INFRASTRUCTURES OF ESCORT: TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION AND ECONOMIES OF CONNECTION IN INDONESIA

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Writing during Suharto's final years of rule, Saya Shiraishi offered *pengantar*—meaning both "introduction" and "escort"—as an elegant pun and entry point for understanding Indonesia's New Order.[1] As James Siegel has suggested, Indonesia is characterized by a politics of connection and patronage rather than a politics of communication and identification based on general rights. As such, proximity to power and recognition are critical dimensions of economic and political life.[2] More specifically, the network, or *jaringan*, is the primary form of access to power and resources—at least in an urban or translocal context—and the *pengantar* (the escort) is the point of access. From the perspective of her own temporary embeddedness in upper-middle-class Jakarta, Shiraishi elaborates on the intimate nature of the politics

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[1] Saya Shiraishi, *Young Heroes: The Indonesian Family in Politics* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1997).

[2] See: James Siegel, *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 44; and, as elaborated upon by Rosalind Morris, "Legacies of Derrida: ~~Anthropology~~," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 36 (2007): 380.

of connection by illuminating the relationship between comfort and coercion that is pervasive in what is widely termed *antar-jemput*; *antar* (the root of *pengantar*) meaning to accompany someone somewhere, *jemput* meaning to pick someone up. Taken together, *antar-jemput* highlights the importance of escort in the context of mobility.

Shiraishi describes her own arrival at Jakarta's Sukarno-Hatta airport and the mass of people she is faced with upon trying to exit the terminal, half of whom she imagines as family members waiting for relatives returning home. The rest, she suggests, make their living off of those who are not expecting anyone to pick them up at the airport. "One has to pay for not being awaited or for not arriving in the way one should."[3] While this points to the importance of having an escort, the more one fears outside danger the stronger the grip of the escort.[4] Allowing oneself to be escorted thus enables mobility and access to resources while creating a relationship that is based on dependency and potentially coercive.

This article takes the web of *antar-jemput* that Shiraishi describes as a starting point for approaching broader processes of migration in Indonesia. More specifically, it argues that the general importance of escort is critical in understanding not only elite forms of mobility in urban centers such as Jakarta, but also low-skilled, documented migration from rural Indonesia to countries across Asia and the Middle East. In particular, the essay argues that escort in the context of migration takes the form of a brokerage, as a wide range of actors become engaged in regulating, aiding, and profiting from migrant mobility. More generally, this forms the basis for the development of a migration infrastructure—a socio-technical platform for mobility[5]—of recruitment, documentation, transport, temporary housing, reception, and physical encapsulation centered on the "protection" (*perlindungan*) of the migrant.

The double-edged sword of protection has been widely noted in Indonesian studies and the social sciences more generally.[6] Protection sets the stage for extraction and shaping—in broader terms—a "racket." In Indonesia, this is evident through modes of "territorialization" in a range of contexts, ranging from brothel villages (*lokalisasi*) to urban security regimes (*siskamling*).[7] In light of this, the current migration infrastructure points to a tendency to territorialize migration channels (*jalur*) within a general economy of labor circulation. These *jalur* draw together human actors and physical structures in a complex, often patchwork, process, as migrant bodies are

[3] Shiraishi, *Young Heroes*, 18.

[4] Shiraishi, *Young Heroes*, 35.

[5] Brian Larkin, "The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 42 (2013): 327–43.

[6] On Indonesia, see: Joshua Barker, "State of Fear: Controlling Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order," *Indonesia* 66 (1998): 6–43; and Ian Wilson, *The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia: Coercive Capital, Authority, and Street Politics* (London: Routledge, 2015). For the seminal statement on the topic, see Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *The Formation of Nation-States in Western Europe*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–87.

[7] On territorialization, see Joshua Barker, "Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung," in *Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam*, ed. Vicente L. Rafael (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1999), 111.

encapsulated—"isolated from broader social relations and access to social resources"—and thus commodified.[8]

The structure of encapsulation, or migration infrastructure more broadly, however, should not be considered strictly as a racket, but also in relation to both the enduring relationship between the Indonesian state and rural peripheries and regional cultures of mobility. Rural populations have historically been infantilized by the Indonesian state in a didactic process of nation-building centered on development projects as diverse as family planning and television programming.[9] As villagers have increasingly been valued as an overseas labor reserve since the 1980s—a process that intensified after the 1997 economic crisis—the geographical divide between the rural and the urban has, in an important sense, become necessary to reorganize.[10] The expansion of migration infrastructure appears as a response to this, as "villagers" are transformed into "migrants," while the enduring relationship between "parent" (state) and "child" (villager), is retained.[11] The Indonesian government and nongovernmental organizations warn prospective migrants, through media and outreach campaigns, about the importance of using formal recruitment channels.

Traveling alone is generally considered inappropriate, dangerous, or even strange across Indonesia and large parts of Southeast Asia, particularly for women.[12] In fact, immobility often appears as a way of avoiding vulnerability.[13] Shiraishi's description of her arrival at the Jakarta airport illustrates as much. More to the point, a culture of mobility has taken shape centered on the vulnerabilities of traveling alone and the comfort and security of traveling with someone or in a group. From this perspective, *antar-jemput*, which shares the didactic element that characterizes the state's concern with rural populations more generally, offers an entry point for conceptualizing migration infrastructure in Indonesia not strictly as an apparatus for the regulation and extraction of labor, or the management of a particular population, but also as an historically embedded cultural form. This, in turn, allows us to move beyond an approach to migration based on facile dichotomies between terms such as freedom and control.

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[8] On encapsulation, see Xiang Biao, "Transnational Encapsulation: Compulsory Return as a Labor-Migration Control in East Asia," in *Return: Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia*, ed. Xiang Biao, Brenda Yeoh, and Mika Toyota (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 84.

[9] See: Anke Niehof and Firman Lubis, eds., *Two is Enough: Family Planning in Indonesia under the New Order, 1968–1998* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003); and Philip Kitley, *Television, Nation, and Culture in Indonesia* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002), 125–26.

[10] See: Georg Cremer, "Deployment of Indonesian Migrants in the Middle East: Present Situation and Prospects," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 24, 3 (1988): 73–86; and Johan Lindquist, "Labour Recruitment, Circuits of Capital, and Gendered Mobility: Reconceptualizing the Indonesian Migration Industry," *Pacific Affairs* 83, 1 (2010): 115–32.

[11] Compare with Shiraishi, *Young Heroes*, 31–32. Thanks to Joshua Barker for helping me elaborate on this point.

