

POLICIES, PROMOTERS, AND PATTERNS OF JAPANESE-KOREAN
AND JAPANESE-TAIWANESE MARRIAGES IN IMPERIAL JAPAN:
MAKING A CASE FOR INCLUSIVE HISTORY

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Ai Baba

August 2019

© 2019 Ai Baba

POLICIES, PROMOTERS, AND PATTERNS OF JAPANESE-KOREAN
AND JAPANESE-TAIWANESE MARRIAGES IN IMPERIAL JAPAN:
MAKING A CASE FOR INCLUSIVE HISTORY

Ai Baba, Ph.D.

Cornell University 2019

This dissertation examines the policies, promoters, and patterns of Japanese-Korean marriages (*naisen kekkon*) and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages (*naitai kyōkon*) in imperial Japan. It seeks to answer why the Japanese empire sanctioned intermarriage when the Euro-American empires condemned marriage between colonizers and colonized subjects in the twentieth century. It also questions who were the people that promoted intermarriage and why people intermarried in Japan, where the government legalized intermarriage but did not promote it at the national level. This research further investigates what happened to people who intermarried before 1945 in postwar Japan, and why so little is known about the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in contemporary Japan.

With existing studies on the history of intermarriage in the Japanese empire focusing on colonial Korea and Taiwan, this project focuses on Japan. Through analysis of internal and external influences on the discourse of intermarriage in the metropole, it first argues that imperial Japan's sanctioning of intermarriage was based on its population policies and observations of its contemporaneous empires, thus should not be equated with the absence of racism in Japan and its isolation from the

world. It then reveals that intermarriage was promoted in Japan at the local level by the members of the Harmony Association (*Kyōwakai*), district commissioners (*hōmen'iin*), and Japanese women. By studying the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages together rather than separately, this research demonstrates the limitation of relying on categories such as “colonizer” and “colonized” alone in understanding the promoters and patterns of intermarriage, and proposes consideration of a/sexuality and ability in addition to race/ethnicity, gender, and class when studying colonizer-colonized relationships in modern empires. Lastly, this research traces the history of intermarriage post-1945 to reveal the existence of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples in postwar Japan and argues that it has been selectively remembered.

Engaging with scholarship in modern Japanese history, imperial and colonial studies, and gender and sexuality studies, this dissertation ultimately makes a case for a more inclusive history that includes into history those who are marginalized in, excluded from, and/or forgotten in existing mainstream frameworks of history, to explain contemporary social issues of historical origin, such as disavowal of racism, in hopes of making a positive social change.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Ai Baba received a B.A. in history from University of California Santa Cruz in 2011, an M.A. in history from Cornell University in 2015, and will be conferred a Ph.D. in history from Cornell University in August 2019.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation exists thanks to the countless inspirations and support. I would first like to thank my dissertation committee members for making this dissertation possible. Thank you to Professor Naoki Sakai and Professor Vic Koschmann for allowing me to continue my studies at Cornell from second year onward and introducing me to the world of Japan Studies and modern Japanese history. I would like to think that I am less naïve than when I started research seven years ago and hope to share the knowledge imparted to me with people I encounter in and out of the academic world. Thank you to Professor Durba Ghosh for acquainting me with the field of Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, which has greatly influenced this project, and keeping me on track throughout the Ph.D. program. I am working to and will continue to pay forward all the help that I received.

This dissertation was also made possible by generous financial support from various sources. Language training was funded by the Biggerstaff Fellowship and the Kathryn Davis Fellows for Peace. Archival research in Japan was made possible by the Sage Fellowship and the Gilmore Fellowship, in addition to the travel grants from the Einaudi Center and the Society for the Humanities. Conference travel grants from the Graduate School also enabled me to present my research at conferences in Japan and the United States, and the last semesters of the writing phase were supported by the East Asia Program's Robert J. Smith Fellowship and the dissertation writing group grants from the Society for the Humanities. A special thank you to Barb Donnell in the history department for processing all of the forms and documents so that I could

progress forward in the graduate program.

I am grateful to the staff, librarians, and archivists in Japan who helped me locate and access historical documents at the following locations: the National Diet Library, Tokyo Metropolitan Library, Shōwakan, History Museum of J-Koreans, Taiwan Kyōkai, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Kyoto Prefectural Library, Kyoto University Libraries, Kyoto City Library of Historical Documents, Rekisaikan, Kyoto International Manga Museum, Osaka Prefectural Archives, Osaka Prefectural Libraries, and Osaka Museum of History.

I would like to further express my gratitude to Professor Komagome Takeshi for hosting me as a research student at Kyoto University and inviting me to join his seminars and lectures. Studying in Japan has been an eye-opening, stimulating, and challenging experience, which I was able to make the most out of thanks to him and the people I met in his graduate seminar. Thank you to Sunaga-san, Mino-san, Namgung-san, Wu-san, Chou-san, Yo-san, Boyan-san, Hanada-san, Yamaguchi-san, Matsushita-san, O-san, Chou Ayami-san, and To-san for offering valuable comments and feedback on my research.

Lastly, I want to extend my appreciation to friends and peers who kept me company at Cornell. I am thankful for all the words of encouragement from fellow officers of the East Asia Program's Graduate Student Steering Committee and folks I met through the Intergroup Dialogue Project. A big thank you to the members of my dissertation writing groups— Shiau-Yun Chen, Sujin Lee, Shoan Yin Cheung, Tinakrit Sireerat, and Ryan Buyco—for reading multiple parts of my dissertation, providing me with thoughtful advice and suggestions, and cheering me on.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Biographical Sketch	v
Acknowledgements	vi
List of Figures	ix
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Chapter 2: Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial Japan: Internal Factors behind the Legalization and Lack of Promotion	26
Chapter 3: Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial Japan: External Factors behind the Legalization and Lack of Promotion	64
Chapter 4: Brokers of Empire at Home: Supporters of Intermarriage in Wartime Japan	99
Chapter 5: Examining the Patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages in Imperial Japan and Making a Case for Inclusive History	136
Chapter 6: Selective Remembering and Forgetting of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages in Postwar Japan	169
Bibliography	208

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Example of Explicit Racism	17
Figure 2: Cycle of Socialization	20
Figure 3: <i>Kekkon sōdanjo</i> Application Form	124
Figure 4: Including Asexuality	160
Figure 5: Cycle of Liberation	205

Chapter 1

Introduction

In Japan, before 1945, the numbers of Japanese-Korean marriages (*naisen kekkon*) and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages (*naitai kyōkon*) never exceeded more than one percent of the total number of endogamous marriages recorded between Japanese. Scholars who study intermarriages between Japanese and Koreans, or Japanese and Taiwanese, deduce that the numbers of common-law, unregistered marriages were most likely higher than the actual numbers recorded. Considering the general lack of awareness about its history and the limited studies on interethnic marriages in the Japanese empire, however, it was neither common nor a major phenomenon in history. Then why study the history of intermarriages in Japan?

This dissertation examines the policies, promoters, and patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in imperial Japan. I show that Japan's government implemented and maintained policies to register interethnic marriages: there was never an outright ban against Japanese men and women marrying colonized subjects (as in other modern Euro-American empires) because the Japanese policymakers recognized the consequences of prohibiting intermarriage. Intermarriage, however, was not actively promoted by the government at the national level, and instead supported by groups at the local level. I examine this contradiction then analyze the patterns of intermarriage in prewar and wartime Japan to demonstrate how race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality, and ability intersected in determining people's promotion of and engagement in Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese

marriages in Japan. Lastly, I trace the cases of intermarriage into the postwar period, to explain why the history of intermarriage is little known in the contemporary period.

Through engagement with historiography and scholarship on modern Japanese history, imperial and colonial studies, and gender and sexuality studies, I make a case for a more inclusive history that includes into history those who are excluded from the existing frameworks of history. I argue that inclusive history can address present issues with historical origin, such as disavowal of racism in contemporary Japan, by revealing the existence of the past social structure still in place today with negative impact on both majority and minority groups in society.

Main Questions and Objectives

This project on Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages started from my interest in researching how Japanese people interacted with non-Japanese East Asians before the fall of the Japanese empire, after observing Japanese racism against them and refusal to acknowledge it as such by generations born after 1945.¹ To trace the history of racism in Japan, I chose to study the history of intermarriage—marriage between two different groups—with a focus on marriages between Japanese colonizers and colonized Koreans and Taiwanese, because such sites of intimacy engendered racial categories and tensions.²

¹ I adopt Tessa Morris-Suzuki's definition of racism as a social act that "preserves and inherits, or creates the unequal and unfair social structure," in which the boundary between the group to which one belongs and the other is not determined by phenotypical differences alone. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Gurōbaruka sareru reishizumu" [Globalizing racism], *Reishizumu sutadīzu josetsu* [Introduction to racism studies] (Tokyo: Ibunsha, 2012), 71–72.

² Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

The conventional understanding appears to be that the Japanese empire ran counter to the global trends by encouraging and promoting marriage between the colonizers and the colonized, in contrast to the Euro-American empires in the twentieth century that condemned it.³ While existing scholarship on Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages agree that the intermarriage policy was theoretically inclusive but exclusive in practice, there is some disagreement regarding the degree and the extent of promotion of intermarriage in Japan. For example, feminist historian most cited in the works on Japanese-Korean marriages, Suzuki Yūko, claims that intermarriage, at least between Japanese and Koreans, was officially promoted.⁴ However, Kim Yōngdal in his empirical research on Japanese-Korean marriages and Eika Tai in her research on the discourse of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in colonial Taiwan argue that intermarriage was not actively promoted.⁵ Did the Japanese empire promote intermarriage? And if so, why did they promote it when their counterparts elsewhere did not?

One of my objectives is thus to examine Japanese policies on Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, particularly in the metropole. I explain why the

³ Interracial unions were condemned in the British, French and Dutch colonies. For example, see David M. Pomfret, “Raising Eurasia: Race, Class, and Age in French and British Colonies,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51.2 (2009): 314–343. Yet there were exceptions: see Robert Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: the British Experience* (Manchester, NY: Manchester University Press, 1990); Damon Ieremia Salesa, *Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁴ Suzuki Yūko, *Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon* [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992).

⁵ Kim Yōngdal, “Nihon no Chōsen tōchi-ka ni okeru ‘tsūkon’ to ‘konketsu’—iwayuru ‘naisen kekkon’ no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite” [Japan’s “intermarriage” and “blood mixing” in colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called “Japanese-Korean marriage”], *Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō* 39 (1999): 1–46; Eika Tai, “The Discourse of Intermarriage in Colonial Taiwan,” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 40.1 (Winer 2014): 87–116.

Japanese government chose to neither encourage nor discourage intermarriage in Japan after the initial legalization of intermarriage. By exploring the internal and external factors that influenced Japan's decision to sanction colonizer-colonized marriages, I build on the existing literature on intermarriage in the Japanese empire and argue that sanctioning of intermarriage should not be equated with absence of racism and Japan's isolation from the world (Chapters 2 and 3).

Another objective is to explore the promoters and patterns of marriage between Japanese and Koreans, along with Japanese and Taiwanese in Japan. Who promoted intermarriage and why did people intermarry when the government did not actively promote it in Japan? Even though most of the marriages are perceived to have taken place in the metropole and not the colonies, existing studies discuss Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages separately with a focus on the colonies.⁶ I thus

⁶ For studies on Japanese-Korean marriages in colonial Korea, see: Nam Bujin, “‘Naisen kekkon’ no bungaku: Jang Hyeokju no Nihongo sakuhin o chūshin ni” [Literature of “Japanese-Korean marriage”: Focus on Japanese works of Jang Hyeokju], *Jinbun Ronshū: Shizuoka Daigaku Jinbungakubu Shakaigakka, Gengogakka Kenkyū Hōkoku* 55.1 (2004): 181–210; Kim Mee-young, “Ilchegangjōmgi naesōnyōnae(kyōrhon)sosōre natanan ilbonyōsōnge kwanhan pyosang yōngu” [A Study on the Representations about Japanese women as a Foreigner-lover or Wife for the Korean man in Korean Modern Novels in Japanese Imperial Period], *Urimalgeul* 41 (2007.12): 239–264; Chang Yong Gyong, “Ilche malgi naisen kekkonronkwa chosōnin yukche” [Policy of Intermarriage, between people of the “Mainland” and Joseon, during the Japanese occupation period, and the Joseon people’s perception of “body”], *Yōksamunjeŷōn’gu* 18 (2007.10): 195–214; Lee Young-Ah, “I Ūn-Nashimotomiya Masakoūi kyōrhon sōsarūl tonghan ‘naesōngyōrhon’ūi nangmanjōng chaehyōn yangsang yōngu” [A study on the romantic representation of the marriage of Lee-Eun and Nashimotomiya-Masako], *Taejungsōsayōngu* 17.1 (2011): 229–258; Oh Tae-Young, “Naesōnilcheūi kyunyōltūl: Kim Sōngminūi ‘Nokkiyōnmaeng’ul chungshimūro” [A Cracks of ‘Naisen Ittai’ (Integration of Japan and Korea)—Focusing on Nokki Renmei (Green Flag League) by Kim, Sung-Min], *Sanghōhakpo* 31 (2011.2): 89–122; Lee Jeong-Seon, “Chōnshichejegi ilcheūi chongdongwōn jōngchaekkwā ‘naesōnhonhyōl’ munje” [The Total Mobilization System during Wartime and the Policy for the Japanese-Korean Hybrid Population], *Yōksamunjeŷōngu* 29 (2013.4): 217–255; Lee Jeong-Seon, “‘Naisen Kekkon’ ni miru teikoku Nihon no Chōsen tōchi to koseki” [Imperial Japan’s rule over Korea and household registration as see in “Japanese-Korean marriage”], *Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai*

focus on presenting the promoters and patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in the metropole together, and argue how race/ethnicity and categories such as “colonizer” and “colonized” alone cannot fully explain the promoters and patterns of intermarriage. I reveal shared factors beyond race/ethnicity and colonial status that influenced the promoters and patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages during Japan’s imperial period.

My approach to study Japanese marriage to Koreans and Taiwanese together in “imperial Japan,” is to make these intimate relationships comparable to the intermarriages and studies of them between colonizers and colonized in other modern empires, to make Japan a site of knowledge production. Scholars writing about

Ronbunshū 52 (2014): 69–97.

For studies on Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in colonial Taiwan, see: Hoshina Hironobu, “Shokuminchi no ‘konketsuji’—naitai kekkon no seijigaku” [“Mixed blood children” of the colonies: Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese marriage], *Taiwan no Daitōa Sensō* [Taiwan’s Greater East Asia War], edited by Fujii Shōzō, Huang Yingzhe, and Tarumi Chie (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 2007); Wang Hsiao-Yun, “Shōji Sōichi no ‘Chen Fujin’ ni miru haiburiddo bunka no kattō” [Tension of hybrid culture as seen in Shōji Sōichi’s “Chen Fujin”], *Ajia Shakai Bunka Kenkyū* 8 (2007): 39–66; Miyazaki Seiko, “‘Naitai kyōkon’ to shokuminchi ni okeru Taiwan josei seinendan no ichizuke” [“Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage” and the position of women’s organization in colonial Taiwan], *Nantōshigaku* 70 (2007): 83–97; Huang Chiachi, “Nihon tōchi jidai ni okeru naitai kyōkon no kōzō to tenkai,” [The structure and development of marriage between Taiwanese and Japanese during the Japanese colonial rule period], *Hikaku Kazoku Kenkyūshi* 27 (2013): 128–155; Kirsten L. Ziomek, “The Possibility of Liminal Colonial Subjecthood: Yayutz Bleyh and the Search for Subaltern Histories in the Japanese Empire,” *Critical Asian Studies* 47.1 (2015): 123–150; Tokuda Yukie, “Ribēn tōngzhì xià Táiwān de ‘nèitáigònghūn’—Ribēn yǔ Táiwān de ‘jiā’ zhìdù de chōngtú hé jiāoliú” [Taiwanese and Japanese interracial marriages: The familial challenges and culture conflicts during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan], Master’s Thesis, Tamkang University, 2007; Yang Peiwen, “Kuàyuè biānjiè de liúdòng yǔ rèntóng: Rìzhì shíqí ‘nèitáigònghūn’ yánjiū” [The study of interracial marriages between Taiwanese and Japanese during the colonial period], Master’s Thesis, National Chengchi University, 2009; Liao Yuanchun, “Yízúhūnyīn de fāzhì yǔ wénhuà tiáoshì: Yī Rìzhì shíqí ‘nèitáigònghūn’ ànlì fēnxī wéi zhōngxīn” [The Law and Culture Adjustment of Interracial Marriages: A Case Study of Interracial Marriages Between Taiwanese and Japanese During the Colonial Period], Master’s Thesis, National Cheng Kung University, 2012.

intermarriage in the Japanese empire rely on English-language scholarship on the modern Euro-American empires produced in “the West”: for example, Ann Stoler’s work is referenced in the study of Japanese marriages to indigenous Taiwanese by Paul Barclay and Su Yun Kim’s study of Japanese-Korean marriages in literature.⁷ The reverse, however, is rarely the case. As a result, “the West” remains the site of knowledge production, while “the Rest” remains the object of study.⁸ In an effort to challenge this asymmetry, I analyze the motives of promoters of intermarriage as well as the patterns of intermarriages, to reveal the multiplex social hierarchies in Japan. By doing so, I attempt to propose consideration of factors beyond race, class, and gender—a/sexuality and ability—when studying the colonizer-colonized relationships in modern empires unlimited to Japan (Chapters 4 and 5).

Lastly, this dissertation grapples with the question of how history can be more inclusive, beyond working to include the history of the Japanese empire in the West-centric history of modern empires. A numerically insignificant historical phenomenon and groups of people, such as the history of intermarriage and people who intermarried, are overlooked, for example, in the national history framework that focuses on the larger events and the majority population of a given nation. While common cases can reveal the trends, particular cases can reveal the potentials in and of

⁷ Paul D. Barclay, “Cultural Brokerage and Interethnic Marriage in Colonial Taiwan: Japanese Subalterns and Their Aborigine Wives, 1895–1930,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 64.2 (May 2005): 323–360; Su Yun Kim, “Romancing Race and Gender: Intermarriage and the Making of a ‘Modern Subjectivity’ in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945,” PhD Dissertation, University of California San Diego, 2009; Su Yun Kim, “Racialization and Colonial Space: Intermarriage in Yi Hyo-sök’s Works,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 18.1 (Spring 2013): 29–59.

⁸ Naoki Sakai, “Theory and Asian Humanity: On the Question of Humanitas and Anthropos,” *Postcolonial Studies* 13.4 (2010): 441–464.

history: I advocate for the inclusion of minorities in mainstream histories, because their histories can become windows into examining what has been and remains overlooked or unchallenged, to expand the existing analytical frameworks to better understand history and explain contemporary society. Furthermore, colleges boast the increasing diversity of their incoming class, but how are they working on retention of the students? What messages are being sent when only the history of privileged and majority groups is taught in a classroom? Privileged individuals in majority groups who have not experienced discrimination and microaggressions may take them lightly or not at all, but they exist and negatively impact student success.⁹ When non-European American culture offers an alternative to white, cis-heteronormative culture in the United States for some minority students (hence the appeal of classes on Japan, Asia, etc.), while other students enroll in a history class to learn about their own identities not taught in primary and secondary schools (say a class on gender while identifying as nonbinary), I advocate doing inclusive history to acknowledge and accommodate diversity beyond race/ethnicity so that students feel included and can succeed.

I therefore aim to make a case for a more inclusive history by engaging with the existing scholarship in two ways. First, I challenge the main narratives of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages—the tragedy and the romance narratives. Were all the marriages forced? What about those who were not forced into

⁹ Sylvia Hurtado, Josephine Gasiewski, and Cynthia Lua Alvarez, “The Climate for Diversity at Cornell University: Student Experiences,” Higher Education Research Institute, UCLA, March 2014, <https://diversity.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/uploaded-files/Qualitative-Study-of-Student-Climate-Full-Report.pdf>. Articles on impact of marginalization and erasure in the curriculum and campus can also be found in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* and *Inside Higher Ed*.

marriage, yet did not marry out of love either? Second, I continue my study past 1945 when most of the existing studies end with the fall of the Japanese empire.¹⁰ What happened to those who intermarried during the imperial period and remained in Japan in the postwar period? By challenging the conventional narrative and temporal frameworks to include into history those who did not marry out of force or romance pre-1945 and people who intermarried and remained in postwar Japan, I demonstrate how inclusive history can be written, why it is important, and what it can do (Chapters 5 and 6).

Situating the Project: Contributions to the Field

By contributing to the scholarship on Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, this project also aims to contribute to the following fields: modern Japanese history, imperial and colonial histories, and gender and sexuality studies.

Modern Japanese History

Current studies on modern Japanese history agree that Japan is not a homogeneous nation, by demonstrating the presence of racialized minorities—most notably the Ainu, Okinawans, *burakumin*, *zainichi* Chinese and Koreans—and questioning the definition of “Japanese.”¹¹ Studies of minorities in Japan are not

¹⁰ One exception to this is Huang Chiachi’s “Dainiji Sekai Taisen zengo no Nihon ni okeru Taiwan shusshinsha no teijūka no ichikatei: Raifu kōsu no shiten kara” [A Process of the Taiwanese Resident’s settlement into Japan before and after the World War II from the viewpoint of their life courses], *Kaikō Toshi Kenkyū* 3 (March 2008): 129–141

¹¹ For example, see: John Lie, *Multiethnic Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Naoki Sakai, Brett de Bary, and Toshio Iyotani, eds., *Deconstructing Nationality* (Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2005); Jane H. Yamashiro, *Redefining*

limited to “invisible minorities,” who cannot be phenotypically distinguished from Japanese: there are “visible minorities,” such as white and black Americans, including Japanese of mixed heritage. When it comes to discussions of mixed Japanese in modern Japanese history, when included, the focus is on Amerasians in the postwar period.¹² Interracial and interethnic encounters, however, were not limited to Japanese and Americans, as Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples and their children appear in studies of colonial Korea or colonial Taiwan.¹³ This project therefore challenges the myth of homogeneous Japan and questions the category of “Japanese,” instead of as a given.

I use the term “Japanese” to refer to people who were registered in the Japanese household registry system (*koseki*)—created in 1871 and implemented since 1872—with legal domicile/permanent register (*honseki*) in Japan. Likewise, “Korean” refers to those registered in Korea, and “Taiwanese” to those registered in the Taiwanese registry system (mostly the non-indigenous Taiwanese), although they were both theoretically “Japanese” once Japan colonized Korea and Taiwan. I

Japaneseness (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2017).

¹² Mitzi Uehara Carter, “Mixed Race Okinawans and Their Obscure In-Betweenness,” *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 35.6 (2014): 646–661; Debito Arudou, *Embedded Racism: Japan’s Visible Minorities and Racial Discrimination* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016); Michael Weiner, ed., *Japan’s Minorities: the Illusion of Homogeneity*, second edition (London: Routledge, 2009).

¹³ Mark Caprio introduces Tauchi Chizuko in *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 169, 207. Barbara Brooks also discuss marriage between Japanese and Koreans that was promoted to speed up assimilation in “Reading the Japanese Colonial Archive: Gender and Bourgeois Civility in Korea and Manchuria before 1932,” *Gendering Modern Japanese History*, edited by Barbara Molony and Kathleen Uno (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 307. Mentions of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages also appear in Cho Kyōngdal’s *Shokuminchi Chōsen to Nihon* [Colonial Korea and Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013) and Takenaka Nobuko’s *Shokuminchi Taiwan no Nihon Josei Seikatsushi* [Japanese women’s life history in colonial Taiwan] (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1995–2001) respectively.

demonstrate the instability of “Japanese” as a category by revealing how intermarriage enabled/disabled transfers between the different registries that were never unified into one system, and the multiplex social hierarchy in which one’s position was determined by the intersection of multiple factors, unlimited to race/ethnicity.

This project aligns with the work of scholars who write against the “dark valley” narrative of modern Japanese history, in which the wartime is seen as an aberration and a time when “Japan lost sight of the overall trends in the world,” as the current Prime Minister Abe phrased it.¹⁴ To write against such a narrative, I will first demonstrate how male Japanese intellectuals who debated whether or not to promote intermarriage were paying attention to the state of affairs concerning race mixing in other empires. I will also trace the history of intermarriage into the postwar period to expose the impact of wartime history into the postwar and the contemporary period in Japan¹⁵—akin to those that look at the impact of Japanese imperialism and colonialism in post-1945 Japan¹⁶—to argue against the idea of wartime as an anomalous period by showing the continuities between the periods before and after 1945. I then propose that studying the history of intermarriage and the complex social hierarchies that were created during the imperial period could explain the connections between the different

¹⁴ “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” August 14, 2015, *Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister*, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/1212349_9926.html.

¹⁵ For example, see: Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Ryūichi Narita, eds., *Total War and Modernization* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2001); Andrew Gordon, ed., *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

¹⁶ Janice Mimura, *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Aaron Stephen Moore, *Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan’s Wartime Era, 1931–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

-isms (e.g., racism, sexism, and ableism) in Japan today.¹⁷

Imperial and Colonial Histories

Although the main focus of this project is on Japan, I frame it in the larger context as “imperial Japan,” in order to consider what was happening outside of the Japanese empire in this period. Speaking from a Japanese imperial perspective, I aim to contribute to the studies of imperial and colonial histories, in which the Western empires are often taken to be paradigmatic and the studies on the Japanese empire are often excluded or sidelined.¹⁸ I do not deny that there were differences between the Japanese and the modern Euro-American empires: most notably how the ruling race was closely linked to whiteness in the latter, while the boundary between the colonizer and the colonized was not based on color in the former. Japan was also geographically close to its colonies, which were closer than the distance between the metropole and the colonies of the other empires. There is also the difference in the pattern of colonizer-colonized marriages: more colonizing women married colonized men in the

¹⁷ Inspired by studies that examine imperial and colonial legacies in the contemporary period, such as Haydie Gooder and Jane M. Jacobs, “Belonging and non-belonging: The apology in a reconciling nation” and Clair Dwyer, “‘Where are you from?’: Young British Muslim women and the making of ‘home’” in *Postcolonial Geographies*, edited by Alison Blunt and Cheryl McEwan (London: Continuum, 2002); Laurent Dubois, “La République Métissée: Citizenship, Colonialism, and the Borders of French History,” *New Imperial Histories Reader*, edited by Stephen Howe (New York: Routledge, 2009); Sarah C. Soh, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

¹⁸ Examples of books and anthologies in which Japan is not included or hardly mentioned: Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, second edition (London: Routledge, 2005); Krishan Kumar, *Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). More recent scholarship, however, is slightly more inclusive: Bonnie G. Smith, *Modern Empires: A Reader* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

Japanese empire, contrary to the frequent pattern between colonizing men and colonized women elsewhere.

Yet despite the easily identifiable differences, there were many similarities between the Japanese and the Euro-American empires: studies on intimate colonizer-colonized relationships in colonial Korea and Taiwan have demonstrated how racial boundaries were engendered in colonial settings in order to secure the racial superiority of the ruling race.¹⁹ Furthermore, although Japanese colonizers and colonized Koreans and Taiwanese were classified as being the same race, racism existed and played a role in determining imperial and colonial policies: Koreans and Taiwanese were racialized and discriminated within the Japanese empire, just as people of color were discriminated in the Western empires.²⁰ Therefore building on the existing literature on imperial and colonial histories, particularly postcolonial studies that challenge the dichotomy between the colonizers and the colonized (e.g. *Tensions of Empire* [1997]), one of the things I aim to do is to connect the studies on the Japanese empire and the Euro-American empires, by identifying the similarities and parallels, such as the concern over race mixing, to demonstrate that just because intermarriage was sanctioned in the Japanese empire, it did not make them a non-racist, as the works of John Dower (1986) and Takashi Fujitani (2011) have shown.²¹

¹⁹ For example, Tai (2014) shows that racism developed overtime in shaping colonial policies, elaborating on Komagome Takeshi's argument in *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon no Bunka Tōgō* [Cultural integration of colonial empire Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996) that racism impacted colonial policies.

²⁰ Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Rotem Kowner, ed., *Race and Racism in Modern East Asia* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

²¹ Fujitani (2011); John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986).

By avoiding reliance on Japanese culture as an explanation of Japan, its people, and its history, this project attempts to “dislocate the West (and the Rest).”²²

By situating Japan more centrally in imperial and colonial historiography, my project contributes particularly to the larger studies on intermarriage. In the existing scholarship on intermarriage in colonial context (e.g., Lora Wildenthal [1997], Durba Ghosh [2006], Gwenn A. Miller [2006], Damon Ieremia Salesa [2011]), there is an analysis of race, class, and gender, and to an extent, sexuality, that made some forms of intimate relationships more acceptable than others.²³ Yet my research shows that in addition to race, class, gender, and sexuality, reproductive ability was also a factor in determining whether inter/marriage was acceptable or not. If race, determined by physical markers, was the only factor in limiting or allowing intermarriage, it does not fully explain why there was a debate on encouraging or discouraging intermarriage in the Japanese empire, where Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese could not be phenotypically distinguished apart. Through this study, I therefore interrogate the concepts of ability and a/sexuality, and argue that in addition to the complex social hierarchy based on race, class, and gender that was created through the colonizer-colonized relationships, intermarriage also reinforced an ableist, as well as a cis-hetero(sexually)normative structure in society, which excluded those who fell outside

²² Gavin Walker and Naoki Sakai, “The End of Area,” *positions* 27.1 (February 2019): 1–31.

²³ Lora Wildenthal, “Race, Gender, and Citizenship in the German Colonial Empire,” *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Durba Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in Colonial India: the Making of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Gwenn A. Miller, “‘The Perfect Mistress of Russian Economy’: Sighting the Intimate on a Colonial Alaskan Terrain, 1784–1821,” *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Damon Ieremia Salesa, *Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

of these normative categories in historiography and history.

Gender and Sexuality Studies

While I draw on scholarship in gender and sexuality studies, I challenge two assumptions about sexuality and marriage: an assumption that all individuals were heterosexual or homosexual, and another that assumes all people married, treating marriage as a given. Gender studies have questioned gender categories and demonstrated that there were women who did not follow traditional gender roles, but the sexuality of women is rarely questioned, with occasional references to the possibility of homosexual men. As a result, why people have complied and continues to comply with marriage as a normative social practice also remain unquestioned. Considering that sexuality is a constructed set of practices, I focus on those who fell outside of the heterosexual–homosexual spectrum, where marriage (and/or co-habitation) could not be taken as a given. Partly driven by my long-term question regarding people’s fixation on the institution of marriage—why keep the institution?—this dissertation questions marriage as a focus of state and social policy. By challenging assumptions about sexuality and the institution of marriage through the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, I seek to locate subjects who are still marginalized or unacknowledged in the mainstream histories.

To do so, this project builds on gender studies scholarship that questions gender binaries, and queer studies that questions heterosexuality as a given. Joan Scott and Judith Butler, who proposed using gender as a category of historical analysis and challenged the category of “women” as a given, led the way in excavating voices of

those gendered feminine in history dominated by men and the masculine,²⁴ but it seems as though marriage is still considered the norm for women. Queer studies further opened up spaces for non-heterosexual/non-cisgender individuals in history by questioning heterosexuality as a given, but dominated by the main LGBT groups.²⁵ What about people who did not marry, and were neither heterosexual nor homosexual? In addition to bringing to light the marginalized history of intermarriage, I use it to find other sexual minorities and those denied marriage in history, because before debating whether those who are silenced can be talked about, their existence needs to be recognized first.²⁶

Lastly, I aim to contribute to the works that are a combination of all three fields—studies on Japanese women in the metropole during the imperial period. Studies of women in the East Asian context have worked to oppose the stereotypical image of “Oriental” women as passive figures in history, as well as to challenge the idea that feminism is a Western product.²⁷ Works by Louise Young (1999), Mariko

²⁴ Joan Scott, “Gender as a Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *American Historical Review* 91.5 (December 1986): 1053–1075; Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York and London: Routledge, 1990). For application in imperial/colonial context, see Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: the ‘manly Englishman’ and the ‘effeminate Bengali’ in the late nineteenth century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).

²⁵ For queer history of Japan, see Gregory M. Pflugfelder, *Cartographies of Desire: Male-Male Sexuality in Japanese Discourse, 1600–1950* (Berkeley: University of California, 1999) and Mark McLelland, *Queer Japan from the Pacific War to the Internet Age* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

²⁶ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313.

²⁷ For example, see: Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow and Atsuko Kameda, eds., *Japanese Women: New Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present, and Future* (The Feminist Press at City University of New York, 1995); Anne Walthall, ed., *The Human Tradition in Modern Japan* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Books, 2002); Hiroko Tomida and Gordon Daniels, eds., *Japanese Women: Emerging from Subservience, 1868–1945* (Kent: Global Oriental, 2005); Barbara Molony, Janet Theiss, and Hyaewol Choi, eds., *Gender in Modern*

Asano Tamanoi (2009), and Lori Watt (2009), for example, further revealed Japanese women's connection to the empire, particularly through Manchukuo,²⁸ similar to how British women were part of the imperial enterprise, as illustrated in *At Home with the Empire* (2006).²⁹ Thus, following their works that portray Japanese women as agents of the empire, I show how one could be implicated in imperialism without direct interaction with people from the colonies in the metropole, to speak to the audience outlined below.

Audience

The dissertation is based on text-based research, but simultaneously informed and shaped by oral interactions with miscellaneous individuals in and out of academia. Therefore while I write to make academic contributions in the above listed fields, I also write with non-academics in mind when I make a case for a more inclusive history, inspired by feminist and social justice-based scholarship that address ways to end oppression, beyond sex-based oppression against women.³⁰ I seek to address

East Asia: An Integrated History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016); Ayako Kano, *Japanese Feminist Debates: A Century of Contention on Sex, Love, and Labor* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2016).

²⁸ Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Mariko Asano Tamanoi, *Memory Maps: the State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009); Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Harvard University Asia Center, 2009).

²⁹ Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, eds., *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Philippa Levine in *Gender and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) further goes beyond identifying women in the empire and examines their active role in the colonies and the metropole.

³⁰ bell hooks, *Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000); Sara Ahmed, *Living a Feminist Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017). Lee Anne Bell defines social justice as "reconstructing society in accordance with principles

people both in and out of Japan, wherever it is difficult to ignore the existence of various forms of oppression, particularly racism, the subtle and the not-so-subtle (Figure 1).



Figure 1: An example of explicit racism in Japan: right-wing Gokoku Shishi no Kai demonstration making anti-Chinese and anti-Korean statements outside of Ikebukuro Station in Tokyo, supposedly fighting against “sabetsu” (discrimination) against Japanese by anti-Japanese forces (photo taken on July 9, 2017).

One of the reasons why I write with people unaffiliated with academia in mind, is because I observe a gap between what is discussed in academia and those outside of it, where people without links to the academic world are unaware of what is happening

of equity, recognition, and inclusion” in “Theoretical Foundations for Social Justice Education,” *Readings for Diversity and Social Justice*, edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 34.

inside it. In addition, while I believe that it is important to write to the conservative, right-wing politicians and other vocal history deniers in mind, and I agree with the criticisms about/toward them, I also believe that it is just as important to write to the non-conservative, “ordinary people” who are not politicians. Of the “ordinary people,” I hope that this particularly reaches those in the majority/privileged/agent groups, because their actions and behaviors stemming from the lack of historical awareness, even if without evil intent, has negative impact on the minority/unprivileged/target groups, and to make a change in the status quo requires involvement of the former. Ideally it would reach both groups, because there is an irony in which one group that is oppressed do not necessary understand the struggles of another group that is also oppressed.

