuring the opinions of the masses when surveys did not exist and the general public lacked the necessary means or skill to record their own thoughts. Black elites can shape the opinions of the masses via information and frames, which suggests that black elite opinion on immigration during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 11 For an exception to the elite driven model, see Lee (2002). 41 may not have been all that different from mass level opinion. Thus, for both theoretical and practical reasons, this chapter will focus on black elites immigration attitudes. Black Newspapers From a methodological standpoint, public opinion surveys are only one of the many ways that scholars quantify and measure individual level preferences. Indeed, Susan Herbst notes that acceptable measures of public opinion have varied quite significantly over time—from straw polls in the early nineteenth century, to newspapers in the mid-nineteenth century, to the modern sample survey in the early twentieth century (Herbst 1993). In particular, newspapers have served as a valuable alternative measure for public opinion researchers. As noted above, studies have employed black newspapers to capture black attitudes about immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Hellwig 1974; Hellwig 1981; Hellwig 1982; Shankman 1978; Shankman 1982; Tillery and Chresfield 2012). Additionally, Rita Simon analyzed media coverage in white periodicals from 1880-1980 to understand how the issue of immigration was covered and received by the public during this extensive time period, which included many years without opinion surveys (Simon 1985). As these rich examples suggest, the use of newspapers for gauging public opinion has strong precedent in existing political science literature, and the use of these alternative measures is particularly important because they offer researchers a lens into the thinking of a group that is traditionally underrepresented in public opinion surveys and research. However, the use of black newspapers as a measure of black’s opinion is not perfect, and methodological concerns must be taken seriously. The challenges associated with using newspapers as a measure of public opinion fall into three categories: audience, existence, and 42 representation. Many black newspapers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were fighting for survival and on the verge of collapse, which made them especially beholden to their audience, as each reader, subscription, and advertising account helped stave off foreclosure. Since rates of illiteracy were so high for African Americans during this era, the audience of the paper was almost exclusively black elites. After all, most blacks lived in the rural south, and it is unlikely that newspapers were passed between agricultural laborers. Thus, concerns arise over the degree to which newspapers catered only to the interests and opinions of black elites. Similarly, one must be aware of representation—the degree to which the newspapers represent the community at large. Representation could be compromised if each newspaper merely served as a microphone for the unique views it’s editor. Black newspapers could also be subject to outside influence from national level elites with views unlike those in the community, or intimidation from racist whites. Moreover, because newspapers often lacked resources and were under tight deadlines, some content may have been recycled from earlier issues, or borrowed from other newspapers in far away cities with distinct views unlike those in the publishing city. Finally, there is the problem of existence. While black newspapers were widespread, many cities did not have their own newspaper. Those cities that were able to support a newspaper, rarely had uninterrupted publication during the Gilded Age and Progressive era, which makes some newspapers a poor measure for a longitudinal study. For researchers, preservation is also essential, as some newspapers existed during this period, but are not available to examine today. The research design must do everything possible to allay, or at least minimize, the above concerns. Because this research is specifically about black elites, concerns associated with audience; that is, the newspaper catering specifically to elites, are avoided because this is precisely the group I am interested in measuring. At the same time, qualms over representation 43 and existence are managed through careful selection of specific newspapers in Cleveland and Savannah, and the precise design of the content analysis used for capturing black elite’s opinions. Before outlining the content analysis, I first offer an overview of The Cleveland Gazette and The Savannah Tribune. The Cleveland Gazette was established in 1883; shortly thereafter, Harry Clay Smith, who was the first editor, acquired the newspaper and served as editor until his death in 1941 (Davis 1972, 113). Since the Gazette was published from the 1880s through the 1920s and is available in archives today, selecting it as a measure of black elites opinions in Cleveland avoids the problem of existence. While the Gazette promoted itself as politically neutral, Smith thought that “advancement of Negroes was coupled with the political influence that the group could develop” and “he believed that the Republican party best served the interest of the NegroAmerican” (Davis 1972, 113). As such, the Gazette was a fervent advocate for blacks and leaned Republican. However, this stance does not mean that the Gazette is unrepresentative of blacks in Cleveland more generally, as most Cleveland blacks of the day were also Republicans (Kusmer 1978). Moreover, clues within the Gazette itself suggest that it voiced views similar to other black elites in Cleveland. Foremost, the Gazette was published almost without interruption every week from 1883 until 1945 with support from advertisers and community organizations. Most pages of the Gazette were accompanied by advertisements, but there were also frequent columns reporting events from local church services, meeting notes from black civic organizations, and the happenings of individuals within the city. All of this indicates that there was support within the city of Cleveland for the Gazette, and that it served as a representative approximation of the views of other black elites in Cleveland. 44 The Savannah Tribune was founded in 1875 by a group of prominent Savannah AfricanAmericans under the name the Colored Tribune. John H. Deveaux, Louis B. Toomer, and Louis M. Pleasant established the Colored Tribune to “serve as a voice of remaining black Republicans, and the rising class of black businessmen and professionals building a life for themselves in Savannah.” (Acker 2012, 134). However, Deveaux and company encountered troubles when the city’s white printers refused to print the newspaper, forcing them to suspend publication from 1878 until 1886 (Sverdlik 2008; Acker 2012). In 1886, Deveaux reestablished the paper under the name The Savannah Tribune and served as editor until 1889. Since Deveaux and his cofounders were loyal members of Savannah’s Republican Party, the Tribune, like the Gazette, supported the Republican Party. When Deveaux was appointed as the collector of customs in 1889, Solomon C. Johnson became editor of the Tribune—a position he held until 1954—and purchased the newspaper in 1909 upon Deveaux’s death (Svedlik 2008). To be sure, the editorial pages of the Tribune reflected Johnson’s convictions, which were “strong… and sometimes clashed with other leaders” (Acker 2012, 135). At the same time, Johnson’s ideology “drew on many different leaders and intellectuals, criticized many others… and represented a view of racial politics deeply influenced by his local context” (Acker 2012, 137). Like the Gazette, the Tribune had pages supplemented with local advertisements, reported local happenings, reprinted church sermons, and served as a mouthpiece for many of the black civic organizations in Savannah—notably the Masons of the State of Georgia. This evidence suggests that the Tribune was not merely a microphone for Solomon C. Johnson, but represented the collective views of Savannah’s black elites. A research design focusing on black elites and selecting newspapers with complete records available today helps allay questions stemming from audience and existence. However, 45 there is still a final issue associated with representation; that is, the extent to which the newspapers borrowed content from other papers, and thus, do not represent views unique to each city. To guard against analyzing recycled stories that were passed between newspapers, the content analysis for this research exclusively analyzes the editorial page. Editorials were the most unique and distinct aspect of each newspaper, and while some editorial content was surely borrowed, the original newspaper was cited, making it easy to identify and filter the recycled content. As noted above, editors only had so much latitude in deviating from the interests of the larger black community since the survival of the newspaper depended on readership and advertisements, which would have presumably declined if editors made statements too far outside mainstream beliefs. Thus, some circumstantial evidence implies that the editor’s views expressed in editorials were, on balance, consistent with other black elites in Cleveland and Savannah. As elite opinion theory would suggest, the Gazette and Tribune also saw themselves as shaping the opinions of their readers, who again were likely other black elites. During the first month of publication, on September 1, 1883, the Gazette answered the question of its influence in the following way: “It is a fact capable of demonstration that the public mind, in making up its judgment upon many questions, is influenced to a considerable extent, by the colored press.” Speaking on the question of lynching on January 1, 1915, the Tribune asserted that the Southern press was “a great molder of public opinion.” Again, this indicates that the editorial page not only represented the opinions of the respective editors, but also the views of the black community in each city. To capture the attitudes of black elites in Cleveland and Savannah from the 1880s until 1921 on the issue of immigration, I rely on content analysis of the editorials published in The 46 Cleveland Gazette, The Savannah Tribune, and The Savannah Weekly Echo.12 These papers were quite similar in presentation, making it easy to identify the editorials. Each issue was, on average, four pages in length with an editorial page located on the second page.13 Within these columns, the editorials were broken down into sub-editorials of varying content and length ranging from one sentence to an entire column long. For instance, an issue of the Gazette from January 16, 1915 contains two lengthy sub-editorials detailing amendments proposed by Senator Reed to a piece of immigration legislation, while also comprising sub-editorials about lynching, labor, black pugilists, and a black comedian. In practice, the content analysis was conducted in the following way: I read through every other newspaper issue available14 from 1883 until 1921 and identified any issue that discussed immigration, meaning at least one subeditorial referenced immigration policy, a specific immigrant group, or immigrants more generally. After reading the editorials in this period, I returned to the issues with content about immigration and coded the sub-editorials according to the coding strategy described in the Appendix. Briefly, a sub-editorial describing the level of immigration to the United States over the past year was coded as referencing immigration policy; a sub-editorial highlighting Irish, German, Chinese, or another immigrant group was tagged as discussing a specific immigrant group; and finally, sub-editorials vaguely citing “immigrants,” “foreigners,” the “foreign born,” 12 Because the historical record for the Tribune is incomplete, I was forced to supplement the early years with editorials from The Savannah Weekly Echo for the years 1883-1884. Since the Weekly Echo’s record is also spotty, there were only five issues available for these two years. Additionally, there is a gap in the record between 1890 and 1891 in which newspapers from Savannah are unavailable today. 13 The remaining space on the editorial page was devoted to correspondent’s reporting on issues from other cities in Ohio or Georgia, reprinting of information published in other newspapers, or advertisements. There were letters to the editor as well, but these appeared infrequently and were often from residents outside of the two respective cities. 14 Like many researchers, I was confronted with the question of how to gather a representative sample of editorials while maintaining a manageable number to read and code. Random sampling is the norm in survey research, but applying this technique to editorials assumes that the content within the editorials is randomly distributed. In the case of immigration editorials, it is likely they are not randomly distributed, but clustered around certain times and events. After reading through every issue from a few select years and plotting when the immigration editorials appeared, I realized that these editorials clustered and reading every other issue achieved the balance of sampling while not omitting important content. 47 and the like were classified as mentioning immigrants. The editorials were also coded for tone, which was broken into five categories: negative, leaning negative, leaning positive, positive, and informational. An editorial was coded as negative if it advocated reducing the level of immigration, mentioned a negative stereotype of immigrants, or more generally, made disparaging comments about immigration and/or immigrants. Positive editorials supported increased immigration to the United States, brought up flattering images of immigrants, or suggested that immigrants and/or immigration had cultural and/or economic benefits. However, not all editorials were so clear-cut, and thus, leaning categories were necessary. For example, an editorial was coded as “leaning” positive or negative if it had similar content to a positive or a negative editorial, but simply did not advocate the position as firmly. Finally, some editorials merely described conditions and informed the readers, which means they did not have a positive or negative tone. Informational editorials, thus, frequently attached ethnic identification to individuals—such as a Jewish girl—or reported on the number of immigrants coming to the United States the previous year. In either case, the intent was simply to convey information to readers, rather than make a judgment about immigration. Black Elite Opinion Towards Immigration The strategies for measuring African American’s attitudes described in the previous section allow for a systematic evaluation of the regional variation in black elite opinion towards immigration. The results of the content analysis suggest that immigration was a frequent topic of conversation for black elites in Cleveland and Savannah between 1883 and 1921. Of more than 1000 newspaper issues in Cleveland, 256 issues referenced immigration and 298 sub-editorials within these issues offered opinions about immigration. This means that roughly one in four 48 newspapers sampled explicitly discussed the issue of immigration in Cleveland. From 778 newspaper issues in Savannah, 129 issues mentioned immigration with 145 sub-editorials expressing immigration preferences. While immigration appeared less frequently in Savannah editorials, the issue of immigration still arose in approximately one in every six newspaper issues sampled. Although the specific number of immigration editorials varies by year, there is an upward trend shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 that correlates with the increase in the number of immigrants coming to the United States during this period. Importantly, there are also subeditorials from each year where newspaper data exists suggesting that immigration garnered consistent attention during this period. Moreover, the substance of these editorials ranges from an overall view of immigration to thoughts about immigration policy as well as beliefs about specific immigrant groups. Overall Immigration Editorial Tone Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah had a negative reaction to immigration, which is consistent with the findings of earlier research (Hellwig 1974, Shankman 1982, and Diamond 1998). However, the data does reveal variation between the two cities, as the restrictionist sentiment was more pronounced in Savannah than Cleveland. For example, in 1892, The Savannah Tribune powerfully endorsed the Georgia Republican Convention platform, which was “strong against the importation of foreign laborers” (Savannah Tribune, 4-23-1892). A few years 49 Number of Sub-Editorials Figure 2.1: Cleveland Gazette Immigration Sub-Editorials, 1883-1921 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Source: Research compiled by author based on sample of 1039 issues of the Cleveland Gazette Figure 2.2: Savannah Tribune Immigration Sub-Editorials, 1883-1921 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Source: Research compiled by author based on sample of 778 issues of the Savannah Tribune 50 Number of Sub-Editorials later a Tribune editorial from June 16, 1894 reported: “The meeting of bodies in the South to encourage emigrants to settle in this section is significant so far as the Negro is concerned. It means that if the Negro does not secure a better foothold than they now have, they will be crowded into the background and there remain as serfs” (Savannah Tribune, 6-16-1894). Not only would immigrants displace African Americans, but black elites also questioned the quality of immigrants arriving in the South. After the turn of the twentieth century, a Tribune editorial from September 14, 1901 suggested that encouraging immigrants to the South was misguided as “the [foreign emigrants] that come to this country [are] not the most desirable.” When neighboring South Carolina recruited immigrants in the early twentieth century, the Tribune confirmed this sentiment: This State will find to its sorrow that it is a very bad thing to have as laborers foreigners such as have infested Northern and Western parts. South Carolina now has as good a class of laborers as it can ever get. What the white citizens want to do is to hold on to that class, and to do everything possible to better their condition morally, physically and otherwise bring them to feel that the white south is friendly to them indeed. Do this and the white man will find as has already been proven that the Negro is the truest laborer that they will ever be able to get (Savannah Tribune, 4-22-1905). Together, the discourse in The Tribune suggests that black elites were unwelcoming of immigrants and resisted efforts to bring immigrants to Savannah specifically, and the South more generally. In Cleveland black elites also portrayed immigration and immigrants negatively, yet their attitudes were more tempered than black elites in Savannah. For example, Cleveland’s black elite thought that immigrants were not on par with African Americans as illustrated by the following Gazette editorial: “many of the members of the waiters’ union are foreigners, far less intelligent than the average Afro-American waiter…” (Cleveland Gazette, 12-1-1917). Black elites further questioned the quality of some immigrants from Europe suggesting that America’s “lax 51 immigration laws…provided a haven for several hundred thousand of the most explosive elements of European society” (Cleveland Gazette, 6-4-1921). Moreover, a Gazette editorial plainly stated: “in this country any endeavor on the part of the foreign element to render itself a triumphing power must fail” (Cleveland Gazette, 5-22-1886). Although these statements demonstrate black elites’ hesitancy over unbridled immigration, there was not the degree of outright denunciation of immigration that existed among Savannah’s black elite. That is, Cleveland’s black elites—while certainly perpetuating a negative image of many immigrants— did not forcefully and unequivocally advocate cutting off the supply of immigrants to the United States. Thus, black elites in Cleveland did harbor restrictionist immigration preferences, yet these attitudes were less stringent than black elites in Savannah. Collectively, Figure 2.3 reinforces the specific opinions expressed above. In particular, Figure 2.3 suggests that more than 41 percent of immigration editorials in Savannah were negative and over eight percent also leaned negative. Conversely, Figure 2.3 also implies that only 33 percent of Cleveland’s immigration editorials were negative and just over ten percent leaned negative. Combined, there were almost seven percent more editorials with a negative or leaning negative tone in Savannah than Cleveland, indicating that Savannah’s black elites were even more restrictionist than those in Cleveland. The percent of positive sub-editorials in each city was quite similar: roughly 20 percent of immigration sub-editorials in Cleveland were positive and almost five percent leaned positive, whereas more than 19 percent were positive in Savannah with close to seven percent leaning positive. Taken together, this evidence suggests that there was, indeed, variation in immigration attitudes between black elites in Cleveland and Savannah: Savannah black elites were simply more vociferous in their opposition to immigration. 52 Percent of Immigration Sub-Editorials 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Figure 2.3: Immigration Editorial Tone: 1883-1921 Informational Leaning Negative Negative Leaning Positive Positive Source: Research compiled by author based on an analysis of a sample of editorials from the Cleveland Gazette and Savannah Tribune. Immigration Policy Beyond qualitative differences in the overall editorial tone and quantitative variation wherein a greater percentage of Savannah’s editorials were negative, there are also distinctions in the tone expressed towards different immigration sub-categories as shown in Table 2.2, Figure 2.4, and Figure 2.5. In particular, black elites in Cleveland and Savannah held more tempered views towards immigration policy than immigration overall. The more moderate immigration policy stance in Cleveland, and to a somewhat lesser degree Savannah, stemmed from black elites recoiling at racially based exclusionary immigration policies. As noted by other scholars (Smith 1997, King 2000, King and Smith 2005), blacks across the nation feared that immigration policies based on racial characteristics would reinforce ideologies supporting blacks’ position at 53 Table 2.2: Immigration Editorial Tone, 1883-1921 Cleveland Immigration Positive Leaning Negative Leaning Informational Total Editorial Positive Negative Number of Type Editorials Immigration 10 2 11 2 17 42 Policy Immigrants 7 4 26 2 23 62 Specific 44 12 69 29 64 218 Immigrant Groups Savannah Immigration Positive Leaning Negative Leaning Informational Total Editorial Positive Negative Number of Type Editorials Immigration 7 07 21 17 Policy Immigrants 5 3 30 4 12 54 Specific 19 7 29 7 25 87 Immigrant Groups Note: some editorials counted more than once. Source: Research compiled by author from a sample of editorials in the Cleveland Gazette and Savannah Tribune. the bottom of the racial hierarchy. Taking a closer look at the editorials from Cleveland and Savannah suggests that black elites did not support Chinese exclusion or the preferential treatment of some immigrant groups. In particular, black elites in Cleveland were upset in 1902 by the prospect of extending the Chinese Exclusion Acts, for they realized the potentially adverse consequences of this restriction for members of the black community. A Gazette editorial from June 7, 1902 illustrates this point well: “[Chinese exclusion] abridged the citizen rights of every Afro-American when it comes to testifying in the courts in certain cases affecting Chinese.” Later that year an editorial from August 30th confirms this sentiment suggesting that, “the Chinese exclusion act… abridges the citizen-rights of… every… Afro-American to testify in certain cases in the United States Courts” (Cleveland Gazette 8-30-1902). By restricting the rights of Chinese immigrants to testify, these laws further strengthened white supremacist 54 practices and ideologies limiting the rights of African Americans (King and Smith 2005). Opinions in Savannah were similar as exemplified by the Savannah Tribune on May 20, 1893 speaking about the Chinese: “the United States should not be so illiberal towards any certain nation.” Together, these editorials suggest that black elites did not approve of immigration policies providing preferential treatment towards any nation, or policies strengthening racist ideologies that would further suppress African Americans. Examining the editorials quantitatively reinforces the comparatively tempered stance exhibited in the passages above. More specifically, of the 42 Cleveland editorials discussing immigration policy, 40 percent simply offered information about immigration policy. Of the remaining immigration policy editorials in Cleveland, 30 percent were negative or leaning negative, while 28 percent were positive or leaning positive. Taken together, this suggests that black elites views of immigration policy in Cleveland were tempered and more concerned with disseminating information than harboring restrictionist immigration policy stances. In Savannah, there were only 17 sub-editorials that discussed immigration policy. Of these immigration policy sub-editorials, there were equal numbers of positive and negative, though there were also more editorials leaning in a negative direction suggesting that black elites in this city leaned slightly towards restrictive immigration policies. While these numbers should be interpreted with some caution, as the number of observations is quite small—particularly in Savannah—they, combined with the specific passages above, indicate that black elites in Cleveland and Savannah resisted immigration policy efforts with discriminatory racial undertones while running counter to the broader national white dialogue of restrictive immigration policy during this period, particularly the exclusion of Chinese immigrants (King and Smith 2005). 55 Percent of Sub-Catagory Editorials Figure 2.4: Cleveland Gazette Immigration Sub-Categories by Tone 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Immigration Policy Immigrants Specific Immigrant Groups Informational Leaning Negative Negative Leaning Positive Positive Source: Research compiled by author based on an analysis of a sample of editorials from the Cleveland Gazette. Percent of Sub-Category Editorials Figure 2.5: Savannah Tribune Immigration Sub-Categories by Tone 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Immigration Policy Immigrants Specific Immigrant Groups Informational Leaning Negative Negative Leaning Positive Positive Source: Research compiled by author based on analysis of a sample of editorials from the Savannah Tribune. 56 Topics in Immigration Editorials The results of the content analysis displayed so far, while providing a systematic analysis and adding nuance, largely confirm previous research: black elite’s overall tone towards immigration during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was negative and black elites resisted immigration policies with racial undertones. However, unlike earlier work, this research has uncovered regional variation in the attitudes of black elites, for black elites in Savannah exhibited greater hostility towards immigrants than their counterparts in Cleveland. Still, to truly appreciate the variation between Cleveland and Savannah, one must peel back another layer and look at the topics appearing most frequently in the immigration editorials. That is, though black elites perceived immigration and immigrants with hostility in both cities, what came to the minds of black elites when the issue of immigration was presented varied significantly by locality. As described in Table 2.3, black elites had a number of considerations come to their minds in conjunction with immigration. These considerations included the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants and/or other groups in society; the partisanship of immigrants and whether they were political allies or adversaries; the race of the immigrant group—particularly if they were “white” or non-white; and, finally, if the group was seen as a source of economic competition. In Cleveland, the relative rights and privileges of blacks and immigrants was mentioned in immigration editorials more than any other issue, appearing in almost 42 percent of immigration editorials. Partisanship was also an important consideration for black elites in Cleveland, though it appeared far less frequently than the relative rights and privileges. Conversely, race and economic competition were relatively evenly distributed among Cleveland immigration editorials and garnered less attention than the aforementioned categories. 57 Table 2.3: Topics Mentioned in Immigration Editorials, 1883-1921 Cleveland Savannah Topic Number of Percent of Number of Percent of Editorials Immigration Editorials Immigration Editorials Editorials Rights and 125 42% 24 16.6% Privileges Partisanship 45 15.1% 4 2.8% Race 35 11.7% 14 9.7% Economic 38 12.8% 45 31% Competition Note: some editorials counted more than once. Source: Research compiled by author from a sample of editorials in the Cleveland Gazette and Savannah Tribune. Black elites in Cleveland recognized that immigrants were offered more rights and privileges—treatment which they saw as particularly galling. An editorial from The Gazette on March 16, 1889 sums it up well: “ignorant poor whites and emigrants are tolerated and welcomed, while the cultured Afro-American fares no better than the ignorant.” The handling of blacks and immigrants was perceived as more than simply unjust or unfair; it was seen as hypocritical, and black elites believed the conduct was duplicitous. The hypocrisy stemmed from a broader dialogue that singled blacks out as a fundamentally different type of group in society— as somehow distinct, separate, and less than immigrants. However, even though blacks felt singled out, they believed “at no period in our career can it be said that we as a race were less fitted to exercise the rights of citizenship than the Irish, the German and other foreign element who have shared equally in the enjoyment of these vested privileges” (Cleveland Gazette, 4-181885). Singling out African Americans was exemplified by some promoters of the World Fair’s in Chicago who wanted a separate exhibit specifically about blacks, to which blacks in Cleveland responded that there would only be reason for this “if the Irish, German, Swede, Jew and other 58 classes of Americans were to have departments” as well (Cleveland Gazette, 3-14-1891). A later editorial expressed a similar sentiment about isolating blacks in the Army and the Navy: The Ohio State Journal is wrong in suggesting ‘Negro Crews for War Vessels’ because there are ‘Negro regiments in the army.’ The separation in the army is wrong in principle and ought to be stopped and done away with entirely. It will be eventually. Why not carry the Journal suggestions a little further and put all the Irish, German and Jewish-Americans (in the navy and army) in crews and regiments to themselves? There would be just as much reason and judgment in such a proceeding and particularly in the case of the Jewish-Americans, as there is in the Journal’s suggestion. This government of ours already winks at too much insulting discrimination against certain of its CITIZENS, to take on any more at anyone’s suggestion” (Gazette, 8-15-1903). Clearly, black elites were upset that they were targeted as a fundamentally different class of people, who were afforded fewer rights and privileges even though they were citizens. Most blacks had been in the U.S. for a longer period of time and many were native born with some even serving in the military, yet other groups were treated with greater respect in American society, law, and politics. Thus, black elites’ felt a sense of hypocrisy and indignation that clearly came through in these Gazette editorials. Black elites also saw inequities in the way immigrants were characterized by political leaders. For example, a Gazette editorial remarked: “President Cleveland had a kind word for the alien, for the persecuted Chinaman; has he none for the murdered Negroes whose brethren defended the Federal flag at Fort Wagner and on many other battle fields where their blood ran like water?” (Cleveland Gazette, 4-24-1886). A few years later the Gazette echoed this sentiment in response to President Cleveland addressing the six Italian immigrants lynched in Colorado by simply stating, “President Cleveland could find time and space in his message to speak at length of the Colorado ‘manifestations’ against helpless aliens (Italians), but not a line does he write in condemnation of the numerous lynchings at the south in which many innocent American citizens of color lose their lives…” (Cleveland Gazette, 12-7-1895). President Cleveland was not alone in 59 this respect, as President Taft failed to consider the plight of African Americans in his public statements, and also actively refused to give blacks certain government positions. For example, President Taft refused to appoint blacks as enumerators for the U.S. Census to which the Gazette responded: “The most harmful phase of this un-American treatment is the outrageous precedent it establishes and the encouragement it gives all classes of people in this country, even foreigners, aliens, to draw color-lines against our people, Americans by birth, not only in politics but also in the business and social life of the nation” (Cleveland Gazette, 5-7-1910). Thus, black elites, in another area, felt a sense of hypocrisy associated with the privileged treatment of immigrants relative to African Americans. Black elites also believed immigrants were advantaged by the education system in Cleveland and beyond. For example, the Gazette remarked: “Eternal vigilance is the price we must pay for our rights and privileges and proper treatment, not only in the public schools of this city, but in almost everything else in this prejudice-ridden country. Our school children must not be subjected to such humiliating and insulting experiences. The children of no other class of Americans are asked to submit to such” (Cleveland Gazette, 11-22-1913). Immigrants, unlike blacks across the United States, were viewed as receiving greater educational opportunities, and in particular, subject to less segregation and stigmatization, which resulted in the perception that immigrants were privileged in this sector of American life. In the political arena, black elites were perturbed because “Different factions, composed of different nationalities, received something for their services and fidelity to the party, but as soon as the colored voter demands what is justly his due, he is said to be using ‘unprincipled language, trying to sell the colored vote, etc.’” (Cleveland Gazette, 9-1-1883). Later, black elites lamented: “About every other potent local factor of the party has been recognized by clerical 60 appointment in these offices but ours, one of the most important. German, Irish, Jewish, and other class factors of the party have been given clerkships. Some of them… are far from the importance of the Afro-American in point of number of party members and workers. Still they have been given the recognition which has been refused us” (Cleveland Gazette, 10-23-1909). Even though blacks were loyal to the Republican Party, they were rarely rewarded for their allegiance in the form of patronage positions or specific policies. However, other groups in society—notably immigrants—received these prizes, and black elites in Cleveland took notice. However, the pattern of black elite discourse in Savannah was quite different. In Savannah, the issue mentioned most by black elites in conjunction with immigration was the economic competition posed by immigrants as described in Table 2.3. More than 31 percent of immigration editorials in Savannah also acknowledged that immigrants were economic competitors, while the partisan allegiance of immigrants hardly resonated with black elites in Savannah and the race of immigrant groups was mentioned in approximately the same percent of immigration editorials as Cleveland. The relative rights and privileges of immigrants was not absent from Savannah black elites thinking—it appeared in more than 16 percent of immigration editorials— yet this issue garnered far less attention than in Cleveland. Thus, when black elites in Savannah thought about immigration, they primarily thought of the economic competition posed by immigration. Black elites in Savannah feared that a rising tide of immigration to the South would provide an alternative source of labor, which would crowd out black workers. Reporting on foreign contractors in Savannah, the Tribune opined: “The contractors are foreigners and if they secure their new help they will also be foreigners… If the newcomers are secured the Savannah laborers will be thrown out of employment. Many of them will not be able to pay their house 61 rent, or grocery or clothing bills, therefore the creditors will suffer” (Savannah Tribune, 1-1- 1898). A few years later in the editorial pages, the Tribune firmly agreed with Miss Nannie Burroughs who suggested: “If the Negro woman doesn’t watch her job and do her work better than any one else she will find that it has been taken by the woman of the same nationalities that took the barber business, the boot-black business, and the whitewash business from the Negro men” (Savannah Tribune, 11-6-1909). Moreover, when the Southern Railway employed Finnish immigrants, black elites maintained that these laborers “are used to receiving but very little for their services, and if allowed to get a foothold will supplant native labor” (Savannah Tribune, 6- 20-1901). Hence, black elites viewed immigrants as economic competitors in Savannah and worried that this group of newcomers would displace black workers in various sectors. However, black elites feared more than simple economic competition from immigrants, for they were equally concerned that once immigrants advanced economically, they would discriminate against blacks. The Tribune articulated this point quite clearly in 1917: A good many foreigners ‘have it’ [prejudice] too, and ‘have it’ zealously and abundantly. They found their businesses, in the majority of cases on Negro patronage in Negro communities and indulge or tolerate Negroes until they have built their fortunes. They then become less tolerant and more impatient with Negroes. They often change their business to ‘white only’ affair or change neighborhoods, may be. The lessons, these examples, should strike deep in the thought of Negro people. Negroes should see that they are being exploited, merely and that affected friendship and comradships are only temporary and purposeful (Savannah Tribune, 2-24-1917). Once immigrants advanced economically, black elites feared they would adopt prejudice attitudes and practices while further withholding economic opportunities from African Americans. Moreover, black elites felt that immigrant’s economic power could translate into political power, which immigrants would further use to propel themselves to a position in society above African Americans. For example, black elites in Savannah believed that employing 62 foreign workers would allows these immigrants to “get a foothold” after which “they will so legislate as to forever bar colored men out as is now in vogue in the northern states” (Savannah Tribune, 10-21-1893). Put simply, black elites believed “the foreigner will never content himself with the position of servant, but he will in time aspire to be master and merchant” (Savannah Tribune, 9-9-1905). Consequently, the fear of economic competition from immigrants was enhanced by feelings that once immigrants advanced in society they would quickly adopt racial prejudice displayed by whites. Despite black elites’ fear of economic competition from immigrants in Savannah, they still exhibited confidence in their own ability as laborers. For example, when immigrants arrived in Georgia, the Tribune reported: “about twenty of these immigrants were stranded and are now being cared for by the public, being unable to secure employment. And thus it will be with countless others who are coming to this section. Colored laborers have nothing to fear from this movement” (Savannah Tribune, 4-6-1907). The following year, the Tribune echoed this sentiment suggesting that “Many of the dear immigrants are returning to the old country. They did not find things here as they expected. They were brought here to compete with Negro labor” (Savannah Tribune, 2-22-1908). Once more, the Tribune drew attention to the superiority of African American labor stating: it is our conviction, after taking into consideration the natural disposition of our people to make the most of circumstances without undue complaint, that our domestics under the present state of affairs, make the most dependable servants to be found. Strikes and lockouts so prevalent among the foreign servant class are wholly unknown to us” (Savannah Tribune, 7-13-1912). While black elites believed—or at least outwardly stated—that they were superior laborers, this is still evidence that immigrants were viewed as economic 63 competitors indicating that when blacks in Savannah considered the issue of immigration it was through the lens of economic competition. Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah had very different considerations on their minds when contemplating the issue of immigration: in Cleveland, black elites were perturbed by the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants that were often denied to African Americans, while elites in Savannah worried about the ill effects of competing with immigrants in the labor force. Collectively as shown in Table 2.3, compared to Cleveland, economic competition appeared more than twice as frequently in Savannah immigration editorials. On the other hand, the relative rights and privileges of blacks and immigrants were far more common in Cleveland than Savannah. Clearly, when the topic of immigration arose in the two cities, different concerns came to the minds of black elites. Specific Immigrant Groups in Savannah and Cleveland Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah voiced opinions about 32 distinct immigrant groups that were the subject of at least one newspaper sub-editorial. In both cities, Chinese, Irish, Italian, Japanese, and Jewish immigrants were discussed most often, but Greek immigrants also caught the attention of black elites in Savannah as shown in Table 2.4, Figure 2.6, and Figure 2.7. These immigrant groups, on average, were characterized and discussed within the larger immigration dialogue mentioned above. That is, specific immigrant groups in Cleveland were most often portrayed within the context of the rights and privileges afforded to their specific group, while individual groups in Savannah were understood within a framework of the economic threat they posed to blacks. There are, of course, important exceptions to this rule as shared feelings of discrimination—especially based on race—tempered the hostility felt towards 64 Table 2.4: Number of Immigration Editorials About Specific Immigrant Groups, 1883-1921 Cleveland Immigrant Group Only Group in Multiple Groups Total Number of Percentage of Editorial in Editorial Editorials Immigration Editorials Chinese 16 7 23 7.7% Germans 16 50 66 22.2% Irish 20 56 76 25.5% Italians 17 7 24 8.1% Japanese 13 6 19 6.4% Jewish 48 33 81 27.2% Savannah Immigrant Group Only Group in Multiple Groups Total Number of Percentage of Editorial in Editorial Editorials Immigration Editorials Chinese 13 1 14 9.7% German 8 11 19 13.1% Greek 3 4 7 4.8% Irish 7 8 15 10.4% Italian 10 6 16 11% Japanese 1 2 3 2.1% Jewish 12 12 24 16.6% Note: some editorials counted more than once. Source: Research compiled by author from a sample of editorials in the Cleveland Gazette and Savannah Tribune. specific immigrant groups in both cities. Moreover, certain groups, notably the Irish in Cleveland, were resented for their political loyalty to the Democratic Party in addition to the perception that they were afforded more rights and privileges. Notwithstanding these nuances, the discourse about specific immigrant groups overwhelmingly bent towards the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants in Cleveland and the economic competition posed by immigrants in Savannah. African-Americans and Irish immigrants had a notoriously acrimonious relationship throughout the United States (Hellwig 1974; Ignatiev 1995; etc.) and black elites in Cleveland shared this bitterness. The hostility towards Irish immigrants was greater than negative sentiments aimed at any other immigrant group in Cleveland, and one persistent theme was the 65 rights and privileges granted to Irish immigrants. A Cleveland editorial from 1885 suggests that Irish immigrants were rewarded for their service, while African Americans were taken for granted: The Indians and Irishmen, whose loyalty and service have been no more significant than the colored man have been amply rewarded and every care give to elevate and dignify their condition. It would be but a matter of justice that the Southern Negro, who stands today an indispensible element of strength in the development of our home and agriculture interest, should be duly cared for (Cleveland Gazette, 1-31-1885). Black elites clearly felt that the Irish were given advantages unavailable to African Americans and the sentiment of this editorial is indicative of the collective understanding of the Irish in Cleveland. For example, 42 sub-editorials mentioned rights and privileges in conjunction with Irish immigrants, and of these editorials, only two suggested that the Irish shared a similar level of rights and privileges as blacks, whereas 29 sub-editorials specified that the Irish had more rights and privileges. Besides feelings of hypocrisy over the rights and privileges afforded to Irish immigrants, which occupied the majority of editorials about the Irish, black elites also resented the Irish for their well-documented allegiance to the Democratic Party. Indeed, the following Gazette passage from October 22, 1892 illustrates this point: In no state, in no city, in no village where republicanism is in the ascendancy do we find the opposition to the colored man so great as it is in places where democracy rules. The composition of the democratic party is conclusive evidence in favor of our statement: the lowest grades of Irish, Hungarian, Italian and other fugitives from justice at home… are members of the democratic party and vote solidly against the Afro-American (Cleveland Gazette, 10-22-1892). Black elites in Cleveland—as in many cities across the United States—had ties to the Republican Party that stemmed from the Civil War era (Frymer 1999). Thus, as the above quote suggests, in addition to the feeling that the Irish had more rights and privileges than African Americans, 66 Percent of Group Specific Sub-Editorials Figure 2.6: Cleveland Gazette Sub-Editorial Tone by Immigrant Group 100 90 80 70 60 Informational 50 Leaning Negative 40 Negative 30 Leaning Positive 20 Positive 10 0 Chinese German Irish Italian Japanese Jewish Source: Research compiled based on an analysis of a sample of editorials from the Cleveland Gazette. partisan differences between these groups contributed to some of the observed hostility from black elites in Cleveland. While black elite’s attitudes towards German immigrants were less overtly negative than those expressed towards the Irish, they were still quite hostile, and importantly, reflect the larger dialogue of rights and privileges. Like Irish immigrants, Germans in Cleveland were perceived to have more rights and privileges than blacks. For example, black elites in Cleveland opined that African Americans had been: Patient too long now… in the face of increasingly contemptible treatment when it comes to their civil rights and certain privileges which are today, in the South, freely accorded…the German traitor… and everything else, but denied not only to our people generally but even to our veterans of the World War some of whom have been brutally lynch murdered when they insisted upon exercising them in a most limited way (Cleveland Gazette, 12-20-1919). Germans were not only afforded superior privileges, but, according to the quote above, did not have the same fear of personal safety as African Americans. Aside from African Americans’ fear 67 Figure 2.7: Savannah Tribune Sub-Editorial Tone by Immigrant Group Percent of Group Specific Sub-Editorials 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Chinese German Greek Irish Italian Japanese Jewish Informational Leaning Negative Negative Leaning Positive Positive Source: Research compiled by author based on an analysis of a sample of editorials from the Savnnah Tribune. of violence that Germans were not burdened with, black elites lamented that organizations in the marketplace privileged immigrants—including Germans. Speaking of railroad organizations, Cleveland’s black elites urged these organizations to “open the doors to their organizations to the Afro-American as they do to the Irish, German and all other classes of people in this country, naturalized or unnaturalized” (Cleveland Gazette, 10-11-1890). In political matters, black elites maintained, “the German element has much less cause to complain of its treatment than we have” (Cleveland Gazette, 5-25-1889). Thus, while black elites were less critical of Germans than the Irish, this group was, nevertheless, perceived as having more privileges than African Americans. Jewish immigrants were the subject of more Cleveland sub-editorials than any other immigrant group, and these editorials reflected a rights based discourse. Unlike the Irish and 68 German immigrants, Jews in Cleveland occupied more of a middle ground for black elites. Jewish immigrants were viewed with less hostility than other groups, and Jews were more often described as having similar rights and privileges as African Americans, even though black elites overall understanding was that they were more advantaged. While Jews eventually became “white” they did encounter racial prejudice along the way. Black elites recognized this prejudice as evidenced by the Gazette in 1889: “If anything has ever been demonstrated to our entire satisfaction, the fact that there is almost, if not quite as much, prejudice in the North against the Jew as against the Afro-American was clearly shown at the polls in this city last Tuesday…” (Cleveland Gazette, 3-30-1889). A few years later, speaking of discrimination encountered by Jews at hotels, a comment from the Gazette suggested, “in all such fights the Jew has the race’s sympathy, even though we do not get too much from them in return, when similarly situated” (Cleveland Gazette, 12-19-1891). Black elites were sympathetic to the familiar denial of rights and privileges Jews faced, yet these elites also respected Jews for their reaction to such prejudice. In the face of prejudice, black elites maintained, “Jews fight every form of racial discrimination against them” and blacks could “learn much from the American Jews incessant fight for all citizen and manhood rights and privileges” (Cleveland Gazette, 2-18-1911). Jewish immigrants, like blacks, faced discrimination in the rights and privileges they were afforded, yet this group fought for their rights and privileges and African Americans felt they could learn from Jews disposition and tactics. Therefore, even though Jews were greeted with less hostility, they were surely interpreted within the right and privileges they were granted. Similarly, black elites recognized discrimination and violence against Italian immigrants, yet this sympathy did not translate into positive sentiments towards Italians overall. While black 69 elites loathed instances of lynching Italian immigrants, they resented the justice provided to the victims’ families by the federal government as evidenced on November 17, 1900: A special agent of the department of justice at Washington has investigated the Tallaluh, La, lynching and clearly established the fact that the four Italians killed by the mob were not citizens of this country. The result will be that President McKinley will recommend to congress the payment of an indemnity to the families of the deceased. This is the result of the Italian government’s demand for reparation. It is indeed a peculiar condition that permits our president and government to treat with a greater degree of fairness the families of mob victims who are aliens than those of American citizens of color whose lives are taken in the same way. Black elites were clearly upset by the privileged treatment of Italian immigrants—which they saw as hypocritical and unjust—when they were the victims of racial violence. However, black elites perception of favored treatment afforded to Italians persisted in 1907 with an editorial about advantages provided to an Italian immigrant by an Ohio congressman: To the Italians one night recently, when addressing them, [Congressman Burton] spoke of having brought a lad from Italy, secured him a place in Washington and looked after his promotion, until now he was holding a valuable clerical position there in the government service. This much he has not done for the AfroAmericans of his district, practically all of whom have continued to vote for him almost to a man year after year throughout his long career in congress (Cleveland Gazette, 11-2-1907). Again, black elites quickly grew tired of listening to public officials lift up Italian immigrants while African American citizens were ignored. Thus, black elites viewed Italians as unfairly having more rights and privileges while also holding negative views about this immigrant group in Cleveland. Although black elites in Cleveland resisted exclusionary race based immigration policies, like the Chinese Exclusion Acts, they still interpreted Chinese immigrants within a rights based discourse, and were lukewarm towards this group of immigrants. In particular, black elites realized that “the Chinese are colored, hence the prejudice against them” (Cleveland Gazette, 11- 70 29-1884). Like other immigrant groups in Cleveland, the Chinese encountered racial prejudice and blacks were compassionate. However, the degree of prejudice and denial of rights and privileges was less severe toward the Chinese than directed at blacks, which caught the attention of African American elites. For example, black elites remarked: “it is seen that even the Chinese Americans are rated above Afro-Americans by the war department…” (Cleveland Gazette, 6-181898). Even though black elites sympathized with the prejudiced treatment of the Chinese and resisted racially based immigration polities like the Chinese Exclusion Acts, they still felt indignation over the privileged position of Chinese immigrants in Cleveland. The stance of black elites towards Japanese immigrants in Cleveland was positive. Black elites overwhelmingly recognized that the non-white Japanese of the “yellow” race were discriminated against and denied important rights and privileges. A Gazette editorial from July 8, 1905 suggests that the Japanese encountered racial discrimination when commenting that a Japanese person was denied membership in an organization because of racial prejudice. Moreover, the Gazette reported that Japanese school children in San Francisco were “being discriminated against because of their race connection” (Cleveland Gazette, 11-10-1906). In spite of discrimination, the Gazette remarked, “the Japs and all yellow, brown and black peoples will doubtless struggle on to final success in spite of it” (Cleveland Gazette, 7-8-1905). Black elites admired the Japanese—as well as other immigrant groups—for “resent[ing] with all of his soul, with all of his might, every wrong done him because of his race, his color, or his condition” (Cleveland Gazette, 12-19-1914). In these passages, black elites clearly recognized that Japanese immigrants were denied important rights and many of the editorials indicate a shared understanding with Japanese immigrants as non-white members of society, which undoubtedly 71 contributed to the positive feelings regarding Japanese immigrants in Cleveland. Thus, another immigrant group in Cleveland was interpreted within the broader rights and privileges discourse. Unlike Cleveland, immigrant groups in Savannah were understood within the context of economic competition. Groups viewed with the most hostility in Savannah—Chinese and Italian immigrants—were also the perceived to be the greatest economic threats to black elites. Other groups, though not necessarily the subjects of such severe hostility, were by and large understood within an economic framework, notwithstanding particular nuances for individual groups. Black elites in Savannah saw the Chinese Exclusion Acts as racially motivated and contrary to liberal democratic ideals. For example, an editorial from 1893 in the Tribune described a proposed extension to Chinese Exclusion in the following way: This is the law that excludes the Chinese from this country. Some persons have been thinking that it was unconstitutional, but the supreme court has settled that point. Yet the United States should not be so illiberal towards any certain nation. It is claimed and it is in a great degree true, that the Chinamen are not just the right kind of citizens on account of their disposition, mode of living, and other peculiarities. If they are distasteful to the Americans why those who are giving them employment should desist. Broad and liberal ideas on all questions are what Americans should have (Savannah Tribune, 5-20-1893). Clearly, black elites felt that the United States should not single out any specific nation or group when constructing immigration policies. However, the above passage also illustrates that black elites recognized Chinese immigrants as competing for employment in the marketplace by suggesting that employers should stop giving them work if Americans wanted Chinese immigrants to leave the country. While black elites abhorred the Chinese Exclusion Acts, this did not translate into support for Chinese immigrants in Savannah. Instead, black elites worried about the economic threat Chinese immigrants posed to African Americans. An editorial from the Tribune on August 24, 1889 nicely outlines the fear of Chinese labor: 72 The safety of the nation depends upon the character of its laboring men. I am opposed to the Chinaman because I do not believe in a servile laboring class. I am opposed to the schemes of contractors who bring foreign laborers here because they can get them cheap. This deprives the American of his bread and butter. High wages are the salvation of the American laborer and when I say that I mean the salvation of the nation. Strike down the laborer and you strike at the very vitals of the nation. Not only were Chinese immigrants threatening to African Americans economic prospects, but black elites also felt this group fundamentally threatened the character of American labor. In fact, more than half of the editorials about Chinese immigrants had a negative tilt, and the fear of economic competition was a persistent theme in these editorials. Thus, black elites felt threatened by competition from cheap Chinese labor, which translated into negative sentiments towards the Chinese in Savannah. Like the Chinese, Italian immigrants were greeted with hostility from black elites in Savannah. More than half of the editorials about Italian immigrants had a negative tone and the majority of these opinions also cited Italians as economic competitors. For example, Italians in the labor market were characterized in the following way: “For years our people have had a monopoly of peddling vegetables, fruits, etc. on the streets. Now they are meeting the competition of the [Italians]…” (The Savannah Tribune, 1-22-1910). Black elites feared that Italian immigrants would crowd out blacks from jobs they previously occupied. Reprinting a passage from the Houston Post, the Tribune predicted: “Remember again that when these shrewd, industrious and economical Italians take the Negro’s place as a laborer in the South, that these same Italians will next make a successful effort to take the Southerners’ commercial and political place in the south” (Savannah Tribune, 9-9-1905). With continued economic success, black elites feared that Italians would establish a foothold that would allow this group to advance socially and politically as well. Black elites were, thus, especially leery of Italian immigrants and 73 viewed them as stiff competition in the labor market, which translated into a hostile reception of this group of immigrants. The stance towards the Irish in Savannah, while still hostile, was more tempered than Cleveland, as more than a quarter of the editorials were positive or leaning positive. However, like Cleveland, black elites in Savannah noticed the Irish in political affairs; that is, black elites realized the political appointments of the Irish in Savannah as well as this group’s voting strength. For example, the Tribune stated: “the Irish element in the Republican Party has been most graciously remembered and received largest” (Savannah Tribune, 4-27-1889). A few years later, the Tribune remarked, “the colored voters of Savannah outnumber the Jews, Irish, and Germans combined” (5-7-1892). Besides understanding the political position of the Irish, black elites in Savannah also respected the Irish for their ability to stand up for themselves in the face of discrimination as described by an editorial from the Tribune on January 30, 1915: “The Irishman resents with all of his hot blood insults heaped upon his race by newspapers and other nationalities.” Therefore, black elites in Savannah appreciated the way Irish immigrants stood up for themselves in the face of prejudice while also understanding this group in the context of their political power and affiliations. However, black elites in Savannah also saw Irish immigrants within a context of economic competition. An editorial from the Tribune in 1921 reflects: “Years ago the corner grocery and smaller stores were conducted by the Irish and German. These were supported mainly by our people. They have made rich many an Irishman and German family whose offspring are totally enjoying the fruits thereof” (Savannah Tribune, 9-22-1921). Instead of African Americans owning local stores, immigrants owned these stores and profited from black 74 patrons. Hence, black elites saw Irish immigrants as economic competitors, even if other considerations—like their partisanship and response to prejudice—also came to mind. Black elites in Savannah expressed moderate feelings towards German immigrants that were quite similar to their perception of the Irish. In fact, there were equal numbers of editorials taking a strictly positive and negative tone towards Germans. Only when considering the leaning editorials does the tone in Savannah trend negative, indicating that feelings towards Germans were more moderate overall as described in Figure 2.7. As noted above, black elites saw Germans as economic competitors because they owned local stores and profited from African American patrons, which was one source of contention between the two groups. At the same time, black elites in Savannah also respected the way German immigrants advocated for their own interests in the face of a slight. In the same editorial from the Tribune mentioned above, the editor notes, “the German cuts out every paper that antagonizes and fights his nationality” meaning that Germans refused to support newspapers that ran counter to their interests (Savannah Tribune, 1-30-1915). Again, black elites in Savannah respected groups that were self sufficient and advocated for their own interests, even if they also saw these groups as competition. Greek immigrants were understood within the framework of economic competition, yet this group was, on average, viewed positively. Even though blacks elites in Savannah worried about being crowded out of jobs by Greeks, they more often viewed Greeks as a group to emulate rather than resent. For example, the Tribune noted: In more recent years the Greeks have displaced [Irish and German immigrants] and are becoming well fixed in this world’s goods from the support of our people. The time is ripe for all of our people to understand the situation by spending their money with their own businessmen and encourage scores of others to open up in other sections of the city. This is the only sure way by which employment can be secured for the hundreds of our boys and girls who are being turned out of school 75 each year and not only that we will be keeping our earnings in our community (Savannah Tribune, 9-22-1921). Instead of being angered by Greek immigrants for taking jobs, black elites felt that they should use this group as an example and establish their own businesses for other African Americans to spend their money at. Moreover, in another editorial, the Tribune remarked to it’s dismay that Greek vendors serving lunches to local school children were outnumbering African American vendors which was a missed opportunity for black businessmen (Savannah Tribune, 11-7-1914). Overall, black elites in Savannah viewed Greek immigrants within an economic context, yet they also saw this group through a positive lens and as a group to mimic. Jewish immigrants were the group discussed most often in Savannah and also one held in the highest esteem by black elites. For one, black elites believed, “as a general thing, the Jews have been friendly disposed towards our people” (Savannah Tribune, 1-1-1898). An editorial from the following year goes even farther remarking, “The Jews are numbered among the best friends of the colored people, and no one can successfully contradict it. They are upon a whole as liberally inclined and do as much to help our people as any other race…” (Savannah Tribune, 128-1889). Despite being favored by black elites for their friendly attitude towards African Americans, black elites surely recognized Jews as an economic force in Savannah and beyond. For example, the Tribune worried that, “the Jew in America who is not near so large in population has out stripped the Negro in commercial enterprises” (12-29-1906). Moreover, black elites believed that, “the standing that the Jews have in this country is mainly on account of their trading ability. The individuals help themselves and at the same time are of benefit to others” (Savannah Tribune, 8-26-1899). While black elites were concerned that Jews were economic competitors, they believed that African Americans should try to replicate Jews successes in the 76 marketplace. Jewish immigrants in Savannah were, thus, viewed within an economic context while also being highly regarded. Japanese immigrants were examined infrequently in Savannah, yet like Jewish immigrants, they were perceived within an economic framework while being viewed positively. For example, the Tribune held: The Japanese immigrant in the west has shown himself to be a worthy and dangerous business competitor of the American, particularly in farming, fruitgrowing and the trades. The Japanese farm-laborer has very often become the proud possessor of his former employer’s farm or a competing one—the Japanese artisan has driven his American competitor to seek other fields for his skill (Savannah Tribune, 2-10-1917). While black elites saw the Japanese as competitors in the market, they were less fearful of this group because there were not enough Japanese immigrants to pose a serious threat to African Americans economic interests, which meant black elites in Savannah were able to understand Japanese immigrants within an economic worldview without feeling direct threatened by this immigrant group. Conclusion Contrary to previous research, the systematic analysis in this chapter suggests that there was significant regional variation in black elite immigration attitudes, for the opinions of black elites in Cleveland and Savannah differed in important ways during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. First, this chapter revealed that immigrants were greeted with hostility in both Cleveland and Savannah, yet black elites in Savannah were even more unwelcoming than their counterparts in Cleveland. Moreover, the considerations that came to the minds of black elites in each city also diverged, and this variation has been overlooked by previous research. While black elites in Cleveland were upset over the relatively better rights and privileges afforded to 77 immigrants, elites in Savannah viewed immigration through a lens of economic competition. Collectively, this indicates that while black elites in both cities held restrictionist immigration preferences, the level of hostility among black elites and the way these individuals accessed the issue of immigration had an important local component that has been overlooked by previous scholarship. Taken together, the results of this chapter fill a significant void in the historical record and provide an important correction to earlier studies of African American’s immigration preferences. At the same time, these findings have important broader implications for scholarly understanding of black public opinion and uncover even more questions that will be addressed in the following chapter. For example, why did African American attitudes vary between regions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century? This is especially puzzling because modern theories of black public opinion suggest that African Americans exhibit remarkable homogeneity in their political beliefs, as individual African Americans use a black utility heuristic wherein each person formulates their individual level preferences based on what they think is optimal for the larger racial group (Dawson 1994). However, this approach tells us little about why exactly attitudes were more negative in Savannah than Cleveland, especially when so many more immigrants lived in Cleveland. Furthermore, an explanation utilizing the black utility heuristic leaves questions about why different images came to the minds of black elites in Cleveland and Savannah? That is, why were the rights and privileges granted to immigrants so appalling to Cleveland’s black elites, but not those in Savannah, and why did Savannah black elites fear the adverse affects of immigrants as economic competitors when there were so many more immigrants in Cleveland to compete with blacks? Based on previous literature detailing African American immigration attitudes and modern day theories of black public opinion, we would 78 expect a dominant and consistent theme to arise in the minds of black elites in both cities, yet as the analysis in this chapter has illuminated, black elites in each city contemplated the issue in very distinct ways. Thus, answering these questions will animate the following chapter. 79 CHAPTER 3 LOCALIZING LINKED FATE: HOW LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT SHAPED BLACK ELITE OPINION IN THE LATE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES In 1889 the Cleveland Gazette—a prominent black newspaper in Cleveland, Ohio— lamented that “ignorant poor whites and emigrants are tolerated and welcomed, while the cultured Afro-American fares no better than the ignorant” (Cleveland Gazette, 3-16-1889). The tone expressed in this passage, and as described in detail throughout Chapter 2, is not unique to this article. Rather, such opinions were widely shared by African American elites located in Cleveland between 1883 and 1921, as they condemned immigrants for having more rights and privileges than blacks. Unlike the opinions described above, black elites in Savannah, Georgia were less concerned about the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants, and instead worried about the economic competition that might accompany increased immigration. For example, on June 16, 1894, The Savannah Tribune opined: “The meeting of bodies in the South to encourage emigrants to settle in this section is significant so far as the Negro is concerned. It means that if the Negro does not secure a better foothold than they now have, they will be crowded into the background and there remain as serfs” (Savannah Tribune, 6-16-1894). As these remarks illustrate, Savannah African American elites viewed immigration through the lens of economic competition, and importantly, as described in Chapter 2, were even more restrictionist than their Cleveland counterparts. Immigration thus elicited varying attitudes among African Americans located in different regions of the United States between 1883 and 1921, which is puzzling given modern day understandings of black public opinion. Rather than noting the regional diversity of black public opinion, modern theories developed and tested with national survey data attempt to explain the 80 remarkable homogeneity of African American’s political beliefs since the1960s (Dawson 1994). In particular, the most influential theory in black public opinion research—linked fate—suggests that individual African Americans use a black utility heuristic wherein each person formulates their individual preferences based on what they think is optimal for the larger racial group. In the examples cited above, it is unclear why there would be such variation in the opinions of African American elites. If group interests, alone, were the overriding influence of African American opinion, we would expect to see black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah upset over the rights and privileges given to immigrants and denied blacks because it should have been in the interest of all African Americans’ to ensure that other groups were not receiving the full rights of citizenship when they were not. Moreover, if group interests were driving black elites’ fears of economic competition from immigration, we would also expect these fears to be manifested in Cleveland as well as Savannah, particularly since there were more immigrants in the former who could compete with African Americans. The divergent attitudes on immigration among Cleveland and Savannah African American elites begs the following question: why was there regional variation in the opinions of African Americans during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when our current theoretical models suggest we should see homogeneity in black public opinion? More specifically, why did black elites in Savannah exhibit more restrictionist immigration attitudes than elites in Cleveland? Additionally, why were the economic fears of immigration so salient in Savannah when there were so many more immigrants in Cleveland to compete with blacks both politically and economically? Finally, why did the relative rights and privileges of citizenship matter so much more to black elites in Cleveland than in Savannah when immigrants were 81 arguably more privileged in both cities and consistently placed above blacks on the racial hierarchy? Explaining the regional diversity in African American public opinion during the turn of the 20th century United States requires a theory that can explain how local institutional contexts affected black attitudes. Absent federal laws protecting and enforcing the civil rights and civil liberties of African Americans, local institutions greatly influenced the life chances and possibilities of blacks. More specifically, I argue that blacks’ long entrenched position at the bottom of the racial hierarchy, in combination with the local institutional conditions in the cities in which they resided, shaped black elites’ sense of racial alienation. In turn, these things influenced what they believed was possible and thus determined (a) the worldview black elites’ pursued for advancing African Americans’ position in society and politics, and (b) the level of hostility to immigrants among black elites. For example, black elites in Savannah were more racially alienated and decidedly more hostile to immigrants, and also took an accommodationist position of racial uplift advocating economic empowerment, racial solidarity, and separate institutions. In contrast, black elites in Cleveland were less racially alienated and less hostile to immigrants. Cleveland black elites pursed an integrationist stance calling for agitation on behalf of political and civil rights while maintaining the importance of higher education for African Americans. The theory of linked fate would suggest black elites in Cleveland would also view immigrants as economic competitors, and that black elites in Savannah would be upset with the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants, but again, the evidence suggests they did not. However, because of the local institutional context, the threat of immigration was interpreted within the context of black elites’ broader worldview—either accommodation or integration— which was why immigrants were perceived with exceptional hostility and as economic 82 competition in Savannah, but resented for the rights and privileges they were afforded in Cleveland. The dominant theory of black public opinion, linked fate, assumes black public opinion is homogenous, national, and conforms to a common framework. As this chapter will demonstrate, in the late 19th and early 20th century, local institutions shaped the experience of race in different ways leading black elites in different cities: (a) to hold different opinions, (b) to view their reference group not as blacks nationally but as blacks in their community, and (c) thus, to develop different frameworks for evaluating what is best for African Americans given their localized context. Thus, an understanding the influence of local institutional conditions on political attitudes is a needed when we study African American opinion in this period. The remainder of this chapter will develop the theory of how local institutional context affects black public opinion and then explore this theory within the context of Cleveland and Savannah black elites’ attitudes towards immigration. The Limitations of Linked Fate for Understanding African American Public Opinion The study of black public opinion has consistently lagged behind the research on white public opinion. Prior to the University of Michigan’s Program on Black America in the late 1970s and early 1980s, blacks were largely left out of public opinion surveys, or treated as “merely the objects of scholarly discourse rather than agents whose opinions matter” (Harris, 2011, 489). Though they have yet to reach parity with whites, national level surveys in subsequent decades have increasingly included larger samples of African Americans, and have allowed researchers to explore many determinants of black public opinion. However, the theoretical models resulting from these studies—notably linked fate—try to do too much, and 83 thus are inadequate for explaining the regional variation in African American public opinion during the late 19th and early 20th century United States. The most fundamental theory for understanding how black public opinion is formed or understood is linked fate (Harris 2011). The linked fate model begins with African Americans’ shared historical experience from which blacks develop unique racial group interests (Dawson 1994; Cohen 1999; Harris-Lacewell 2004). Michael Dawson (1994) most consistently advocates the influence of racial group interests on African American political behavior and public opinion and theorizes a black utility heuristic which “simply states that as long as African-Americans’ life chances are powerfully shaped by race, it is efficient for individual African Americans to use their perceptions of the interests of African Americans as a group as a proxy for their own interests” (Dawson 1994, 61). Because African Americans are rational actors with a shared historical experience, Dawson argues, it is simpler, more efficient, and less costly for individuals within this group to develop individual political orientations based on their understanding of what would be beneficial for the larger racial group (Dawson, 57-59). Thus, Dawson suggests that black public opinion is quite homogenous precisely because African Americans’ shared history makes individual blacks support what is ideal for the group even if it is not optimal for them individually. Indeed, scholars of black public opinion have found linked fate quite helpful for understanding African Americans’ political beliefs. For example, scholars have associated feelings of linked fate with support for majority-minority Congressional districts (Tate 2003); suspicion of the mainstream media (Davis and Gandy Jr. 1999), support for community Black Nationalism in the form of demands that blacks control and support the communities and institutions in which they predominate (Brown and Shaw 2002), and a preference for having 84 black neighbors (Krysan and Farley 2002). Important exceptions exist and not everyone has uncovered a relationship between linked fate and blacks’ political beliefs. For example, Howell, Perry, and Vile (2004) find that feelings of linked fate have insignificant effects on African Americans’ evaluations of the police, while others have suggested that there is significant intraracial variation in the level of racial identity and group interests among African Americans (Cohen 1999). Nevertheless, linked fate, to date, has provided the most leverage for understanding black political beliefs. Although linked fate is the most wide-ranging theory for understanding black public opinion, it cannot easily explain the varied reaction to immigration during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This chapter challenges three of the core assumptions of linked fate. First, at its core, linked fate assumes that—and attempts to explain why—black public opinion is homogenous. Nevertheless, African American’s opinions are not always the same, as suggested by black elites’ immigration preferences outlined above, and our theoretical models need to be just as adept at explaining varied attitudes as homogenous opinions. That is, our theoretical approach must clarify why some blacks viewed immigrants as economic competitors while others resented their advantaged position in society. Presumably, it would have been in the best interest of all African American elites to limit the economic competition from immigrants, not just black elites in Savannah where immigrants arguably posed less of an economic threat than Cleveland. Black elites in Savannah held many occupations from physicians and dentists—the pinnacle of professional advancement—to owners of groceries, pharmacies, mortuaries, and the first black hotel in the state of Georgia. Less educated black businessmen worked as hackmen and draymen delivering goods (Acker 2012). On the other hand, immigrants were recruited to the South to fill a perceived void in agricultural 85 labor. Indeed, the majority of the black masses worked in agriculture in the South, but the point remains: it is unlikely that immigration to Savannah would have directly displaced black elites in their employment, and if elites were concerned about immigrants hurting the employment opportunities of the masses, we would expect this sense of racial group interest to operate similarly in both cities. Moreover, if group interests, alone, were the driving force of black elites’ attitudes, we would expect black elites in both cities to be equally upset that immigrants were passing over African Americans for full rights of citizenship. After all, black elites in Cleveland arguably had equal or greater rights and privileges than their counterparts in Savannah, and the gap in rights and privileges between blacks and immigrants was likely smaller in Cleveland than Savannah simply because blacks were so much more repressed in the South. Objectively, it was likely in the interest of African Americans in Savannah to be upset by the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants, but again, that was not the sentiment most reflected in their immigration opinions. Thus, the immigration preferences of black elites in Cleveland and Savannah between 1883 and 1921 suggest that a national-level theory of linked fate is not applicable and something else must be at play. The second linked fate assumption this chapter challenges is that the reference group black elites have in mind when forming their opinions is the same in all times and places. Individual African Americans may be thinking about what is best for the racial group, but if the group they are thinking of is locally circumscribed and has unique needs, we might expect to see varied opinions, not homogeneity. To the extent that blacks think of different groups of African Americans when evaluating group interests, they are likely imagining their black neighbors, community members, or fellow state residents, not an amorphous national group of African 86 Americans. Thus, when black elites in Savannah thought of how immigration affected African Americans, they were imagining other blacks in Savannah, nor their counterparts in Cleveland. Finally, this chapter challenges the assumption within the linked fate theory that all African Americans assess what is best for their racial group similarly. While scholars have assumed that there is national consensus among African Americans, today, as to what is best for their racial group, it is more likely that individuals had different assessments based on their local environment during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. That is, the most pressing and important concerns—and their remedy—likely had a very local component. After all, why would we expect Northern blacks and Southern blacks existing in completely different legal, social, political, and economic environments assess what is best for blacks in the same way? For the issue of immigration, how would Cleveland black elites have known what was best for Savannah’s African Americans, and why would we expect their best interest to be the same? Thus, in the next section, I provide a theory that is attentive to the local institutional influences of black elites’ opinions. A Theory of Local Institutional Context on Black Elites’ Immigration Attitudes To understand black elite opinion in the late 19th and early 20th century, a theory that is attentive to the local institutional context is needed. To date, few scholars have linked insights from historical institutionalism and individual political behavior at the mass level, for as Mettler notes: “the engagement between historical institutionalism and political behavior is conspicuous by its absence” (Mettler 2010-11, 44). While notable exceptions exist, historical institutionalists who utilize time, historical context, and institutional arrangements as important factors for explaining political outcomes, largely overlook the effect of these broader political processes on 87 mass political behavior, including public opinion.15 On the other hand, scholars of political behavior generally, and public opinion more specifically, pay little attention to how rules, institutions, procedures, and policies influence individual preferences, and these studies frequently examine behavior at a discrete point in time while attempting to generalize based on cross-sectional snapshots.16 This chapter bridges the divide between historical institutionalists and scholars of political behavior by offering a theory of political preferences that takes seriously the local institutional environment encountered by black elites while heeding the call of recent scholarship urging more qualitative longitudinal analysis of black immigration attitudes (Waters, Kasnitz, and Asad 2014). Unlike contemporary African Americans who exhibit remarkable homogeneity in their political opinions, black elites in the late 19th and early 20th century differed in the way they perceived an important issue of the day: immigration. While, the immigration preferences of black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah between 1883 and 1921 were restrictionist, a close examination of their attitudes uncovers two puzzles. First, the immigration opinions of black elites in Savannah were significantly more restrictionist than those in Cleveland. Second, black elites considered and discussed immigration differently in each city: in Cleveland, black elites felt indignation over the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants, whereas elites in Savannah feared the economic effects of persistent immigration. These two puzzles lead to the central questions of this chapter: why are the immigration opinions of Savannah’s black elites more restrictionist than those in Cleveland? Secondly, why do different concerns come to the minds of black elites in Cleveland and Savannah when contemplating the issue of immigration. 15 For exceptions to this generalization see Mettler and Welch (2004); Skocpol (2003) and Bensel (2004); Mettler (2011); Schickler and Caughey (2011). 16 For exceptions see Page and Shapiro (1992); Berinsky (2009). 88 Figure 3.1: The Theory of Local Institutional Context Local Institutional Context Racial Alienation Other Groups in Society Worldview Opinions To unravel these puzzles, I developed the theory described in Figure 3.1 that is attentive to the unique institutional dynamics encountered by African Americans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. We cannot fully understand black politics, or black public opinion, without recognizing the structure of race in American politics and society, including the unique institutional arrangements faced by African Americans. National institutions—particularly federal laws—set many of the rules of the game by, for one thing, communicating to groups their status in American society. Beginning with the enslavement of African Americans tacitly endorsed in the U.S. Constitution, federal laws strongly told blacks they were inferior (Smith, 1993; Smith, 1997; Kim 1999; Lowdnes, Novkov, Warren 2008). These initial laws placed blacks at the bottom of the racial hierarchy denoting blacks as less desirable members of society and only partial citizens (Omi and Winant 1994; Masuoka and Junn 2013). Subsequent laws and practices reinforced this message. For example, state electoral institutions were allowed under federal laws to determine if blacks could participate in politics, how they could participate, and the choices available when participating (Smith 1997, Klinker and Smith 1999, Keyssar 2000). Economic institutions creating marketplaces, subsidizing commerce, and regulating both of them often, advantaged whites (Katznelson 2005). In 89 combination, these legal, political, and economic institutions awarded whites and blacks very different and unequal liberties. The ever-present denial of civil rights and civil liberties of African Americans was a consistent reminder that while institutions set and enforce the rules governing the behavior of members of society, those rules were not the same for every group. The Local Institutional Context in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries In the absence of federal laws guaranteeing civil rights and civil liberties to African Americans, the local institutional context African Americans encountered varied across the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which mattered for the formation of African American political preferences. From ratification of the Constitution until the New Deal, the United States operated under a system of dual federalism and dual citizenship in which “the actual content of American citizenship was defined primarily by the individual states rather than by the national government” (Mettler 1998, 1). Race was thus experienced differently for blacks in different parts of the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century. Segregation, civil and political rights, economic empowerment, and racial violence, shaped the local institutional context and thus advantaged or disadvantaged African Americans living in some locations over others. For example, while segregation was customary throughout the United States in the late nineteenth century, it was far more codified and institutionalized in the South than the North or West. In the South: whether by law or practice, one found everything from segregated hospitals and orphanages, schools and churches, restaurants and hotels, trains and streetcars, lavatories and phone booths, swimming pools and bowling alleys, even separate textbooks in school and separate bibles on which to swear in court. Where blacks and whites were allowed into the same institutions or businesses, they were 90 required to sit in separate sections, or whites were served first (Fox and Guglielmo, 336). The institutional structure that segregated the races was simply more developed and supported in the South. In terms of education, the South was slower to adopt compulsory education laws and whites often encouraged blacks working in agriculture to keep their children on the farm, rather than sending them to the few black schools (Lieberson 1980; Fox and Guglielmo 2012). Further, while “many blacks attended segregated and inferior schools in the North… public education for blacks in the South, in particular, provided a daily lesson in social closure and social distance. Blacks were taught in segregated and vastly inferior schools, if they were provided schools at all” (Fox and Guglielmo 2012, 340). Thus, though blacks were often eager to attend schools, it was more difficult for them to do so in the South. Politically, southern blacks were also at a greater disadvantage, even though they were so heavily concentrated in this region of the United States. Between the end of Reconstruction and the Great Depression, most blacks identified with the Republican Party, yet the South was solidly Democratic and maintained institutions devoted to continuing the racial status quo (Frymer 1999). For example, states adopted, “in varying combinations—poll taxes, cumulative poll taxes (demanding that past as well as current taxes be paid), literacy tests, secret ballot laws, lengthy residence requirements, elaborate registration systems, confusing multiple voting-box arrangements, and eventually, Democratic primaries restricted to white voters” (Keyssar 2000, 111). These laws worked quite well in restricting the voting turnout of African Americans, as southern post-Reconstruction turnout percentages fell into the single digits for African Americans (Keyssar 2000). For example, “in Mississippi after 1890, less than 9,000 out of 147,000 voting-age blacks were registered to vote; in Louisiana, where more than 130,000 blacks 91 had been registered to vote in 1896, the figure dropped to an astonishing 1,342 by 1904” (Keyssar 2000, 114). Thus, electoral institutions in the South were very effective at repressing the voices of African Americans in the late 19th and early 20th century. When African Americans violated the laws and customs, they risked physical harm. Violence against blacks was often used as a control tactic by whites to keep African Americans in a subordinate position in the period between the end of Reconstruction and the Great Depression. While blacks were vulnerable across the country, the worst forms of racial terrorism typically occurred in the South. For example, lynching was far more frequent in the South, and the ten states with the highest number of African Americans lynched were all in the South (Tuskegee Institute Statistics). Between 1882 and 1930, there were 2,805 combined confirmed lynchings in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee (Tolnay and Beck 1995). Blacks in the South, thus, had good reason to fear for their personal safety. The Local Institutional Context and Racial Alienation These varied local institutions sent strong, even absolutely demanding, signals about African Americans’ place in society, shaping their level of racial alienation. African American’s feeling of racial alienation emerged from shared historical experiences and perceptions about the current political, economic, and social opportunity structure. The level of alienation blacks perceived was fundamentally influenced by their experience of subordination, with greater racial subordination leading to higher level of racial alienation (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Since African Americans in the South were more oppressed and faced an institutional context allowing for few political, social, or economic opportunities, they often experienced greater feelings of 92 racial alienation. In turn, racial alienation influenced black elite opinion on immigration in several ways. Racial Alienation and Views Toward Other Groups Varied racial alienation in turn influenced black elites’ perception of other social groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. When racial experienced high levels of racial alienation, they were more likely to view other groups as threatening their own position in society. (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Because access to political and economic resources was a zero sum proposition, African Americans in some regions of the United States experiencing higher levels of racial alienation and who were already insecure in their position in society, were especially likely to see new groups such as immigrants as competitive threats. On the other hand, when alienation was less severe, particularly in the North, African Americans were more secure in their position and viewed other groups as somewhat less threatening. This had important implications for black elite opinion on immigration, as more alienated elites were also more likely to view immigrants with greater hostility. Different Worldviews in Response to Alienation: Accommodation and Integration The level of racial alienation black elites experienced also influenced their view of what was optimal for the betterment of their race, determining the worldview they adopted for advancing the status of African Americans. While all black leaders sought to advance their race, they generally fell into one of two camps at the turn of the 20th century: those recommending accommodation as a strategy and those who pursued integration (Baker 1908; Kusmer 1976). 