[12] See Shelly Errington, *Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 251.

[13] Errington, *Meaning and Power*, 54. Furthermore, in large parts of Southeast Asia power is signified by immobility; see: Errington, *Meaning and Power*, 134; and Benedict Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Claire Holt (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 1–69. On Flores, Catherine Allerton notes the importance of "accompanying" the bride in extended marriage rituals; see Catherine Allerton, *Potent Landscapes: Place and Mobility in Eastern Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013).

The Rise of Documented Migration

In the wake of the 1997 Asian economic crisis there was a dramatic rise of documented transnational migration from Indonesia to countries across Asia and the Middle East, most notably Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, as the number of documented migrants quadrupled within a decade to around 750,000 annually, with the vast majority being female domestic workers.[14] The collapse of the Indonesian rupiah, the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, the intensification of the Malaysian deportation regime, and the more general rise of a system of circular migration across Asia and the Middle East further shaped these flows.[15]

In Indonesia, documented migration has taken shape through an expansive migration bureaucracy centered on the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, BNP2TKI), which was created in 2006 to consolidate the government's organization of international migrant labor both on the national and provincial levels, and regulate a growing number of licensed recruitment companies, which increased tenfold to more than five hundred between 1995 to 2007.[16] Recruitment companies are generally based in major cities, such as Jakarta and Surabaya, but most have multiple branch offices in key recruitment areas. There were an estimated four thousand licensed recruitment offices across the country in 2010 (although that number dropped after the Indonesian state moratorium on workers traveling to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East following the execution of an Indonesian domestic worker and more general patterns of abuse).[17] These recruitment companies, in turn, depend on vast and instable networks of *petugas lapangan* (PL, field agent), informal labor recruiters who generally work without contracts and licenses and are the actual links between recruitment companies and the villages that are the primary sources of migrant labor across Indonesia.

In comparative terms, there are a few notable points about Indonesian documented migration. First, while private labor brokers have characterized Asian migration since the colonial era,[18] the number of informal brokers engaged in

[14] Graeme Hugo, "International Labour Migration and Migration Policies in Southeast Asia," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 40, 4 (2012): 399.

[15] Since the ongoing moratorium on sending female domestic workers to Saudi Arabia was initated in 2013, these numbers have dropped significantly. The number of documented migrants dropped to around 512,000 in 2013, according to BNP2TKI; see: http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/uploads/data/data_07-08-2015_023536_Laporan_Pengolahan_Data_BNP2TKI_S.D_31_JULI_2015.pdf, accessed August 20, 2015. It should also be noted that there are ongoing high-level attempts to further ban the migration of women; see "Indonesia Maid Ban Won't Work in Mideast, http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/06/asia/indonesia-migrant-worker-ban/, last modified May 6, 2015, accessed, May 4, 2017.

[16] For a history of BNP2TKI and Indonesian migration bureaucracy more generally, see Wayne Palmer, *Indonesia's Overseas Labour Migration Programme, 1969–2010* (Leiden: Brill, 2016). The increase in labor recruitment companies is an estimate based on conversations with owners of companies and government officials.

[17] Maria Platt, "Migration, Moralities and Moratoriums: Female Labour Migrants and the Tensions of Protectionism in Indonesia," *Asian Studies Review* 42, 1 (2018): 96.

[18] Vincent Houben, "Before Departure: Coolie Labour Recruitment in Java, 1900–1942," in *Coolie Labour in Colonial Indonesia—A Study of Labour Relations in the Outer Islands of Indonesia, c. 1900–1940*, ed. Vincent Houben and Thomas Lindblad (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999), 25–42. See also Johan Lindquist, "Reassembling Indonesian Migration: Biometric Technology and the Licensing of Informal Labor Brokers," *Ethnos*, https://doi.org/10.1080/00141844.2017.1364780, accessed July 4, 2018.

Indonesia's documented labor migration is arguably unparallelled in relation to other countries across the region. To the best of my knowledge, the Indonesian government introduced the PL system in the late 1960s to deal with the cultural intimacies of birth control in the context of large-scale family planning programs.[19] More recently, private recruitment companies have come to appropriate the same terminology, thus pointing both to the enduring importance of brokerage between formal institutions and rural populations and the intimate relationship between the market and the state. Although PLs are frequently return migrants, many of the most successful have never been labor migrants themselves and often work at the intersection between villages and towns and state and market—as elementary school teachers, village heads, and other low-level bureaucrats. Marginal forms of state power are thus converted into economic capital.[20] PLs never work alone, however, and are dependent on chains of sub-PLs, many of who move in and out of the recruitment business.

Second, the list of required documents for Indonesian migration is extensive: birth certificate, letter of permission from husband or parents, *kartu keluarga* (family card), two different ID cards, medical certificate, letter of permission to have a passport made, a special 24-page migrant passport, and a *surat keterangan jalan* (travel permit) that certifies that the individual is a documented migrant. The PL, who handles much of the paperwork, is an ambiguous but critical figure in this documentation process. Government and recruitment companies consider PLs to be necessary for finding laborers and setting the migration process in motion, while PLs are simultaneously demonized due to their ability to control migrants' mobility during the first stage of the recruitment process.

Third, the encapsulation—or isolation—of migrants during the migration process, not only in the context of departure but also upon their return, appears unprecedented internationally, particularly in relation to women.[21] Most notably, at the Sukarno-Hatta airport, between 1999 and 2014, there was a specific reception terminal for returning migrants, a model that was, for a time, reproduced on a smaller scale at other airports across the country, including Solo and Lombok. Despite being properly documented, returning migrants were not free to leave the terminals on their own accord but, rather, were compelled to purchase tickets on minivans that escorted them home. A comparable process is evident in the deportation of Indonesian migrants from Malaysia,[22] a point I will return to later. Encapsulation, particularly of women, was writtten into government directives, ostensibly in the name of protection from

[19] AZK, "Tiap Seratus Kundjungan Kerumah-rumah Hanja Hasilkan Rata-Rata 4 Akseptor" (Every one hundred home visits generally results in only four acceptors [meaning individuals agreeing to begin using contraceptives]), *Kompas*, December 29, 1971. See also Anke Niehof and Firman Lubis, *Family Planning in Practice: Cases from the Field*, in *Two is Enough: Family Planning in Indonesia under the New Order, 1968–1998*, ed. Anke Niehof and Firman Lubis (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), 126–27.

[20] Johan Lindquist, "The Elementary School Teacher, the Thug, and his Grandmother: Informal Brokers and Transnational Migration from Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 85, 1 (2012): 69–90.