Historian Hirota Masaki in his search for the source of discrimination in *Sabetsu kara miru Nihon no rekishi* (2008) argues the importance of learning from history to overcome it.³¹ Similarly, in “The Anatomy of Korea-Phobia in Japan” (2015), Itagaki Ryūta explains how racism against Koreans in contemporary Japan has historical origins, and how it is necessary to historicize the issue in order to address the problem.³² I likewise aim to trace the history of racism and illustrate its links to heterosexism and ableism (and needless to say, sexism and classism, too) through the study of policies, promoters, and patterns of intermarriage in imperial Japan. My objective in demonstrating the connections between the different -isms to the

³¹ Hirota Masaki, *Sabetsu kara miru Nihon no rekishi* [Seeing history of Japan through discrimination] (Osaka: Kaihō Shuppansha, 2008).

³² Itagaki Ryūta, “The Anatomy of Korea-Phobia in Japan,” *Japanese Studies* 35.1 (2015): 49–66.

“ordinary people” is to convince them how one could be complicit in and affected by the structure that enables various oppressions to exist, even if one is oppressed. And instead of simply pointing out that the problems exist, I want to propose a solution: if existing problems are perpetuated in a negative cycle, as Bobbie Harro illustrates in the “Cycle of Socialization” (Figure 2), then I aim to make this project be the “direction for change,” by explaining how ending one form of oppression could benefit others who are oppressed.³³

Whether ordinary “Japanese” people would listen to someone who’s not considered “Japanese” in Japan aside, I also write for audience outside of Japan, because the phenomenon in which the privileged groups disavow their own privileges and oppressions of the underprivileged and unprivileged is not unique to Japan (e.g., responding to the Black Lives Matter and the #MeToo movement with “all lives matter” and “#NotAllMen”). Although there may be a pushback from the privileged groups, there are psychological, social, moral, spiritual, intellectual, material, and physical costs of oppression for them as well.³⁴ In agreement with scholars who argue that it is the responsibility of the privileged to listen and how those who are privileged should not be in the position to decide when an apology, reparation, etc. is enough,³⁵ I

³³ Bobbie Harro, “The Cycle of Socialization,” *Readings for Diversity and Social Justice*, edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 27–34.

³⁴ Diane J. Goodman, “The Costs of Oppression to People from Privileged Groups,” *Promoting Diversity and Social Justice: Educating People from Privileged Groups* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2001), 103–124.

³⁵ For example of scholars making this argument in the context of Japanese history, see: Naoki Sakai, “Nihonshi to kokuminteki sekinin” [Japanese history and national responsibility] *Nashonaruru hisutorī o manabisuteru* [Unlearning national history] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006), 161–190; Lisa Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).




Figure 2: Cycle of Socialization

hope that unfolding marginalized history and drawing connections with the contemporary period, could at least get people to listen and reflect on their own role in the negative cycle, and ideally, work to break the “Cycle of Socialization,” to enter the “Cycle of Liberation” (diagram in Chapter 6).³⁶

³⁶ Bobbie Harro, “The Cycle of Liberation,” *Readings for Diversity and Social Justice*, edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 627–634.

Chapter Outlines

Chapter 2

Titled “Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial Japan: Internal Factors behind the Legalization and Lack of Promotion,” this chapter examines why intermarriage became legal in Japan, but was not promoted. Beginning with how intermarriage was legalized between the late 1910s and the early 1930s, I explore the discourse of intermarriage that appeared in public outlets, such as newspapers and magazines, as well as in the less-accessible sphere where male Japanese intellectuals discussed the topic of intermarriage from legal, diplomatic, and scientific perspectives, to first demonstrate that the topic of intermarriage was not censored, but not promoted at the national level either. Then, through the exploration of the discourse of intermarriage among Japanese men, I argue that Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were condoned yet not promoted, because they were aware of the consequences of banning and suppressing intermarriage in the other empires, and there was a lack of scientific evidence to outright condemn intermarriage. Another factor was the wartime population policy that valued both quality and quantity of the population: even though there were opponents against intermarriage, population quality and quantity could be monitored and maintained as long as people who intermarried registered their marriages. Here, I challenge viewing intermarriage policy solely as an assimilationist policy that failed, and aim to show Japan’s connection to its contemporaneous Euro-American powers to argue in favor of studying Japan’s imperial history in larger context.

Chapter 3

Since the previous chapter examined internal factors that led to sanctioning of intermarriage in imperial Japan, this chapter, “Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial Japan: External Factors behind the Legalization and Lack of Promotion,” examines the impact of external factors on the Japanese government’s decision to neither encourage nor discourage intermarriage after its legalization, even in the 1940s when Koreans and Taiwanese were being conscripted into the Japanese military. I first introduce the Japanese government’s position on intermarriage in the 1940s, and aim to show that the anxiety of racial degeneration of the ruling race that led to condemnation of colonizer-colonized marriages in the modern Euro-American empires also existed in Japan. Through an analysis of documents that deliberated on intermarriage in planning the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, I argue that in the case of Japan, the fear of displaying explicit racism like the Euro-American powers and antagonizing non-Japanese Asians in areas to where Japan expanded, was greater than the fear of racial degeneration, hence the condoning of intermarriage in Japan and its empire. Japan’s move to legalize and sanction intermarriage may appear to have ran counter to the global trends, but this was a result of being aware of what was happening outside of its empire—neither because imperial Japan was ignorant of or isolated from other imperial powers nor because it was less racist than its Euro-American counterparts.

Chapter 4

Having examined the internal and external reasons behind the intermarriage policy in imperial Japan where the government neither encouraged nor discouraged

Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages even in the 1940s, this chapter, titled “Brokers of Empire at Home: Supporters of Inter-marriage in Wartime Japan,” explores the promoters and supporters of inter-marriage in the metropole: the Harmony Association (*Kyōwakai*), the district commissioners (*hōmen’iin*), and Japanese women. These groups, which members sometimes overlapped, participated in the promotion of and/or supported inter-marriage at the local level when the government did not at the national level. By examining their activities in imperial Japan, I first argue that there were ideological and/or practical reasons behind their support and/or promotion of inter-marriage, which was possible because it was an extension of government-backed activities. I particularly focus on Japanese women who worked in favor of inter-marriage, to analyze why they supported inter-marriage contrary to Japanese men and the government. I then argue that in addition to inter-marriage providing a practical solution to social issues in wartime Japan, it enabled Japanese women to fulfill their own interests. By subsequently demonstrating how Japanese women’s support of inter-marriage inadvertently reinforced and perpetuated the patriarchal system that placed minorities, including women, at a disadvantage, I further explain that one could be complicit in imperialism even at the metropole with good intentions.

Chapter 5

This chapter, titled “Examining the Patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages in Imperial Japan and Making a Case for Inclusive History,” examines the “unique” patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in imperial Japan, where more colonizing women married colonized men, contrary to the pattern between colonizing men and colonized women more common

in the Euro-American empires. I begin by challenging the three dominant narratives of intermarriage—intermarriage as a tragedy, a romance, and/or a form of hypergamy—because existing narratives exclude cases that do not fit into the narratives and cannot be explained by the “colonizer” and “colonized” categories alone. To show how those who have been excluded can be included into history, I then compare the history of intermarriage alongside endogamous (Japanese-Japanese) marriages to reveal factors beyond gender, race/ethnicity, and class that influenced people’s decision to intermarry: I argue that inevitability, financial security, and/or interest in participating in patriotic activities were additional reasons besides force and love that led more Japanese women to intermarry than Japanese men. Furthermore, I make a case in favor of a comparative study between majority and minority histories that focuses on similarities instead of differences alone, because it can identify and challenge unquestioned assumptions in writing of history. I then propose inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses to address an assumption that emerged in comparing intermarriages and non-intermarriages, to locate individuals excluded and still unaccounted for in history, as well as challenge the history deniers, unlimited to those in Japan. Because this proposal was made possible by studying marginalized history along with mainstream history, I end with an explanation of why inclusive history is important.

Chapter 6

Lastly, the final chapter addresses the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriage in Japan after 1945. Titled “Selective Remembering and Forgetting of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages in Postwar Japan,”

it traces the whereabouts of people who intermarried pre-1945 and how they were “re-discovered” in postwar Japan. While the postwar attention has been on Japanese women who had married Korean men and were “found” in South Korea, I reveal through the American occupation documents and legal journals evidences of intermarried couples who remained in postwar Japan, to argue that the history of intermarriage has been selectively remembered. I subsequently argue that the selective remembering and forgetting of the history of intermarriage were made possible by a combination of the following factors in postwar Japan: shift in the population policy, change in the nationality and household registration laws, and the presence of the United States, which enabled fostering the “myth of Japanese homogeneity” and Japan as the victim of World War II.

At the end of this chapter, I conclude with a discussion on why it is important to learn about the history of minorities, such as the history of intermarriage, by illustrating how it could raise consciousness and contribute to forming alliances to allow for a positive change in society. If the previous chapter was aimed at convincing historians to write a more comprehensive, inclusive history, then this chapter’s objective is to convince non-historians why studying the history of minorities is important, in and out of Japan.

Chapter 2

Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial Japan: Internal Factors behind the Legalization and Lack of Promotion

Intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans became legal in 1923, and marriages between Japanese and Taiwanese in 1933. There are discrepancies in existing scholarship regarding promotion of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, but there are agreements. One of the agreements, is that intermarriage policy was one of the assimilationist policies that aimed to assimilate Koreans and Taiwanese in and from the colonies. There is also an agreement about intermarriage policy being unsuccessful and/or a failure because of the small number recorded.¹ And lastly, there is an agreement that as an assimilationist policy, the legalization of intermarriage was inclusive in rhetoric but exclusive in practice. Through intermarriage, colonized Koreans and Taiwanese could enter the Japanese *koseki* (household registry), hence inclusive. Yet it was inherently exclusive, because the registration system remained separate and never unified between Japan, Korea, and Taiwan: colonized people who did not intermarry or were not adopted into a Japanese household could never become “Japanese” in terms of one’s *honseki* (domicile, or

¹ For example, Paul Barclay describes the failure of “political-marriage” policy in Taiwan, in which marriage between Japanese men and Atayal women who intermarried “ended up divorced, abandoned, dead, or disgraced” (in “Cultural Brokerage and Interethnic Marriage in Colonial Taiwan: Japanese Subalterns and Their Aborigine Wives, 1895–1930,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 64.2 [May 2005]: 325). This chapter will not address the success or failure of the policy, because as feminist scholar Ueno Chizuko argues, judging in history is heavily influenced by the postwar perspective (*Nashonarizumu to jendā* [Engendering nationalism] [Tokyo: Seidosha, 1998], 83). The failure of getting people to intermarry, could have been considered a success by those who wanted to suppress intermarriage when the government would not.

place of registry), which determined whether one was “Japanese” or not, even though Koreans and Taiwanese were technically Japanese subjects. And this exclusivity is attributed to the discrimination against colonized people in and from the colonies.

But was assimilation the only reason behind the legalization of intermarriage? Were there other reasons behind the legalization of intermarriage, when discrimination against Koreans and Taiwanese existed? Was discussion of intermarriage ever censored from the public, and is this the reason why little is known about the history of intermarriage in Japan? With the Japanese empire treated as a “copycat” of Euro-American empires in the historiography of modern empires, why is it that Japan did not copy and follow the trends elsewhere that banned or discouraged marriage between colonizing and the colonized groups by the twentieth century? And did allowing intermarriage signal general support of intermarriage in imperial Japan?

I will first introduce how intermarriage came to be legalized in Japan, then examine how intermarriage has been discussed in mainland Japan from the late nineteenth century onwards to argue that although Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were not overtly promoted, they were not censored from the public either. I then examine the discourse of intermarriage in spheres less accessible to the public, to explore who were involved in the debate to encourage or discourage intermarriage. By examining male Japanese intellectuals who argued for or against intermarriage from legal, political, and scientific perspectives, I argue that the reason why intermarriage was not banned in imperial Japan, was not limited to assimilation. Marriage was legalized yet not promoted, because the intellectuals aware of the consequences of banning/suppressing intermarriage in other empires and were

concerned with both the quality *and* quantity of the Japanese population, even prior to the wartime. Even if there was an ambition to ban or suppress intermarriage, there was not enough scientific evidence, and intermarriage—although not ideal in terms of quality—could at least maintain and contribute to the increase of the Japanese population in terms of quantity. As long as people married and registered their marriages, quality could also be monitored.

Legalization of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages

In Japan's early modern period, society was divided into four classes, hierarchized in the order of samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants. Among the ruling samurai class, marriages were arranged as a family affair and they could not marry members of other classes.² The commoners who constituted the majority of the society, however, had more choice in choosing marriage partners with less familial control. During the Tokugawa era, marriage, as well as births and deaths, were recorded by local temples and privately by the families themselves.³ This changed, however, in the modern period, when the state came to intervene. The Meiji government eliminated the former class system, by gradually reducing the samurai ranks and reclassifying samurai and non-samurai as commoners in the early 1870s, so that the commoners could now marry each other as “fellow citizens.” And by removing the barriers to marriage between people of different statuses, “Japanese,” as

² There were exceptions to inter-class marriages toward the end of the Tokugawa period. Yoko Tokuhiko, *Marriage in Contemporary Japan* (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 94.

³ Barbara Molony, Janet Theiss, and Hyaewol Choi, eds., *Gender in Modern East Asia: An Integrated History* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016), 75–76

what Etienne Balibar calls the “fictive ethnicity” required in forming a nation, was formed.⁴

The Meiji government also intervened in registration of marriage. To officially and formally marry in Japan involves entering a *koseki* of one’s spouse—usually the husband’s. The modern *koseki* system was established by the Household Registration Law (*koseki-hō*) in 1871, effective since 1872. It “required that all families register their members and made family membership a requirement for legal rights”⁵ in order for the government to identify and control the population, as well as define who was “Japanese.”⁶ And since the promulgation of the Meiji Civil Code in 1896 (effective 1898) that established the patriarchal family (*ie*) system and the Nationality Law (*kokuseki-hō*) of 1899 that stipulated patrilineal *jus sanguinis* as the basis of acquiring nationality, to be “Japanese” required one to have a father holding a *koseki* with *honseki* in the metropole and be registered as a member of the family.⁷

Before Korea became a colony in 1910 and Taiwan in 1895, Japanese could marry Koreans and Taiwanese (who were considered foreigners) freely, as marriage between Japanese and non-Japanese foreigners became possible in 1873. Yet once

⁴ Balibar defines “fictive ethnicity” as a “community instituted by the nation-state,” in “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, edited by Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 96, 100.

⁵ Richard Ronald and Allison Alexy, “Continuity and change in Japanese homes and families,” *Home and Family in Japan: Continuity and transformation*, edited by Richard Ronald and Allison Alexy (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 3.

⁶ For the history of household registration in Japan, see Kenji Mori’s “The development of the modern *koseki*,” translated by Karl Jakob Krogness, in *Japan’s Household Registration System and Citizenship: Koseki, Identification, and Documentation*, edited by David Chapman and Karl Jakob Krogness (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 59–75.

⁷ Karl Jakob Krogness, “*Jus Koseki*: Household registration and Japanese Citizenship,” *Japan’s Household Registration System and Citizenship: Koseki, Identification and Documentation*, edited by David Chapman and Karl Jakob Krogness (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 147.

Korea and Taiwan became colonies, when Koreans and Taiwanese technically became “Japanese,”⁸ marriage could not be registered. This did not mean that people did not marry, as those who wished to marry but could not legally do so could enter into common-law relationship (*naien kankei*).⁹ The reason why Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese could not legally intermarry, that is, be entered into a household registry, was because Koreans and Taiwanese were separated from the metropolitan Japanese by the different household registration systems.¹⁰

The different household registration systems in each territory caused several problems for the Japanese government. The problems included people in common-law relationships not registering their marriages, thus escaping government radar. There were also intermarried couples with more than one registry, and bigamy was an additional problem.¹¹ Thus in 1918, the Common Law was established to address the issues caused by the different legal systems between the metropole and the colonies. However, Article 3 of the Common Law, which stipulated that one had to leave one’s registry if entering another, did not come into effect until 1921, and it was not until 1922 (in effect from 1923) that Japanese-Korean marriages became fully legal with

⁸ Endō Masataka, “Shokuminchi shihai no nakano kokuseki to koseki” [Nationality and family register in colonial rule], *Waseda Seiji Kōhō Kenkyū* 68 (2001), 282–284.

⁹ Koreans and Taiwanese were excluded from the *koseki-hō* once Korea and Taiwan became colonies. See Eika Tai, “The Discourse of Intermarriage in Colonial Taiwan,” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 40.1 (2014): 93–94.

¹⁰ For more information, see Endō Masataka, *Kindai Nihon no shokuminchi tōchi ni okeru kokuseki to koseki: Manshū, Chōsen, Taiwan* [Nationality and family registration within modern Japan’s colonial territories: Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2010).

¹¹ Lee Jeong-Seon, “‘Naisen kekkon’ ni miru teikoku Nihon no Chōsen tōchi to koseki” [Imperial Japan’s rule over Korea and household registration as seen in “Japanese-Korean marriage”], *Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai Ronbunshū* 52 (2014): 72–73.

the promulgation of the Korean Household Registration Ordinance (*Chōsen koseki-rei*), through which methods of transferring one's household registry between Japan and Korea were established.¹²

The legalization of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages occurred later in 1932 (in effect from 1933), after mutual management of entering/leaving the registry between Japan and Taiwan became possible in the occurrences of marriage and adoption under the Taiwan Household Registration Ordinance (*Taiwan koseki-rei*).¹³ The reason why the Common Law did not apply to Taiwan and Taiwanese in the 1920s, and this change had to be implemented in the 1930s, was because Taiwan did not have the household registration system and instead had the alternative *kokō* system, which prevented transfers with the Japanese system. In addition, the Common Law only applied to the regions that did not have the Civil Code (*minpō*), which Taiwan was under, but not Korea. Hence the Common Law only applied to Korea, legalizing Japanese-Korean marriages in the 1920s, but not Japanese-Taiwanese marriages until its legalization in the 1930s.¹⁴

The legalization of intermarriage, however, only enabled Japanese women and Koreans and Taiwanese (both men and women) to transfer their registries. Japanese men's transfers were limited, as were the cases in intermarriage between Japanese and

¹² Yoshioka Seiichi, "Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 2" [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 2], *Koseki Jihō* 421 (1993): 57–63 and "Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 3" [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 3], *Koseki Jihō* 424 (1993): 72–77.

¹³ Hozumi Shigeto'o, "Naitai kyōkon" [Japanese-Taiwanese marriage], *Yūkan Hōgaku* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1934), 183–184; Tai (2014): 99, 107.

¹⁴ Seki Kōjirō, "Naitai kyōkon mondai no kaiketsu ni tsuite (2)" [On solving the Japanese-Taiwanese marriage problem (2)], *Hōsōkai Zasshi* 11.7 (July 1933): 39–40; Yoshioka "Kyū gaichihō kōgiroku 3" [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 3], 72–73.

non-Japanese foreigners. Under the Common Law, only Japanese men without conscription duties could enter a Korean or a Taiwanese household registry—Japanese men between the ages of 17 and 40 could not transfer their *koseki* when the Common Law came into full effect in 1921. The age of Japanese men who could not transfer their registry extended from 0 to 40 in 1942, then the age limit was removed once Korean and Taiwanese men also became subject to conscription.¹⁵ And once the bans on the transfers of household registration were lifted, Japanese men could enter the household registry of Korean and Taiwanese women. These changes in the registration practices reveal a concern with the Japanese population even before the wartime when human resources became crucial: to keep Japanese men who could be conscripted within Japan.

After the legalization of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in 1923 and 1933 respectively, it was promoted to an extent in Korea and Taiwan. Secondary sources show those who intermarried being featured and awarded in the newspapers in the colonies.¹⁶ Yet despite the legalization of intermarriage, the same did not happen in Japan. Legalization appears to not have signaled the promotion of intermarriage in the metropole, despite claims in the secondary sources about intermarriage having been “promoted” as a national policy, although with little

¹⁵ 1938 for Korean men, 1942 for Taiwanese men. Endō (2001), 299.

¹⁶ For example, in Korea, the Governor General of Korea awarded Japanese-Korean couples, who were featured in the press (Su Yun Kim, “Romancing Race and Gender: Intermarriage and the making of a ‘Modern Subjectivity’ in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945,” PhD Dissertation, University of California San Diego [2009], 71). In Taiwan, Japanese-Taiwanese couples were featured in newspapers for being model families that represented harmony between Japan and Taiwan (Yang Pei-Wen, “Kuàyuè biānjiè de liúdòng yǔ rèntóng: Rìzhì shíqí `nèitáigònghūn` yánjiū” [The study of interracial marriages between Taiwanese and Japanese during the Japanese colonial period], Master’s Thesis, National Chengchi University [2009], 17).

evidence.¹⁷ The following section will thus examine how Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were discussed in the metropole, first in the outlets that were available to the public, and then in the outlets that were less accessible to the non-intellectuals in the public. Were they promoted? How were they discussed? And who were involved in the discussion?

Intermarriage Discourse in the Public in the Metropole

Mentions of intermarriage appeared in the press soon after the Japanese colonization of Taiwan in 1895, and Korea in 1910. On May 28, 1986, the *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper* reported the issue with household registries and naturalization after colonization. Titled “Taiwanjin to kekkon” (Marriage to a Taiwanese), a Taiwanese man had married a Japanese woman in Nagasaki about twenty years prior, had two children, and moved to Taiwan. The wife, however, came to miss Japan, so the Taiwanese husband asked another Japanese man who was in Taiwan to marry her and

¹⁷ Suzuki Yūko (in *Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon* [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] [Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992], 110) and Oguma Eiji (in *Tan'itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen* [The myth of the homogeneous nation] [Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995], 241, 254–255) claim that intermarriage, at least between Japanese and Koreans, was promoted as a national policy by the government in Japan. Takeshita Shūko (in *Kokusai kekkon no shakaigaku* [Sociology of international marriage] [Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 2000], 55) also claims that intermarriage was promoted in both Japan and Korea. According to Hoshina Hironobu (in “Shokuminchi no ‘konketsuji’—Naitaiekkon no seijigaku” [“Mixed blood children” of the colonies: Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese marriage], *Taiwan no Daitōa Sensō* [Taiwan’s Greater East Asia War] [Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 2002], 268) and Miyazaki Seiko (in “‘Naitai kyōkon’ to shokuminchi ni okeru Taiwan josei seinendan no ichizuke” [“Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage” and the position of women’s organization in colonial Taiwan], *Nantōshigaku* 70 [2007]: 84, 93), intermarriage was promoted in Taiwan. However, Kim Yōngdal (in “Nihon no Chōsen tōchika ni okeru ‘tsūkon’ to ‘konketsu’—iwayuru ‘Naisen Kekkō’ no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite” [Japan’s “intermarriage” and “blood mixing” in colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called “Japanese-Korean marriage”], *Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō* 39 [1999]: 43) and Eika Tai ([2014]: 114) argue that the call for intermarriage was more of a slogan, and not actually promoted.

bring her back to Japan. The Japanese man's parents then opposed the marriage because the woman was "Chinese," but the newspaper claimed that the woman, although married to a Taiwanese, was and should be Japanese because of her origin in Nagasaki. It concluded with the confusion surrounding an attempt to naturalize her as Japanese, because her record had been removed from the registry, which determined her Japanese status.¹⁸ This article did not encourage or discourage intermarriage, but what can be observed is the opposition to intermarriage from the people surrounding the couple considering intermarriage—in this case, the parents of the Japanese man who was asked by a Taiwanese man to marry his Japanese ("Chinese") wife. The article additionally reported the importance of being recorded in the Japanese household registry to be considered Japanese.

Soon after the annexation of Korea in 1910, too, an account of Japanese-Korean marriage appeared. Titled "Nikkan gappei to kekkon" (Japan's annexation of Korea and marriage), featured in a magazine *Tokyo Shin Kokkei* from 1910, it promoted marriage between Japanese and Koreans. Expecting the number of intermarriage to increase now that the Koreans were "new fellow beings" (*shin dōhō*), the article introduced benefits to both Japanese men and women if they married Korean men and women: if a Japanese man married a Korean woman, he will be treated well because in Korea, it was not the husband who loved the wife, but the wife who loved and took care of the husband. If a Japanese woman married a Korean man, she will be treated well and become happy, because Korean husbands cared for their

¹⁸ "Taiwanjin to kekkon" [Marriage to a Taiwanese], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 28 May 1896: 4.

wives.¹⁹ Because the magazine appears to be a satirical magazine (translated title would be *Tokyo New Humor*), the genuineness of the message purporting the advantages for Japanese to marry Koreans is uncertain. Perhaps the article was pointing to people's misunderstanding and fantasy of the colonization and failures of the Japanese-Korean marriages in reality. Yet this article, like the one that followed the colonization of Taiwan, neither banned nor tried to suppress intermarriage between Japanese and non-Japanese from the colonies.

Also from the same magazine six years later, there was an article reporting from Seoul, on *jiyū kekkon* (free, or unmediated marriages) among Japanese men in Korea. It is critical of *naichijin* (Japanese) who went to Korea to make a fortune and took Korean wives there, but did not register their marriages. The article also observed the rising number of illegitimate children, due to the marriages being unregistered.²⁰ This critique of Japanese men's irresponsible behavior may have arisen from the concern over rising discontent in Korea against Japanese colonization during the "military rule" (1910–1919) of colonial Korea, as well as to critique the Japanese men who were responsible for being the head of the family (*ie*), to function as the building blocks of the nation. Without further context, one could also speculate that it may have been pointing to the lack of a legal pathway to register intermarriages. And while the action of not registering marriages was critiqued, the intermarriage itself and having children with people from the colonies, again, were not.

¹⁹ "Nikkan gappei to kekkon" [Japan's annexation of Korea and marriage], *Tokyo Shin Kokkei* 19 (1910): 3.

²⁰ "Zaisen naichijin to jiyū kekkon" [Japanese in Korea and free marriages], *Tokyo Shin Kokkei* 10.88 (1916): 6.

In 1910, a support of Japanese-Korean marriages was also found in an article written by Unno Yukinori, a eugenicist and a social theorist who has written about intermarriage between the white and the yellow race.²¹ In *Taiyō*, a magazine that featured social and political commentaries, Unno supported intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans, because he believed that mixing with Koreans could help eliminate the defects born from endogamous Japanese-Japanese marriages and improve the Japanese race. Unlike the “yellow-white” or Japanese-Westerner marriages that were debated as part of the *jinshu kairyōron* (race improvement theory) in the 1880s and the 1890s, there was no need to worry about Japanese becoming assimilated, because the Japanese were superior to Koreans.²² Here, we start to see the concern with the quality of the Japanese race impacted by intermarriage, as Lee Jeong-Seon argues was the reason why there was a careful consideration regarding promotion of intermarriage in the metropole.²³

After these initial accounts of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages following colonization, discussions of marriage between Japanese and Koreans re-emerged in the press with the engagement between the royal families in 1916.²⁴ Their marriage did not take place until 1920, due to the death of the father of

²¹ Unno Yukinori, “Zakkon mondai” [Mixed marriage problem], *Taiyō* 1914 (1913.11): 138–143.

²² Unno Yukinori, “Nihonjinshu to Chōsenjinshu to no zakkon ni tsuite” [On mixed marriage between Japanese race and Korean race], *Taiyō* 16.16 (1910): 98–104; Lee Jeong-Seon, “Chōnshichejegi ilcheūi chongdongwōn jōngchaekkwā 'naesōnhonhyōl' munje” [The Total Mobilization System during Wartime and the Policy for the Japanese-Korean Hybrid Population], *Yōksamunjeōngu* 29 (April 2013): 223–224.

²³ Lee (2014).

²⁴ “Nissen dōka no kiso” [The basics of Japan-Korea assimilation], *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, 4 August 1916.

Prince Yi Ŭn and the March First Independent Movement in 1919.²⁵ The engagement and marriage between Korean prince Yi Ŭn and Japanese princess Nashimoto Masako, however, were celebrated and praised for being a model of harmony between Japan and Korea. The praise of this marriage from the Government General of Korea was also published in the Japanese press.²⁶

It was after the royal marriage that intermarriage became legal for commoners, and reports and updates of the legalization process were featured in *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper* in early 1921, the year when Article 3 of the Common Law came into effect.²⁷ Once Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were legalized in 1932 and enforced from 1933, there was an announcement again in the newspaper, which reported that the push to legalize intermarriage between Japanese and Taiwanese came from the Government General of Taiwan.²⁸

²⁵ For an autobiography and biography of Nashimoto Masako, see: Yi Bangja (Ri Masako), *Dōran no naka no ōhi* [Princess amidst the storm] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1973); Otabe Yūji, *Ri Masako: Ichi Kankokujin to shite kuinaku* [Ri Masako: Without regret as a Korean] (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 2007).

²⁶ “Ouseishi denka no shingoten o gokenchiku” [Constructing the palatial home of his highness the prince] *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 20 April 1920: 9.

²⁷ “Kyōgaku kyōkon” [Mixed education, mixed marriage], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 16 January 1921: 3; “Kyōkonhō teishutsu ni kessu” [To decide on submitting the mixed marriage law], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 11 February 1921: 1; “Taiwan koseki jinjirei shingi” [Deliberation on Taiwan’s household registration and personnel ordinance], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 10 May 1921: 1.

²⁸ “Harete mitomerareru, naitaijin no kyōkon” [Japanese-Taiwanese marriages to be lawfully permitted], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 17 September 1932: 3; “Naitaijin kyōkon no hokusei teian” [Proposing legal regulation of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 20 October 1932: 2; “Taiwan kyōkon chokureian” [Plan on imperial ordinance concerning Japanese-Taiwanese marriages], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 17 November 1932: 2; “Naien kara honseki ni yorokobu Taiwan” [From de facto to de jure, Taiwan rejoices], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 22 November 1932: 5; “Taiwan no kyōkon mondai kettei” [Decision on Taiwan’s intermarriage problem], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 23 November 1932: 1; “Heieki kankeisha no mukoiri kinshi” [Prohibition on people involved in military service marrying into wife’s family], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 26 November 1932: 3.

Since the initial legalization of Japanese-Korean marriages, discussions of intermarriage appeared occasionally in Japanese newspapers during the 1920s. For example, anarchists Pak Yōl and Kaneko Fumiko's plan to marry in prison was reported in the *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper* on November 25, 1925.²⁹ Activities of the *Sōaikai* (Mutual Friendship Society) were further reported in 1928, which included promotion of Japanese-Korean marriages as a part of their larger objective to promote harmony between Japan and Korea.³⁰

In the 1930s, the topic of intermarriage appeared in an “Advice for Women” column of the *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*. Yamada Waka responded to a Japanese woman who was considering marriage to a Korean man, and prompted her to do so even though people around her may disapprove.³¹ Yamada also responded to two other questions concerning interracial and interethnic relationships: one from a woman asking what do to about her daughter yearning for a Japanese-French youth, who declined the relationship because he was a *konketsuji* (literally “mixed blood child”).³² The other was from a Japanese woman married to a Chinese man who wanted to naturalize, and in response, Yamada Waka wished her well to achieve the “beautiful result” of international marriage.³³ From these articles, too, one could observe that the

²⁹ “Chikaku keimusho de seishiki no kekkonshiki” [Formal marriage ceremony to be held soon at prison], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 25 November 1925: 1.

³⁰ “Naisenjin no kekkon shōkai” [Introducing Japanese-Korean marriage], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 19 January 1918: 2.

³¹ “Josei sōdan: Chōsenjin kara ai sareru” [Advice for women: To be loved by a Korean man], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 8 August 1931: 10.

³² “Josei sōdan: Konketsu no seinen o shibo” [Advice for women: Yearning a mixed blood youth], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 14 August 1934: 7.

³³ “Josei sōdan: Museki yue kika ga konnan” [Advice for women: Difficulty naturalizing due to lack of registry], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 13 October 1934: 7. “International marriage” was used to refer to marriage between Japanese and Chinese, because it was a

disapproval came from the people surrounding individuals considering intermarriage or were married to a non-Japanese person.³⁴

Since the report of legalization of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, mentions of intermarriage hardly appeared in the Japanese newspapers, but appeared occasionally in women's magazines. Similar to the "Advice for Women" column that featured "international marriages" in *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, women's magazines tended to feature more marriages between Japanese and Westerners, particularly between Japanese men and Western women, many which suggest the idolization of Japanese-Westerner marriages.³⁵ There was also a debate over Japanese-Chinese marriages in 1938,³⁶ but not between Japanese and Taiwanese. There was one article from 1940 by Kim So-un, a Korean poet (1907–1981) who married a Japanese woman in Japan.³⁷ Titled "Japanese-Korean Marriage Problem" published in *Fujin Kōron (Ladies' Review)*, Kim raised the negative examples of marriages between Japanese and Koreans, which he attributed to Japanese-Korean marriages not being welcomed by the people surrounding the couples, frictions in the style of living, and language barriers.³⁸ Noting that he was bringing up a "topic of considerable degree," Kim

marriage between people of two different countries (this term was not used for a marriage between Japanese and Koreans/Taiwanese).

³⁴ See Chapter 4 for more information on Yamada Waka.

³⁵ For examples in *Fujin Kōron*: "Ijinshu kekkon no hōmu" [Homes of interracial marriages] (1916): 10–13; Okakura Yoshizaburō, "Kokusai kekkon o yumemiru hitobito e" [To people who dream of international marriage] (1934): 264–265.

³⁶ Sugiyama Heisuke, "Shinajin to kekkon suruna" [Do not marry a Chinese], *Shufu no Tomo* (1938.3): 272–282; Ka Seiwa "Shinajin to kekkon suru koto o osoreruna" [Do not fear marrying a Chinese], *Shufu no Tomo* (1938.5): 250–254.

³⁷ He apparently divorced two years later, and their child was raised by the Japanese mother.

³⁸ Kim postulated that such frictions would be less between Japanese and Taiwanese, or Japanese and Manchurians.

observed that the society's reactions toward Japanese-Korean marriages were "cold-hearted," with more hostile views denouncing such unions. Thus he argued that the Japanese-Korean marriages should be "caringly" instructed from above, just as the government was leading Greater East Asia, to dispel discriminations against Japanese-Korean marriages.³⁹ This was the first to show cases of unsuccessful cases of intermarriages, but Kim did not disapprove or tried to dissuade people from marrying, and instead, called for more support. This article also demonstrates that again, the denouncement and disapproval came from the surrounding people.

In Kim's article, he claimed that despite it being "such a large social phenomenon," Japanese-Korean marriages were being ignored by society—even in 1940, when the numbers of intermarriage were rising. The few mentions of intermarriage available to the public, perhaps reflected the lack of public interest on this issue, and this can explain the reason why the history of intermarriage between Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages are not very well known today, as opposed to marriages between Japanese and Westerners that gained more positive attention. Despite the sparsity of mentions, however, it was not framed in a negative way—if any disapproval existed, we can see it from the people surrounding those who intermarried. There was no dissuasion against intermarriage, with no outright denial or disapproval of intermarriage: this may be the reason why intermarriage is thought to have been "promoted," because there was no negative promotion or anti-intermarriage discourse in the public. Yet with the exception of the articles praising the royal

³⁹ Kim So-Un, "Naisen kekkon no mondai" [Problems regarding Japanese-Korean marriages], *Fujin Kōron* 25.10 (1940): 196–199.

marriage, I argue that it is difficult to declare that intermarriage was actively promoted on a national scale in Japan. It is also difficult to state that there was a move to deter “Japanese women...from marrying men from the colonies.”⁴⁰ Based on examining how intermarriage was discussed in outlets available to the public, it appears to not have been censored from the public, at least not in the initial phases pre- and post-legalization of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages.