93 When racial alienation was high, black elites rightly recognized their very restricted possibilities and the danger of confrontation. High racial alienation encouraged an accommodationist worldview most widely espoused by Booker T. Washington, who advocated economic uplift, racial solidarity, and industrial education in which individuals could learn skills necessary to enter the workforce (Woodson and Wesley 1972; Klinker and Smith 1999; Dawson 2001). Because black elites faced rampant segregation, very limited political and civil rights, and racial violence in the South, they gravitated towards the accommodationist worldview, as it was simply a safer and more pragmatic strategy for racial advancement. Booker T. Washington rose to national prominence as a black leader following his Atlanta Exposition Address on September 18, 1895. Often referred to as the Atlanta Compromise, Washington conciliated the white South by articulating accommodation to prevailing racial institutions. Though Washington secretly “aided lawsuits to combat the very segregation and disenfranchisement that he publically urged blacks to accept,” he was willing to publicly consent to these evils in order to maintain harmony with southern whites (Klinker and Smith 1999, 98). In keeping with this spirit of harmony, Washington’s accommodationist philosophy advocated racial solidarity among blacks, the construction of separate black institutions, and in particular, educational facilities where blacks could develop their industrial skills. If separate black institutions were a pillar of the accommodationist doctrine, economic self-help was the foundation because Washington believed that racial advancement came through, “virtues of hard work, thrift, and the accumulation of wealth” (Kusmer 1976, 113). As a strategy for advancing the economic condition of the black masses Washington advocated industrial education, stating: “I plead for industrial education and development for the Negro not 94 because I want to cramp him, but because I want to free him. I want to see him enter the all- powerful business and commercial world” (Washington 1895, 7). Blacks could receive such an education at the Tuskegee Institute in Tuskegee, Alabama where Washington served as President until 1915. At the institute, black students received instruction in: thirty-three trades and industries, including carpentry, blacksmithing, printing, wheel righting, harness making, painting, machinery, founding, shoemaking, brick masonry and brickmaking, plastering, sawmilling, tinsmithing, tailoring, mechanical and architectural drawing, electrical and steam engineering, canning, sewing, dressmaking, millinery, cooking, laundering, housekeeping, mattress making, basketry, nursing, agriculture, dairying and stock raising, horticulture (Washington 1895, 7). Industrial and vocational training at Tuskegee was meant to prepare blacks for entering and thriving in the marketplace and society. Industrial training, for Washington, far exceeded the importance of political or civil rights. In his Atlanta Address, he stated that: The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremist folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of all privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing. No race that has anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long in any degree ostracized. It is important and right that all privileges of the law be ours, but it is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercise of these privileges. The opportunity to earn a dollar in a factory just now is worth infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in an opera-house (Washington 1895, 170). Washington believed, perhaps naïvely, that if blacks toiled long enough and succeeded economically, whites would voluntarily afford them full citizenship. In the meantime, separate institutions, racial solidarity, and economic uplift through self-help were enough for accommodationists. Conversely, when racial alienation was lower, black elites, buoyed by greater social and economic possibilities and fewer dangers, more frequently chose an integrationist worldview 95 championed by William Monroe Trotter and W.E.B. Du Bois, who argued that racial uplift must be won through agitation for civil and political rights, and the higher education of blacks according to individual ability (Harrison 1946; Woodson and Wesley 1972; Puttkammer and Worthy 1958; Kusmer 1976). Because black elites in the North, and elsewhere, lived in an institutional context that allowed partial integration with whites, permitted some political and civil rights, and was less violent, they found the integrationist worldview to be a more appealing strategy of racial advancement (Kusmer 1976). While accommodationists supported economic uplift, integrationists firmly demanded total equality between the races. As an early advocate of the integrationist position, William Monroe Trotter established the Guardian, a black newspaper in Boston, as a platform for this worldview and criticized Washington’s accommodationist policy. Trotter held that “as citizens, colored people deserve the same opportunities as whites; these equal rights will be secured only by persistent manly agitation, untempered by compromise!” (Puttkammer and Worthy, 298). For Trotter, and other integrationists, segregation was simply wrong and any form of separation was viewed as an accommodation and sanction of racism (Kusmer 1978). Trotter and his fellow integrationists favored agitation as a tactic because they felt that individual examples of black success would do little to encourage whites to grant blacks full political and civil rights. Instead, Trotter organized protest meetings where leaders lamented the condition of blacks, fought for individual civil rights when local statutes were violated, sought out remedies for individuals who faced discrimination in public life or employment, and would even travel to the nation’s capital to petition political leaders on civil rights issues (Puttkammer and Worthy 1958). A consistent theme in Trotter’s ideology was his belief “that political participation by Negroes was one of the most effective ways to secure rights…” (Puttkammer 96 and Worthy 1958, 306). For example, Trotter successfully orchestrated a protest in Boston that banned the film “The Birth of a Nation” and led theaters across the city to agree to stop showing content objectionable to blacks.17 Like Trotter, Du Bois believed in complete civil and political equality for blacks. In fact, Du Bois called for a trifold approach to racial uplift consisting of voting rights, civil equality, and education according to ability (Du Bois 1999; 1903). Du Bois argued that by postponing demands for these things, as Washington proposed, blacks would continue to be disenfranchised, contemned to legal discrimination, and suffer declining funding for black institutions of higher learning (Du Bois 1999; 1903). For Du Bois the stakes were high: “unless [blacks] have political rights and righteously guarded civic status, [they] will still remain the poverty-stricken and ignorant plaything of rascals, that [they] now [are]” (Du Bois 1999, 18). To achieve equality, Du Bois advocated “voting where we may vote, by persistent unceasing agitation; by hammering at the truth, by sacrifice and work” (Du Bois 1999, 185). With Trotter, Du Bois organized and led the Niagara Movement, an organization that opposed accommodation and promoted equality for blacks in all aspects of life. Though the Niagara Movement lasted only five years, many of the original members combined with white liberals to form the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which continues to agitate for the social, political, and economic rights of minorities. While the accommodationist approach rested on individual self-help and industrial education for the masses, integrationists like Du Bois countered that exceptional African Americans must be groomed for political and social leadership through higher education. In fact, Du Bois believed that “the Negro race, like all races, is going to be saved by its exceptional men” 17 However, Trotter was an uncompromising man, which was a trait that eventually alienated him from other black leaders like W.E.B. Du Bois. 97 (Du Bois 1999, 13). The “talented tenth,” as Du Bois referred to them, should be trained through higher education, and these learned college men “ought to be, the group leader, the man who sets the ideals of the community where he lives, directs its thoughts and heads its social movements” (Du Bois 1999, 23). Aside from political and social leaders, Du Bois pointed out that the industrial education prized by accommodationists required teachers, who were often trained in higher education. Thus, Du Bois was not simply a high minded academic, but also saw practical reasons for accommodationists to appreciate the necessity of higher education for blacks. Although Washington and Du Bois acted as figureheads for two distinct philosophies, their camps were of unequal size. Washington had many more followers, especially among black leaders in the South. In fact, most accommodationists resided in southern states, whereas integrationists lived in northern areas. Still, while not all leaders fell into one of the two camps— in fact, even Du Bois was conflicted on certain issues—and not all northern blacks were integrationists, these two philosophies structured much of the thinking of black elites during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Kusmer 1978). Thus, Black elite opinions on issues in the world including immigration were filtered through the lens of these two worldviews. For black elites in the late 19th and early 20th century, the local institutional context shaped their experience of race in different ways as illustrated by their different levels of racial alienation. This led them to use their community of African Americans, not the nation as a whole, as their reference group in forming political attitudes and worldviews for understanding what was best for their race. As a result, their attitudes on issues like immigration were highly localized because their experience of race was highly localized. By taking seriously the way local institutions shaped black elite opinion, this research moves beyond group interests as a singular force shaping black’s attitudes and deepens our understanding of black public opinion. 98 The next section will show the variation in racial alienation between Cleveland and Savannah, including how it was shaped by local institutions and how, in turn, it shaped black elites attitudes. Local Institutional Context and Immigration Attitudes in Cleveland and Savannah The local institutional context in Cleveland and Savannah created very different environments for black elites and their respective elites thus adopted different worldviews for pursuing racial advancement. Black elites in Cleveland lived in an institutional context that allowed greater integration with whites, benefited from wider educational opportunities, and enjoyed more civil and political rights. Thus, Cleveland black elites generally espoused an integrationist worldview advocating agitation for civil and political rights combined with the importance of higher education. Immigration was considered within this broader rights based worldview, which helps explain why immigrant rights and privileges were seen as particularly galling to black elites in Cleveland. On the other hand, black elites living in Savannah were segregated in most aspects of life, denied civil and political rights, and often feared for their own personal safety, which made black Savannahians more racially alienated than their counterparts in Cleveland. These institutional conditions combined with a high percentage of blacks in the population, made the accommodationist worldview promoting economic uplift, industrial education, and racial solidarity more appealing to the black elite in The Forest City. Because local institutional conditions in Savannah made African Americans feel especially racially alienated and immigration was interpreted through the lens of the economic based accommodationist worldview, immigrants were viewed with greater hostility and feared as economic competition. 99 The Institutional Conditions in Cleveland and Savannah African Americans occupied the bottom of the racial hierarchy in both Cleveland and Savannah, yet the local context in Savannah was much worse and as Dittmer notes: “Savannah took great pride in a reputation for racial paternalism which went back to the days of slavery” (Dittmer 1980, 9). First, blacks were more segregated in Savannah than Cleveland. Racial groups “tended to cluster in certain areas of the city, making it simple for government officials to favor some groups and not others” by channeling resources to certain areas and groups (Acker 54). While blacks lived near white folks they served in the aftermath of the Civil War, by the turn of the twentieth century, “the distribution of population resemble[ed] a great 0, with the whites in the center and the blacks in the surrounding circle” (Dittmer 1980, 10). The pattern of residential segregation continued throughout the early twentieth with poor rural blacks moving to Savannah city slums and middle class blacks residing in new black neighborhoods on the east side of the city (Dittmer 1980). Segregation in Savannah, however, was not limited to living arrangements, for blacks faced segregated social and economic institutions as well. Civil rights laws were rarely upheld in the South including Savannah, and when the federal government began to enforce civil rights laws in the early 1880s, southern states and politicians responded by passing measures advancing segregation (Acker 2012). For example, on multiple occasions, Savannah passed ordinances segregating rail cars and public transportation, though these measures were met with boycotts from Savannah’s black population (Dittmer 1980, Campbell 1986, Acker 2012). In 1912 maritime transportation from Savannah was also segregated when the Beaufort-Savannah steamship line forced “black passengers to ride on the lower deck amidst freight, boilers, and 100 engines” (Dittmer 1980, 19). While blacks initially boycotted the steamship line, within a few months they acquiesced and continued booking excursions (Dittmer 1980). When blacks needed medical attention, they were forced into a separate hospital, the Georgia Infirmary (Hinton 1899). Moreover, while black citizens of Savannah paid taxes, their children were not allowed to play on any of the five city playgrounds, which were for whites only (Dittmer 1980). Black elites in Savannah also attended segregated and inferior educational institutions from early education to training later in life. A public school for African Americans was not established in Savannah until 1878 and the first public institution of higher education for blacks did not arrive until 1890 (Sullivan 2003). Indeed, the Savannah City Directory of 1882 lists only two black schools—both beginning at first grade with one culminating at sixth grade and the other at eighth grade—in contrast to seven white schools including separate high schools for boys and girls (Shole’s Directory 1882). By the turn of the 20th century, there were four schools in Savannah for blacks and ten for whites despite blacks being more than half of the population (Gamble 1904). Once educated, black elites’ owned and operated distinctly black business like groceries, pharmacies, mortuaries, and the like, thus further cementing their social and economic distance from whites (Shole’s Directory 1882; Acker 2012). To facilitate the entrepreneurial spirit of blacks, the Wage Earners bank was established in 1900, which was especially welcome when the Southern Bank of Savannah established separate deposit windows leading most blacks to withdraw their deposits (Dittmer 1980). Moreover, an African American insurance agency protected blacks from unexpected events (Acker 2012). Thus, blacks and whites existed in separate societies throughout Savannah leading to feelings of racial alienation, and distinct black business and institutions followed suit. 101 African Americans in Cleveland, on the other hand, were less alienated as they were integrated economically and socially with whites. Blacks not only lived in most parts of the city occupying all but 17 of the 155 census tracts in 1910, but black elites also worked as “merchants and small entrepreneurs, skilled craftsmen, barbers who owned their own shops, headwaiters in exclusive establishments, a few doctors, lawyers, and other professionals” and “in all of their occupations, they either had white clientele or associated with whites in the course of their work” (Kusmer 1976, 98-99). Before joining the workforce, many black elites attended integrated educational institutions alongside whites, and once in the workforce, served in skilled trade unions with whites (Kusmer 1976; Jones Ross 1995). Together, this suggests that “elite blacks had particularly good rapport with whites” in Cleveland (Kusmer 1976, 99). Thus, black elites in Cleveland were less segregated than their contemporaries in Savannah, which is one indicator that elites felt less racially alienated in Cleveland. Besides segregation, black elites in Georgia were denied political and civil rights. Southern electoral institutions were designed to preserve the dominance of the Democratic Party, which entailed restrictions on African American suffrage because blacks were solidly aligned with the Republican Party. For example, as a requirement for voting, the 1868 Georgia Constitution required that all taxes were paid for the year prior to the election (Keyssar 2000). Later, in 1907, a Georgia statute enacted even stricter suffrage requirements including that all taxes had been paid since the 1877 constitution at least six months prior to the election; that voters could read and write any portion of the United States Constitution and/or Georgia Constitution; and there were exemptions for all veterans of all wars and their descendants, which advantaged whites (Keyssar 2000). Cumulatively, these restrictions meant that in Savannah, “the black community was represented by a disproportionately low number of registered voters” 102 (Acker 2012, 55). And, by the turn of the twentieth, blacks were “almost complete exclu[ded]…as an influential political factor” (Perdue 1973, 25). Though there were a few black politicians in Savannah, Perdue notes, “they were unable to accomplish much for their followers because of their allegiance and subordination to white politicians” (Perdue 1973, 26). Thus, the denial of political rights combined with the segregation in most aspects of public life meant that blacks simply had a more alienated existence in Savannah than Cleveland. Black elites in Cleveland not only lived in a less segregated environment, but they also had access to political and civil rights unavailable to southern blacks. Cleveland blacks were able to vote at higher rates because Ohio had fewer restrictions on suffrage. For example, Ohio had no taxpaying, property, or literacy requirements to vote between 1870 and 1924 (Keyssar 2000). Additionally, black elites were elected to political office and benefited from patronage positions. John Patterson Green, for example, was a successful black politician in Cleveland first elected as a justice of the peace in 1873. He ultimately became “the first (and only) northern Negro to be elected to a state senate in the nineteenth century” in 1891 by a district composed mainly of white voters (Kusmer 1976, 118). Harry C. Smith—the editor of the Cleveland Gazette—also served in the Ohio legislature. Other elites, though not holding political office, had close ties to the Republican Party and benefited from patronage positions. Close ties to political leaders— black and white alike—allowed black elites the opportunity to push for civil and political rights. For example, these connections were pivotal in getting Ohio’s Black Laws “prohibiting interracial marriages, denying Blacks access to public education funds, and barring Blacks from serving in the military and on juries in a court of law” wiped from the books in the late nineteenth century (Jones Ross 1995, 58; see also Kusmer 1976). Moreover, the legal system provided an avenue for the pursuit of black civil and political rights. For instance, a prominent 103 black lawyer in Cleveland—Charles S. Sutton—was responsible for using the legal system to challenge cases of discrimination and other civil rights violations in court, which resulted in progress for African Americans (Kusmer 1976). Together, the greater degree of racial integration in Cleveland coupled with success in the political arena helped black elites feel less subordinated, and thus, less racially alienated. Another tactic used by southern whites for the repression and control of blacks was violence. When blacks were deemed out of line by whites, they could be lynched. Indeed, between 1882 and 1930 Georgia had more lynchings than any state save Mississippi (Tolnay and Beck 1995). While, coastal Georgia, including Savannah, was safer than many Georgia cities with only 13 lynchings compared to 176 for South Georgia between 1880 and 1930, the prospect of racial violence was an ever-present reality for all Georgia African Americans (Brundage 1993; Tolnay et al. 1996). The fear and oppression stemming from southern violence against blacks only reinforced the sense of inferiority and alienation that began with segregation and unequal civil and political rights. The story in Cleveland suggests more progress. While black elites in Cleveland, of course, also experienced racial violence, they used their political connections as well as their political and civil rights to push for legal protection. For example, the passage of the Ohio Anti-Mob Violence Act of 1896 allowed the families of individuals who were lynched to sue the county where the lynching occurred leading to a significant reduction in the number of Ohio lynchings (Cayton 2002; Finkelman 2009). Though lynching was still a concern for black leaders in Ohio as late as World War I, the problem was less severe than in any of the Southern states. Hence, on another metric, black elites in Cleveland were less repressed, which means they likely felt a lower sense on racial alienation. 104 African Americans were heavily concentrated in the South as described in Table 2.1, which also made separate institutions particularly viable in Savannah precisely because blacks were such a large, concentrated, group. The institutional context, as well as the demographic factors, in Cleveland were different. In contrast, the black population in Cleveland—like many northern cities before the Great Migration—was small, which had important implications for structuring the worldview of black elites because there were not enough African Americans to sustain separate black institutions. For example, while all black elites held individualist views to some extent, “the ideological appeal of the Washington doctrine of self-help and racial solidarity was weaker in Cleveland than in larger black communities because the development of the ghetto and segregated facilities progressed more slowly there” (Kusmer 1976, 115). The problem ran both ways in Cleveland: there were too few blacks to support separate institutions, and because separate institutions developed slowly there was less racial solidarity, which was necessary for building separate institutions. Thus, the local institutional context in Cleveland pushed black elites towards an integrationist position, while demographic features made that strategy even more attractive. Integration and Immigration in Cleveland The integrationist worldview of black elites in Cleveland was clearly demonstrated in Gazette editorials. In one of the Gazette’s earliest issues, the paper advocated “education, equality, and progression” indicating an integrationist worldview (Cleveland Gazette, 8-251883). Years later, the Gazette opined: “The Afro-American needs and must have all the ‘equality’ that all other classes of Americans need and enjoy” while further commenting, “This ‘equality’ includes the so-called ‘social equality’” (Cleveland Gazette, 5-13-1911). Consistent 105 with the integrationist position, black elites in Cleveland praised W.E.B. Du Bois, criticized Booker T. Washington, promoted equality in education while denouncing segregated educational facilities, campaigned against Ohio’s black laws and other forms of institutionalized discrimination, and agitated for the political rights of African Americans in Cleveland. Black elites in Cleveland held W.E.B. Du Bois in particularly high esteem. In fact, the Gazette announced, “The real leader of the race, today, is Prof. W.E.B. Du Bois. This is a fact that all loyal and intelligent Afro-Americans recognize” (Cleveland Gazette, 10-8-1910). However, his personality was criticized, as Cleveland’s black leaders, at times, described the man as “icy” and too academic (see Cleveland Gazette, 6-7-1913). Instead, Clevelanders favored the ideology Du Bois disseminated, particularly his book The Souls of Black Folk, which was described as “unquestionably the best publication anent the race, of recent months. It is really a fine thing and ought to be in the home of every loyal, intelligent, and progressive Afro- American” (Cleveland Gazette, 10-10-1903). In contrast to the characterization of Du Bois, the accommodationist leader Booker T. Washington was criticized on multiple occasions. For example, the Gazette noted that “Mr. Booker Washington is entirely too broad or sweeping in some of his remarks. They border on insults” (Cleveland Gazette, 11-28-1896). However, the most searing challenge to Washington was reserved for after his death. Commenting on his passing, the Gazette stated: Dr. Booker T. Washington was not “THE leader of the Negro race.” The best that can truthfully be claimed is that he was A leader of the race—as an exponent of the industrial education idea. He was the leader of all peoples, the world over, in this respect, much as the daily press has tried to confine his leadership of all kinds, to “the Negro race.” It is a notorious fact that the great majority of the leading men and women of the race have never accepted Dr. Washington’s leadership except when it comes to the matter of industrial education. This same thing is true of the majority of the masses of our people (Cleveland Gazette, 1120-1915). 106 While accommodationists mourned the loss of their leader, black elites in Cleveland firmly held to the integrationist principles elaborated by Du Bois and others, which were displayed in the pages of the Gazette. The Ohio black laws, which “infringe upon our rights as citizens of Ohio and the United States” and separate education facilities were one target of black elites agitation during the 1880s (Cleveland Gazette, 6-20-1885). While Ohio’s black laws dictated segregation in many areas of life, segregated education facilities, in particular, drew the ire of black elites. The Gazette noted the numerous problems with segregated education facilities including discrimination in the selection of studies for black and white students, lower salaries for black teachers compared to white teachers, fewer and inferior school buildings for black children, and longer commutes to and from school each day (Cleveland Gazette, 9-22-1883). Frequent agitation among black elites combined with the support of a few black legislators helped chip away at the remaining black laws on the books in Ohio, and this strategy illustrates the integrationist spirit among Cleveland’s black elites (Gerber 1976). Once the black laws were rescinded, agitation turned towards combating lynching and advocating for political rights. Anti-lynching laws were the most common form of civil rights legislation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and in Cleveland, the Gazette took up the campaign against lynching. For example, Gazette editorials cited statistics regarding the number of lynchings the previous year and recounted in great detail gruesome instances of violence against blacks.18 The campaign of Ida B. Wells was also featured prominently in Gazette 18 For issues featuring lynching statistics see Gazette editorials from February 2, 1897, December 9, 1911, January 13, 1917, January 19, 1918, July 19, 1919, etc.; and, for an account of a lynching see a Gazette editorial from November 28, 1896. 107 editorials.19 However, constant agitation like the following was pivotal in the campaign against lynching: “If our people will see their state senators TO-DAY and TO-MORROW and urge them to vote for House Bill No. 123, the anti-mob violence or anti-lynching bill, it will pass in the senate next week. Please do so at once. Don’t wait on anyone” (Cleveland Gazette, 3-28-1896). Upon passage of the law that allowed victim’s families to sue the county wherein the lynching occurred, the Gazette exclaimed: “Rah! For Ohio’s anti-lynching law! It was a long, hard fight, but success crowned our efforts at last” (Cleveland Gazette, 4-11-1896). While agitation was effective in Ohio and the number of lynchings in the state declined markedly in following years, as late as 1913, black elites opined that lynching still constituted one of the three most important issues for blacks alongside Jim Crow cars and disenfranchisement (Cleveland Gazette, 1-18- 1913). Cleveland’s black elites wanted more than just civil rights, for they also sought political rights and just recognition from the Republican Party they so loyally supported. Consistent with the integrationist position, they agitated for voting rights and pointed to instances in Cleveland— and other places—where blacks were denied basic rights of citizenship. The Gazette, found the conditions and outright disenfranchisement of blacks in the South particularly galling (Cleveland Gazette, 8-11-1900). When blacks were able to vote, they overwhelmingly supported the Republican Party and black elites wanted recognition and appreciation for their support: All other classes, important factors of the party have been recognized but ours [sic]. Not only have they (its leaders) ignored our reasonable requests and the warnings, but local republican leaders, who hold office in the different municipalities have also treated our people equally as shamefully. To say the least this is party suicide. For as every one knows, the Afro-American republican vote in this state is more than double the usual republican plurality when the party is victorious (Cleveland Gazette, 7-4-1891). 19 For coverage of Ida B. Wells’s anti-lynching campaign see Gazette editorials from June 16, 1894, September 1, 1894, June 29, 1895, etc. 108 Because blacks made up a significant share of Republican Party votes, black elites believed that the party owed them the same benefits afforded to other party supporters. When these benefits were denied, black elites agitated in the pages of the Gazette for their due while also protesting the rampant disenfranchisement in the South. The agitation for civil and political rights of African Americans continued during wartime. A common complaint in Cleveland among black elites was the perceived hypocrisy associated with fighting wars for democracy abroad while blacks in the United States, particularly in the South, were refused basic rights. When a black soldier arrived home from the Spanish-American War the Gazette described his treatment in the following way: “Lieutenant Blount was hand-cuffed, beaten and thrown into the patrol wagon and hurried on to confinement,” while further remarking, “shame on a government that would thus cowardly permit the perpetration of an act so humiliating…” (Cleveland Gazette, 11-18-1899). And, again at the end of World War I, the Gazette observed that, “The world war is a fight for democracy— the kind that does NOT exist in the south where nearly twenty-five colored persons (two were women, one about to become a mother) were lynched most brutally (in Georgia and Texas) in the first three weeks of June, this year” (Cleveland Gazette, 8-31-1918). Thus, black elites continually prized and agitated for their rights, rather than conceding these rights and pursuing an economic strategy of racial uplift. From their worldview as integrationists favoring higher education and agitation for civil and political rights, Cleveland’s black elites contemplated the issue of immigration. Given their history alongside whites and an environment permitting agitation without too much fear for personal safety, Cleveland black elites subscribed to the integrationist philosophy. As an alienated group, they found immigrants threatening, but the threat was interpreted within their 109 broader worldview, which emphasized civil and political rights. Because black elites viewed racial uplift in terms of integration, the context for interpreting the world was in terms of a rights based discourse. Accommodation and Immigration in Savannah Black elite discourse in Savannah clearly reflected an accommodationist worldview. Editorial discussion from the Tribune was littered with comments echoing racial solidarity, support for Booker T. Washington and his doctrine, conciliatory views towards political rights and expression, and firm opposition to social equality. As discussed earlier, groups of immigrants were seen as serious threats because blacks were so racially alienated in Savannah. However, immigration was interpreted within the context of black elite’s broader accommodationist worldview, and thus, black elites perceived immigrants as economic competitors and threats to their plan for racial uplift. Solomon Johnson, the longtime editor of the Tribune, was a believer in Washington’s doctrine of individualism and economic self-help (Acker 2012). Praise for his philosophy was best exhibited in the eulogy published when Washington died: The death of Booker T. Washington has removed one of the most valuable assets the Negro race possessed. His life was so intertwined in the development of the race that a sadder and more irreparable loss could not be sustained by the ten million black souls in this country who are toiling and working that the race might some day reach its proper place among the great people of the universe. Mr. Washington was indeed a great man. He was the possessor of a mind with clean, clear-cut, practical ideas…[and] he went forward building up a following the like of which no Negro and few leaders of any other race have yet attained (Savannah Tribune, 11-20-1915). Black elites approved of the message put forth at the Atlanta Exposition in 1895 as well saying “[Washington] represented the colored people and he did it admirably too” (Savannah Tribune, 110 9-21-1895). While no one was immune from criticism in the Tribune, Washington’s ideology was held in high esteem among Savannah’s black elites as evidenced by their favorable comments on racial solidarity and economic uplift. Black elites in Savannah expressed comments favorable to racial solidarity and unity with their racial group that were consistent with the accommodationist position. Editorial discussion in the Tribune was sprinkled with references to the black masses with common phases like “our people” and “the masses” appearing in most issues. Moreover, black elites were particularly concerned with the actions of the black youth, so much so, that these elites could be perceived as paternalistic. For example, the youth in the city were urged to save their money,20 to be concerned with their appearance, but not so much that they always needed expensive clothing,21 not to be seen frequenting certain parts of town, and not to loaf about.22 These injunctions were consistent with the accommodationist philosophy of racial uplift in that they suggested that blacks should present themselves in the best light possible while in public—especially when in the presence of whites. Stemming from their feelings of racial solidarity, black elites wanted members of the black upper class to establish businesses for the masses to patronize, as this was an important component of their overall vision of racial uplift. Rather than taking their business to establishments owned by whites or immigrants, African American elites thought blacks should be able to patronize businesses run by members of their own race. As the Tribune put it, “the coming year should not terminate without the establishment of several more business enterprises among our people” (Savannah Tribune, 12-21-1901). The paper was particularly anxious that 20 For an example, see the editorial page of The Savannah Tribune from November 2, 1901. 21 For an example, see the editorial page of The Savannah Tribune from January 28, 1893. 22 For an example, see the editorial page of The Savannah Tribune from October 10, 1903. 111 black-run businesses provide for the essential needs of their community—groceries, restaurants, banks, barbers, tailors, insurance agencies, hotels, etc. In this way, black elites were further championing their conception of racial solidarity, separate economic institutions, and economic uplift. Politics rarely intruded into the worldview of Savannah’s black elites, the legal status quo was seldom challenged, and political rights were often discussed in the context of economic uplift. For example, the imposition of poll taxes was so engrained in black elites expectations that they simply urged voters to “pay your poll tax.” In fact an editorial from September 17, 1910 argued that when the tax books are “opened for the payment of state and county taxes an appeal should be made to each colored man in the state and especially those in this county to pay his poll tax. The paying of this tax will help…because it is the main qualification for registering as a voter…” (Savannah Tribune). Similar appeals appeared in countless editorials from 1883-1921 in Savannah and indicate that blacks should be in an economic position to pay the tax even though the monetary amount was prohibitive for many. Black elites in Savannah also explicitly opposed the integration and social equality. For example, social equality was vehemently denounced in a Tribune editorial from September 21, 1889: “In all social matters the colored people prefer their own society and never have attempted to force themselves upon white people; and don’t force themselves upon each other.” A few years later the tone was even stronger: “Social Equality? Away with the idea! The Negro does not want it. They frown at the thought of it” (Savannah Tribune, 2-7-1903). The paper needed to explain their position because whites used social equality as a scare tactic in order to mobilize their own race against blacks. To be clear, black elites did yearn for equality before the law, but 112 this fell short of complete social integration and equality. All of this coincides with Washington’s accommodationist stance. As in Cleveland, the issue of immigration was interpreted in the context of black elite’s broader worldview, which for Savannah’s black elites was the accommodationist position. Savannah had a longer history of suppression and violence, which made blacks feel even more alienated than their northern counterparts and helps account for the especially hostile response to immigration. Moreover, the institutional context in Savannah made the accommodationist position emphasizing individualism and economic uplift more appealing than agitation for civil and political rights because the latter might have risked the personal safety of black elites. While immigrants were courted in campaigns by southern whites and entered Savannah in the middle rungs of the racial hierarchy, there were far fewer immigrants in Savannah than Cleveland and the number of black elites directly displaced by immigration to the South was likely quite small. Thus, in objective terms, economic competition should have been less pressing for black elites in Savannah. However, black elites understood the world in terms of accommodation that promoted individualism and economic self-betterment as a means of racial advancement. This meant that issues—like immigration—were interpreted in the context of this philosophy and considerations consistent with accommodation more salient even if they did not quite mesh with objective realities. Thus, black elites saw immigrants as threats in a way that was consistent with their broader worldview, which is why economic competition was a more pressing consideration in the formation of immigration preferences in Savannah. 113 Conclusion Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah viewed the issue of immigration from different perspectives. While black elites in Savannah were especially restrictionist and thought of immigrants as economic threats, black elites in Cleveland resented immigrants for their rights and privileges. This historical variation in black elites opinion cannot be explained by modern theories of black public opinion—notably linked fate—that predicts homogeneity in blacks’ political preferences. From a group interest perspective, we would expect black elites in Cleveland to fear immigrants as economic competitors—arguably to an even greater extent than Savannah—because there were so many more immigrants to compete with blacks in this city. Instead, Cleveland’s black elites were much more preoccupied by the rights and privileges given to immigrants that were denied to their own race, which is curious because the gap between the rights and privileges afforded African Americans and immigrants was almost certainly smaller in Cleveland simply because blacks were so repressed in Savannah. Thus, if we take seriously the theory of linked fate, it should have been in the best interest of all African Americans to be upset with the rights and privileges afforded to immigrants, not only those in Cleveland, and we should observe very similar anti-immigration opinions in both cities. The fact that we observe something different suggests we need to move beyond the theory of linked fate and group interest as the single narrative of black public opinion. To explain the differences in black elite opinion in Cleveland and Savannah, this chapter developed a theory of black elite opinion that is attentive to the institutional context undergirding black elites’ political preferences. That is, I have argued that the local institutional context influenced black elites’ racial alienation, which in turn shaped (a) views about the level of threat 114 immigrants posed, and (b) the worldview black elites adopted for pursuing racial advancement. The latter was then used for interpreting issues in the world. African Americans existed at the bottom of the racial hierarchy, but what this meant for the daily lives of black elites varied based on local institutional conditions. In Savannah, the institutional context made African Americans feel even more alienated than in Cleveland, which made black elites hostile to immigration. However, the local context mattered in another way as well, for black elites were not content to remain at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. Local institutional conditions also shaped which worldview black elites could adopt for racial advancement. In Cleveland, black elites held an integrationist worldview emphasizing civil and political rights and higher education, whereas, black elites in Savannah subscribed to the accommodationist tradition wherein individualism, economic self-help and industrial education served as the pillars for racial advancement. When immigrants came into contact with blacks, African American elites viewed them as threats because blacks were racially alienated, yet since elite worldviews differed between the two cities, the perception of the type of threats immigrants posed also varied. Considerations consistent with black elites broader worldview were more salient in each city, which is why different attitudes emerged in Cleveland and Savannah when the issue of immigration arose. By putting the regional variation in African Americans political preferences at the forefront, this chapter challenges the three core assumptions of the theory of linked fate: first, that black public opinion is homogenous; second, that African Americans imagine the same group in all times and places when evaluating group interests; and third, that all African Americans similarly assess what is best for the racial group. In so doing, this chapter pushes us 115 to look beyond linked fate, and instead consider how the local institutional contexts fundamentally shape black elite political beliefs. The institutional explanation presented in this chapter takes a step toward bridging an important divide in political science scholarship between historical institutionalists and analysts of political behavior while offering a challenge to the theory of linked fate. However, the most important contribution of this work is more basic, as this research offers a comprehensive account of late 19th and early 20th century black elite opinion. Given the dearth of research on black public opinion during this time, this chapter helps ensure that these important voices in American history will not be lost. 116 CHAPTER 4 BLACK ELITE IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES IN POST-1965 CLEVELAND AND SAVANNAH Passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act fundamentally changed the United States’ position on immigration. By replacing the national origin quota system, which dominated immigration law for the previous 40 years, with a new preference system that placed family reunification and individual’s relationships with employers at the forefront, America reopened it’s doors to immigrants from around the globe. In the following decades the total number of immigrants in the United States rose from nearly 10 million in 1960 to over 40 million by 2011 effectively almost tripling the proportion of newcomers in the total population (Migration Policy Institute). The racial and ethnic composition of immigrants also shifted from predominantly European immigrants in the middle of the 20th century to immigrants of Hispanic origin23 and Asians24 by the early years of the 21st century (Migration Policy Institute). With this transformation, scholars began examining the social, economic, and political effects immigration would have on the United States (Borjas 1998; Bean et al. 1999; Briggs Jr. 2004; Johannsson and Shulman 2004; Shulman and Smith 2005; etc.) as well as how natives would respond to the new and increasingly diverse immigrant populations (Brader et al. 