Keeping the Liancourt Rocks Dispute Afloat: Interactions Between State and Society in Korea and Japan Sean Lee Starkweather, James Madison University Abstract Originating in its modern form during the postwar period, the Lian- court Rocks dispute between South Korea and Japan has long exas- perated observers who recognize the need for cooperation in an in- creasingly volatile regional political environment.1 While the existing literature centers on variables ranging from nationalism in the public sphere to resource acquisition, this study argues that a more powerful explanation lies in the interactions between the two governments and their respective publics. Specifically, each state has actively engaged in a major nation-building process to integrate the dispute into their na- tional identities in order to rally the public around perceived territori- al transgressions. Through these consolidated identities, the Korean and Japanese publics later compel their governments to sustain more hostile policies even during periods where the two governments may desire reconciliation or compromise, and punish them in instances of perceived defection. This dynamic between the two governments and their citizenry suggests that conventional explanations grounded in ma- terial variables—such as competition over resources—are insufficient in explaining the severity and longevity of the dispute, leaving room for identity to occupy a major role. [1] SEAN LEE STARKWEATHER is a Boren Scholar at Waseda University, where he is studying the Japanese language. A graduate of James Madison University, where he received a degree in international affairs with a minor in Asian studies, he will be attend- ing the University of Chicago in Fall 2024 to pursue a master’s degree in international re- lations. His research interests include East Asian security, foreign policy decision-mak- ing, alliance politics, and nationalism. Cornell International Affairs Review 67 Map of the East Sea/Sea of Japan* *Ulleung Island is a territory of South Korea, while the Oki Islands are territories of Ja- pan. The Japanese government considers the Liancourt Rocks to be a part of Okinoshi- ma, a town on the Oki islands. Source: You-Jin Lim, “Liancourt Rocks,” ArcGIS StoryMaps, April 12, 2021, https://stor- ymaps.arcgis.com/stories/a6c56b1cd05047dc956c1c167bd2a9f0. https://ymaps.arcgis.com/stories/a6c56b1cd05047dc956c1c167bd2a9f0 https://stor Cornell International Affairs Review 68 INTRODUCTION On July 25, 2008, the US Board on Geographic Names (BGN) issued a seemingly innocuous revision that ignited a diplomatic firestorm, garnering enough attention and backlash as to involve then-US presi- dent George W. Bush: they changed the status of the Liancourt Rocks (known as Dokdo, or , in Korea; Takeshima, or , in Japan) from “South Korean territory” to “undesignated sovereignty.”2 Immedi- ately following the name change, Korean and Japanese media outlets, public figures, and government officials aggressively asserted their re- spective countries’ claims of ownership over the group of islands. This sudden antagonism between these American allies was so severe that President Bush personally intervened to reverse the BGN’s decision and reinstate the status quo of recognizing the Liancourt Rocks as South Ko- rean territory.3 This remarkable display led to confusion among West- ern observers largely unfamiliar with East Asian history as to how such a controversy could be generated from such a small series of rocks. The continuously changing ownership of the islands has augmented the complexity of the dispute. Beyond material considerations, the signifi- cance of the Liancourt Rocks lies in their ability to invoke powerful na- tionalist sentiments among both Korean and Japanese publics, fueling anti-Korean and anti-Japanese perceptions and thereby inhibiting both states from actively cooperating to resolve the disagreement over the territory. Despite the evident complexity that has defined the dispute, however, most of the current literature is limited in scope and focus- es on particular aspects of the dispute, including: the strategic impact [2] In this paper, I use “Dokdo” when discussing South Korean policy, “Takeshima” when discussing Japanese policy, and “Liancourt Rocks” when discussing the territory in a general sense. The name “Liancourt Rocks” originates from the discovery of the island by French whalers in 1849 and has since become the default choice of name for Western observers. For additional context over the name change, see: “U.S. Did Not In- form S. Korea about Change to Dokdo Classification,” Hankyoreh, July 29, 2008, https:// english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/301303.html. [3] “US Reinstates S. Korean Sovereignty Over Dokdo,” The Korea Times, July 31, 2008, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2022/06/113_28523.html. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2022/06/113_28523.html Cornell International Affairs Review 69 of the Liancourt Rocks on Korean and Japanese foreign policymaking; the effect of the dispute on Korean and Japanese national identities; the ability of both states to use the dispute as a distraction or leverage for other policy issues; and so forth. Previous research has evaluated how disputes between South Korea and Japan have inhibited security coop- eration between the two countries by creating an environment charac- terized by mistrust, making it difficult to coordinate responses to chal- lenges posed by states such as North Korea.4 It is therefore important to trace the contours of the dispute and determine the causes of the dis- pute’s longevity. This analysis examines how Korean and Japanese na- tion-building has integrated the territory into their respective people’s national identities, and how public opinion in turn compels the govern- ments to sustain an inflexible policy vis-a-vis the territory, thereby re- stricting the policy options that states see as viable and decreasing the probability that a resolution be reached which satisfies both countries. A CENTURIES LONG DISPUTE? A Brief History The struggle for control of the Liancourt Rocks spans centuries. Accord- ing to South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), its claim to the territory extends back to the Samguk Sagi (The Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms).5 Although this historical record was only published in 1145, it included an account of the 512 discovery and subsequent [4] Kathryn Botto, “Overcoming Obstacles to Trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan Interoper- ability,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 18, 2020, https://carneg- ieendowment.org/2020/03/18/overcoming-obstacles-to-trilateral-u.s.-rok-japan-in- teroperability-pub-81236; Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, 1st edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2000); Krista E. Wiegand, “The South Korean–Japanese Security Relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets Dispute,” The Pacific Review 28.3 (May 27, 2015): 347- 8, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1011209; Snyder, “Why the Japan-South Korea Dispute Just Got Worse,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 27, 2019, https://www.cfr. org/in-brief/why-japan-south-korea-dispute-just-got-worse. [5] “Why Dokdo Is Korean Territory,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, accessed April 27, 2023, http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/m/eng/. http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/m/eng https://www.cfr https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1011209 https://ieendowment.org/2020/03/18/overcoming-obstacles-to-trilateral-u.s.-rok-japan-in https://carneg Cornell International Affairs Review 70 takeover of Usan-guk (State of Usan), which included Dokdo.6 Today, Korean media proudly tells the story of how Ahn Yong-bok, a Korean fisherman, repelled Japanese competitors from Dokdo in 1693.7 The Ko- rean government argues that Japan recognized Dokdo as Korean terri- tory following this incident — according to South Korea, Japan banned travel to Dokdo in 1696, later recognizing Dokdo as a territory of the Jo- seon Dynasty in 1870.8 Japan disputes the Korean version of events. Spe- cifically, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) asserts that Japan recognized Takeshima’s existence as early as 1618 and has claimed sov- ereignty over the islands since the mid-1600s. In January 1905, the Japa- nese government declared that the islands were to fall under a branch of the Shimane Prefectural Government.9 The ordinance reflected broader Japanese imperialist ambitions; the ordinance was issued as Japan was engaged in a bitter military conflict with Russia over control of the Ko- rean peninsula and Manchuria, which would conclude later that year with the Treaty of Portsmouth. Included in the treaty was a concession [6] For a broad overview of the dispute, see: https://www.bbc.com/news/world- asia-19207086; for Korea’s history of Dokdo, see: https://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/dokdo/ reason.jsp. [7] Little is known about Ahn himself, and most of the evidence concerning his travels to Dokdo consists of second-hand accounts written by Confucian scholars in Korea in the mid-18th century; for more information, see: “Ahn Yong-Bok, the Defender of Dok- do in Joseon Era,” KBS World, August 9, 2012, http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/contents_ view.htm?lang=e&menu_cate=history&id=&board_seq=60850&page=20&board_ code=; Ji-soo Kim, “Ahn Yong-Bok Told of Dokdo, Ulleungdo,” The Korea Times, April 16, 2013, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/04/139_134022.html. [8] “Why Dokdo Is Korean Territory,” KBS World, accessed April 27, 2023, http://world. kbs.co.kr/special/dokdo/english/history/base.htm; while KBS World does not represent the Korean government, the information used in the page is noted as having been pro- vided by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs ; Michael Weinstein, “South Ko- rea-Japan Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute: Toward Confrontation,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, May 6, 2006, https://apjjf.org/-Michael-Weinstein/1685/article.html; as a note, Weinstein places the date as 1693—the Korean MOFA notes it is 1696. [9] “Incorporation of Takeshima into Shimane Prefecture,” Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs of Japan, accessed April 27, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/takeshima/ page1we_000060.html; For a broad overview of Japan’s history of Takeshima, see: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/position.html; for their description concerning Japanese sovereignty over Takeshima, see: https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/ takeshima/page1we_000058.html. https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/position.html https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/takeshima https://apjjf.org/-Michael-Weinstein/1685/article.html http://world https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/04/139_134022.html http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/contents https://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/dokdo https://www.bbc.com/news/world Cornell International Affairs Review 71 on the part of the Russians to concede the Korean peninsula to Japanese control.10 Unsurprisingly, then, in the context of Korea, it has been observed that the Liancourt Rocks have taken on an almost “sacred” quality as proof of Japan’s long-time efforts to infringe on Korean sovereignty.11 Losing the rocks, therefore, would invite comparisons to earlier losses to Jap- anese imperialism.12 To the Japanese, losing the rocks would both un- dermine the sense of superiority which often lingers in the mindsets of former colonial powers and validate existing feelings of unfairness at the hands of Koreans, who already suffer from a stereotype of being “un- trustworthy.”13 However, while both Korea and Japan sought to assert control over the Liancourt Rocks for quite some time, the dispute that exists between the two countries today is a modern phenomenon which began with Ja- pan’s defeat in the Pacific War. In 1951, Japanese and American officials gathered in San Francisco to negotiate the contours of the post-World War II settlement. The resultant treaty asserted that Japan renounce its rights to “Korea, including the islands of Quelport, Port Hamilton and [10] To further emphasize the association between the Liancourt Rocks and Japanese imperial ambitions, it is worth noting that