[21] Sanneke Kloppenburg, "Tracing Mobilities Regimes: The Regulation of Drug Smuggling and Labour Migration at Two Airports in the Netherlands and Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 2013), 111.

[22] Johan Lindquist, "Rescue, Return, In Place: Deportees, Victims, and the Regulation of Indonesian Migration," in *Return: Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia*, ed. Xiang Biao, Brenda Yeoh, and Mika Toyota (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 122–40.

bad actors, such as *preman* (thugs, gangsters), who were seen as having the ability to divert and exploit migrants. Migrants en route were thus not to be left alone.

The ubiquity of brokers, the demand for paperwork, and the encapsulation of migrants should be considered together in the context of the culture of *antar-jemput* and the expanding migration infrastructure that organizes migrant mobility. This illustrates how the Indonesian state's enduring and paternalistic concern with controlling rural populations depends on collaborations with formal and informal brokers throughout the recruitment process. As in the case of urban security regimes described by Joshua Barker,[23] there have been attempts to license these brokers so that recruitment companies and the state can retain control over the migration process and profits.[24] Nevertheless, and in line with the conceptualization of infrastructure as a socio-technical platform for mobility, it is important to highlight the patchwork nature of migration infrastructure and the cultural forms that are integral to its functioning.

Departure

It is just before dawn as we drive along the main east–west road that cuts through Lombok (an island located just east of Bali), from the main commercial town of Mataram in the east toward the ferry port to Sumbawa in the west. A landscape of sound surrounds us as we pass men dressed for prayer walking to their local mosques. Together with Ibrahim, who works for PT Sinar, one of the most successful licensed recruitment companies on the island, I am on my way in a white minivan to pick up nine men who are ready to depart Lombok. In a few days PT Sinar will be sending a group of two hundred migrants recruited from around the island to work on a palm oil plantation in Pahang, in West Malaysia, on two-year contracts, a job order that they had three months to fill. First, however, the men have to be accompanied to a run-down hotel to take part in a government-regulated, predeparture training before being escorted to the airport the following day for the flight to Kuala Lumpur, where they will be picked up by the Malaysian plantation staff and driven directly to their workplace on the estate.

The transportation of these and other men to the hotel is a logistical feat that involves traveling along decrepit north–south roads lacking public transportation—in places, the road is so bad it is literally impossible for cars to use. A complex network of PLs is therefore put to work to pick up and transport the migrants. In fact, it is not unusual for low-level PLs also to be motorcycle-taxi (*ojek*) drivers who ply the route between the main road and villages, transporting people, goods, and information. As we travel along the road we stop to pick up one of the PLs, Jusri, who has personally recruited five of the migrants. Jusri is a former migrant who quickly turned to recruitment when it became apparent that being a PL was far more lucrative than plantation labor. The migrants he has recruited all live in the vicinity of his village and he is well known in the area as a reliable recruiter. As we sit next to each other in the van he wearily tells me about all the work he has put into the recruitment process,

[23] Joshua Barker, "Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung."

[24] Lindquist, "Reassembling Indonesian Migration."

including repeat visits to prospective migrants' homes and escorting them to and from government offices, not to mention the cost of purchasing snacks and cigarettes.

On rural Lombok, a white minivan, often with tinted windows, signals migrant transport. As we turn north off the main road and dramatically reduce our speed on the poor road—sometimes moving at only ten kilometers per hour—people walking along the road stop and stare as we pass. After an hour we turn onto an even smaller road and eventually stop at a house where two men are waiting with their backpacks leaning against the wall. There is a crowd of perhaps twenty people waiting to see them off. Ibrahim and Jusri get out and greet the men, one of them quite young, probably still a teenager. A woman, his mother it turns out, grabs his arm and begins to weep as he pulls away to get into the van. We do not waste time and quickly leave. This scene is repeated in similar form a couple of times, as we drive to other villages to pick up other men, but at the final stop there are two men and no one to send them off. They have not told anyone that they are leaving. There is a problem with debt in the village, Ibrahim later tells me.

Despite the dramatic feminization of labor migration during the past decades—and in contrast to male migration—the departure of women remains a sensitive issue shrouded in secrecy.[25] On Lombok, departing women are usually picked up individually by their PL. Although fees for recruiting women are far higher than for men, many PLs and recruitment companies abstain from sending women because of perceived risks associated with pregnancy or abuse abroad. Indonesian state moratoriums on sending female domestic workers, previously to Malaysia and currently to Saudi Arabia, have followed directly from serious abuses against migrant women in those countries, and many villagers and religious leaders remain critical of allowing women workers to migrate. This does not imply, however, that women themselves do not desire migration or that their remittances are not welcome; rather, their departure remains characterized by ambivalence.

As we drive back toward the main road in silence, with the men and their bags crowded in the back of the minivan, we encounter two young men standing near the middle of the road, holding up buckets, ostensibly to collect money for a local mosque under construction. It appears that they are particularly aggessive toward the van compared to the cars ahead. Ibrahim scowls as he swerves to avoid hitting them and turns to me and asks rhetorically, "you know what they say about Lombok? It is the island of a thousand mosques [*pulau seribu masjid*] … and a million thieves [*sejuta maling*]."

About five hours after departing we are back in Mataram, by 10 AM, and drive to the local hotel that has the monopoly on housing predeparture migrants and hosting their compulsory government-sanctioned briefing sessions. The briefing has already started; there are a few hundred men recruited by several companies in the decrepit auditorium, being informed about their rights, but primarily being lectured about their responsibilities as migrants. The men will spend a couple of nights in cramped quarters at the back of the hotel before being shuttled in minivans to the airport a couple of days later to take the direct flight to Kuala Lumpur.

[25] Olivia Killas, *Follow the Maid: Domestic Worker Migration from Indonesia* (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2018), 105–6.

Transport and Passage

The migrant minivan is ubiquitous throughout the migration process. While many PLs use motorbikes to transport prospective migrants one at a time—either to government authorities, such as the immigration office, to produce passports; to clinics, for medical certification; or to recruitment companies upon departure—the minivan allows recruiters to scale up, as it is possible to fit more than ten migrants at a time into a vehicle. For the PL and the recruitment company, the minivan, usually a Toyota Kijang, is a sign of success that signals a good reputation while representing a particular quality of travel. One PL told me that he bought a Kijang so that migrants would feel *aman* (safe, secure) when he escorted them to Mataram.