Intermarriage Discourse among Japanese Male Intellectuals

Although intermarriage may not have appeared in the public frequently, with appearances in the newspapers and magazines for the public declining toward the 1940s, the discourse did not stop or disappear from Japan—they appeared more in sources less accessible to the public. In this section, I explore who were involved in the discourse of intermarriage, to explore the reasons why intermarriage was legalized but not actively promoted, as the above section has shown. I argue that the reasons for legalization included awareness about the consequences of banning or suppressing intermarriage, lack of evidences to suppress intermarriage even if the government and policymakers wanted to, and interest in the quality and quantity of the Japanese population that could be secured by marriage and registration of it.

One of the places in which discussion of intermarriage occurred outside the popular press was in legal journals. Legal scholars were invested in the legalization of intermarriage, particularly to allow transfers between the different household

⁴⁰ Mark McLelland, *Queer Japan from the Pacific War to the Internet Age* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 40.

registration systems in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. For example, *Nihon Hōsei Shinshi* (*Japanese Journal of Law and Politics*), a journal published by the Japan Law School, featured a short observation on assimilation of Taiwanese in Taiwan through marriage with Japanese people by Kubota Toyozō. Introducing the numbers of Japanese and Taiwanese who intermarried, Kubota reported that there were relatively few poor Taiwanese spouses despite the variety in occupation of Taiwanese married to Japanese. He then sought to congratulate and encourage more Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in the future, which could not be legally and officially registered at the time of publication in 1920.⁴¹

Another example of intermarriage discussed from a legal standpoint, is an article by Hozumi Shigeto'o, a law scholar, featured in a compilation of articles from *Hōritsu Jihō* (*Law Journal*) in 1934. Originally written when Japanese-Taiwanese was finally being legalized, Hozumi lamented “how slow” the legalization of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages was, taking more than thirty-five years after colonization. Ending with an anecdote on giving a speech at a marriage ceremony of his Taiwanese friend who married a Japanese woman in 1932, he was hopeful for the Taiwan Household Registration Ordinance, which would finally enable transfers between Japanese and Taiwanese registries and thus legalize intermarriages.⁴²

Seki Kōjirō, a judicial secretary, further commented on Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in *Hōsōkai Zasshi* (*Lawyers' Association Journal*) in 1933. Seki did not

⁴¹ Kubota Toyozō, “Kekkon no kazu yori mitaru naitai dōka no jitsugen” [Attainment of Japanese-Taiwanese assimilation based on marriage numbers], *Nihon Hōsei Shinshi* 17.1 (1920): 76–78.

⁴² Hozumi (1934), 182–186.

particularly endorse Japanese-Taiwanese marriages like Kubota and Hozumi, but he observed an unfair situation, in which Taiwanese were treated as less than the foreigners, even though they were also imperial subjects (*teikoku shinmin*) as the Japanese. He also noted that the Taiwan Household Registration Ordinance that enabled Japanese-Taiwanese marriages was only a temporary solution, and argued for the implementation of the same household registration system in Japan and Taiwan as a permanent solution to the unfavorable treatment of Taiwanese people.⁴³

The reason why legal discussions of intermarriage were focused on Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, is most likely due to the belated legalization compared to Japanese-Korean marriages, raising concerns for Japanese-Taiwanese couples, for example, in determining the legitimacy of the children—one of the concerns Hozumi raised. These articles demonstrate that one, there was a more favorable evaluation of Taiwanese over Koreans, possibly attributed to Taiwanese in Japan being of upper class and more assimilated. Two, the legal interest also reveals that in Japan, the concern over intermarriage was with the separate household registration systems, as much as, if not more so, than assimilating people in and from the colonies.

The legal scholars supported legalization of intermarriage, but the support was not unanimous among Japanese male intellectuals, as there were people who showed a greater interest in the negative impact of intermarriage on the Japanese population, not Koreans or Taiwanese. One of the places where opposing voices against intermarriage appeared was in *Gaikō Jihō* (*Revue Diplomatique*), a journal on diplomacy.

⁴³ Seki Kōjirō, “Naitai kyōkon mondai no kaiketsu ni tsuite (1)” [On solving the Japanese-Taiwanese marriage problem (1)], *Hōsōkai Zasshi* 11.6 (June 1933): 31–40 and “Naitai kyōkon mondai no kaiketsu ni tsuite (2),” *Hōsōkai Zasshi* 11.7 (July 1933): 37–67.

With the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, there was one person who supported interethnic marriage: Nanba Monkichi, a sociologist and a professor at Dōshisha University, expressed his support of marriage between Japanese and Chinese to achieve “ethnic fusion” (*minzokuteki yūgō*) in 1937, in the process of critiquing how the United States and Germany were discriminating Jews and black and yellow races, because of their belief in white superiority.⁴⁴ Nanba, however, was an exception in promoting marriage between Japanese and non-Japanese, as other contributors in *Gaikō Jihō* opposed intermarriage.

In the following year, Chiba Ryō, a politician turned researcher at *Tōyō Kyōkai* (Oriental Society),⁴⁵ adamantly opposed intermarriage between Japanese and Taiwanese. Chiba distrusted leaving the household to Taiwanese women, whom he identified as being the world’s least familial women of the Han *minzoku*. This is one article that negatively portrayed Taiwanese people, claiming that Japanese women strongly disliked Taiwanese men. Despite the potential for furthering assimilation, which the legal scholars who supported intermarriage viewed as an asset, Chiba worried that intermarriage would result in retrogressing of the Japanese “pedigree.”⁴⁶

Another opponent to intermarriage in *Gaikō Jihō*, was a eugenicist Koya

⁴⁴ Nanba Monkichi, “Minzokuteki yūgō no kihon mondai” [Basic problem of ethnic fusion], *Gaikō Jihō* 86.800 (1938): 70–87. In subsequent articles, Nanba argued against European-style birth control, because it decreased the birthrate and lead to the weakening of European powers (“Minzoku no kōbō to jinkō mondai” [Rise and fall of the minzoku and the population problem], *Gaikō Jihō* 86.805 [1938]: 57–77). He also justified the war against the white race to liberate the non-white races (“Daitōa sensō to jinshu sensen” [The Greater East Asia War and the racial front], *Gaikō Jihō* 101.893 (1942): 22–34.

⁴⁵ *Tōyō Kyōkai* was formerly the *Taiwan Kyōkai*, founded in 1898. Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 234.

⁴⁶ Chiba Ryō, “Shinkō Taiwan no saininshiki” [Reacknowledgement of emerging Taiwan], *Gaikō Jihō* 90.827 (1939): 137–151.

Yoshio. In his article, Koya pointed out that the policies surrounding *minzoku* had been centrifugal, concerned with what was happening outside of Japan because the colonial policies had been focused on removing excess population from Japan. He then argued that the policy concerning *minzoku* needed to change, to become more centripetal with a focus on development of the Japanese *minzoku*, so that Japan will not be weakened. In the process of making a case for a change in the *minzoku* and the larger population policy, Koya introduced the problem of “blood mixing” with *gaichijin* (people of colonial origin), using an example of intermarriage with Malaysians. Koya understood the potential of “blood mixing” to produce positive results, such as improved adaptability. Yet he argued against mixing, not only because of the potential to also produce negative outcomes in terms of physique, but also because of the social and political problems that might occur, as demonstrated in Koya’s examples from French-controlled Haiti and the Dutch East Indies, which saw an uprising by the mixed population against the white rulers.⁴⁷ From this and the previous articles, we see opposition to intermarriage connected with the interest in the quality of the Japanese population. Moreover, opinion on intermarriage was based on observations that the intellectuals made about what was happening outside of Japan, and the consequences of intermarriage and race mixing in other empires.

Tōgō Minoru, with experience in Taiwan’s colonial affairs, opposed with similar reasons. In an article from June 1943, Tōgō argued against assimilation of different *minzoku*, because forced assimilation would lead to problems, such as

⁴⁷ Koya Yoshio, “Jikyoku to minzoku seisaku” [Current state of affairs and minzoku policy], *Gaikō Jihō* 105.914 (1943): 45–51.

rebellions. But because “*minzoku* problem” could not be avoided with the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Tōgō instead promoted “differentiation” (*bunka*, instead of *dōka*), to connect to other people by heart and respect of different groups.⁴⁸ Although Tōgō did not openly oppose intermarriage in the article from June, in November of the same year, Tōgō clearly argued against intermarriage and race mixing, based on his observation of the Philippines. He recognized that mixing between similar groups, such as intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans, or Japanese and Taiwanese within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, would not produce detrimental results, compared to the results between white and black people since the differences were fewer. However, Tōgō expressed his worry over losing Japaneseness, especially when only men were employed in the expansion. Japanese men’s marriage to local indigenous women, Tōgō feared, would subsequently lead to the loss of “purity of the Japanese *minzoku*.” Therefore he proposed transferring the entire Japanese household (*katei*) as a whole in the process of expansion, to prevent intermarriage, so that the position of Japanese as the “leading *minzoku*” (*shidō minzoku*) can be upheld.⁴⁹ His position was also the same in another article on colonial policies, which argued against intermarriage because Japaneseness would be lost through mixing with other *minzoku*.⁵⁰

These opposing voices in *Gaikō Jihō* reveal the concern over the social and

⁴⁸ Tōgō Minoru, “Daitōa to minzoku mondai” [Greater East Asia and the minzoku problem], *Gaikō Jihō* 106.925 (1925): 35–38.

⁴⁹ Tōgō Minoru, “Daitōa kensetsu to zakkon mondai” [Construction of the Greater East Asia and the mixed marriage problem], *Gaikō Jihō* 108.934 (1943): 5–13.

⁵⁰ Tōgō Minoru, “Shokumin seisaku to minzoku shinri” [Colonial policy and ethnic consciousness], *Gaikō Jihō* 105.916 (1943): 23–32.

political effects of “blood mixing” based on observations of race mixing in other empires, as well as the concern over losing Japaneseness, not assimilation of Koreans, Taiwanese, or other non-Japanese people. And while the discussions of intermarriage and “blood mixing” in *Gaikō Jihō* turned increasingly against intermarriage, discussion among scientists, particularly those involved in eugenics and population policies, were mixed, due to the conflict between wanting to oppose intermarriage on the one hand, but not having concrete scientific evidence to ban or suppress intermarriage on the other.

For example, the journal *Yūseigaku* (*Eugenics*) featured opinions on intermarriage and “blood mixing” between different ethnic groups from the 1920s, after the legalization of Japanese-Korean marriages. In 1924, Watanabe Yoshizō, a medical doctor, voiced his opposition against mixed marriages in *Yūseigaku*. He recognized that the Japanese people were of mixed heritage, but argued against both interracial and interethnic marriages by relying on results of mixing between different types of animals, which showed negative physical impacts of mixing on the descendants.⁵¹ In the same year, the journal also reported an increase in the number of Japanese-Korean marriages, specifically in Osaka, which was one of the prefectures with the largest Korean population in Japan. The data was compiled by Osaka’s police after the Great Kantō Earthquake, which led to an increase in activity of Koreans residing in Osaka, then numbered 23,635. According to the survey completed, there were eighty-seven Korean men with Japanese wives, and thirty-six Korean women

⁵¹ Watanabe Yoshizō, “Zakkon no rigai” [Pros and cons of mixed marriages], *Yūseigaku* 1.3 (1924): 16–17.

with Japanese husbands. The report acknowledged that this increase in number was seen by some as a positive move toward achieving *naisen yūwa* (harmony between Japan and Korea), but ended with a statement on how difficult it was to judge the actual value without examining the quality of these intermarriages in detail.⁵²

In 1927, biologist and geneticist Komai Taku also wrote an article that did not outright oppose intermarriage, but hinted his opposition to intermarriage. By exploring the results of mixing in plants and animals, and mixed marriages between people in North America and Africa, Komai argued that interracial and interethnic mixing could result in “disharmony” (*fuchōwa*) of personality. An example of the consequence of mixing that Komai used, was a high rate of suicide among the Japanese, declaring that “there is no other human race that commits as many suicides as the Japanese.”⁵³

Similar to Watanabe, Komai also acknowledged that the Japanese were of mixed origin, constituted of Malays, Koreans, Chinese, and the Ainu, but unlike Watanabe, Komai gave human examples, and also referenced cases from other empires in warning about the consequences of mixing between different racialized groups.

Using observations of intermarriage cases from other imperial countries and their colonies, is also the approach taken by Koya Yoshio, the same individual who published in *Gaikō Jihō*, to oppose intermarriage in *Yūseigaku*. Over two articles in *Yūseigaku*, Koya wrote about “*minzoku kokusaku*” (national policy on *minzoku*), a term that he claimed to have used first, to argue for a need of a policy that aimed to

⁵² “Naisenjin no kekkon gekizō” [Marked increase in Japanese-Korean marriages], *Yūseigaku* 1.2 (1924): 30.

⁵³ Komai Taku, “Kinshinkon to zakkon” [Consanguineous marriage and mixed marriage], *Yūseigaku* 4.9 (1927): 11–18.

improve the quality, as well as the quantity, of the Japanese population. Koya was concerned that the weak Japanese population—both in terms of quality and quantity—would result in weakening of Japanese diplomacy, similar to what he observed was happening in England and France. He thus warned the importing of Western culture, such as the birth control movement that he was personally against, if Japan wanted to avoid the fate of adverse selection, which brought on the decline and fall of ancient Greece and Rome. And based on his concern over the decline of the quality and quantity of the Japanese population, Koya warned against assimilation through intermarriage and race mixing. According to Koya in the first article, even if the Japanese were of mixed origin, it took a long time for the Japanese *minzoku* to be superior as they were today.⁵⁴ In the second article continuing from the first, Koya continued to warn against intermarriage, by giving examples of “disharmony.” While Komai gave examples of “disharmony” in personality as a consequence of intermarriage and mixing, Koya gave examples of mixed individuals’ “disharmony” with the environment, as well as “disharmony” in physical characteristics. For example, this included bad vision, resulting from different body structures. If Koya’s opinion on “blood mixing” between different races and ethnicities was not clear in the first article, it became clearer in the second, as he claimed that Japan “cannot allow blood mixing to occur inadvertently,” and to blunder so would be very troubling, as was the case in the United States, England, and France. Koya further extended his sympathy and praise to German policy of Jewish exclusion, yet he did not call for

⁵⁴ Koya Yoshio, “Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai (1)” [Various problems of national policy on minzoku (1)], *Yūseigaku* 16.11 (1939): 3–13.

action to ban intermarriage in Japan—just warnings and calls for more research, because it was lacking and inadequate in Japan to make a decision.⁵⁵

Such a strong opposition to “blood mixing” as Koya’s, however, appeared less in the journal *Yūseigaku* overtime: there were calls for more research on “blood mixing” between different *minzoku* beginning in the late 1920s, as well as articles featuring research on mixed children from outside of Japan.⁵⁶ For example, Tanimoto Tomeri, one of the editors of the journal, introduced the research on interracial children in the United States.⁵⁷ Occasional updates and announcements on policies banning intermarriage in Germany in the early 1930s also suggest that there were interests and possibly other supporters of the German policy like Koya.⁵⁸ From the 1930s onward, however, most articles on intermarriage were ambivalent, in that the position of men who were writing on whether to promote or not promote intermarriage was not clearly stated.⁵⁹

This ambivalence of wanting to stop intermarriage but not stating explicitly so, appeared in the writings of researchers of “blood mixing” who did not find any particular problems with intermarriage, as well as those who articulated the

⁵⁵ Koya Yoshio, “Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai (2),” [Various problems of national policy on minzoku (2)], *Yūseigaku* 16.12 (1939): 1–10.

⁵⁶ Osaka-fu Ishikai, “Minzoku eisei shisetsu ni kansuru” [On racial hygiene facilities], *Yūseigaku* 5.6 (1928): 11–13.

⁵⁷ Tanimoto Tomeri, “Konketsuji ni tsuite” [On mixed blood children], *Yūseigaku* 8.10 (1931): 2–6. Also see “Konketsuji kenkyū no hoi” [Addendum to research on mixed blood children], *Yūseigaku* 9.5 (1932): 2–8.

⁵⁸ “Minzoku no junketsu o mamore” [Protect the pureblood of minzoku], *Yūseigaku* 10.6 (1933): 33; “Ijinshu to no kekkon makanarinaranu” [Marriage to a different race must not be allowed], *Yūseigaku* 10.8 (1933): 22, 31.

⁵⁹ An exception is an article without an identifiable author that expressed support of Japanese-Chinese marriages. See “Nikkajin kekkon no zehi!” [Propriety of Japanese-Chinese marriages], *Yūseigaku* 18.4 (1941): 8.

consequences of intermarriage. For example, Mizushima Haruo, in his study of the Japanese *minzoku* and the “blood mixing problem,” saw the benefits of mixed marriages between Japanese and Koreans, with Japanese-Korean children having a better physique and intelligence than Japanese and Korean children.⁶⁰ Mizushima further critiqued white people’s baseless opposition to race mixing. He concluded that there was no biological problem with race mixing, yet he still warned the readers to not jump to conclusions and promote intermarriage, because of the potential emergence of social and political problems, as well as the lack of Japanese spirit among mixed Japanese children.⁶¹ Therefore although opposition to intermarriage may have appeared in the 1920s and the 1930s among intellectuals writing in the *Yūseigaku* journal, by the 1940s, scholars appeared to agree that there at least were no biological issues with “blood mixing” as Mizushima claimed, although concerns over non-biological issues remained. ⁶²

The growing ambivalence of the scholars’ stance, however, did not mean that the disapproval of intermarriage ended. Outside of *Yūseigaku*, there were just as many ambivalent and vague opinions on intermarriage, but rarely were their opinions in favor of promoting or encouraging intermarriage after its legalization.⁶³ Discussions of intermarriage outside of the legal journals, *Gaikō Jihō*, and *Yūseigaku*, were found

⁶⁰ Mizushima Haruo, “Nihon minzoku no kōsei to konketsu mondai (1)” [Composition of the Japanese minzoku and the blood mixing problem (1)], *Yūseigaku* 19.6 (1942): 2–7.

⁶¹ Mizushima Haruo, “Nihon minzoku no kōsei to konketsu mondai (2)” [Composition of the Japanese minzoku and the blood mixing problem (2)], *Yūseigaku* 19.7 (1942): 2–6.

⁶² Another example from the journal that expresses anxiety over blood-mixing: Taniguchi Toratoshi, “Konketsu mondai” [Mixed blood problem], *Yūseigaku* 20.3 (1943): 17–19.

⁶³ Takeda Yukio’s “Naichi zaijū hantōjin ni tsuite” [On Koreans residing in Japan] is one exception (*Jinkō Mondai Shiryō* 30 [1937]: 460–465).

in documents concerning the population policy, such as the *Jinkō Mondai Shiryō* (*Population Problem Documents*), compiled by the *Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo* (Population Problem Research Center, or the Institute of Population Problems), which was established in 1939 within the Ministry of Welfare to address Japan's population problem following Japan's entry into the war.

Zenshō Eisuke, who has done anthropological studies on Korea and Manchuria, was one figure who neither supported nor opposed intermarriage, claiming that Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were neither “good nor bad,” even though he was also concerned with the consequences of intermarriage. He was worried about Koreanization and Taiwanization of the Japanese in intermarriages, leading to a potential loss of Japaneseness.⁶⁴ Journalist and economist Takagi Tomosaburō in his article on Japanese-Chinese marriages, also in the *Jinkō Mondai Shiryō*, shared this unease concerning the quality of the Japanese population. Takagi argued against Japanese marriage to non-Japanese—Chinese in particular—even if the two groups were similar and shared the goal to create an East Asian community, because of the historical precedents of Chinese people with stronger physical assimilation prowess.⁶⁵ Although the former's position concerning intermarriage was not as clear as the latter who clearly argued against intermarriage, both shared the concern with the Japanese population, which characterized the reactions of the intellectuals involved in population policies.

⁶⁴ Zenshō Eisuke, “Waga kuni gaichi imin no seisaku” [Our country's policies on immigrants from the outer territories], *Jinkō Mondai Shiryō* 36 (1939): 339–349.

⁶⁵ Takagi Tomosaburō, “Nisshi minzoku no kekkon ni tsuite” [On Japanese-Chinese marriages], *Jinkō Mondai Shiryō* 36 (1939): 351–354.

Similar to Zenshō, the same ambivalent stance was also in a book on population policy by Kitaoka Juitsu, a member of the Population Problem Research Center. Kitaoka acknowledged that the “blood mixing” policy was the most important to consider among the population policies. And observing the anti-miscegenation policies in Nazi Germany and the American West Coast, which he identified as being discriminatory and contradictory to the assimilationist policies, Kitaoka believed that as long as the numbers of mixed marriages were limited, insignificant, and of excellent quality, then it could be beneficial and acceptable. Simultaneously, however, he was also cautious, because the Japanese people have not favored inter-*minzoku* marriages in the past.⁶⁶

Another former member of the Population Policy Research Center turned researcher in the Ministry of Education’s *Minzoku Kenkyūjo* (Ethnic Research Center, or the Institute for Research on the Ethnic Nation),⁶⁷ Koyama Eizō, was someone who was ambivalent but turned into a staunch opponent of intermarriage. In the late 1930s, his stance leaned against race mixing, based on his observations of race mixing among Westerners. Instead of stating his position against intermarriage, however, he simply called for more research on “blood mixing” at the time, because he anticipated that this would be an important problem as Japan expanded.⁶⁸ But he became a strong

⁶⁶ Kitaoka Juitsu, *Jinkō seisaku* [Population Policy] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1943).

⁶⁷ *Minzoku Kenkyūjo* was established in 1943, created at the order of the *Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai* (Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia). Nakao Katsumi, “Minzoku Kenkyūjo no kōsō to ‘Minzoku Kenkyū Kōza’” [The Conception of Ethno Institute and Its “Ethnic Studies Lectures”], *Kokusai Jōmin Bunka Kenkyū Sōsho* 11 (2015): 366.

⁶⁸ Koyama Eizō, “Shizen minzoku ni okeru jinkō mondai: Konketsuji ni tsuite” [Population problem with regards to natural race: On mixed blood children], *Jinkō Mondai Shiryō* 30 (1937): 73–81.

opponent against intermarriage in the 1940s, because of the negative biological and social consequences of mixing, in addition to having a critical view of those who intermarried. Koyama described Westerners who intermarried as “animalistic,” for “lay[ing] their hands on anything, even the Hottentot.” He was also critical of those who intermarried in Japan.⁶⁹ His research was concerned with mixing between Japanese and other *minzoku* outside of Japan as the empire expanded in the 1940s, and while he acknowledged both opponents and supporters of intermarriage and the reasons behind their positions, Koyama opposed because of the potential for the quality of the *Yamato* (Japanese) *minzoku* to decrease, instead of assimilating and improving the quality of other *minzoku* with whom Japanese *minzoku* intermarried.⁷⁰ Thus similar to other researchers, Koyama’s concern was with the quality of the Japanese population.

Discussion of intermarriage also appeared in advice and readers on marriage, which was an important facet of the population policy because marriage was one of the important components for increasing the quantity of the Japanese population during the wartime.⁷¹ For example, in *Kokumin kekkon dokuhon* (National marriage reader), which was published to “instill correct understanding about marriage” for

⁶⁹ Koyama was an exception among the intellectuals involved in the discourse of intermarriage, in that he openly declared his concern of Japanese women being taken by men of other race and ethnicities. He also praised Japanese men for being the least likely to intermarry in the world, because Koyama associated intermarrying to the lack of control of one’s sexual desires and impulse. See Koyama Eizō, “Zakkon oyobi dōka mondai” [Mixed marriage and assimilation problem] (1943), reprinted in *Kokusai Jōmin Bunka Kenkyū Sōsho* 11 (2015): 97–108.

⁷⁰ Koyama Eizō, *Nanpō kensetsu to minzoku jinkō seisaku* [Construction of the South and minzoku population policy] (Tokyo: Dainihon Shuppan Kabushiki Gaisha, 1944).

⁷¹ The government investment in encouragement of marriage as one of the population policies to increase the population will be discussed more in Chapter 4.

Japanese citizens, intermarriage and “blood mixing” were mentioned, although briefly. Introducing how intermarriage between Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese was legal, it abridged in-depth discussion of “blood mixing” and did not argue for or against intermarriage. However, it did emphasize the need to think about one’s blood(lines) first.⁷² Likewise, Aoki Nobuharu, a medical officer at the Ministry of Welfare, was another figure who neither promoted nor opposed intermarriage in his book, *Yūsei kekkon no hanashi* (Stories about eugenic marriage) in 1942. Aoki was an advocate of “eugenic marriage” to improve the Japanese race in order for Japan to win the Greater East Asia War, and shared the views of other researchers, such as Komai Taku and Koya Yoshio, that “blood mixing” caused “disharmony.” Aoki did not adamantly oppose “blood mixing,” but the then contemporaneous research that demonstrated no biological consequences of mixing was not enough for him to encourage intermarriage either.⁷³

Speaking of Koya, his opinion on intermarriage also appeared in this genre of marriage advice, nor surprisingly since the same people who commented on intermarriage and “blood mixing” also gave advice on (eugenic) marriage. For example, in *Kekkon shintaisei danwashū* (Conversations on new marriage system), featuring opinions from specialists in government, academia, etc., on marriage for the “prosperity of Japan and the Japanese people,” Koya again expressed his disapproval

⁷² This reader was published in 1940, marking the 2600th anniversary of the Japanese empire, and the first few pages of this book contains calligraphy of the government officials. Nakamura Akito and Itai Takeo, *Kokumin kekkon dokuhon* [National marriage reader] (Tokyo: Nihon Seinen Kyōiku Shuppanbu, 1940).

⁷³ Aoki Nobuharu, *Yūsei kekkon no hanashi* [Stories about eugenic marriage] (Tokyo: Ryūginsha, 1942).

of intermarriage. This particular article discussed intermarriage between Japanese and Chinese, through which case Koya voiced his concern of losing Japanese-ness when bloods of two different groups were mixed: not losing Japanese-ness was important for Japan to avoid the fate of countries like the United States, England, and France.⁷⁴ In another book of marriage advice, Yasui Hiroshi, who published extensively on eugenic marriage and also ran a eugenic marriage consultation center, claimed that he could not easily agree to support intermarriage, because of the potential biological “disharmony” and the psychological consequences of mixing that were not researched well enough.⁷⁵ These discussions of intermarriage among male Japanese intellectuals reveal that just because intermarriage was legal did not necessarily mean that it was unanimously supported, with more opposing voices that were based on observations of the consequences of intermarriage in other empires. Even if there was an ambition to prevent intermarriage out of concern for the quality of the Japanese population, it was not possible due to lack of research.

Existing studies argue that intermarriage became legal to assimilate Koreans and Taiwanese, as well as to address the discontent of Koreans and Taiwanese.⁷⁶ If the legalization was to show the benevolence of the Japanese, then banning or preventing intermarriage would have undermined Japanese efforts to be benevolent.

⁷⁴ Koya Yoshio, “Kyōeiken to konketsu no mondai” [Mixed blood problem in the Co-Prosperty Sphere], *Kekkonshintaisei danwashū* [Conversations on new marriage system] (Tokyo: Asahi Shobō, 1941): 65–73.

⁷⁵ Yasui Hiroshi, *Senji kekkon kyōtei* [Wartime marriage manual] (Tokyo: Nagao Shuppan Hōkokukai, 1943).

⁷⁶ For example, see Oguma (1995); Suzuki (1999); Takeshita (2000); Su Yun Kim (2009); Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); and Cho Kyōngdal, *Shokuminchi Chōsen to Nihon* [Colonial Korea and Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013).

Lee Jeong-seon, in her analysis of studies done on mixed children born to Japanese and Korean couples during the colonial period, adds that there was a carefulness surrounding promotion of intermarriage in Japan but promoted in Korea, because Japanese-Korean mixed children were considered to be better in quality than Koreans, but inferior to pure-blooded Japanese.⁷⁷ Eika Tai, in her examination of the discourse of intermarriage in colonial Taiwan, further adds that the reason why intermarriage was legalized, but no additional steps were taken to implement the same household registration system across the empire, was to uphold the distinction between Japanese and non-Japanese through the *koseki* system.⁷⁸ Discussions I have examined in political and scientific journals support Lee's argument, as the intellectuals expressed their concern with the *quality* of the Japanese population and consequences of intermarriage, based on their observations of intermarriage and mixed children outside of Japan. The lack of mention to unify the household registration system after legalization in discussions of intermarriage in Japan also supports Tai's argument, regarding Japanese interest in keeping the systems separate. I do not disagree that assimilationist motive was behind legalization of intermarriage, as legal scholars revealed in their support of intermarriage. However, I argue that there were additional reasons behind legalization of intermarriage without promotion in imperial Japan: in the remainder of this chapter, I more closely examine Koya Yoshio, who was involved in the population policymaking process during the wartime, to argue that concern over quality of the Japanese population *and* its quantity, which intermarriage could help

⁷⁷ Lee (2014).

⁷⁸ Tai (2014).

maintain as long as it was registered, were additional reasons why intermarriage was legalized yet neither promoted nor banned.

Intermarriage and Population Policy

Koya Yoshio was a medical doctor born in 1890, who became a professor of medicine at Chiba University in 1925 and at Kanazawa University from 1932. In between, he studied abroad in Germany from 1927 to 1928, which influenced his decision to study eugenics.⁷⁹ As a member of the Ministry of Welfare and the Population Problem Research Center, Koya contributed to the Guidelines for Establishing Population Policy (*Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō*), which outlined Japan's population policy goals, released to the public in 1941. One can see evidences of Koya's influence in the drafts of the Guidelines: the earlier draft included a proposal to “suppress intermarriage between the imperial *minzoku* and another *minzoku* as much as possible,”⁸⁰ which was Koya's stance on marriage found in his articles and books. Yet in the final draft of the Guidelines that became public, the proposal to suppress intermarriage disappeared.

Why did the attempt to prevent Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages disappear from the national population policy? I attribute the concern over quality *and* quantity of the Japanese population, which required marriage. Koya's writings show that even before the late 1930s when intermarriage and “blood mixing”

⁷⁹ Matsumura Hiroyuki, “‘Kokubō kokka’ no yūseigaku” [Eugenics in a “defense state”], *Shirin* 83.2 (2000): 102–103.

⁸⁰ “Jinkō seisaku kakuritsu yōkō (an)” [Guidelines for establishing population policy (draft)], October 24, 1940, *Minobe Yōji Bunsho* G:32:6 <000-0006695>.

gained increasing attention from Japanese male intellectuals out of concern for the quality of the Japanese population, he expressed interest in the quantity of the Japanese population.⁸¹ Since the beginning of the 1930s, Koya called for more research on “blood mixing” between different races and ethnicities, based on his observations of what had happened and was happening in the Western countries, outside of Japan.⁸² He was also interested in the future prosperity of Japan and the Japanese *minzoku*, which required valuing family. According to Koya, it was important to achieve happiness of the family through (eugenic) marriage and elimination of the defects, so that Japan and Japanese people can continue to prosper in terms of quality and quantity. He disclaimed that eugenics was a method of birth control, and suggested following government policies like the ones in Germany, where steps to promote marriage between pure-blooded Germans and encourage people to have more children were already being taken.⁸³ While quality was important, quantity was just as important, as Koya tied the quantity of population to the diplomatic strength of a country. For this reason, he disapproved Western individualism and liberalism that the members of the upper class in Japan were adopting, which led to their use of birth control and late marriages, threatening the future supply of human resources in Japan. He worried that people in the upper class who were concerned only

⁸¹ The primary concern with the population in the prewar period was overpopulation. Koya Yoshio, “Minzoku yūseigaku ni kansuru shuju no gainenteki shiben” [Various conceptual speculations pertaining to minzoku eugenics], *Tokyo Iji Shinshi* 2710 (1931): 31–38.

⁸² Koya Yoshio, *Minzoku seibutsugaku gairon* [Introduction to minzoku biology] (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 1933).

⁸³ Koya Yoshio, “Kekkon to iden” [Marriage and heredity], *Fujin Kōron* 18.12 (1933): 204–210. An article of the same name is again published in 1938 in the same magazine. See *Fujin Kōron* 23.1 (1938): 226–234. Also, see Koya Yoshio, “Nihon minzoku no seibutsugakuteki hijōji” [Japanese minzoku’s biological crisis], *Seikai Ōrai* 6.7 (1937): 39–44.

about themselves and did not value the family, thus avoiding and/or delaying marriage and reproduction, may lead to the eventual decline and downfall of the Japanese *minzoku*.⁸⁴

Koya was not alone in valuing marriage to secure the quality and quantity of the Japanese population. For example, was Nagai Hisomu, a biologist and one of the leaders of Japanese eugenics who chaired the *Nihon Minzoku Eisei Kyōkai* (Japan Racial Hygiene Association), which goals included sterilizing people deemed inferior, promoting eugenic marriages, opposing birth control, and increasing the Japanese population.⁸⁵ Nagai also opposed intermarriage and called for avoidance, because it would lead to a decline in the quality of the Japanese *minzoku*: although “blood mixing” could be beneficial for the inferior *minzoku*, it would not bring any benefits to the Japanese that were already superior. Therefore Nagai was in favor of race hygiene to eliminate defects and improve the quality of the Japanese population.⁸⁶ At the same time, Nagai was also concerned with the quantity of the Japanese *minzoku* and its prosperity in the future as early as 1917. Nagai argued that marriage was necessary for the Japanese *minzoku* to prosper, since children followed marriage. He further vilified single women who avoided motherhood and had no children, identifying such behavior as a “bad custom” that needed to be eliminated because the nation will

⁸⁴ Koya Yoshio, “Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai (1).”

⁸⁵ Nagai was involved in establishing the *Nihon Minzoku Eisei Gakkai* (Japan Racial Hygiene Academy) in 1930, which became the *Nihon Minzoku Eisei Kyōkai* (Japan Racial Hygiene Association) in 1935. Koya was the vice-chair. Matsumura (2000): 103; Oguma (1995), 249–250.

⁸⁶ Nagai Hisomu, “Minzoku no konketsu ni tsuite” [On blood mixing among minzoku], *Minzoku Eisei* 2.4 (1933): 55–56.

otherwise “perish.”⁸⁷ Quality of the Japanese population was important, but it was just as important for people to value family, get married, and reproduce to secure the quantity of the Japanese population.

I therefore propose that despite oppositions to intermarriage, the domestic reasons why intermarriage was legalized yet neither promoted nor banned in Japan, were concerns over population quality and quantity. There were concerns about the decline in the quality of the Japanese population through intermarriage, yet the quality could be monitored as long as people registered their marriages, made possible by the legalization of intermarriage. Moreover, although the number of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages may have been insignificant, a ban on intermarriage would have caused discontent in and people from the colonies as existing studies note, in addition to less people marrying and/or not registering their marriage. This would have intervened in the government attempt to track the population and also reduced the number of potential human resources for it to exploit. When Japanese men were fighting at the warfront and Japanese women were experiencing difficulties finding a partner, particularly in wartime Japan, intermarriage would have been able to at least contribute to the wartime population goal of increasing the quantity of the population, as long as people married, registered, and reproduced (to be examined more in Chapter 4). Intermarriage was preferable to no marriage and common-law marriages.

⁸⁷ Nagai Hisomu, “Minzoku eisei yori mitaru kekkon no kairyō” [Improvement of marriage from the view of racial hygiene], *Fujin Kōron* (1917): 50–61 and “Jinrui no saisei to minzoku no seisui” [Regeneration of the human race and rise and fall of the minzoku], *Fujin Eisei Zasshi* (1919): 1–37.