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hopkins 2010; etc.). However, most research has focused on white Americans, and although greater interest has developed surrounding how blacks respond to immigration, the current research is wrought with contradictory findings. Thus, we still lack a unified, or coherent, understanding of the response and influences of African American 23 Throughout this chapter, I use the term “immigrants of Hispanic origin” to refer to immigrants who identify as, or are identified as, Hispanic, Latino, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, or another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin. This terminology is consistent with the inclusive definition of immigrants of Hispanic origin provided by the U.S. Census. 24 I use the term “Asian immigrants” to refer to immigrants from Eastern and Southeastern Asia, as understood by the U.S. Census classification. 117 immigration attitudes generally, and black elites in particular. Understanding black elite immigration attitudes has implication for assessing the likelihood of future coalitions, the composition of political parties, public policy, and the shape of American politics in an increasingly diverse United States. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to offer new insights into an unsettled debate over the immigration preferences of African Americans by providing a systematic and longitudinal analysis of black elite immigration preferences from 1965 until 2009 in Cleveland, Ohio and Savannah, Georgia. By focusing on two cities rather than the nation as a whole, and utilizing a content analysis of newspaper editorials instead of simple surveys, this chapter offers a more parsimonious, contextually rich, and comprehensive analysis of black elite discourse. In so doing, this chapter fills a significant void in the historical record, as we currently know little about the preferences of black elites in the first two decades following the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, and we do not yet have a systematic or longitudinal evidence of black elite immigration discourse in the post-1965 era. Additionally, this chapter serves as the evidentiary basis for the theoretical arguments of the following chapter with respect to the changing nature of black elite immigration preferences during two major waves of immigration to the United States. Relying on a content analysis of two black newspapers—the Cleveland Call and Post and the Savannah Herald—this chapter reports that black elites greeted immigrants warmly in both Cleveland and Savannah throughout the post-1965 period. During this period, there was less evidence of regional differences in immigration opinions than in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though black elites in Cleveland offered even more positive evaluations of immigration than their counterparts in Savannah. In both cities, black elites developed feelings 118 of commonality with immigrants based on a perception that the two groups were inextricably linked in their struggle to overcome common challenges. Moreover, black elites pointed to both groups’ fight for full recognition of their civil rights and civil liberties. However, black elites in Cleveland also highlighted similar political attachments of the two groups, while black elites in Savannah were more attuned to the racial dynamics of modern day immigration than their counterparts in Cleveland. Although reports in the media and some scholarly discourse point to competition between blacks and immigrants as a source of tension, I find little systematic evidence that black elites viewed immigrants as either economic or political competitors. Lacking Consensus: African American Immigration Attitudes African American immigration preferences have recently become a more frequent topic of scholarly discussion, yet the following paragraphs reveal that current research is far from reaching a consensus. In particular, though some agreement emerges around African American’s belief in the humanitarian rights of immigrants and refugees, disagreement persists: over the tone of African Americans’ reaction to immigration; whether immigrants are viewed as political and economic threats; how local contextual factors influence beliefs; and how socioeconomic and demographic characteristics affect immigration opinions. Because current research uses varied levels of analysis—from ethnographic work in small towns to national samples—that capture opinions for different lengths of time, and often does not adequately specify the group of African Americans being measured, we have a very muddled picture African Americans’ immigration opinions. Rather than continuing to duplicate existing approaches and coming up with more competing findings, we need a more parsimonious method that systematically measures opinions 119 of specified groups of blacks in specific locations over a longer time horizon if we are to truly understand the beliefs of African Americans about the issue of immigration. National public opinion surveys since the 1980s have provided the most detailed picture of the blacks’ immigration opinions. The scholarship utilizing these national level snapshots homogenizes African Americans by obscuring in-group variation while comparing African American and white immigration attitudes. This research reveals that blacks have held more positive immigration opinions than their white counterparts (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Morris 2000; Brader et al. 2010), view Hispanic Americans more positively than whites do (Cummings and Lambert 1997), and resist delaying access to government services for immigrants (Citrin et al. 1997). Utilizing a different array of sources, Diamond (1998) argues that, “the major national African-American organizations also favor liberal immigration policies” (461). Conversely, others found that nationally blacks were more likely than whites to support reducing the level of immigration (Citrin et al. 1997), that African Americans were concerned and threatened by the growth of the Latino population in North Carolina (McClain et al. 2007), and that blacks in California expressed restrictionist opinions (Johnson Jr. et al. 1997; Alvarez and Butterfield 2000). When the issue of undocumented immigrants arises, blacks have also exhibited contradictory views: at times, African Americans are less likely than whites to express negative views (Nteta 2014), yet at other times, blacks are more punitive towards undocumented immigrants (Nteta 2012). Thus, the scholarly evidence we have produces a mixed picture of African American immigration opinion, and the factors influencing these opinions hardly clarifies this impression. Immigration scholars have examined how feelings of competition affect African American immigration attitudes, yet preexisting work again fails to reach a consensus. One 120 research stream suggests that blacks worry that they will have fewer opportunities if immigrants enjoy economic progress (Johnson Jr. et al. 1997; Doherty 2006; Morris and Gimpel 2007), recognize that those who view immigrants as economic competitors favor more restrictive immigration policy (McClain et al. 2007; Nteta 2012; Hutchings and Wong 2014; Nteta 2014), and argue that individuals who are in a more precarious financial position view immigration more harshly (Burns and Gimpel 2000, Hutchings and Wong 2014). On the other hand, Pastor and Marcelli (2003) contend that African Americans hold ambiguous views about immigrants as economic competitors, and Gutierrez (2012) argues that there is no simple causal relationship between lower immigration levels and black economic progress. Moreover, others find that personal economic circumstances are no more likely to influence black immigration attitudes than whites (Citrin et al. 1997), that perceived economic deprivation did not create negative orientations towards Hispanics, Asians, or West Indians (Cummings and Lambert 1997; Thornton and Mizuno 1999), and that among all Americans, labor market competition is not a significant influence of anti-immigrant sentiment (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Quite simply, some suggest that a rising tide lifts all boats: when Hispanics do well economically, so do African Americans (McClain and Karnig 1990). However, as already indicated, this is hardly the only interpretation. In spite of the conjecture among politicians, pundits, and scholars alike about the perceived economic rifts between blacks and immigrants, many also maintain that future political coalitions between blacks and immigrants are more than plausible possibilities. Jeff Diamond (1998), for example, notes that as early as the 1970s and 1980s “black and Hispanic leaders were attempting to lay the groundwork for future cooperation” and that coalitions between the Black Caucus and the Hispanic Caucus formed on immigration reform in the 1980s 121 and 1990s (Diamond, 458; see also Fuchs 1990). In the following years, Pastor and Marcelli (2003) argued that African Americans do, indeed, see immigrants as potential political allies (see also Pastor and Carr 2003). However, others disagree and point to cracks in this alliance, as Kaufmann articulates, “Contemporary realities suggest, however, that Black-Latino electoral coalitions are the exception and not the rule” (Kaufmann 2007, 80). Moreover, research based on mass level public opinion surveys has shown that African Americans who identify as Democrats—a party position that should make them more amenable to immigration—actually held less favorable views toward undocumented immigrants (Nteta 2014). Similarly, a collection of research has argued that blacks believe increased immigration reduces political power and influence for African Americans (McClain and Karnig 1990; Kaufmann 2007; Morris and Gimpel 2007), and that there is little evidence that coalitions routinely form in urban areas (Rocha 2007). One explanation for the discrepancy in these findings is generational; that is, older cohorts of blacks were more supportive of coalitions while younger African Americans pursued other political goals (Jackson et al. 1994). Notwithstanding this generational explanation, for both economic and political competition, the results are decidedly mixed: in some studies African Americans view immigrants as competitors, yet others find just the opposite. While immigration has brought many newcomers to America, these individuals—like African Americans—have not settled evenly across states, cities, or localities. This means that the extent of contact between blacks and immigrants has varied. The social, economic, and political receiving context immigrants encountered has also varied, and both have affected the reception from African Americans. In some cases, closer proximity to immigrants and greater contact between blacks and immigrants promoted understanding and feelings of commonality, which resulted in positive evaluations of undocumented immigrants (Nteta 2014), lower levels of 122 prejudice in neighborhoods (Ha 2010), and reduced support for restrictionist immigration policy (Tolbert and Hero 1996; Morris 2000). From her semi-structured interviews and participant observations in eastern North Carolina, Marrow (2008) argues that receiving context and institutional structures matter greatly for interminority relations as a larger proportion of African Americans relative to whites in one county soothed feelings of threat associated with increased immigration and eased political tensions between blacks and Hispanics. In contrast, this same demographic make-up—compared to a majority white county—promoted socioeconomic competition indicating that the effect of the receiving context and local institutions are complex and nuanced (Marrow 2008). However, while cooperation and commonality can emerge from interactions and close proximity between blacks and immigrants, others point to more competitive and adversarial outcomes. For example, Claudine Gay (2006) claimed that the local economic context of neighborhoods affects African Americans’ views of Latinos, as blacks who live in neighborhoods where Latinos are economically advantaged harbor more negative stereotypes. Likewise, some African Americans in Compton, California worried that Hispanics moving into their neighborhood depleated social services (Johnson Jr. et al. 1997). Moreover, greater exposure to Asian Americans has been correlated with anti-immigrant sentiments (Ha 2010) and metropolitan diversity has lead to increased racial stereotyping and feelings of competition (Oliver and Wong 2003) while living in the South more generally resulted in reduced feelings of closeness to immigrants among African Americans (Thornton and Mizuno 1999). At the same time, Cummings and Lambert (1997) and Hood and Morris (2000) fail to uncover a relationship between context, or contact with immigrants, and black immigration attitudes. This reveals that 123 the effect of commonality and competition may be even more muddled, and uncovering the effect of these variables has depended on specific times, places, and research designs. Despite feelings of competition among some African Americans, black leaders have overwhelmingly supported humanitarian rights for immigrants, and in particular, refugees (Fuchs 1990; Diamond 1998). For example, Sawyer (2008) notes that, “On moral grounds, African Americans must stand by their tradition of being the guiding light for freedom and human dignity in the U.S. and around the world and support the legalization of the more than 12 million people in the U.S. struggling for basic rights and desperately trying to obtain what so many Americans take for granted: their citizenship” (43). Moreover, Diamond (1998) argued that African American leadership emerging from the struggles of the Civil Rights Movement “viewed the advancement of their race as linked to the acceptance in American society of universal principles of fairness and justice” (467). As a result, black leaders were sympathetic to refugees in the 1980s and stood with Mexican-Americans in vociferously opposing legislation limiting illegal immigration (Fuchs 1990). These sentiments also translated to the mass level, as a 2006 Pew Research Center study indicated African Americans were sympathetic to illegal immigrants receiving social services and believed that those immigrants should also be allowed to attend public schools (Doherty 2006). Tatishe Nteta (2014) builds on this argument to show that feelings of egalitarianism lead African Americans towards a more positive evaluation of undocumented immigrants. Thus, while some African Americans—though certainly not all—are concerned with competition from immigrants, black leaders and the masses alike feel a duty to support the basic human rights of immigrants and refugees. In addition to indicators of African American immigration opinions such as commonality, competition, and humanitarianism, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the black 124 population also influence African American immigration preferences, although not in a consistent or unified way. African Americans with higher levels of education have both held more negative views of undocumented immigrants (Nteta 2014), have been more supportive of English only ballots (Hutchings and Wong 2014), and have been less concerned about the growth of the Latino population than those who are less educated (McClain et al. 2007). Although working class blacks harbor more restrictive immigration preferences than middle class blacks (Nteta 2012), McClain and her coauthors find that, among blacks, income is not a significant predictor of perceived economic threat posed by immigration. There is some continuity on how religiosity shapes immigration beliefs, for those African Americans who frequently attend services are more likely to support immediate deportation policies (Knoll 2009), and this restrictionist streak continues among blacks who have been exposed to political messages from the clergy—particularly among those who also express economic concerns (Brown 2010). And, when blacks harbor negative stereotypes or prejudicial beliefs about other racial groups, they also tend to hold more restrictionist immigration preferences (Cummings and Lambert 1997; Kessler 2001). The research highlighted above provides valuable insights into the thinking of African Americans, yet we still lack a consistent and coherent picture of black immigration attitudes in the post-1965 era. Foremost, work utilizing survey research did not begin until 1984 which leaves almost twenty years after the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act largely unexplored (see Fuchs 1990; Diamond 1998 for exceptions). Given the changing nature of immigration between the 1960s and 1980s, as well as the diversifying social, economic, and political position of African Americans, it is likely that immigration attitudes varied during this period. Second, there is little effort made in the extant literature to parse out the immigration attitudes within 125 African Americans as a group (see Nteta 2012 for an exception) and the evidence gathered for understanding mass level opinions differs from that used to grasp the thoughts of black leaders and elites. At the mass level, studies utilize surveys of large numbers of African Americans, but these surveys are reductionist, providing little contextual information about the thought processes and mechanism behind blacks thinking about the issue of immigration (see Marrow 2008 for an exception). On the other hand, elite level research is underdeveloped and relies almost exclusively on a small number of interviews with black elites, votes in Congress, and/or public addresses, which allow for detailed accounts of immigration preferences among a small set of African American elites, but do not provide a systematic and longitudinal account of black elite immigration opinions. Finally, because the existing work is survey based, or focuses on national level elites, it tells us little about how African Americans at the local level are receiving new groups of immigrants. Investigating blacks response to immigration in new locations is important because the characteristics that sometimes, though inconsistently, influence opinions, such as economic threat, political competition, and socioeconomic and demographic context, may vary by location. A City Level Analysis Shifting the level of analysis from national level opinion polls that only offer snapshots of black immigration preferences—or detailed, but infrequent, analyses of national discourse among black leaders—to the city level offers a more parsimonious approach for sorting out African American immigration preferences.25 A city level analysis has many virtues that make it preferable for evaluating the overall tone of black immigration attitudes, and the factors shaping 25 For examples of city level studies of African American immigration preferences see: Johnson Jr. et al. 1997; Alvarez and Butterfield 2000; McClain et al. 2007; Marrow 2008; etc. 126 these opinions. Using cities as the cite for examining opinions strikes a balance between the depth of information found in ethnographic studies—or those relying on statements, interviews, and other remarks from a small select group of respondents—and the generalizability of national level sample of individuals at a specific point in time. Further, by examining opinions at the city level instead of a national level analysis, the researcher can exploit variation in the city level characteristics that, at times, have influenced African American immigration opinions such as the relative group size of blacks and immigrants, differences in political and economic competition, legacies of race relations, demographics, location within the United States, and other variables. Thus, a city level analysis has both been underutilized and offers a valuable cite for observing the immigration opinions of African Americans. Description of Cleveland and Savannah, 1965-2009 Cleveland, Ohio and Savannah, Georgia are valuable cases for examining the immigration opinions of black elites because they provide an opportunity for comparison, yet still vary in theoretically important ways. Foremost, as described in Table 4.1, both Cleveland and Savannah had sizable African American populations. Between 1970 and 2010, African Americans comprised approximately 40 percent or more of the population in both Cleveland and Savannah. Though larger in number in Cleveland, the percentage of immigrants in each city was also relatively stable over this time period. Notwithstanding this stability, the cities did undergo different demographic changes that may alter our expectations for the immigration opinions in each city. For example, the number of immigrants in Cleveland—along with the population as a whole—declined after the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, while over the same time period—particularly after 1980—the number of immigrants in Savannah increased. Thus, to the 127 Table 4.1: City Population, 1960-2010 Cleveland Year Group Number of Percent of Total People Population 196026 Total 1,796,595 100% Population Blacks 257,088 14.3% Foreign Born 174,875 9.7% 1970 Total 750,932 100% Population Blacks 287,841 38.3% Foreign Born 56,400 7.5% 1980 Total 573,822 100% Population Blacks 251,347 43.8% Foreign Born 33,347 5.8% 1990 Total 505,616 100% Population Blacks 235,405 46.6% Foreign Born 20,975 4.1% 2000 Total 478,393 100% Population Blacks 243,939 51% Foreign Born 21,372 4.5% 2010 Total 396,815 100% Population Blacks 211,672 53.3% Foreign Born 18,304 4.6% Source: United States Census Bureau, 1960-2010 Savannah Number of Percent of Total People Population 188,299 100% 124,582 2,448 118,344 66.2% 1.3% 100% 52,734 1,348 141,378 44.6% 1.1% 100% 69,281 3,049 137,557 49% 2.2% 100% 70,580 2,676 131,510 51.3% 1.9% 100% 75,072 5,065 136,286 57.1% 3.9% 100% 75,507 8,547 55.4% 6.3% extent that feelings of threat associated with increased immigration influenced African American immigration opinions, we would expect this inclination to be more pronounced in Savannah than Cleveland. On the other hand, if larger out-groups lessen feelings of hostility, immigrants may be seen as less threatening. The following analysis will help to sort out these competing possibilities. 26 For 1960, the population estimates reported by the census for Cleveland and Savannah are the standard metropolitan statistical areas, rather than the population in the central cities, respectively. 128 Nevertheless, immigrants were of ample size in each city, indicating that the two groups were likely aware of one another. Though blacks primarily lived in poor and dilapidated neighborhoods just outside the wealthy, primarily white, historic district in Savannah, many immigrants lived in adjoining neighborhoods (Hepburn 1987). As a port city, Savannah also saw an influx of visitors from various origins and nationalities (Hepburn 1987; Tuck 2001). Moreover, Savannahians took pride in their diversity, as represented by their ethnic festivals such as ‘Greek Week,’ and at one point, Savannah held the second largest St. Patrick’s Day parade in the United States (Hepburn 1987). Diverse racial and ethnic groups were also featured in Savannah’s political life with the first Greek mayor of Savannah John Roussakis serving in the 1970s and 1980s, and African Americans’ occupied the mayor’s office from 1996 onward (Walton Jr. and Orr 2010). Like Savannah, Cleveland blacks were segregated from more affluent white communities, and Cleveland was even described as being made up of a “core of poverty and the ring of affluence” (Miller and Wheeler 1997, 179; see also Leahy and Grant 1985). Nevertheless, by the 1980s and 1990s some blacks moved out of poor ghettos while migrating from the city’s core to the suburbs, where whites and older ethnic groups were concentrated (Stakes 1995). Moreover, by 2000, traditional black neighborhoods in Cleveland, such as Hough, bordered communities where Asian immigrants lived. While Cleveland’s black and immigrant populations may have been less residentially intertwined than in the past, these groups were surely aware of one another in the political sphere. Preceding the election of the first African American mayor of a major city, Carl B. Stokes, Cleveland’s mayoral office was occupied by individuals with diverse ethnic backgrounds from the 1940s through the early 1960s (Moore 2003). Between the 1960s and 1980s, some remarked that “the city’s mayors have seemed to reflect every hue of the racial and ethnic 129 spectrum, except white Anglo-Saxon Protestant” (Van Tassel and Grabowski 1986, 178). During this time, African Americans became increasingly entrenched in municipal bureaucracies and Cleveland city politics, thus rivaling the earlier ethnic establishment politics (Nelson Jr. 1995). Thus, in Cleveland as well as Savannah, blacks were surely aware of immigrants—particularly as both groups were situated in the political landscape of each city. Importantly, Cleveland and Savannah are also representative of different regions in the United States, as Cleveland is in a northern state while Savannah is in the South. As we saw in earlier chapters, regional dynamics have historically influenced African American immigration opinions. Historical legacies of race relations, along with the addition of non-white immigrants complicating the binary racial structure of the South, may have implications for the immigration preferences of African Americans (Marrow 2008). As illustrated above, living in the South versus the North does indeed influence African American immigration opinions (Thornton and Mizuno 1999). Thus, to the extent that regional dynamics still affect black immigration opinion, as they have historically, we would expect to see differences between Cleveland and Savannah. Collectively, Cleveland and Savannah are sufficiently similar to offer fruitful comparison, yet they also have important differences that can be leveraged to sort out competing factors influencing African American immigration opinion. Measuring Black Elite Attitudes in the 20th and 21st Centuries Like the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there are still a number of challenges associated with analyzing black public opinion from the latter half of the twentieth century onward. In comparison to earlier time periods, African Americans made gains in educational attainment, literacy, and social and political rights, yet they were still often excluded 130 in public opinion surveys. Like earlier chapters, this chapter focuses on the attitudes of black elites in Cleveland and Savannah for both practical and theoretical reasons. Theoretically, as described in Chapter 2, elites play a powerful role in most public opinion research. In fact, many researchers posit a top-down relationship in which elites supply the information, considerations, and frames that individuals use in formulating their preferences (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Erickson et al. 2002; etc.). Because elites supply information and frames, they are naturally important to the process of immigration attitude formation and expression. Practically, elite level opinions are simply more likely to be expressed and recorded. African American elites gave public addresses, served as editors and authored newspaper articles, kept diaries, and participated in other aspects of public life. Moreover, mass level African American opinion on immigration is difficult, if not impossible, to measure retrospectively as surveys sampling large numbers of blacks while also asking about issues related to immigration did not appear until the mid-1980s. Capturing national, or regional, mass level African American opinion about immigration for the first twenty years after the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act has thus eluded researchers. The research we do have examining black opinion in the decades following the 1965 Immigration Act actually measures elite level opinion—via black newspapers, votes in Congress, statements from elected officials, speeches from prominent African Americans and the like—even if they do not explicitly acknowledge that fact (Fuchs 1990; Diamond 1998). Because black elites were more likely to record their thoughts, and elites often supply the information and frames individuals use in formulating their opinions, there is ample reason to 131 believe that elite and mass level opinion on immigration since 1965 may not be all that different. Thus, like earlier chapters, this chapter focuses on black elites for both theoretical and practical reasons. Black Newspapers As described in greater detail in Chapter 2, public opinion surveys are only one way that researchers have understood and measured individual level preferences. To briefly recap, measures of political preferences have evolved from straw polls, to newspapers, to modern sample surveys (Herbst 1993). Constituency mail to the President was also used to capture mass level opinion during the civil rights era (Lee 2002). Historically, black newspapers have also served as a measure of African American opinions (Hellwig 1974; Hellwig 1981; Hellwig 1982; Shankman 1978; Shankman 1982; Tillery and Chresfield 2012). These alternative measures of individual preferences are especially important in light of the lack of consensus described above; and indeed, recent studies have urged: “future work on black opinion on immigration should employ a more variegated set of evidence” including “African American newspapers…” (Nteta, 2014, 404). Thus, this research draws on a history of alternative measures of individual preferences while heeding the call of recent scholarship to utilize the rich data source that are African American newspapers for gauging the opinions of a group that is traditionally underrepresented in public opinion surveys. Black newspapers offer evidence of black elite opinion that strikes a delicate balance; newspapers are a more detailed and information rich than survey responses, yet newspapers allow for a greater number of observations over a longer time horizon than interviews or participant observation. However, the use of black newspapers as a measure is not perfect and 132 the researcher must do everything possible to relieve methodological concerns. Like the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, apprehension associated with the use of newspapers as evidence for individual preferences in the post-1965 era falls into three categories: audience, representation, and continuous publication. Newspapers in the latter half of the twentieth century faced declining readership, circulation, and the challenge of remaining financially solvent, which made the newspapers especially beholden to their audience. Though there were socioeconomic advances in the black community between the early and middle twentieth century, most African Americans in the post-1965 era—particularly in central cities—were still poor and buying a newspaper subscription was more than a minor financial decision. Thus, black elites were still a significant source of readership, as the black middle class largely “eschews the Negro newspaper” (Walker 1974, 25). Researchers using black newspapers as a measure of opinion must also address the degree to which individual newspapers represented a community’s view more broadly. That is, as outlined in Chapter 2, the representativeness of newspapers could be compromised: if each newspaper simply served as a microphone for the editor; if newspaper content was shaped by individuals outside the community such as national level elites, elites in distant cities, or intimidation and discrimination from whites; or if a newspaper short on funds and time recycled content from earlier issues, or borrowed stories from newspapers in cities with dissimilar views. Finally, black newspapers, like all newspapers in the twentieth century often folded, which presents a unique problem for researchers, as a longitudinal measure of attitudes using newspapers relies on consistent publication in each city, and that the newspapers are available to be examined today. The research design must do everything possible to minimize the concerns associated with audience, representation and continuous publication. Since the newspapers were written and 133 read by black elites, and the present research is concerned with measuring black elite opinion, some of the questions associated with audience can be set aside. Concerns about the representativeness and continuous publication are managed through careful selection of specific newspapers, and the design of the content analysis used to capture black elite opinion. Prior to describing the content analysis, I first offer an overview of the Cleveland Call and Post and the Savannah Herald. The Cleveland Call and Post was established in 1927 by a merger of the Cleveland Call and the Cleveland Post (Davis 1972). Inventor and cosmetic manufacturer Garret A. Morgan started the Call in 1920 as an avenue for advertising his inventions and line of cosmetics, though the paper was sold to a group of investors just five years later (Ross 1996). The investors who purchased the Call included Herbert Chauncey in addition to the Murrell brothers, Howard and Edward, who owned and operated a small printing business out of their home. However, disagreements over the management of the Call led Chauncey and the Murrells to leave the newspaper and form the Murrell Printing Company. Newspaperman Herbert Chauncey formed the Post in 1920 as an organ for his fraternal insurance society, and this paper was later taken over by the Murrell Printing Company (Davis 1972). Both the Call and the Post faced financial insolvency before merging into what would become one of the most widely circulated and influential black newspapers in the United States. The rise of the Call and Post began under the editorship of William O. Walker, who was persuaded to leave Washington D.C. and move to Cleveland in 1932. Walker later purchased the Call and Post in 1940 with a partner who passed away in 1959 making Walker the sole owner, and editor, of the newspaper until his death in 1981 (Ross 1996). After Walker’s death, Harry Alexander and John H. Bustamante served as copublishers until 1990 when Bustamante continued at the helm alone. Though circulation was 134 good in 1995, the Call and Post faced financial turmoil and filed for bankruptcy. Three years later Don King purchased the newspaper and continues to publish it today. The Call and Post has a long history of publication, and is still available in online archives today. Thus, selecting this newspaper as a measure of black elite attitudes in Cleveland resolves the issue of continuous publication. While the Call and Post was published widely in the post-1965 period and still exists today, we may still ask how well it represented the views of Cleveland’s black elites. Circulation and continuous publication are both indicators of acceptance by the black community in Cleveland, as a black newspaper could not have survived without loyal African American readers. Readership of the Call and Post was extensive with 75 percent of black homes in Ohio reading the weekly paper in 1944, 44,000 readers by 1985, and circulation still at 35,000 in 1995 despite declining population in Cleveland and newspaper readership in America overall (Ross 1996). Advertisements from black businesses, local news and events, and reports from across the state of Ohio were also featured in the pages of the Call and Post. Though Walker had ties to the Republican Party, he did not let his party affiliation distract the Call and Post from endorsing the nomination of the first African American mayor, Carl B. Stokes, a Democrat (Ross 2008). In fact, Walker’s Republican political attachments rarely diverted the Call and Post away from its advocacy of the rights and treatment of African Americans in Cleveland and the country at large indicating that the editorial pages were more than just his personal soapbox (Ross 2008). Moreover, the Call and Post subscribed to the credo of the black press, which held: “I shall mould public opinion in the interest of all things constructive. I shall seem impatient at times. I will be abused and misunderstood, but I shall try always to be right and ignore the abuse, knowing that the wages of advocates and prophets, ever have been, in the beginning abuse and 135 misunderstanding” (Call and Post, 11-6-1965). Indeed, the Call and Post fought for the fair treatment of blacks at home and abroad, urged African Americans to use their power at the polls, and highlighted police misconduct in Cleveland among other breaches of African Americans civil liberties (Ross 1996). Ultimately, as Moore notes, “the Call and Post, one of the most popular black weeklies in the country, provided strong coverage of civil rights activities…thereby raising the racial consciousness of Cleveland’s black population” (Moore, 2002, 25). All of this indicates that the Call and Post represented the views of African Americans elites in the city of Cleveland and that the newspaper editorials can serve as an approximation of their beliefs. Floyd “Press Boy” Adams Sr. established The Herald—later known as The Savannah Herald—in 1945. The Herald was a family business, and once Floyd Adams Jr. was of age, he began editing the newspaper in 1968 (Golus 1996). Adams Jr. took on the additional responsibility of president and publisher in 1983 when his father passed away, but continued as editor of the weekly newspaper until 1996 (Walton Jr. and Orr 2010). Though not as lengthy or widely read as the Call and Post, the Herald was consistently published from 1945 onward and still exists in archives for researchers to examine today thus satisfying the requirement of continuous publication. Moreover, the continuous publication of the Herald also speaks to its representation of the black community in Savannah. Since the Herald existed in a smaller media market than the Call and Post, it was even more beholden to local support/opinion and advertisers who could have been alienated if the editorial discourse strayed too far outside mainstream black elite beliefs. The continuous publication of the Herald led the paper to tout itself in 1995 as, “the most popular and successful African-American oriented newspaper in Southeast Georgia…” (Savannah Herald, 9-13-1995). Indeed, each issue of the Herald branded 136 itself, “Savannah’s Black Voice” with coverage of local news from the black community, church news, local sports, editorials, and other content representative of African American life in Savannah. The Herald saw itself, and the black press more generally, as a “clarion of justice and equality” and as a powerful force in “directing that ballot” of African Americans (Savannah Herald, 7-13-1968). Further indication that the Herald represented black elites in Savannah more generally is found in how Savannahians cast their ballots in that Herald editor Floyd Adams Jr., who had a long political career in Savannah, was elected Savannah’s first African American mayor in 1996. Taken together, this evidence suggests that Herald editorials serve as a solid proxy for the preferences of the black elite community in Savannah. To retrieve black elite attitudes towards immigration in Cleveland and Savannah from 1965 to 2009, I rely on a content analysis of editorials published in the Cleveland Call and Post and the Savannah Herald. Though the format of each newspaper varies more than the newspapers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the editorial pages were labeled making them easy to identify. Still, rather than one long editorial essay, the editorial pages were broken into many sub-editorials. These sub-editorials were often more numerous and slightly longer in the Call and Post, which averaged approximately eight sub-editorials per issue while the Herald contained roughly six. Altogether, each issue of the Call and Post and the Herald contained one to two newspaper pages of editorials. The content analysis was conducted similarly to the earlier period: I read through the editorials from one newspaper issue per month in each city between 1965 and 2009 and identified any issues with at least one sub-editorial referencing immigrants, immigration policy, or specific immigrant groups. Whenever possible I examined editorials printed during the same week in each month to ensure I captured responses 137 to external events happening outside of each city, such as a national debate about immigration policy, votes in Congress on immigration policy, or refugee crises among other events.27 Like the content analysis described in Chapter 2, after reading through all of the newspaper issues, I returned to the editorials flagged as referencing immigrants, immigration legislation or administrative decision, or specific immigrant groups and coded these sub- editorials using the coding strategy described in the Appendix. To briefly review the coding strategy, a sub-editorial mentioning an immigration policy such as the 1965 Immigration Act, was coded as referencing immigration policy; a sub-editorial vaguely describing “immigrants,” “the foreign born,” “illegals,” and the like was classified as discussing immigrants; and, sub- editorials describing a specific group such as Asian Americans, immigrants of Hispanic origin, or the Irish, for example, were placed into the specific immigrant group category. These editorials mentioning an ethnic groups such as Hispanics, Latinos, Jews, Irish, etc. were flagged as referencing a specific immigrant group. Each editorial was also coded for tone, which was classified into five categories: positive, leaning positive, leaning negative, negative, and informational. A sub-editorial was coded as negative if it advocated reducing the level of immigration, portrayed negative stereotypes of immigrants, or generally made disparaging comments about immigrants or a specific immigrant group. Positive editorials, on the other hand, supported immigration levels, suggested that the United States benefited from immigration/immigrants, and described immigrant traits as desirable for cultural and/or 27 Though the newspaper records between 1965 and 2009 are more complete than those of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there are some missing data. For the Cleveland Call and Post there was some missing data between 1986 and 1992, and in 1998, 2004, 2007, and 2009. With the exception of 2004, data was still collected from these years, but there was not always data representing each month of the year. Likewise, there are some incomplete records from the Herald from 1970-1976, and from 1984-1989. However, with the exception of 1975 and most much of 1974, there is still data from these years, but not from each month of the year. When newspapers did not exist for a particular month, I sampled additional newspapers from another month during the year. If this was not possible, then there were simply fewer data points from these years. 138 economic reasons among other things. Leaning editorials took comparable positions, or emphasized similar issues, but they were not as strongly worded or fervent in their positive or negative descriptions. Sub-editorials were placed in the informational category when they simply described an issue, or were only meant to convey information. For example, if a sub-editorial mentioned the number of immigrants to the United States during a specific year, or attached an ethnic identification to an otherwise neutral description, this sub-editorial was coded as informational. In both situations, the intent of informational editorials was simply to inform the reader, not to offer an opinion or persuade the reader in one direction or another. Black Elite Immigration Opinion in Post-1965 Cleveland and Savannah The strategies outlined in the previous section allow for an evaluation of the editorial content published in Cleveland and Savannah, thus providing a systematic measure of black elite opinion on immigration in these two cities. Between 1965 and 2009, the topic of immigration was frequently addressed in both Cleveland and Savannah. Among the 498 newspaper issues examined in Cleveland, 253 issues referenced immigration and 300 sub-editorials within these issues offered opinions about immigration. This means that more than half of the newspaper issues sampled in Cleveland explicitly discussed the issue of immigration. From the 455 newspaper issues sampled in Savannah, 143 issues discussed immigration with 177 subeditorials offering immigration opinions. Though immigration appeared less frequently in Savannah, the issue of immigration still arose in almost one third of the Savannah Herald newspapers sampled. Immigration in both cities received consistent coverage over this time period, as there are immigration editorials from each year where data existed meaning immigration was a regular 139 Number of Sub-Editorials Figure 4.1: Cleveland Call and Post Immigration SubEditorials, 1965-2009 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Source: Research compiled by author based on sample of 498 issues of the Cleveland Call and Post. topic of interest among black elites. Moreover, the general trend in each city reflects the changing percentage of immigrants in Cleveland and Savannah as shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. That is, in Savannah where immigrants represented a growing percent of the population from the 1960s forward, editorial discussion of immigration by black elites increased over time. On the other hand, in Cleveland where immigrants represented a shrinking portion of the population over this time period, the issue appeared less often in 2007 than 1970. Besides simply evaluating immigration overall, black elites contemplated specific aspects of the issue such as immigration policy and specific immigrant groups. 