The minivan is also clearly valued by migrants themselves. The two times when I traveled in minivans together with groups of departing women, the atmosphere quickly became bustling and lively (*ramai*), as the comfort of being escorted in the minivan apparently reinforced the positive dimensions of the migration decision and experience.[26] On another occasion, when I joined a PL to pick up migrants who were departing for Malaysia, one of the relatives angrily complained that we had arrived in a *bemo*, a minibus used for public transport (e.g., a shared taxi), refurbished to cram in as many passengers as possible. She adamently claimed that the passengers would all become sick and vomit if they were forced to sit cramped and facing the side of the road. More importantly, though, I suspect that the *bemo*, being a mundane form of transport, did not match the gravity of the migrants' departure. To be picked up is thus a form of statement—by whom and how one is transported suggests the quality of the PLs' connections to the world beyond the village.[27]

While minivans are rare in rural Indonesian, throughout urban Indonesia those run by private companies—positioned between public buses and private automobiles—have become a ubiquitious form of semi-public, door-to-door transport for the growing middle class, usually in the context of inter-city travel.[28] This form of escort, however, is most evident in the context of *antar-jemput anak sekolah*, the business of picking up and dropping off school children in major urban centers. As Shiraishi has suggested, there is a didactic dimension to this process by which children learn to accept the protection and comfort of escort.[29] This urban phenomenon is thus transposed to a rural population previously imagined as

[26] I thank Rachel Silvey for reminding me of this. See her chapter, "From Java to Saudi Arabia and Dubai: Precarious Itineraries of Indonesian Domestic Workers," in *Departing from Java: Javanese Labour, Migration, and Diaspora*, ed. Rosemarijn Hoefte and Peter Meel (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2018), 200.

[27] I thank Emily Hertzman for clarifying this point.

[28] In comparable terms, in her ethnographic research on cross-border medical travel between Pontianak in Kalimantan in Indonesia and Kuching in East Malaysia on Borneo, Meghann Ormond describes how the driver "enacts a therapeutic environment within the van" through the production of comfort and the distribution of Malaysian vitamins to the passengers; see Meghann Ormond, "*En route*: Transport and Embodiment in International Medical Travel Journeys between Indonesia and Malaysia," *Mobilities* 10, 2 (2015): 294; while Ismail Fajarie Alatas, in his work on the rise of Indonesian pilgrimage to the Hadramawt Valley in Yemen, describes how Yemen-based Indonesians, in collaboration with travel agents, engage in the *antar-jemput* of pilgrims; see Ismail Fajarie Alatas, "The Poetics of Pilgrimage: Assembling Contemporary Indonesian Pilgrimage to Hadramawt, Yemen," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 58, 3 (2016): 607–35.

[29] Shiraishi, *Young Heroes*, 26–27. I thank Rina Priyani for reminding me of this.

immobile, or, more specifically, produced as such through a history of colonial and postcolonial travel regulations aimed at capturing labor and regulating identity.[30]

The minivan is not only used during departure but also upon return. As noted, until 2014, returning migrants at the Sukarno-Hatta airport, particularly women, have been compelled to pass through a specific migrant terminal, which they have not been allowed to leave by themselves. Instead, most have been escorted to their home villages by government-licensed transport companies. In government directives that regulate return, the importance of safety (*keamanan*), comfort (*kenyamanan*), and protection is highlighted.[31] As stated in one of the documents, "each phase of the return process, from leaving the airplane until arriving at the home village, can be experienced as safe and comfortable by migrants coming from abroad."[32]

For migrants' return trip, transport companies have been required to use dark-blue Isuzu minivans with dark windows, and official stickers identifying them as special migrant vehicles must be placed on the windows. Minibuses en route may only stop at registered roadside restaurants, where migrants are counted and required to sign a form.[33] In the context of transporting migrants away from Terminal 4, Kloppenburg notes how the "tips" that drivers receive from their passengers are used at least in part to pay off thugs on local roads.[34] The transport companies' mandate is to deliver migrants to their front door. This means leaving the main highway and using smaller roads, where drivers inevitably are stopped intermittently and asked for money in order to pass. The tip money is thus "a lubricant for literally keeping the buses in motion when they enter local areas."[35] Even in areas where police protection has been settled, the costs are comparable.[36] Similar stories were pervasive in my own fieldwork on Lombok.

Anecdotal accounts suggest that local forms of roadside extraction multiplied after the fall of the New Order, as opportunities to territorialize extraction in the wake of political decentralization increased. On Lombok's key thoroughfares, young men ostensibly ask for mosque donations. As described above, drivers such as Ibrahim show them disdain but often feel compelled to comply. People traveling on small roads are generally *orang kenal* (people who are known), but on the main road there is more traffic comprising strangers who should, ideally, pay a toll. Migrants—people

[30] While the Dutch Cultivation System policy was in effect, the Javanese peasant economy became organized on a territorial basis by the colonial state, as the village became the primary unit for the extraction of labor and taxes. The creation of travel passes further regulated labor mobility and positioned the village chief in a mediating position of power, not least when it came to the recruitment of migrant labor. See: Jan Breman, *Labour Migration and Rural Transformation in Colonial Asia* (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1990), 16; Joshua Barker, "The Tattoo and the Fingerprint: Crime and Security in an Indonesian City" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1999), 127–28; and Thio Termorshuizen, "Indentured Labour in the Dutch Colonial Empire, 1800–1940, in *Dutch Colonialism, Migration and Cultural Heritage: Past and Present*, ed. Gert Oostindie (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 294.

[31] Kloppenburg, "Tracing Mobilities Regimes," 136.

[32] Peraturan 01/KA/SU/I/2008, quoted in Kloppenburg, "Tracing Mobilities Regimes," 114.

[33] Kloppenburg, "Tracing Mobilities Regimes," 130.

[34] Kloppenburg, "Tracing Mobilities Regimes," 157.

[35] Kloppenburg, "Tracing Mobilities Regimes," 157.

[36] That local forms of territorial power do not necessarily stand in contrast to an omnipotent state is suggested in the occasional *polsek* (or *kepolisian sektor*, police sector) that I encountered, with an adjacent sign stating that this was a *kawasan tertib lalu lintas*, or an area with ordered traffic.

passing through—are thus perceived as goods or commodities to be taxed. When I once commented how people dared walk along the road as cars and motorbikes sped by, the man by my side replied, "if there is an accident it is always the person driving who is at fault." This is a logic of territoriality rather than general rights, and one that it is generally respected by the police. Local inhabitants have the right to walk along or on the side of the road, unlike the car, which is just passing through. The same logic shapes the demands for donations.