Conclusion

This chapter began with the timeline of how Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages became legal in Japan, then examined how they have been discussed in the public from the late nineteenth century to the 1940s. Although the history of intermarriage may not be well-known in modern Japanese history, discussion of intermarriage in newspapers, non-academic journals, and magazines existed and appear to not have been censored from the public. Yet at the same time, legalization of intermarriage did not signal an increase in the support of intermarriage or large-scale explicit encouragement of marriage between Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese. I thus explored the discourse of intermarriage in professional and academic journals that were dominated by Japanese men who expressed ambivalence toward and/or opposition to intermarriage, demonstrating their awareness about the consequences of banning and suppressing intermarriage in other empires. Even if they wanted to stop intermarriage, there was also not enough scientific evidence. I argued that besides assimilating and appeasing Koreans and Taiwanese, reasons why intermarriage became legal but not promoted in Japan, included Japanese male intellectuals' concerns, especially among those involved in eugenics and the population policymaking process, with the quality and quantity of the Japanese population, which could be secured through marriage. Intermarriage could lead to a decrease in the quality of the Japanese population, according to the opponents of intermarriage, but as long as people married and registered their marriages, then quality can be monitored and quantity maintained (and ideally increase).

Because this chapter focused on internal factors to explain the lack of

promotion since legalization, as well as the lack of open condemnation of intermarriage despite the opposing voices, the next chapter turns to external factors outside of imperial Japan that influenced intermarriage policy in Japan and its empire. With particular attention to international affairs in the 1940s, Chapter 3 will continue to demonstrate that Japan's intermarriage policy was not a result of Japan's isolation from and ignorance of the world, but rather the opposite, to propose inclusion of the Japanese empire in the West-centric history of modern empires.

Chapter 3

Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial Japan: External Factors behind the Legalization and Lack of Promotion

In the late 1930s and the early 1940s, there were opposing voices against intermarriage among Japanese men who were involved in the discourse of intermarriage in Japan. Despite the presence of vocal opponents and individuals with ambivalent stance warning about the potential consequences of intermarriage, the Japanese government never condemned interracial and interethnic marriages.

The Japanese government's sanctioning of intermarriage "ran counter to the global trends," in which intermarriage between people of different race and colonial status has been condemned.¹ If modern Japan was a "copycat" in its development as an empire,² then why did it *not* copy the Western empires' policies on intermarriage? Is this a case of Japan having fallen into the "dark valley," in which wartime Japan is seen to have been isolated from the rest of the world and blind to what was happening outside of Japan in modern Japanese historiography?

Previous chapter argued that although there were opponents against intermarriage in Japan, intermarriage was never banned nor actively promoted after its legalization, because the consequences of intermarriage in the other empires were known, and there was not enough scientific evidence to suppress intermarriage. I also argued that the interest in both the quantity and quality of the Japanese population,

¹ Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 371–372.

² Alexis Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 35.

which could be maintained by marriage and registration of marriage, were additional reasons behind why intermarriage was permitted in Japan.

This chapter will place the discourse of intermarriage among Japanese men in the metropole in larger historical context to explore the external reasons why the Japanese government did not openly condemn intermarriage despite the oppositions. I will begin by introducing the Japanese government's stance on intermarriage in the 1940s, then examine the presence of fear, which played a role in discouragement of and/or bans on miscegenation in the Western empires. My first argument is that the same fear—fear of racial degeneration through race mixing—also existed in the Japanese empire, found in the documents that planned to construct the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The fear of racial degeneration, however, did not lead to any condemnation of intermarriage in the Japanese empire, because there was another fear of displaying explicit racism and antagonizing non-Japanese Asians, who could obstruct the building the new world order, also found in the same documents: there was a risk in condemning intermarriage in the Japanese empire like its Euro-American counterparts. I thus further argue that sanctioning of intermarriage was not a result of Japan being non-racist, unaware and ignoring what was happening outside of Japan, but a form of “polite racism” that was rather a result of being well aware of global trends, to challenge those who treat wartime Japan as an anomalous period in modern Japanese history, in which Japan became isolated from the world.³

³ I adopt Fujitani's definition of “polite racism”: “inclusionary, more but not exclusively universalist, humane, relativist and more culturalist in its understanding of difference, historicist in its affirmation of the possibility of assimilation (that is, the racialized were inside history, but lagging or culturally pathological), at least minimally concerned about fostering the health and well-being of marginalized peoples, and collectivist like vulgar racism in

Japanese Government's Stance on Intermarriage

There are three documents from 1943, 1944, and 1945 that expressed the Japanese government's stance on intermarriage. First is from a reference material that the Ministry of Welfare prepared in 1943 for the 84th Imperial Diet's discussion of "harmony work" (*kyōwa jigyō*), which goal was to assimilate *gaichijin* (people of colonial origin): in this document, the primary target of assimilation among the colonized peoples was Koreans residing in Japan.⁴ There is a section outlining the situation of Japanese-Korean marriages and their increasing numbers in Japan, and according to this reference, the "conventional attitude" of the Japanese government, suggesting that the Japanese government had this attitude even before 1943, has been to neither "ban nor promote" intermarriage, and "letting it be."⁵

The second document containing the Japanese government's stance on intermarriage is a report of the meetings held by *Shisō Taisaku Kenkyūkai* (Thought Measures Research Group) which was established in May 1943 and consisted of participants from the government, police, and industries.⁶ One of the reports, titled "Korean Problem," from 1944, discussed solutions to prevent Koreans from running

racializing subpopulations, but different in its close attention to the systematic subjectification of individuals making up the aggregated population sets." Fujitani (2011), 25.

⁴ Although documents regarding "harmony work" claim to assimilate *gaichijin* without specifying Koreans, the contents of the documents are almost always concern Koreans only. Chapter 4 will discuss "harmony work" in detail.

⁵ Kōseishō [Ministry of Welfare], "Shiryō: Zainichi Chōsenjin ni taisuru dōka seisaku no 'kyōwa jigyō' (1943)" [Document: 'Harmony work,' an assimilation policy for *zainichi* Koreans (1943)], *Zainichi Chōsenjinshi Kenkyū* 17 (1987): 139.

⁶ It is not clear as to in which organization *Shisō Taisaku Kenkyūkai* belonged, but Korea scholar Mizuno Naoki, who edited the archival collection including this document, deduces that the research group was part of *Kyōchōkai*, which was established in 1919 by the government and the financial world to foster conciliatory relationships between employers and workers. Mizuno Naoki, "Kaisetsu" [Commentary], *Senjiki shokuminchi tōchi shiryō* [Wartime colonial rule documents] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1998), 7–29.

away from work and causing troubles in Japan. In this context of viewing Koreans as trouble-causing figures in Japanese society, the report included the Japanese government's stance on intermarriage along with a brief summary of the situation of Japanese-Korean marriages in Japan: the government was still in the midst of researching whether to promote or ban intermarriage, and the government's position on intermarriage was unclear. However, "for the time being," the government was letting Japanese-Korean marriage "run its course."⁷

Although the previous documents have only referred to the Japanese government's stance on intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans, the government had the same stance toward intermarriage between Japanese and Taiwanese. The third document is "Q&A Concerning Political Treatments of Korean and Taiwanese Residents (unfinished manuscript)," dated March 6, 1945. Below is an excerpt from the document addressing both Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages:

Japanese-Korean marriages have been recognized as a policy since Taishō 7 (1918), and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages since Shōwa 8 (1933), but the government has been taking the stance to *neither particularly encourage nor discourage* such marriages. Up until now, the numbers of both marriages have been extremely low, and it is not expected that the numbers will suddenly increase. The government thus intends to continue to maintain the existing policies as before.⁸
[emphasis added]

⁷ Shisō Taisaku Kakari, "Hantōjin Mondai (1944)" [Korean Problem (1944)], in vol. 7 of *Senjiki shokuminchi tōchi shiryō* [Wartime colonial rule documents], ed. Mizuno Naoki (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1998), 320.

⁸ Naimushō Kanrikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs Administrative Bureau], "Chōsen oyobi Taiwan zaijūmin seiji shogū ni kansuru shitsugi ōtō (miteikō)" [Q&A Concerning political treatment of Korean and Taiwanese residents (unfinished manuscript)], 6 March 1945, *Japan Center for Asian Historical Records*, A15060169000, <http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M0000000000000324990>.

The above document was created by the Investigating Committee on Political Treatment of Korean and Taiwanese Residents (*Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū Chōsakai*), established on December 26, 1944 to investigate and deliberate the political treatment of Koreans and Taiwanese.⁹ The Committee addressed issues, such as the voting rights of Koreans and Taiwanese, in an attempt to be more inclusive and ensure that no discrimination existed between the treatments of people inside the metropole (referring to Japanese) and outside the metropole in the colonies, because Koreans and Taiwanese together constituted one-quarter of imperial subjects in the Japanese empire, seen as a crucial source of power to win the war.¹⁰ There is no detailed record of discussions concerning intermarriage within the Committee, but the final decision on what to do with intermarriage appears to have been based on the numbers of intermarriage recorded in the reference documents, also compiled by the Committee: the numbers remained small even after more than a decade has passed since the legalization of both Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages.¹¹

⁹ The Committee, headed by prime minister Koiso Kuniaki, was part of the Ministry of Home Affairs Administrative Bureau, which was established when the Ministry of Greater East Asia replaced the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, resulting in Korea and Taiwan becoming under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry of Home Affairs was formerly only in charge of the metropolitan (Japanese) affairs, but Korea and Taiwan were placed here and not under the newly established Ministry of Greater East Asia, which became responsible for matters in occupied territories falling under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere.

¹⁰ “Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū Chōsakai dai ikkai sōkai ni okeru Koiso kaichō no aisatsu” [Greetings from committee chair Koiso at the first general meeting of the Investigating Committee on Political Treatment of Korean and Taiwanese Residents], in *Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū Chōsakai (1)*, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, A15060167700, <http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M0000000000000324976>.

¹¹ “Sankō shiryō” [Reference documents], in *Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū Chōsakai (1)*, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, A15060169100, <http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M0000000000000324991>. When calculated in comparison to the total number of marriages recorded in Japan, Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages combined constituted less than one percent.

By deciding to “maintain the existing policies as before,” the Japanese government continued to sanction Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, but did not promote or suppress them. And this lack of action reflected the discourse of intermarriage in Japan among male Japanese intellectuals who wanted to oppose or were ambivalent about intermarriage and race mixing because of mixed results.

The above documents all show that the Japanese government’s stance—neither encouraging nor discouraging intermarriage—remained unchanged in the 1940s. This stands in contrast to the Euro-American empires, which condemned intermarriage between the colonizing and the colonized groups, at least in the colonies, and in the metropole (depending on the empire).¹² Why the difference? The following sections will explore why the Japanese empire took this position and sanctioned intermarriage unlike the West, by examining the role of fear.

Fear of Racial Degeneration

Fear played an important role in influencing intermarriage policies in the Western empires. For example, fear of “pollution” of the white race, especially when Aryan/white women produced children who were not racially pure with “racial degenerates” (non-Aryan/non-white men) through race mixing, became the basis of anti-miscegenation laws in Germany and the United States.¹³ Fears of white racial degeneration and contamination were especially heightened in the Western colonies,

¹² See Taihoku Hikakuhōgakkai, ed., *Hikaku kon'inhō dai ichibu* [Comparative marriage laws, part one] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1937).

¹³ Judy Scales-Trent, “Racial Purity Laws in the United States and Nazi Germany: The Targeting Process,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 23.2 (2001): 263, 289, 294.

as mixed race children blurred the racial categories and posed a threat to the hegemonic status of the white race in the colonial hierarchy. As a result, although intermarriage between the colonizing and the colonized peoples were not illegal in the metropolises of the British, French, and the Dutch empires unlike Germany and the United States, intimate interracial relationships were banned or discouraged in the Western colonies in Asia and Africa.¹⁴

It was not only in intermarriage policies that fear played a role: fear also influenced other colonial policies. For example, in *Anxieties, Fear, and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown* (2016), edited by historian Harald Fischer-Tiné, scholars demonstrate the influences of “negative emotions,” such as anxiety, fear, and embarrassment, on the actions of the colonizing and the colonized peoples in the colonies of the British, French, Dutch, and German

¹⁴ Ann Stoler, who studied interracial intimacy in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina, is the leading figure in the study of intimate relationships between the colonizer and the colonized [see “Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th Century Colonial Cultures,” *American Ethnologist* 16.4 (1989): 634–660 and *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002)]. For discussions of race mixing in the Western colonies, see, for example, Lora Wildenthal, “Race, Gender, and Citizenship in the German Colonial Empire,” *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, edited by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Durba Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in Colonial India: the Making of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David Pomfret, “Raising Eurasia: Race, Class, and Age in French and British Colonies,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51.2 (2009): 313–343; and Damon Ieremia Salesa, *Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Discussions of Western attitudes toward race mixing in the metropole can be found, for example, in Catherine Hall, ed., *Cultures of Empire: A Reader* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Elisa Camiscioli, *Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy, and Embodiment in the Early Twentieth Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); and Martin Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For exceptions, see Robert Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: the British Experience* (Manchester, NY: Manchester University Press, 1990).

empires in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.¹⁵ Similar to the existing studies on intermarriage in imperial and colonial contexts centered on the Western empires, existing studies on fear in imperial and colonial settings are also West-centric.¹⁶ The isolation and exclusion of imperial Japan can be attributed to, among others, the colonizer/colonized dichotomy that was not marked by color, since both the colonizers and the colonized were of the same Asian race, and instead differentiated by ethnicity (Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, etc.) in Western sense. However, although Japan saw itself as one of the “colored” races that also included Koreans and Taiwanese, it differentiated itself from other *minzoku*, word translated as “ethnicity” or “ethnic group,” or as “(culturally-defined) race.” Thus the Japanese differentiated between Japanese *minzoku* and Korean or Taiwanese *minzoku* (the latter sometimes conflated with the Han *minzoku*), and saw itself more superior, similar to how the Western empires viewed and differentiated the white race from the colonized non-white race.

I therefore object to the isolation of the Japanese empire from the larger imperial and colonial studies just because the colonizer/colonized dichotomy does not match in terms of race, and instead seek its inclusion by demonstrating connections between the Japanese and the Western empires. In the remainder of this section, using “race” in quotation marks to denote Japanese concept of *minzoku*, I aim to reveal that Japan, too, had the same fear—fear of “racial” degeneration through “race” mixing—

¹⁵ Harald Fischer-Tiné, *Anxieties, Fear, and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).

¹⁶ E.g., Maurus Reinkowski and Gregor Thum, eds., *Helpless Imperialists: Imperial Failure, Fear, and Radicalization* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013) and Robert Peckham, ed., *Empires of Panic: Epidemics and Colonial Anxieties* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015).

by introducing two plans for constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere from the 1940s, which included discussions on the topic of intermarriage.

Meeting Records of the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia

One of the documents in which the fear of Japanese “racial” degeneration through “race” mixing appeared is the meeting records of the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia (*Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai*). This was a group that the government organized in February 1942, in response to the beginning of the “Greater East Asia War,” named so in December 1941, to discuss the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Council held the first of its secretive meetings attended by leaders and influential figures in the government, military, politics, and business circles on February 27, 1942, and made the following four inquiries:

1. Basic requirements concerning the construction of Greater East Asia.
2. Cultural and educational policies dealing with the construction of Greater East Asia.
3. Population and policies on “race” accompanying the construction of Greater East Asia.
4. Basic policies on construction of the Greater East Asian economy.¹⁷

To address the above inquiries, there existed four separate committees to address each. Of the four, the Third Committee became responsible for finding solutions on ways to increase and strengthen the population of the Japanese “race,” who were to constitute

¹⁷ Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai [Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia], “Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai sōkai giji sokkiroku, dai ikkai sōkai giji sokkiroku” [Proceeding records of the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia, proceedings from the first general meeting], 27 February 1942, in vol. 1 of *Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai Kankei Shiryō* [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 12–13.

the core and be the driving force behind the creation of the new Greater East Asian world order. It also became responsible for policies concerning the management of other East Asian “races” to be included in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Meeting records from this committee included discussions of “race” mixing, or *konketsu* (literally “mixing blood”).

The Third Committee met five times between March and May 1942, and raised the issue of blood mixing since the first meeting held on March 11, 1942, when each member presented and shared topics they believed must be addressed to successfully construct the Co-Prosperity Sphere. One of the members who raised the issue of blood mixing was Fujiyama Ai’ichirō, who was then the head of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Based on his observations of *konketsuji* (“mixed blood children”) in the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, he viewed blood mixing unfavorably, because he believed that *konketsuji* were “quite different” from the “pure blood,” with tendency to pass on “bad” genes to the offspring.¹⁸ He acknowledged that there were scientific opinions that did not find any problem in Japanese blood mixing with the “natives” (who were of the same Eastern race as the Japanese), but Fujiyama subjectively opposed race mixing. He anticipated that the race mixing will be a major problem and therefore called for a more careful research on the problem of “mixed blood children,” who Fujiyama expected to increasingly emerge with Japan’s southern expansion. Once the results were found, Fujiyama then proposed, appropriate

¹⁸ Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai [Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia], “Dai sanbukai giji sokkiroku, dai ikkai giji sokkiroku [Proceeding records of the Third Committee, proceeding records from the first meeting],” 11 March 1942, in vol. 2 of *Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai kankei shiryō* [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 3.

measures should be taken to address the problem. Fujiyama's suggestions of possible measures included prompting Japanese men going abroad to take their families, because there would then be no need to find a spouse outside of Japan when Japanese men were accompanied by their family members.¹⁹ By proposing to take precautionary measures to prevent race mixing from occurring before it became a problem, Fujiyama appeared to anticipate negative results from research on race mixing and impact on the Japanese "race."

Shimada Toshio, a politician, was another one of the eleven members who were part of the Third Committee to comment on race mixing. Compared to Fujiyama, Shimada was less subjective and less critical of "race" mixing, because he believed that the different "races" in the East were already mixed, including the Japanese.²⁰ While Fujiyama called for more research and Shimada did, too, Shimada suggested working to create measures to address "race" mixing in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, with the presupposition that mixed marriage and blood mixing will happen regardless of any attempts to prevent it. In Shimada's opinion, banning "race" mixing was impossible.²¹ However, in raising the issue and advocating for research to address the issue, Shimada noticeably shared the concern with Fujiyama.

A Buddhist monk Ōtani Kōzui did not deny that "race" mixing was an issue of "extreme concern." Based on opinions of unnamed eugenicists, Ōtani, like Shimada, recognized that the Japanese were also of mixed heritage, including himself. However in the meeting records, Ōtani tried to convince other members who were concerned

¹⁹ Ibid., 4–5.

²⁰ Ibid., 26.

²¹ Ibid., 27.

about blood mixing that it should not be too grave a concern. He argued the impossibility of Japanese to maintain purity of the blood, because one would need to marry within family and between siblings, which were illegal in Japan.²² He also gave examples from India, which became weaker after the upper class limited intercaste marriages, in comparison to the “Arab race,” who were able to develop quickly and expand from Asia to Europe because they kidnapped women from other “races.” By explaining the consequences and possible benefits of mixing, Ōtani, too, called for more scientific and medical research, but stressed that, “mixed marriage is something not to be feared that much.”²³

Ōtani’s stance on intermarriage was a mix of Fujiyama and Shimada: on the one hand, he advocated for more scientific and medical research on intermarriage, and on the other hand, he also viewed race mixing as inevitable and uncontrollable, likely to occur regardless of any attempts to stop it. Just because Ōtani tried to assuage other members about their concerns of “race” mixing in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, however, it did not necessary mean that he supported or encouraged intermarriage. It also did not mean that he viewed other “races” in Asia any differently from other members, who considered the non-Japanese to be inferior. In the second meeting of the Third Committee held on March 18, 1942, in which members discussed policies concerning other East Asian “races” and distribution of the Japanese “race” within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, Ōtani insisted on the need for the Japanese “race” to maintain its leadership position and make sure that the Japanese “race” did not lose its

²² Ibid., 42.

²³ Ibid., 43.

superiority.²⁴ This concern of losing Japanese superiority by mixing with other “races” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere ran as an undercurrent in the subsequent discussions of what to do about intermarriage and “race” mixing, which resurfaced in the fourth meeting held on April 10, 1942.

Maintaining Japanese superiority was also important for Takahashi Sankichi, then the deputy manager of Manchurian Bureau of Affairs and a former navy admiral. He argued that it was better not to “do mixed marriage,” despite claiming to not know much about mixed marriage. Takahashi wanted to maintain the “special characteristics” of the Japanese “race,” and worried that the average quality of the Japanese will decline if intermarriage was allowed. While Takahashi, like Ōtani and Shimada, recognized the mixed origin of the Japanese, he still argued against intermarriage like Fujiyama, because the “admirable” Japanese “race” emerged only after long years of discipline, education, and training without mixing with other “races.”²⁵ Thus to maintain the current purity of Japanese blood, Takahashi also proposed that Japanese going abroad be married, to prevent intermarriage with another non-Japanese “race.”²⁶

Although the members of the Third Committee differed in their positions on

²⁴ Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai [Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia], “Dai sanbukai giji sokkiroku, dai nikai giji sokkiroku [Proceeding records of the Third Committee, proceedings from the second meeting],” 18 March 1942, in vol. 2 of *Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai kankei shiryō* [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 98.

²⁵ Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai [Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia], “Dai sanbukai giji sokkiroku, dai yonkai giji sokkiroku [Proceeding records of the Third Committee, proceedings from the fourth meeting],” 10 April 1942, in vol. 2 of *Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai kankei shiryō* [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 158.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 160.

intermarriage—Fujiyama and Takahashi opposing intermarriage, while Shimada and Ōtani neither opposing nor promoting intermarriage—they were all concerned about the possible consequences of leaving the issue of “race” mixing and intermarriage unaddressed. Shimada did not specify his reason for advocating more research on “race” mixing in the meeting records, but Fujiyama, Ōtani, and Takahashi were concerned about the decline of Japanese “racial” superiority by marrying other “races” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, in which Japan was to be at the center and the leader of the people within it.

Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

The second document in which the fear of losing Japanese “racial” superiority via “race” mixing and intermarriage appeared, is an unfinished manuscript titled, “Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (*Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku*). Dated February and March 1943, it was produced roughly a year after the above-examined meetings. This was a summary plan for constructing the Co-Prosperity Sphere produced by the Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems (*Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai*), which formed in 1942 and located within the Research Institute of National Policy (*Kokusaku Kenkyūkai*). The group was not established by the government, but had affiliations with government institutions, such as the Population Problem Research Center (*Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo*), and constituted by bureaucrats, scholars, as well as individuals from the military involved in policymaking—in particular, the planning for the Co-Prosperity Sphere.²⁷

²⁷ “Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai” [Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems], *Kokusaku Kenkyūkai* (11 July 1942): 1–4. Goals of the study group on page 3.

Composed of three volumes, this document also laid out the plans for building the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The first volume outlined the basic principles of constructing the Co-Prosperity Sphere, the second on policies to build and maintain Japan's position as the leading country within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the third on the relationship between the war and the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The underlying message found continuously throughout the document, was the justification of creating the Co-Prosperity Sphere, which would create a new world order to overthrow the old world order dominated by the white race—Anglo-Saxons in the US and the UK in particular—and to liberate the people of East Asia. Of the three volumes, the first and the second included discussions on the issue of intermarriage—not only interethnic marriages between Japanese and non-Japanese Asian “race,” but also interracial marriages between East Asian and white races.

In explaining why the Co-Prosperity Sphere must be built, the “Measures” included several grievances against the Euro-American powers—generally the British and the Americans, but occasionally the French and the Dutch. These grievances included: the enslavement of the people of East Asia by the Euro-Americans; their discriminatory attitudes toward East Asians; and depriving East Asians the opportunity to develop economically, politically, as well as intellectually due to Euro-American control.²⁸ Based on this disdain toward the white race, the document then called for a

²⁸ Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai [Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems], “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, jōhen (miteikō)” [Measures for the construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, volume 1 (unfinished manuscript)], 25 February and 11 March 1943, *Minobe Yōji Bunsho*, E:25:1 <000-0004445>: 6-2, 7-3; and Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai [Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems], Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems, “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, chūhen (miteikō)” [Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, volume 2

ban on mixed marriage between the (East) Asian race and the white race in the discussion of policies concerning “race” within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, found in the last chapter of the first volume.²⁹ In this chapter, titled, “Basic Measures on ‘Race’ and Culture of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” the basic policies concerning “race” within the Co-Prosperity Sphere were outlined as follows:

1. To take measures so that the “races” within the Co-Prosperity Sphere will unite as one East Asian “race,” counter to those outside of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
2. To form a tenacious, organic organization within the sphere, in which the Japanese “race” will be at the core and all “races” will harmonize and trust each other.
3. To take measures so that both the quality and quantity of the East Asian “race” will improve, especially working to develop the meritorious characteristics of each “race” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.³⁰

Of the above three interrelated policies concerning “race,” the second policy on “harmony and unification” of all the East Asian “races,” with the Japanese “race” at the core, was considered to be the most important policy requiring thoughtful and thorough consideration, although the other two were not less important.³¹ In order to achieve the formation of this one East Asian unit, the plan insisted on the need for the first and the third policies to also work toward achieving “harmony and unification.”³² According to the document, the first policy was important to prepare for the possibility of a racial war, and prevent the possible obstruction that would interfere with the

(unfinished manuscript)], 25 February and 11 March 1943, *Minobe Yōji Bunsho*, E:25:2 <000-0004446>: 36.

²⁹ Volume 1, 7-3. Some of the contents from Volume 1 and Volume 2 overlap. The seventh chapter of Volume 1 and the third chapter of Volume 2 are the same.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1, 7-1; Volume 2, 39.

³¹ Volume 1, 7-2.

³² *Ibid.*, 7-5.

construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.³³ The third policy was important as well, because the superiority or inferiority of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was dependent on the quality and quantity of the people within it.³⁴ Both of these policies were to then work together toward achieving the second policy on uniting the East Asian “races,” and developing the one, East Asian “race.”³⁵

It was within the above context in which the “Measures” used the words *yūwa* (“harmony”) and *ittaiika* (“unification,” “integration,” or literally, “becoming one”) to call for the uniting of various “races” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, where the measure to ban mixed marriage between East Asian “race” and the white race “as much as possible” was proposed. The purpose of the ban was to maintain the purity of the East Asian “race,” as well as to protect the confidence and pride of the East Asian “race,” because mixed marriage and blood mixing were thought to weaken the bond between the different “races” in East Asia.³⁶ Suspicion toward people of mixed parentage, unlimited to children, emerged in the second volume, as they were identified as one of the groups of “obstructive elements” for having close connections to the British and the American powers, and not welcoming the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia.³⁷ Therefore along with the bans on intermarriage to prevent future emergence of mixed people, the plan also proposed that the people of mixed race, who took up a privileged position under Western colonial rule, be deprived of their old privileges. Then, a system based on merit, rather than race, could be established, which, when

³³ Ibid., 7-2.

³⁴ Ibid., 7-4.

³⁵ Ibid., 7-6.

³⁶ Ibid., 7-2, 7-3.

³⁷ Volume 2, 21–22, 27.

combined with assimilation of the mixed people, particularly the superior ones, into the ways of East Asia, could then eliminate their attempts at opposing and preventing the unification of East Asian “race.”³⁸ Thus the proposed ban on interracial relationships between East Asian and white races aimed to prevent any obstruction against Japan’s attempts to construct the Co-Prosperity Sphere from the mixed population, who were viewed with suspicion.

In addition to trying to remove obstacles from the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, the bans on interracial mixing and marriage aimed to uphold the unity of the East Asian “race.” However, the “Measures” also proposed a ban on intermarriage between the different “races” within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, even though they were to be united as one. Expecting the number of intermarriages between the Japanese “race” and another “race” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere to increase with the Japanese expansion into Asia, the plan proposed the following with regard to mixed marriage between Japanese and the Asian “races” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere:

1. To conduct a thorough research on which patterns of mixed marriage will improve or deteriorate the Japanese “race,” by doing a historical survey on the results of mixed marriages.
2. Based on the above results, the “race” which would cause degeneration [of the Japanese “race”] are to be prevented from coming to the metropole as much as possible, and measures must be taken to suppress mixed marriage with them. If mixed marriage with that “race” [which would cause degeneration] was committed, punishments must be implemented [onto the Japanese], such as depriving the Japanese registry of the person who intermarried, who will then be deemed a “race” of another registry.³⁹

The grave concern about the superiority of the Japanese (blood) becoming lost by “race” mixing, was based on historical precedents: unspecified superior “races” of the

³⁸ Ibid., 28.

³⁹ Ibid., 56.

past, which successfully controlled larger territories, lost their superior “racial” qualities and degenerated after mixing with the inferior “race” who came under its control.⁴⁰ Seeing Japan in the same situation and wanting to prevent the same fate, the plan thus proposed banning mixed marriage between Japanese and another Asian “race,” to prevent the deterioration of the quality of the Japanese “race.”

Similar to the members of the Third Committee in the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia, this document by the Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems also urged for the need to do more research. Yet what was different, was that it had a harsher stance against intermarriage and “race” mixing, by proposing to take away the Japanese registry of Japanese individuals who broke the ban on mixed marriage. This meant that the Japanese deprived of their registry would then also be deprived of privileges given to the Japanese and be excluded from the Japanese national community. Also, this document was created in 1943, when the Guidelines for Establishing Population Policy (*Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō*) that aimed to increase the Japanese population was already implemented. Considering the value that was placed on the quantity of the Japanese population, willing to reduce the quantity for the sake of quality suggests how serious of a concern “race” mixing through intermarriage was considered among Japanese men involved in policymaking.

Regardless of the differences, both plans to construct the Greater East Asia Co-

⁴⁰ Although superior “races” of the past were unspecified, they most likely referred to ancient Rome and Greek, which intellectuals studying the consequences of race mixing used as negative examples to argue why intermarriage must not be permitted in Japan. For examples, see Nagai Hisomu, “Jinrui no saisei to minzoku no seisui” [Regeneration of the human race and rise and fall of the minzoku], *Fujin Eisei Zasshi* (1939): 1–37 and Komai Taku, *Nihonjin o shu to shita ningen no iden* [Human genetics principally involving the Japanese] (Osaka: Sōgensha, 1942).

Prosperity Sphere anticipated intermarriage becoming a major issue, and contained evidences of fear that the Japanese “race” will lose its superiority by “race” mixing and intermarriage. The Japanese empire was therefore not different from the Western empires, in that the fear of racial degeneration was also present. Yet despite these explicit suggestions to prohibit intermarriage in these drafts outlining the plans for building the Co-Prosperity Sphere, such proposals disappear in the final and publicized versions of the Co-Prosperity Sphere’s construction plans. The following section will address why attempts to condemn intermarriage disappeared.

Disappearance of the Fear?

The plans for constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere have revealed that the fear of racial degeneration through mixing with the less superior “race” was a concern in the Japanese empire among Japanese men as it was in the Western empires. Attempts to prohibit intermarriage and “race” mixing, however, disappeared in the final versions of the plans, and ultimately, intermarriage was never condemned within the Japanese empire.

For example, the “Basic Plan for the Construction of Greater East Asia,” based on the findings from the meetings of the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia, sought to “to retain the unity of the Japanese ‘race’.”⁴¹ Although this attempt to “retain the unity of the Japanese ‘race’” hints the desire to prevent “race” mixing from

⁴¹ Kikakuin [Planning Board], “Daitōa kensetsu kihon sōsaku” [Basic plan for the construction of Greater East Asia], July 1942, in vol. 1 of *Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai kankei shiryō* [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 13.

occurring out of fear of Japanese “racial” degeneration, there is no direct mention or proposal about stopping mixing as was discussed by the Third Committee. The closest phrase that suggest an attempt to limit intermarriage, is the proposal to prevent co-habitation of the Japanese with the non-Japanese “as much as possible,” by prompting Japanese [male] settlers to be accompanied by their families.⁴² Thus the “Basic Plan” indirectly attempted to limit mixing between difference “races” within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, but without openly and crudely condemning intermarriage.

Likewise, suggestions to take a harsher stance against mixed marriage that appeared in “Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia-Co-Prosperity Sphere” by the *Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai* also disappeared in subsequent plans on the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. One of such plans is the *Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia (Daitōa kyōdō sengen)* published in 1944, based on the Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia adopted at the Greater East Asia Conference in 1943. In this book, there is also no word on condemning “race” mixing and mixed marriage.⁴³

To explore why any condemnation of intermarriage disappeared in the final and publicized versions of the plans to construct the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, this section will revisit the two documents discussed above, and additionally examine the *Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia*. In the process, I will reveal the presence of another fear, besides the fear of racial degeneration, and how the other fear influenced the metropolitan government’s policies to neither encourage nor discourage

⁴² Ibid., 16.

⁴³ Jōhōkyoku [Cabinet Information Bureau], *Daitōa kyōdō sengen* [Joint declaration of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 1944).

intermarriage in the 1940s.

Meeting Records of the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia, Revisited

In the meeting records from the Third Committee of the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia, there was another fear besides losing Japanese “racial” superiority through “race” mixing. This other fear appeared in the suggestions made by Koiso Kuniaki, then the Minister of Colonial Affairs and later the Governor General of Korea and prime minister of Japan, who raised the issue of race mixing during the fourth meeting.⁴⁴ Unlike Fujiyama and Takahashi who strongly opposed intermarriage out of concerns that the superior qualities of the Japanese “race” will deteriorate, Koiso was a proponent of mixed marriage. Recognizing, like Ōtani and Shimada, that intermarriage could not be controlled and will happen regardless of the ban, Koiso proposed taking more concrete measures to address the issue of race mixing. Rather than leaving it left unsupervised, Koiso recommended two ways to take control of mixed marriage.

One of Koiso’s suggestions, was to treat mixed children as “racially” Japanese. Acknowledging that mixed children were already born to Japanese, he gave an example of how mixed children in the United States were considered “negro,” even if they only had twenty percent “negro blood.” The treatment of mixed people in the United States as inferior to white Americans, Koiso pointed out, contributed to the fragility of America’s “racial unity.” To prevent the same from happening in Japan, Japan needed to treat mixed children as “racially” Japanese, especially in areas that

⁴⁴ Koiso was absent in the first through the third meeting, then joined the Third Committee from the fourth meeting.