while the Treaty of Portsmouth never refer- enced the Liancourt Rocks themselves, Japan evidently held great interest in controlling the islands in its periphery—the treaty would involve the ceding of the southern half of Sakhalin by Russia to Japan; Andrew Glass, “Theodore Roosevelt Brokers Peace Treaty, Sept. 5, 1905,” POLITICO, September 5, 2018, https://www.politico.com/sto- ry/2018/09/05/theodore-roosevelt-brokers-peace-treaty-sept-5-1905-806208. [11] Brandon Palmer and Laura Whitefleet-Smith, “Assimilating Dokdo: The Islets in Korean Everyday Life,” ASIANetwork Exchange A Journal for Asian Studies in the Liberal Arts 23, no. 1 (2016): 23. [12] Masako Ikegami, “Solving the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute: Searching for Common Ground Through the Aland Model,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 23.1 (2009): 8. [13] Victor D. Cha, “Hate, Power, and Identity in Japan–Korea Security: Towards a Synthetic Material-Ideational Analytical Framework,” Australian Journal of Internation- al Affairs 54.3 (November 1, 2000): 313, https://doi.org/10.1080/00049910020012598; Sayaka Chatani, “How to Address the Racism at the Heart of Japan-South Korea Ten- sions,” United States Institute of Peace, January 17, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publica- tions/2023/01/how-address-racism-heart-japan-south-korea-tensions. https://www.usip.org/publica https://doi.org/10.1080/00049910020012598 https://www.politico.com/sto Cornell International Affairs Review 72 Dagelet” without mention of the Liancourt Rocks.14 However, the Lian- court Rocks were not included in the treaty, and then-Assistant Secre- tary for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk later rejected a subsequent ROK appeal to have the territory explicitly included in the text.15 A variety of theories persist as to the cause, including one which posits that John Foster Dulles sought to insert “wedges” between Japan and its neighbors in order to defend against Communist expansion by retaining sources of discord.16 However, it is more probable that American diplomats were uncertain if Korea or Japan had been the original owners of the territory and deferred the dispute by allowing South Korea and Japan to come to a settlement.17 Following the end of the U.S. occupation of Japan in 1952, the U.S. once more “feigned disinterest” to avoid having to determine final ownership of the territory, a move that would foreshadow U.S. policy for the next 70 years.18 In response to the U.S.’ decision not to settle the dispute, South Korean president Rhee Syngman announced in 1952 the Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over Adjacent Seas, which asserted Korea’s control over a large maritime zone which included Dokdo. This unilat- erally-established boundary would come to be known as the Syngman Rhee Line (known in Korea as the “Peace Line”). Two years later, South Korea took military control of Dokdo, stationed its coast guard in the region to patrol the area surrounding the islands, and later implement- ed the Fishery Resources Conservation Law, which enabled the Korean [14] Min Jung Chung, “Analysis of the Territorial Issue Regarding the Liancourt Rocks between Korea and Japan,” The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law 7.1 (May 9, 2019): 53, https://doi.org/10.1163/22134484-12340116. [15] Kimie Hara, “Takeshima/Dokdo Problem in the San Francisco System: Reconsider- ing Its Origin and Settlement in a Multilateral Framework,” The Korean Journal of Inter- national and Comparative Law 4.1 (May 30, 2016): 32, https://doi.org/10.1163/22134484- 12340067. [16] Ibid, 32-3. [17] Ibid, 54. [18] Alexis Dudden, “Dangerous Islands: Japan, Korea, and the United States,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, August 1, 2008, https://apjjf.org/-Alexis-Dud- den/2852/article.html. https://apjjf.org/-Alexis-Dud https://doi.org/10.1163/22134484 https://doi.org/10.1163/22134484-12340116 Cornell International Affairs Review 73 coast guard to seize any vessels found fishing within the zone.19 While there were brief flare-ups in tension over the dispute, both South Korea and Japan remained largely conflict-averse until March 15, 2005, when Japan’s Shimane Prefecture’s assembly proposed a bill that declared Feb- ruary 22nd a new holiday known as “Takeshima Day.”20 Henceforth, the Liancourt Rocks became—and remained—a focal point of contention in Korean and Japanese elite and popular discourses.21 Literature Review Territories are symbolic of a national sense of identity as they reflect and represent a broader national history.22 To Korean and Japanese people, it is not important that the Liancourt Rocks consist of only one permanent resident; that the infrastructure on the islands consist of only a handful of buildings, most of which are used to house Korean police officers and service small groups of tourists; or that in terms of resources, the area around Dokdo offers only fish and suspected pock- ets of natural gas.23 What is important is that the territory is inherently [19] Sang-ho Song, “S. Korea Holds Event to Commemorate 1954 Dokdo Battle,” Yonhap News Agency, November 19, 2021, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211119003200325; Hideo Takabayashi, “Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea: Agreement on Fisheries Note,” Japanese Annual of International Law 10 (1966): 16; for Japan’s official perspective on the 1954 policies by Korea, see: https://www.mofa. go.jp/a_o/na/takeshima/page1we_000064.html. [20] Michael Weinstein, “South Korea-Japan Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute: Toward Con- frontation,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, May 6, 2006, https://apjjf.org/-Mi- chael-Weinstein/1685/article.html; “Annual Event Pushes Japan’s Claim to South Korea-Held Islets,” Nikkei Asia, February 22, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Ja- pan-South-Korea-rift/Annual-event-pushes-Japan-s-claim-to-South-Korea-held-islets. [21] Ji-Young Lee and Jaehyun Lee, “Dokdo in South Korean Education, Media, and Culture,” in The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute (Brill Nijhoff, 2021), 201–21, https://doi. org/10.1163/9789004447899_010; Yuji Fukuhara and Takeshi Sato, “Takeshima in Jap- anese Education, Media and Culture,” in The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute, 10, Maritime Cooperation in East Asia (Brill | Nijhoff, 2021), 171–200, https://brill.com/view/book/ edcoll/9789004447899/BP000016.xml. [22] Jan Penrose, “Nations, States and Homelands: Territory and Territoriality in Na- tionalist Thought,” Nations and Nationalism 8.3 (2002): 282. [23] Euan McKirdy and Sophie Jeong, “Widow, 81, Sole Resident of Remote Is- land Disputed by South Korea and Japan,” CNN, February 15, 2019, https://www.cnn. com/2019/02/14/asia/south-korea-japan-disputed-islands-one-resident-intl/index.html; https://www.cnn https://brill.com/view/book https://doi https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Ja https://apjjf.org/-Mi https://www.mofa https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211119003200325 Cornell International Affairs Review 74 theirs and part of their respective national stories.24 In this sense, the Liancourt Rocks’ value as a symbol is tied to its status as comprising part of the larger Korean or Japanese “homeland.”25 However, much of the existing literature either fails to appreciate the degree to which the Liancourt Rocks remain embedded in public consciousness in Korea and Japan or takes it for granted. At this point, a large percentage of the literature on the Liancourt Rocks dispute has centered on the dispute’s resolution.26 Questions related to the political problems of who has the stronger claim to sovereignty over the islands and how the dispute can be navigated and, ultimately, legally resolved are also among the more common topics of focus.27 More recent research has begun to investi- gate the impact of the dispute on national identities, domestic politics, and foreign policymaking. To many outside observers, the seemingly obvious explanation is the geographic value of the islands. Sitting at the midpoint between Korea and Japan, the geopolitical importance of the “Police Officer Stationed on Dokdo Urges Tourists to Visit Island,” Korean Culture and Information Service, September 28, 2021, https://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Honor- aryReporters/view?articleId=204337; “Islands Disputed between Seoul and Tokyo,” Re- uters, July 14, 2008, sec. World News, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-japan- islands-sidebar-idUST13712020080714. [24] For a discussion of the centrality of territory to national histories, see: O. Yiftachel, “Territory as the Kernel of the Nation: Space, Time and Nationalism in Israel/Palestine,” Geopolitics 7.2 (September 1, 2002). [25] For a discussion of the relationship between “homelands” and national identities, see Chapter 3 of Walker Connor’s Ethnonationalism (1994). Also see: Jan Penrose, “Na- tions, States and Homelands: Territory and Territoriality in Nationalist Thought,” Na- tions and Nationalism 8.3 (2002). [26] Garret Bowman, “Why Now Is the Time to Resolve the Dokdo/Takeshima Dis- pute,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 46.1 (January 1, 2014): 433. [27] Laurent Mayali and John Yoo, “Resolution of Territorial Disputes in East Asia: The Case of Dokdo,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, January 18, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3320079; Seokwoo Lee, “Dokdo: The San Francisco Peace Treaty, International Law on Territorial Disputes, and Historical Criticism,” Asian Perspective 35.3 (2011): 361; Rio H. Kwon, “Resolving the Le- gal Status of Dokdo/Takeshima: Why Join Referral to the International Court of Justice Is a Realistic Approach Comments,” University of Hawai’i Law Review 40.2 (2018 2017): 212; Daisuke Akimoto, “Takeshima or Dokdo? Toward Conflict Transformation of the Japan-Korea Territorial Dispute,” Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 22.1 (Fall 2020): 52. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3320079 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-japan https://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Honor Cornell International Affairs Review 75 islands initially seems to be great. Certainly, they can impact the two country’s maritime borders and, by extension, access to fishing and nat- ural resources such as natural gas.28 However, South Korea and Japan have reached bilateral agreements that address access to resources in the Sea of Japan/East Sea in the past. During the 1960s, South Korea and Japan reached a bilateral agreement to determine equitable fishery regu- lations in relation to the aforementioned Peace Line.29 Emphasizing the symbolic value of the Liancourt Rocks, other scholars argue that the dis- pute may also play a functional role for the Japanese and especially the Korean governments—both North and South—by serving to strengthen the countries’ respective national identities and invoke powerful nation- alist sentiments.30 Specifically, political elites in Korea and Japan may have intentionally politicized the dispute for their own personal gain by reaping domestic political benefits.31 Notably, it has been found that Korea’s bilateral disputes with Japan over Dokdo directly contribute to increased presidential popularity among the public.32 At the local level, a number of scholars have sought to explore the sig- nificance of the Liancourt Rocks as a symbol within the national ethos. Unsurprisingly, some of these arguments arose in response to earlier [28] Norman Cherkis, “Natural Gas Is Key Issue,” The Korea Times, August 18, 2008, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2022/06/356_29572.html; “Why Are the Dokdo Islets so Vital for Korea, Japan?,” Korea JoongAng Daily, July 28, 2008, https:// koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2008/07/28/etc/Why-are-the-Dokdo-islets-so-vital-for- Korea-Japan/2892904.html. [29] Hideo Takabayashi, “Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Repub- lic of Korea: Agreement on Fisheries Note,” Japanese Annual of International Law 10 (1966): 17. [30] Bec Strating, “The Symbolic Politics of the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute,” The Inter- preter, December 6, 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/symbolic-poli- tics-dokdotakeshima-dispute; Balazs Szalontai, “Instrumental Nationalism? The Dokdo Problem Through the Lens of North Korean Propaganda and Diplomacy,” Journal of Northeast Asian History 10 (December 1, 2013): 105–62. [31] M. Erika Pollmann, “The Politicization of the Liancourt Rocks Dispute and Its Ef- fect on the Japan-South Korea Relationship,” Pacific Forum CSIS, Pacific Forum CSIS Issues and Insights, 15.10 (October 2015): 27. [32] Wonjae Hwang, Wonbin Cho, and Krista Wiegand, “Do Korean-Japanese Histori- cal Disputes Generate Rally Effects?,” The Journal of Asian Studies 77.3 (2018): 702-705. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/symbolic-poli https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2008/07/28/etc/Why-are-the-Dokdo-islets-so-vital-for https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2022/06/356_29572.html Cornell International Affairs Review 76 realist arguments focusing on the material aspects of the dispute.33 In particular, the role of Dokdo in Korean historical memory and national discourse as a symbol of Japanese colonialism presents an increasingly popular and interesting line of inquiry.34 Though typically seen as appli- cable more to Korea, many scholars argue that Dokdo’s importance, and the two countries’ inability to reach a resolution, derives from the fact that the Korean and Japanese publics have placed the territory within the scope of their own sense of national identity.35 The biggest strength, as well as the most significant drawback, of most of the literature has been its narrow scope. Representing a first step to- wards comprehensively explaining the dispute, this literature provides invaluable insight into the origins, scope, and possible resolutions of the dispute. Yet, many scholars have put too much stock into the explanato- ry power of single factors: for example, Bec Strating asserted that “the key to understanding the dispute lies in domestic politics and the way the rocks have become totemic in broader historical debates.”36 More- over, while the scholarship on the significance of the dispute on Korean and Japanese national identities and the role of historical memory in driving the conflict has been informative, most scholars have focused [33] Sungbae Kim, “Understanding the Dokdo Issue: A Critical Review of the Liberalist Approach,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 24.2 (2010): 1–27. [34] Mikyoung Kim, “A War of Memories: Dissecting The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute,” Global Asia, September 2012, https://www.globalasia.org/v7no3/feature/a-war-of-mem- ories-dissecting-the-dokdo-takeshima-dispute_mikyoung-kim; Bec Strating, “The Symbolic Politics of the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute,” The Interpreter, December 6, 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/symbolic-politics-dokdotakeshima-dis- pute; Tasevski, “Islands of Ire: The South Korea–Japan Dispute,” The Interpreter, April 27, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/islands-ire-south-korea-japan- dispute. [35] Alexander Bukh, “Shimane Prefecture, Tokyo and the Territorial Dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima: Regional and National Identities in Japan,” The Pacific Review 28.1 (January 1, 2015): 47–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2014.970040; Dong-Joon Park and Danielle Chubb, “Why Dokdo Matters to Korea,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2011, https://thediplomat.com/2011/08/why-dokdo-matters-to-korea/. [36] Bec Strating, “The Symbolic Politics of the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute,” The Inter- preter, December 6, 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/symbolic-poli- tics-dokdotakeshima-dispute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/symbolic-poli https://thediplomat.com/2011/08/why-dokdo-matters-to-korea https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2014.970040 https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/islands-ire-south-korea-japan https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/symbolic-politics-dokdotakeshima-dis https://www.globalasia.org/v7no3/feature/a-war-of-mem Cornell International Affairs Review 77 on national identity as it applies to the national group; few, if any, focus on how such identity conceptions impact the decision making of foreign policy elites and vice versa. Therefore, the most promising research in this area has been done by researchers looking into the intersection of two domains of the dispute and Korea-Japan relations more broadly. Perhaps the most notable has been forwarded by Victor Cha, whose framework sought to synthesize materialist and culturalist explanations of Korea-Japan friction into a coherent whole.37 More specific analyses on the dispute have likewise sought to integrate material and ideational variables; in particular, Ralf Emmers sought to examine the intersection between nationalism and natural resources.38 Focusing on the “triggers” of the dispute’s period- ic escalation, Sung-jae Choi argued for the importance of identifying the ways in which extralegal and “extrahistorical” variables interacted with one another.39 Similarly, Krista E. Wiegand asserts that domestic accountability in South Korea—that is, pressures exerted through pub- lic opinion and actions by civil society groups—is responsible for the inability of South Korea and Japan to cooperate on security issues.40 However, Choi’s study does not assess the role played by the Korean and Japanese governments in integrating the territory into their national identities, instead focusing on the impact of civic groups and nongov- ernmental organizations; Wiegand’s study likewise focuses on the Kore- an context, leaving space for a similar analysis to be conducted on Japan. This study seeks to expand on the work done by Choi and Wiegand [37] Victor D. Cha, “Hate, Power, and Identity in Japan–Korea Security: Towards a Syn- thetic Material-Ideational Analytical Framework,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 54.3 (November 1, 2000): 309–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/00049910020012598. [38] Ralf Emmers, “Japan-Korea Relations and the Tokdo/Takeshima Dispute: The In- terplay of Nationalism and Natural Resources,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 212 (November 10, 2010): 43. [39] Sung-jae Choi, “The Politics of the Dokdo Issue,” Journal of East Asian Studies 5.3 (December 2005): 465–66, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800002071. [40] Krista E. Wiegand, “The South Korean–Japanese Security Relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets Dispute,” The Pacific Review 28.3 (May 27, 2015): 347–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1011209. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1011209 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800002071 https://doi.org/10.1080/00049910020012598 Cornell International Affairs Review 78 by evaluating the impact of the interactions between state (country leaders, executive agencies, and legislative bodies) and society (public opinion and civic groups). In particular, this study will examine how nation-building efforts by both countries’ governments have created a culture in which the Liancourt Rocks became an integral part of Ko- rean and Japanese national identity. Moreover, it seeks to evaluate how nationalist sentiment has, in turn, ensured that each government main- tains little flexibility in how they carry out their policy vis-à-vis the Li- ancourt Rocks, ultimately unable to pursue any sort of compromise. As Andrew Oros notes, “there is an intersubjective relationship where iden- tity and interests are linked; actors influence their environment, and the environment influences them.”41 STATE INTERESTS AND TOP-DOWN SOCIAL ENGINEERING Material Variables To be clear, there are definite strategic interests which contribute to the shape and form of the dispute around the Liancourt Rocks. As Japan’s 2021 Diplomatic Bluebook suggests, the permanent stationing of securi- ty personnel on the territory by the Korean military as well as the mili- tary’s occasional exercises near the territory have consistently led to dip- lomatic protests by the Japanese MOFA.42 The military and geographic components of the dispute were reemphasized the following year in the 2022 Diplomatic Bluebook.43 In response, South Korea responded that Dokdo is part of Korea “in terms of history, geography and international law,” though it is also possible to interpret the term as referring to con- ceptions of the Korean “homeland.”44 Indeed, in 2012, then-South Ko- [41] Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 2008), 30. [42] “Diplomatic Bluebook 2022: Japanese Diplomacy and International Situation in 2021,” diplomatic bluebook (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2022), 63-64, https:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2021/pdf/pdfs/2021_all.pdf. [43] “Diplomatic Bluebook 2022: Japanese Diplomacy and International Situation in 2021,” Diplomatic Bluebook (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2022), https://www. mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2021/pdf/pdfs/2021_all.pdf. [44] “MOFA Spokesperson’s Commentary on Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2022,” Min- https://www Cornell International Affairs Review 79 rean President Lee Myung-bak visited Dokdo in response to a defense white paper published by the Japanese government earlier that year, which had laid claim to the territory. Speaking to police officers sta- tioned on the islands, he reportedly asserted that “Dokdo is truly [Kore- an] territory, and worth defending with our lives.”45 While analysts often overstate the geopolitical significance of Dokdo, there is some truth to the notion that there are material components which contribute to both states’ desire to control the territory. Japan may feel that it must commit to the Liancourt Rocks dispute because to with- draw from it would mean jeopardizing Japan’s claims to other Pacific territories—namely, the Senkaku Islands and Kurile Islands (known in Japan as the Northern Territories).46 Any concessions made over the Li- ancourt Rocks may embolden China and Russia—the other disputants in the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Kurile/Northern Territories disputes—to view Japanese claims as a sign of weakness and more aggressively con- test Japan over those territories.47 In addition, the problem of determin- ing each states’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has a number of impli- cations for access to natural resources, which will factor into each states’ respective calculus over whether to continue pursuing control of the territory. For example, the Korea National Oil Corporation detected for the first time in 1998 a commercially viable layer of natural gas near the islands; drilling began in 2004, with two other deposits being located nearby since then.48 Given that both Japan and South Korea are among istry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, April 22, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/ brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322036&page=2. [45] Sang-Hun Choe, “South Korean’s Visit to Disputed Islets Angers Japan,” The New York Times, August 10, 2012, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/world/ asia/south-koreans-visit-to-disputed-islets-angers-japan.html. [46] Tasevski, “Islands of Ire: The South Korea–Japan Dispute,” The Interpreter, April 27, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/islands-ire-south-korea-japan- dispute. [47] This dynamic, whereby initially small defeats produce a positive feedback loop such that a state’s enemies perceive the state as weak and therefore prone to conceding on other issues, is discussed in greater detail in Robert Jervis’ System Effects (1999). [48] Shin, Hyon-hee, “[Weekender] Dokdo’s Promising Resources, Ecology,” The Korea Herald, January 17, 2014. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140117000879. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140117000879 https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/islands-ire-south-korea-japan https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/world https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng Cornell International Affairs Review 80 the top importers of liquefied natural gas, even the possibility of large deposits of natural gas near the Liancourt Rocks would incentivize both to lay claim to the territory.49 Considering the above factors, as well as the popularity of econom- ics- and resource-based arguments with regard to the origins of Japan’s imperial ambitions in the middle of the 20th century, it would seem reasonable to perceive Dokdo as being the product of resource-based motivations.50 However, materialist explanations fail on several ac- counts. To begin with, legal scholars have noted that it is unlikely that the Liancourt Rocks would alter a state’s EEZ given that the rocks lack self-sustaining resources that allow for human habitation.51 More signifi- cantly, if the dispute was strictly limited to material considerations, it is highly probable that the two states would have reached a bilateral agree- ment long before the its revival in 2005. After all, as noted earlier, South Korea and Japan have successfully reached an agreement over fishing rights before, and it is difficult to imagine that other resource-based factors would preclude a similar agreement from being reached today. This becomes especially apparent considering that most of the estimat- ed natural gas deposits near the Liancourt Rocks have not actually been discovered, and the perceived need for natural gas has declined in both countries as a result of decreasing domestic demand and increased nu- clear energy production.52 [49] Eric Yep et al., “South Korea, Japan Natural Gas Surpluses Offset Heat Wave-Driv- en Demand in Rest of Asia,” S&P Global, April 25, 2023, https://www.spglobal.com/ commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/energy-transition/042523-south- korea-japan-natural-gas-surpluses-offset-heat-wave-driven-demand-in-rest-of-asia. [50] For an explanation of Japanese imperialism grounded in economics, see: Kaoru Sugihara, “The Economic Motivations behind Japanese Aggression in the Late 1930s: Perspectives of Freda Utley and Nawa Toichi,” Journal of Contemporary History 32.2 (1997): 261-262. [51] Phil Haas, “Status and Sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks: The Dispute between Japan and Korea,” Gonzaga Journal of International Law 15.1 (2012 2011): 8. [52] Eric Yep et al., “South Korea, Japan Natural Gas Surpluses Offset Heat Wave-Driv- en Demand in Rest of Asia,” S&P Global, April 25, 2023, https://www.spglobal.com/ commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/energy-transition/042523-south- korea-japan-natural-gas-surpluses-offset-heat-wave-driven-demand-in-rest-of-asia. https://www.spglobal.com https://www.spglobal.com Cornell International Affairs Review 81 Additionally, given the U.S.’ recognition of the importance of the U.S.- Japan-South Korea trilateral relationship, it is unlikely that a territorial conflict rooted solely in disagreements over resource acquisition would see the U.S. remain on the sidelines for 70 years.53 More concretely, ma- terialist arguments fail to explain the fact that Korean protests against Japanese policy towards Dokdo are often tied to complaints over Japa- nese history textbooks, lack of culpability over the comfort women is- sue, and other explicitly identity-based factors.54 The inability of mate- rial factors to sufficiently explain the dispute leaves space for ideational considerations as well as identity to assume a major role in explaining how the dispute has managed to become generational. Seeing Like a State: Perception, Memory, and Identity Identity formation is a process laden with emotions related to perceived commonalities among an in-group and differences with out-groups, of- ten grounded in abstract “memories” of the experiences of a group. In developing what would become one of the cornerstones of social psy- chology—social identity theory—Henri Tajfel argued that in categoriz- ing themselves into social groups and comparing their group against other out-groups, people will seek to determine the negative elements of out-groups in order to enhance their self-esteem. These social identities are causative in that someone’s social identity partially determines their behavior.55 Thus, one can expect that the emotions and identities of de- [53] White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: White House, 2022), 8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-In- do-Pacific-Strategy.pdf; Hideo Takabayashi, “Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea: Agreement on Fisheries Note,” Japanese Annual of Interna- tional Law 10 (1966): 17. [54] “MOFA Spokesperson’s Commentary on Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2022,” Min- istry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, April 22, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/ brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322036&page=2; “MOFA Spokesperson’s Statement on Ja- pan’s Authorization of Textbooks,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, March 30, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322023&page=4. [55] Henri Tajfel, “Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour,” Social Science Informa- tion 13.2 (April 1, 1974): 91-93, https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847401300204; for a review of social identity theory and the process of social identity formation, see: Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847401300204 https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322023&page=4 https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-In Cornell International Affairs Review 82 cision makers play a significant role in shaping the dispute and increas- ing its longevity as a byproduct. In the context of the dispute between South Korea and Japan over the Liancourt Rocks, there are two main components of identity that are especially relevant: 1) Identity helps shape how decision makers themselves perceive their adversary, deter- mines which options and alternatives are viable, and dictates how com- mitted a state is to a particular interest. It can transform topics that are otherwise of no interest into a vital interest which commands national attention from policymakers and the public.56 2) Identity is a malleable construct, thereby allowing the state to manipulate its form and con- tent.57 While competing ideas exist over the substance of their respective na- tional identities, both Korea and Japan retain a strong sense of national pride. As Sven Saaler argues, history forms the core of Japanese nation- alism, and historical memory — the contours of Japan’s national iden- tity.58 Indeed, as a parliamentarian, former prime minister Shinzo Abe played a critical role in organizing the Historical Examination Commit- tee within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1993, where he helped advocate for historical revisionist perspectives on Japanese aggression in the Pacific, comfort women, the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, and other historical issues.59 Yet Abe’s mission was just one part of a broader LDP effort to produce and reinforce a conservative and nationalist identity in Japan.60 While the two major parties in Korea have not experienced the 63.3 (September 2000): 224–37, https://doi.org/10.2307/2695870. [56] While the transformation of political issues into a vital security issue suggests the applicability of securitization theory, the case of the Liancourt Rocks precludes easy ap- plication. Although Dokdo/Takeshima is seen as an important geographic and symbolic issue, both governments tend to avoid tying the issue to security. [57] Referred to as “official nationalism” by Benedict Anderson in his Imagined Com- munities (1983), national identities crafted in a top-down manner have become a popu- lar area of research, with imperial Japan being a prominent case study. [58] Sven Saaler, “Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 14.20 (October 15, 2006), https://apjjf.org/2016/20/Saaler.html. [59] Ibid. [60] Junki Nakahara, “Deconstructing Abe Shinzo’s ‘Take Back Japan’ Nationalism,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 19.24 (December 15, 2021), https://apjjf.org/2021/24/ https://apjjf.org/2021/24 https://apjjf.org/2016/20/Saaler.html https://doi.org/10.2307/2695870 Cornell International Affairs Review 83 same form of single-party dominance as the LDP has enjoyed in Japan, both promote a sense of Korean nationalism; since the two Koreas split in 1945, both regimes have sought to assert themselves as the legitimate representative of the Korean nation.61 Unsurprisingly, then, one of the more interesting—and prominent—dy- namics in the Korea-Japan relationship concerns their colonial past. As Victor Cha argues, the colonial history of Japan manifests in contem- porary politics as a superiority complex towards Korea — a complex “inherent in the collective mindsets of former colonizers.”62 For Japan, then, losing to Korea is unacceptable because it would compromise their sense of exceptionalism, which defines Japanese national identity. For Korea, on the other hand, a sense of anti-Japanism pervades discourses on Korean national identity; government officials loathe the prospect of losing to Japan because each loss is perceived against the backdrop of the historical memories related to Japan’s colonization of Korea.63 In fact, as Cha asserts, Korea’s anti-Japanism is sometimes intense enough whereby “making a concession to Japan becomes synonymous with treason.”64 Thus on August 2, 2019, at the outbreak of a trade dispute be- tween Korea and Japan, then-president Moon Jae-in promised cabinet members as well as the Korean public that they would “never again lose to Japan,” signaling the beginning of a prolonged quarrel between the two states.65 This highly personal view of the other as an antagonist—or even an ene- my—derives from their identities, grounded in a particular understand- Nakahara.html. [61] Gi-Wook Shin and Paul Yunsik Chang, “The Politics of Nationalism in U.S.-Korea Relations,” Asian Perspective 28.4 (2004): 127. [62] Victor D. Cha, “Hate, Power, and Identity in Japan–Korea Security: Towards a Synthetic Material-Ideational Analytical Framework,” Australian Journal of Internation- al Affairs 54.3 (November 1, 2000): 313, https://doi.org/10.1080/00049910020012598. [63] Ibid, 314. [64] Ibid. [65] Moon, Jae-in, “Opening Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at Emergency Cabi- net Meeting,” Cheong Wa Dae, August 2, 2019, http://english1.president.go.kr/Briefing- Speeches/Speeches/630. http://english1.president.go.kr/Briefing https://doi.org/10.1080/00049910020012598 Cornell International Affairs Review 84 ing of their national histories. Both Korean and Japanese policymakers, therefore, have a personal stake in ensuring that they come out victori- ous over the other.66 As such, although both Korea and Japan wish to be perceived by the international community as adhering to internation- al legal norms, both countries’ commitment to “winning” the dispute means their commitment to resolving disputes between one another through established legal mechanisms is weakened. Manufacturing an Official Nationalism Education represented the most effective means by which the Korean and Japanese governments could advance their concept of their respec- tive national identities as well as their particular understanding of the dispute. In Japan, the nationalist character of education has become a topic of intense scrutiny as external observers began to criticize the revisionist versions contained within textbooks and taught in class- rooms. Notably, a number of textbook publishing executives have deep networks with LDP officials and share many of the same conservative views on Japan’s recent past. One such executive is Hiromichi Moteki, the founder of the publishing firm Sekai Shuppan and acting chairman of the right-wing and historical revisionist Society for the Dissemina- tion of Historical Fact, which has affiliations with government officials.67 In 2016, when South Korean lawmakers visited Dokdo on Liberation Day, Hiromichi Moteki described the act as “stupid and ridiculous” and “purely propaganda.”68 Later in 2017, Hiromichi Moteki even went so [66] This need for “winning” in order to bolster their own self-esteem as well as ele- vate the status of their nation is not limited to the context of Korea-Japan relations; as Joseph Yi and Wondong Lee argue, Korea’s approach to the pandemic was nationalist and politicized by the ruling party at the time—for their argument, see: Joseph Yi and Wondong Lee, “Pandemic Nationalism in South Korea,” Society 57.4 (August 1, 2020): 446–51, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-020-00509-z. [67] Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Un-Remembering the Massacre: How Japan’s ‘History Wars’ Are Challenging Research Integrity Domestically and Abroad,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (blog), October 25, 2021, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/10/25/ un-remembering-the-massacre-how-japans-history-wars-are-challenging-research-in- tegrity-domestically-and-abroad/. [68] Julian Ryall, “‘Stupid