140 Number of Sub-Editorials Figure 4.2: Savannah Herald Immigration Sub-Editorials, 1965-2007 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Source: Research compiled by author based on sample of 455 issues of the Savannah Herald. Overall Immigration Editorial Tone Collectively black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah characterized immigration positively between 1965 and 2009, which is a departure from the findings in some of the literature described above (Citrin et al. 1997; McClain et al. 2007; Johnson Jr. et al. 1997; Alvarez and Butterfield 2000; Nteta 2014). Despite the similarity in tone, black elite opinion in Cleveland was more supportive of immigration than that of their counterparts in Savannah. For example, the Call and Post supported cultural pluralism by embracing the diverse origins, cultures, and experiences of people in the United States: Polish-Americans, Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Jewish-Americans, and many dozens of other groups are reaffirming that this is a nation of immigrants and that while we are all citizens of one land, each of us brings to it a special, specific culture and background. America is a combination of all those different cultures and its strength lies in a healthy, diverse pluralism that respects all and 141 belittle none. In part, this new ethnicity stems from the civil rights movements of the late 1950s and early 1960… (Call and Post, 7-26-1975). Promoting a shared understanding between African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities was still a priority for Cleveland’s black elites years later as the Call and Post suggested that cities in America needed to “reexamine [their] societal infrastructure” and “bring together for common purposes people of diverse cultures, ethnic backgrounds, different races, those of different religions and creeds, and to get these people to start talking to one another, believing in one another and understanding the problems of one another” (Call and Post, 5-141992). More generally, the paper maintained that, “The United States has always benefited from immigration. Human beings are valuable resources, just like natural resources and capital…” (Call and Post, 6-6-1991). Thus, unlike their response in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, black elites in post-1965 Cleveland advocated inclusion while approving of immigration. Savannah’s black elites also held positive beliefs about immigration. However, while black elites in Cleveland approved of immigration outright, black elites in Savannah were more tempered in their endorsement of immigration and other minorities. For example, the Herald recognized the struggles of minorities including Latino and Asian-Americans who had “survived centuries and decades of exploitation and injustice” (Savannah Herald, 2-5-1992). Later that year, the Herald expressed that white people “have consciously and sub-consciously decided to divide, oppress, destroy and kill Black, Brown, Red, and Yellow people across the earth” (Savannah Herald, 5-13-1992). Moreover, black elites worried that efforts to establish a more inclusive society may actually have adverse effects as illustrated by the following passage from January 17, 1996: 142 Why can’t we all just be Americans? I hear that question posed quite often these days. It seems like a simple enough proposition that everyone should support. However…[u]nder the guise of a ‘colorblind society’ and wanting everyone to ‘just be American,’ some people are trying to keep minorities and women from achieving their full potential. (Savannah Herald, 1-17-1996) These passages underscore an affinity for other racial and ethnic minority groups—including immigrants—yet the praise for diversity and immigration is not as strong as in Cleveland. That is, while black elites in Savannah urged Americans “to understand the contributions of each racial group to this nation and must make welcome all at the table,” this support is less intense than suggesting that the cultural pluralism strengthens the United States, or that America benefits from immigration (Savannah Herald, 4-11-2001). The difference in intensity is repeated in by the overall pattern of immigration editorials displayed in Figure 4.3. As shown in Figure 4.3, more than 71 percent of sub-editorials in Cleveland were positive or leaning positive, whereas positive and leaning positive editorials made up roughly 64 percent of Savannah’s sample. Moreover, the combined percentage of negative and leaning negative editorials in Savannah was greater in Savannah than Cleveland. Taken together, the passages presented above and the collective editorial evidence of Figure 4.3, suggest that the positive attitudes of black elites in Cleveland were more pronounced than in Savannah. Immigration Policy Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah held overwhelmingly positive opinions on immigration policy, which were largely consistent with their overall evaluation of immigration. While black elites in both cities expressed some concern over the potential for economic displacement that might accompany unrestricted immigration and Cleveland’s black elites had 143 Percent of Immigration Sub-Editorials 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Figure 4.3: Immigration Editorial Tone: 1965-2009 Informational Leaning Negative Negative Leaning Positive Positive Source: Research compiled by author based on an anaylsis of a sample of editorials from the Cleveland Call and Post and the Savannah Herald. minor worries about ‘illegal immigration,’ black elites in both cities sympathized with refugees and developed coalitions with immigrants and other people of color to resist immigration policies they viewed as racist. Much like black elite opposition to the Chinese Exclusion Acts and race based immigration quotas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modern day black elites in Cleveland and Savannah resisted immigration policies they viewed as racist. For example, California’s Proposition 187, which restricted access to state social service programs, health care, and public education for undocumented immigrants, drew the ire of black elites in Cleveland and Savannah. The Herald bluntly evaluated this initiative: “Proposition 187, reforming the welfare state, cutting free lunches and abolishing affirmative action, is just another way of saying to legal and illegal n---s (aliens), we are not taking care of you anymore. Race is 144 definitely a factor in the overall scheme of things” (Savannah Herald, 3-1-1995). The Call and Post simply called passage of the initiative, “a dark day in the history of the nation that has embraced European, Middle Eastern and Asian refugees by the millions, but has been much less tolerant of Blacks and Hispanics hoping to share the American dream.” (Call and Post, 5-11- 1995). Opposition to Proposition 187 was rooted in a rejection of racial characteristics influencing immigration policy decisions and a linkage between immigrants and other people of color. A syndicated editorial published in both the Call and Post and The Herald, demonstrates black elite linkage to other people of color, their desire to form coalitions with racial and ethnic minorities, and their resistance to any immigration policy they viewed as racially unjust: So often in this nation’s history we’ve seen the divide and conquer strategy used to keep people of color apart. As people of color, too often we have internalized the racism which has been fed to us and we believe misconceptions and stereotypes about other people of color, and sometimes even about ourselves. In politics, the divide and conquer strategy has been used time and again to keep people of color out of elected office. Now there is a group which is working from a new paradigm, a multiracial/multicultural coalition working together to elect progressive candidates in Los Angeles. Called Coalition LA, this grassroots group of citizens from the 10th City Council District has worked for more than a decade against such divisive California propositions as Proposition 187, the antiimmigrant legislation and Proposition 209 the anti-affirmative action law (Call and Post, 3-18-1999; Savannah Herald, 3-17-1999). Thus, when evaluating immigration policies across the United States, black elites in Cleveland and Savannah were especially aware of any racial prejudice, and when racism did emerge in immigration policy, black elites advocated alongside other minorities for their repeal. Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah also sympathized with refugees—particularly refugees from Haiti with whom they shared a racial identity—while questioning the United States’ motivation for granting aid to some refugees and not others. The Savannah Herald nicely articulated this point: “That the U.S. is accepting more refugees shows a streak of decency of which we all can be proud,” yet the editorial goes on to say that, “a puzzled look must appear on 145 many black faces when we note that Haitian refugees are being put back on the boat and sent home” (Savannah Herald 7-11-1979). As the Cleveland Call and Post suggested the following year, U.S. Immigration officials used a “double standard” when evaluating refugees from Haiti and Cuba, as the United States welcomed Cuban refugees while “black boat people from Haiti” were turned away, which suggested to black elites “that the ugly factor of racism [wa]s once again asserting itself in American immigration policy” (Call and Post, 5-24-1980). A few years later, the Call and Post maintained that political and racial dynamics created this double standard: We saw it in the lopsided decision to welcome Cuban refugees while rejecting Haitian refugees. Cuba is considered an enemy of this country while Haiti, though oppressive and brutal, is considered a friend. And, of course, racism too continues to be an overriding factor in determining INS policy towards Haitian refugees. The same political and racist motives drive the decision by the INS to refuse sanctuary to Black South Africans (Call and Post, 7-18-1985). Black elites in both cities believed that Haitian’s were refused asylum, not merely because of diplomatic relations with Haiti, but because the United States was hesitant to receive additional black immigrants. Put simply, the Call and Post asked: “Could it be that the Haitians are Black? We think so.” A few years later the Herald affirmed this sentiment and commented, “the U.S. must stop sending Haitian refugees back to Haiti without a hearing by U.S. immigration officials—never before in U.S. history have we taken such steps and such actions easily lead to charges of racism” (Savannah Herald, 4-13-1994). Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah clearly felt a sense of commonality with persecuted black refugees from Haiti and questioned the United States’ refugee policy, which they viewed as racist. Although African American elites felt a sense of commonality with black refugees, they still expressed some fear that economic competition could coincide with additional immigrants. The Call and Post delicately expressed this point: “Please do not get the impression that we are 146 Table 4.2: Immigration Editorial Tone, 1965-2009 Cleveland Immigration Positive Leaning Leaning Negative Informational Total Editorial Positive Negative Number of Type Editorials Immigration 15 22 52 25 Policy Immigrants 21 23 6 95 66 Specific 74 107 24 14 30 252 Immigrant Groups Savannah Immigration Positive Leaning Leaning Negative Informational Total Editorial Positive Negative Number of Type Editorials Immigration 5 21 11 10 Policy Immigrants 12 24 6 23 48 Specific 42 39 15 10 27 136 Immigrant Groups Note: some editorials counted more than once. Source: Research compiled by author from a sample of editorials in the Cleveland Call and Post and Savannah Herald. unsympathetic to the growing number of refugees coming into this country, we wonder how we are going to feed, clothe and get jobs for all of them without denying jobs to some of our own hard-pressed colored citizens” (Call and Post, 12-11-1965). More generally, the Call and Post commented in 1975 that “white foreign labor can still come to America and get jobs in preference to blacks,” while suggesting a few years later that, “Immigrants, many poor and unskilled, are flooding into this country at a time when the economy is least able to absorb them” (Call and Post, 4-26-1975; Call and Post, 9-6-1980). This theme was echoed years later in the Savannah Herald, which simply stated: “The immigration problem would ultimately lead to labor competition that would cause even more Americans to become unemployed and homeless. In general, immigrants would work the same low wage jobs as Americans but for less” (Savannah Herald, 3-21-2007). The fear of economic competition, though not the overriding 147 consideration in black elite attitudes, still emerged in the immigration policy discourse of black elites in Cleveland and Savannah. Fear of economic competition was not limited to documented immigrants, for black elites were more concerned about undocumented or ‘illegal’ immigrants. While the issue of undocumented immigration rose to the forefront of the national immigration debate years later, black elites identified this issue as early as 1980 suggesting that “a person might begin to wonder how the legal and illegal immigrants and our unemployed persons will survive,” while further stating, “the presence of large numbers of illegal aliens raises the possibility of racial and class conflict. Because of the slowing down of the economy, unemployment continues to rise and many illegal immigrants may feel obligated to accept jobs for less than the minimum wage” (Call and Post, 9-6-1980). Years later the Call and Post urged African Americans to reevaluate their position on undocumented immigration: While many African Americans don't see illegal immigration as an issue of concern, in reality it is. This nation is spending billions of dollars to provide countless services to individuals who are not legal citizens of this country. These are tax dollars that could be expended on those who are Americans by birthright especially African Americans whose ancestors built this nation (Call and Post, 523-2007). Black elites thus expressed some concerned about competition from ‘illegal’ immigrants for employment and other social services, as in their view, the wellbeing of native blacks should be prioritized over non-native immigrants. Despite their apprehension over the potential economic costs of immigration and ‘illegal’ immigration more generally, black elite discourse in both Cleveland and Savannah still overwhelmingly supported open immigration policy as described in Table 4.2, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5. For example, in each city there were more than twice as many immigration policy editorials with a positive and leaning positive tone than with a negative and leaning negative 148 tone. The Call and Post simply concluded that, “Crafting a fair immigration policy is absolutely essential” (Call and Post, 4-13-2006), while the Savannah Herald summed up the overall immigration policy sentiment of black elites during this period: Ideally, there would be one-world without political boundaries and quotas and passports and visas, and everyone would be free to settle wherever he could find a place. And work and live and share with everyone. No one should have to live on boat, or go hungry, or be denied health services, clothing, shelter, education, and employment. And all of this is very possible in our world and should be accomplished (Savannah Herald 7-11-1979). Topics in Immigration Editorials Black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah held positive views about immigration between 1965 and 2009. However, to truly appreciate black elites’ immigration opinions one must peel back another layer and examine the topics discussed in conjunction with the issue of immigration in each city. As described in Table 4.3, black elites had six central considerations arise in connection with immigration. These considerations included the rights and privileges granted to immigrants and/or other groups in society relative to African Americans; the political partisanship of immigrants; whether immigrants or specific immigrant groups were political allies or competitors; the race of immigrant groups and whether they were “white” or non-white; economic considerations associated with immigration and the potential economic competition immigrants could pose; and, finally, the commonality felt between blacks and other groups in society; i.e., the degree to which black elites felt tied to other groups and that their own well being was connected to the well being of other groups in society. In Cleveland, there was a discourse of commonality, and in particular, that blacks and immigrants encountered similar challenges to their own civil rights and civil liberties. At the same time, black elites recognized the partisanship of immigrant groups and more frequently viewed them as political allies. 149 Percent of Sub-Category Editorials Figure 4.4: Cleveland Call and Post Immigration SubCategories by Tone, 1965-2009 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Immigration Policy Immigrants Specific Immigrant Groups Informational Leaning Negative Negative Leaning Positive Positive Source: Research compiled by author based on an analysis of a sample of editorials from the Cleveland Call and Post. Percent of Sub-Category Editorials Figure 4.5: Savannah Herald Immigration Sub-Categories by Tone, 1965-2009 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Immigration Policy Immigrants Specific Immigrant Groups Informational Leaning Negative Negative Leaning Positive Positive Source: Research compiled by author based on an analysis of a sample of editorials from the Savannah Herald. 150 Finally, comments about the race of distinct immigrant groups, and the economic competition that might arise with immigration, were not central factors shaping the views of black elites in Cleveland. Black elites in Cleveland were acutely aware of the common challenges faced by people of color, and beliefs about the commonality between blacks and other minorities, were associated with a positive evaluation of immigration. In particular, Cleveland’s black elites commented on the socioeconomic similarities between blacks and other people of color, and the common racial hurdles encountered by African Americans and minorities more generally that they believed were masked in mainstream debates. As the Call and Post opined, black elites believed, “This country has used every conceivable issue or happening to divert the attention of the American people from the plight of millions of black people and other minorities” (Call and Post, 6-91973), which was particularly concerning because “for too long, persons of color have had limited forums and formats in which to debate, vent or just to share ideas” (Call and Post, 3-212007). The common socioeconomic challenges African Americans and immigrants faced were a frequent topic of conversation in Cleveland. The Call and Post often lamented the educational difficulties of black and other minority children. For example, black elites suggested that, “Teaching black, Hispanic, or poor children requires that teachers demonstrate respect for the child and his heritage. It means overcoming white middle class behavior and speech patterns and accepting the validity of other cultures. Such a constructive attitude demands a degree of sensitivity lacking in many schools today” (Call and Post, 12-15-1979). Minority groups had common, yet unique, experiences that were distinct from many whites in the middle class, and this was further exemplified by an achievement gap between whites and minorities. Remarking 151 Table 4.3: Topics Mentioned in Immigration Editorials, 1965-2009 Cleveland Savannah Topic Number of Percent of Number of Percent of Editorials Immigration Editorials Immigration Editorials Editorials Rights 160 53.3% 80 45.2% Partisanship 50 16.7% 14 7.9% Political Allies 52 17.3% 27 15.3% Race 53 17.7% 58 32.8% Economics 52 17.3% 33 18.6% Group 180 60% 92 52% Commonality Note: some editorials counted more than once. Source: Research compiled by author from a sample of editorials in the Cleveland Call and Post and Savannah Herald. on educational achievement in in California, the Call and Post opined, “three out of four Black fourth and eighth graders and two out of three Latino fourth and eighth graders were in the ‘below basic’ category” (Call and Post, 9-13-2001). Black elites, thus, saw lackluster achievement and common education challenges among people of color, and these similarities were observed on other socioeconomic markers as well. Poverty and economic vulnerability were additional experiences black elites believed they shared with other people of color. In particular, black elites often compared the economic conditions of African Americans and Hispanics, which revealed the subordinate position of both groups. In the early 1980s, the Call and Post highlighted that “Blacks accounted for 8.6 million poor and people of Spanish origin comprised 3.5 million persons below the poverty level” (Call and Post, 10-10-1981) and that “A disproportionate number of the ‘new poor’ are black, and the percentage of blacks who are poor has risen to 34.2, while 26.2 percent of Hispanics are poor.” (Call and Post, 9-18-1982). One implication of poverty—combined with institutional racism— was that minorities had difficulty purchasing their own homes, which the Call and Post observed in 1991:“It is not just low-income families who face difficulties in housing. According to a study 152 released in October by the Federal Reserve Board, banks are more likely to approve mortgage loans for whites than for Blacks and Hispanics, and even poor whites get mortgages more easily than well-to-do minorities” (Call and Post, 12-5-1991). Black elites did not perceive much improvement in Cleveland, or nationally, over the following decades, for they maintained: African Americans still struggle to gain economic parity. Despite the city’s strong industrial base and large minority population, people of color represent less than two percent of corporate executives and less than 5 percent of the board of directors of Cleveland’s largest companies. In addition, while being home to 11 Fortune 500 companies, there are no Black-owned companies in the city with over $25 million in sales. Grim statistics, indeed, but nationally the picture is even worse. According to a recently released survey conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve, in 1998 the median net worth for Hispanics, African Americans, Asians, and other minorities was $16,400. That was less than one-fifth, or 17.28% or the $94,900 median net worth for Whites. And this ratio increased only slightly from 17.23 percent in 1992 (Call and Post, 1-18-2001). Thus, black elites in Cleveland perceived similar socioeconomic realities between blacks and other minorities, which translated into feelings of commonality between the two groups. Consistent with the overall pattern above, black elites expressed concern that minorities were overrepresented in some institutions, while simultaneously being severely underrepresented in others. For example, black elites felt that people of color were disproportionately likely to end up in prisons, which the Call and Post confirmed arguing that, “courts are more likely to convict blacks and other minorities…” (2-3-1973) and that the entire penal system was unfair to minority groups as it, “overwhelmingly favors the rich white defendant over the poor Black or Hispanic defendant” (Call and Post, 11-29-1984). Moreover, black elites believed that the prison system continued to disadvantage people of color once they were convicted of a crime, as “black and Hispanic inmates get the worst assignments” in prisons (Call and Post, 5-24-1980). In contrast, black elites in Cleveland also worried that minorities were underrepresented among civil service workers saying: 153 Shortly after the first to next year the Cleveland Civil Service Commission will schedule examinations for policemen and firemen. The examinations will have been preceded by some special efforts to interest black and Spanish-surnamed applicants, who, at the moment, are very poorly represented in our safety forces in light of the fact that Cleveland is rapidly approaching a 60-40 ratio in white-black population” (Call and Post, 12-1-1973). Besides institutions of public service, black elites suggested that people of color were underrepresented among leaders of the United Methodist Church saying, “There are no Native American or Hispanic bishops, and only one Asian-American bishop. Their lack of representation on national boards and agencies has for years been recognized as a denominational disgrace” (Call and Post, 5-8-1976). Again, black elites observed a common position with people of color more broadly in their control of media agencies remarking, “Other communities of color are in the same situation, or worse. The nation currently has only one Native American broadcast station owner. In the year 1997-98 there was a loss of 15 Hispanic commercial broadcast station owners. Asian broadcasters lost one of three owners” (Call and Post, 11-4-1999). Together, these passages suggest that black elites in Cleveland felt a sense of commonality with other minorities, and were particularly attuned to the struggles of people of color including immigrants. The exceptional sense of commonality between blacks and immigrants was further exemplified by similar struggle for civil rights and civil liberties, as illustrated by black elite discussions of interactions with law enforcement and attempts to restrict the suffrage of minority groups. Quite simply, while “during the course of our history many minority groups have had to turn to the law for protection,” legal institutions were not always designed to protect people of color (Call and Post, 8-24-1967). Instead, African Americans and other minority groups faced comparable challenges to their rights, which black elites in Cleveland took note of. 154 Black elites were particularly upset by police mistreatment of minorities. Editorial comment in the Call and Post railed against “random stops of Black and Latino motorists,” as these “law enforcement practices in the ghettos and barrios, the denial of civil liberties protections, due process and privacy made a mockery of the criminal justice system to many Blacks and Latinos” (Call and Post, 5-4-2000). Unfortunately, these collective experiences of racial profiling often turned violent and led to the injury, or death, of minorities. For example, an editorial in the Call and Post from January 24, 2002 reported the experience of three African Americans and one Hispanic: Let’s recount what John Hogan and James Kenna did. The two White police officers fired 11 shots into a car containing one Hispanic and three African American young men heading for a basketball tournament. They have finally admitted that they only stopped the car because they were targeting African American and Latino drivers. They covered up this fact by falsifying official records that would have exposed their racist behavior. This was not an isolated incident, but rather a common occurrence of police misconduct towards people of color. In another event, a West African immigrant, who “was ‘armed’ with only a wallet” was shot by plain clothes police officers in New York City (Call and Post, 5-10-2001). Again, black elites in Cleveland condemned the treatment of a Haitian immigrant, who was brutally abused by New York City officers: “As Haitian immigrant Abner Louima lays in a New York City hospital with a torn rectum and a lacerated bladder, a national outrage has been focused upon that City's police department and the two officers who have been indicted to date after one of the most vicious attacks upon a person in custody that has ever been reported” (Call and Post, 8-21-1997). Thus, black elites were concerned with the violation of the civil rights and civil liberties of both African Americans and immigrants, which contributed to their overall evaluation of immigration. 155 Cleveland’s black elites also fervently advocated the protection and expansion of political rights of African Americans and immigrants. At the national level, the Call and Post praised the Congressional Black Caucus for helping renew the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and expanding “the Act…to cover Spanish-speaking and other minorities” (1-10-1976). Moreover, in the following years black elites maintained “The Voting Rights Act has been the single most effective protection of the right to vote for blacks and Hispanics” (Call and Post, 8-22-1981) especially after 1975 when “provisions were included to protect Hispanics, Asians and others (Call and Post, 1-24-2002). Despite pushing for these national protections, black elites observed that “Literacy tests, long used against blacks in the South, are now used in some states, including liberal ones like New York to keep Spanish-speaking citizens and some blacks from registering” and “There are plenty of other administrative regulations and local laws that keep people out of the system when they should be used to include them in” (Call and Post, 8-12-1972). The lack of bilingual ballots as well as voter identification laws requiring individuals to show identification—on some occasions photo identification—were among the devices meant to disenfranchise minority voters that were denounced by black elites. In their endorsement of Jennifer Brunner’s candidacy for Ohio Secretary of State in 2006, black elites at the Call and Post stated approvingly: She is an opponent of the measures enacted by the Republican-controlled legislature in House Bill 3, the voting "reform" measure that has been effectively blocked in the courts because so many of its provisions would make it easier for individuals to challenge voters who might be foreign-born; or impose voter identification requirements to solve a "problem" that hasn't been much of a problem in past elections; or make it more difficult for third-party groups to register new voters (11-2-2006). In spite of Secretary Brunner’s opposition, House Bill 3 was enacted forcing individuals to show identification before they could vote, which concerned black elites in Cleveland because they 156 worried about, among other things, the challenges this new law would present to recently naturalized citizens (Call and Post, 2-2-2006). Moreover, black elites criticized Republican efforts to undermine key portions of the Voting Rights Act arguing, “They wanted to eliminate the requirement for bilingual ballots in some jurisdictions - a provision that has effectively improved the voting process for millions of immigrant citizens who may not speak or write or read English very well, although they are still citizens” (Call and Post, 7-13-2006). Thus, in another instance, black elites in Cleveland expressed feelings of commonality with immigrants and supported efforts to protect the rights and liberties of all minorities. Support for voting rights among black elites was a principled stand, yet it was also a pragmatic strategy because it strengthened political alliances between blacks and other minorities. Indeed, black elites in Cleveland commented on the need for African Americans to form coalitions against prejudice stating: “Somehow, differing minorities must find a way back to trust of one another and to build a strength that will make burners of crosses and wearers of Swastikas think twice before forging into attacking them because they are Black, Jew, Japanese, Chinese, Chicano and West Indian” (Call and Post, 9-15-1979). Coalitions between blacks and Hispanics also supported an increase in “the number of minority attorneys in [The D.C. U.S. Attorney’s] office by 50%” (Call and Post, 2-7-1981), and grassroots coalitions fought environmental racism in communities of color across the country including “Latino communities… along the New River in southern California, where the maquiladoras, the factories located on the U.S.-Mexico border dump their wastes” (Call and Post, 5-2-2002). These coalitions for common goals were not limited to racial injustice, but black elites also saw avenues for political coalition with other minority groups as well. 157 Politically, black elites viewed coalitions with other minorities as essential. In fact, black elites argued, “The reason we have made so little political progress in the past has been our inability to put together valuable coalitions, intra-racial as well as inter-racial” (Call and Post, 110-1981). However, coalitions did emerge, and, as civil rights activist John Lewis was quoted in a Call and Post editorial stating, when “young dynamic, resourceful candidates could put together a strong, committed coalition of blacks, whites, and Chicanos” then “the politics of hope is a possibility” (Call and Post, 4-21-1973). Jesse Jackson continued this call for hope in the forthcoming years when he advocated a Rainbow Coalition of people of color, which black elites in Cleveland wholeheartedly endorsed. Black elites welcomed Jesse Jackson’s candidacy and approved of his mobilization strategy targeting “The 75 million persons of voting age who did not vote in the 1980 presidential election” who were “mostly black, brown, poor and young” (Call and Post, 4-26-1984). Even though Jackson was an African American, black elites maintained that his “support is based primarily on his stand on important issues, not on race,” while continuing to argue that, “Hispanic voters understood this. The Rev. Jackson visited Spanish Harlem—and spoke to the concerns of the poor and to those denied decent housing” (Call and Post, 4-26-1984). In the following decades, black elites in Cleveland continued to endorse the Rainbow Coalition and praised Rev. Jackson’s call for “unity, and an end to stereotyping and scapegoating” in relations between African Americans and Arab Americans communities (Call and Post, 4-24-1997). Approval of minority political coalitions is another factor influencing the positive attitudes of African American elites towards immigration. While black elites supported coalitions for racial and political rights, they also saw people of color as allies gathering under the Democratic Party umbrella. Black elites maintained that in Ohio politics, “organizing constituency groups including Blacks, ethnic voters, senior citizens, 158 labor, women’s groups…are key to a Democratic victory in Ohio” (Call and Post, 9-1-1988). Despite the support of minorities for the Democratic Party and liberal politics, black elites counseled Democrats not to take this constituency for granted. For example, black elites warned, “liberal politicians especially [need] to prove to minorities that their professed liberal beliefs are not just a screen that can be tossed away whenever it suits them” (Call and Post, 4-10-1976). However, this demand was largely toothless; in fact, the Call and Post evaluated the political climate in the following way: “large cities, with large minority populations, usually produce sizeable votes for Democrats” (Call and Post, 3-18-1999). Support for one Democrat—President Clinton—was exemplified in commentary regarding his 1997 budget proposal: The budget restorations would alleviate the harsh impact that will be felt by children, unemployed people and legal immigrants. We commend the President for, once again, demonstrating his compassion for his fellow man, and especially those who are in need. When the President signed the welfare reform legislation that had been passed by the Republican-controlled Congress, he pledged to make some adjustments. Some of the changes being considered include restoring some of the dramatic cuts in the food stamp program and allowing legal immigrant children and disabled persons to remain eligible for Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid. This makes sense, because food stamps, are in many cases, the last remaining portion of the so called "safety net", and the last step before malnutrition. Also, most legal immigrants are also taxpayers, and should be entitled to the same protections as other taxpayers (Call and Post, 1-2-1997). When Clinton’s term was up a few years later, black elites reported overwhelming support for his Vice President and Democratic Presidential Nominee Al Gore. Put simply, the Call and Post informed readers: “Ninety percent of all African-American voters supported Gore, vs. a meager 8 percent endorsing Bush. About two-thirds of all Latinos and the majority of Asian Americans voted for Gore” (2-15-2001). Collectively, this evidence suggests that black elites in Cleveland viewed immigrants as Democratic political allies and supported policy efforts from Democrats that would aide immigrants. 159 Notwithstanding reports in the news media and some scholarly research to the contrary (McClain et al. 2007; Nteta 2012; Hutchings and Wong 2014; Nteta 2014), feelings of economic competition were not the most significant factor influencing black elites immigration opinions in Cleveland. In fact, black elite feeling was decidedly mixed on whether immigrants posed significant competition for African Americans. To be sure, there were the familiar claims made by black elites that: “white foreign labor can still come to America and get jobs in preference to blacks” (Call and Post 4-26-1975), and that “Mexicans, Cubans and White women are rapidly taking…jobs away from us” (Call and Post, 6-21-1980). Moreover, black elites worried that “employers using illegal immigrants are helping to suppress wages for millions of American workers at the lower end of the wage scale.” (Call and Post, 4-13-2006). However, black elites also viewed African Americans and Hispanic as engaged in a common struggle for economic survival. For example, the Call and Post argued, “Blacks, Hispanics, other minorities, women and young people cannot be denied the right to earn a living. Their needs cannot be subordinated to those of white males who get the first call on our society’s jobs” (12-9-1978). Moreover, black elites believed that African Americans in Cleveland could learn lessons from the economic prowess of some immigrant groups, as “Hispanics are making great strides in operating their own business” (Call and Post, 10-25-1980). Finally, black elites also denied that immigrants were at fault for African Americans economic woes in an editorial from August 29, 1985: “Blaming the Koreans, Indochinese, Arabs and Cubans won’t help. Neither will calling Asiatics ‘chinks’ and ‘gooks’ or beating up the Laotians in Philadelphia. It’s us—not them” (Call and Post, 8-29-1985). Thus, black elites did suggest that immigrants were economic competitors at certain times, yet these sentiments were balanced with opinions that minorities shared common economic challenges and African Americans could learn from the economic successes of some 160 immigrant groups. In addition, the overall tone of black elite immigration editorial discourse suggests that while 17 percent of immigration editorials in Cleveland mentioned economic issues, only nine percent explicitly described immigrants as economic competitors indicating that economic competition was not the most salient consideration used by black elites when forming their immigration opinions. The topics that arose in connection with the immigration attitudes of black elites in Savannah were quite similar to those in Cleveland with only one exception. While black elites in Savannah also expressed a discourse of commonality, felt that both groups struggled to for their civil rights and civil liberties, and perceived possible political coalitions with immigrants, black elites in Savannah were also particularly aware of the racial dynamics of immigration, describing many newcomers as fellow people of color. Lastly, black elites in Savannah also did not view immigrants through a lens of economic competition. Black elites in Savannah saw immigrants through a lens of commonality, which helped inform their positive characterization of immigration. In particular, Savannah’s black elites resisted efforts they perceived as trying to drive wedges between people of color, as they felt it weakened the position of minorities in society. For example, the Herald maintained in 1989 that “One of the basic strategies of the powerful and oppressive forces of this society is to divide and sub-divide racial and ethnic communities against themselves” (Savannah Herald, 5-31-1989). Instead of division, black elites in Savannah believed that minorities should be aware of their similar position, opportunities, and circumstances. The perception of common challenges among minorities started early in life as the Herald lamented, “We are told and warned that in particular racial and ethnic children in the United States are now being doomed for future hardships” 161 (Savannah Herald, 7-19-1989). Though black elites imagined many future hardships, they were especially cognizant of the educational hurdles faced by minorities. Systematic underachievement among African Americans and other minorities concerned Savannah’s black elites making them worry about the future prospects for people of color more generally. As in Cleveland, black elites in Savannah articulated a vision of education that incorporated the history and experiences of people of color. For instance, the Herald opined: “Where minorities are concerned, they realize that years of social neglect has given them grounds for unrest and a desire to indoctrinate pride of race or national origin into the educational system” (Savannah Herald, 5-17-1969). However, this vision rarely materialized and the achievement gap between people of color and whites continued to haunt the thoughts of black elites in Savannah. Addressing the question of educational success head on, the Herald commented: “I do not want to appear nor sound as a prophet of doom; but, it seems to me as I move around in my Black habitat, that passing through the grades and not being academically prepared; impacts so heavily upon all students, but more so on minorities. So many cannot read, well, cannot spell, nor can they write. Reading, spelling, and writing are the everyday tools students need to excel” (Savannah Herald, 12-14-1983). When these early and common educational difficulties interacted with institutional racism, they led African Americans and other minorities to be underrepresented in social, economic, and political institutions, which was a present topic of black elite discourse in Savannah. Once African Americans and minorities completed their education, black elites commented on their representation in other institutions in American society. The Herald described an investigation that revealed “great indignation at the frustration faced by Negroes, American Indians and Spanish speaking minorities in their attempt to enter businesses. The 162 investigation shows that government red tape has in many cases joined with community prejudice and the reluctance of financial institutions to discourage their efforts” (Savannah Herald, 3-13-1971). Establishing their own businesses was often difficult for people of color, and this contributed to their underrepresentation in the upper echelon of the public and private sector. While their numbers improved significantly, black elites still called attention to the low percentage of minorities serving in elite public institutions such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation: “Do you know that in 1961 the F.B.I. under Hoover had 5,873 agents and only 11 Black special agents. As of June 1976 there were 131 Black agents, 144 Spanish surnames, 17 Indians and 35 Asians. These 314 minority agents represent 3.6 per cent of the corps of 8,617, almost an 18-fold reverse over 1961 and more than 300 per cent jump over 1970” (Savannah Herald, 10-27-1976). Moreover, black elites highlighted an EEOC report claiming that United Airlines “failed to hire minority and female pilots at twice the percentage of qualified applicants” and that “elements of United’s selection process disproportionately screened out blacks, other minorities, and women” (Savannah Herald, 9-21-1988). These slights to people of color irked black elites in Savannah and perpetuated feelings of common oppression against African Americans and immigrants, which in turn, helped shape feelings among black elites towards immigration. Along with a general feeling of commonality with immigrants, black elites in Savannah cited similar impediments among minorities seeking their full rights and liberties. Although black elites in Savannah believed, “that a dedicated effort on the part of Negroes and other minority groups to achieve first class citizenship can be realized through deliberate effort” their comments in the following decades revealed that people of color still faced inequities in many facets of American society (Savannah Herald, 7-23-1966). In general, the Herald believed that 163 the “rights of minorities have been abridged…resulting [in] hundreds of far reaching law suits…being filed in federal courts” (Savannah Herald, 6-27-1970). More specifically, black elites highlighted concerns about housing practices meant to disadvantage minorities: More recently, the National Fair Housing Alliance conducted paired testing of large insurers in nine cities and found evidence of discrimination against blacks and Hispanics in half of the tests. Applicants from minority communities were refused insurance, offered inferior policies, or forced to pay higher premiums. Applicants from minority communities were found to be held to more stringent maximum age and minimum policy requirements (Savannah Herald, 1-2-2002). Discriminatory housing policies targeting people of color were not the only complaints black elites in Savannah had about the rights and privileges of minorities, for they also decried the disproportionate number of minorities engaging with the criminal justice system and their treatment inside prison walls. For example, the Herald argued there was “hostility based on racism” from “guards…towards the inmates” in the nation’s jails and prisons whose population was “more than 60 percent…urban black and Spanish-speaking (Puerto Rican, Chicano, Etc.)