While forms of extraction are intermittant and unpredictable, the costs for specific passage points, such as ports and airports, are well established and usually phrased with the verb *handle* (the term used in Indonesia). For instance, in 2010, *handle airport* on Lombok included payments to the airport police, customs, Angkasa Pura (the government agency responsible for airport management), and immigration office. Recruitment companies that escorted migrants overland to Jakarta distributed official BP3TKI (the provincial office for BNP2TKI) envelopes with a *surat keterangan jalan*, a travel permit, and cash payments to checkpoints at harbors along the way.

Curiously, the minivan also appears in the context of migrant smuggling from the Middle East via Indonesia to Australia. In Luke Mogelson's widely publicized *New York Times* article, in which he, together with a photographer, pays to be smuggled to Australia, the journalist appears dumbfounded by the mode of transport, as they leave their safehouse in Jakarta in preparation for departure.

> We all crammed into a new car with tinted windows, driven by a squat Indonesian man with long rapier-like pinkie nails that tapered into points, who belched every couple of minutes and chain-smoked flavored cigarettes … We stopped at three gas stations along the way and linked up with other drivers. By the time we made it out of the city [Jakarta], several hours later, we led a convoy of six identical cars, all packed with asylum seekers. It seemed a bit conspicuous, and sure enough, as we climbed a narrow, winding road up a densely forested mountain, people came out to watch whenever we passed a shop or village. It was maybe eight or nine at night when our driver got a call that caused him to accelerate abruptly and career down a side road that led into the woods. The other cars followed. Pulling to a stop, shutting off the lights and engine, our driver spun around and hissed: "Shh! Police."[37]

The migrants and drivers were, indeed, apprehended, but then, for reasons Mogelson does not comprehend, the former were allowed to leave and make their way back to Jakarta by way of public transport. The drivers and vehicles remained at the police station, the story suggests, to settle the debt.

Despite its tinted windows, the minivan clearly reveals more than it obscures, not only to the police but to most everyone it passes. This is the case for government-licensed vehicles, licensed recruitment companies, PLs, and, apparently, even migrant smugglers. It would appear that the transport of migrants calls for a particular "look" that communicates itself as such. The self-identification of the minivan as a mode of migrant transport places it in a particular *jalur* in the context of documented migration.

[37] Luke Mogelson, "The Impossible Refugee Boat Lift to Christmas Island," *The New York Times*, November 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/magazine/the-impossible-refugee-boat-lift-to-christmas-island.html?ref=magazine&_r=1, accessed June 5, 2018.

While in 1990s Jakarta, characterized by an authoritarian state, Shiraishi described how most elite *antar-jemput* took place with a car, which allowed for a separation from the dangers of the street: "the commuters in their automobiles and the pedestrians live in two separate worlds."[38] Today, both in relation to middle-class mobility and low-skilled migration, it is possible to see how this distinction must be understood in broader terms. From this perspective, migration infrastructure can be conceptualized as an infrastructure for *antar-jemput*.

Housing

There are various forms of temporary housing that are critical during the period after the migrant has been delivered by the PL to the recruitment company and before the actual departure abroad. For prospective female domestic workers, there is a training period that formally takes up to several months, in which they ostensibly learn languages, cleaning and child-care skills, and culturally specific styles of cooking. The largest training centers, run by the most successful recruitment companies, are often former schools or hospitals surrounded by high fences with security guards. Olivia Killas, following Erving Goffman, terms them "total institutions."[39] The training itself is generally seen by recruitment companies and state bureaucrats as a "civilizing mission," rather than primarily as preparation for the overseas work itself.[40]

Prospective migrants are usually not allowed to leave the training premises freely, are often kept under lock and key, and have their cell-phones confiscated upon arrival.[41] While recruitment companies claim that women are locked up to protect them from outside dangers, a critical reason is clearly the gendered organization of debt. In contrast to men, who generally borrow money to finanace their departure, recruiters often give women "shopping money" (*uang belanja*) to become migrants. The women pay off this debt through salary deductions abroad, up to nine months of a two-year contract (about three-eighths of their total salary). As the company further invests in a female migrant through the production of government documents and the purchase of airline tickets, she becomes increasingly valuable and a commodity to be protected. More specifically, recruitment companies are worried that a woman will regret her decision and return to her village, be "taken" (*diambil*) by another recruiter, or become pregnant, which would lead to the automatic termination of the migration process. The manager of one recruitment company told me that pregnancy is the "most common disease" (*penyakit yang paling biasa*) for female migrants. It is common practice for migrant women at recruitment companies on Lombok to be sent off to clinics to receive a contraceptive shot prior to departing for the head office in Jakarta, months before they are due to leave the country.

It is with regard to locking up these women that recruitment companies are most frequently demonized by human-rights actors. For instance, the owner of a well-established company in Jakarta told me that John Miller, the head of the US State

[38] Shiraishi, *Young Heroes*, 27.

[39] Killas, *Follow the Maid*, 108.

[40] Killas, *Follow the Maid*, 119.

[41] Compare with Killas, *Follow the Maid*, 112.

Department's counter-trafficking program, had visited a training center and been allowed to interview the migrants. When Miller asked the owner why the migrants were locked up, he replied that his company had invested a lot of money in them. Miller responded, "I have invested a lot of money in my children, but I don't lock them up." The man laughed as he told me the story and it was clear that he felt that this was a completely different issue, that migrants were both valuable commodities and inexperienced women who needed to be carefully protected.

Training centers, however, are not strictly experienced as oppressive by their female inhabitants. They are also spaces in which social relations are created and where some enjoyment can be found. Francisca Yuen Ki Lai describes the pleasure that women in Indonesian training centers take in subverting the training center's surveillance through same-sex sexuality, while Rachel Silvey, in her description and discussion of Indonesian female migrants in training centers in Java, and as runaways in Dubai, makes an important and more general point: for "scholars of gender and transnational migration, attention to sociality implies a shift in register away from liberal questions of resistance and empowerment and towards more complex conceptions of desire, power, and possibility."[42] This shift of attention is in line with the argument that *antar-jemput* should be taken seriously as a starting point for approaching Indonesian migration, not least in terms of gender.

In contrast to women, male migrants who work within the Malaysian palm oil industry or on construction projects do not face extensive training, nor do they endure restricted mobility, since their debt is generally tied to personal loans. Yet, as I have pointed out, there are great logistical difficulties in moving migrants and bringing them together in temporary spaces at various times during the recruitment process. Prior to 2013, male migrants gathered at one of the inexpensive hotels that hosted the compulsory, three-day, final predeparture briefing (Pembekalan Akhir Pemberangkatan, PAP), with an auditorium and barrack-style accomodations in the back. The owner of one of the hotels told me "if the migrants don't pass through my hotel, they are not documented [*resmi*]." Since 2013, the PAP has been shortened to one day, but the briefing deals with the same themes as before: insurance, workers' rights, but mainly the migrants' obligations abroad, notably the ban on joining labor unions, avoiding drugs and prostitution, and the importance of remitting wages to support their families and develop Lombok.