Japan allowed self-rule (i.e., Burma and the Philippines) within the Co-Prosperity Sphere.⁴⁵ In the territories ruled directly by the Japanese, Koiso then advocated for race mixing instead of deterring it. He introduced the following view that was “recently being recited”: based on the success of blood mixing in colonial Korea, the blood of the people in Japanese territories should be mixed with the blood of the superior Japanese “race.” Although Koiso confessed that this was a “childish plan,” unlikely to actually be implemented, he further explained how this would work: race mixing would be limited to women of considerable class, who would then be housed and trained at a special institution to encourage the birth of mixed blood children. Then, these children will be specially treated from the beginning, and will be educated to become “superior” like the Japanese.⁴⁶

Both of Koiso’s suggestions that offered to treat mixed children as Japanese and thus superior, in contrast to the American treatment of mixed children as inferior to the white Americans, stemmed from his concern about the consequences of prohibiting intermarriage. Koiso was especially anxious about possible revenge from the people who Japanese had intimate relationships with. To argue against the intermarriage ban in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, Koiso further shared a story he heard from a person returning from the Southern Seas: a Japanese man impregnated a woman in the Dutch Indies and left her there with the child when the man returned to Japan. Fortunately, she was happy about “receiving Japanese blood,” because she would no longer need to worry about securing food—thus this case did not involve

⁴⁵ “Dai sanbukai giji sokkiroku, dai yonkai giji sokkiroku” [Proceeding records of the Third Committee, proceedings from the fourth meeting], 148.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 149.

any actual revenge. Yet Koiso critiqued such “morally destructive behavior” of the Japanese, because local women and their children may grow to espouse grievances and plan to retaliate against the Japanese.⁴⁷ Koiso also mentioned the possibility of antagonizing additional figures lest intermarriage remained uncontrolled, such as business owners employing local women: if Japanese men impregnated local women, who then may stop working due to pregnancy or not finding the need to work, employers would lose labor power and may harbor animosity against the Japanese for the loss of their employees. In such situations, Koiso worried that businesses may then be carried in a “bad direction” for Japan, but Japan would not know the reason why if intermarriage was not acknowledged and left uncontrolled.⁴⁸

Therefore Koiso, too, feared losing Japanese superiority, and his support did not necessarily indicate a lack of concern about the Japanese quality: he advocated “race” mixing only to women of the upper class, and called for education of mixed children to become superior. He also critiqued immoral behavior of Japanese men, and voiced his worry about the declining quality of the Japanese living in areas unsuited to the Japanese, like Taiwan, when calling for separate living arrangements.⁴⁹ Yet what was different from those who opposed intermarriage out of fear of Japanese “racial degeneration,” was that Koiso was more concerned about what would happen if intermarriage was prohibited or left unacknowledged in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. If intermarriage was banned and mixed children were treated poorly, then non-Japanese Asian women who Japanese men had intimate relationships with, children born in

⁴⁷ Ibid., 156.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 157

⁴⁹ Ibid., 180.

those relationships, and people surrounding them, may obstruct Japanese expansion into Asia out of discontent with the Japanese. This fear of acting similarly to the Western imperial powers and subsequently antagonizing people in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, was what led Koiso to propose permitting intermarriage and even proactively mixing, as well as treating mixed children as superior like the Japanese in contrast to the Americans.

The presence of Asians in the Co-Prosperity Sphere played an important role in shaping intermarriage policies, observable in the Third Committee's discussion of how to phrase mixed marriage policies after initially raising the issue. Tsuda Shingo, an entrepreneur and another member of the Third Committee, was especially worried about how mixed marriage policies will be received by the non-Japanese. During the fourth meeting, he proposed eliminating the phrase, "suppress blood mixing" in plans to build the Co-Prosperity Sphere, because he considered the wording "vulgar."⁵⁰ His alternative suggestion, was to say something along the lines of, "based on objective to secure the unity of the Japanese 'race'."⁵¹ Tsuda opposed openly mentioning suppression of "race mixing," but it did not mean that Tsuda did not possess the fear of "racial" degeneration either, as he also opposed promotion of blood mixing.⁵²

Tsuda's attention to the wording was supported by another participant, Shimada, who had earlier proposed creating measures to address "race" mixing. According to Shimada, the Council meetings were secretive: however, if someone on the "outside" happens to see the details of what have been discussed, then they faced

⁵⁰ Ibid., 163.

⁵¹ Ibid., 164.

⁵² Ibid., 163.

potential criticisms.⁵³ Therefore Shimada also supported Tsuda and suggested removing “suppress blood mixing,” and instead using phrases such as “based on objective to secure the unity of the Japanese ‘race’” when discussing ways to protect the quality of the Japanese “race” in the final report.

Tsuda’s suggestion to remove “suppress blood mixing” appears to have influenced the final draft of the policies on constructing the Co-Prosperity Sphere produced by the Third Committee, which was responsible for the population and policies on “race.” The basic policy on mixed marriage was rewritten in the final version of the plan as follows: the Japanese “race” were to be the driving force in constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and this requires maintaining the unity of the Japanese “race” to uphold the quality of the Japanese “race.”⁵⁴ The fear of “racial” degeneration by “race” mixing remained in the proposal as seen in the attempt to maintain “unity of the Japanese ‘race’,” and there is no word on promoting intermarriages. However, the lack of what Tsuda identified as “vulgar” expression in the Third Committee’s final draft of the proposal, as well as in the “Basic Plan for the Construction of Greater East Asia,” which included findings of the Third Committee and which goals included eliminating the notion of Euro-American superiority and Anglo-American world view,⁵⁵ suggest the existence of fear besides degeneration of the Japanese “race”—the anxiety of being explicitly racist like the Western imperial

⁵³ Ibid., 181.

⁵⁴ Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai [Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia], “Dai sanbukai giji sokkiroku, dai gokai giji sokkiroku” [Proceeding records of the Fifth Committee, proceeding records from the first meeting], 6 May 1942, in vol. 2 of *Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai kankei shiryō* [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 187.

⁵⁵ Kikakuin, “Daitōa Kensetsu Kihon Hōsaku,” 9.

powers and consequently antagonizing non-Japanese Asians in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Revisited

The attempt to differentiate Japanese rule from Euro-American rules to appeal to the people in the Co-Prosperity Sphere is also noticeable in “Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” In addition to arguing against intermarriage and attempting to ban it to secure and maintain Japanese “racial” superiority, it also argued for the need of Japan to be at the center and a leader of all the “races” in (East) Asia. To achieve that position required:

1. Taking necessary steps to protect the superior characteristics of the Japanese “race.”
2. Taking special measures to determine which occupations the Japanese “race” take outside of Japan.
3. Increasing the number of Japanese in certain occupations.
4. Decreasing the number of Japanese in certain occupations.⁵⁶

If prohibiting mixed marriage was to address the first goal, then controlling which occupations that the Japanese can take in the Co-Prosperity Sphere was to address the other goals. According to the Measures, prescribing certain occupations to the Japanese within the Co-Prosperity Sphere was an attempt to make sure that the other “races” will not see Japanese engaging in activities, such as prostitution, gambling, and opium dens, which would contradict with the Japanese goal to become “friends, consultants, and leaders” of the local people.⁵⁷ There was a concern that if the Japanese were seen engaging in inferior occupations and activities, they would lose the respect from non-Japanese Asians.

⁵⁶ “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, chūhen (miteikō),” 52–54.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 57–59.

It was important for the Japanese to be respected and deemed superior by the people in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, because the goal of constructing it required support from people within the Co-Prosperity Sphere. And the way in which Japan tried to garner support from Asians after gaining respect, and preventing any possible obstructions in the construction process, was by establishing systems and customs based on principles of racial equality.⁵⁸ This involved elimination of all former policies, systems, and customs, and any discriminatory treatments imposed by the US, UK, Netherlands, and France that treated Asians poorly while privileging the white race.⁵⁹ By doing so, it enabled Japan to justify its expansion into Asia, while distinguishing itself different from the exploitative and discriminatory Western powers.

Yet in the “Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” there was also an attempt to suppress intermarriage, not only between East Asians and whites, but also between Japanese and non-Japanese Asians as introduced in the previous section. If this was condemned, however, it would be difficult for Japan to claim itself different from the Western powers that condemned colonizer-colonized relationships. I thus deduce that between this incompatibility of wanting to stop intermarriage to prevent Japanese “racial” degeneration on the one hand, and desire to differentiate itself from the Western powers to gain Asian support on the other, the latter was of greater importance, hence the disappearance of any intermarriage ban in the final versions of the plans to construct the Co-Prosperity

⁵⁸ Ibid., 36; “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, jōhen (miteikō),” 6-2, 7-3.

⁵⁹ Volume 1, 7-3, Volume 2, 28.

Sphere, not only in the “Basic Plan for the Construction of Greater East Asia” analyzed above, but also in the *Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia* to be examined below.

Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia

Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia was a book published by the Japanese government’s Cabinet Information Bureau, which controlled information made available to the public in Japan during the war. Made for the Japanese masses, the book contained contents and analysis of the details from the Greater East Asia Conference that convened in November 1943 that representatives from Japan, China, Thailand, Manchukuo, the Philippines, Burma, and India attended in Tokyo.

This document outlined the plans of building a new world order for Asians liberated from British and American domination, which were similar to those found in the meeting records of the Third Committee and the plan by the Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems. However, in the *Joint Declaration*, signs of fear concerning Japanese “racial” degeneration via race mixing were absent. For example, instead of treating the presence of diverse “races” as a threat within the Co-Prosperity Sphere that posed a challenge to maintaining the unity and superiority of the Japanese “race,” diversity was rather welcomed in the *Joint Declaration*.⁶⁰ In another example, the Asian countries and the people of each country were likened to siblings sharing the same blood.⁶¹ Although it was evident in the earlier plans that the planners considered non-Japanese Asians be inferior and separate from the Japanese,

⁶⁰ Jōhōkyoku, 153.

⁶¹ Ibid., 141.

hence the need to prevent mixed marriages, there is no word about suppressing “race” mixing or intermarriage, with a pretense that the Japanese and non-Japanese Asians were alike and equal.

However, what remained from the plans to build the Co-Prosperity Sphere, were the criticisms against the Euro-American powers and the attempt to garner support from the people viewed inferior. In justifying the war against the West to liberate Asia, the Conference adopted the “Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia,” to actualize a world liberated from British and American rule.⁶² It consisted of five principles, and of the five, I want to direct attention to the last principle:

“The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world, and work for the abolition of racial discriminations, the promotion of cultural intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the world, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.”⁶³

The “racial discrimination” here is referring to the exclusive, racist behavior and policies of the West, primarily the British and the Americans. This included exploiting resources in Asia, which they viewed as inferior to the West, placing limits on immigration from Asia, as well as discriminating other people of color, such as black Americans in the United States, despite claiming to stand for “freedom and equality.”⁶⁴

This rhetoric, of painting the British and the Americans as “racists” for its discriminatory attitudes and policies, was used by Japan as part of its wartime

⁶² Ibid., 2–3.

⁶³ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 150, 152–154.

propaganda.⁶⁵ By claiming that Japan was also one of the victims of Western injustices, it was able to claim solidarity with Asians who were exploited and discriminated by the Western powers. To further gain support from Asians in its war efforts, Japan had to simultaneously portray itself as anti-racist and different from the racist British and American powers, to justify its qualification to lead the new world order. In this context, had Japan copied the West and condemned race mixing and intermarriage, then Japan's wartime propagandistic efforts to gain Asian support would have been undermined, as condemnation of interracial relationships in the Western empires was based on fear of white racial degeneration and losing its superiority by mixing with the non-white people, thought to be inferior. If Japan, too, openly suppressed intermarriage in its empire, it would have revealed Japanese view of other Asians as inferior, and not any different from the Western powers. And if Japan failed to distinguish itself different from their white counterparts, then it may have provoked antipathy from Asians in countries where Japan invaded, resulting in failure of constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with an increased likelihood of facing obstructions from people within it in the process of its creation. Failure to construct the Co-Prosperity Sphere, would then ultimately have prevented Japan from achieving its own actual exploitative interests in Asia.

The disappearance of attempts to ban intermarriage, and lack of any condemnation of intermarriage in the Japanese empire, thus did not signify the lack or

⁶⁵ For discussions of how Japan (as well as the United States) portrayed the other using racial rhetoric during World War II and faced a dilemma to not appear racist, see John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). Fujitani also discusses how Japan and US were engaged in competition to portray themselves as non-racists that disavowed racism in *Race for Empire* (2011).

the disappearance of the fear of Japanese “racial” degeneration through “race” mixing. The fear of losing Japanese “racial” superiority, just as it existed in the Western empires, also existed in Japan. Yet Japan also had the fear of antagonizing people in the territories it was taking over by behaving similarly to the Euro-American imperial powers—particularly Britain and the United States—which I argue outweighed the former fear, and this was why attempts to prohibit “race” mixing appeared in the earlier plans to expand into Asia, but disappeared in the finalized and publicized plans. And because intermarriage between Japanese and non-Japanese Asians was not, or could not be banned in Greater East Asia, the Japanese government could not but sanction intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans, and Japanese and Taiwanese, even though Koreans and Taiwanese were considered inferior to the Japanese and there were plenty of oppositions to intermarriage among Japanese men who debated about intermarriage. This was a result of imperial Japan observing the global trends, not ignoring them.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have first shown that intermarriage was neither encouraged nor discouraged in imperial Japan. Although this may have ran counter to the Western trend of condemning mixed marriage out of fear of racial degeneration of the white, ruling race, I first argued that Japan also had the same anxiety of losing Japanese “racial” superiority, found in the plans that discussed how to construct the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the 1940s. Then why did Japan not ban and discourage intermarriage in its empire? Based on the observations of how the attempts to ban

intermarriage disappeared in the final plans of building the Co-Prosperity Sphere and the presence of concerns over Asian discontent, I moreover argued that the reason behind imperial Japan's sanctioning of intermarriage, despite the oppositions, was due to the fear of displaying racist behaviors and consequently losing Asian support having been greater than the fear of racial degeneration. One of the ways in which Japan justified its expansion was criticizing the West for exploiting Asia and discriminating Asians. Had Japan copied the West by condemning intermarriage, however, this justification would have been untenable, and the plan to construct the Co-Prosperity Sphere would also have failed.

What I hope to have shown in this chapter, is that in addition to the domestic wartime population policies discussed in the previous chapter, there were additional contexts outside of Japan that influenced Japan's decision to sanction intermarriage. I also hope to have shown that Japan was not isolated from the world during the wartime. The previous chapter introduced Japanese men who relied on intermarriage and race mixing cases from the other empires to argue against intermarriage. This chapter, too, introduced Japanese men involved in the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, who were aware of what was happening outside of Japan and its empire, such as the participants of the Third Committee of the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia. Sanctioning intermarriage was a result *not* of wartime Japan turning its back to the West, but rather working strategically based on its observations of the West for its own exploitative interests in Asia.

By demonstrating Japan's similarities to and observations of the Euro-American imperial powers in its decision to sanction intermarriage, this chapter was

also an attempt to “dislocate the West (and the Rest).”⁶⁶ With the categorization of Japan in “the Rest,” the Japanese empire in the historiography of modern imperialism and colonialism focused on the Euro-American empires categorized as “the West,” is excluded or sidelined, leading to “the West” remaining the site of knowledge production.⁶⁷ I thus used the term “race” in quotation marks, instead of *minzoku*, to draw attention to the parallels between Japan and its Euro-American counterparts in the twentieth century (i.e., the fear of racial degeneration of the ruling race) as a way to challenge the binary of “the West” and “the Rest.” Yet the drawback in continuing to use the word “race,” besides conforming to and perpetuating “the West” as the site of knowledge production, is that it is a social construct. While this does not mean that race is irrelevant, it is also not a sole basis of other discriminations, such as discrimination against religious minorities. Therefore as an alternative to talk about race (as well as ethnicity and nationality, such as “Japanese” that is not a given), one could rely on and adopt terms used in social justice scholarship, such as “agents,” “dominant” or “advantaged” to talk about social groups with power and resources, ranked above those who are “targets,” “subordinated” or “disadvantaged.”⁶⁸

The remainder of this dissertation will continue to question and challenge the binary of “the West” and “the Rest” in an attempt to de-marginalize Japan in the West-

⁶⁶ Gavin Walker and Naoki Sakai, “The End of Area,” *positions* 27.1 (February 2019): 1–31.

⁶⁷ Naoki Sakai, “Theory and Asian Humanity: On the Question of Humanitas and Anthropos,” *Postcolonial Studies* 13.4 (2010): 441–464.

⁶⁸ Lee Anne Bell, “Theoretical Foundations for Social Justice Education,” *Readings for Diversity and Social Justice*, edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 34–41; Bobbi Harro, “The Cycle of Socialization,” *Readings for Diversity and Social Justice*, edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 27–34.

centric historiography of modern empires, and find ways in which studies on Japan could be applicable in studies of and contribute to understanding “the West.” Having examined internal and external factors that led to legalization of intermarriage without promotion, the next chapter will explore *who* was promoting intermarriage in Japan, with a particular focus on Japanese women, and propose consideration of factors beyond race, class, and gender when studying colonizer-colonized relationships in modern empires, unlimited to Japan.

Chapter 4

Brokers of Empire at Home: Supporters of Intermarriage in Wartime Japan

The previous two chapters introduced Japanese men who were the primary participants in the discussion of intermarriage in imperial Japan, debating whether to encourage or discourage it. These two chapters also showed that despite oppositions against intermarriage, it could not ultimately be condemned in Japan due to a combination of internal and external factors, which led the government to take a neutral stance to neither encourage nor discourage intermarriage even in the 1940s, after more than a decade since the legalization of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages.

This leads to the question of *who* was promoting intermarriage in Japan, because there are records claiming that intermarriage was promoted in Japan. One example is from a collection of testimonies from 1972 in a magazine *Ushio*, which featured testimonies mostly from Japanese women who married Korean men in Japan before the fall of the empire in 1945, and were “found” in South Korea in the postwar period. According to one woman named Sakai Kiyoi, she was forced to marry a Korean man against her will in 1940, at a time when “*naisen kekkon* (Japanese-Korean marriage) was being called for.”¹ Kim Bongsu, in another testimony, recalled his marriage to a Japanese woman in 1943: people around him congratulated and praised him when they coaxed him into *naisen kekkon*.² Based on such statements, Suzuki

¹ “‘Kimin’ ni sareta Kankoku no Nihonjinsuma no shōgen” [Testimonies of Japanese wives abandoned in Korea], *Ushio* 153 (1972.5): 254.

² *Ibid.*, 270.

Yūko, one of the first historians to publish a monograph on Japanese-Korean marriages in 1992, concluded that Japanese-Korean marriages were promoted as a “national policy,” not only in colonial Korea but also in Japan.³ Oguma Eiji, too, claims that the Japanese government “promoted” intermarriage, at least superficially.⁴ Non-scholarly, popular reporting on Japanese women who intermarried Korean men before 1945 also write about intermarriage as though it has been officially promoted in Japan.⁵ However, subsequent research, such as Kim Yōngdal’s and Eika Tai’s, has argued that it was not promoted although condoned.⁶ But who, then was doing the promotion in Japan?

This chapter will address the following questions: if the Japanese government did not encourage or discourage intermarriage in Japan, then *who* was promoting it and *why*? Was promotion of intermarriage a form of resistance against the government that was hesitant to promote it? Why was it possible, when there were opposing voices arguing against intermarriage? To answer these questions, this chapter surveys three different, but sometimes overlapping and interconnected groups of people in Japan who participated in the promotion and/or support of intermarriage: Harmony

³ Suzuki Yūko, *Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon* [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992), 110, 191–193.

⁴ Oguma Eiji, *Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen* [The myth of the homogeneous nation] (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995), 241, 254–255.

⁵ See Yamazaki Tomoko, “Okisarareta Nihon josei tachi (jō) ‘naisen kekkon’ to ‘tairiku hanayome’” [Japanese women left forgotten (part one) “Japanese-Korean marriage” and “continental brides”], *Sekai* 762 (2007.3): 277–291. Why there are more records of Japanese-Korean marriages compared to Japanese-Taiwanese marriages will be addressed in the following chapter.

⁶ Kim Yōngdal, “Nihon no Chōsen tōchi-ka ni okeru ‘tsūkon’ to ‘konketsu’—iwayuru ‘naisen kekkon’ no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite” [Japan’s “intermarriage” and “blood mixing” in colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called “Japanese-Korean marriage”], *Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō* 39 (1999): 43; Eika Tai, “The Discourse of Intermarriage in Colonial Taiwan,” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 40.1 (Winer 2014): 31.

Association, district commissioners, and Japanese women. I first argue that promotion of intermarriage occurred at the local level, by supporters who had ideological and/or practical reasons for supporting intermarriage. It was possible to support intermarriage despite the lack of promotion at the national level, because support of intermarriage was an extension of government sanctioned activities. I particularly focus on Japanese women who supported intermarriage and examine what led them to support intermarriage contrary to the government's let-it-be attitude and Japanese men who opposed intermarriage introduced in the previous chapters. I argue that Japanese women's support of intermarriage was part of the larger effort to promote marriage and to help other Japanese women in need, based on their interests in advancing Japanese women's rights. Lastly, I argue that Japanese women at home in the metropole working in and for the interest of themselves and other Japanese women were inadvertently complicit in imperialism, by showing how their support of inter/marriage—although well-intentioned and seemingly contradictory to the imperial government—reinforced and perpetuated the patriarchal system that discriminated people who could not be citizens.

Supporters of Intermarriage in Japan

There were at least three groups that supported intermarriage in Japan before 1945—members of the Harmony Association (*Kyōwakai*), the district commissioners (*hōmen'iin*), and Japanese women. I argue that these groups supported intermarriage not only for ideological reasons, such as assimilation of people from the colonies, but also for practical reasons, where enabling interethnic marriage was an extension of

their ordinary activities that involved helping people in need. In addition, promotion of intermarriage, although limited, did exist in Japan, but it was at a local level, not at the national level.⁷ The position on intermarriage of these groups may have differed from the government, but their promotion and support of intermarriage was not necessarily a resistance. They were able to support intermarriage because it was an extension of government sanctioned activities.

Harmony Association

One of the groups that supported intermarriage (at least between Japanese and Koreans), was the Harmony Association (*Kyōwakai*).⁸ The first Harmony Association emerged in Osaka in 1924, with a goal of promoting *naisen yūwa*, or harmony between Japan(ese) and Korea(ns), living in Osaka (numbering over 20,000 in 1924) in the aftermath of the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake.⁹ The initial motive was to protect and rescue Koreans living in Osaka, and the *Kyōwakai* activities included

⁷ One group not discussed in this chapter, but which name appears in secondary sources, is *Sōaikai* (Mutual Friendship Society), formed under the guidance of the Government General of Korea in 1921, with the aim of acting as a labor broker as well as an enforcer of Japanization programs in Japan. However, such effort was not supported by all Koreans, as there appears to have been a conflict between *Sōaikai* and those from Jeju Island (see Osaka-fu Shakaika [Osaka Prefecture Society Department], *Osaka-fu hōmen 'iin jigyo nenpo shōwa ninen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1927] [Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1928]). Also see Edward W. Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan, 1904–1950* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), 22. According to Wagner, the Society maintained close and unofficial relationship with the police, thus functioning as a “control organ” that aimed to Japanize Koreans by coercion. They appear to have existed in both Japan and Korea, but their activities in Japan that involved promotion of Japanese-Korean marriages beyond the 1920s when they appeared in newspapers, are unclear.

⁸ This is separate from the *Kyōwakai* in Manchukuo, known as the Concordia Society, Harmony Society, and/or Harmony Association. Ozawa Yūsaku, “‘Kyōwa’ o bōkyaku no fuchikara sukuidasu tameni” [To bail ‘harmony’ from the verge of oblivion], *Kyōwa jigyo nenkan (fukkokuban)* [Harmony work yearbook (reprinted edition)] (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1990), 8.

⁹ Osaka-fu Shakaika, *Osaka-fu hōmen 'iin jigyo nenpo taishō jūsanen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1924] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1925), 281, 295.

providing housing, job referral services, Japanese language education, access to medical services, and other welfare services, which were funded through public donations and financial support from the Osaka prefectural government and the Government General of Korea.¹⁰

Following the establishment of the first Harmony Association in Osaka, Harmony Associations also soon emerged in Hyōgo and Kanagawa in 1925, both prefectures with a large Korean population. Yet it was in the 1930s that the Harmony Associations emerged Japan-wide with the establishment of the Central Harmony Association (*Chūō Kyōwakai*): sources differ in the establishment date, but it appears that the creation of the Central Harmony Association began in 1934, and started to spread across the metropole from 1936, which was also the year when *Kyōwakai* emerged in Tokyo and Kyoto, beyond Osaka, Hyōgo, and Kanagawa prefectures.¹¹

The Central Harmony Association was then formally established under the

¹⁰ “Naisen kyōwakai hokkaishiki” [Japan-Korea Harmony Association opening ceremony], *Shakai Jigyō Kenkyū* 12.6 (1924): 100–102.

¹¹ 1934 is the year dated on Central Harmony Association’s “Prospectus of Establishing the Central Harmony Association” (*Chūō Kyōwakai setsuritsu shuisho*), outlining the need to create a centralized system to facilitate communication between different Harmony Associations around Japan (*Tachi Collection* [Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library], PDFY100916008). According to Higuchi Yūichi, 1936 was the year that the planning began, and 1939 was the official year of establishment (“Kaidai” [Bibliographical information], *Kyōwa jigyo nenkan (fukkokuban)* [Harmony work yearbook (reprinted edition)] [Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1990], 6). The formal year of establishment as 1939 is also supported by Tsukazaki Masayuki (in “Ajia Taiheiyō Sensōka no Osaka-fu Kyōwakai, Kyōwa Kyōryokukai, Kōseikai no katsudō to Chōsenjin” [Activities of Osaka prefecture’s Kyōwakai, Kyōwa Kyōryokukai, and Kōseikai during the Asia Pacific War and Koreans], *Higashi Ajia Kenkyū* 54 [2010]: 20) and *Chūō Shakai Jigyō Kyōkai* [Central Social Work Association] (in *Nihon shakai jigyo nenkan shōwa jūyon, jūgonenban* [Japan social work yearbook 1939/1940 edition] [Tokyo: Bunsei Shoin, 1941], 539). Chimoto Hideki wrote that the Central Harmony Association was established in 1936 (“Kyoto-fu Kyōwakai to Uji no zainichi Chōsenjin” [Kyōwakai of Kyoto prefecture and Koreans in Uji], *Rekishi Jinrui* 16 [1988]: 185), supported by Wagner ([1951], 22, 50–51).

Ministry of Welfare in 1939, leading to the establishment of Harmony Associations in all prefectures except Okinawa by 1940 and facilitation of communications between various Harmony Associations across Japan to achieve its more unified goals.¹² By this time, the initial work of the Harmony Association, or harmony work (*kyōwa jigyō*), shifted from providing aid to Koreans to assimilation of Koreans, due to the impact of the Sino-Japanese War and also due to the greater involvement of the police within the Central Harmony Association.

According to the bylaws of the Central Harmony Association, the objective of the organization was to “promote assimilation of compatriots from *gaichi* (outer lands, or colonies) living in Japan and achieve harmony among all citizens.”¹³ Because *gaichi* encompassed Taiwan, those from Taiwan would theoretically also have been subject to assimilation efforts of the Harmony Association. However, there is no evidence of the Taiwanese colonial government being involved, similar to how the Korean colonial government and businesses were involved as the trustees of the Harmony Association.¹⁴ Also, according to the *Harmony Work Yearbook* (*Kyōwa jigyō nenkan*), the goal of the Harmony Association was to aim for *isshi dōjin* (“universal benevolence”) under which everyone from both *naichi* (metropole) and *gaichi* (colonies) were all under the equal gaze of the emperor, yet because Koreans were more numerous—around 900,000 compared to around 8,000 Taiwanese in Japan

¹² Higuchi (1990), 6.

¹³ Chūō Kyōwakai [Central Harmony Association], “Chūō Kyōwakai jigyō keikaku” [Central Harmony Association work plan], 1938, *Tachi Collection* (Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library), PDFY100916009.

¹⁴ See Takeda Yukio, ed., *Chūō Kyōwakai yōran* [Central Harmony Association Directory] (Tokyo: Chūō Kyōwakai, 1940).

as of 1939—“compatriots from *gaichi*” (*gaichi dōhō*) were largely equated with Koreans.¹⁵

Thus the Harmony Association, whose upper positions were filled by the Japanese and the police, mainly targeted Koreans as subjects of assimilation efforts.¹⁶ It required Koreans to become a member of the organization, through which their activities and movements were policed and could be mobilized during the wartime.¹⁷ Koreans from the “intellectual occupation” class also participated in actualizing the goals of the Harmony Association, for example, by providing guidance to other Koreans living in Japan.¹⁸ Other activities to assimilate Koreans included: researching about Koreans residing in Japan; providing instructions on improving their living situations; enforcing Japanese language education; and offering housing and employment.¹⁹

¹⁵ Chūō Kyōwakai, *Kyōwa jigyo nenkan shōwa jūrokunenban* [Harmony work yearbook 1941 edition] (Tokyo: Chūō Kyōwakai, 1942), 3.

¹⁶ Higuchi (1990), 4; Tsukazaki (2010): 19–20.

¹⁷ Kyoto City International Foundation, *Kyoto ni ikiru zainichi Kankokujin, Chōsenjin* [Zainichi Koreans living in Kyoto] (Kyoto: Kyoto City International Foundation, 1994), 71–72.

¹⁸ Tsukazaki Masayuki, “Senkyūhyakunijūnendai Osaka ni okeru ‘naisen yūwa’ jidai no kaishi to naiyō no saikentō” [Re-examination of “Japan-Korea harmony” era’s beginning and contents in 1920s Osaka], *Zainichi Chōsenjinshi Kenkyū* 37 (2007): 23–52; Zainichi Chōsen Kagaku Gijutsu Kyōkai [Zainichi Korean Science and Technology Association], “Zainichi Chōsenjin no seikatsu jittai” [Zainichi Koreans’ living conditions], 1951, in *Kindai minshū no kiroku: Zainichi Chōsenjin* [Modern people’s memory: Zainichi Koreans], edited by Ozawa Yūsaku (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1978), 272–311; Chōsen Ginkō Keijō Sōsaiseki Chōsaka [Bank of Korea Keijō President-chaired Investigation Division], “Naichi, Shina kakuchi zaijū no Hantōjin no katsudō jyōkyō ni kansuru chōsa” [Investigation on activities of Koreans living in Japan and China], vol. 24 of *Shokuminchi shakai jigyo kankei shiryōshū, Chōsenhen* [Colonial social work related documents collection, Korea edition] (Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 1999), 112–113.

¹⁹ Tsukazaki (2007); Tamura Yoshio, “Honfu shakaika kankei shodantai no tōsei to nōritsu zōshin o mezashite [Aiming for control and increase in efficiency of the head office’s different organizations related to the society department],” *Shakai Jihō* (1937.4): 10.

In addition to Korean men, Korean women were also the targets of the Harmony Association's assimilation efforts. There were special lessons for Korean women to teach Japanese manners and how to wear Japanese clothes as a way to improve their lives and promote Japanization.²⁰ Furthermore in the 1940s, Japanese citizens, too, became targets of harmony work, as the Harmony Association held symposiums and lectures for Japanese homeowners and factory owners who interacted with Koreans on a daily basis. The goal was to foster a deeper understanding of Koreans in their everyday interactions to eliminate discriminations that impeded the Harmony Association's goal to achieve harmony between Japan(ese) and Korea(ns).²¹

As part of the larger assimilation efforts of the Harmony Association, some evidences show that Japanese-Korean marriages were promoted at the prefectural, or the local level. For example, in the *Harmony Work Yearbook* from 1941, one of the activities of the Harmony Association in Kōchi prefecture listed promotion of *naisen kekkon*.²² In another example, Kanagawa prefecture's list of activities included promoting *naisen ittai*, meaning "Japan and Korea as one body," a slogan that was used during assimilation campaigns. Whether Kanagawa prefecture's Harmony Association promoted Japanese-Korean marriage is unclear, but one of the ways to achieve *naisen ittai* was intermarriage. Considering the case of Kim Bongsu from the

²⁰ The efforts of assimilating Korean women, however, was not always successful, as documents record their oppositions and rejections to such efforts. Ozawa (1978), 4–29; Imanishi Yoneshirō, "Kokumin seishin sōdōin to Kyoto-fu Kyōwakai no katsudō" [National Spiritual Mobilization movement and Activities of Kyoto Prefecture's Harmony Association], *Shakai Jihō* (1938.3): 29–31.

²¹ For example, see Tsukazaki (2010): 36; "Kyoto-fu Kyōwakai" [Kyoto prefecture's Harmony Association], *Shakai Jihō* (1938.4): 46–52.

²² Chūō Kyōwakai (1942), 260.

introduction of this chapter, who was coaxed into marriage with a Japanese woman when *naisen ittai* was being called for by the people around him, Kanagawa's Harmony Association may also have promoted intermarriage.²³ Observations of harmony work from the outside confirms the connection between assimilation efforts and intermarriage: Igarashi Tasuku, in his comparison of harmony work that aimed at eliminating discriminations against Koreans versus "reconciliation work" (*yūwa jigyō*) that aimed to eliminate discriminations against *burakumin*, recorded that more Japanese were increasingly marrying Koreans due to the efforts of harmony work, compared to the non-*burakumin* avoiding marriage with *burakumin*.²⁴

Although intermarriage may not have been promoted nationwide, the presence of members of the Harmony Association who intermarried recorded in Central Harmony Association's documents suggests that intermarriage was not discouraged. For example, there were at least two Korean members who were married to Japanese women.²⁵ One of the two was a Korean member of the Harmony Association in Tokyo, called Kobayashi, who was praised for demonstrating the spirit of the harmony between Japanese and Koreans. Featured as one of the "heartwarming stories" published by the Central Harmony Association, the story also praised Kobayashi of his good character, which led him to be well taken care of by the people around him, including his Japanese wife, when he fell ill.²⁶

²³ Ibid., 102–103, 194.

²⁴ Igarashi Tasuku, "Kyōwa jigyō to yūwa jigyō" [Harmony work and reconciliation work], *Niigata Shakai Jigyō* 13.4 (1941), in vol. 3 of *Kyōwakai kankei shiryōshū* [Harmony Association related documents collection], edited by Higuchi Yūichi (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1991), 59–60.

²⁵ Zainichi Chōsen Kagaku Gijutsu Kyōkai (1951), 272–311.

²⁶ Chūō Kyōwakai, "Naichi zaijū dōhō jūgo bidan" [Heartwarming stories at the home front

Moreover, there were affiliates of the Harmony Association who expressed their support of intermarriage. One was Takeda Yukio, the “ideologue of the Harmony Association” and an official in the Ministry of Welfare. Takeda recognized that intermarriage was still at its “trial stage,” referring to the slow growth in number of Japanese-Korean marriages. Yet he saw the increase, although small, in a positive light as a reflection of the success of assimilating Koreans, which he claimed was important in order for Japan to become the leader of Asia.²⁷ This is not to claim that all affiliates of harmony work supported intermarriage, however, as there were opponents arguing against Japanese-Korean marriages, too. For example, Nagashima Keizō (née Kang Kyeong-ok), who was a member of the *Osaka Kyōwa Kyōryokukai* (Osaka Harmony Support Association), which consisted of Koreans who were supportive of the Harmony Association’s efforts, suggested not enforcing Japanese-Korean marriages even though there were positive outcomes reported.²⁸

Although intermarriage may not have been discouraged, as evidenced by the promotion of intermarriage at the local level, existence of Korean members who intermarried, expression of support by the Central Harmony Association, and presence of Japanese supporters, there is no evidence of the *Kyōwakai* promoting Japanese-Korean marriages as its official policy at the central, national level. This may be due to the Harmony Association being under the Ministry of Welfare and the government’s

of compatriots living in Japan] (1944), in vol. 2 of *Kyōwakai kankei shiryōshū* [Harmony Association related documents collection], edited by Higuchi Yūichi (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1995), 477–481.

²⁷ Takeda (1940), 460–465.

²⁸ Tsukazaki (2010); Nagashima Keizō, “Kyōwa jigyo no konponteki kaikaku shian” [Proposal on fundamental reform of harmony work], July 1944, *Japan Center for Asian Historical Records*, B02031286800, A-5-0-0-1_1_002, 290.

stance to neither officially encourage nor discourage intermarriage. Yet the government also supported assimilation, which has been Harmony Association's primary activity during the wartime. Harmony Association's support of intermarriage was thus not entirely contradictory to the government's decision to neither encourage nor discourage intermarriage in Japan: at the local level, members of the Harmony Association could promote intermarriage because it was part of government sanctioned assimilation efforts.