…” (Savannah Herald, 12-11-1971). These distinct features of American society created similar feelings of discrimination between blacks and immigrants, and these feeling extended to the political realm as well. Black elites in Savannah condemned practices aimed at restricting the opportunities for minorities to participate in the political process and called for election reform that would make it less costly for minorities to vote. As an example, the Herald suggested “The steady decline in voting and the height of the barriers discouraging minorities electoral participation demand voter reform laws now”( Savannah Herald, 5-31-1989). The proposed improvements included Election Day registration allowing voters to register to vote the day of the election, and/or mail in registration. Aside from same day registration, black elites believed in electoral reforms meant to help non-English speakers: “Another section subject to review in 2007 require that districts 164 with high numbers of non-English speaking citizens provide bilingual ballots and authorize monitoring of elections. This is a provision that remains important in the looming shadow of Florida 2000” (Savannah Herald, 10-20-2004). Securing political rights for minorities was important for black elites in Savannah, as they viewed other minorities as political allies and fellow supporters of the Democratic Party. In Savannah, black elites perceived other racial and ethnic groups as political allies. Black elites were particularly optimistic in the 1990s about a the possibility of a diversifying field of political representatives, which they articulated in the following way: “The 1990’s will continue to see the national political landscape change both at the national and state levels. African Americans and other racial and ethnic candidates will continue to make significant progress in challenging the past racial exclusivity of state and national elected offices” (Savannah Herald, 2-14-1990). Indeed, only a few years later, when Savannah’s first African American mayor Floyd Adams Jr. ran for office the Herald noted: “A broad cross-section of Savannahians including African Americans, whites, Jewish community leaders, officials of the Chatham County Democratic Party, and supporters of former 21-year Savannah Mayor John P. Rousakis have joined forces to mount a dynamic citywide campaign to elect Adams mayor next week” (Savannah Herald, 11-22-1995). Unsurprisingly, the Herald wholeheartedly endorsed Adam’s candidacy and supported his administration once in office. Black elites also commented on the need for alliances among minorities at the national level saying Democratic Presidential Nominee Al Gore “and his vice presidential running mate Joe Lieberman will not win the White House without the Black and Hispanic vote” (Savannah Herald, 8-16-2000). During this same election, black elites welcomed the “active coalition of Black and Latino/a political leaders who have focused the candidates on their issues” (Savannah Herald, 3-1-2000). Thus, black elites in 165 Savannah also viewed immigrants and other minorities through a political lens in which the latter groups were seen as allies. In addition to feelings of commonality in their struggle for political and civil rights, and feelings that other minorities could be political allies, black elites in Savannah saw immigrants through a racial lens and recognized that many new immigrant groups were also people of color. In particular, black elites in Savannah perceived a racial hierarchy in the United States, which put, “black on the bottom, brown and red in the middle, and white on top” (Savannah Herald, 318-1992). However, rather than resenting other groups for seeming to leapfrog African Americans, black elites in Savannah maintained that “The general problem of racial abuse between ethnic groups is usually motivated by the principles of racism that predominate America” (Savannah Herald, 8-15-1990). Moreover, the following year the Herald proclaimed: “American racism feeds its perpetuation by fostering negative racial stereotypes concerning people of color” and there is little justification for “promot[ing] or substantiat[ing] inter-racial hatred and stereotyping” (Savannah Herald, 12-18-1991). In the same vein, black elites in Savannah supported efforts for affirmative action that would benefit African Americans and other minorities including immigrants. Therefore, more so than in Cleveland, black elites in Savannah, perceived immigrants as fellow people of color. Black elites in Savannah, like their counterparts in Cleveland, did not systematically view immigration through a lens of economic competition. Rather, black elites felt that they should emulate the economic strategies of successful immigrant groups. More specifically, black elites in Savannah felt the black community should patronize African American owned and operated businesses: “A recent San Francisco study showed that the dollar changes hands five to six times in the Chinese community, four to five times in the Jewish community, three to four in the white 166 community, but just once in the black community—it comes in and then goes out!” (Savannah Herald, 9-29-1976). The problem according to black Savannahians was that “African Americans are price loyal while other groups are ethnic loyal. This means that Koreans, Chinese, and others will patronize their people even if a Black person next door has a cheaper price” (Savannah Herald, 5-10-2000). Instead, black elites felt that African Americans more broadly needed to believe in themselves “as do the Cubans, Koreans and Vietnamese” in order to “outperform the preferred majority” (Savannah Tribune, 1-18-1989). In either case, black elites in Savannah did not blame other racial and ethnic groups for their economic position in society, but reversed the causal arrow saying the, “Ethnic group consumer market is not the cause of social problems but the by product of them” (Savannah Herald, 11-26-1966). Collectively, the editorial discourse in Savannah reinforces this picture: while more than 18 percent of the immigration editorials discuss economics, only five percent explicitly point to immigrants as economic competitors. Hence, like Cleveland, there is little evidence to suggest that immigrants in Savannah were viewed as economic competitors by black elites. The overall picture displayed in Table 4.3 confirms the pattern. In Cleveland the topic of group commonality was expressed in 60 percent of the immigration editorials with 47 percent of the immigration editorials describing ties to and commonality with immigrants. When black elites felt commonality with immigrants, they almost always positively evaluated immigration. Secondly, the rights afforded to immigrants were a frequent topic of black elite editorial discourse. In fact, this topic made up 53 percent of immigration editorials in Cleveland, and when the topic of rights appeared, black elites were more likely to evaluate immigration positively, yet these feelings were conditioned by the perceived rights immigrants possessed. If immigrants were thought to have more rights than African Americans, which was the case in 167 seven percent of immigration editorials, immigration was more likely to be evaluated negative. Conversely, in the 27 percent of immigration editorials that described immigrants as having the same or fewer rights as blacks, immigration was also more likely to be viewed positively. Together, when immigrants were seen as co-partisans, which occurred in more than seven percent of immigration editorials, immigrants were also more likely to be viewed positively. The same was true of stories calling immigrants political allies—when immigrants were seen as allies, they were also more often positively portrayed. These topics were the most influential lens through which black elites in Cleveland interpreted the issue of immigration. Finally, as mentioned above, economic competition was seldom discussed in Cleveland, and the racial dynamics of immigration were not featured prominently. The narrative in Savannah was quite similar. The topic of group commonality arose more often than any other issue in black elite discourse in Savannah and immigrants were viewed as sharing ties with African Americans in more than half of the immigration editorials. Among the editorials indicating commonality, the issue of immigration was more often conveyed positively. When the topic of rights arose—which occurred in 45 percent of Savannah’s immigration editorials—black elites were more likely to evaluate immigration positively. Moreover, like Cleveland, when immigrants were perceived to have the same or fewer rights—almost 21 percent of immigration editorials—black elites were more favorable to immigration. Though the partisan attachments and political allegiances of immigrants were less discussed in Savannah than Cleveland, the story was similar: when immigrants were viewed as political allies and/or as having similar partisan attachments, black elites felt more positively about immigration. The topic of race was more pronounced in Savannah appearing in almost 33 percent of immigration editorials. In particular, there were almost three times as many editorials suggesting immigrants 168 were non-white as those maintaining immigrants were white. When black elites thought that immigrants were non-white, they felt more positive about immigration. Although economics emerged as a topic of conversation appearing in almost 19 percent of immigration editorials, feelings of economic competition were seldom discussed in Savannah. For example, only five percent of immigration editorials explicitly mentioned immigrants as economic competitors, and among these editorials, black elites were only slightly more likely to have negative feelings about immigration. Thus, as in Cleveland, immigration was viewed through a lens of commonality, rights, and to a lesser extent politics and race, not economic competition. Specific Immigrant Groups in Savannah and Cleveland Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah voiced opinions about 32 distinct immigrant groups. These groups were the central topic of conversation in at least one immigration subeditorial in each city. However, in both cities, immigrants of Hispanic origin as well as, Asian and Jewish immigrants were discussed most often, as described in Table 4.4. Black elites also offered opinions on Arab, Caribbean, and traditional European immigrants, though these groups garnered less attention.28 Each of these immigrant groups, on average, was interpreted within the larger immigration dialogue described above. That is, the specific immigrant groups were understood within a context of group commonality, the rights they were afforded, and their political attachments, and/or their racial composition. 28 In this categorization, immigrants of Hispanic origin include those described as Mexicans, Latino/as, Hispanics, Puerto Rican, Chicano, and Cuban. Asian immigrants include those described as Asian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese. Caribbean immigrants include those described as Caribbean, Haitian, West Indian, and Jamaican. Traditional European immigrants refer to the German, Irish, and Italian immigrant groups represented in Table 4.4. 169 Table 4.4: Number of Immigration Editorials About Specific Immigrant Groups, 1965-2009 Cleveland Immigrant Group Only Group in Multiple Groups Total Number of Percentage of Editorial in Editorial Editorials Immigration Editorials Arab 4 4 8 2.7% Asian 10 31 41 13.7% Caribbean 8 9 17 5.7% German 0 6 6 2% Hispanic Origin 81 41 122 40.7% Irish 0 12 12 4% Italian 3 23 26 8.7% Jewish 59 24 83 27.7% Savannah Immigrant Group Only Group in Multiple Groups Total Number of Percentage of Editorial in Editorial Editorials Immigration Editorials Arab 0 5 5 2.8% Asian 13 29 42 23.7% Caribbean 8 3 11 6.2% German 0 3 3 1.7% Hispanic Origin 31 18 49 27.7% Irish 2 4 6 3.4% Italian 1 3 4 2.3% Jewish 35 12 47 26.6% Note: some editorials counted more than once. Source: Research compiled by author from a sample of editorials in the Cleveland Call and Post and Savannah Herald. Black elites in Cleveland viewed immigrants of Hispanic origin through a dual lens of group commonality and civil and political rights, which contributed to their substantial overall approval of immigrants of Hispanic origin. At the end of the 1970s, black elites in Cleveland suggested African Americans and immigrants of Hispanic origin shared a common struggle: “it was a year of continued hardship for blacks, Hispanics and other minorities,” while pointing the finger of blame toward the Oval Office: “Blacks are not the only ones chagrined over the policies of the Carter administration…many Hispanics are teed off as well” (Call and Post, 1-6-1979). Years later, black elites highlighted feelings of commonality again in their discussion of Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan saying, “with his proposal to build an electric 170 fence across Texas to keep illegal aliens out, and his racist references to all Hispanics as ‘Jose’, we can only wonder what Mr. Buchanan has in store for Black Americans, should he be elected” (Call and Post, 2-28-1996). Black elites worried that the ideology underpinning Buchanan’s immigration rhetoric would also harm African Americans, which indicated a feeling of commonality between the two groups as subjects of discrimination. Additionally, black elites believed African Americans and immigrants of Hispanic origin shared a common socioeconomic position as both groups had poverty handed down from generation to generation (Call and Post, 8-7-1965), low paying jobs (Call and Post, 8-2-1969), high and increasing levels of unemployment (Call and Post, 2-15-1975), and their children had trouble in America’s education system (Call and Post, 6-7-1975). Overall, as Figure 4.6 indicates, collectively, almost 80 percent of editorials about immigrants of Hispanic origin were positive or leaning positive, and additionally, more than 65 percent of immigration editorials about immigrants of Hispanic origin in Cleveland also mentioned a sense of commonality between the two groups. However, black elites in Cleveland also saw immigrants of Hispanic origin fighting for civil and political rights. Commenting on the Poor People’s March on Washington, the Call and Post argued, “it isn’t just poor Negroes who are marching, it’s also poor whites, Spanishspeaking citizens, Indians, and all who are oppressed and left out of our country’s prosperity” (511-1968). In general, black elites believed that “discrimination against blacks is joined by discrimination against other groups as well,” as “the figures for Latins is as bad as that for blacks…” (Call and Post, 6-8-1974). More specifically, black elites in Cleveland were upset with police officers’ unjust treatment of minorities: Although African Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped and searched, they were less likely to be in possession of contraband. On average, searches and seizures of African-American drivers yielded evidence only 8 percent of the time; searches and seizures of Hispanic drivers yielded evidence 171 only 10 percent of the time; and searches and seizure of White drivers yielded evidence 17 percent of the time. (Call and Post, 1-24-2002). These types of events impelled black elites to sympathize with immigrants of Hispanic origin over the denial of both group’s civil rights and civil liberties. In fact, analysis of black elite editorial discourse in Cleveland reveals that 55 percent of editorials about immigrants of Hispanic origin also discuss rights. Moreover, among editorials about this group, almost 38 percent argue that immigrants of Hispanic origins have the same or fewer rights as African Americans. African American elites’ relationship with Asian immigrants in Cleveland was more complicated and nuanced than with immigrants of Hispanic origin. That is, the economic prowess and educational achievements, though lauded in many instances, were also a source of envy and friction for black elites. Notwithstanding brief moments of animosity, attitudes towards Asian immigrants were positive with 80 percent of immigration editorials about Asian immigrants being positive or leaning positive. Like immigrants of Hispanic origin discussed above, Asian immigrants were also viewed at through a lens of group commonality and rights. Specifically, black elites saw Asian immigrants as fellow minorities subject to discrimination, for the Call and Post suggested, “Asian Americans, like Blacks and other racial minorities, have always faced discrimination here” (Call and Post, 4-26-1975). In immigration policy, black elites lamented the racism in past exclusionary immigration policy that, “at various times either excluded or severely limited the numbers of Mexicans, Japanese, and Chinese attempting to immigrate to the United States” (Call and Post, 5-24-1980). Feelings of discrimination directed at both blacks and Asians continued years later as the Call and Post maintained “that a reservoir of antagonism and outright hatred for Jews, for Blacks, for Latino and Asian-Americans, for Arab-Americans and Muslims, for gays and lesbians—have I left any group out? —still exists in 172 Percent of Group Specific Sub-Editorials Figure 4.6: Cleveland Call and Post Sub-Editorial Tone by Immigrant Group, 1965-2009 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Arab Asian Caribbean German Hispanic Irish Italian Jewish Origin Informational Leaning Negative Negative Leaning Positive Positive Source: Research compiled by author based on an analysis of a sample of editorials from the Cleveland Call and Post. America” (Call and Post, 9-21-2000). Common experiences of discrimination were reflected in the overall picture of black elites discourse surrounding Asian immigrants as 46 percent of Asian immigration editorials also mentioned feelings of commonality between the two groups. Even more striking, 60 percent of editorials about Asian immigrants discussed the rights afforded to Asians with 36 percent suggesting that Asians possessed the same or fewer rights as African Americans. African American elites in Cleveland had a long and complex history of cooperation with Jews, which led to feelings of affection despite some policy disagreements—particularly surrounding affirmative action. While, black elites in Cleveland wholeheartedly supported efforts for affirmative action, Jewish immigrants were more reserved and worried about the adverse affects affirmative action might have on the Jewish community. The Call and Post characterized 173 the disagreement in the following way: “One such area of disagreement has been affirmative action. Jews have historically been penalized by quota systems and recoil from affirmative action programs that extend to numbers, goals and timetables. They have been in the forefront of campaigns to end what they call ‘reverse discrimination’” (Call and Post, 9-15-1979). Thus, black elites and Jews had moments of fierce disagreement over modern policy debates, and affirmative action revealed an instance in which the two groups’ interests were at odds. However, disagreement over affirmative action was not enough to override a history of common struggles for civil rights. That is, black elites suggested that, “Black American- Jewish relations are tremendously important. Historically the two communities have worked together to move our nation forward on all issues associated with human rights” (Call and Post, 12-18-1976). In particular, “Black and Jewish American unity during the Civil Rights Movement produced significant progress against overt American racism” (Call and Post, 2-26-1987). Behind this coalition between African Americans and Jews was a deep respect for the struggles of both group, as black elites suggested, “the majority of black people are fully in sympathy with the Jews, whose history and struggle closely parallels our own struggle up from slavery and discrimination” (Call and Post, 8-29-1970). For their part, black elites maintained that: most American Jews have shown great understanding of an sympathy for the ceaseless struggle of Negro American for first-class citizenship, and it is a commentary on the unreasoning nature of a small, but highly vocal segment of the civil rights movement (or revolution) that there can be found Negroes in America, no matter how negligible their number, who could be goaded into displays of antiSemitism. Fortunately for Cleveland there is little evidence of this sort of stupidity in our town… (Call and Post, 2-15-1969). Black elites in Cleveland, and their Jewish counterparts, thus expressed feelings of common challenges for their civil rights and civil liberties. And, although Jews had the advantage of 174 ‘whiteness,’ black elites felt that “American Jews, here and abroad have known all the vicissitudes of the scorned and rejected, the tormented and the persecuted, and more so than any other ethnic group have endured and survived the greatest mass slaughter in the history of mankind” (Call and Post, 6-17-1967). Jewish immigrants, therefore, were evaluated positively by black elites in Cleveland with 72 percent of the editorials about Jews characterizing the group in a positive or leaning positive way. Collectively, Jews were understood through a lens of commonality and rights with 57 percent of Jewish immigration editorials mentioning rights and 40 percent discussing feelings of commonality between the two groups. Therefore, in the aggregate, disagreements over affirmative action did little to color black elites positive perception of Jews in Cleveland. Black elites in Cleveland also expressed opinions about Caribbean immigrants and traditional European immigrant groups, such as, Italian, Irish, and German immigrant. Attitudes towards Caribbean immigrants among Cleveland’s black elites were overwhelmingly positive with every editorial naming this group solidly positive or leaning positive. Moreover, as discussed above, Caribbean immigrants—especially Haitian immigrants—were interpreted within a rights based discourse in which black elites believed America should protect Haitian refugees’ human rights and not discriminate against this specific group of immigrants. In total, 82 percent of editorials about Caribbean immigrants also mention rights. Traditional immigrant groups such as Italian, Irish, and German immigrants caught the attention of black elites in Cleveland less often, yet they were still evaluated positively within a framework of rights and group commonality. For example, among the editorials about Italian immigrants, 50 percent also mentioned the rights of Italians while 38 percent expressed feeling of commonality between African Americans and Italians. Thus, even the groups that were less apparent in black elite 175 discourse in Cleveland were still interpreted affectionately with respect for their commonality and rights. While the scholarly research described above suggests mixed results about the relationship between blacks and immigrants of Hispanic origin, the evidence in Savannah is clear: black elites viewed immigrants of Hispanic origin positively through a lens of commonality and rights. Certainly, black elites in Savannah recognized the similar socioeconomic position of immigrants of Hispanic origin stating: “With more than 32 percent of black children and more than 28 percent of Latino children in poverty and signs that poverty is growing as a result of the recession, minority children are in dire need of programs that significantly decrease the poverty to which they are exposed throughout the early stages of their development” (Savannah Herald, 8-25-2004). More simply, the Herald noted, “We are the poorest people (us and Mexicans) in Savannah” (Savannah Herald, 1-18-2006). Further, black elites viewed this poverty as the result of broader trends in American society that did not privilege the education or training of minorities. For example, the Herald argued, “America is falling behind because we’ve disinvested in the foundations of our economy—especially in the education and training of the disadvantaged minorities who will be core of our new workforce…These problems are not Black Problems…They are not our problems…They are massive problems for all Americans…” (Savannah Herald, 1-16-1991). Black elites in Savannah, thus, viewed immigrants of Hispanic origin, and other minorities more generally, through a lens of socioeconomic similarity, which drew them closer to this group of immigrants. Besides feelings of group commonality rooted in socioeconomic similarities, black elites realized that African Americans and immigrants of Hispanic origin faced similar struggles for recognition of their full civil rights and civil liberties. For example, black elites argued that 176 African Americans and Hispanics were both victims of police profiling and mistreatment. In a Herald editorial from January 22, 1997, black elites argued, “we need to end those policies and practices of the police—such as the discriminatory traffic stops of black motorists—which have eroded trust in and respect for the police among law-abiding African-American and LatinoAmerican citizens” (Savannah Herald, 1-22-1997). A few years later, black elites again noted this practice: “There’s a phenomenon of which African American and Mexican men are well aware. In the black community we call it Driving While Black (DWB) and in the west coast Latino Community it’s called Driving While Mexican (DWM);” however, they were optimistic about reform because, “the Congressional Black Caucus introduced legislation to stop racial targeting of black and Latino motorists” (Savannah Herald, 2-3-1999). Black elites sympathized with this violation of the civil liberties of people of Hispanic origin, which contributed to their positive evaluation of this immigrant group. In total, as displayed in Figure 4.7, more than 73 percent of editorials about immigrants of Hispanic origin were positive or leaning positive, and more than 63 percent of these editorials about immigrants of Hispanic origin also expressed feelings of group commonality. Like their evaluation of Hispanic origin immigrants, black elites in Savannah perceived Asian immigrants positively through a lens of group commonality, yet they also saw Asians through a racial lens. For example, black elites recognized that the dominant white majority saw Chinese immigrants as linked to blacks because they were both non-white members of society: White people in America (especially America) and in most European nations ACT different than Chinese, Indians, and Africans, White America ACTS WHITE; meaning that, generally speaking, White Americans have been socialized over the past 600 years to feel and to believe that they are superior to other humans, and they have the right to control the destiny of people of color, especially Black people, because of their ‘whiteness’ (Savannah Herald, 10-18-2006). 177 Percent of Group Specific Sub-Editorials Figure 4.7: Savannah Herald Sub-Editorial Tone by Immigrant Group, 1965-2009 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Arab Asian Caribbean German Hispanic Irish Italian Jewish Origin Informational Leaning Negative Negative Leaning Positive Positive Source: Research compiled by author based on an analysis of a sample of editorials from the Savannah Herald. As non-white members of society, African Americans and Asian Americans experienced common features of American racism, of which black elites in Savannah were well aware. Calling for recognition of past wrongdoings, black elites maintained, “America must make right its use of Africans as slaves, but it must also make right the theft of the land and the genocide of Native Americans, and it must also make right its treatment of Asian and Hispanic Americans as well” (Savannah Herald, 4-11-2001). Additionally, the Herald affirmed black elites’ appreciation of the sacrifices made by Asian immigrants: “For those Asian American soldiers whose loyalty was questioned and those Native American and Hispanic American soldiers who were discriminated against, I give thanks” (Savannah Herald, 5-26-1999). Thus, black elites in Savannah understood Asian immigrants as struggling for common goals of inclusion and fellow 178 sufferers of past racial injustices, which contributed to their positive evaluation. Indeed, as described in Figure 4.7, almost 62 of the editorials about Asian immigrants were positive, and among the editorials about Asian immigrants, 38 percent also mentioned group commonality while 40 percent discussed the race of Asian immigrants. Black elites and Jews had a long history of friendship, yet this relationship was more complicated than with other immigrant groups. For one, black elites and Jews clashed over the issue of affirmative action. Still, though black elites thought, “It will take some time to heal this new rift between two groups that have traditionally been allies in the cause of civil rights,” they optimistically continued, “it is of utmost importance that both Jews and blacks display greater sensitivity to issues affecting both groups, that they display greater respect for each other’s vital interests, and that they work together in areas of mutual concern. They’ve been good partners in the past and ought to be friendly allies in the future” (Savannah Herald, 9-12-1979). Indeed, black elites commented on the long history of amiable relations between the two groups arguing, “despite Bakke and the cooling of affirmative action, blacks can never forget the thousands of Rosenwald schools a Jew built for them in the South to start us upward bound, neither can we forget the long years of support Joel and Arthur Spingarn, Jews, gave the NAACP” (Savannah Herald, 10-25-1979). Moreover, black elites felt that African Americans and Jews had faced similar challenges to their civil rights as late as the 1970s, for they give the example of prominent members of both groups being excluded from an exclusive tennis club (Savannah Herald, 9-18-1971). Further, the American Jewish Committee partnered with African Americans in Georgia to conduct “daily demonstrations against the Georgia flag in Atlanta during the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games” because “The flag flies over the Georgia Capitol and other state properties” and was “changed in 1956 to protest the federal mandates such as school 179 desegregation, integration of public accommodations, and voting rights for African Americans throughout the South” (Savannah Herald, 9-11-1996). Thus, although the two groups were sometimes at odds on affirmative action policy, in total, 53 percent of editorials about Jews were positive, and 38 percent of these editorials also mentioned rights indicating that black elites often viewed Jews through a rights based lens that illuminated Jews’ support in overcoming their common challenges. Black elites also discussed other immigrant groups in Savannah, and largely interpreted these groups within the context described above. However, traditional immigrant groups such as German, Irish, and Italian immigrants only made up a little of seven percent of immigration editorials. Caribbean immigrants fared slightly better appearing in roughly six percent of immigration editorials. When Caribbean immigrants were discussed, it was usually within a racial context, or with respect to Haitian refugees described above. Indeed, 54 percent of immigration editorials about Caribbean immigrants mentioned their race and identified them as non-white. Conclusion This chapter provides a more parsimonious, systematic, and longitudinal analysis of black elite immigration opinion in Cleveland and Savannah, thus offering some needed clarification regarding African American attitudes towards immigration. In so doing, the analysis suggests that black elites viewed immigration in an overwhelmingly positive manner in both Cleveland and Savannah. Black elites in both cities recognized that blacks and immigrants were linked in their struggle to overcome common challenges, and also viewed immigration through a rights based lens in which elites believed both groups were unjustly denied their full civil rights 180 and civil liberties. While there was ample evidence that black elites understood immigrants through a dual lens of commonality and rights, black elites in Cleveland to a greater extent also saw immigrants as co-partisans and political allies while black elites in Savannah recognized the racial backgrounds of modern day immigrants. Importantly, this chapter also shows that there is little systematic evidence that black elites in either Cleveland or Savannah perceived immigrants as economic or political threats. Collectively, this chapter fills a significant void in the historical record by comprehensively measuring and documenting the beliefs of black elites from the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act until the first decade of the twenty first century. However, while this chapter provides much needed clarification regarding existing debates, it also unearths broader comparative questions. For example, why is there less variation in the opinions of black elites during the most recent wave of immigration to the United States than during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? That is, during the wave of immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, black elites viewed immigrants through the markedly different lenses of economic competition an rights and privileges, yet in the post-1965 period, black elites’ views are quite similar in Cleveland and Savannah. Indeed, immigration was even more embraced in Cleveland than in Savannah, and politics was more present in Cleveland’s black elite discourse, while racial characteristics emerged in discussions in Savannah, yet these are small differences in comparison. Moreover, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, black elites greeted immigrants with great hostility, whereas this chapter shows black elites in the post-1965 era perceived immigrants positively. These reactions are puzzling because of rampant speculation regarding the adverse effects of immigration on African Americans in both periods, 181 which would suggest that we would see hostility from black elites in both periods. Sorting out these puzzles is the task I turn to in the following chapter. 182 CHAPTER 5 RIGHTS MATTER: AN EXPLANATION FOR THE TEMPORAL CHANGE IN BLACK ELITE IMMIGRATION OPINION Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah exhibited varied reactions to the issue of immigration during two major waves of immigration to the United States. As illustrated in Chapter 2, between 1883 and 1921 black elites greeted immigrants with hostility lamenting that, “the [foreign emigrants] that come to this country [are] not the most desirable” (Savannah Tribune, 9-14-1901). Though black elite attitudes were even more restrictionist in Savannah than Cleveland, and different considerations came to the minds of black elites in each city when formulating their immigration preferences, the overall sentiment in both locations was to limit immigration to the United States. Following the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, black elite opinion on immigration was decidedly different, as the Cleveland Call and Post explained, “The United States has always benefited from immigration” (Call and Post, 6-6-1991). Moreover, between 1965 and 2009, black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah viewed immigrants through a lens of rights and commonality in which the two groups were seen as linked in their struggles to overcome common challenges. Thus, the first question this chapter addresses is why black elites held negative immigration attitudes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but had positive orientations from 1965 until 2009? Secondly, why did black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah interpret immigration through a lens of rights and commonality in the post-1965 era? These varied immigration opinions are particularly puzzling given our current understanding of African American opinion formation and change. Scholars such as Michael Dawson have consistently argued that black public opinion is homogenous, and national, because 183 individual African Americans use their understanding of what is good for the larger—national— racial group as a proxy for their own individual level preferences (Dawson 1994). However, as the previous chapters illustrate, African American immigration opinion has hardly been consistent across space and time. This heterogeneity is surprising because scholars and pundits alike have explained the challenges for the African American community associated with increased immigration (Libman-Rubenstein 1979; Ignatiev 1997; Diamond 1997; Smith 1997; Jacobson 1998; Waters 1999; King 2000; King and Smith 2005; etc.). Presumably, it would have been in the best interest of African Americans writ large to harbor restrictionist immigration opinions, yet this sentiment only emerged among black elites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, something more than national group interests must help account for the variation in black elite opinion on immigration. To explain the varied immigration opinions of black elites, I argue that the institutional context African Americans encountered in both time periods affected their immigration preferences. While media outlets became more nationalized in the late twentieth century, and individual black elites were more closely connected to national institutions, they still experienced politics locally first and nationally second, which further clarifies the theoretical underpinnings of Dawson’s argument for which group African Americans imagine when formulating ideas about what is best for the larger racial group. The nationalization of civil rights and civil liberties with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 led to less variation in the rights and liberties individual African Americans experienced, yet individual black elites were still deeply embedded in their local communities as evidenced by the discourse in the Cleveland Call and Post and Savannah Herald. Changes in these national laws created better material conditions in Cleveland and Savannah in the late 184 twentieth century compared to the late nineteenth century. Black elites objectively experienced less discrimination, had more political power to affect change, and importantly were less likely to encounter racial violence in the post-1965 era in both cities meaning they would have felt less racially alienated than in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This does not mean that individual blacks did not have subjective experiences of discrimination, or feelings of powerlessness, that made them feel alienated, only that these feelings were on average less pronounced in the post-1965 period than the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, individual black elites also had positive subjective experiences that diluted feelings of powerlessness, discrimination, and a lack of opportunities. Because black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah felt less racially alienated in the post-1965 era, they were less threatened by immigration and adopted more positive immigration positions, which is consistent with current research linking lower racial alienation to positive immigration preferences among African Americans in contemporary American politics (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hutchings et al. 2011; Wilkinson and Bingham 2016). Similar levels of racial alienation among black elites in Cleveland and Savannah meant black elites in both cities adopted integrationist worldviews. Though Dubois, Trotter, and other integrationist leaders had passed and aspects of this worldview evolved between the 1920s and the turn of the twenty first century, advocates of integration still emphasized a rights based discourse and held tightly to ideas of equality and equal opportunities. The discourse in the Call and Post and the Savannah Herald is filled with integrationist language and support for key integrationist leaders of the post-1965 period such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Jesse Jackson. This discourse, importantly, interprets leaders, events, and issues through a local lens first, calling into question the national group interest argument (Dawson 1994). Thus, black elites in 185 each city interpreted immigration through this worldview and emphasized the rights and commonality among blacks and immigrants. This chapter provides needed clarification on the theoretical underpinnings of the racial group interest model, suggesting that individual African Americans look to members of their community, not a national amorphous group, when considering what is optimal for African Americans more generally. Even during the post-1965 time period when the media became more nationalized, and the conduits between local and national politics were more well developed, black elites in Cleveland and Savannah were still entrenched in their communities and experienced politics at the local level first as evidenced by the local issues, stories, and events emerging in newspaper editorials. Secondly, the argument that variation in alienation influences black elite immigration opinion runs counter to scholarship suggesting that local economic differences, neighborhood, and/or metro level demographics shape African American opinion on immigration (Gay 2006; McClain et al 2007). Together, this chapter provides needed clarification of the key factors shaping black elite immigration opinions during two major waves of immigration to the United States. Nationalizing Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Civil rights advances in the 1960s enhanced the objective material conditions black elites experienced across the United States by bringing an end to years of legal segregation, disenfranchisement, and discrimination based on race, religion, sex, or national origin. These institutional changes also sent important subjective signals to African Americans about their power to affect social and political change, the opportunity structure available to members of their racial group, and more generally, their inclusion in the polity. Years of campaigns, 186 speeches, marches, protests, sit-ins, violent encounters, and smaller legal victories culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954 and the subsequent decision in 1955 were watershed moments for integrating educational facilities, and the Civil Rights Act of 1957 ushered in modest advances for African American’s civil rights, yet the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the beginning of the end of legal discrimination against African Americans in the United States. In particular, the 1964 Act outlawed discrimination in public accommodations including motels, hotels, restaurants, theaters, and state and local governments were prohibited from denying access to public facilities based on race, color, religion, or national origin. The Act also legally protected African Americans from discrimination by: employers, government agencies receiving federal funds, and racist white courts and juries by allowing cases to be moved from state courts to federal courts. Moreover, the Act continued the legacy of Brown by granting the Attorney General powers to enforce the desegregation of public schools. Finally, the Act took steps to protect equal political rights of by mandating the accumulation of data on voting and voter registration in specific geographic regions while forbidding the unequal application of voter registration requirements. All told, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 took a major step toward streamlining the civil rights and civil liberties of African Americans across the United States. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a landmark achievement for America, yet its reach did not extend far enough to guarantee the full political rights of many African Americans. While the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 created important institutions such as the United States Commission on Civil Rights and a separate Civil Rights division within the Department of Justice, increased government information about voting and elections, and provided greater litigation capacities for voting rights abuses, these measures did not go far enough to fully ensure 187 the franchise for African Americans, particularly in the Deep South (Valelly 2004). However, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 overcame the limitations of earlier legislation, and finally ensured African Americans’ equal right to participate in the electoral process. As Valelly explains, “the design of the Voting Rights Act efficiently got around earlier difficulties” by creating three crucial elements: the coverage formula, a preclearance requirement that required review of proposed electoral rule changes by the Justice Department, and forbid the use of tests and devices meant to restrict voting (Valelly 2004, 201). The coverage formula applied additional requirements to counties that had previously engaged in egregious restrictions on voting rights with special tests and devices—such as literacy tests, knowledge or understanding requirements, or requiring proof of good moral character—and places where turnout of the voting age population in the 1964 Presidential election was below 50 percent. Secondly, Section 5 of the 1965 Act established a preclearance requirement wherein any changes to voting rules or requirements at the state and local level were subject to prior review by the Attorney General and/or a three judge panel in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia (Valelly 2004). Collectively, coverage and preclearance requirements placed the practices of many states in Deep South under greater surveillance and provided federal agencies with enhanced enforcement power. Finally, the Act reinforced the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by prohibiting poll taxes and residency requirements in state and local elections, and directed the Attorney General to sue states and localities that failed to comply (Valelly 2004). Thus, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and its subsequent renewals over the following years, finally, ensured the legal right to vote for African Americans across the United States. The third pillar of the civil rights advances of the 1960s came with the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Even with the civil rights victories of the previous years, African Americans 188 encountered “redlining” where discriminatory lenders and insurance companies refused to grant loans or insurance in racially and ethnically diverse areas of a city, were still restricted from renting houses in certain areas of major cities across the United States, and encountered intimidation, coercion, and violence when individuals violated community norms and practices (King 2007). These discriminatory practices perpetuated segregation and put African Americans in a more precarious economic position by restricting the purchase of property outside the most dilapidated areas. Title VIII of the 1968 Act, also known as the Fair Housing Act, addressed these problems by outlawing discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of property based on race, religion, or national origin. These provisions applied to almost 80 percent of property in the United States, and placed enforcement under the discretion of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (King 2007). Though the Fair Housing Act has failed to result in complete integration in many cities across America, it still serves as a fundamental achievement in America’s path of nationalizing the civil rights and civil liberties of African Americans. Thus, these three pieces of policy fundamentally changed the civil rights and civil liberties of African Americans across the United States. The Institutional Context of Cleveland and Savannah in the Modern Era The nationalization of civil rights and civil liberties during the Civil Rights Movement with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act took major steps toward creating better, and similar, material conditions among African Americans in Cleveland and Savannah by protecting their civil rights and civil liberties. For example, in both cities, black elites were integrated in public and private spaces, had greater opportunities to live in close proximity to whites, and were employed in leading public and private professions. Most 189 significantly, black political elites—empowered by the Voting Rights Act and support from black constituents—were ushered into political office in both Cleveland and Savannah. Collectively, the following paragraphs illustrate that black elites in Cleveland and Savannah had similar experiences of their race in the post-1965 era even though they were deeply embedded in their respective local communities. The Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act contributed to improving the material conditions among black elites in Cleveland and Savannah by ending legal segregation and promoting integration in public and private spaces. Lines of strict segregation in Savannah waned by the middle of the twentieth century. The Civil Rights Movement (CRM) was alive and well in Savannah, which led to progress in social institutions, even before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Tuck 1995). The Savannah branch of the NAACP—one of the strongest in Georgia—pushed for social progress and aided African Americans when their rights were violated (Roche 1998). As a result of the CRM in Savannah, integration appeared in Savannah’s city schools as early as 1963, and public spaces such as city buses, golf courses, fire departments, parks, libraries, and eating facilities at the airport and bus station were integrated before the signing of the 1964 Act (Tuck 1995). However, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was still key for legally securing integrated facilities across Savannah, and guaranteeing these newly won rights did not recede. Moreover, while racism was unequivocally a feature of life for Savannah African Americans, the city did not exhibit “the overwhelming bitterness and proclivity to violence associated with the Deep South,” and in fact, Savannah displayed relatively liberal race relations (Tuck 2001, 129). As a port city, Savannah routinely experienced diverse groups of people entering the city in the post-1965 era, and more importantly, Savannah’s economy relied 190 on tourism, which the city believed would suffer if violence against African Americans appeared in the news (Hepburn 1987; Tuck 2001). The story of integration in Cleveland after the civil rights measures of the 1960s is more mixed. On the one hand, Cleveland has been one of the most residentially segregated cities in the United States over the past fifty years with African Americans confined to specific areas within the central city (Leahy and Grant 1985; Miller and Wheeler 1990). One effect of residential segregation in Cleveland was that city schools were also highly segregated—an issue that was addressed by federal courts in 1979 when they enforced citywide busing to integrate public schools (Van Tassel and Grabowski 1986; Krumholz 1995).29 However, like Savannah, African Americans in Cleveland no longer faced legal segregation in public and private spaces, and while low income blacks were heavily concentrated in specific portions of the central city, the narrative of middle and higher income African Americans suggests more progress. By 1960, more blacks were living in owned or rented homes in the suburbs than they had just twenty years earlier (Davis 1972). As Krumholz (1995) explains, fair housing laws in the 1960s, “made it possible for middle- and upper-income blacks to enjoy a wider choice of residence in metropolitan Cleveland, particularly in some of the eastern suburbs. Shaker Heights, Cleveland Heights, Warrensville Heights, and a few other suburbs absorbed a large number of black residents and continued to maintain both a desirable environment and an integrated population” (Krumholz 1995, 130; see also Davis 1972). Indeed, the suburban neighborhoods outside the central city were still more integrated in 1970, and by 1980 East Cleveland, “Cleveland Heights, Shaker Heights, Garfield Heights, and Euclid all had sizable black populations” (Miller and Wheeler 1990, 180; see also Leahy and Grant 1985, Keating 1995). 