On the evening prior to departure, the hotel where the migrants stay is generally packed with visiting family and friends, and the various PLs, as well as vendors and traveling salesmen selling everything from balloons and stuffed animals to traditional medicine and the Koran. Often the head of the recruitment company will offer a ritualized speech highlighting the importance of working hard, remitting money, and avoiding immoral activities. In fact, this is often the first time that the migrants encounter the company, having strictly interacted with the PLs previously. After a short night, the migrants are called to prayer at dawn after which there is a roll call, and then the men, wearing their company shirts, enter a fleet of minivans that shuttles them to the airport, where they are given their tickets and wait for their flight.

[42] See: Francisca Yuen Ki Lai, "Lesbi Migrant Sexuality: Indonesian Domestic Workers in Hong Kong" (PhD dissertation, Purdue University, 2014), 45–54; and Silvey, "From Java to Saudi Arabia and Dubai," 200.

This is also where the PLs bid farewell to the migrants they have recruited, the PLs' responsibilities now deferred to the licensed recruitment company.

Like the motorcycles and minivans that move migrants from rural villages to urban hubs for further transport abroad, much of the temporary housing that has become necessary with the expansion of documented migration is refurbished and patchwork: former schools, clinics, and decrepit hotels that have been integrated into a developing migration infrastructure. Although there is a stark contrast between how men and women are treated in this process, there is a broader, state-centered moral project—Tania Li terms this *The Will to Improve*—which reflects the relationship between urban centers and the explicitly underdeveloped rural peripheries, as villagers are transformed into migrants in a didactic process that is evident in a wide range of state interventions leading back to the colonial era.[43] Nowhere does this appear more formalized than in another temporary space, namely, the reception terminal for migrants returning from abroad.

Return

"The airport is the new bus terminal." This is a phrase I have often heard in recent years. It refers not only to the movements of growing numbers of migrants, but also to the thugs and forms of extraction that are increasingly pervasive at airports, and which had previously been associated with bus stations. The deregulation of the airline industry and the rise of low-cost carriers, such as AirAsia and Lion Air, have increased the range of destinations and made flying inexpensive, thus transforming flows of migrants, not least to Malaysia, who increasingly travel by plane rather than overland.[44] Provincial airports have become increasingly connected to international destinations, such that the Lombok airport today regularly sees trucks arrive packed with family and friends, either to see migrants off or wait for them to return.

Shiraishi's account suggests, unsurprisingly, that *premans*, real or imagined, were evident in some form at Sukarno-Hatta airport in the 1990s. The opening of a special migrant terminal in 1999 in response to public outcries against the abuses that overseas migrants faced upon returning from overseas—as the migration industry was booming following the economic crisis—reinforces this point. Indeed, while the actions of the government acknowledged extortion as a problem—for instance, through exhorbitant porter costs or ticket prices—the solution was imagined in terms of infrastructure. As described by Silvey, the terminal produced a spatial distinction between "returning migrants" (TKI, *tenaga kerja Indonesia* [migrant workers in general], and TKW, *tenaga kerja wanita* [female migrant workers]) and "general passengers," ostensibly in the name of protection.[45]

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[43] See: Tania Murray Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Houben, "Before Departure"; and Lindquist, "Reassembling Indonesian Migration."

[44] For a more general description of the rise of budget airlines in Asia, see Max Hirsh, *Airport Urbanism: Infrastructure and Mobility in Asia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).

[45] TKI is generally used as an acronym for *tenaga kerja Indonesia* (Indonesian migrant worker) and TKW for *tenaga kerja wanita* (Indonesian female worker), thus further illustrating the formalized gendered distinctions in the migration process. See Silvey, "Unequal Borders: Indonesian Transnational Migrants at Immigration Control," *Geopolitics*, 12 (2007); 265–79.

In collaboration with licensed travel companies, the terminal was meant to create a safe and reasonably priced system of transport (a *jalur*) to migrants' home villages, often long distances from Jakarta. It quickly became evident that this spatial segregation actually came to organize and intensify abuses against migrants by creating an enclosed environment for extraction. Largely as a response to protests and with the creation of BNP2TKI, the old, 1999 terminal was closed and a new one opened in 2008. Formally called the Building for the Registration of the Return of Indonesian Migrant Workers (informally it was called Terminal 4), it was located a fifteen-minute drive from the main airport, adjacent to an urban village.[46]

In 2009—during the first of my three visits—between four hundred and one thousand migrants, nearly all of them women, passed through the terminal each day.[47] This was due to the fact that most migrants who returned via Sukarno-Hatta airport had been domestic workers in the Middle East, and were thus women. Furthermore, as women they were more easily identified as migrants because of their Middle Eastern style of dress. Kloppenburg has shown how migrants were not only identified but also self-sorted into specific corridors that led them to Terminal 4 after passing through immigration. In the bagage areas there were signs pointing toward the "special lane for Indonesian migrant workers" (*jalur khusus TKI*). Even if government officials were able to make qualified guesses, they could not know with any certainty which passengers were migrants, and, in fact, there was no regulation forcing returning migrants to pass through Terminal 4. It is clear from Kloppenburg's account, however, that migrants rarely resisted this sorting but tended to follow the identified lanes.

As migrants left the main airport by bus for Terminal 4, the travelers were warned by officials to only bring the money they needed for the trip, thus preparing them for the dangers of the trip home.[48] This way of assuring migrants while highlighting their vulnerability was evident throughout the return process. Some signs and banners promised that the workers would be taken care of, while others stated that extra charges were not allowed, suggesting the possibility that one may very well be asked to pay additional fees to keep moving homeward.[49] As noted, this was also evident in government directives concerning the transport companies and on the return trip itself.[50]

A large banner reading *"Selamat datang pahlawan devisa"* (Welcome home, foreign revenue heroes) was draped over the entrance to Terminal 4, which was a cavernous space the size of football field. Near the entrance a half-dozen kiosks with computers signaled where migrants should line up to be registered. Inside the building were half a dozen moneychanger booths (with far worse exchange rates than even at the main

[46] It was closed in 2014 due to the decreasing flows of migrants following the moratorium on sending domestic workers to the Middle East and continuing complaints that migrants were being forced to pass through the off-site terminal.