District Commissioners

The second group that supported intermarriage was *hōmen'iin*, or district commissioners, some of whom were also part of the Harmony Association.²⁹ District commissioners and members of the Harmony Association worked together on occasions, for example, in helping a poor Korean family return to Korea after the primary provider of the family passed away.³⁰ In another example, Osaka's Harmony Association introduced a Korean youth to a district commissioner in Osaka: the youth arrived in Japan to study, and the district commissioner took the student in and paid for his tuition.³¹ And at least in Osaka and Kyoto prefectures, both the Harmony Association and district commissioners were found under the same department within the prefectural government, which would explain their collaborative work.

²⁹ Mizuno Naoki, "Kaisetsu" [Commentary], *Kyoto ni okeru Chōsenjin no rekishi, shiryōshū: "Shakai Jihō" kankei kiji* [History and documents collection of Koreans in Kyoto: *Shakai Jihō* related articles] (Kyoto: Sekai Jinken Mondai Kenkyūjo Sentā, 1997), xxi.

³⁰ After the father passed away, the Korean family in Tokyo was sent to the Harmony Association in Osaka by the district commissioners in Tokyo, in order to find funding to return to Korea. Osaka-fu Shakaika, *Osaka-fu hōmen'iin jigyo nenpō shōwa gonen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1930] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1931), 121–123.

³¹ *Osaka-fu hōmen'iin jigyo nenpō* (1928), 162–165.

So who were the district commissioners? They were the precursors of the *minsei'in* (welfare commissioners) in the postwar period, and constituted of Japanese men from middle to upper middle classes who helped people in need on a voluntary, philanthropic basis.³² The district commissioner system (*hōmen'in seido*) first emerged in Okayama prefecture in 1917, then in Osaka in 1918. Influenced by the social work system in Germany, Britain, and the United States, as well as Japan's *goningumi* system from the early modern period, the *hōmen'in* system gradually developed across Japan after the rice riots and the post-WWI economic stagnation to act as a supporting organ of the government's social work efforts.³³

³² Ito Yoshiko, "Social Work Development in Japan," *Social Policy & Administration* 29.3 (1995): 262.

³³ Kitaba Tsutomu, "Taishō-ki ni okeru hōmen'in seido tanjō no shakaiteki haikei to imi ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu" [Social background and meaning of the hōmen'in system born in the Taishō era], *Study Report of Japan College of Social Work* 55 (2009.2): 4–5; Nagaoka Masami, "Senjika hōmen'in katsudō to seisaku, jissen kadai" [Wartime district commissioner activities and policies, issues in practice], *Fukkoku, Senjika Osaka-fu hōmen jōmuiinkai giji sokkiroku* [Reprinted, Wartime Osaka prefecture district standing committee conference proceedings record] (Osaka: Kinki Chiiki Fukushi Gakkai, Osaka-fu Hōmen'in Katsudō Shiryō Kenkyūkai, 1999), 959.

The *hōmen'in* system was also implemented in Korea, Manchukuo, and Taiwan, analyzed to have been part of the assimilatory mechanism in the colonies, closely affiliated with the colonial governments. *Hōmen'in* system was established in Taiwan in 1923, and in Korea, 1927. For more information, see Nagaoka Masami, "Nihon tōchika Taiwan shakai jigyōshi kenkyū no igi to kadai" [Significance and challenges of research on Taiwan's social work history under Japanese rule], *Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, Taiwanhen bessatsu* [Colonial social work related documents collection, Taiwan edition, supplementary volume] (Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 2001): 5–42; Shin Ketsu, "Shokuminchi Taiwan ni okeru hōmen'in seido no tenkai oyobi sono tokushitsu" [Evolution and characteristics of district commissioner system in colonial Taiwan], *Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, Taiwanhen bessatsu* [Colonial social work related documents collection, Taiwan edition, supplementary volume] (Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 2001): 109–132; Ōtomo Masako, "Nihon tōchika Taiwan ni okeru shakai jigyō seisaku no tenkai" [Evolution of social work policies in Taiwan under Japanese rule], *Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, Taiwanhen bessatsu* [Colonial social work related documents collection, Taiwan edition, supplementary volume] (Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 2001): 43–108; Park Kwangjoon, "Hōmen'in seido wa Kankoku ni oite naze shōgen shitanoka" [Why did the hōmen'in system lapse in Korea], *Bukkyo University Journal of the Faculty of Social Welfare* 11 (2015): 79–99.

The system spread throughout Japan when the Home Ministry promoted the spread of the *hōmen'iin* system in Taishō 11 (1922), but it was not until 1928 that the system was established in all prefectures. The Relief Law passed in April 1929 and enforced since 1932, in which the government became responsible in providing relief to the poor, paved the path to the standardization of the system across Japan a few years later.³⁴

What made the district commissioners unique compared to governmental social work, besides not having legal authority, was that district commissioners were focused on rescuing *individuals* in need.³⁵ One of their main activities included surveying people's living conditions, determining which category the people in need fell into: Type 1 or Type 2. Those grouped in Type 1 were in extreme poverty and determined by the district commissioners to be unable to live by themselves, while those identified as Type 2 were also in poverty, but a temporary poverty caused by illness and accidents. This information was then registered on a card to keep track of individuals needing help: when people recorded on the card changed their residence, the district commissioners updated the information on the card to determine who really needed help, in order to stop the abuse and misuse of social aid.³⁶ Once one was

³⁴ Ogasawara Yūji, "Hara Taiichi cho *Hōmen jigyo* kaidai" [Bibliographical introduction to Hara Taiichi's *Hōmen jigyo*], in vol. 11 of *Senzenki shakai jigyo bunkenshu* [Prewar social work document collection] (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentā, 1995), 4–5.

³⁵ Kitaba (2009): 27; Yoshida Kyūichi, *Shōwa shakai jigyōshi* [Shōwa social work history] (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 1971), 97.

³⁶ Yoshida (1971), 96; Osaka-fu Shakaika, *Osaka-fu hōmen'iin seido* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner system] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 192?), 3. A sample of the card can be found in Kyoto-fu Shakaika [Kyoto Prefecture Society Department], *Kyoto hōmen'iin seido nijūnenshi* [Twenty years history of Kyoto's district commissioner system] (Kyoto: Kyoto-fu Gakumubu Shakaika, 1941), 15.

determined to need help, district commissioners offered consultation, guidance, and assistance, such as on healthcare and childcare. They also promoted youths to study and attend schools, introducing those in need to appropriate institutions and facilities, in addition to arranging the household registration (*koseki*) if and when necessary.³⁷ Ultimately, their responsibilities included the following: 1) survey of living situations of the people living in the assigned district; 2) surveying the people in need of aid; and 3) helping the needy be able to support themselves.³⁸

On November 14, 1936, the *hōmen'iin* system was promulgated under the District Commissioner Ordinance (*hōmen'iin-rei*) and executed starting January 15 of the following year. This standardized the structure, instruction, and operation of the district commissioners across Japan, as they previously varied from region to region.³⁹ And since the promulgation of the ordinance, the *hōmen'iin* began to work more closely with the local/municipal government as a supporting organ, whereas they had been more of a private system before.⁴⁰

But even before the national institutionalization of the district commissioner system, district commissioners have been involved in supporting intermarriage, at

³⁷ Cases needing management of the household registry included: not registering stillbirth, change of residency, unregistered marriage, unregistered birth, and *koseki* needing corrections. See *Osaka-fu hōmen'iin seido* (192?) and *Kyoto hōmen'iin seido nijūnenshi* (1941).

³⁸ Yoshida (1971), 157.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 98; Ogasawara (1995), 5; Shakai Jigyō Kenkyūjo [Social Work Research Center], *Nihon shakai jigyo nenkan shōwa jūsanban* [Japan social work yearbook 1938 edition] (Tokyo: Chūō Shakai Jigyō Kyōkai, 1938), 3–4.

⁴⁰ Kyoto-fu Shakaika, *Kyoto shakai jigyo yōran shōwa jūyonendoban* [Kyoto social work directory 1939 edition] (Kyoto: Kyoto-shi Shiyakusho, 1940), 19–20. For more information, see Anna Maria Thränhardt, “Institutional Continuity and Functional Change: The Development of the System of *Minsei-iin* in the History of Social Welfare in Japan,” *Japan's Socio-Economic Evolution: Continuity and Change*, edited by Sarah Metzger-Court and Werner Pascha (Sandgate, Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library, 1996), 91–108.

least between Japanese women and Korean men, as Koreans were also recipients of *hōmen'in*'s support (although Japanese were prioritized as recipients of aid).⁴¹ For example, is a case from 1920: when a Japanese woman named KiXX (name partly censored in the original) eloped with a Korean man named Choi to Korea, she was forced to return to Japan by her family as a punishment. When she returned to Japan, she was pregnant and close to full term, so she gave birth to a baby in Osaka, where Choi also followed and worked. KiXX's mother and brother tried to give away the baby because they considered the child Korean, so they visited the office of a district commissioner for instruction. This was when a male district commissioner in Osaka intervened, and worked to convince KiXX's family that the child belonged to both KiXX and Choi. The district commissioner, contrary to the father of KiXX who had berated Koreans by likening them to "pigs and cows," ultimately succeeded in persuading KiXX's family to keep the child, and made Choi pledge to take care of KiXX and their child, now living together.⁴² It is unclear from the report when and

⁴¹ Osaka-fu Shakaika (1928), 376. See Tsukazaki (2007): 23–52 on how the district commissioners prioritized Japanese over Koreans because of the presence of Harmony Association in Osaka.

For the debate on whether to serve Koreans or not, see *Osaka Prefecture District Commissioner Work Yearbook Taishō 13* (1925). For an example of district commissioners helping Koreans, see Osaka-fu Shakaika (1928), 162–165. The *hōmen'in* appeared to have been deeply engaged with Koreans in areas with a high Korean population by the late 1930s (see Osaka-fu Shakaika, *Osaka-fu hōmen'in jigyō nenpō shōwa jūsanen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1938] [Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1939]). District commissioners were not limited to helping Koreans only, as there is a report of a Chinese family receiving help from the district commissioners (a Chinese man was left with three children by a Japanese wife, and was facing a deportation order after being found consuming opium (see Osaka-fu Shakaika, *Osaka-fu hōmen'in jigyō nenpō shōwa hachinen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1933] [Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1934], 201–204).

⁴² Osaka-fu Shakaika, *Osaka-fu hōmen'in jigyō nenpō taishō kyūnen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1920] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1921), 215–216.

how they married, as KiXX and Choi were unmarried when they escaped to Korea, but when the district commissioner made Choi swear to take care of KiXX, she was called a “wife.” Thus it is difficult to determine whether the district commissioner was involved in encouraging the two to marry, but he was supportive of their co-habitation as a family unit.

Another case in which a *hōmen'in* was directly involved in supporting intermarriage after the institutionalization of the district commissioner system, comes from the minutes from the district commissioners' meeting in Osaka held in April of 1942: one member reported helping a Korean man, working as a tailor, enter the household registry of a Japanese woman who worked as a housekeeper with nine children. She was previously with a Japanese man under a common-law marriage, but ran away with her seven children from him due to his drinking problem. Since the Japanese man passed away, she and the Korean man “married” and had two children, but their marriage was unregistered, thus the two children born to the couple were illegitimate. According to the report, not only was the Korean husband concerned about the children, but also concerned about the impact of him being Korean on the wife's seven other children, which caused some difficulty at home between the family members. Praising the Korean man as an “admirable Japanese,” the district commissioner in the end helped the Korean husband enter his Japanese wife's registry as part of “managing the household registry,” one of the responsibilities of the district commissioners.⁴³

⁴³ See “Shigatsu hōmen jōmuiinkai giji sokkiroku” [April district standing committee conference proceedings record], *Fukkoku, Senjika Osaka-fu hōmen jōmuiinkai giji sokkiroku* (Osaka: Kinki Chiiki Fukushi Gakkai, Osaka-fu Hōmen'in Katsudō Shiryō Kenkyūkai,

These two cases first reveal that *hōmen'iin* were also taking a part in the assimilation efforts, to achieve *naisen yūwa*, or harmony between Japan and Korea, used to describe the second case in particular, but also evident from the first case in which the reporter claims “Koreans should not be held in contempt today.”⁴⁴ Thus assimilation was one of the reasons why the district commissioners supported Korean men’s marriage to Japanese women. Secondly, the cases also reveal that the *hōmen'iin*’s support of intermarriage could be seen as an extension of their ordinary activities, which was to rescue the poor. There thus was an additional practical reason in supporting intermarriage. According to sociologist Suzuki Tomomichi, district commissioners’ registration of marriage was a way in which they worked to promote the ideals of the modern family and to standardize the family order, which was thought to solve the problems facing the needy: If people in need married and entered a registry, there would be a family member that the people in need could rely on and be taken care of, instead of the responsibility to care for such individuals falling on the government.⁴⁵ Therefore the support of intermarriage from the district commissioners were due to ideological and practical reasons. Although the government did not encourage or discourage intermarriage, the district commissioners could have enabled it, because entering people into the household registration system to mitigate social problems was supported by the government.

In both of the above cases, it was the male district commissioners who supported the Korean-Japanese couples. Yet female district commissioners, although a

1999), 44–59.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 51; Osaka-fu Shakaika (1921), 216.

⁴⁵ Kitaba (2009): 31.

minority among the district commissioners, were also accepting of and further worked to promote Japanese-Korean marriages. I will introduce them separately below, as I examine the last group that supported intermarriage in the metropole: Japanese women.

Female Supporters of Intermarriage in Japan

The members of the Harmony Association and the male district commissioners could support intermarriage because their primary activity of assimilating Koreans or providing aid to the needy, of which supporting intermarriage was a part, was backed by the government. Therefore although it differed from the government's position to neither encourage nor discourage intermarriage, support of it was not necessarily contradictory to the government. Below, I introduce Japanese women who supported intermarriage in Japan and examine what led to their support and/or promotion of intermarriage in Japan. I first argue that Japanese women could support intermarriage because it was part of the larger effort to promote marriage that the government supported during the wartime. I then argue that Japanese women supported intermarriage because it offered a practical solution to a social issue during the wartime and also enabled them to fulfill their interests.

One group of Japanese women who expressed their support of marriage between Japanese women and Korean men, was the female district commissioners (*fujin hōmen'in*), who were a minority among the district commissioners as social

work in Japan was a men's sphere.⁴⁶ There were no female district commissioners until 1927, approximately after a decade since the district commissioner system first emerged.⁴⁷ Along with Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto were among the first prefectures to include women as district commissioners, yet their numbers were extremely low.⁴⁸ According to a survey of female district commissioners by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, women constituted only 1.7% out of the 19,515 district commissioners in Japan as of 1930.⁴⁹ The number of women grew slowly over the 1930s, but even by 1934, there were only 1089 female district commissioners Japan-wide (out of 39,254).⁵⁰

Women were not initially involved as district commissioners, because men saw women as unfit for social work for not being level-headed like men. Men regarded women as too pushy and self-assertive, and even in prefectures that relied on women's participation in the district commissioner system, women were often limited to supplementary positions because of the assumed incompetency.⁵¹ Yet this changed in

⁴⁶ Imai Konomi, "Naze hōmen'iin wa 'Female Professional' toshite seiritsu shinakattanoka: Osaka-fu no Hōmen Fujin Hogo'iin sōsetsuan no shiryō o tōshite" [Why district commissioners failed to establish as a 'Female Professional': Through Osaka prefecture's Hōmen Fujin Hogo'iin establishment plan documents], *Shakai Jigyōshi Kenkyū* 43 (2014): 5.

⁴⁷ Yamauchi Fukiko, "Nihon de saisho no fujin hōmen'iin" [Japan's first female district commissioners], *Fujin no Tomo* 21.10 (1927): 85.

⁴⁸ Unno Yukinori, "Fujin hōmen'iin no kenkyū 1" [Research on female district commissioners 1], *Shakai Jigyō* 12.7 (1928): 67–68.

⁴⁹ Naimushō Shakaikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs Society Bureau], *Fujin hōmen'iin ni kansuru chōsa* [Survey concerning female district commissioners] (Tokyo: Naimushō Shakaikyoku Shakaibu, 1930), 4.

According to this survey, the total number of female district commissioners surveyed as of 1930 is tallied to be 322, the number is as low as 60 in Senda Chiyoko, "Onna hōmen'iin no shuki" [Notes of a woman district commissioner], *Fujin Kōron* (1931.10): 478–481. There is a discrepancy between the numbers, but the fact that women were a minority remains the same.

⁵⁰ Yoshida (1971), 98.

⁵¹ Wakisaka Sakujirō, "Fujin hōmen'iin no shinshutsu" [Advancement of female district commissioners], *Shakai Jigyō* (1939.8): 40–47.

the 1930s, when women became responsible for protecting mothers and children, as well as in addressing matters related to the home. This was due to the promulgation of the Mother-Child Protection Law (*boshi hogo-hō*) in 1937 (implemented since 1938), aimed at rescuing mothers and children in need.⁵² The law targeted mothers with children under thirteen years old and unable to raise them due to poverty, as well as mothers without or lacking a spouse, which population the male district commissioners deemed female district commissioners more fit to address.⁵³ Therefore by 1941, there were approximately 3000 female district commissioners across Japan.⁵⁴ Their work entailed offering advice to people in need so that they will not need any assistance in the future, especially on household matters, such as how to manage the household budget that women from poorer background may not know how to do.⁵⁵

The work of female district commissioners, were not limited to helping mothers and children, and matters related to taking care of the physical home: similar to the male district commissioners, their responsibilities also included managing the household registry.⁵⁶ The age group of the male and female district commissioners

⁵² Nakamura Shūichi, “Josei minsei’iin, jidō’iin no rekishiteki yakuwari to tokusei” [Historical functions and characteristics of female welfare commissioners and child welfare volunteers], *Kyūshū Ōtani Kenkyū Kiyō* 32 (2006): 143.

⁵³ Wakisaka Sakujirō, “Boshi hogo no tettei to fujin hōmen’iin” [Thoroughness of mother-child protection and female district commissioners], *Shakai Jigyō* 21.11.2 (1938): 51–53.

⁵⁴ “Chihō daihyō fujin hōmen’iin ni kiku” [Inquiring regional female district commissioner representatives], *Fujin Kōron* 26.10 (1941.10): 175.

In Osaka, the proposal and the decision to include women as well as youth as part of the district commissioners was made in 1940. They were seen and to be treated as assistants to the male district commissioners, as women were thought to be not appropriate to take on the same roles that the men were required to fulfill in their districts. The decision to include women also came about because of the war and an increased interest in women to work. See Osaka-fu Shakaika, *Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyō nenpō shōwa jūgonen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1940] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1941).

⁵⁵ “Chihō daihyō fujin hōmen’iin ni kiku,” 174–184.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 179–180.

were also the same, in that the ages of the district commissioners ranged from 51 to 60 for both men and women.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the female district commissioners, too, worked on a volunteer basis, also from middle to upper-middle class backgrounds: they consisted of midwives, members of women's organizations, school teachers, and graduates of women's schools, all educated and some with previous social work experience.⁵⁸

During the wartime, both male and female district commissioners were involved in promoting marriage.⁵⁹ While promotion of intermarriage was not an official part of “district work” (*hōmen jigyō*), female district commissioners expressed their support of intermarriage at the First National Women's District Commissioner Conference, which was co-sponsored by the Ministry of Welfare and the All Japan League of District Commissioners (*Zen Nihon Hōmen'in Renmei*).⁶⁰ Held in Tokyo between October 28–29 in 1942 when the recipients of aid had been expanding due to the war—thus no longer unlimited to the poor—representatives of female district commissioners from prefectures around Japan participated in the Conference.⁶¹ The discussion topics ranged from reforming the citizens' lives, edification of deceased

⁵⁷ Zen Nihon Hōmen'in Renmei [All Japan League of District Commissioners], *Hōmen jigyō nenkan shōwa jūnananendoban* [District work yearbook 1942] (Tokyo: Zen Nihon Hōmen'in Renmei, 1943), 193.

⁵⁸ Naimushō Shakaikyoku (1930), 4.

⁵⁹ “Senjika no kekkon mondai” [Wartime marriage problems], *Shūhō* 343 (1942.5.12): 21–24.

⁶⁰ All Japan League of District Commissioners (*Zen Nihon Hōmen'in Renmei*), the central organ of the *hōmen'in* (district commissioner) system, was established in 1932, which is the same year in which the Poor Relief Law was implemented to provide aid to those in need. The League became *Zen Nihon Minsei'in Renmei* in 1946, and *hōmen'in* also became *minsei'in*, the welfare commissioners in the postwar period.

⁶¹ Ichikawa Fusae, *Ichikawa Fusae jiden* [Autobiography of Ichikawa Fusae] (Tokyo: Shinjuku Shobō, 1974), 557.

soldiers' families, to increasing and strengthening the population.⁶² The representatives also discussed ways to promote marriage, which they saw as a necessary step before having children, and raised the following tentative solutions: 1) popularization of marriage consultation centers; 2) research on providing social aid so that the youth would willingly marry; 3) offering thorough guidance and instruction on ways of living to prevent divorce; and 4) promoting marriage between Korean men and Japanese women.⁶³

To what extent the promotion of Korean-Japanese marriages was put into effect is unclear, due to there being no detailed meeting minutes nor a follow-up conference after 1942. But what can be concluded from the female district commissioners' support of intermarriage, is that the support came from women, who, like the men involved in harmony work and district work, were directly interacting and supporting people at the local level, and promotion of intermarriage would have been an extension of their regular activities that included registration of people into the household registration system and promotion of marriage.

Second group of women who supported intermarriage were those whom the secondary sources identify as "feminists" in modern Japanese history. One of these women is Yamada Waka, introduced briefly in Chapter 2. Yamada (1879–1957), was an *ex-Ameyukisan* turned feminist, who gained her reputation as a social critic, a

⁶² "Busshi nadono hanashi hazumu fujin hōmen'iin, shushō fujin o tou" [Female district commissioners' lively talk on resources and such, visit to the prime minister's wife], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, 29 October 1942: 3.

⁶³ Ikuta Hanayo, *Kekkon zengo* [Before and after marriage] (Osaka: Risseisha, 1944), 186. According to Ichikawa Fusae who attended the meeting, discussion on increasing and strengthening the population (which included discussion of promotion of marriage) was the liveliest (see Ichikawa [1974], 557).

journalist, and a female activist known for advocating for protection of motherhood.⁶⁴

The *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper* selected her to answer a Q&A column called *Josei Sōdan* (*Advice for Women*), which responded to a variety of questions, ranging from romance and marriage, to matters related to jobs, economics, and laws.⁶⁵ The column started in 1931, and in August of the same year, one of the featured questions was titled, “To be loved by a Korean man” (*Chōsenjin kara ai sareru*), which read:

“I am a woman who is perplexed these days for being loved by a Korean man. I love him, but if I were to marry him, what would the society think? I would think it natural for me to give up [marrying him] if I were to be held in contempt [by the society] for the rest of my life. However, I cannot but be drawn to him because of his earnest attitude. I please ask *sensei* of your opinion.”

And Yamada responded to the above advice-seeker as follows:

“If you marry a Korean man and you are held in contempt, those who hold you in contempt are *in the wrong*. If he loves you and you love him, it is a virtue to get married [to him]. You have to firmly keep in mind that you must not sacrifice virtue for vice.

I will certainly not say that it is acceptable to ignore what society thinks in all situations, but you may do so in your case. That is because [society’s opinion] is in the wrong. Continue to trample on the vices, and have courage in leading the general public to the right path.

His earnest love may be a treasure that you may not be able to obtain again. You should not lose that treasure just because of the society’s wrongful attitude.”⁶⁶ [Emphasis in original.]

⁶⁴ *Ameyukisan* were Japanese women recruited to work as prostitutes in the United States. For biography of Yamada, see Yamazaki Tomoko, *The Story of Yamada Waka: from Prostitute to Feminist Pioneer* (Tokyo: Kōdansha International, 1985).

⁶⁵ Tokyo Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., *Josei sōdan* [Advice for women] (Tokyo: Kimura Shobō, 1932), 4.

⁶⁶ “Josei sōdan: Chōsenjin kara ai sareru” [Advice for women: To be loved by a Korean man], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 8 August 1931: 10.

Not only was Yamada's response contradictory to the attitudes of Japanese men who opposed intermarriage, but the response also disclosed that the society, too, was not supportive of Japanese-Korean marriages. By identifying the reactions of the people around the woman who asked the question (alias S-ko) as committing a "vice" for holding her in contempt if she married a Korean man, and further encouraging S-ko to go ahead and marry him, her support may have been driven by assimilation goals, but aligned more closely with her advocacy of "free love," as opposed to arranged marriages that were the norm.

Besides Yamada, another feminist who indirectly enabled intermarriage, was Tanaka Takako, who ran a marriage consultation center (*kekkon sōdanjo*) of Tokyo city, established in April 1933. Because it operated under the Tokyo city government, it was limited to the residents of Tokyo city, but its goal was to mediate matches between men and women looking for marriage partners, and staffed with women who took on the role of an official matchmaker, becoming the first of its kind in Japan.⁶⁷

Tanaka (1886–1966), who was born Takanashi Takako, studied in the United States during the 1910s. She obtained a master's degree in social work at University of Chicago, then introduced American social work in Japan after returning in 1918. In 1919, she married philosopher Tanaka Ōdō (18??–1932), and also became an official

⁶⁷ "Tokyo-shi kekkon sōdanjo hanjōki" [Sketches of Tokyo city's marriage consultation center], *Fujokai* 49.4 (1934): 80–81. There were other marriage consultation centers across Japan privately prior to Tokyo City's Marriage Consultation Center. It was not until 1942 that a public marriage consultation was established in Osaka, which was the first in the Kansai region. See *Osaka-shi Kita Kekkon Sōdanjo nijūgonen no ayumi* [Twenty-five years of Osaka city's Kita Marriage Consultation Center] (Osaka: Osaka Shiritsu Kita Shiminkan, 1967); *Osaka-shi hōmen'in minsei'in seido gojūnenshi* [Osaka city's district commissioner and welfare commissioner system's fifty-year history] (Osaka: Osaka-shi Minsei'in Renmei, 1973), 164.

delegate to the International Labor Conference to represent female workers. Along with Yamada Waka, Tanaka was also one of the ten officers selected in the New Women's Association (*Shin Fujin Kyōkai*), the first women's rights organization in Japan founded in 1919 by Oku Mumeo, Hiratsuka Raichō, and Ichikawa Fusae.⁶⁸

Tanaka ran the marriage consultation center after her husband's death with other female consultants who interviewed men and women individually. Those interested had to bring a family register (*koseki tōhon*), a form of identification (*mibun shōmei*), a résumé (*rirekisho*), and a photograph to the center. Then at the center, they filled out a form that asked for their and their family's information, as well as what they looked for in a partner (Figure 3). Following a consultation, a house visit would be conducted by the center's employee, who collected information from the applicants' neighbors and co-workers. If and when an appropriate partner also registered at the center was found by the consultants, the photos were shared and an *omiai* (an arranged meeting to introduce the couples) were set up, accompanied by the applicants' parents.⁶⁹ The cost to sign-up was one yen, which allowed the applicants to find a partner over the course of one year. Although it closed down temporarily due to limited number of successful pairings after one year, the center re-opened due to high demand, pairing over one hundred couples in two years.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Ronald P. Loftus, *Telling Lives: Women's Self-Writing in Modern Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004), 45–51.

⁶⁹ Tanaka Takako, "Kekkon yori mitaru sesō" [Seeing Society through Marriage], *Itoshiji* 6.4 (1934.4): 29–30.

⁷⁰ "Kekkon baicai no senmonka bakari no enmusubi no hōhō no zadankai" [Roundtable talk on ways to tie the knot with just the marriage mediation specialists], *Shufu no Tomo* 19.7 (1935.7): 129.

(面 表)

其の他 考ふるべきこと	同居すべき家族	再婚の場 合には	嗜好	宗教	収入	現在の地位	學歷	性 格	職 業	自己のこと	身 長	體 重	健康状態	年 齢	病 名	理由	死別	再婚の場 合	其の他 考ふるべきこと
	子供の數と年齢	死別 年 前	酒は — 煙草は	兵隊關係						(甲) 男子結婚相談申込書									
										昭和 年 月 日 受理									
										相手に對する希望 (満足すべき最低條件)									
										健康診断の要否									

(第一號様式)

(面 表)

其の他 考ふるべきこと	再婚の場 合には	嗜好	宗教	學歷	性 格	職 業	自己のこと	身 長	體 重	健康状態	年 齢	病 名	理由	死別	再婚の場 合	其の他 考ふるべきこと			
	子供の數と年齢	死別 年 前	酒は — 煙草は	兵隊關係			(乙) 女子結婚相談申込書												
										昭和 年 月 日 受理									
										相手に對する希望 (満足すべき最低條件)									
										健康診断の要否									

(第二號様式)

Figure 3: Sample application forms for men (on the left) and for women (on the right). The columns are mostly the same, but the men's form asks about military service and whether he smokes or drinks, while women's form asks about special skills. The reverse side of the application (same for both men and women) asks for one's honseki (legal domicile, or location of the family register) which would have revealed whether one was "Japanese" or not. (From *Kekkon sōdan* [Marriage consultation], edited by Tanaka Takako (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1943), 236–239).

There unfortunately is no statistical data on the numbers of intermarriage arranged at the center, because the records were burnt during the war (Tanaka in the postwar period wrote as though the records were burnt on purpose).⁷¹ Yet unlike the

⁷¹ Tanaka Takako, "Kekkon sōdan' nijūnen: Enmusubi issenkumi no kobore banashi" [Twenty years of marriage consultation: Episodes of 1000 married couples], *Kingu* 28.10 (1952.11): 344–347.

Eugenic Marriage Counseling Center that was first established in 1927, staffed and sponsored by eugenicist Ikeda Shigenori's Eugenic Exercise/Movement Association that discouraged marriage between Japanese women and Korean men recruited as laborers from Korea, the marriage consultation center headed by Tanaka did not have any rules against intermarriage.⁷² What mattered in finding a marriage partner for Tanaka were the following: 1) character; 2) physique; 3) education; 4) occupation; 5) income; 6) family; 7) hobbies; and 8) pedigree (i.e., good genes), not the origin of the individuals.⁷³ And according to one observer of city of Tokyo's marriage consultation center in 1935, at least one marriage between a Taiwanese man and a Japanese woman, and another between a Korean man and a Japanese woman were successfully paired, and reported to have been going well.⁷⁴ Thus matching Japanese women to Korean and Taiwanese men was part of the matchmaking activities, the primary function of the *kekkon sōdanjo*.

Whether it be the female district commissioners during the wartime or Japanese feminists, what enabled Japanese women to consider promoting and/or supporting intermarriage between Japanese women and non-Japanese men when the government did not encourage nor discourage intermarriage, was the wartime

⁷² According to Jennifer Robertson, the Eugenic Marriage Counseling Center staff attempted to “discourage marriages between Japanese women and Korean men” (in “Blood Talks: Eugenic Modernity and the Creation of New Japanese,” *History and Anthropology* 13.3 (2002): 202, 205).

⁷³ Tanaka Takako, “Kekkon no aite o erabu ni wa” [On choosing a marriage partner], *Fujio to Shūyō* 5.5 (1936.5): 38–39. Interests and age were also factors, although a minor component (Tanaka Takako, “Oyomesan omukosan kouhosha hyōtenhō” [How to rate bride and groom candidates], *Fujin Kurabu* 15.7 [1934]: 194).

⁷⁴ “Kekkon kaizen zadankai 2” [Roundtable talk on improving marriage 2], *Chōsen Shakai Jigyō* 13.6 (1935): 43.

population policy—the same policy that prevented Japanese male opponents against intermarriage from suppressing it.

In January 1941, the cabinet endorsed the Guidelines for Establishing Population Policy (*Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō*), which aimed to increase the quality and quantity of the Japanese population to build a stronger military and labor force for the war. The goal of this policy was to reach a population of one hundred million people in the metropole by 1960, to be achieved by increasing the birth rate, decreasing the death rate, and lowering the age of marriage so that each family produced an average of five children, instead of the then average of four.⁷⁵

When the slogan “*umeyo fuyaseyo*” (“give birth and multiply”) prevailed, marriage, seen as a necessary step before reproduction, thus became an important component of achieving the wartime population policy. To implement it, the Marriage Patriotism Council (*Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai*) developed within the Ministry of Welfare in 1942, one year after the cabinet endorsed the Guidelines.⁷⁶ The executive board members consisted primarily of men from the Ministry of Welfare, but the Council also included women like Tanaka Takako and other feminists such as Oku Mumeo, Abe Shizue, and Muraoka Hanako. The purpose of the Council was also to promote facilities promoting marriage, such as the marriage consultation centers, and “enlightening” people with “correct thoughts” on marriage to achieve the goals of the

⁷⁵ The original document can be found on the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research website: www.ipss.go.jp/publication/j/shiryou/senzensiryous.asp.

⁷⁶ The Population Bureau was established within the Ministry of Welfare in August 1941, after the Guidelines for Establishing Population Policy was issued in January 1941 to implement the Guidelines. “Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai no setsuritsu” [Establishment of the Marriage Patriotism Council], *Jinkō Mondai Kenkyū* 3.2 (1942): 58; Yoshida (1971), 164.

population policy outlined in 1941. To disseminate “correct thoughts” on marriage, meant eliminating the view of marriage as that between individuals with their own interests, and instead teaching how marriage was a crucial basis for the family state.⁷⁷ The Council also aimed to enforce the idea of marriage as the basis of the family (*ie*) and *minzoku* (race/ethnicity), but the ultimate goal was to strengthen and increase the population for the war efforts.⁷⁸

When marriage became an interest of the state, state control over women increased. However, Japanese women were neither passive participants nor recipients of the control, since they actively participated in promoting marriage. For example, one of the planned activities of the Marriage Patriotism Council included publishing materials that promoted marriage, and since the Council’s founding, readers on marriage were published by and for women.⁷⁹ One of such readers was *Wartime Women’s Reader* (*Senji fujin dokuhon*) published in 1943, which included a chapter on marriage patriotism by Tanaka Takako, who not only still headed Tokyo city’s marriage consultation center in 1943, but was a member of the Council. Prior to becoming a Council member, Tanaka has written an article that women would instinctively be against war: due to their maternal instincts, women would not want to give birth to and raise a child, only for that child to be killed in the war.⁸⁰ Tanaka’s

⁷⁷ Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai [Marriage Patriotism Council], “Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai kaisoku” [Bylaws of Marriage Patriotism Council], July 1942, *Tachi Collection* (Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library), PDFY0921647.

⁷⁸ Shakai Jigyō Kenkyūjo [Social Work Research Center], *Nihon shakai jigyo nenkan shōwa jūhachinenban* [Japan social work yearbook 1943 edition] (Tokyo: Chūō Shakai Jigyō Kyōkai, 1943), 130–131.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁸⁰ Tanaka Takako, “Bosei no tachiba yori mitaru gunji kyōiku” [Military education from motherhood’s standpoint], *Fujin no Tomo* 19.2 (1925): 15–18.

earlier words on marriage also proposed a careful selection of a spouse, and the importance of romance for a marriage to be successful.⁸¹ Yet her stance changed in the 1940s, when she identified marriage not as a personal, private matter but a public matter, and how marriage was a duty for young people who needed to be willing to compromise when selecting a partner.⁸² This change is reflected in the *Reader*, as Tanaka sent a message to women, especially young women, to marry early and give birth to many children, through which they can serve the country.⁸³ In a similar fashion, feminist Ichikawa Fusae, who was not a Council member but another contributor to and editor of the *Reader*, found it an honor for women to finally be recognized and acknowledged for their position as mothers of the nation. Ichikawa also exhorted other women to marry, then give birth to and raise children—roles that only women could fulfill.⁸⁴ Marriage as what one does for the country is echoed by other Japanese women during the wartime, regardless of their membership in the Marriage Patriotism Council.⁸⁵

Considering how the government was promoting marriage, Japanese women's support of intermarriage was not incongruous to the government, similar to the members of the Harmony Association and the male district commissioners. Their

⁸¹ Tanaka Takako, "Ai no kekkon seikatsu" [Marriage life of love], *Fujin Gahō* 1921.11.191 (1921): 38–41.