29 Busing was hardly an effective remedy for integrating the public schools of Cleveland, as this policy was frequently met by “white flight” (Van Tassel and Grabowski 1986). In fact, by the mid-1980s schools were 70 percent black, which was an increase of ten percent from the decade before (Miller and Wheeler 1990). 191 Though some neighborhoods affluent blacks migrated to were hit with high foreclosure rates between the 1970s and 1990s, blacks elites’ living conditions and opportunities for equal housing had improved, as they were no longer crowded in black ghettos (Miller and Wheeler 1990; Mallach and Branchman 2010). Discrimination in the marketplace also receded in the post-1965 era compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah shared similar economic opportunities and many professions while facing common hurdles. To be sure, African Americans were economically deprived in the post-1965 Savannah. The black masses were largely confined to ghettos with unsound housing located just outside the affluent and restored white historic district, and they fell far short of economic parity with whites (Hepburn 1987; Tuck 2001). However, as Tuck (1995) explains, “Despite obvious economic inequalities, the overall welfare of Savannah’s black community was less bleak than that evident throughout much of the Deep South” (Tuck 1995, 553). Indeed, as described above, black elites in Savannah ran for and won political office, owned and ran important businesses such as banks and newspapers, and were professors at Savannah State University (Ammons 1996; Brooks 2012). Likewise, the black masses in Cleveland were often impoverished, underemployed, and the victims hit hardest by economic adversity. However, though black elites in Cleveland were underrepresented among private sector business elites meaning there were few black executives of large corporations, banks, law firms, or black owned businesses of significant size, they still had many economic opportunities, held notable professions, and were particularly well represented in the public sector (Krumholz 1995). For example, prominent blacks in Cleveland were lawyers, surgeons, physicians, athletes, entertainers, professors at nearby Case Western and Cleveland State Universities, deans of Case Western University, members of the Cleveland 192 Board of Education, served as United States Attorney’s, judges in the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, the superintendent of Cleveland schools, and held political offices (Chatterjee1975; Miller and Wheeler 1990). All told, though black elites faced glass ceilings in many professions in both cities, their experiences in Cleveland and Savannah suggest that black elites were still employed alongside whites in elite professions and that economic opportunities for black elites had improved since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Voting Rights Act ushered in a dramatic shift in the objective political power of African Americans in Cleveland and Savannah as well as sending subject signals of political opportunity and influence. While African Americans made gains in many arenas across Cleveland compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their political progress was most pronounced (Miller and Wheeler 1990). Ethnic Democrats held the mayor’s office for the majority of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. In office, these mayors “produced city administrations characterized by low taxes and low service levels and neglected the concerns of black Clevelanders. In sum… Cleveland had a caretaker type of government” and “African Americans, more than any other group, were hurt by this political inaction” (Moore 2003, 303). Blacks in Cleveland were upset by this style of governing, and their frustration erupted in 1966 with riots in the Hough neighborhood.30 In the aftermath of the Hough riots in 1966, African Americans rallied behind Carl B. Stokes’ candidacy for mayor of Cleveland. A native Clevelander, Carl Stokes was an assistant prosecutor and named partner at the law firm Stokes, Stokes, Character, and Terry—a role he continued well into his political career. In the following 30 While Cleveland was historically an exemplar for the treatment of African Americans, racial tensions erupted in Hough neighborhood riots of 1966 (Van Tassel and Grabowski 1986; Wye 1995). Acts of looting, arson, and violence in the predominantly black neighborhood of Hough emerged after the death of four Hough residents at the hands of the local police (Stakes 1995). Two years later riots broke out in the Glenville neighborhood in response to a shootout between the police and a radical militant group led by Fred “Ahmed” Evans. Before the shootout was over, seven were dead, and looting and arson continued for days after. 193 years, Stokes became “active in the Cleveland Urban League, the local NAACP, the County Federated Democrats of Ohio, and the Young Democrats” (Moore 2001, 81). By 1962, Stokes was the first black Democrat elected to the Ohio House of Representatives running on a platform that emphasized increased educational opportunities and a state minimum wage (Moore 2001). Stokes served in the legislature for three terms before pursuing higher office. During the 1967 Democratic mayoral primary, Stokes unseated incumbent mayor Ralph Locher (Moore 2001).31 In the general election Stokes stressed three themes to keep white Democrats from defecting: first, he argued that he deserved their support because he was the Democratic nominee; second, Stokes maintained he would be a mayor that represented all of people; and third, he suggested that his experience and background in the inner-city made him the most qualified candidate (Moore 2003). Moreover, Stokes advised members of the white business community that he was the only candidate that could prevent future racial unrest in Cleveland. When the polls closed, Stokes nearly swept the black vote, but also “won critical support from middle-class whites and business people that ensured his victory” (Moore 2001, 85). Thus, with the support of black community in Cleveland, Carl B. Stokes became the first African American mayor of a major U.S. city signaling the newfound political power of Cleveland’s African Americans. Two years after Carl Stokes became the first African American mayor of Cleveland, his older brother Louis Stokes was elected to Congress as a representative of the 21st District of Ohio, which was primarily based in Cleveland. The elder Stokes was the first African American to represent Ohio. Prior to his election, Louis Stokes was a prominent civil right lawyer, who 31 Blacks and whites alike were upset with the Locher administration. African Americans felt that the mayor failed to address the concerns of the black community, leading to the tensions that erupted in Hough (Moore 2003). Moreover, many in the white community saw Mayor Locher as particularly ineffective when U.S. Department of Housing and Development Secretary Robert Weaver “cut off Cleveland’s urban renewal dollars because of the city’s incompetence in completing projects” (Moore 2001, 83). 194 was active in the Cleveland Branch of the NAACP eventually servings as vice president. During his eleven consecutive terms in Congress, Stokes tallied a number of “firsts” including being the first African American to serve on the powerful House Appropriations Committee when he was appointed to the Subcommittee on HUD, Veterans, and Independent Agencies (Fenno 2003).32 Stokes became chair of this subcommittee in 1992, and from this position overseeing a large chunk of federal discretionary spending, Stokes channeled immense resources into his predominately African American district in Cleveland such as a housing development in the Hough neighborhood (Fenno 2003). Along the way, Stokes proudly championed causes in the interest of all African Americans, thus achieving nearly iconic status in Cleveland and never facing a significant challenge to his elected position both of which signaled improved objective and subjective conditions to Cleveland’s black elites (Fenno 2003). Throughout the 1970s and into 1980s Cleveland was run by one of the most powerful political machines in the nation. Carl Stokes created a base of power in the black community by establishing the Twenty-First District Caucus, an independent political organization with its own rules and procedures that acted like a third party and exerted great power in Cleveland electoral politics during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Nelson Jr. 1995). The choice by Mayor Stokes not to seek reelection combined with conflict among leaders of the Caucus led many black political leaders back into the fold of the Democratic Party, giving rise to a shift in Cleveland’s political power structure (Nelson Jr. 1995). With this shift in politics came the ascendency of George L. Forbes as the boss of Cleveland’s black political machine (Miller and Wheeler 1990; Moore 2003). First elected to the Cleveland City Council in 1963, Forbes later became president while simultaneously serving as co-chair of the Cuyahoga County Democratic Party. The combination 32 Stokes was also the first African American to serve as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and the first black representative to be chair of the Ethics Committee—a position he held twice (Fenno 2003). 195 of these two posts allowed Forbes to amass an enormous amount of personal and political power as he had direct access to party patronage, which he used to generate “IOUs” from other members of the city council (Nelson Jr. 1995; see also Krumholz 1995). Indeed, as Nelson Jr. explains, Forbes, “parlayed his control over committee assignments and budgets into almost dictatorial control over the council” (Nelson Jr. 1995, 287). Though Forbes used his position as machine boss for self-enrichment, he also promoted efforts to help the black community. For example, Forbes funneled public funds to the black community through the black church, spoke forcefully against discrimination in housing and by law enforcement, wrote affirmative action requirements into city legislation, and when he took steps to expand travel through Cleveland’s Hopkins International Airport, he forced airlines to comply with the city’s goals of equal opportunities in employment (Nelson Jr. 1995; Moore 2003). Thus, the electoral and political power of Cleveland’s African Americans guaranteed by the Voting Rights Act was marshaled into one of the most commanding political machines in the United States creating a sense of expanded opportunities and feeling of powerfulness among black elites in Cleveland. The reign of Forbes as Cleveland’s political boss came to an end in the mayoral election of 1989. Though Forbes was armed with a massive war chest and countless political connections, former city councilman and Ohio State Senator Michael White “campaigned as a progressive who saw the need to turn public attention back to the neighborhoods” and gave “people the hope that long-neglected problems of the city’s neighborhoods would be addressed” (Bartimole 1995, 173). In so doing, White advocated “neighborhood development, attack[ed] bank redlining and corporate abatement policies that reduced Cleveland Public School revenues” and challenged “the slow response time of the Cleveland Police Department.” (Stakes 1995, 100). Ultimately, White put together a coalition of blacks and enough whites to give himself a place in the general 196 election—an election in which he won 56 percent of the vote to Forbes’ 44 percent (Nelson Jr. 1995). Thus, White was elected as the second African American mayor of Cleveland in 1989 signaling the continued political power of blacks in Cleveland. During his time in office from 1989 until 2001—the longest reign for any Cleveland mayor—White presided over projects and policies that transformed Cleveland. First, Mayor White fought for publically subsidized development including his Greenway Project, which imposed a county-wide tax on liquor and tobacco to fund a new stadium and arena for the Cleveland Indians and the Cleveland Cavaliers (Stakes 1995; Moore 2003). Moreover, White also pushed for the development of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, the Cleveland Browns Stadium, expansion of Cleveland’s airport, other downtown buildings, and for Cleveland to host the 1992 Democratic National Convention (Nelson Jr. 1995; Moore 2003). At the same time, White made efforts to address Cleveland’s social concerns. For example, Mayor White convinced developers to build over 2000 new homes, constructed the East Side Market and Church Square, revitalized some east side neighborhoods, and urged banks to end redlining practices in selective Cleveland neighborhoods leading to increased residential loan commitments for city residents from financial institutions (Stakes 1995). By forming the Minority Business Council, White brought together minority businesses and minority contractors so they could work together to earn city contracts (Nelson Jr. 1995). The White administration also took steps to reforming Cleveland schools by: (1) endorsing candidates to affect the makeup, and ultimately policies, of the school board: (2) helping to appoint the superintendent of the school board; (3) holding weekly forums on public education; and (4) appointing a liaison between his office and the school board (Nelson Jr. 1995). By the 1993-94 school year, forced busing in Cleveland ended. In addition to these accomplishments, Mayor White appointed the 197 first black police chief, Patrick Oliver in 1989 (Stakes 1995). With these reforms, Cleveland was labeled the “Comeback City” in the early 1990s and Mayor White enjoyed political success until he decided not to seek reelection in 2001. Thus, the political stature of black elites in post-1965 Cleveland was buoyed by the nationalization of political rights, which empowered the African American community to help elect black leaders. Like in Cleveland, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 combined with Savannah’s changing demographics in the following years empowered African Americans in Georgia’s First City. Though some blacks did register and vote in Georgia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, poll taxes, coercion, intimidation, and other forms of disenfranchisement contributed to meager rates of electoral participation as “the black electorate constituted less than 10 percent of the voters after 1908” (Dowe and Walton, Jr. 2013, 231).33 In contrast, African Americans’ asserted their political will at both city and national level in the post-1965 period, which helped national Democratic tickets and ushered in black elected officials throughout Savannah. For example, African Americans used their new political rights to act as a pivotal voting bloc in the 1984 Georgia Democratic Presidential Primary Election. Jesse Jackson brought his 1984 presidential bid to Georgia searching for a large enough share of votes to warrant federal campaign funding. African Americans in Savannah rallied behind Jackson, who won more than 71 percent of the vote in Chatham County—his best county in the state (Walton Jr. and Orr, 2010). By the mid-1990s African Americans made up more than a third of the electorate in presidential elections, and those who were registered to vote turned out in high numbers. The 1996 Presidential election, more than 61 percent of registered blacks in Chatham County turned out to vote. Black voter turnout continued to rise in the following presidential elections reaching 33 For discussion of voting restrictions in Georgia during this period, see Keyssar 2000, and for Savannah in particular, see Perdue 1973 and Acker 2012. 198 more than 69 percent by 2000, 71 percent in 2004, and almost 79 percent in 2008 when the first African American president was elected.34 At the local level African American electoral power contributed to the election and appointment of black leaders in Savannah. Only three years after the Voting Rights Act, Savannah received its first black county commissioner with the election of Reverend L. Scott Stell in 1968 (Brooks 2012; see also Walton Jr. and Orr 2010). A few years later in the mayoral election of 1970, local black leadership, including the Savannah NAACP, cut a deal with Democratic mayoral candidate John P. Rousakis that resulted in the election of Boles Ford as the first black City Councilman (Dowe and Walton Jr. 2013). A transplant from Columbus, Ohio who moved to Savannah to work for Guaranty Life Insurance Company, Ford’s election created great enthusiasm in the black community—and, of course, he was supported by the white establishment—until he angered blacks by going out of his way to comment that he was elected to serve all of Savannah’s people, not just the African American community (Brooks 2012). In the following election of 1974, a second black City Councilman was nominated and elected followed by “a second state legislator, county commissioner, and two members of the school board in subsequent elections” (Walton Jr. and Orr 2010, 141). Though, Rousakis served as mayor for more than 20 years, his alliance with the African American community eventually waned. By the early 1980s demographic shifts provided blacks with a population majority in Savannah, but not in Chatham County. Demographic changes, in turn, led to annexation, redrawing district lines in Savannah, and enlarging the city council from six to eight seats (Walton Jr. and Orr 2010; Brooks 2012). These political alterations momentarily reduced black 34 Election returns accessed on the Chatham County Board of Elections online archive: http://elections.chathamcounty.org/Elections-Archive. 199 political power in Savannah. However, the elections of 1982 still brought another African American to the city council meaning that of the eight city council seats, three were held by blacks—two of whom later became mayor (Dowe and Walton Jr. 2013). The split between Mayor Rousakis and the black community reached an impasse in the 1986 election, as African Americans believed Rousakis had become too accustomed to their support without providing the black community their requisite benefits. Thus, former two-term city councilman Roy L. Jackson entered the 1986 mayoral election becoming the first African American to mount a significant challenge for the mayor’s office. Though, Jackson did not win, he received enough votes to force a runoff election with Mayor Rousakis, and in the process, offered the black community a glimpse of their electoral clout and the future of municipal politics in Savannah (Walton Jr. and Orr 2010; Brooks 2012; Dowe and Walton Jr. 2013). Floyd Adams Jr. was elected mayor of Savannah in 1995 becoming the city’s first African American mayor, which showed the political power of the black community and sent a strong subjective signal to black elite about their power, ability to affect social and political change, and the opportunity structure currently available to African Americans in Savannah. Adams was a native Savannahian, who came of age editing his father’s newspaper The Savannah Herald and began his political career as a city Alderman in 1982 (Brooks 2012). After being elected to the city council three times and serving in this role for thirteen years, Adams rallied support from the black community—particularly black women—to narrowly win 260 more votes than the incumbent Susan Weiner (Dowe and Walton Jr. 2013). Though former mayor Weiner questioned the slim margin of victory and alleged voter fraud, Adams easily won reelection in 1999 (Brooks 2012). During Adams’ second term, white political elites in Savannah petitioned the state legislature to enact term limits for the mayor. Thus, Adams was the first African 200 American mayor of Savannah, the first black mayor to win reelection, and the first mayor of Savannah to be subject to term limits (Dowe and Walton Jr. 2013). While term limits forced Adams out of office, African Americans in Savannah continued to exercise their political power. The 2003 Mayoral Election pitted the only black candidate in the election, Dr. Otis S. Johnson, against Pete Liakakis, who was a former Alderman and owner of multiple businesses in Savannah. Like Adams before him, Johnson was a native of Savannah and had served as a city Alderman in addition to working for the Economic Opportunity Authority, Model Cities Program, serving as a faculty member and dean at Savannah State University, and directing the Savannah-Chatham Board of Education (McFayden 2010). The black community united around Johnson’s candidacy for mayor in 2003, as he received more than 70 percent of his votes from African American districts (Brooks 2012). By runoff election Johnson was elected as the second black mayor of Savannah. In office, Johnson presided over an improving Savannah as evidenced by increasing high school and college graduation rates, higher median family income, and a lower percentage of families living below the poverty line (McFayden 2010). Thus, in 2007, Johnson was reelected as mayor of Savannah further signaling blacks’ political power. Black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah were objectively and subjectively empowered by the passage of the civil rights acts of the 1960s. Objectively, compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the nationalization of civil and political rights led to: high rates of electoral participation and the many black elected officials; employment in key teaching and administrative positions at local colleges; less economic discrimination coupled with opportunities that placed them in upper echelon profession in the public and private sectors; residential integration in neighborhoods; and importantly, blacks encountered violence less often 201 as an acceptable tactic for controlling and enforcing their behaviors. Subjectively, black elites surely still faced challenges, glass ceilings in politics and employment, micro aggressions, passive and active racism, and the like, which conferred messages of powerlessness and limited opportunities. However, on average, black elites’ objective and subjective experiences with the institutional conditions present in Cleveland and Savannah undoubtedly improved by the post1965 period compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Institutional Conditions, Racial Alienation, and Attitudes Towards Immigration The institutional arrangements black elites confronted in Cleveland and Savannah during the post-1965 period led to similar levels of racial alienation, which had two implications for black elites’ immigration attitudes. First, black elites of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were almost certainly more racially alienated than contemporary black elites of the post1965 era. While black elites of an earlier time faced tough objective material conditions including rampant segregation, discrimination in public and private social and economic institutions, were disenfranchised at high rates, and feared for their personal safety if they violated laws, customs, or social norms, modern day black elites held elected office and voted at high rates, lived and worked alongside whites, were no longer legally segregated in public and private spaces, and were empowered by the nationalization of their civil rights and civil liberties. These differences in the objective conditions black elites experienced between two time periods suggest that black elites in the post-1965 period were politically empowered, had the ability to affect social and political change, experienced less overt discrimination and violence, and had greater opportunities than their ancestors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 202 Subjectively, black elites of the modern era most certainly experienced discrimination; resistant in social, political, and economic arenas of their lives; and moments of powerlessness and limited opportunities. These feelings cannot be discounted; however, the passage of key civil rights laws, election of black representatives, widespread electoral participation and courting from political parties, and employment in influential positions also sent equally important subjective signals of empowerment, inclusion, and possibility to black elites in Cleveland and Savannah. Collectively, the objective and subjective experiences of black elites in post-1965 Cleveland and Savannah indicate that racial alienation was lower in this time period compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Lower racial alienation in the post-1965 era compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in turn, led black elites to see immigration as less threatening. Just as black elites in Cleveland between 1883 and 1921 viewed immigration with less hostility than their more alienated counterparts in Savannah, less alienated black elites in the contemporary era were more approving of immigration than their counterparts of an earlier era as evidenced by the opinions displayed in Chapter 4. Moreover, black elites in Cleveland and Savannah in the post1965 era had comparable levels of racial alienation meaning there was less regional variation in the tone of their response to immigration. The second implication of comparable levels of racial alienation between black elites in Cleveland and Savannah is they adopted similar worldviews for advancing the status of African Americans. While elites of the past interpreted racial uplift through an integrationist or accommodationist lens, contemporary elites of the post-1965 period, confronted with analogous objective and subjective experiences that led to analogous levels of racial alienation, adopted similar worldviews for advancing the status of African Americans. In turn, rather than 203 interpreting immigration through distinct worldviews emphasizing accommodation or integration, post-1965 black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah considered immigration through the integrationist worldview. The Integrationist Worldview After 1965 Like black elites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, lower levels of racial alienation led African American elites in the post-1965 period to advocate an integrationist worldview. Though notable exceptions exist, and contingents of black nationalists—particularly community nationalists—have developed, integration has historically been the most widely espoused worldview among African Americans (Dawson 2001). Thus, black elites have used this integrationist lens for developing strategies to advance the status of African Americans, and used this worldview for interpreting events in the world such as immigration in the post-1965 era. The integrationist worldview has deep roots in the African American community extending back to the days of Frederick Douglass. Later champions of integration included William Monroe Trotter, Ida B. Wells, and famously W.E.B. Du Bois. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. carried the torch lit by Du Bois and was the clear leader of African Americans until his death. Not only was King the unparalleled leader of African Americans, but he was also the most outspoken advocate of the integrationist position in the post-1965 period. A newly minted graduate of Boston University, King returned to the South and began his career as a pastor and civil rights leader in Montgomery, Alabama where he joined “forces with the local NAACP, and dug in for a year long bus boycott created to end the Jim Crow law of racial segregation in public transportation” (Dyson 2008, 6). As an organizer of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, King received national attention as a burgeoning civil rights leader, later forming and serving as president of the 204 Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)—an African American civil rights organization that used nonviolent tactics to fight racial discrimination and inequality. As president of SCLC, King preached non-violent direct action, led protests, demonstrations, boycotts, and spoke against perceived racial injustices in America (Dyson 2008). Until his death in 1968, King was the figurehead of the civil rights movement, a forceful black leader, and a fierce believer in the integrationist worldview. As described in Chapter 3, integrationists like King fundamentally believed that racism in American society was unjust, and America failed to live up to its democratic tradition by allowing prejudice and discrimination based on racial characteristics (Dawson 2001). This challenge was exemplified in King’s 1963 “I have a Dream” speech at the “March on Washington.” In his address, King explains: In a sense we’ve come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects of our Republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men—yes, black men as well as white men—would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check which has come back marked ‘insufficient funds’ (King 1963) Racism, segregation, and inequality were simply unacceptable for integrationists, and they looked to the federal government to rectify inconsistencies between America’s ideals and practices. Indeed, integrationists believed in the importance of a strong national government to guarantee full citizenship for African Americans (Marx 1998). Thus, the first pillar of the integrationist worldview was the repudiation of American racism. Besides a deep distain for racism that hardly differentiated integrationists from other African Americans, black elites holding this worldview believed in complete equality between 205 all individuals in American society. For many integrationists, equality meant equal participation in civil society, and that “equality of opportunity should be reflected in equality of outcomes” (Dawson 2001, 268). However, integrationists wanted more than equality before the law, as they sought equality in political, social, and economic spheres of American life. As Martin Luther King famously asked in 1965, “What good does it do to be able to eat at a lunch counter if you can’t afford to buy a hamburger?” (Quigley 2015). Integrationists, thus, believed that while the legal advances made during the civil rights movement and the subsequent federal civil rights legislation of the 1960s were long overdue, they also proposed that more should be done to ensure greater opportunities and more equal results in political, social, and economic life. In so doing, integrationists continued their pleas for a stronger central state and held more radical civil rights beliefs than many mainstream Americans. In the years after Dr. King’s death, Jesse Jackson continued the integrationist message and served as the de facto leader of African Americans (Nelson 2003). Jackson was a contemporary of Dr. King, who marched with King in Selma, Alabama, worked for SCLC, and was with King in Memphis when he was assassinated. Though Jackson continued working with SCLC after King’s death, he eventually resigned and later formed his own organization. As Nelson explains, Jackson “adopted the term ‘Rainbow Coalition’ as the rallying motto for a unique intra-racial political movement, and created People United to Save Humanity [PUSH] to make the nation’s wealth available to the disadvantaged and poor” (Nelson 2003, 269). With this organization and the “Coalition” in his pocket, Jackson launched a massive and targeted voter registration drive meant to bring unregistered African Americans into the political process (Walton Jr. 1997). In so doing, Jackson simultaneously bolstered his own image as an African American leader, a champion of the integrationist worldview by seeking full political 206 incorporation and equal political opportunities for African Americans as a means to advance the position of blacks in society, and sowed the seeds for his future presidential campaigns. Jesse Jackson ran for President of the United States in 1984, setting a record for the most votes received by an African American candidate for president, and ultimately, finished third in the Democratic primaries. Four years later, as Dawson explains, “the Jackson campaign represented a concrete implementation of the radical economic restructuring within the framework of capitalism” that integrationists have advocated for the majority of the twentieth century (Dawson 2001, 270). Indeed, in his address at the1988 Democratic National Convention, Jackson articulated the greatest challenge of the day: “What’s the moral challenge of our day? We have public accommodations. We have the right to vote. We have open housing. What’s the fundamental challenge of our day? It is to end economic violence…Even the greedy do not profit from greed—economic violence” (Jackson 1988). Moreover, in his address, Jackson also championed the integrationist principle of political empowerment encouraging “A commitment to new priorities that insure that hope will be kept alive. A common ground commitment to a legislative agenda for empowerment, for…universal, on-site, same-day [voter] registration everywhere” (Jackson 1988). Though Jackson placed second in the 1988 Democratic primaries, his campaign served as a platform for promoting key principles of the integrationist worldview including championing the political rights and empowerment, and a commitment to equal economic opportunities and fair economic outcomes, both of which would help advance the status of African Americans. The integrationist worldview promoted strict equality in all aspects of social, economic, and political life. In addition to a strong central state that, ideally, would guarantee these outcomes, integrationists believed in a number of central tactics that were useful in their pursuit 207 of equality and racial uplift. Foremost, like late nineteenth and early twentieth century integrationists, those in the contemporary era proposed agitation for their rights and equality. This agitation included grassroots activism and bottom-up protest meant to pressure key institutions in American society to afford racial justice (Dawson 2001). Moreover, as Dawson explains, integrationists “do believe… in political, social, and economic struggle waged morally, through the electoral process, and in the streets” (Dawson 2001, 258). In an era where blacks had electoral clout, they could use this power to exert political pressure, which was another useful avenue of activism meant to usher in greater equality and advance the position of African Americans. Thus, like their predecessors, integrationists in the post-1965 era promoted equality in social, economic, and political arenas while suggesting that agitation, protest, and electoral pressure were useful tactics for racial advancement. The Integrationist Worldview in Cleveland and Savannah Between 1965 and 2009, black elites in Cleveland and Savannah drew from their local experiences of racial alienation and adopted an integrationist worldview for advancing the status of African Americans. As integrationists, these elites believed that racism was a violation of American values, that complete equality in social, economic, and political affairs was an essential goal, which could be achieved through agitation, bottom-up activism, and electoral pressure. In turn, black elites in Cleveland and Savannah interpreted events and issues in the world—including immigration—through this worldview that was an artifact of their local experiences, being embedded in their communities, and ultimately their vision of what was ideal for fellow African Americans in their respective localities. 208 One indication that black elites in Cleveland and Savannah adopted an integrationist worldview was their reverence for integrationist leaders in the post-1965 period. In particular, black elites in both cities exhibited enormous affection for Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. The Savannah Herald, for example, referred to King as “a modern Moses” and a “giant leader of the great crusade for human rights, social justice and economic equality for a minority and underprivileged group” (Savannah Herald, 4-13-1968). Later, the Herald nostalgically praised “the dream that Martin Luther King so eloquently defined in the 60’s March on Washington” (Savannah Herald, 3-16-1977). In Cleveland, the Call and Post placed King in a historical context of black leaders saying: “No man since Frederick Douglass, has captured the imagination and feelings of the people as has Dr. King. Like Douglass, Dr. King has a wide following from whites as well as Negroes. Also, like Douglass, he is fearless; like Douglass, he is articulate and persuasive” (Call and Post, 4-3-1965). However, black elites in Cleveland believed that King was superior to earlier black leaders like Douglass, Du Bois, and Walter White, as “none before him had ever been able to articulate the dream with the passion and dedication that Martin Luther King brought to it. None before him had ever been able to so completely challenge the dormant conscience of white America into meaningful action” (Call and Post, 4-13-1968). Quite simply, the Call and Post described King as “dynamic and spectacular” stating, “He is the…decoration on the racial cake” (Call and Post, 2-6-1965). Thus, black elites in both cities respected and followed the King as the integrationist leader of their time. In the years after King’s death, Jesse Jackson assumed the position as the champion of the integrationist worldview, and black elites in Cleveland and Savannah responded with praise. While Jesse Jackson was praised in both cities, he and his campaign were both described and interpreted in uniquely local ways. For example, Jackson’s PUSH organization had a branch 209 located in Savannah, which planned “a series of community forums to provide political education to the residents of the second, fifth, and eighth county commission districts of Chatham County…” but black elites also supported his 1984 presidential campaign (Savannah Herald, 6-27-1984, see also Savannah Herald, 7-11-1984). More broadly, the Savannah Herald called his campaign “a crusade galvanizing hundreds of thousands of minorities, poor and progressive whites and women around the principles of the Rainbow Coalition…” (Savannah Herald, 5-30-1984). Professor Otis Johnson, who was a campaign chairperson for Jackson and years later became mayor of Savannah, was quoted in the Savannah Herald stating that, “We have greatly stepped up our efforts to get out the vote for Rev. Jackson in the Black community” (Savannah Herald, 2-29-1984). When the Jackson campaign visited the Savannah Civic Center, “The arena filled to capacity before the program began and many Jackson supporters were turned away” (Savannah Herald, 2-15-1984). Indeed, some estimates reported that there were 4,000 supporters, unable to fit in the arena, who stayed in the parking lot during Jackson’s address (Walton Jr. 1997). Clearly, the Jackson campaign of 1984 enjoyed wide support among black elites in Savannah, and importantly his campaign was discussed in the context of local events in Savannah and the approval of Savannah’s black elites and masses alike. Black elites in Cleveland similarly supported Jackson’s second run for the presidency four years later and discussed his candidacy with respect to its local influence and importance. For example, the Call and Post vehemently endorsed Jackson for president in 1988: Once in a while--once in a long while—a politician comes along with a real message; with the message which is able to energize thousands, and with the skills to present that message to the masses. Jesse Jackson is that man for this hour, and he deserves the votes of Ohio's Democrats for their nomination to the presidency of the United States. Jackson…has promoted a message which is designed not to divide, but to unite Americans into a common goal to attack, not each other, but the real enemies which would destroy the nation’s social health and prosperity… Jackson has shown that he has what it takes to be the next 210 president of the United States. We urge Ohio voters to go out to the polls on May 3 and help Jackson make his dream--and ours--come true (Call and Post, 4-281988). Though Jackson did not receive the Democratic Party’s nomination, Cleveland’s black elites still viewed his candidacy as a success. In fact, the Call and Post fondly reflected that “Jackson came to the convention as the clear and uncontested political leader of a constituency which is overwhelmingly Black” and “won all the nation’s major cities. He won in 100 congressional districts. He gained not only 1100 delegates, but seven million votes…He has won a number of battles, in respect for himself and for the political potency of Blacks.” (Call and Post, 8-111988). In his campaign, Jackson demonstrated that an African American could be a viable presidential candidate, and like their counterparts in Savannah four years earlier, Cleveland black elites rallied to support him. Besides supporting these influential integrationist African American leaders, black elites in Cleveland and Savannah also advocated the integrationist principles of guaranteeing equal opportunity and fairer results for African Americans in economic and political life. For example, an editorial from the Call and Post took an extreme integrationist stance suggesting that, “the time has come for the nation to guarantee its citizenry an annual income to enable even its poorest to rise out of poverty. There should be a floor, an absolute minimum income, beneath which no family or single individual ought to be allowed to fall.” (Call and Post, 8-7-1965). In the following year, black elites in Cleveland advocated affirmative measures to provide blacks with equal opportunities by correcting for past discrimination. As a Call and Post editorial eloquently summarizes, “Discrimination is still a factor in employment and only vigorous affirmative action programs can overcome it” (Call and Post, 10-7-1978). Moreover, “where civil rights laws are aggressively enforced or where federal and state governments mandate some 211 affirmative action in hiring, there has been some progress in increasing opportunity for Blacks.” (Call and Post, 12-3-1992). However, despite making some progress by enacting affirmative actions programs, black elites firmly held “that the struggle is not over” and “society must continue to tear down the barriers to full economic and social participation which bigotry and legalized, institutionalized racism have created.” (Call and Post, 11-17-1994). In addition to affirmative action in employment, black elites also saw the need for affirmative action in housing bluntly stating: “more affirmative action is also needed to break down the subtle barriers that keep blacks out of their fair share of the nation’s good housing…those communities that take steps to lower the economic barriers that keep lower income families out ought to be rewarded and encouraged…” (Call and Post, 7-10-1971). Thus, in employment and housing, black elites in Cleveland drew on their local experiences and advocated integrationist principles of ensuring equal opportunities while paving a way towards greater equality in outcomes. The narrative among black elites in Savannah was similar while also highlighting how local issues featured into black elite’s integrationist worldview. For example, in the wake the Martin Luther King Jr. assassination, a local pastor of St. Johns Church, Rev. Alexander was quoted in the Savannah Herald suggesting that “Savannah can see that every man has a decent job and a chance for advancement…see that every man has decent housing…Savannah can pave muddy streets” (Savannah Herald, 4-13-1968). In the following decades, black elites identified that “economic problems, which undergird all of our other problems, remain persistent and sever… economic progress for Black Americans is the key of our social progress in health, housing, education and family stability.” (Savannah Herald, 2-13-1985). Later that year, the Savannah Herald continued black elites’ integrationist message advocating affirmative action to enhance opportunities for blacks: 212 The civil rights law and affirmative action…opened doors of opportunity that many thousands walked through. Once people saw they could get those jobs, their aspirations were raised and they equipped themselves with the skills to get them. So it’s a dim view of human nature that says social programs corrupt people. They enable people. That’s what America should be doing today, too—enabling people to move from poverty to decent standards, from despair to hope, from alienation to inclusion in the mainstream (Savannah Herald, 9-11-1985). However, despite their advocacy, as late as 1998 black elites in Savannah lamented, “the next civil rights agenda is economic parity” (Savannah Herald, 1-14-1998). Hence, like their counterparts in Cleveland, black elites in Savannah trumpeted an integrationist chorus of enhancing the opportunities of African Americans, even if those opportunities and outcome did not always manifest. Black elites in Cleveland recognized the importance of political equality and voting rights, which again, is consistent with an integrationist worldview for racial advancement. Before the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, an editorial in the Call and Post commented ““IT IS in areas like Selma, where the civil rights laws will get their severest test. Unless and until the right to vote is freely established in such communities, the civil rights laws will be merely scraps of paper” (Call and Post, 2-13-1965). Civil rights alone thus were not enough for black elites in Cleveland, as they also wanted an equal opportunity to express their political voice in the electoral arena. Once established, black elites called the Voting Rights Act “one of the most important civil rights pieces of legislation” (Call and Post, 1-10-1970). A few years later in 1982, black elites worried that if the Act was not extended “many of us risk being slaves again, because we will only be able to vote when the White man says so!” (Call and Post, 3-13-1982). Though the Voting Rights Act was established and extended, black elites were not complacent with their legal right to vote, as they firmly believed in bringing more African Americans into the political process via voter registration drives. 