and Ridiculous’: Japan Groups Slam South Korean MPs Visit to Disputed Islets,” South China Morning Post, August 18, 2016, https://www.scmp.com/ https://www.scmp.com https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/10/25 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-020-00509-z Cornell International Affairs Review 85 far as to deny that Korea was oppressed by Japan, arguing instead that “Japan spent so much money that you could say it was the Koreans that exploited us.”69 Moreover, despite the volume of international criticism and outrage found in Korea, China, the Philippines, and other former colonies of Japan, Abe Shinzo himself had asserted that such revisions were necessary to eradicate the postwar regime that had been estab- lished during the period of US occupation from 1945-1952.70 Government manipulation of historical education extended to the ques- tion of Takeshima as well. In 2012, Japanese textbooks referred only to “disagreements” over Takeshima.71 However, as part of a broader effort by Shinzo Abe to eliminate “masochistic” feelings among Japa- nese regarding their history, replace such feelings with patriotism, and strengthen their territorial claims, Japan’s Ministry of Education, Cul- ture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) announced in 2014 that it would revise its teaching guidelines and recommend that teachers instruct students that Takeshima, as well as the Senkaku Islands, were both Japanese territories.72 Later in 2019, Japan’s MEXT announced that beginning in 2020, social studies textbooks for 5th and sixth graders would state that Takeshima is an “inherent part of Japan’s territory” and news/asia/diplomacy/article/2005195/stupid-and-ridiculous-japan-groups-slam-south- korean-mps-visit. [69] At the time, Sekai Shuppan was embroiled in a controversy concerning the use of a particular set of history textbooks published by Sekai Shuppan and used across 50 junior high schools. Specific grievances regarding the textbooks included the omission of the Nanjing Massacre of 1937, which saw hundreds of thousands of Chinese dead, the omission of the comfort women issue, wherein hundreds of thousands of women in Korea, China, the Philippines, etc. were forced into sexual slavery, and for asserting that the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was justified as the US’ prior embargo was itself an act of war; Julian Ryall, “Japan’s ‘nationalist’ School Books Teach a Differ- ent View of History,” Deutsche Welle, August 15, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/japans- nationalist-school-books-teach-a-different-view-of-history/a-40092325. [70] Ibid. [71] Justin McCurry, “Japan: Teachers to Call Senkaku and Takeshima Islands Japanese Territory,” The Guardian, January 28, 2014, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/jan/28/japan-teachers-call-senkaku-takeshima-island-japanese-terri- tory. [72] Ibid. https://www.theguardian https://www.dw.com/en/japans Cornell International Affairs Review 86 that it is illegally occupied by Korea.73 This trend in education over his- torical and territorial issues marks a broader generational shift in Japan. As Andrew Horvat noted in an interview with Reuters, “the failure to reach consensus on a difficult past … has resulted in a lack of tolerance in a new generation that sees things in a less nuanced manner, devoid of real experience.”74 With these developments, some Japanese scholars noted that Takeshima was now “consolidated among people”—that Ja- pan had embraced a nationalist perspective on the Takeshima dispute.75 In other words, the Japanese government had succeeded in integrating the territorial dispute over Takeshima into Japan’s national identity, and was able to use it to ensure that its policy towards the territory remains stable.76 Taking advantage of these developed nationalist inclinations, Japanese officials, including former Foreign Minister Kono Taro, repeat- edly described Korea’s actions in disputes as being unfair and resulting in “unjust disadvantages” for Japan.77 Japan then sought to shore up sup- port to continue with the dispute by presenting Japan’s own approach as being in accordance with international norms—Japan was attempting to resolve the disputes through established legal mechanisms, and Korea was unilaterally and unfairly rejecting Japan’s proposals and behaving irrationally.78 With the dispute framed as Japan fighting against an irra- [73] “Japanese School Textbooks to State Dokdo Is Japanese Territory Starting in 2020,” Hankyoreh, March 27, 2019, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_interna- tional/887653.html. [74] Linda Sieg, “Japan, Led by Less Apologetic Generation, Stays Tough in South Ko- rea Feud,” Reuters, August 8, 2019, sec. Emerging Markets, https://www.reuters.com/ar- ticle/us-southkorea-japan-labourers-history-an-idUSKCN1UY1BA. [75] Yuji Fukuhara and Takeshi Sato, “Takeshima in Japanese Education, Media and Culture,” in The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute, 10, Maritime Cooperation in East Asia (Brill | Nijhoff, 2021), 171, https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004447899/BP000016. xml. [76] For an explanation on how Takeshima became integrated into Japanese identity construction, see: Alexander Bukh, “Shimane Prefecture, Tokyo and the Territorial Dis- pute over Dokdo/Takeshima: Regional and National Identities in Japan,” The Pacific Re- view 28.1 (January 1, 2015): 47–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2014.970040. [77] Taro Kono, “Extraordinary Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Kono,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 4, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaik- en/kaiken4e_000593.html. [78] Ibid. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaik https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2014.970040 https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004447899/BP000016 https://www.reuters.com/ar https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_interna Cornell International Affairs Review 87 tional, unfair Korea, the LDP could rally support around the perceived need to overcome injustice and punish cheaters. Importantly, this pro- cess is not unique to Japan, and a similar process can be observed in South Korea. Following its impressive economic development and transition to de- mocracy, as well as the rise of new generations who did not live through the Pacific War, South Korea has become another illustrative example of how the state can use education to ensure that views conducive to its policy choices are sustained.79 Certainly, while some observers in- terpreted Japan’s 2012 history textbooks as referring to Takeshima in relation to other ongoing disagreements, the Korean government inter- preted the term as being suggestive towards a claim over the islands.80 In response to this perceived slight, the Korean Ministry of Education announced that it would distribute supplementary textbooks to all pub- lic schools dedicated entirely to teaching Dokdo’s history and “raise stu- dents’ awareness of the necessity for guarding [their] territorial rights over Dokdo and the history of strong responses against Japan’s territo- rial claim.”81 Later, in 2017, the Korean Ministry of Education indicated that it would strengthen education on Dokdo by designating a full week in April to Dokdo, in which schools would organize events and contests to raise awareness.82 The ministry also stated that it would provide ma- terials suggesting that the idea of Dokdo being a Korean territory is, in fact, not disputable.83 While the Korean government’s focus on educating the public about Dokdo may appear uniquely intense, this phenomenon is in fact not exclusive to Dokdo. Korean education on Japanese colonialism more [79] While not a rigid date, South Korea’s democratic transition can be marked as hav- ing finalized in 1987 with the first democratic national election, which resulted in the election of president Roh Tae-woo. [80] Woo-young Lee, “Korea Ups Education on Dokdo,” The Korea Herald, April 3, 2012, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120403001223. [81] Ibid. [82] “S. Korea to Reinforce Education on Dokdo against Japan’s Claim,” Yonhap News Agency, March 24, 2017, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170324009200315. [83] Ibid. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170324009200315 https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120403001223 Cornell International Affairs Review 88 broadly tends to focus on the Koreans’ lived experiences and, in partic- ular, their victimhood.84 Understandably, victim groups—whether they be former comfort women, laborers, or other victimized individuals— have served as especially strong advocates for education regarding these topics.85 This focus, while perhaps more historically accurate than what is represented in Japanese textbooks, has greatly contributed to modern feelings of animosity towards the Japanese among Koreans who never directly experienced the brutality of colonial rule.86 But efforts to raise awareness on Dokdo go beyond the classroom. In the Central Hall of the War Memorial of Korea in Yongsan-gu, one can find a small dis- play containing a scaled-down model of Dokdo and information on the island’s history. Above it is a screen which plays a film on the dispute, wherein it is argued that Dokdo is Korean territory and, more impor- tantly, that Japan knows this.87 Just as in Japan, the Korean government has found that framing Japan’s role in the dispute as an unjust and unfair one does much to appeal to the powerful emotions which accompany national identities, thereby functioning as a means to elevate the status of the territory and the significance of the dispute in the minds of Kore- an citizens, in turn securing their position regarding the dispute.88 Along a similar line, several Korean organizations, including Samsung and the Northeast Asian History Foundation, have established muse- ums devoted to educating the Korean public about Dokdo’s history and [84] Hu Young Jeong and Johanna Ray Vollhardt, “Koreans’ Collective Victim Beliefs about Japanese Colonization,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 27.4 (2020): 635, https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000496. [85] Ibid, 637. [86] Michael Bergmann, “Patriotism of Victim Country,” The Korea Times, June 17, 2016, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2022/06/162_207260.html. [87] Unfortunately, there is no information regarding the display on official websites, though a photo is attached in Appendix A. Furthermore, it is on open display in the Central Hall near the Korea War Rooms I and II. [88] Ji-Young Lee and Jaehyun Lee, “Everyday Politics of ‘Dokdo’ and South Ko- rean National Identity: An Analysis of Education, Media, and Civil Society,” The Ko- rean Journal of International and Comparative Law 7.1 (May 9, 2019): 87, https://doi. org/10.1163/22134484-12340117. https://doi https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2022/06/162_207260.html https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000496 Cornell International Affairs Review 89 politics.89 While not within the strict context of government, many of these economic and academic elites have deep connections within the Korean government, and on many occasions, lawmakers themselves have publicly supported, participated in, and even helped organize efforts initiated by these groups.90 In other cases, policymakers them- selves founded groups such as the Dokdo Love Society, an organization founded in 2000 by twenty-nine Korean legislators for the express pur- pose of pushing the National Assembly to enact policies that would re- inforce Korea’s claim on Dokdo.91 These educational institutions play a similarly critical role to national education by advancing perspectives of Dokdo as Korean territory and promoting views favorable to the Kore- an state’s foreign policy objectives. The result has been to integrate Dok- do into the broader national narratives, and that South Koreans have been socialized into understanding “Koreanness” as involving a belief in Dokdo as being inherently part of Korea.92 However, while many in the public sphere began to openly express pow- erful anti-Japanese sentiments, the Korean government consistently de- cided not to escalate disputes with Japan prior to 1996, instead opting to normalize relations. Faced with other issues that demanded more im- mediate attention, South Korean leaders made the conscious decision not to pursue the series of grievances which had surfaced immediate- ly following the