⁸² "Atarashiki kekkon no rinri o kataru" [Discussion on new marriage ethics], *Hōsō* 1.2 (1941.11): 14–15.

⁸³ Tanaka Takako, "Kekkon hōkoku" [Marriage patriotism], *Senji fujin dokuhon* [Wartime women's reader], edited by Ichikawa Fusae (Tokyo: Shōwa Shobō, 1943), 37–38. The change starts appearing in 1941 (see "Korekara no kekkon to yūsei o kataru" [To talk of marriage and eugenics to come], *Ie no Hikari* 17.1.3 [1941.1.3]: 124–131).

⁸⁴ Ichikawa Fusae, "Fujin to kokka [Women and the family state]," *Senji fujin dokuhon* [Wartime women's reader], edited by Ichikawa Fusae (Tokyo: Shōwa Shobō, 1943), 9–10.

⁸⁵ For example, see Tanaka Takako, ed., *Kekkon sōdan* (1943).

support of intermarriage was possible because it was an extension of government-supported activity of marriage promotion. But why was it that Japanese women supported intermarriage, contrary to the Japanese men who opposed it? I argued that there were ideological and/or practical reasons behind the support of intermarriage by the members of the Harmony Association and the male district commissioners. I would like to additionally argue that there was a practical reason for Japanese women, too: for female supporters, support of intermarriage (and marriage) provided a solution to the issue of “marriage difficulty” during the wartime. In addition, women’s support of intermarriage was part of their advocacy work in gaining rights for Japanese women.

Kekkon ’nan, literally “marriage difficulty,” was an obstacle for women during the wartime: the difficulty for Japanese women to find a partner began after the Depression, when men chose not to marry because they were not financially stable to support a family. The problem exacerbated during the wartime with increasing financial hardships, in addition to Japanese men going away to war: marriage to Korean and/or Taiwanese men, then provided a solution to Japanese women who could not find a Japanese partner in wartime Japan.

Whether the partner was Japanese or not was a concern for Japanese men, such as Koya Yoshio, who happened to also be a member of the Marriage Patriotism Council.⁸⁶ On the contrary, whether the partner was Japanese or not was never brought up by Japanese women. Yamada’s advice on finding a partner, for example,

⁸⁶ Matsumura Hiroyuki attributes the proposal to suppress intermarriage to Koya, in “‘Kokubō kokka’ no yūseigaku” [Eugenics in a “defense state”], *Shirin* 83.2 (2000): 125–127.

was to choose someone who is loving and caring. Her message remained constant from the 1920s, and her stance was reflected in her advice to S-ko on marrying a Korean man who loved her.⁸⁷ Tanaka in *Wartime Women's Reader* argued the importance of checking the partner's *kettō* (pedigree, descent, or bloodline) to avoid marrying someone with hereditary diseases, and she further adamantly instructed women to avoid consanguineous marriage (*ketsuzoku kekkon*), but never interethnic marriage as did Koya. Neither warning nor dissuasion against intermarriage could be detected in writings by female district commissioners who considered promoting Korean-Japanese marriages. Instead, what was common in all of the marriage advice for women in finding a potential partner written by women in and out of the Marriage Patriotism Council, was the health of the partner. For example, in a discussion of what characteristics to look for in an ideal husband in a reader published in 1944, titled *Before and After Marriage (Kekkon zengo)* by Ikuta Hanayo, a friend of Tanaka Takako and one of the consultants at another marriage consultation center in Tokyo, good health was listed, but never the origin of the partner.⁸⁸ Because marriage would have afforded security to the women in need, Japanese women supported intermarriage as long as there was someone healthy to whom women could marry. Japanese men's reasons for not encouraging race mixing was connected with the larger context outside of Japan and how Japan as a country was seen by other countries, yet the concern for Japanese women involved in the discussion of intermarriage was more

⁸⁷ “Endōi musume no iku michi to michibikikata sōdankai” [Conference on the path of daughters with little prospect of marriage and how to guide them], *Fujin Kurabu* 15.2 (1934): 164–177; Yamada Waka, *Shōwa fujin dokuhon* [Shōwa women's reader] (Tokyo: Bunkyo Shoin, 1927).

⁸⁸ Ikuta (1944), 42.

connected with impact of inter/marriage to the people with whom they interacted on a daily basis at the local level.

If intermarriage provided a practical solution to address one of the social issues in wartime Japan, it also afforded female Japanese supporters of intermarriage to fulfill their own interests of advancing women's rights, particularly, recognition of Japanese women as citizens. Citizenship for Japanese women, Elyssa Faison in "Gender and Korean Labour in Wartime Japan" writes, depended on recognition from the state, "according to their ability and willingness to comply with the ideal of good wife and wise mother, a decidedly middle-class notion of feminine roles."⁸⁹ Jennifer Robertson further frames "female citizenship" to have been defined "in terms of procreation and consumption."⁹⁰ Therefore by helping Japanese women find a marriage partner to be able to give birth and become a mother, the female Japanese supporters of intermarriage were helping Japanese women become female citizens, which was of interest to Japanese feminists. Their support of intermarriage was not necessary because their view of Korean and Taiwanese people differed from Japanese men. Japanese women's primary concern and interest were Japanese women, for whom intermarriage provided one way to access privilege of becoming a citizen as a reproductive wife and mother—protection by the state.

⁸⁹ Japanese male citizenship "focused on men's rights and obligations as household heads, rights of political participation including voting, and military conscription," which Japanese women did not have. Elyssa Faison, "Gender and Korean Labour in Wartime Japan," *Gender and Labour in Korea and Japan: Sexing Class*, edited by Ruth Barraclough and Elyssa Faison (London: Routledge, 2009): 28.

⁹⁰ Robertson (2002): 203.

Conclusion

The Japanese government's stance on intermarriage was to neither encourage nor discourage it, thus there was no official, national promotion of Japanese-Korean and/or Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in the metropole. However, there were groups in the metropole that supported intermarriage, mostly Japanese-Korean marriages, which were the Harmony Association, the district commissioners, and Japanese women, who were all involved in activities that involved aiding people at the local level. These groups' support of intermarriage could be attributed to ideological and/or practical reasons, and it was possible to support intermarriage because it was an extension of their regular activities that were sanctioned by the government—assimilation of people from the colonies, social work, and promotion of marriage. Because their promotion and/or support of intermarriage was not contradictory to the government, their view of Korean and Taiwanese people should not be considered entirely different from the view of Japanese men in/or working with the government that chose not to promote intermarriage.

In the case of Japanese women examined in the latter half of this chapter, reasons for supporting intermarriage included a practical reason to address the problem of *kekkon'nan*. They were able to express their support of intermarriage, because the government also promoted marriage as part of its population policy in wartime Japan. But as a result of their collaboration with the wartime government in fulfilling their own interests to advance their and other women's rights and claim citizenship, their stories were forgotten in the postwar period. For example, scholars attribute the district commissioners' collaboration with the government, willing or not,

as the reason why many of the wartime records regarding district commissioners were discarded after the war.⁹¹ Among those who are forgotten includes Yamada Waka, whose participation as a feminist is being reappraised.⁹²

Jun Uchida, in her study of Japanese settlers in colonial Korea that aimed to complicate their roles as more than a simple collaborator of the government, used the word “brokers of empire” to refer to those who acted to fulfill their interests, while functioning as intermediaries between the state and the people.⁹³ I thus used the term in the title to not only show that Japanese women were not passive collaborators, which existing studies on Japanese women claim,⁹⁴ but also to make a connection between Japanese women at home and the Japanese empire when it may not be explicit: I argue that although Japanese women may have been well-intentioned in their support of inter/marriage so that Japanese women could become wives and mothers, which determined Japanese women’s citizenship and privilege attached to being recognized as a citizen, their conformity to the definition of a female citizen as a

⁹¹ Nakamura Shūichi concludes that the district commissioners were forced to collaborate ([2006]: 144). But Nagaoka Masami points to the *hōmen’iin*’s invasion of human rights and privacy in the process of offering aid to those in need, thus not a passive collaborator ([1999], 967). Herbert Liu also mentions the *hōmen’iin*’s collaboration with the war effort (in “Social Work in Japan,” *Social Work in East Asia*, edited by Christian Aspalter [Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2014], 15–32), while Yamamoto Keitarō who identifies the *hōmen’iin* as unwilling collaborators similar to Nakamura, attribute the collaboration as reasons for the discarding of documents (in “Hōmen’iin seido, soshiki no henka ni tsuite” [On district commissioner policy and organization change], *Fukkoku Senjika Osaka-fu hōmen jōmuiinkai giji sokkiroku* [Osaka: Kinki Chiiki Fukushi Gakkai, Osaka-fu Hōmen’iin Katsudō Shiryō Kenkyūsha, 1999], 970).

⁹² E.g., Yamazaki (1985) and Ayako Kano, *Japanese Feminist Debates: A Century of Contention on Sex, Love, and Labour* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2016).

⁹³ Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 5–8.

⁹⁴ For example, *Japanese Women: New Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present, and Future*, edited by Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow and Atsuko Kameda (The Feminist Press at City University of New York, 1995) and *Gendering Japanese History*, edited by Barbara Molony and Kathleen Uno (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005).

woman who became a reproductive wife and mother reinforced the social hierarchy in imperial Japan that discriminated against those who could not be citizens.

If the social hierarchy in wartime Japan was to be illustrated in a pyramid, then the emperor would be at the top, and all the imperial subjects under the emperor. Theoretically, Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese, as imperial subjects would be equidistant to the emperor at the top. Yet in reality, Japanese were above Koreans and Taiwanese: if broken down by gender, Japanese men would be at the top, and Korean and Taiwanese women at the bottom. The middle section, however, would not be clear-cut between Japanese women and Korean or Taiwanese men, because as Korean or Taiwanese, the men were treated as second-class citizens in Japan. Yet Korean and Taiwanese men could vote in Japan under universal male suffrage, while Japanese women could not.⁹⁵ And within this middle section under Japanese men and above Korean and Taiwanese women, the stratum of Japanese women could further be stratified between reproductive and non-reproductive women, which determined Japanese women's citizenship. Those who could bear children, and if not, advocate for it, could claim and be treated as a citizen, and move up the social hierarchy. Yet those who could not, for example, due to genetic illnesses or diseases thought to be genetic (e.g., Hansen's disease and mental illnesses), were sterilized and faced forced

⁹⁵ Korean and Taiwanese men living and registered as residents in Japan could vote in Japanese elections after 1925. Voting rights, however, were not extended to the colonies. Vera Mackie, "Picturing political space in 1920s and 1930s Japan," *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*, edited by Sandra Wilson (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 41; *Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan*, edited by Sonia Ryang and John Lie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 5, 127, 197n9.

abortion, hence deprived of their reproductive abilities.⁹⁶ And those who could not reproduce and thus could not perform the roles expected of a female citizen—motherhood for women advocated by Japanese feminists during the wartime—were not protected by the state and made disposable, such as the “comfort women.”

Thus by supporting inter/marriage that enabled Japanese women in Japan find partners, the Japanese women were inadvertently contributing to and perpetuating the system in which those who were not Japanese, not male, not in a heterosexual relationships, not abled, and/or lacking reproductive ability, were marginalized and discriminated in the imperial Japanese society. Even in the metropole, one could have contributed to imperialism, albeit indirectly, even if well-meaning and not involved in assimilation efforts such as the members of the Harmony Association and the male district commissioners.

Getting intermarried provided advantages to Japanese women who could then become wives and mothers, yet the female supporters of intermarriage were all in the position above helping those below, and they were not intermarried themselves. With the exception of a few members of the Harmony Association, who were the people who intermarried? The next chapter will distinguish those who promoted/supported intermarriage from people who intermarried to examine the latter group in-depth. Having examined the policies and promoters, the last two chapters will address the patterns of intermarriage in imperial Japan.

⁹⁶ 1940’s National Eugenics Law (*kokumin yūsei-hō*) prohibited abortion and birth control, but sterilization and abortion on eugenic grounds were sanctioned. Andrea Germer, Vera Mackie, and Ulrike Wöhr, “Introduction: Gender, nation and state in modern Japan,” *Gender, Nation, and State in Modern Japan* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 10.

Chapter 5

Examining the Patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages in Imperial Japan and Making a Case for Inclusive History

Chapters 2 and 3 explained why intermarriage was neither encouraged nor discouraged at the national level despite oppositions from Japanese men, while the previous chapter demonstrated that there were supporters of intermarriage who promoted and/or supported intermarriage as a part of their ordinary activities that involved providing aid to people in need at the local level. The lack of a large scale, Japan-wide promotion may explain the following low numbers of marriages recorded between Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese, from a compilation of reference materials that the Investigating Committee on Political Treatment of Koreans and Taiwanese Residents (*Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Seiji Shogū Chōsakai*) compiled in 1944 to determine how to treat Koreans and Taiwanese residing in Japan.¹

Location	Husband (Japanese)	Wife (Japanese)	Year
Japan (Japanese-Korean Marriages)	183 (133 unregistered, 50 registered)	9760 (7214 unregistered, 2363 registered)	Shōwa 14 (1939)
Korea (Japanese-Korean Marriages)	1009 (645 unregistered, 364 registered)	1606 (734 unregistered, 872 registered)	Shōwa 17 (1942)
Taiwan (Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages)	187 (registered)	596 (registered)	Shōwa 19 (1944)

¹ Numbers taken from Naimushō Kanrikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs Administrative Bureau], “Chōsen, Taiwanjin to naichijin to no tsūkonjōkyō” [Situation of intermarriage between Koreans, Taiwanese, and Japanese], 1944, *Japan Center for Asian Historical Records*, A15060174000, www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M0000000000000325037.

Titled “Intermarriage situation of Koreans, Taiwanese, and Japanese,” this data is not comprehensive: there is no data on unregistered Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in Taiwan, nor any data of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in Japan. But these numbers reveal that intermarriage was not a common occurrence in Japan. The numbers also reveal that there were more Japanese-Korean marriages, and how more Japanese women, Korean men, and Taiwanese men intermarried compared to Japanese men, Korean women, and Taiwanese women in all three locations.

Since the people who supported intermarriage were not necessarily the ones engaged in intermarriage—with the exceptions of Korean members of the Harmony Association with Japanese wives—who were the people who intermarried? Why did Japanese women, Korean men, and Taiwanese men intermarry more frequently than Japanese men, Korean women, and Taiwanese women? And for what reason did they intermarry? Were the people who intermarried less discriminatory? Were there any advantages to intermarriage, just as there were advantages to the Japanese feminist supporters of intermarriage, who could demonstrate their patriotism to the state while working in the interests of advancing women’s rights? And when Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were a minor phenomenon in history, why study them? In what ways can their history be included into history?

This chapter is guided by three main questions. The first question, is “Why did people intermarry?” In this section, I introduce the three dominant narratives of intermarriage—intermarriage as a tragedy, romance, or hypergamy—to argue for consideration of other narratives, because existing ones exclude cases of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriage that were not a result of force, love, or

marrying up, and cases that cannot be fully explained by the “colonizer” and “colonized” categories alone. My second question is again, “Why did people intermarry?” But this section aims to find similarities with the reasons why people married in general. Focusing on wartime Japan, I argue in favor of studying the history of intermarriage not in isolation and/or limited to colonial categories, to reveal factors beyond gender, race/ethnicity, and class that led people to intermarry: I propose studying minority and mainstream histories together and looking for similarities instead of differences, because it could be helpful in conceiving ways to de-marginalize the history of minorities, such as the history of intermarriage, and also to locate assumptions made in historiography. Based on an assumption that I observed in examining intermarriages together with non-intermarriages in wartime Japan, I make a case for inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses to write a more inclusive history in the last and final section of this chapter, which asks “Why study people who intermarried?” Because expanding the framework of sexuality to include asexuality enables studying historical figures who are still unrepresented in history and challenging the deniers of history, and making this case was made possible by studying Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, I further argue in favor of and seek to advocate studying the history of intermarriage and other histories of minorities.

Why did people intermarry?—Part 1

The numbers of registered interethnic marriages have gradually increased over the twentieth century, yet even in the last years of the imperial period, the numbers

were significantly less than the total number of marriages recorded in Japan. To explain the low numbers and why the common pattern of intermarriage in Japan was not that between colonizing men and colonized women seen in other empires, scholars have attributed to people's resistance and the failure of the intermarriage policy as an assimilationist policy.² For example, Suzuki Yūko argues that the low number of Japanese-Korean marriages, especially between Japanese men and Korean women, was a sign of Korean women's resistance to the assimilationist policy that aimed to "deprive Koreans' ethnicity."³ Lee Jeong-Seon attributes the low social standing of Korean women as one reason behind the low numbers, particularly of Korean women engaging in intermarriage.⁴ Whether Taiwanese women also resisted is unclear, but according to Miyazaki Seiko, they were not targeted to intermarry in colonial Taiwan, because they were viewed with skepticism by the Government General of Taiwan.⁵

Another reason attributed to the low numbers is the presence of Japanese discrimination against Koreans and Taiwanese.⁶ For example, Japanese women were

² Kim Yōngdal, "Nihon no Chōsen tōchi-ka ni okeru 'tsūkon' to 'konketsu'—iwayuru 'naisen kekkon' no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite" [Japan's "intermarriage" and "blood mixing" in colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called "Japanese-Korean marriage"], *Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō* 39 (1999): 1–46

³ Suzuki Yūko, *Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon* [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992).

⁴ Lee Jeong-Seon, "Chōnshichejegi ilcheūi chongdongwōn jōngchaekkwā 'naesōnhonhyōl' munje" [The Total Mobilization System during Wartime and the Policy for the Japanese-Korean Hybrid Population], *Yōksamunjeyōngu* 29 (2013.4): 217–255; Lee Jeong-Seon, "'Naisen Kekkon' ni miru teikoku Nihon no Chōsen tōchi to koseki" [Imperial Japan's rule over Korea and household registration as seen in "Japanese-Korean marriage"], *Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai Ronbunshū* 52 (2014): 69–97.

⁵ Miyazaki Seiko, "'Naitai kyōkon' to shokuminchi ni okeru Taiwan josei seinendan no ichizuke" ["Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage" and the position of women's organization in colonial Taiwan], *Nantōshigaku* 70 (2007): 83–97

⁶ Nam Bujin, "'Naisen kekkon' no bungaku: Jang Hyeokju no Nihongo sakuin o chūshin ni" [Literature of "Japanese-Korean marriage": Focus on Japanese works of Jang Hyeokju], *Jinbun Ronshū: Shizuoka Daigaku Jinbungakubu Shakaigakka, Gengogakka Kenkyū Hōkoku*

discouraged from marrying Korean or Taiwanese men by their families, and at times cut off from the family due to the family's prejudice against Korean or Taiwanese men.⁷ The oppositions from people surrounding the individuals who planned to intermarry due to discrimination were visible in the stories covered in the press (Chapter 2) and the cases reported by the district commissioners (Chapter 4).

Despite the discrimination and the lack of the Japanese government's proactive promotion of intermarriage, however, there were still people who intermarried. Who were they, and why did they intermarry? There are three main narratives through which scholars explain the history of intermarriage: The first common narrative is that of intermarriage as a tragedy. Intermarriage is viewed as one of the assimilationist policies that was forced onto the people, particularly to the detriment of Koreans and Taiwanese. Suzuki's work is representative of this, in that she views intermarriage policy as a way to eliminate Korean's ethnicity by attempting to assimilate Koreans from the blood level. Thus the royal marriage between Korean prince Yi Ŭn and Japanese princess Nashimoto Masako, because the two did not have a say in their marriage, is given as an example of "tragedy."⁸ Suzuki also sees Japanese-Korean marriages functioning as one way to forcefully keep Korean laborers in Japan from leaving through allocation of Japanese women, in which Korean men became victims of the Japanese state, and Japanese women became victims and victimizers.⁹ Cho

55.1 (2004): 205; Sakaguchi Naoki, *Senzen Dōshisha no Taiwan ryūgakusei: Kirisutokyō kokusai shugi no genryū o tadoru* [Taiwanese study abroad students at prewar Dōshisha: Tracing the source of Christian internationalism] (Tokyo: Hakuteisha, 2002), 15.

⁷ Miyazaki (2007).

⁸ Suzuki (1992), 76, 88–93.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 85.

Kyōngdal's discussion of Japanese-Korean marriages in his book on colonial Korea and Japan that highlights the violence of colonialism, also echoes Suzuki's view of Japanese-Korean marriages as a tragedy. Viewing intermarriage as Japanese colonizers' assimilationist attempt to eliminate Korean ethnicity, Cho gives examples of how the rate of divorce was higher than the rate of marriage in Japanese-Korean marriages, to point out the unsuccessfulness, in addition to the tragic cases in which Japanese husbands sold their Korean wives to the pleasures quarters after divorce.¹⁰

The tragedy narrative is particularly prominent in the postwar period in Japan. For example, Morita Yoshio's memoir of repatriation from Korea published in 1964 includes a record of a Japanese woman who was coaxed into intermarriage and claimed to have been "sacrificed for *naisen ittai*" as one of the "tragedies" during the repatriation period. This woman and her Korean husband were praised as a "model couple" and featured in newspapers during the colonial period, but "abandoned by Japanese and Koreans" after the war ended even though they were forced to intermarry.¹¹ Another example that follows the tragic narrative is from a magazine called *Ushio*, which in 1972 featured testimonies of people who intermarried during the imperial period and living in South Korea at the time, along with commentaries by social critics who criticized the Japanese government and called for recognition of its responsibilities to take care of people who intermarried and were forgotten.¹²

¹⁰ Cho Kyōngdal, *Shokuminchi Chōsen to Nihon* [Colonial Korea and Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), 174–175.

¹¹ Morita Yoshio, *Chōsen shūsen no kiroku: Beiso ryōgun no shinchū to Nihonjin no hikiage* [A record of the end of war in Korea: Advance of American and Soviet troops and repatriation of the Japanese] (Tokyo: Gannandō Shoten, 1964), 820.

¹² Ōta Ryū, "Koumi-san o jisatsu saseta nowa dareka," Lee Hoesung, "Dōhō kankaku ga towareru," and Fujisaki Yasuo, "Kokuseki o kesareta zaikan Nihonjin," in "Tokushū: 'Kimin'

Historian and non-fiction writer Yamazaki Tomoko in a more recent series of articles on history of Asian women from 2007, introduces the story of Japanese-Korean marriages as a “tragedy” that poses as a “deep, grievous problem” for both Japanese and Koreans. According to Yamazaki, it was a tragedy because Koreans had no option but to follow the Japanese government’s policy and promotion of intermarriage, and because of the poor postwar situation of Japanese women left in Korea.¹³

Framing the history of intermarriage as a tragedy brings attention to the discriminatory and the violent aspects of colonialism. It sheds light on Japanese government’s and people’s role as colonizers and victimizers during the imperial period, and cases of intermarriage that were forced.¹⁴ But the problem with viewing people who intermarried as victims, is that it assumes intermarriage was a national policy that was enforced by the government when it was not. Thus it overlooks the roles and presence of supporters of intermarriage at the local level, such as the district commissioners who helped Japanese and Koreans in Japan register their marriages. It also leaves out the stories of people who were not forced into intermarriage and may not see themselves as victims of the government. Kim Yōngdal criticizes this

ni saretā Kankoku no Nihonjinzuma” [Special feature: Japanese wives rendered “abandoned people” in South Korea], *Ushio* 153 (1972.5): 196–252.

¹³ Yamazaki Tomoko, “Okisarareta Nihon josei tachi (jō) ‘naisen kekkon’ to ‘tairiku hanayome’ [Japanese women left forgotten (part one) “Japanese-Korean marriage” and “continental brides], *Sekai* (2007.3): 277, 280.

¹⁴ For example, Yamazaki Tomoko, who tells the history of intermarriage as a tragedy, explains her time spent living with a young Korean man in her early twenties during the 1950s, during which time she experienced ethnic discrimination and realized her ignorance about Asia as a Japanese person, as what led to her research on Japan’s interactions with other Asian countries from women’s standpoint. Yamazaki Tomoko, “Ajia Josei Kōryūshi Kenkyū” [Research on Asian women’s history of exchange], *Minato no Hito*, www.minatonohito.jp/products/020_02.html.

narrative, too, as a “personal affront” to people who intermarried.¹⁵ Moreover, the tragedy narratives are based on postwar testimonies from people who intermarried before 1945, and “discovered” in a poor state in South Korea in the 1960s and the 1970s. But what about people who intermarried and were living in Japan or Taiwan? Were all intermarriages in the Japanese empire forced? And did all intermarriages from the imperial period result in a tragic ending?

The second narrative is the romance narrative, in which those who intermarried are explained to have married out of love. For example, Yamazaki describes the story of a Japanese woman named Murakami Haru and her unregistered marriage to Seo Won-rok as a romance story, taken from *Keishū Nazare'en* (1982) by Kamisaka Fuyuko, which featured stories of Japanese women who intermarried during the imperial period, found in South Korea in the postwar period, and taken care of at the Gyeongju Nazareth Gardens. Murakami fell in love with Seo, whom she met in Japan. She ran away from home and lived with Seo for one year, until she was discovered a year later by the police because her parents reported her missing. At the time of her discovery, Murakami was already pregnant, and she escaped to Korea to be with Seo when her parents refused to allow her to marry Seo. Yet in Korea, Murakami found out that Seo was already married with a Korean wife, and she miscarried out of shock. This story is told as a romance story, because Seo chose to live with Murakami in a separate house from his Korean family.¹⁶

The romance narrative would also include the case of Tauchi Chizuko, a

¹⁵ Kim (1999): 44.

¹⁶ Yamazaki (2007): 285–286.

Japanese woman who married a Korean man, Yoon Chi-ho, known as the “leader of beggars,” in 1938. Her story of taking care of Korean orphans in an orphanage in Korea from the colonial period with her husband, and through the Korean War and beyond after her husband’s death, appears in books and articles about her life and lifework as “love that crossed borders” and as a sign of hope.¹⁷ For example, an article in *Korea Times* by Kim Mi-kyoung, professor at Hiroshima City University’s Hiroshima Peace Institute on remembering Tauchi Chizuko, frames the story as a “heartfelt inspiration” amidst political divisions over history between Japan and South Korea, in 2015.¹⁸ Other stories that would fall under this category would include that of S-ko who wrote to Yamada Waka to ask whether she should marry a Korean man whom she loves, as well as the district commissioner’s case of helping a Japanese woman KiXX, who eloped with a Korean man named Choi to Korea, but forcibly brought back to Japan by her family (Chapter 4).

The romance narrative addresses cases of intermarriage in which people were not forced into intermarriage, but may ignore the larger context. Kirsten Ziomek, in attempting to write the histories of subalterns in colonial history, demonstrates how Yayutz Bleyh, an Atayal woman, was taken advantage of by the Japanese colonial government, by examining Yayutz’s marriage to a Japanese man, Nakano Chūzō, in Taiwan as more than a “love story” as it was sensationalized.¹⁹ Kamoto Itsuko, in her

¹⁷ For example, see Moriyama Satoshi, *Shinju no uta: Kankoku koji no haha Tauchi Chizuko no shōgai* [Song of a pearl: Life of Tauchi Chizuko, mother of Korean orphans] (Tokyo: Shinju no Uta Kankō Inka, 1983).

¹⁸ Kim Mi-kyoung, “Remembering Tauchi Chizuko,” 30 July 2015, *The Korea Times*, www.koreatimes.co.kr:80/www/news/opinion/2015/09/197_183833.html.

¹⁹ Kirsten Ziomek, “The Possibility of Liminal Colonial Subjecthood: Yayutz Bleyh and the Search for Subaltern Histories in the Japanese Empire,” *Critical Asian Studies* 47.1 (2015):

book on “international marriage” that contains a discussion of Japanese-Korean marriages, is also critical of students who romanticize “international marriage” for overlooking and ignoring history.²⁰ There is an additional danger of the romance narrative in commodifying those who intermarry and their children as “emblems of multiculturalism.”²¹ Thus those who intermarried despite the unwelcoming environment may present an inspirational story and pose as signs of hope, but it cannot fully explain the pattern of why there were more pairs between Japanese women and Korean or Taiwanese men, versus pairs of Japanese men and Korean or Taiwanese women.

To better analyze why people intermarried—neither out of force nor romance—recent studies are examining the factors that led to the particular patterns of intermarriage in the Japanese empire, where more colonizing women married colonized men. The third common explanation for intermarriage in the Japanese empire is hypergamy, particularly for Korean and Taiwanese men. For example, Su Yun Kim examines Japanese-Korean marriages against the “archival grain”: instead of associating intermarriage solely with assimilation, she analyzes how male Korean intellectuals could climb the social hierarchy through control of Japanese women to reveal the precariousness of the colonial social hierarchy.²² Through marriage to

125–130.

²⁰ Kamoto Itsuko, *Kokusai kekkonron!?: Rekishihihen* [International marriage theory?!: History edition] (Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 2008).

²¹ Stephen Small and Rebecca C. King-O’Riain, “Global Mixed Race: An Introduction,” in *Global Mixed Race*, edited by Rebecca C. King-O’Riain, Stephen Small, Minelle Mahtani, Miri Song, and Paul Spickard (New York and London: New York University Press, 2014), viii.

²² Su Yun Kim, “Racialization and Colonial Space: Intermarriage in Yi Hyosök’s Works,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 18.1 (Spring 2013): 29–59.

Japanese women, especially if they entered into the wife's family, Korean and Taiwanese men could become Japanese, and move up from the position of second-class citizens.²³ And this is used to explain why many elite Korean and Taiwanese men, who were doctors and lawyers, married Japanese women, as marrying Japanese women meant marrying up. There were also economic benefits to Korean and Taiwanese men who married Japanese women, as they could earn a better salary compared to other Korean and Taiwanese men who did not intermarry.²⁴ This further explains why Korean and Taiwanese men who married Japanese women were not limited to elite men and consisted of laborers from the colonies residing in Japan.

Intermarriage as a form of hypergamy for Korean and Taiwanese men could explain marriages that did not fall under the tragedy and the romance narratives, but it does not address the appeals of intermarriage for Japanese women in Japan, where most of the intermarriage took place, considering that their marriage to Korean or Taiwanese men were opposed by parents and the people surrounding them.²⁵ The three existing narratives could also overlook other reasons why people married, such

²³ Huang Chiachi, "Dainiji Sekai Taisen zengo no Nihon ni okeru Taiwan shushinsha no teijūka no ichikatei: Raifu kōsu no shiten kara" [A Process of the Taiwanese Resident's settlement into Japan before and after the World War II from the viewpoint of their life courses], *Kaikō Toshi Kenkyū* 3 (March 2008): 134.

²⁴ Takeshita Shūko, *Kokusai kekkon no shakaigaku* [Sociology of international marriage] (Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 2000), 57; Takeshita Shūko, *Kokusai kekkon no shosō* [Various aspects of international marriage] (Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 2004), 14.

²⁵ In Korea and Taiwan, one explanation for why more Japanese women intermarried than Japanese men, is the unpopularity of Japanese women born in the colonies for Japanese men, who returned to Japan to find Japan-born Japanese wives. See Gaichi Bunka Kyōkai [Colonial Culture Association], *Gaichi fujin seikatsu to kekkon* [Lives of women in the colonies and marriage] (Tokyo: Fujin no Iesha, 1942). Takenaka Nobuko also notes how Japanese men from the colonies returned to Japan to find Japanese wives, instead of marrying Japanese women born and raised in the colonies. See *Shokuminchi Taiwan no Nihon josei seikatsushi: Shōwahan, jō* [Japanese women's life history in colonial Taiwan: Shōwa edition, part one] (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 2001), 142, 219.

as religious and practical reasons:

For example, religion seems to have played a role in the case of a male Taiwanese Christian graduate of Dōshisha University, Reverend Chou Tsai-tz'u, the first student to study abroad from Taiwan in 1905. He married a Japanese woman named Katsumi Chiyo, who was a graduate of Dōshisha Women's College, whose three brothers knew Chou from Dōshisha, a Christian institution.²⁶ Religion also connected Tauchi and Yoon, who were both Christians. Yamada Waka, who supported a Japanese woman's marriage to a Korean man and judged the Japanese society that discriminated Koreans as "wrong," was also Christian.²⁷ To what extent and how religion and/or religious figures were involved in intermarriage is unclear, but it is a factor that is overlooked when we focus only on race/ethnicity, gender, and class in analyzing colonizer-colonized relationships.

There were also cases of intermarriage in which people married for practical reasons. One example, is from Huang Chiachi's interview with a Taiwanese man identified as A.M., who had an arranged marriage to a Japanese woman in 1944. The Japanese woman's father, who made a living selling shoes, arranged his daughter's marriage to A.M., because even though he was Taiwanese and considered a "second-class citizen," his income was higher and the Japanese father's business was struggling

²⁶ Sakaguchi, in his study of the Taiwanese study abroad students, points out that Katsumi's parents were progressive for allowing their daughter to access education, but they still had opposed her marriage to Chou. Sakaguchi (2002), 13–26.

²⁷ "Josei sōdan: Chōsenjin kara ai sareru" [Advice for women: To be loved by a Korean man], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, 8 August 1931: 10. In biography of Yamada authored by Yamazaki Tomoko, she claims that Yamada's opinions and moral positions were influenced partly by her Christianity (the other factors that influenced her were her life in America and her past as a sex worker). See *The Story of Yamada Waka: from Prostitute to Feminist Pioneer* (Tokyo: Kōdansha International, 1985), 142.

during the wartime.²⁸

Such practical and religious reasons may be overlooked in the dominant narratives, because the existing mainstream narratives are based on and limited to the context of colonial history, in which Japanese are strictly categorized into the position of the “colonizer,” assumed to have had more power, and Koreans and Taiwanese into the “colonized” category, in which they are seen to lack power and at a disadvantage. This leads to those who were “forced” into intermarriage as victims of Japanese colonialism and viewing of “love” stories as signs of hope that overcame discrimination. This is not surprising, because existing history of intermarriage focuses on intermarriage in colonial Korea and Taiwan. Association of colonizer as the powerful and colonized as powerless may work in explaining colonizer-colonized relationships, such as those in the modern Euro-American empires, where the common pattern was that between white, colonizing men and colonized women of color. Yet in the Japanese empire where the most frequent pattern of intermarriage was that between colonizing women and colonized men, in which race/ethnicity and gender power dynamics did not run parallel, there is a limit to what the “colonizer” and “colonized” categories can explain. The hypergamy narrative begins to address the pattern of intermarriage in the Japanese empire, and it explains why more Korean and Taiwanese men intermarried. To further explore the appeals of intermarriage, particularly for Japanese women in the metropole who were not forced into marriage nor married out of love, and also those who are excluded from the existing narratives,

²⁸ Huang (2008): 134–135.

I propose studying the history of intermarriage in the context of modern and imperial Japanese history, focusing on the similarities instead of the differences with endogamous (Japanese-Japanese) marriages. While race/ethnicity, gender, and class are primary categories used in analyzing interracial/interethnic relationships in imperial and colonial studies, I believe that there were other factors that could explain the patterns of intermarriage in imperial Japan.