[47] I first visited in 2009 with Rachel Silvey, who was conducting research there; and in 2012 and 2013, through the auspices of the International Organization for Migration's Jakarta office. The government officials working at the terminal were the source of the statistics.

[48] Kloppenburg, "Tracing Mobilities Regimes," 121. This process was evident in Terminal 3 as well; see Silvey, "Unequal Borders," 272.

[49] Silvey, "Unequal Borders," 275.

[50] Kloppenburg, "Tracing Mobilities Regimes," 127.

airport terminals), a couple of cellphone shops, a bank office, two small restaurants, a travel agency, a gift shop selling electronics and stuffed animals, a large waiting area for the migrants (with different sitting areas marked according to the returning migrants' home provinces), a clinic, a room for the licensed transportation companies, an office for insurance claims, and BNP2TKI offices, as well as a room for "*TKI bermasalah*" (Indonesian migrant workers with problems). Sleeping rooms for women who had to stay overnight were located on the second floor. During a period beginning in 2012, the Jakarta office of the International Organization for Migration had an office there in which they identified and offered support to victims of trafficking, who, following the logic of documented return, were escorted home after a period of rehabilitation.

Upon arrival, migrants were registered. The data collected included names, passport numbers, home addresses, recruitment companies being used, and the reasons for returning home. One of the good things about the new terminal, compared to the old one, an official told me, was that data collection was well-ordered ("*penataan teratur*"). As returning migrants waited in line, the moneychangers came out and stopped at an invisible line, waving and yelling to the migrants to change money. As soon as I pulled out my camera, however, they did an about-face and returned to their stalls, clearly aware of the negative media reporting associated with their practices. Once migrants passed the data-collection kiosk, they faced a second series of kiosks selling bus tickets. A majority of the migrants were sent directly to purchase bus tickets to their home addresses. Generally, as explained below, seeking alternative transportation home, even rides from friends and relatives, was not allowed. The fares for each destination were clearly listed on a signboard. For migrants who lived on Lombok, or even further afield, this trip could take up to forty hours. Each van took nine people and migants were driven all the way to their house in a door-to-door process. The twenty-nine licensed transport companies (in 2009)—many of which were part of larger conglomerates that included recruitment companies—took turns filling the vans.

Government officials I spoke with made it clear that their main priority was to return migrants safely to their home addresses. This meant that migrants could neither be picked up by family members—who were not permitted to enter the terminal—nor return to their recruitment companies in Jakarta.[51] According to both Silvey and Kloppenburg,[52] while it was possible to change certain types of data contained within a passport, it was particularly difficult to alter the home address printed on the last page of the passport. The burden of proof was on the migrant who wanted to return to a different address to show that either her parents or husband live there. The reason given was that there was a risk that women migrants could be intercepted and *recycled* (the Indonesian term)—that is, involuntarily sent abroad again

[51] In her article on Terminal 3, Silvey noted the large number of family members waiting outside the terminal for returning migrants. Some had camped out for days, having only received a letter or a quick phone call revealing on what approximate day they would be returning. Although the names of arrived migrants were read over a loudspeaker system, uncertainty reigned, as many names were common or difficult to discern. Many migrants, not knowing that family members were waiting for them, came out with tickets for a return home to their village, which they had been forced to purchase on the inside. See Silvey, "Unequal Borders," 276.

[52] See: Silvey, "Unequal Borders," 273; and Kloppenburg, "Tracing Mobilities Regimes," 126.

by brokers through illicit channels. (*Preman,* apparently, lurked in the vicinity of the terminal awaiting unsuspecting prey.)

Indeed, when I spent time in the terminal witnessing the registration process, an official would open the migrant's passport and enter the data listed therein into a computer. He would then ask for the migrant's address and compare it with the one in the passport. If the addresses were inconsistent, the migrant was asked to report to the office for "Indonesian migrants with problems." While I was observing in that office for a couple of hours, one official told a few of the migrants sitting there that it was important for them to return home to their families and their *kampung halaman* (home village); that one should not return to the recruitment company or join anyone else. He joked that the minivan would carry them all the way to their village, but could not enter their actual house.

Through the efforts of Jumhur Hidayat, a well-known anti-Suharto-regime activist, who was head of BNP2TKI before being forced to step down in 2014, Terminal 4 became a prototype for other terminals across Indonesia. I don't want to dwell on the effectiveness of these new terminals in terms of "protection," but rather note the enduring importance of the term, and, more specifically, the concepts of escort and safe return. In effect, this reveals that the state recognizes the dangers of traveling alone, but responds to the threats primarily through an infrastructure of escort and encapsulation, which is evident both during departure and return. Training centers, terminals, and minivans become nodes in corridors that move migrants along particular *jalur*.

Deportation

The deportation process of undocumented workers from Malaysia to Indonesia follows a strikingly similar logic to that of the return of documented migrants (although there is no direct connection between the two operations in terms of organization). In contrast to arrivals at Jakarta's airport terminal, however, the vast majority of the deportees are men who have been arrested in Malaysia as undocumented workers on construction sites and palm oil plantations across the country. During the past decade, an increasingly regulated deportation infrastructure has developed, whereby these undocumented migrants are transported by ferry from Johor, in western Malaysia, to Tanjung Pinang, on Bintan (Indonesia). There the men are received by the department of social affairs and held in a reception center called Wisma Transito before being sent on by Pelni ship (Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia, the national shipping and passenger company) to the port of Tanjung Priok, in Jakarta.[53] Since 2006 the frequency of deportations has varied, from several times a week to once every other week, but the structure has remained the same. As in the context of documented migrants returning via airport reception terminals, the deportees, most of

[53] While men, women, and children were initially segregated at Wisma Transito prior to departure, as of 2013 women and children were moved to a different location, RPTC (Rumah Perlindungan Trauma Center, Trauma Protection Center), which also included victims of domestic violence. It was created through a national decree and each province was required to have one.

whom are men and destitute, have not been allowed to leave on their own because of fears that they will be *recycled* and trafficked back to Malaysia.[54]

Even the most influential NGO activist dealing with migration and deportation issues in Tanjung Pinang agreed with the official government position of forced encapsulation, claiming that there was too great a risk that these undocumented migrants (i.e., deportees) would be intercepted and re-trafficked, since most did not have any money and *wanted* to return to Malaysia. Their desire to return to Malaysia rather than to their home villages with nothing to show for their time abroad was evident in the requests for support they made to the activist—for instance, her help in obtaining a passport—which generally related to the migrants' desire to find a way to cross the border again.