end of Japanese colonization. Two components of this phenomenon are that the authoritarian governments of Rhee Syngman, [89] Krista E. Wiegand and Ajin Choi, “Nationalism, Public Opinion, and Dispute Res- olution: The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute,” Journal of Asian Pacific Communication 27.2 (January 1, 2017): 241, https://doi.org/10.1075/japc.27.2.05wie; the museums themselves contain an impressive collection of materials on Dokdo’s history and present much of this information in 3-D format—for more information on the Dokdo Museum in Seoul, see: http://dokdomuseumseoul.com/en/about/. [90] Ibid. [91] Sung-jae Choi, “The Politics of the Dokdo Issue,” Journal of East Asian Studies 5.3 (December 2005): 470, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800002071. [92] Ji-Young Lee and Jaehyun Lee, “Everyday Politics of ‘Dokdo’ and South Kore- an National Identity: An Analysis of Education, Media, and Civil Society,” The Kore- an Journal of International and Comparative Law 7.1 (May 9, 2019): 84, https://doi. org/10.1163/22134484-12340117. https://doi https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800002071 http://dokdomuseumseoul.com/en/about https://doi.org/10.1075/japc.27.2.05wie Cornell International Affairs Review 90 Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan were highly insecure about the stability of the regime and, ideologically, more anti-Communist than they were anti-Japanese—Rhee in particular had spent considerably more time living and being educated in the U.S. than in Korea, and had to contend with other political figures such as Kim Gu, an independence activist who had led the Korean government-in-exile and maintained a legendary stature.93 Thus, although the early Korean leaders did har- bor anti-Japanese sentiment, these feelings were overshadowed by the need to consolidate their domestic authority and the looming threats of North Korea and China.94 However, by far the most significant reason was that South Korea need- ed to secure the economic aid that would provide the stimulus to grow the Korean economy in the decades following the Korean War. For example, in 1983, then-Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro had announced that he would become the first prime minister to visit South Korea, not only as a sign of goodwill but also to discuss plans to provide $4 billion in loans to South Korea.95 In addition, 1983 saw the twelfth Korea-Japan ministerial meeting and the eleventh round of meetings between members of the Korea-Japan Assembly Members’ League. Just the year prior, however, a program hosted in 1982 by the government-owned Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) debuted Jeong Kwang-tae’s song, “Dokdo is Our Land,” which immediately achieved [93] Nak-chung Paik, “On ‘Eradicating the Vestiges of Pro-Japanese Collaborators,’” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, November 1, 2021, https://apjjf.org/2021/21/Paik. html; Key Ray Chong, review of Review of The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations Under American Occupation, 1945-1952, by Sung-hwa Cheong, Journal of Third World Studies 10.1 (1993): 438; Soojin Chung, “Rhee Syngman, First President of the Republic of Korea,” Boston Korean Diaspora Project, accessed May 6, 2023, https://sites.bu.edu/koreandiaspora/individuals/1910s/rhee-syn- gman-first-president-of-the-republic-of-korea/; Charles Kraus, “Kim Gu on Reunifica- tion and War, 1948,” Wilson Center, accessed May 6, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter. org/publication/kim-gu-reunification-and-war-1948. [94] Nak-chung Paik, “On ‘Eradicating the Vestiges of Pro-Japanese Collaborators,’” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, November 1, 2021, https://apjjf.org/2021/21/Paik. html. [95] Sung-jae Choi, “The Politics of the Dokdo Issue,” Journal of East Asian Studies 5.3 (December 2005): 469, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800002071. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800002071 https://apjjf.org/2021/21/Paik https://www.wilsoncenter https://sites.bu.edu/koreandiaspora/individuals/1910s/rhee-syn https://apjjf.org/2021/21/Paik Cornell International Affairs Review 91 popular acclaim.96 Fearing that the song could provoke anti-Japanese sentiment, the authoritarian Chun government preemptively banned the song from July to November 1983.97 Later in 1987, South Korea underwent a democratic transition, after which the government began to publicly express offense at perceived Japanese neo-colonialism, such as high-level visits to Yasukuni Shrine– that is, a Shinto shrine used to honor Japan’s war dead, including the fourteen Class-A war criminals, among many Class-B and Class-C war criminals, convicted during Tokyo War Crimes Trials following World War II.98 Yet, there was a delay between Korea’s democratic transition, which occurred in 1987, and its changing policy vis-a-vis its disputes with Japan, which is identified as taking place in 1996. This lag can be explained by several factors. To begin with, although Korea held its first democratic elections in 1987, the winner of the presidential election was Roh Tae-woo, a former general in the army and close ally of the former dictator Chun Doo-hwan. As such, although Korea had democratized, the Roh administration retained many authoritarian tendencies. For in- stance, despite descriptions of Roh’s 1987 liberalization drive as a “golden age” for the Korean press, such impressions belie the fact that through the Roh administration, all cultural products were required to undergo a review system and receive official authorization before being publicly circulated.99 Worse yet, while the Roh administration made meaningful [96] “Dokdo is Our Land”, Khan, August 16, 2021, https://m.khan.co.kr/arti- cle/202108160300115. [97] Since the ban was lifted in November 1983, the song has grown in popularity to be- come a household name, even being represented in the recent globally-acclaimed South Korean film Parasite. [98] Steven E. Lewentowicz, “In Response to Yasukuni: The Curious Approach the Chinese and South Korean Governments Take toward an Unresolved Link to the Past” (Master’s Thesis, Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 87, https://cal- houn.nps.edu/handle/10945/34697; the author is careful to note that the political sys- tem, and the increased importance of public opinion, is only one factor, albeit a major one—economic development also played a significant role in giving the state a great- er range of options that it could pursue; Higurashi Yoshinobu, “Yasukuni and the En- shrinement of War Criminals,” nippon.com, July 1, 2023. https://www.nippon.com/en/ in-depth/a02404/. [99] Hun Shik Kim, “Media, the Public, and Freedom of the Press,” Social Indicators https://www.nippon.com/en https://nippon.com https://houn.nps.edu/handle/10945/34697 https://cal https://m.khan.co.kr/arti Cornell International Affairs Review 92 attempts to open up diplomatically to the Communist bloc— a long- term process which required careful diplomatic maneuvering through- out the entirety of his presidency—the administration was also largely concerned with amassing personal wealth and power. Later in 1995, Roh would be convicted alongside Chun Doo-hwan and others within his circle on charges of bribery, having amassed over $300 million in bribes from thirty corporate entities.100 The post-1996 shift in the Korean government’s policy regarding dis- putes itself can be explained in three ways. First, between 1945 and 1993, the South Korean government maintained strict control over all media. Deemed necessary to maintain the fragile relationship with Japan and secure key loans that would stimulate Korea’s economic development, the controls enabled the Korean government to prevent information about Japanese provocations from entering public consciousness and manifesting in anti-Japanese attitudes that could sour relations between the two states.101 These controls were largely removed in 1996, when the South Korean Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional.102 Second, Kim Young-sam, who was elected president in 1993 after Roh Tae-woo’s, did not face provocations from Japan between 1993 and 1995. Howev- er, between 1995 and 1996, Korean policymakers became increasingly Research 62/63 (2003): 345-6; Seungjin Han, “Paving the Path to Soft Power: Crucial Moments in South Korea’s Cultural Policies,” Wilson Center, September 27, 2022, https:// www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/paving-path-soft-power-crucial-moments-south-ko- reas-cultural-policies. [100] Teresa Watanabe, “South Korean Ex-President Arrested : Corruption: Roh Tae Woo Is Jailed on Charges of Taking More than $300 Million in Bribes from Business Tycoons.,” Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1995, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la- xpm-1995-11-17-mn-4124-story.html. [101] Emily Ambrose, “What Seoul Saw, What Gwangju Knew: Journalism and Censor- ship During the Gwangju Pro-Democracy Movement” (Bowling Green, OH, Bowling Green State University, 2020), 6-7, https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/honorsprojects/479; Seungjin Han, “Paving the Path to Soft Power: Crucial Moments in South Korea’s Cul- tural Policies,” Wilson Center, September 27, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog- post/paving-path-soft-power-crucial-moments-south-koreas-cultural-policies. [102] Seungjin Han, “Paving the Path to Soft Power: Crucial Moments in South Korea’s Cultural Policies,” Wilson Center, September 27, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/ blog-post/paving-path-soft-power-crucial-moments-south-koreas-cultural-policies. https://www.wilsoncenter.org https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/honorsprojects/479 https://www.latimes.com/archives/la https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/paving-path-soft-power-crucial-moments-south-ko Cornell International Affairs Review 93 angered by a series of comments made by Japanese policymakers, in- cluding an assertion by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama that the annexation of Korea was legally valid.103 Third, there were domestic po- litical incentives to adopt a harsher line on Japan. Although President Kim maintained approval ratings nearing 90% between 1993 and 1995, his party faced one of the largest scandals in the country’s history on October 1995—just half a year before the 1996 general election—when it was finally discovered that Roh Tae-woo and Chun Doo-hwan, both members of the same party as Kim Young-sam, had engaged in corrupt practices. Kim’s approval rating crashed to 33.4%, and other polls indi- cated that the opposition party was leading the incumbent party in the upcoming general election by over 16%.104 Recognizing the dire pros- pects they would face if the country’s attention remained on the Roh presidency, the ruling party saw an opportunity to exploit the Japanese provocation concerning Dokdo—in fact, the party’s president, Kim Yun-hwan, bluntly asserted that “[the dispute] is clearly good materi- al for us since an external trouble unites a nation.” In February 1996, following Seoul’s announced plans to construct a wharf facility on the Liancourt Rocks, the Japanese foreign minister claimed the territory as Japanese.105 Seoul issued public statements countering the claim in re- sponse, and President Kim personally and publicly called the maritime police stationed on the territory, a move that was followed by the de- ployment of naval and air forces to conduct exercises near the islands. Despite having lost the country’s first nationally-held local elections in December 1995, Kim’s party, the New Korea Party, rebounded during the legislative elections held in early 1996 to win the majority of seats in the National Assembly, though it failed to win a majority.106 [103] Sung-jae Choi, “The Politics of the Dokdo Issue,” Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 3 (December 2005): 479, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800002071. [104] Ibid. [105] Ibid. [106] B. C. Koh, “South Korea in 1996: Internal Strains and External Challenges,” Asian Survey 37.1 (1997): 1–9, https://doi.org/10.2307/2645768.; unfortunately, no verifiable public opinion data regarding the Kim administration in 1996 appears to exist—while figures can be found to be referenced in Namuwiki, the Korean equivalent of Wikipedia, there is no sourcing found. Searches in the digital archives for the major Korean news- https://doi.org/10.2307/2645768 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800002071 Cornell