213 Voter registration efforts were considered vital for black elites in Cleveland. For example, in 1965, the Call and Post urged African Americans to support the registration campaign of Dr. King: Dr. Martin Luther King, showing the strain of almost incessant campaigning around the nation on behalf of Negro advancement, came to Cleveland last week to exhort an estimated 40,000 Negro residents here to register and vote…We suggest that, every registered voter (you proud and noble first class citizens) accept the responsibility, this week, to persuade just one of your unregistered neighbors to qualify as a voter, Rev. King’s Cleveland visit and his continuing crusade will not have been entirely wasted (Call and Post, 8-7-1965). Again, this is an instance in which the editor of the Call and Post views a national issue first through a local lens and draws attention to how Dr. King’s registration drive will impact African Americans in Cleveland. Years later, black elites continued their praise for voter registration drives explaining, “One of the greatest instruments for movement from disgrace to dignity in the political affairs of our nation is the Jesse Jackson Campaign…for voter registration…[which] represents the most significant coalition of new voters since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt.” (Call and Post, 7-19-1984). Despite the efforts of leaders like King and Jackson to register more African Americans, black elites still complained that “The path to the ballot box is often strewn with enough barriers to create a formidable obstacle course for many Americans” and “registering and voting remains a major problem for many” even years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act (Call and Post, 9-27-1984). Barriers to registering and voting persisted into the twenty first century in the form of voter identification requirements, yet black elites continued to express their displeasure with any measures intended to make voting or registration more difficult. Indeed, black elites called voter identification requirements “a disturbing action” that would “make it more difficult for groups to register voters” and would hinder democracy (Call and Post, 12-22-2005). Thus, black elites in Cleveland favored more inclusion in the 214 political process and chided efforts meant to keep African Americans away from the polls in Ohio. Savannah black elites also valued political equality, promoted voting rights, and denounced practices aimed at making individual electoral participation more difficult. Though the Voting Rights Act of 1965 extended voting rights to African Americans, Savannah Herald interpreted voting rights through a local lens by commenting in 1970, that “This year more than ever it is important that our voting rights be secured and protected…We must secure realistic local and national reforms to improve and enlarge upon programs of the sixties that opened new vistas to many minorities. This is not a time to turn back and the ballot box is our best forward movement. This year we must get involved if we are to be involved in this decade” (Savannah Herald, 2-21-1970). A few years later, an editorial in the Herald argued that, “heavy voting output has resulted in a more rapid system of integration in employment…” suggesting that electoral participation could lead to advancement for African Americans in other areas of life (Savannah Herald, 9-23-1972). Indeed, comments in the following years maintained, “if blacks want power—they will have to get it through the ballot box,” as “the present leadership views politics as a solution to community problems and have proceeded to engage themselves in electoral politics” (Savannah Herald, 10-27-1976; Savannah Herald, 1-3-1979). Before individuals could engage in the electoral process, they needed to register to vote. Thus, the Herald announced, “We need to urge our people continuously to register. So many are not registered and some who have been registered have not voted for awhile and their names are not now on the books” (Savannah Herald, 3-19-1980). In this reference to “our people” black elites in Savannah are referring to their fellow blacks in Savannah first, followed by African Americans nationally. When impediments to equal electoral participation were later enacted in 215 Georgia with voter identification requirements in 2005, black elites in Savannah denounced them as an “unconstitutional burden to a citizen’s right to vote” and urged the judiciary to strike down such practices (Savannah Herald, 11-2-2005). Thus, like their contemporaries in Cleveland, black elites in Savannah held to integrationist principles wherein the believed in promoting equality in the political arena for Savannah’s African Americans, and these principles stemmed from their local experiences and thoughts about what was ideal for blacks in Savannah. Though black elites adhering to an integrationist worldview favored equal political and economic opportunities, the rest of society did not always live up to these ideals. To impel their local communities in Cleveland and Savannah to live up to these democratic principles, integrationist black elites believed in agitation, protest, and activism. The tradition of protest and activism among black elites in Savannah was long. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, African Americans in Savannah agitated to tear down racial segregation in education by suing the Chatham County School Board. Though a federal judge ruled against the black plaintiffs in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, African Americans in Savannah put the community on notice that they would not silently forgo their equal rights (Ducat 2009). Indeed, the Savannah chapter of the NAACP “unanimously expressed its preference for integration” during the Sibley Commission hearings, which were tasked with gathering the preferences of Georgian’s regarding desegregation (Roche 1998, 137). Besides expressing dissatisfaction with segregation in these formal arenas, black elites in Savannah adopted strategies of “protest, which aimed to coerce local whites into integrating, rather than provoking violence in an effort to secure federal help” (Tuck 2001, 130). In the Savannah Herald, black elites opined, “we believe that a dedicated effort on the part of Negroes and other minority groups to achieve first class 216 citizenship can be realized through deliberate effort” (Savannah Herald, 7-23-1966). The following year, an editorial from the Herald pushed this sentiment further: The task this year is therefore to press for completion of the many projects that will mean equality of opportunity. The ideals of the past twenty years are not the goals of our time but the fields of endeavor on which we are to continue to pursue until our society is perfect…The time has now come for us to take inventory of the unfinished business at hand. Housing, quality, education and full participation in public and civic affairs. There is need of new ideas that will include all citizens as equals and not accessories (Savannah Herald, 1-21-1967). Agitation for equal rights was not confined to the 1960s, as black elites in Savannah subsequently pushed for more equal treatment. For example, in 1988, the Herald noted “inequities still persist; segregated and inferior classrooms, housing discrimination, unequal pay, rampant joblessness, and poor health facilities for Blacks. The list goes on and so does the continued need for the Black Press to voice our protests against inequities” (Savannah Herald, 3- 23-1988). Thus, black elites in Savannah not only believed in integrationist principles for racial advancement in Savannah, but they also favored using integrationist tactics in their local communities by agitating for equal rights. Like their counterparts in Savannah, black elites in Cleveland believed in pressure to compel the city of Cleveland to live up to democratic ideals of equality. At the organizational level, Cleveland had the infrastructure necessary for coordinated agitation with local branches of the NAACP, SCLC, and Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) (Chatterjee 1975). Moreover, the Call and Post published and endorsed an editorial by Martin Luther King Jr. where he suggested: The stirring lesson of the age is that mass nonviolent direct action is not a peculiar device for Negro agitation. Rather, it is an historically validated method for defending freedom and democracy and enlarging these values for the ultimate benefit of the total society…Now, more than ever before, is the time for creative leadership, imaginative proposals and massive action programs to correct the monstrous wrongs of racial inequality (Call and Post, 1-29-1966). 217 While King eloquently stated the need for non-violent direct action to remedy racial inequities, countless editorials in the Call and Post endorsed this tactic.35 Indeed, the Call and Post maintained, “It can be unequivocally stated that the vast majority of Negro Americans are still on the side of non-violence…” (Call and Post, 4-13-1968). When King was assassinated, black elites called for “a great upsurge of immediate and continued action by all Americans. The decent people can’t remain silent.” (Call and Post, 4-13-1968). Black elites in Cleveland, therefore, endorsed integrationist tactics such as nonviolent direct action, protest, and pressure for the equal rights of African Americans in their communities. Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah adopted an integrationist worldview for racial advancement that stemmed from their local experiences and reflected their perspective of what was an ideal course for advancing the status of African Americans in their respective communities. The discourse in the Call and Post and Savannah Herald—even in the nationalized media environment of the late twentieth century—clearly reflected local issues, events, and ideas. From this worldview emphasizing equality, rights, and agitation, black elites interpreted issues and events in their local environments. When the issue of immigration arose, the considerations most salient to black elites were those consistent with their broader integrationist worldview meaning immigration was interpreted in the context of rights and equality. In turn, immigrants in both cities were recognized as fellow subjects of injustice and inequality. Conclusion The preceding paragraphs provided important insights on the factors shaping black elite immigration opinions during two waves of immigration to the United States. The passage of the 35 For endorsements of nonviolent direct action, see Cleveland Call and Post editorials from: January 15, 1972; February 10, 1979; June 16, 1979; January 16, 1986; etc. 218 Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 fundamentally altered the objective conditions African Americans experienced in Cleveland and Savannah. Compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these measures meant black elites in the post-1965 era no longer encountered legal segregation, discrimination was less overt, racial violence waned, political power increased as evidenced by black office holder and high rates of electoral participation, all of which contributed to a greater realm of opportunities for African Americans. Subjective measures of powerlessness and discrimination also lessened in the post-1965 period compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Collectively, these objective and subjective conditions meant that black elites of the contemporary era were less racially alienated than previous generations in Cleveland and Savannah. Lower levels of racial alienation meant black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah found immigrants less threatening in the post-1965 period compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and adopted more positive views of immigration overall. Secondly, because black elites were less racially alienated in the post-1965 period, they adopted integrationist worldviews for racial advancement that reflected their perception of what was the ideal course for bettering the position, status, and opportunities available to members of their local black communities. African American elites were deeply embedded in their local communities and experienced politics locally first even during the post-1965 era when conduits to national media, parties, and elites were more developed. Like the newspapers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Call and Post and the Savannah Herald had an undeniably local component. Indeed, the pages were littered with local advertisements for black owned 219 businesses, guest editorials were written by local leaders, and local issues were featured prominently. When integrationist leaders like Jesse Jackson were featured, they were interpreted within the local context of each city, and when integrationist ideals emerged in the pages of the newspapers, they were first in reference to local issues. Through this locally engineered integrationist worldview, black elites interpreted the issue of immigration. Immigrants in the contemporary era were, therefore, understood as fellow subjects of discrimination also fighting for equality. Collectively, these findings make two significant contributions to our understanding of black opinion formation and change. First, contrary to previous research suggesting that African American public opinion was homogenous because individual blacks used their perception of what was ideal for the larger—national— racial group as a proxy for their own individual preferences, this research suggests that opinions on immigration varied spatially and temporally (Dawson 1994). Because individuals were deeply embedded in their local communities as evidenced by the local issues present in the Call and Post and Savannah Herald, they looked to other African Americans in their community first, not an amorphous group of national blacks, when conceiving of the ideal course for racial advancement among African Americans. This is an important and underdeveloped theoretical point in Dawson’s (1994) account of the black utility heuristic—that the group blacks imagine when evaluating the racial group interest is local, not national. Secondly, this chapter illustrates that varying racial alienation as evidenced by objective material conditions as well as subjective feelings of powerlessness, discrimination, and a perception of the opportunity structure available to African Americans influenced varied immigration opinions of black elites. This is an important finding that is consistent with contemporary research on racial alienation and blacks immigration preferences (Bobo and 220 Hutchings 1996, Hutchings et al. 2011, Wilkinson and Bingham 2016). Importantly, this argument also runs counter to economic explanations for African American opinion on immigration suggesting that opinions result from variation in local economies, neighborhoods factors, and/or metro level demographics (Gay 2006; McClain et al. 2007; etc.). Instead, this chapter suggests that the historical institutional context in which black elites were imbedded altered African Americans’ experiences and perceptions, altering their feelings of racial alienation, and ultimately their immigration preferences. 221 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION Millions of immigrants arrived to the United States between 1880 and the early 1920s. During this time, the percent of the total population held by immigrants fluctuated between 13 and 15 percent (Colby and Ortman 2014). Unlike earlier waves of immigrants stemming from Ireland, Germany, and Scandinavia, most immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries arrived from Southern and Eastern Europe (Zong and Batalova 2015). Legislation passed in 1921 and 1924 restricted the flow of immigrants to the United States, and the percent of total population held by immigrants waned between 1930 and 1970 when it reach a low point of five percent. The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 reopened America’s doors, and in the years after 1970, the number of immigrants coming to the United States again began to sharply rise (Nwosa et al. 2014). By 2010 there were almost 40 million immigrants in the United States making up nearly 13 percent of the U.S. population. However, unlike the immigrants from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these immigrants— particularly after 1980—originated from Latin America and Asia (Nwosa et al. 2014). Thus, during two periods of American history, millions of new individuals entered American society, and at times, vied with natives for position in the social and political order. The aim of this dissertation has been to systematically measure, analyze, and explain how one historically overlooked group—black elites—responded to immigration during these two key waves of immigration to the United States. 222 The Central Argument and Findings The preceding chapters provide important methodological and theoretical contributions to our scholarly understanding of public opinion formation, change and measurement; African American politics and history; and the politics of immigration in the United States. This dissertation puts forth a novel methodological approach by arguing that scholars of political behavior have become too reliant on survey data to evaluate longitudinal questions that originate prior to the development of widespread public opinion surveys, and particularly for groups—like African Americans—that are already underrepresented in public opinion surveys. At the same time, the dissertation suggests that political development approaches that often use unique methodological techniques for answering historical and longitudinal questions have largely overlooked political preferences as an outcome of interest. Using a content analysis of editorial comments in four historical newspapers—the Cleveland Gazette, Savannah Tribune, Cleveland Call and Post, and the Savannah Herald—the findings challenge arguments that black public opinion is national and homogenous (Dawson 1994) while also challenging the findings of historians that African American immigration attitudes were consistent across localities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Hellwig; Shankman 1982). The content analysis of the Cleveland Gazette and the Savannah Tribune revealed that while immigration was viewed negatively in both Cleveland and Savannah between 1883 and 1921, black elites in Savannah were even more restrictionist. Moreover, the considerations that came to the minds of black elites in conjunction with immigration also varied regionally. Black elites in Cleveland understood immigration through a rights based lens in which they were upset over the rights and privileges that were often denied to blacks but afforded to immigrants. Conversely, black elites in Savannah saw the issue of immigration 223 through an economic lens and worried about the economic competition that might accompany increased immigration. In contrast to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, black elites approved of immigration between 1965 and 2009. A content analysis of the Cleveland Call and Post and the Savannah Herald provides a systematic and longitudinal analysis of black elite opinion after the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which replaced the national origins quota system and allowed million of immigrants from diverse racial backgrounds to enter the United States over the next fifty years. Despite the development of sample surveys in the twentieth century, public opinion surveys with large samples of African Americans did not begin to ask questions about immigration until the mid-1980s leaving the response of African Americans to immigration for first twenty years after the passage of the 1965 Act unexplored (see Fuchs 1990 and Diamond 1998 for exceptions). Scholarship that did examine African Americans’ immigration attitudes in the following years relied on snapshots at specific points in time and was wrought with contradictory findings that did not provide a unified or coherent understanding of African Americans immigration preferences. The systematic and longitudinal analysis of editorial comments from the Call and Post and the Herald suggests that black elite immigration opinion varied less between Cleveland and Savannah in the post-1965 era than during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, in both cities, black elites developed feelings of commonality with immigrants based on an observation that the two groups were linked in their struggle to overcome common challenges and realize their full civil rights and civil liberties. Together, these findings systematically reported the attitudes of black elites in two cities—one northern and one southern—during periods in American history when surveys of African Americans were rare. In 224 so doing, this research fills a significant void in historical record; documents the preferences of a group that is traditionally underrepresented in public opinion research; and helps clarify disagreements over the tone and shape of African American immigration preferences in the post1965 era, and offers a bridge between scholars of political behavior and historical institutionalism. The primary theoretical contribution of this dissertation is the argument that research on African American public opinion homogenizes black views, ignoring spatial and temporal variation. The dissertation argues that black elites were deeply embedded in their local communities, thus developing political orientations locally first, rather than nationally. As a result, when black elites considered what was ideal for African Americans more broadly, they pondered how policies, opinions, and actions would affect other blacks in their community first, not an amorphous “national” group. This argument provides needed clarification to an underdeveloped aspect of Dawson’s black utility heuristic, which does not specify that the group African Americans consider in forming their racial group interests are most certainly local first, and national second (Dawson 1994). Thus, this dissertation further clarifies the theoretical underpinnings of the linked fate model of black public opinion. To account for the varied reaction of black elites to immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this dissertation finds that the local institutional context African Americans were embedded in influenced their preferences on immigration. Divergent experiences of race led black elites in Cleveland and Savannah to feel varied levels of racial alienation. Black elites in Cleveland encountered superior objective material conditions as they lived throughout the central city, were educated and employed alongside whites, and participated in the political process. Conversely the conditions their counterparts in Savannah faced included 225 segregated living arrangements, segregated social and economic institutions, the denial of political rights, and the fear of racial violence if they violated laws and customs. Black elites in Cleveland and Savannah, thus objectively, existed in quite different institutional contexts affording them different opportunities and feelings of their own power. These objective differences in conditions also interacted with and intensified subjective perceptions of powerlessness, discrimination, and altered black elites’ views of the opportunity structure available to African Americans, all of which led to varied feelings of racial alienation. Greater racial alienation in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Savannah, stemming from a more oppressive local institutional context, meant black elites saw immigrants as even more threatening in Savannah than Cleveland. Moreover, varied racial alienation reflecting their local experiences influenced the worldview black elites in each city adopted for advancing the status of African Americans. Less alienated black elites in Cleveland gravitated towards an integrationist approach for racial advancement emphasizing agitation for civil and political rights and increased education. On the other hand, more alienated black elites in Savannah adopted an accommodationist worldview that valued racial solidarity, separate black institutions, economic empowerment, and industrial education. Through these distinct visions of what was ideal for their local racial group, black elites contemplated the issue of immigration, which offers an explanation for why black elites in Cleveland resisted immigration on the grounds that immigrants were afforded more rights and privileges, while black elites in Savannah feared the economic implications of immigration. Importantly, this shows that black elites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had different experiences of their race as evidenced by varied level of racial alienation, which in turn led them to adopt unique, rather than homogenous, political preferences. 226 The institutional context black elites encountered in the post-1965 era also significantly shaped their experience of their race, ultimately influencing their political preferences and helping account for different immigration preferences than the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The nationalization of civil rights and civil liberties with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act led to less variation in the rights and liberties African Americans experienced in post-1965 Cleveland and Savannah. Even though there was less variation in black elites’ rights and liberties and closer ties to national media, parties, and other elites, black elites were still deeply embedded in their communities, experiencing politics locally first and nationally second, as evidence by the discourse in local newspapers. The Call and Post and the Savannah Herald, for example, were filled with local advertisements, local events and issues, and national events were interpreted through a local lens. Changes in national laws led to better objective material conditions among black elites in post-1965 Cleveland and Savannah relative to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Black elites in the post-1965 period experienced less overt discrimination, participated widely in electoral politics, were elected to political office, were not restricted from the marketplace or neighborhoods because of their race, and racial violence was less prevalent in both cities meaning blacks would have felt less racially alienated than earlier generation in Cleveland and Savannah. While black elites in the post-1965 era most certainly had subjective feelings of powerlessness, discrimination, and a lack of opportunities, they also had positive subjective feelings, such as seeing the first black mayor or president become elected. The point is, on average, the objective and subjective experiences of black elites created less racial alienation in the post-1965 period compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Because black elites’ were less racially alienated in the post-1965 period, they saw immigration as less 227 threatening, which is consistent with current research linking lower racial alienation with more positive immigration orientations (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hutchings et al. 2011; Wilkinson and Bingham 2016). Comparable levels of racial alienation meant that black elites in both Cleveland and Savannah adopted integrationist worldviews for racial advancement in the post-1965 era. As integrationists, black elites in these two cities held to principles of complete equality in all aspects of life, favored agitation for their rights, and praised notable integrationist leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Jesse Jackson. The integrationist discourse in the editorials of the Call and Post and the Savannah Herald, importantly, interpret events, issues, ideas, and leaders through a local lens first, which further clarifies the local component of African Americans racial group interests (Dawson 1994). In turn, immigration in each city was interpreted though this integrationist lens, which is why the rights, equality, and commonality of black and immigrants was so heavily emphasized. These findings challenge economic driven explanations for black public opinion on immigration that prize economic self-interest as black’s motivation for hostile immigration attitudes. Variation in neighborhoods, metro, and/or city level demographics (Gay 2006; McClain et al. 2007) appear to have little explanatory value in explaining black elites opinions in Cleveland and Savannah. Additionally, this research adds a historical and longitudinal support to current research positing a link between racial alienation and black public opinion (Hutchings et al. 2011; Wilkinson and Bingham 2016). Finally, the findings of this dissertation also clarify how racial group interests are formed first based on local level politics and experiences, thus providing further theoretical development of the black utility heuristic (Dawson 1994). 228 The Work Ahead The findings presented in this dissertation address three areas that receive too little attention in political science research, each of which offers fruitful avenues for future research. First, future research should continue to expand the current racial narrative beyond isolated descriptions of one racial group, or interactions between whites and blacks. While race has been an ever present feature of American politics that is woven into the nation’s laws, social and economic institutions, and very culture, and vital for understanding political parties, ideologies and discourse, the current narrative for how and why race matter is incomplete insofar as it centers around the stain of slavery, the legacies of Jim Crow, and the subordination of African Americans by the dominant white majority. This narrative treats racial politics too simply—as merely the relationship and consequences of white and non-white interactions. In a diversifying 21st century America, relations among non-whites will have increasingly important consequences, as they will alter the possibility of political coalitions; the shape, support, and enactment of public policies; and America’s laws and political institutions. By examining the dynamics of minority group relations; the conditions under which minority coalitions form and change; the historical underpinnings of preferences on racial issues, and how these adapt and change over time, future research can provide key insights into racial politics, and thus, a fuller understanding of American politics more broadly. Second, while groups are frequently taken for granted and treated as static and homogenous, future research should seek to understand and explain variation within minority groups’ opinions and behavior, particularly as a result of varied temporal, regional, and local political and institutional arrangements. By examining black elite opinion, this research takes a step in direction of specificity and parsimony, yet there are still many questions left to explore. In 229 particular, future research should expand our understanding of black elite opinion by utilizing additional measures such as elite speeches, diaries, biographies, organizational records and pamphlets, among other sources to test the insights derived in this project. Additionally, future work should investigate how the worldview black elites have held influences their preferences and behaviors on other issues such as education and gay rights. Besides elite level analysis, future research should longitudinally explore mass level African American preferences on the issue of immigration, particularly how they vary based on unique institutional arrangements. Scholars studying other groups in American politics such as Asian-Americans and Latinos should also challenge themselves to parse these groups based on meaningful characteristics that likely influence their opinions and behaviors in varied ways. In this vein, scholars should consider how varied institutional arrangements and experiences of race and ethnicity influence the outlook and preferences of other minority groups. Third, future research should continue to use methodological insights from historical institutionalist scholars to answer historical and longitudinal questions about individual political behavior. In so doing, scholars should strive to utilize unique data sources that allow them to unearth the preferences and behaviors of: (a) underrepresented groups in American politics and political behavior research, and (b) individuals existing during time periods when conventional behavioral measures did not exist. As shown in this dissertation, historical newspapers are a rich source of information that can provide key insights into the beliefs and actions of individuals in American politics and society. White newspapers extend to the early days of the republic, and, in subsequent years, newspapers emerged representing a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. These newspapers offer access into the beliefs of individuals and groups during pivotal periods in American history that may otherwise be inaccessible. Continued use of creative—and often 230 qualitative—measures to understand political preferences and behavior will allow researchers to ask broad and interesting historical questions while illuminating hidden factors that affect political phenomena today. Interminority Relations in the Years to Come The United States is more diverse in 2016 than it was in 1965 and shows no signs of slowing down. The United States Census estimates that the total number of immigrants will rise to nearly 57 million by 2030 (Colby and Ortman 2014). If these estimates are correct, immigrants will make up almost 16 percent of the total population, surpassing the previous high mark of 1890 and holding a larger share of the population than they have at any other point in American history. Meanwhile, as a result of increased immigration, birth and mortality rates, and other factors, some estimates project that by 2044 the United States will become a majorityminority nation (Frey 2014). With these transformations, the topic of immigration will only become more salient, and the future of interminority relations will continue to be a ripe area of inquiry. The theoretical arguments put forth in the preceding chapters offer several predictions for the shape and contour of interminority relations in the coming years. First, if the institutional context African Americans’ experienced in the post-1965 period maintains or improves, we would expect positive relations between blacks and immigrants to continue. The continued political progress of African Americans since the Voting Rights Act, and particularly over the past two decades, suggests an optimistic future. For example, there has been an increase in blacks registering to vote since the mid-1990s, a greater percentage of black voters turning out in presidential elections since 1996, and constant turnout in midterm elections since 1994 (Brown-Dean et al. 2015). However, black turnout in local elections is still much 231 lower, and the percentage of black elected officials lags far behind African American’s proportion of the population. Still, the number of black elected officials in the U.S. Congress, state legislatures, and local offices has increased steadily since 1965, and in 2008 Barack Obama was the first African American elected as President of the United States (Brown-Dean et al. 2015). If continued, these political victories could translate into improved institutional conditions for African Americans, lower levels of racial alienation, and contribute to affection between blacks and other minority groups moving forward. On the other hand, if the institutional conditions blacks experience deteriorate, the predictions for the future relations are less hopeful. Indeed, there are signs that African Americans’ experience of their race is worsening. For example, blacks were one of the groups hit hardest by the Great Recession. Blacks experienced a significant loss in their wealth, and the gap in wealth between blacks and whites is the highest it has been since 1989. The gap in median wealth between white and black families rose from whites having eight times more wealth in 2010 to thirteen times more in 2013 (Kochhar and Fry 2014). Moreover, after the recession, African Americans were significantly more likely to be unemployed with an unemployment rate almost twice as high as whites in 2010 (Mortensen and Chen 2013, Pfeffer et al. 2013). Though the overall unemployment rate receded to 4.8 percent by 2015, the black unemployment rate was still 8.8 percent while the white unemployment rate was only 4.1 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Thus, inequities in economic opportunities and results mean the future economic position of black elites, and African Americans more broadly, may be less secure. In addition to more constrained economic opportunities, the African American community may fear retrenchment of their political rights. In the 2013 case Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court struck down Section 4(b)—the “coverage formula” provision—of the 232 Voting Rights Act of 1965. By overturning the coverage formula, which determined the jurisdictions that were subject to the preclearance requirement in Section 5 of the VRA, the Court effectively eliminated preclearance until Congress could create a new coverage formula. The preclearance requirement had historically protected voters—particularly vulnerable minorities—by requiring changes in voting regulations and practices to be approved by the Justice Department prior to implementation. Without preclearance requirements states and localities may continue adopting strict voting requirements, like voter identification laws, and/or other practices that increase the costs to voting. While voter identification laws, which require voters to show identification—sometimes photo identification—before they are allowed to vote, emerged before the Shelby decision, states like Texas and North Carolina used the Court’s ruling to accelerate the implementation of stricter voting requirements that disproportionately affected the poor and minorities (Brenan Center for Justice).36 Voter identification requirements matter for African Americans because while most white voters possess the requisite identification, a much lower percentage of blacks have the identification required to vote (Brown-Dean et al. 2015). Thus, black elites, and African Americans more generally, may have good reason to worry about their political rights in the future if these voting laws continue. Contact with the criminal justice system may also have implications for African American’s experience of their race moving forward. The prison population in the United States has risen dramatically since the 1970s and 2.2 million people are currently incarcerated in America’s jails and prisons (Sentencing Project). African American men are disproportionately more likely to experience contact with the carceral state, as one in three black men and one in 36 In the days after the Court’s decision, Texas passed a new photo identification requirement for voting that had been rejected by the Justice Department the previous year because it discriminated against poor and minority voters. North Carolina passed a measure that significantly reduced early voting, which was used by many African Americans and minority voters (Brennan Center for Justice). 233 eighteen black women will serve time in prison during their lifetimes (Weaver and Lerman 2010). Not only does this have implications for African Americans economic opportunities, but it also significantly effects their political power because virtually all states disenfranchise former felons (Uggen and Manza 2002). In fact, one of every thirteen African Americans is unable to vote because of a felony conviction, a number that is nearly four times greater than non-African Americans (Uggen, Shannon, and Manza 2012). However, the unequal effects of the criminal justice system are not only reserved for those African Americans convicted of a felony. Episodes of police misconduct directed at African Americans are not a new phenomenon, yet a series of incidents beginning in 2012 brought attention to how blacks are often mistreated by law enforcement officials. In Febuary 2012, a black teenager named Trayvon Martin was shot and killed by a white neighborhood watch captain while walking from a convenient store to the home of his father’s fiancée (Kuo 2012). The neighborhood watch captain claimed self-defense, but was indicted and brought to trial after protests across the United States brought national media attention to the case. Many claimed that this was just another instance of racial profiling, vigilante justice, and unequal treatment of African Americans, yet the watch captain was found not guilty (Blow 2012). Two years later, in July 2014, a video surfaced of a New York City police officer using a chokehold to subdue a black man, Eric Gardner, who later died in the hospital as a result of the injuries sustained during the altercation (Queally and Samuels 2014). A few weeks later in Ferguson, Missouri, an unarmed black teenager, Michael Brown, was shot by a white police officer. A Grand Jury decided not to indict the police officer, which set off a wave of protests, looting, and arson throughout Ferguson that were so severe the Missouri National Guard was brought in to suppress the unrest (Buchanan et al. 2015). The Department of Justice launched an investigation into the events in Ferguson, and “called on Ferguson to overhaul its 234 criminal justice system, declaring that the city had engaged in constitutional violations” (Buchanan et al. 2015). Only a few months later a twelve-year-old black adolescent, Tamir Rice, was holding a pellet gun in a city park when he was shot and killed by a Cleveland police officer, who was not indicted for the shooting (Williams and Smith 2015). The following year, a black man named Freddie Gray died after he sustained injuries while being transported by officers from the Baltimore Police Department. Though the officers were later indicted, protests erupted across the city and the Department of Justice opened an investigation into potential civil rights violations in Gray’s death (The Baltimore Sun, 4-20-2015). These kinds of events may signal a rollback of African Americans civil rights and civil liberties, that if unabated, could have important implications for African Americans’ experience of their race. Collectively, if African Americans fail to recover economically from the 2008 Great Recession and feel their economic opportunities slipping away, see additional restrictions placed on their political rights, continue to encounter the criminal justice system at alarmingly higher rates than whites, and see fellow blacks mistreated by law enforcement officials, they may become more racially alienated in the following years. If blacks become more racially alienated, they may view immigrants as greater threats and look to a more separatist worldview for advancing the status of African Americans such as black community nationalism. As Dawson (2001) explains, if African Americans begin adopting this worldview in larger numbers, “we can expect a more hostile orientation toward the police and immigrants, and support for building strong, independent political and civic black organizations” (Dawson 2001, 320). Thus, way that blacks experience their race in the years to come will undoubtedly have important implications for their strategies of racial advancement. Whether we will continue to see positive relations 235 among minority groups in the future will depend heavily on these experiences and the institutional arrangements African Americans confront in the coming years. 236 APPENDIX VARIABLE CODING DESCRIPTION Immigration Policy Tone (0=Negative; 1=Positive; 2=Neutral; 9= NA) What is the tone of the editorial about immigration policy? Negative: If the editorial mentions any detrimental effects of immigration policy, such as a loss of political, economic, or social rights. If the editorial advocates reducing the level of immigration to the US. Leaning Negative: The editorial mentions similar issues as negative editorials, but does not offer as strict of criticism. Positive: If the editorial mentions positive effects of immigration policy, such as bringing new cultures and ideas to the United States. If the editorial advocates increasing the level of immigration to the United States. If the editorial mentions overturning a restrictive measure. Leaning Positive: The editorial mentions similar issues as positive editorials, but does not offer as much praise. Informational: Makes no judgment on immigration policy, simply reports facts about the issue such as the number of immigrants coming to U.S. or that there was a debate about immigration policy. Immigrants Tone If the editorial discusses immigrants, but not a specific immigrant group, is the discussion negative, leaning negative, positive, leaning positive, or informational? Negative: The editorial mentions dislike of immigrants. The editorial mentions disparaging stereotypes of immigrants. Leaning Negative: The editorial mentions similar issues as negative editorials, but does not offer as strict of criticism. Positive: The editorial expresses praise of immigrants. The editorial expresses flattering stereotypes (hardworking, intelligent, etc.) of immigrants. Leaning Positive: The editorial mentions similar issues as positive editorials, but does not offer as much praise. Informational: The editorial does not offer a judgment on immigrants in question; it simply states something factual about this group. 237 Immigrant Group Tone How is the immigrant group discussed? Negative: The editorial expresses dislike of a certain immigrant group or person. The editorial expresses a disparaging stereotype (lazy, greedy, stupid, etc.) of certain immigrant group. Leaning Negative: The editorial mentions similar issues as negative editorials, but does not offer as strict of criticism. Positive: The editorial expresses praise of a certain immigrant group or person. The editorial expresses a flattering stereotype (hardworking, intelligent, etc.) of an immigrant group. Leaning Positive: The editorial mentions similar issues as positive editorials, but does not offer as much praise. Informational: The editorial does not offer a judgment on the immigrant group in question; it simply states something factual about that group. Conflicted: When multiple immigrant groups are discussed with a different tone. Intensity/Length How long is the discussion of immigration policy or immigrant groups? (Note: this is not the length of the sub-editorial, but rather the length of the discussion of immigration or immigrant groups within the sub-editorial. This is an important distinction as immigrant groups or immigration policy may be briefly mentioned in the context of another issue.) 0-2 Sentences: The discussion is one word up to two sentences. 2 Sentences to 1 Paragraph: The discussion is two sentences to one paragraph long. Longer than 1 Paragraph: The discussion is longer than one paragraph. Partisanship In the discussion of immigration, is there also reference to the political allegiance of the immigrant group? Partisanship Difference If there is reference to the political allegiance of the immigrant group, is the immigrant group aligned with the same political party? 238 Rights In the discussion of immigration, is there also reference to the rights and privileges of immigrant groups? Rights Difference DO If there is mention of the rights of the immigrant group, does the group have more, less, or the same rights and privileges than African Americans? Rights Differences SHOULD If there is mention of the rights of the immigrant group, should the group have more, less, or the same rights and privileges as African Americans. Race Mentioned Is the race of the immigrant group mentioned? White/Non-White If the race of the immigrant group is mentioned, is the group referred to as white or non-white? Economic Competition Are immigrants mentioned as economic competitors? No: Not mentioned as economic competitors, but the story is about labor, economics, etc. Yes: Immigrants mentioned as economic competitors. N/A: Story is not about economic competition, labor, etc. Group Commonality (0=No; 1=Yes; 9=NA) Does the editorial discuss the immigrant group with similarity or difference? That is, does the editorial see immigrants as similar and tied to blacks in the sense that there is linked fate between the two groups? 239 REFERENCES Achen, Christopher H. 1975. "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response." 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