Another woman in the same NGO had taken the Pelni ship to Tanjung Priok several times. When the deportees boarded the ship, they were locked up until the boat departed, after which they were allowed to move about with the rest of the passengers. She told me that she herself had seen how recruiters among the regular passengers approached these migrants and strongly encouraged them to exit through the regular gate at Tanjung Priok rather than the one for deported migrants. More generally, the mismatch between the number of deportees placed aboard ship and the number who actually arrived at Tanjung Priok's holding area worried many of the responsible government officials I talked to, while what could be done in response was often unclear.[55]

Once in Tanjung Priok, the regular passengers exited first through the main gate, while the deportees came last and were directed through a separate entrance by an official using a loudspeaker system.[56] Once inside the large waiting room, which had been officially inaugurated in August 2006 by Indonesia's president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as a *ruang tamu TKI,* or "Indonesian migrant waiting room," the migrants were directed to sit in the sections that were sign-posted according to their respective home areas, primarily Java, Lombok, and Sumbawa. In one corner there was a small, makeshift health clinic, while banners on the wall read "Coordinating Post for the Sending Home [*Pemulangan*] of Migrant Workers Deported from Malaysia" and "We Will Facilitate Return to Your Area of Origin [*Daerah Asal*]." As the names of provinces were called one by one, migrants lined up in front of a desk with two officials. The migrant-cum-deportees were photographed and asked for their addresses, ages, places of origin, and where they had been in Malaysia. As far as I understood, the information collected was not used for any further purpose other than data collection itself, and the fact that they were deportees was not held against them.

The deportees were then transported to a public bus station in North Jakarta, from where they were sent back to their home provinces on buses chartered by the government. Once the deportees arrived at their own province's department of manpower office, they were driven back to their home villages. "We cannot force the

[54] For more on the deportation program to Bintan, see: Lindquist, "Rescue, Return, In Place"; and Anne McNevin, "Beyond Territoriality: Rethinking Human Mobility, Border Security and Geopolitical Space from the Indonesian Island of Bintan," *Security Dialogue* 45, 3 (2014): 295–310.

[55] It is difficult to judge the average percentage of mismatch, but clearly the vast majority of migrant workers were returned home.

[56] I witnessed this particular episode in May 2007.

migrants to return," an official I talked to told me, "but we prefer this process because it is our responsibility toward the family members and the migrants themselves. Once the migrant has returned home he is free to do what he wants."

The similarities between the deportation process and the return home of documented migrants is striking, in terms of their encapsulation, the importance of escorting them all the way home (*antar pulang*), the organization of the spaces where they wait—spatially organized according to home province—and the collection and checking of data, in particular their place of origin. While the idea of "home" as a safe space is widely valued in migration policy internationally, usually uncritically so, the Indonesian case points to a strikingly institutionalized concern with regulating mobility between the space of migration and the village (*kampung*).[57] The Indonesian state's need to protect migrants from the dangers of being en route suggest not only that rural populations remain infantilized or that migrants are seen as exploitable by a wide variety of actors, but also points to broader anxieties concerning its ability to govern.

Conclusion

Why is it considered strange to travel alone in Indonesia? Beginning with this question—difficult if not impossible to respond to properly—rather than the organization of migration per se, allows us to take *antar-jemput*, the infrastructure of escort, as a starting point for describing and conceptualizing documented (and sometimes undocumented), low-skilled Indonesian transnational migration. In other words, the perceived strangeness of traveling alone leads to the demand for escort, which allows for the expansion of brokerage in the context of a growing migration industry. Understanding travel and mobility as rooted in *antar-jemput* complicates liberal dichotomies of state power versus individual freedom, and introduces a complex continuum between control, exploitation, comfort, desire, trust, and care in the context of migration.[58] The focus on escort allows us to approach Indonesian migration as a historically contingent form that should be considered in relation to the enduring problem of the rural–urban divide. This leads back to the indirect rule of the Dutch colonial state, which relied on a wide range of intermediaries to mediate between villages and urban centers of power.

The mediation of migration has intensified with the rise of state-sponsored, documented, circular migration that developed in Indonesia in the 1980s and, in particular, since the 1997 Asian economic crisis. In this process, there has been an expansion of migration bureaucracy with related demands for migrant documentation. As a result, migrants have faced an increasingly regulated migration infrastructure as they are escorted and controlled by a large number of actors, usually in the name of protection. As in Barker's description of the rise of *siskamling*, the Indonesian system of urban policing developed during the New Order, there has been an explicit attempt by the state to transpose or deterritorialize certain forms of localized authority, which have then been reterritorialized through licensing, regulations for migrant mobility,

[57] Lindquist, "Rescue, Return, In Place."

[58] Silvey, "From Java to Saudi Arabia and Dubai," 200.

housing, transport, documentation, and actual buildings.[59] One might identify this as a form of *jalur*, a channel that ideally moves migrants from the village, to employment abroad, and back to the village again.

As we have seen, however, these *jalur* are patchwork, instable, and depend on forms of brokerage centered on contingent relationships between actors, technologies, and physical structures. This is particularly evident with regard to informal brokers (PLs) who—like labor recruiters during the colonial era—have tended to develop autonomy with regard to centralized forms of authority based on their relationships with prospective migrants in the early stages of the recruitment process.[60] Villagers do not choose to become migrants because of their relationships with licensed recruitment companies, but rather with PLs who are known in the areas where they live. Villagers thus negotiate with prospective PLs in the process of becoming a migrant. As a result—and through their ability to move prospective migrants between recruitment companies—PLs have come to capture a significant proportion of the profit in the migration industry, as attempts to license them have proven unsuccessful.[61] In other words, the figure of the PL highlights the complex relationships and forms of mediation between villages and urban areas around Indonesia that make migration possible.

With the expansion of migration infrastructure, albeit as a system-in-the-making, forms of mediation have evolved and become increasingly complex, while others appear to be collapsing, most notably the special migrant terminal at the Jakarta airport. The ideal form of migration and mobility, however, remains centered on *antar-jemput*. These contemporary forms of migration and mediation, however, should not be understood strictly in relation to the transformation in recent decades of the Indonesian migrant worker into an export commodity, or the rise of a global demand for migrant workers. Historical processes have shaped and continue to shape the rural–urban divide and associated forms of mobility in Indonesia, which takes a particular form through the cultural economy of *antar-jemput*.

[59] Barker, "State of Fear."

[60] Houben, "Before Departure."

[61] Lindquist, "Reassembling Indonesian Migration."