International Affairs Review 94 Taking this into consideration, it is clear that in instances of Japanese provocations, “political systems appear to have some bearing on an- ti-Japanese nationalism because the government felt compelled to be responsive to public opinion in a manner different from the previous decades.”107 Moreover, they are able to utilize diversionary tactics to distract the public from internal issues. Altogether, the efforts to inte- grate the territorial issue within the scope of national identity and use it to advance their particular policies have ultimately been successful in both South Korea and Japan. Across two surveys conducted by Genro NPO in both Japan and Korea in 2013, 50.1% of Japanese respondents and 84.5% of Korean respondents indicated that the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute was a cause of the negative attitudes of both countries towards the other.108 Interestingly, in order to bolster its claim on Takeshima, Ja- pan leveraged another opinion survey conducted by the Territorial and Sovereign Issues Planning and Coordination Office, which found that 94.5% and 63% of Japanese respondents were familiar with the Takeshi- ma dispute and agreed with the assertion that South Korea was illegally occupying the territory, respectively.109 In response, South Korea filed a formal complaint against the “provocative action” amidst further public anger.110 More recently, the dispute was inflamed once more during the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics, when the Inter-Korean Unification flag that represented the joint North-South Korean team included a depic- papers also yielded no results. [107] Steven E. Lewentowicz, “In Response to Yasukuni: The Curious Approach the Chinese and South Korean Governments Take toward an Unresolved Link to the Past” (Master’s Thesis, Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 86, https://cal- houn.nps.edu/handle/10945/34697. [108] “The 1st Japan-South Korea joint opinion poll,” The Genron NPO, May 14, 2013, https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5263.html. [109] “Japan Uses Public Survey to Bolster Dokdo Claim,” Korea JoongAng Daily, Au- gust 2, 2013, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2013/08/02/politics/Japan-uses-pub- lic-survey-to-bolster-Dokdo-claim/297555 [110] The institute that carried out the survey was founded in February of 2013 by the Shinzo Abe administration; “Japan Uses Public Survey to Bolster Dokdo Claim,” Korea JoongAng Daily, August 2, 2013, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2013/08/02/pol- itics/Japan-uses-public-survey-to-bolster-Dokdo-claim/2975550.html; “Japanese Poll on Dokdo Enrages South Korea,” KBS World, August 2, 2013, http://world.kbs.co.kr/ser- vice/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=97563. http://world.kbs.co.kr/ser https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2013/08/02/pol https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2013/08/02/politics/Japan-uses-pub https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5263.html https://houn.nps.edu/handle/10945/34697 https://cal Cornell International Affairs Review 95 tion of Dokdo.111 In response, Tokyo lodged a complaint with the In- ternational Olympic Committee, resulting in a pledge by South Korea not to use the same flag in the future.112 Later that year, Japan passed guidelines to teach high school students about Takeshima, and through 2023, roughly two-thirds of the Japanese public remains interested in the territorial dispute.113 Beyond support for policy options themselves, the effect of this proj- ect of nation-building around issues of historical memory—including those involving territorial disputes such as Dokdo/Takeshima—has real benefits for incumbent leaders and parties in Korea. In particular, the Dokdo dispute not only has the capacity to rally domestic support for these issues, but also to increase presidential approval ratings, a dynam- ic which became critical following Korea’s democratic transition.114 The dispute would benefit later presidencies as well. In particular, President Lee Myung-bak’s approval ratings increased following his controversial visit to Dokdo in 2012.115 The 2021 controversy over a Japanese diplo- mat’s comments leading up to the Tokyo Olympics presents an even stronger case. During the lead-up to the Tokyo Olympics, which took place in summer 2021, Korea and Japan became embroiled in another Dokdo-related controversy when a senior diplomat at the Japanese em- bassy in Seoul suggested to a Korean reporter that President Moon’s up- coming visit to Tokyo to repair relations amounted to “masturbation.”116 [111] Paul Huth, Sunwoong Kim, and Terence Roehrig, “Conclusion,” in The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute (Brill Nijhoff, 2021), 244, https://doi. org/10.1163/9789004447899_012. [112] Ibid. [113] Ibid; “Two-Thirds of Japanese Remain Interested in Takeshima Dispute, Sur- vey Finds,” The Japan Times, February 19, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/2023/02/19/national/politics-diplomacy/japanese-interested-takeshima-islets/. [114] Wonjae Hwang, Wonbin Cho, and Krista Wiegand, “Do Korean-Japanese Histori- cal Disputes Generate Rally Effects?,” The Journal of Asian Studies 77.3 (2018): 698. [115] In-Soo Nam, “President Gets Small Ratings Pop After Islets Visit,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2012, sec. Korea Real Time, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL- KRTB-3096; Kee-seok Kim, “Lee Myung Bak’s Stunt over Disputed Islands,” East Asia Forum, August 19, 2012, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/19/lee-myung-baks- stunt-over-disputed-islands/. [116] “South Korea’s Moon Cancels Japan Trip amid Spat over Insult,” Al Jazeera, July https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/19/lee-myung-baks https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL https://www.japantimes.co.jp https://doi Cornell International Affairs Review 96 Contributing to the controversy was a decision made earlier that May by the Tokyo Olympic Committee to include Takeshima in its torch relay map; when South Korea protested to the International Olympic Committee, Japan doubled down.117 Unsurprisingly, the Korean public was outraged; in response, Moon canceled his planned trip to Tokyo, a move supported by over 65% of Koreans.118 However, what makes this incident especially interesting is the domestic context in which Korean leaders were operating. Several months earlier, in March, the Democrat- ic Party—President Moon’s party—had been embroiled in the largest scandal of Moon’s presidency. Ten individuals, all associated with the party, were found to have been engaging in real estate speculation, a discovery viewed as particularly offensive given President Moon’s very strong commitment to curbing skyrocketing housing prices.119 In light of this scandal, Moon’s approval rating dropped to 34.1%, with his dis- approval rating jumping to 62.2%, the highest it had ever been.120 After Moon’s public decision to cancel his trip to Tokyo, his approval rating jumped to 46.9%, demonstrating the effectiveness of satisfying popular demands not to concede to Japan on improving presidential approval ratings, even in light of otherwise large domestic scandals.121 19, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/19/south-koreas-moon-cancels-japan- trip-amid-spat-over-insult. [117] Joseph Egidio, “Japan and South Korea’s Battle over Dokdo/Takeshima at the Olympics,” East Asia Forum, October 9, 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum. org/2021/10/09/japan-and-south-koreas-battle-over-dokdo-takeshima-at-the-olym- pics/. [118] “[Newsmaker] Over 65% of S. Koreans Support Moon’s Decision Not to Vis- it Japan: Survey,” The Korea Herald, July 21, 2021, https://www.koreaherald.com/view. php?ud=20210721000435. [119] Choe Sang-Hun, “‘The Den of Thieves’: South Koreans Are Furious Over Hous- ing Scandal,” The New York Times, March 23, 2021, sec. World, https://www.nytimes. com/2021/03/23/world/asia/korea-housing-lh-scandal-moon-election.html. [120] Jaewon Kim, “South Korea Property Scandal Hurts Moon Ahead of Key Polls,” Nikkei Asia, March 22, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/South-Korea-property- scandal-hurts-Moon-ahead-of-key-polls. [121] “[Newsmaker] Over 65% of S. Koreans Support Moon’s Decision Not to Vis- it Japan: Survey,” The Korea Herald, July 21, 2021, https://www.koreaherald.com/view. php?ud=20210721000435. https://www.koreaherald.com/view https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/South-Korea-property https://www.nytimes https://www.koreaherald.com/view https://www.eastasiaforum https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/19/south-koreas-moon-cancels-japan Cornell International Affairs Review 97 Therefore, it can be theorized that in the case of Korea, the top-down nation-building effort serves two purposes: 1) to shore up public sup- port for the government’s policy position on Dokdo, based in large part on leaders’ own nationalist beliefs regarding territorial sovereignty and the prospect of “losing” to Japan, and 2) to allow the government to use the dispute as a distraction to either engage in other policies or divert attention away from controversies. Indeed, the first is one of the ma- jor findings of Ji-Young Lee and Jaehyun Lee’s study on South Korean domestic politics in relation to the dispute—that is, that ”narratives on Dokdo … are first and foremost designed to enhance South Korean ter- ritorial sovereignty over the islands.”122 While this may also be the case for Japan, there have yet to be similar empirical studies conducted. Sim- ilar to Japan, the manner in which Korea has designed its educational materials on Dokdo has fulfilled a similar purpose in provoking nation- alist sentiments over Japanese colonialism and perceived neo-colonial ambitions, and thereby shoring up domestic support for Korea’s foreign policies on Dokdo. This section began with a brief discussion on the material value—that is, value derived from the resources that can be extracted, such as oil and fish—of the Liancourt Rocks. Despite the initial appeal of resource-based arguments, however, the Liancourt Rocks dispute has evaded the same sort of resolution that has been reached in other disputes over resourc- es, even in the narrow context of South Korea-Japan relations, thereby suggesting the relevance of other, non-material factors. This study fo- cuses on the significance of national identity and how it shapes the way in which Korean and Japanese leaders perceive their counterparts, or adversaries, and helps frame the desirability of certain policy options. Furthermore, how leaders understand their nation’s history in particu- lar—including the history of the Liancourt Rocks—informs what they perceive to be the right course of action. In order to sustain the dispute [122] Ji-Young Lee and Jaehyun Lee, “Everyday Politics of ‘Dokdo’ and South Ko- rean National Identity: An Analysis of Education, Media, and Civil Society,” The Ko- rean Journal of International and Comparative Law 7.1 (May 9, 2019): 71, https://doi. org/10.1163/22134484-12340117. https://doi Cornell International Affairs Review 98 and achieve victory—or perhaps to distract from domestic issues and gain favorability among domestic audiences—the two governments are incentivized to use education to nurture a national identity in which the territory is tied to people’s sense of “homeland.” While the content of history textbooks have been the most visible evidence of this dynam- ic, the process of official nation-building extends beyond written text to include trips to museums, special exhibitions, and annual commemora- tions, all designed to raise awareness and interest in the territory and the dispute concerning it among the respective populations. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND BOTTOM-UP PRESSURES Disdain between the Korean and Japanese governments was not always externally obvious. For instance, in an analysis of reactions by the Ko- rean and Chinese governments following visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime ministers, Steven E. Lewentowicz found that the South Korean government ignored all Japanese visits prior to 1996, the time period that encompasses Korea’s authoritarian period. After 1996—that is to say, soon after Korea’s democratic transition—the Korean govern- ment objected to such visits.123 Describing Korea’s approach under the dictatorship of President Park Chung-Hee, Lewentowicz argues that while normalization of diplomatic relations was a core element within Park’s plan for South Korean economic development, the Korean pub- lic reacted negatively at what it saw as a governmental betrayal.124 This public backlash against visits to the shrine would have impeded Park’s efforts to normalize Korea’s economic relations with Japan, however “Park’s violent political suppression in 1965 ensured that public opinion did not guide policy nor challenge the regime.”125 [123] Steven E. Lewentowicz, “In Response to Yasukuni: The Curious Approach the Chinese and South Korean Governments Take toward an Unresolved Link to the Past” (Master’s Thesis, Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 71, https://cal- houn.nps.edu/handle/10945/34697. [124] Ibid, 74. [125] Ibid. https://houn.nps.edu/handle/10945/34697 https://cal Cornell International Affairs Review 99 However, while policy shifts were easier to implement in South Korea under the authoritarian regime, the status of the two countries today as modern democracies presents a significant challenge—the two govern- ments may find themselves unable to shape public opinion to be amena- ble to cooperation with the other regarding the territorial dispute. Iden- tities, while malleable, are also typically slow-changing. Old identities can be replaced only when alternative ideas are proposed and achieved through “social salience,” whereby they are supported by important con- stituencies or influential groups.126 Without adequate political willpow- er on the part of political elites, it is likely that the status quo will remain unchanged. In Japan, this has certainly been the case, as the LDP retains staunchly conservative views of the Japanese nation. If a state were to shift its narrative to an extent that is too far and too sudden, it risks los- ing its audience and its legitimacy among voters.127 Naturally, this risk is far greater in states with democratic forms of government. Using an ex- perimental approach, Michael Tomz found that audience costs—that is, domestic political costs that a leader incurs as a result of backing down in a dispute, typically in the form of lower approval ratings or decreased support in future elections—arise in conditions where the country’s cit- izens care about the reputation of the country or its leader.128 In fact, audience costs can sometimes be so great that “war may be preferable to concessions.”129 Public opinion can therefore exert significant pressure on a govern- ment to sustain or even escalate their policy in a dispute, particularly in cases where the other actor is perceived as a rival.130 In the case of [126] Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Secu- rity Practice (Stanford University Press, 2008), 27. [127] James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of Interna- tional Disputes,” The American Political Science Review 88.3 (1994): 577–92, https://doi. org/10.2307/2944796. [128] Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experi- mental Approach,” International Organization 61.4 (2007): 835. [129] Shuhei Kurizaki and Taehee Whang, “Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes,” International Organization 69.4 (ed 2015): 949–80, https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0020818315000211. [130] It is unclear whether South Korea and Japan can be considered to be rivals. None- https://doi.org/10.1017 https://doi Cornell International Affairs Review 100 Korea specifically, attempts to change tack and reach compromises with Japan would simply be unacceptable in the eyes of many Koreans who often perceive such shifts as bowing before the former colonial power. In Lewentowicz’s analysis, one of the political consequences of the dem- ocratic transition was public demands for responses to Japanese prov- ocations.131 On this point there is a difference in the degree of freedom which Korea and Japan can exercise in selecting among policy alterna- tives. In Japan, the LDP has maintained near hegemonic power over the domestic political scene since 1955 with the exception of two brief peri- ods (1993-1994 and again in 2009-2012). While Japan is not necessarily a one-party state, the LDP’s deep and expansive system of pork barrel politics has allowed it to wield an immense amount of political clout, shadowing all other opposition parties.132 Korea, on the other hand, is similar to the U.S. in that two parties are dominant, with power regular- ly shifting between the two parties. Therefore, Korean leaders must be more sensitive to public opinion, as failing to do so gives opportunities for the opposition party to make electoral gains. The 2005 Transition Similar to how Korean objections to Japanese visits to Yasukuni Shrine became consistent only after 1996, Korean assertions over control of Dokdo and objections to Japanese claims became pronounced after 2005, when Shimane Prefecture instituted “Takeshima Day” as a prefec- tural holiday. Prior to 2005, both Korea and Japan had largely allowed the territorial dispute to lurk in the background in order to pursue clos- theless, the literature on rivalries in international politics poses interesting questions; for an introduction on Asian rivalries, see: Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18.3 (1993): 5–33. [131] Steven E. Lewentowicz, “In Response to Yasukuni: The Curious Approach the Chinese and South Korean Governments Take toward an Unresolved Link to the Past” (Master’s Thesis, Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 45, https://cal- houn.nps.edu/handle/10945/34697. [132] Haruhiro Fukui and Shigeko N. Fukai, “Pork Barrel Politics, Networks, and Local Economic Development in Contemporary Japan,” Asian Survey 36.3 (1996): 268, 282, https://doi.org/10.2307/2645692; Jun Saito, “Pork Barrel Politics in Contemporary Ja- pan” (Ph.D., United States -- Connecticut, Yale University, 2006), 179, https://www.pro- quest.com/docview/304987040/abstract/497B93DC08EE4D5BPQ/1. https://quest.com/docview/304987040/abstract/497B93DC08EE4D5BPQ/1 https://www.pro https://doi.org/10.2307/2645692 https://houn.nps.edu/handle/10945/34697 https://cal Cornell International Affairs Review 101 er bilateral relations. In fact, just two months prior to Shimane Prefec- ture’s announcement, then-Korean president Moo-hyun Roh made an official visit to Japan—during the visit, the two governments designated the year 2005 as the “Korea-Japan Friendship Year” to mark the 40th an- niversary of Korea and Japan’s diplomatic normalization in 1965.133 But, having been picked up by Korea’s domestic media outlets, Shimane Pre- fecture’s February proposal generated a public firestorm in Korea, made worse when the Japanese ambassador to Korea, Toshiyuki Takano, made a statement asserting that Takeshima was Japanese territory. The situa- tion became further inflamed on March 16, when the bill was passed and February 22 officially became Takeshima Day.134 Just two days pri- or to the official announcement, a large demonstration demanding that Japan drop the new policy was organized in front of Japan’s embassy in Seoul.135 In the wake of this public outrage, Korea’s MOFA issued official complaints on February 23 and March 16 pressing Shimane Prefecture to remove the ordinance and asserting that Dokdo is Korean territory.136 Thereafter, Korean media would report on every Takeshima Day cel- ebration in Japan, and nearly every time, Korea’s MOFA issues a press [133] “Opening of the Korea-Japan Friendship Year 2005,” Ministry of For- eign Affairs, Republic of Korea, January 17, 2005, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/ brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=297652&srchFr=&%3BsrchTo=&%3Bsrch- Word=ROK-New&%3BsrchTp=&%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&%3Bitm_se- q_1=0&%3Bitm_seq_2=0&%3Bcompany_cd=&%3Bcompany_ nm=&page=819&titleNm=. [134] Norimitsu Onishi, “Dispute Over Islets Frays Ties Between Tokyo and Seoul,” The New York Times, March 22, 2005, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/22/ world/asia/dispute-over-islets-frays-ties-between-tokyo-and-seoul.html; Kosuke Taka- hashi, “Japan-South Korea Ties on the Rocks,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, March 28, 2005, https://apjjf.org/-Kosuke-Takahashi/1767/article.html. [135] Alexander Bukh, “The ‘Protect Dokdo’ Movement in South Korea,” in These Islands Are Ours (Stanford University Press, 2020), 96, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503611900- 006. [136] “Comments by the Spokesperson of the MOFAT on the designation of ‘Dok- do Day’ by Japan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, February 23, 2005, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=295575&page=2; “Statement by the Spokesperson of the MOFAT on the designation of ‘Dokdo Day’ by Japan,” Minis- try of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, March 16, 2005, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/ brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=295587&page=2. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=295575&page=2 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503611900 https://apjjf.org/-Kosuke-Takahashi/1767/article.html https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/22 https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng Cornell International Affairs Review 102 release on the event. Three factors offer partial explanations of this shift: 1) from the per- spective of the political elite, Korea’s successful economic development made economic relations with Japan less critical (especially in light of Japan’s Lost Decade), thereby allowing the Korean government to pur- sue historical issues; 2) the Korean media apparatus in the 2000s was more robust compared to the 1990s, allowing news to be disseminated more rapidly across a broader audience; 3) the democratic transition al- lowed Korean voters to have a greater influence on foreign policy—lead- ers who failed to match the public’s expectations about proper responses to Japanese actions would be voted out in the next election and replaced by opposition candidates. The latter two factors are of particular interest in the context of bottom-up pressure impacting foreign policy decision making. Democratic Accountability and Commitment Problems The value of public opinion lies partly in its ability to prevent a gov- ernment from pursuing particular policy options that are deemed un- desirable. In Korea, activists spent decades establishing a more account- able government. Korea’s democratic transition helped ensure that the government would be compelled to respond to public opinion to a far greater degree than under previous regimes. Thus, in the context of the Liancourt Rocks dispute more broadly, if either the Korean and Japa- nese governments wish to make amends, reach a compromise, or oth- erwise adopt a more friendly approach to improve bilateral relations, they may be unable to do so without risk of major political costs do- mestically. While this has affected both Korea and Japan, it is especially significant in Korea, where two parties must continuously compete with one another for domestic political power. As discussed previously, Ko- rean domestic public opinion and civil society groups have been major factors in preventing more friendly security relations with Japan.137 In [137] Krista E. Wiegand, “The South Korean–Japanese Security Relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets Dispute,” The Pacific Review 28, no. 3 (May 27, 2015): 363-364, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1011209. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1011209 Cornell International Affairs Review 103 other words, democratic accountability, while a critical feature of dem- ocratic governance, may have increased the dispute’s longevity by pre- venting either government from pursuing compromise. At first glance, public opinion in Korea and Japan on the Liancourt Rocks seems to provide a favorable outlook. In both countries, over 70% of respondents to the 2013 Genro NPO survey indicated that re- lations with the other country were important.138 Furthermore, over 80% of Japanese and over 90% of Korean respondents indicated that the Takeshima/Dokdo issue was the primary barrier to the development of deeper bilateral relations.139 Under normal circumstances, this appears to suggest that the Korean and Japanese publics would push their gov- ernments to seek and reach an agreement to settle the dispute, allowing the two countries to cooperate further on other security, economic, and diplomatic fronts. Yet, the opposite has been observed. While Koreans and the Japanese alike wish to resolve the dispute, both groups view the territory as inherently theirs and therefor