Why did people intermarry?—Part 2

This section will compare exogamous (Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese) marriages and endogamous (Japanese-Japanese) marriages, particularly during the wartime in Japan when the number of intermarriages increased. Because existing studies focus on intermarriage in Korea and Taiwan as a form of assimilation in colonial history, I place it in Japan as part of modern and imperial Japanese history, to attempt to write a more comprehensive history of intermarriage beyond those told in the tragedy, romance, and hypergamy narratives. Following the warning Rosemary Breger and Rosanna Hill make in *Cross-Cultural Marriage*, that “preoccupation with race, ethnicity, Other—that is, with difference—blurs the fact that there are so many other facets affecting cross-cultural encounters,”²⁹ I focus on similarities between Japanese-Japanese marriages and Japanese-Korean/Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in Japan. I believe that exploring the similarities rather than examining the history of intermarriage in isolation, can reveal factors besides race/ethnicity, gender, and class

²⁹ Rosemary Breger and Rosanna Hill, “Introducing Mixed Marriages,” *Cross-Cultural Marriage: Identity and Choice*, edited by Rosemary Anne Breger and Rosanna Hill (Oxford: Berg, 1998), 11.

that led to intermarriage, so that the people who intermarried but are excluded from the existing narratives can be included. I also argue in favor of examining similarities to conceive ways to write a more inclusive history and to reveal assumptions in historiography that remain unquestioned.

One of the similarities that I propose be considered, is the context in which interethnic and non-interethnic marriages took place: in wartime Japan, men and women of marriageable age were subject to the state's promotion of marriage. Since the Ministry of Welfare issued the Guidelines for Establishing Population Policy (*Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō*) in January 1941, it established the Marriage Patriotism Council (*Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai*) as a way to promote marriage to achieve the goal of increasing the Japanese population to 100 million by 1960, because marriage was seen as a prerequisite to giving birth to increase the population.³⁰ The Ministry of Welfare also issued the “Ten Maxims on Marriage” (*kekkon jikkun*) found in various outlets. For example, one of the places that introduced the “Ten Maxims,” was in an article titled “From now on marriage should be like this,” in *Shashin Shūhō* (*Weekly Photographical Journal*), a weekly pictorial journal that functioned as “part of the government's publicity policy.”³¹ Published in April 1942, the piece called for healthy marriages in order to increase the number of healthy people for the construction of Greater East Asia, and included the “Ten Maxims”: 1) Pick someone you can trust as life's significant other; 2) Pick someone who is both physically and

³⁰ Ichikawa Fusae, ed., *Fujinkai no dōkō* [Trends in women's world] (Tokyo: Bunmatsudō Shuppan, 1944), 90–97.

³¹ “A Window into the Early Shōwa Period—*Shashin Shūhō*: Weekly Photographical Journal, 1938–1945,” *Japan Center for Asian Historical Records*, www.jacar.go.jp/english/shuhou-english/home.html.

mentally healthy; 3) Exchange each other's health information; 4) Pick someone without bad heredity; 5) Avoid consanguineous marriages; 6) Marry as early as possible; 7) Do not be bound by superstitions and conventions; 8) Respect the opinion of parents and elders; 9) Keep the ceremonies simple and register immediately; and 10) Give birth and raise them for the country.³² Health was important, but there were no instructions against choosing a non-Japanese spouse.

Promotion of marriage as a means of achieving the population policy goals also became known as the “new system of marriage” (*kekkonshintaisei*), in which marriage was increasingly seen to be tied to and for the state, and the state gave instructions on marriage.³³ This was also the time when *umeyo fuyaseyo* (“give birth and multiply”) campaign prevailed, during which time those who gave birth to many children were awarded for their patriotism and efforts for the country.³⁴ Consideration of how the government nationally promoted marriages and awarded people who married to have children, especially when there were no instructions against marrying non-Japanese in the marriage guides, would allow for the demonstration of patriotism to be one reason why people intermarried, if they did not marry out of force or love.

³² “Korekara no kekkon wa kono yōni” [From now on marriage should be like this], *Shashin Shūhō* 218 (April 29, 1942): 18–19. Also found in Aoki Nobuharu's *Yūsei kekkon no hanashi* [Stories about eugenic marriage] (Tokyo: Ryūginsha, 1942). According to Yoshida Kyūichi, the “Ten Maxims on Marriage” was created at the Ministry of Welfare's Eugenic Marriage Consultation Center (*Kōseishō Yūsei Kekkō Sōdanjo*) to instruct an ideal marriage (see *Shōwa shakai jigyōshi* [Shōwa social work history] [Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 1971], 165).

³³ *Kekkōshintaisei* [New system of marriage] (Tokyo: Seijisha, 1941); *Kekkōshintaisei danwashū* [Conversations on new marriage system] (Tokyo: Asahi Shobō, 1941); Nakamura Miyuki, “Jinkō seisaku no shosō: Kekkō hōkoku o megutte” [Various aspects of the population policy: Concerning marriage patriotism], *Sensō to josei zasshi: 1931–1945* [War and women's magazines: 1931–1945], edited by Kindai Josei Bunkashi Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 2001), 126.

³⁴ “Kodakara hōkoku” [Childbearing patriotism], *Shashin Shūhō* 152 (1941): 20–21.

There were similarities in the exogamous and endogamous marriages themselves. One was the practice of not registering marriages. Because people did not register their marriages, which would have resulted in illegitimate children who could not be tracked by the government and require the government to provide unnecessary aid when there were family members to take care of, activities of the members of the Marriage Patriotism Council included registration of marriages. For example, to prompt people to register their marriages, one of the suggestions included registering marriage on the day of the wedding ceremony, so that the registration would not be forgotten.³⁵ If we only followed the tragedy narrative, we may see the district commissioners' registration of Japanese-Korean marriages solely as an enforcement of assimilation, but taking into consideration of the government attempt to register marriages would open to non-assimilationist explanation for the registration of intermarriages in Japan.

Another similarity is the arranged and love marriages. Prior to 1945, arranged marriage was the norm in Japan: according to Satoshi Ota, seventy percent of the couples had an arranged marriage in 1940.³⁶ The marriage partner would be chosen by their parents, their workplace supervisors, neighbors, and/or through the marriage consultation centers, which were not limited to the one ran by Tanaka Takako in Tokyo (marriage consultation centers were built around Japan to alleviate the

³⁵ “Korekara no kekkon wa kono yōni”; “Atarashiki kekkon no rinri o kataru” [Discussion on new marriage ethics], *Hōsō* 1.2 (1941.11): 14–21.

³⁶ Ninety percent of couples married out of love by 1996. See “Herbivorous Boys and Predatory Girls: Gender, Consumerism, and Low Birthrate in Japan,” *Japan's Demographic Revival: Rethinking Migration, Identity and Sociocultural Norms*, edited by Stephen Robert Nagy (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2016), 224.

difficulty of finding a partner).³⁷ Thus entering an arranged marriage and being forced into marriage without choice, was not unique to cases of intermarriage.

Although arranged marriages were in the majority, “love marriages” also existed. Since arranged marriage was the norm, selecting one’s partner out of one’s choice could be seen as a positive example of women exercising their agency or subverting figures of authority. Yet the reason why “love marriages” could coexist with arranged marriages, was because as long as they were “public,” they could be counted and contribute to the goal of increasing the human resources.³⁸ Thus both the people who intermarried out of love and force were still within the confines of state-approved marriages: love marriages were not necessarily free from established boundaries and thus require careful examination before celebrating or tokenizing them.

There are also shared reasons behind intermarriages and non-intermarriages, in that marriage afforded economic stability. During the wartime when Japanese men were conscripted, there was a gender imbalance that led to *kekkon ’nan*, difficulty in finding a marriage partner, for Japanese women in the metropole.³⁹ This gender imbalance, combined with the factor that most Koreans and Taiwanese laboring in

³⁷ For a list of marriage consultation centers in Japan, see “Zenkoku kekkon sōdanjo ichiranhyō” [A list of marriage consultation centers across the nation], *Fujin Kōron* 28.7 (1943.7): 77–79. Also see Tanaka Takako’s *Kekkon sōdan* [Marriage consultation] (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1943), 240–278.

³⁸ Sakai Yūichirō, “Senzenki ‘baikaikon shugi’ no shisō to ronri” [The ideology and normative logic on marital mediation in prewar Japan], *Keiō Gijuku Daigaku Daigakuin Shakaigaku Kenkyūka Kiyō: Shakaigaku Shinrigaku Kyōikugaku, Ningen to Shakai no Tankyū* 70 (2010): 105–107.

³⁹ Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai [Marriage Patriotism Council], “Jigyōjō ni okeru kekkon shōrei” [Promotion of marriage at the workplace], 1942, *Tachi Collection* (Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library), PDFY09121648, 1.

Japan were men who could socially and financially benefit from marrying Japanese women, is one explanation for the pattern of intermarriage in which more women of the colonizing group married men of the colonized group.⁴⁰ While the hypergamy narrative focuses on benefits for Korean and Taiwanese men, it does not fully explain the benefits for Japanese women—but the economic stability afforded by marriage offers one explanation. For example, in marriage advices for women featured in women’s magazines during the wartime, including ones by Tanaka Takako and others working at the marriage consultation centers, income was considered one of the greatest factors in spouse selection for women. So much so, that marriage advisors observed how men of lower class felt pressured and were hesitant to marry because of their low income.⁴¹ The importance of economic security can also be read from Tanaka Takako who stated that women who had the economic means to take care of themselves did not have to marry, even when Tanaka was one of the proactive promoters of marriage as the director of the marriage consultation center and a member of the Marriage Patriotism Council.⁴² The benefits of economic security during the wartime would be able to explain why there were cases in which Japanese parents arranged an intermarriage for their daughters, as seen in the case introduced by

⁴⁰ For example, see Koshō Yukiko, “Ōita ni okeru Chōsenjin: Omoni, harumoni no hanashi o rikai surutameni” [Koreans in Ōita: To understand the stories of mothers and grandmothers], *Kindai minshū no kiroku: Zainichi Chōsenjin* [Modern people’s memory: Zainichi Koreans], edited by Ozawa Yūsaku (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1978), 654; Lee (2014): 90; Huang (2008): 134–135.

⁴¹ Those who gave advice instructed women to not solely rely on income as a factor, and men to not delay their marriage because they felt they did not have enough, because both were considered factors that led to people marrying later than the ideal government set age (by twenty-five for men, by twenty-one for women).

⁴² Tanaka Takako, “Shokugyō fujin no katei seikatsu” [Working women’s family life], *Haha to Ko* 19.1 (1938.1): 29–37.

Huang.

Marriage also allowed Japanese women to be politically active through participation in an organization created under government initiatives, such as the *Dai Nihon Fujinkai* (Greater Japan Women's Association), formed in 1942 as a combination of *Aikoku Fujinkai* (Patriotic Women's Association), *Dai Nihon Kokubō Fujinkai* (Greater Japan National Defense Women's Association), and *Dai Nihon Rengō Fujinkai* (Greater Japan Federated Women's Association). But according to Ueno Chizuko, membership in the *Dai Nihon Fujinkai* were limited to "all Japanese women above the age of 20 *except unmarried women*" (emphasis added).⁴³ If Japanese women had the means to support themselves, they did not have to necessarily marry, but it would have deprived them of membership in the *Dai Nihon Fujinkai*. Thus marriage enabled Japanese women to not only demonstrate their patriotism through reproductive labor which contributed to achieving the state's population policy goals, but also strive to be recognized as a citizen by taking advantage of the opportunities to be politically active and reproduce.

Historicizing intermarriage in wartime Japan and looking for similarities with endogamous Japanese-Japanese marriages reveal that there were factors unlimited to force and romance for Japanese women who intermarried. Japanese women may have selected or been in an arranged marriage with Korean or Taiwanese men, as an alternative to remaining single, in which case they would not be able to join the political activities as married women. Furthermore, intermarriage also may have been

⁴³ Ueno Chizuko, *Nashonarizum to jendā* [Engendering nationalism] (Tokyo: Seidosha, 1998), 32.

inevitable for Japanese women who needed financial means to survive. When Japanese men were away at war, and Japanese women needed to marry as a form of economic stability, then marriage to Korean or Taiwanese men, in which men married into the family, would also have enabled Japanese women to demonstrate their patriotism to the nation through giving birth to Japanese children. By expanding the framework to analyze intermarriage, unlimited to reliance on colonial categories and not solely as an assimilationist policy that view people who intermarried as victims and/or inspirational figures who overcame the obstacles of colonialism, I believe that it would be possible to write a more comprehensive history that would include and be open to the experiences of people who are currently excluded from the tragedy, romance, and the hypergamy narratives—especially when the stories of people who intermarried and remained in Japan are limited (reasons behind the silences will be examined in the next chapter). I do not mean to deny the history of colonialism and the discrimination that were present. But for minorities to come forward with their stories and write a more comprehensive history, historians need to provide a space for them to be listened to, instead of forcefully allotting them into already-existing categories.⁴⁴

Besides opening up spaces for those who are currently not represented in the

⁴⁴ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313. This has also been influenced by stories of Japanese women who have not come forward about their experience of having been victims of sexual violence fearing reproach. For example, a woman who had to “sexually entertain” Soviet soldiers in Manchuria after Japan’s surrender felt that she could not talk about her experience when her daughter condemned the Korean “comfort women” in the news (Hirai Miho, “Sorehei no ‘sei settai’ o meijirareta otometachi no, nanajūnengo no kokuhaku” [Confessions of maidens who were ordered to “sexually entertain” Soviet soldiers, seventy years later], 23 August 2017, *Gendai Bijinesu*, <https://gendai.ismedia.jp/articles/-/52608>).

existing narratives for a more comprehensive history of intermarriage, I also posit that finding similarities between marginalized and mainstream histories could subsequently indicate the presence of non-Japanese in Japan, instead of limiting modern Japanese history to Japanese people. By including history of intermarriage in modern Japanese history and/or as a part of history of marriage in Japan, for example, the implication of Japanese people in the metropole in imperialism and colonialism, even when that connection may not be clear, could also be addressed. Inclusive history, then could make history relevant and teachable to the skeptics of history and/or the humanities, by teaching how people are connected to and could be implicated in the larger structure unknowingly.

In addition to the potentials for a more comprehensive and inclusive history, I also would like to argue in favor of looking for similarities between marginalized and mainstream histories, to uncover and address assumptions that remain unquestioned: namely, the assumption of marriage as the “norm” or “natural” part of a course of a human life. Whether it be scholarship on intermarriage in colonial history unlimited to the Japanese context, or marriage in Japanese history, there is an assumption that historical figures were all heterosexual, or homosexual at most. In the following section, I propose the inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses, and argue the importance of studying marginalized histories by showing how they could lead to opening up spaces for additional figures who remain unacknowledged in history.

Why study people who intermarried?

One of the observations I made in existing scholarship on intermarriage and

non-intermarriage when comparing intermarriage in the Japanese empire and other empires, as well as exogamous and endogamous marriages in Japan, is the assumption that all individuals are/were heterosexual. The government promotion of marriage is examined in studies of population policy which led to campaigns to urge Japanese women to have more children in wartime Japan.⁴⁵ But marriage is seen as a “normal” part of one’s life and the institution of marriage is unquestioned, so that everyone is assumed to have married. In this framework in which people are assumed to be heterosexual and marriage is unquestioned and thought to be the norm, Japanese women are either analyzed as “wives and/or mothers” who participated in the institution of marriage, or those who were excluded from the institution as “prostitutes.”⁴⁶ The state protected the former but not the latter, who were treated as easily disposable, because of their lack of contribution to the state through reproduction, which determined women’s citizenship and their protection from the state. This made me question about the whereabouts in history of those who did not belong in either of these categories that were based on an assumption of heterosexuality.

Discussions of sexuality in modern Japanese history address how the modern period limited people’s sexual desires, especially of men who had more options in terms of sexual relationships in the premodern period, prior to the institutionalization

⁴⁵ For example, Miho Ogino in “From Natalism to Family Planning: Population Policy in Wartime and the Post-War Period,” translated by Leonie Stickland, in *Gender, Nation, and State in Modern Japan*, edited by Andrea Germer, Vera Mackie, and Ulrike Wöhr (London and New York: Routledge, 2014): 198–210.

⁴⁶ Other roles that could be filled by women were “laborers” and “soldiers.” Sasaki Yōko, *Sōryokusen to josei heishi* [Total war and female soldiers] (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2001), 36–37.

of family that curtailed men into heterosexual relationships. Women's sexuality, too, was heterosexualized, as their sexuality was increasingly tied to reproduction, a determining factor of value of women.⁴⁷

The heterosexualization of individuals in the modern period, however, did not reflect the actual sexuality of the people, because there were individuals who would be categorized as homosexual, even if people would not have identified themselves as such in the past.⁴⁸ Yet even when the categories of sexuality are expanded to include homosexuality, this leaves out people who did not fall within the heterosexual–homosexual spectrum. For example, the previous sections in this chapter revealed how Japanese women who married, regardless of their partners' origin, could participate in demonstrating their patriotism and economically secure their lives. But what about those who did not marry?

Because the assumption of heterosexuality limits the categories of women to potentially reproductive and heterosexual “wives/mothers” or “prostitutes” who were sexualized as objects of heterosexual men, and the heterosexual–homosexual spectrum also assumes that all individuals were sexual, I propose expanding the categories of sexuality in historical analyses to include asexuality—sexual orientation to describe people who do not experience sexual attraction—as one option of sexuality (Figure 4). Instead of working on the assumption that all individuals were (allo)sexual, I propose approaching sexuality (not just heterosexuality) as a “historical construct” similar to

⁴⁷ Mark McLelland, *Queer Japan from the Pacific War to the Internet Age* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

⁴⁸ For example, see Gregory M. Pflugelder, *Cartographies of Desire: Male-Male Sexuality in Japanese Discourse, 1600–1950* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

race and gender,⁴⁹ to write about the history of individuals who are still marginalized, as well as to reveal the larger structure to challenge the history deniers and address the consequences of heteronormativity.

Inclusion of asexuality would allow for writing of a more inclusive history: one group that can be included, is the asexualized—group of individuals who were denied sexuality, which in the case of modern Japanese history




Figure 4: Including Asexuality

would include the disabled and others deemed unfit to reproduce, thus marginalized or segregated in society, and/or sterilized without consent. With sexuality being closely tied to reproduction, we can also consider the elderly as part of the asexualized group. Inclusion of asexualized people into history can further bring to attention ableism and ageism in mainstream histories, currently dominated by the (hetero)sexual, the abled, and non-elderly adults.

By including asexuality when studying history, there is also a possibility to be able to write the history of those who today would be identified or would identify as asexual, estimated to constitute at least one percent of the human population.⁵⁰ People

⁴⁹ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 105.

⁵⁰ One percent is the common, standard number, but some sources say up to five percent.

in the past would not identify themselves as asexual when such term was not available, and simply locating asexual people in history to justify recognition of people who identify as asexual today is also problematic, because this could backfire and be used to disavow the existence of people who cannot be found in history. But the assumption that all human beings are sexual has excluded those who did not fall within the heterosexual–homosexual spectrum and treated those who fell outside of this spectrum as an anomaly. Thus recognizing asexuality in historical studies would not only allow historians to write about asexual people, but also do so in a non-pathologizing narrative.

In addition, writing a more inclusive history through the inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses, I propose, can further confront the history deniers, particularly the right-wing, conservative, and the neonationalists who deny imperial and colonial history—in the case of Japan, those who disavow the history of “comfort women.” The deniers refuse to admit direct state involvement, because this would require the Japanese state to apologize, which they believe has already been done.⁵¹ The deniers also refuse to admit coercion and violence that were involved, because they view all the “comfort women” as prostitutes who entered the situation voluntarily, and now demanding money because they are being greedy. Furthermore, the deniers believe

Anthony F. Bogaert, *Understanding Asexuality* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012); *Asexualities: Feminist and Queer Perspectives*, edited by Karli June Cerankowski and Megan Milks (New York: Routledge, 2014).

⁵¹ The deniers claim that there is a disagreement among scholars regarding state involvement, but this is simply not true. Historians in Japan have issued a statement criticizing government officials and the media for denying and ignoring the “comfort women” issue. See “Joint Statement by Associations of History Scholars and Educators in Japan on the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue,” 25 May 2015, *Tokyo Rekishi Kagaku Kenkyūkai*, www.torekiken.org/trk/blog/oshirase/20150525e.html.

that Japan is being unfairly accused, because rape during the wartime occurs in other countries, and it is “inevitable.” And this claim of inevitability, is made on the assumption that all human beings are sexual, and that sex is natural and necessary.

The above-mentioned deniers can be quite vocal and make news,⁵² but there are historians and other scholars who are and have been challenging them in and out of Japan. One group of scholars challenging the deniers, is the feminist and gender studies scholars, who exposed how the treatment of women as property of men in a patriarchal society is one of the factors that enabled the “comfort women” system to exist.⁵³ Moreover, discrimination against prostitutes (who could not become wives/mothers) is also given as one of the factors that made the “comfort women” system possible, and difficult for the survivors to come forward.⁵⁴

Besides revealing the gendered power dynamics in society that sanctioned the “comfort women” system, feminist and gender studies scholars demonstrated the intersection of discriminations based on class, race/ethnicity, and gender. Those who became prostitutes were from the lower economic classes, who were sold by their families or were more prone to be forced into prostitution. This was not limited to women in Japan, but also in Japan’s colonies, where people were ranked low within

⁵² For example, in 2018, a mayor of Osaka city sent a letter to San Francisco’s mayor to cut the sister city ties between Osaka and San Francisco after the installment of a statue of “comfort women” in the latter. During the same year, a Japanese man kicked the “comfort women” statue in Taiwan, and the “comfort women” statue in the Philippines was removed due to pressure from the Japanese government.

⁵³ For example, see Ueno (1998).

⁵⁴ Japanese “comfort women” are still silent (see Seiya Morita, “Overcoming Double Erasure: Japanese ‘comfort women’, nationalism, and trafficking,” translated by Caroline Norma, *The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 15.21.3 (November 1, 2017): apjif.org/2017/21/Morita.html).

the imperial hierarchy, thus given less or no protection from the state. And it was these women of lower socio-economic status who were exploited as “comfort women,” to protect Japanese women of middle class or above, categorized into wives/mothers and expected to bear children for the state. By revealing a combination of state-sanctioned sexism, classism, and racism at play in enabling the “comfort women” system to exist and run on a large scale that makes the “comfort women” issue significant from other wartime sexual violence, feminist scholars are making a case of why an apology admitting state involvement is necessary.

However, these challengers to the deniers are also working on the assumption that all human beings are heterosexual, in that women were either reproductive and heterosexual wives/mothers, or prostitutes who were sexual objects of men who were heterosexual. This is the same assumption as the deniers, and on which basis they refuse to take responsibility over the history of “comfort women.” Thus to challenge the deniers’ claim of “inevitability” of sex at the warfront, I argue that the assumption that all human beings are sexual needs to be questioned.

The assumption that all human beings are heterosexual is being questioned by scholars who work on sexuality and queer studies. Their analyses of “comfort women” system see it as an extension of the structure that came to be in place in modern Japan from the late nineteenth century, in which women who were not expected to reproduce (i.e., women who would be categorized as prostitutes) were exploited to manage men’s heterosexuality and to protect women (i.e., wives/mothers) who were expected

to reproduce through heterosexual acts.⁵⁵ Sexuality and queer studies scholars, however, are working on the assumption that all human beings fall within the heterosexual–homosexual spectrum of sexuality—thus humans are sexual, but not necessarily heterosexual. This expansion of human sexuality can challenge the deniers who refuse to admit state involvement, because it was the state that channeled people into heterosexual behaviors and sanctioned them in the modern period.

But working with an understanding that all human beings are not necessarily heterosexual, still cannot challenge the deniers who refuse to take responsibility by claiming that sex at the warfront was inevitable because for humans to be sexual was innate and natural, even though studies on wartime rape have shown it was not about sex, but about violence and power. I thus I propose inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses. By no means am I denying or attacking individuals who are sexual and fall within the heterosexual–homosexual spectrum. What I am trying to suggest, is that instead of assuming that all human beings have sexuality that is naturally geared toward another, to consider that any sexuality toward another had to be instructed through socialization, to reveal the “structure” that made (hetero)sexuality “normal.”⁵⁶ By demonstrating that any sexuality towards another was *not* necessarily inherent, then the deniers’ unfounded claim that it was “inevitable” to have “comfort women” at the warfront because men needed to relieve their sex drive using another, can be undermined: this was not inevitable, because such behaviors, in which another is

⁵⁵ For example, see McLelland (2005).

⁵⁶ Inspired by Sara Ahmed’s *Living a Feminist Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017): “An individual man who violates you is given permission: that is structure. His violence is justified as natural and inevitable: that is structure. A girl is made responsible for his violence: that is structure” (30).

involved in relief of one's sex drive had to be taught and sanctioned over time, most notably, by the state, but also perpetuated by the people who did not question and also working under the same assumptions.

I believe that it is important to view sexuality, not just heterosexuality and homosexuality, as a sociohistorical construct, because the assumption that all human beings are/were sexual continues today with consequences for people beyond those whose existence are denied by the history deniers. For example, because of the assumption that everyone is sexual, tied to the expectation that all will be married, those who do not or cannot marry and/or reproduce are stigmatized.⁵⁷ Same-sex marriage is not legalized in Japan, because of the continued value placed on reproduction, as is evident in the arguments against same-sex marriage tied to the declining population. There is the government promotion of marriage today, reminiscent of the wartime in reducing women as tools for reproduction. The innateness of (hetero)sexuality is furthermore used in arguments supporting the sex industry that takes advantage of sex workers and in victim-blaming that hurts women and men. Recognition of these problem that are tied to assumptions about sexuality, is the first step in making a change, as will be discussed further in Chapter 6.

Therefore by proposing the inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses, based on finding that there was an assumption being made about (hetero)sexuality of

⁵⁷ Recently (when this chapter was being written), a right-wing politician in Japan made news for claiming that LGBT people are not tax-money worthy because they were not reproductive. Tomohiro Osaki, "LDP lawmaker Mio Sugita faces backlash after describing LGBT people as 'unproductive'," 24 July 2018, *The Japan Times*, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/07/24/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-lawmaker-mio-sugita-faces-backlash-describing-lgbt-people-unproductive/#.W62NvhNKgdU.

historical subjects after examining the similarities between intermarriages and non-intermarriages, I seek to challenge the history deniers who argue that sexuality was innate and uncontrollable, and eventually write a history of asexual people. Thus in response to historians who ask, “why bother studying such a minor phenomenon in history,” referring to the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, my answer would be that it can expand the subjects of what historians study: studying marginalized history enables locating the still marginalized, forgotten, and/or unrepresented figures in history, especially when taking the approach of looking for similarities with the mainstream histories. I call for the inclusion, if not at least a recognition, of minorities in history to historians who do not find the need to do inclusive history, because in addition to accommodating diversity in the classrooms, making a change requires reaching to and change from people who are perpetuating the system that disadvantages minorities, not the people who are already disadvantaged.

Conclusion

This chapter began by introducing the tragedy, romance, and hypergamy narratives employed to tell the history of intermarriage, to first point out how they exclude individuals who did not marry out of force and love, and cannot fully explain the pattern in which more Japanese women intermarried than Japanese men. As a way to include into history those who are not accounted for by the three dominant narratives that heavily rely on the categories of “colonizer” and “colonized,” I argued for historicizing intermarriage not only in the context of colonial history, but also as

part of “mainstream” histories such as modern Japanese history. I then argued that exploring the similarities between Japanese-Korean/Japanese-Taiwanese marriages and Japanese-Japanese marriages, instead of highlighting the differences, could create space for stories that do not fit the existing narratives and find assumptions that remain unquestioned, such as the assumption of (hetero)sexuality. And by showing how challenging this assumption—via inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses—could include into history subjects who are still unaccounted for in history and explain the consequential impact of such assumption to undermine the history deniers, I hope to have shown why marginalized histories, like the history of intermarriage, need to be studied. Moreover, since assumption of heterosexuality is not unique to studies on marriage and intermarriage in Japan, questioning hetero(sexual)normativity in studies of inter/marriage in the (former) imperial Western countries may also enable writing a more inclusive history.

Calling for an expansion of the framework to better understand a historical phenomenon, such as examining exogamous marriages in the same field as endogamous marriages, is not a denial of the existing framework and its importance. Rather, it builds on the existing framework to allow for a more comprehensive story, just as Sarah Soh studied the “comfort women” beyond the “familiar master narrative, or the feminist humanitarian paradigmatic story,” for a more broad understanding of Korea’s “comfort women.”⁵⁸ Marginalized histories and minorities gaining recognition also does not deprive and take away recognition from existing histories

⁵⁸ Sarah C. Soh, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008), xiv.

and majorities. If anything, recognition of minorities reveals structures that enable discrimination against and marginalization of minorities, and crucial in teaching non-Western history classes, such as modern Japanese history, to not be co-opted into nationalistic, xenophobic, anti-immigration arguments that fantasize Japan as a monoethnic society.

In the next, final chapter of this dissertation, I will address some of the questions that were raised in this chapter: what happened to people who intermarried and stayed in Japan after 1945? And why is it that the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages is marginalized in mainstream history? It will explore the reception of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in postwar Japan and how they have been forgotten and remembered, to further address the deniers of history and the connections between people in former imperial countries and colonial responsibilities, unlimited to those in Japan.

Chapter 6

Selective Remembering and Forgetting of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages in Postwar Japan

This dissertation has been an attempt to de-marginalize marginalized histories and histories of minorities for a more inclusive history. The previous chapters were written on the basis of understanding that the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages was marginalized, partially because of its numerical insignificance—prior to 1945, marriage between Japanese and Koreans or Taiwanese constituted less than 1% of the total number of Japanese-Japanese marriages recorded in Japan. In the twenty-first century, *kokusai kekkon*, literally “international marriage,” referring to marriage between Japanese and non-Japanese in Japan, constitute a slightly higher percentage: the percentage peaked in 2006 at 8%, and reduced to 3.3% in 2013. And of the recorded number of intermarriages in contemporary Japan, the most common foreign partner of Japanese men were Chinese nationals (38.7%), followed by those from the Philippines (20.7%) and then Koreans (15.3%). The most common foreign partner of Japanese women were men from North and South Korea (25.4%), followed by those from the US (18.3%) and China (12.1%).¹ The image associated with *kokusai kekkon*, however, is marriage between Japanese and white people.² Why is this the case?

¹ Kōsei Rōdōshō [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare], “Heisei nijūhachinendo jinkō dōtai tōkei tokushu hōkoku, ‘kon’in ni kansuru tōkei’ no gaikyō” [2016 specified report of vital statistics, overview of “statistics concerning marriage”], 2017, www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyuu/konin16/dl/gaikyo.pdf, 11–12.

² Kamoto Itsuko, *Kokusai kekkon!?: Rekishihen* [International marriage theory!?: History edition] (Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 2008); Karen Kelsky, *Women on the Verge: Japanese Women, Western Dreams* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).

One reason besides the numerical insignificance that explains the lack of awareness about the higher rate of intermarriages between Japanese and non-Japanese Asians in contemporary Japan, is the ability of the non-Japanese Asian spouses to physically blend into Japanese society and “pass” as Japanese. But does this explain the reason why the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages is and came to be marginalized, not only in general history of intermarriage between colonizers and colonized, but also in modern Japanese history? Chapter 5 briefly mentioned that the tragedy narrative of Japanese-Korean marriages were based on Japanese wives who were found in South Korea decades after the fall of the Japanese empire—but what about the couples who remained in Japan? Why is so little known about their whereabouts?

This chapter aims to address why Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages “disappeared” in postwar Japan and marginalized in modern Japanese history. The first section will begin by tracing how the cases of intermarriage were “re-discovered” in postwar Japan. By subsequently locating couples who intermarried and remained in Japan but not covered in the popular press, I argue that there was a selective remembrance at work. In the following section, I then demonstrate that the shift in the population policy, change in the nationality and household registration laws, and the presence of the United States, enabled Japan and its people to forget the history of intermarriage and the existence of Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese who intermarried and remained in postwar Japan, in order to foster the “myth of Japanese homogeneity” and a sense of victim consciousness around which guilt and taking responsibility could be avoided.

One of the main questions of this dissertation has been to explore the reticence over racism in Japan—pretending or believing that racism does not (or no longer) exist. By arguing that the history of intermarriage on the margins of national history was selectively remembered and forgotten, I explain in the epilogue the importance of studying histories of minorities that have been forgotten in similar ways, to challenge the majority-public to acknowledge their privilege in being able to forget history. I believe that using history to learn about one’s complicity, even if unintentional, in perpetuating the current structure that sanctions racism, sexism, ableism, classism, etc., and how one’s participation in that structure is hurting the participants themselves, could potentially allow for a move toward making a positive social change.

Selective Remembering of Intermarriage in Postwar Japan

When one searches “The Complete Database for Japanese Magazine and Periodicals from Meiji Era to the Present” (<http://zassaku-plus.com>), the first mention of *naisen kekkon* (Japanese-Korean marriage) in the postwar period appears in 1969, and it is not until the 2000s that Japanese-Taiwanese marriages (*nitai kyōkon*) appear in the results. The results, however, do not mean that Japanese-Korean marriages and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were forgotten in Japan until then, nor that the people who intermarried disappeared from postwar Japan. Although most stories may focus on people who intermarried and left Japan in the postwar period, there were people who intermarried pre-1945 and remained in Japan post-1945. This section first traces how intermarriages have been remembered in the public in Japan after 1945, then

demonstrate the existence of intermarried couples not accounted for in the popular narratives but found in legal journals and American occupation documents, to argue that intermarriage has been selectively remembered in postwar Japan.

Stories of Japanese-Korean marriages did not begin to emerge in the public until the late 1950s. One of the first stories was of Japanese women who married Korean men, both before and after 1945, who planned to leave and left for North Korea as part of the “return” of over 90,000 people from Japan to North Korea from 1959 onward.³ There were two articles in *Fujin Kurabu* (*Women’s Club*), one of the four major women’s magazines in the prewar and the postwar period: both described the discrimination that the Japanese women married to Korean men and their families faced living in Japan, such as being denied housing and facing ethnic discrimination. Describing North Korea as a “country of hope,” Japanese wives hoped to find a better environment for their family, who were discriminated for being Korean. Both of the articles ended on a positive note, in which the Japanese wives who married their Korean husbands out of love could expect to find a brighter future, yet there was a tone of pity for these women who did not imagine themselves leaving Japan and worried about leaving their Japanese families behind.⁴

It was also during the 1960s that the stories of the two most well-known cases of Japanese women who married Korean men began appearing in newspapers and

³ For information on “return” of ethnic Koreans to North Korea, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s *Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007).

⁴ Kin Tatsuju, “Sabetsu no kuni kara kibō no kuni e” [From the land of discrimination to a land of hope,” *Fujin Kurabu* 40.5 (1959): 104–107; Motokawa Tamayo, “Kokokuyo, mata itsunohika” [Dear homeland, one day again], *Fujin Kurabu* 41.2 (1960): 112–115.

magazine articles. One of the women was Japanese princess Nashimoto Masako (aka Ri Masako or Yi Bangja), whose royal marriage to Yi Ŭn gained coverage in the newspapers since their engagement in the 1910s. Their relationship was upheld for representing the spirit of *naisen ittai* (“Japan and Korea as one”). Yet there was more than a decade of silence in the media between 1945 and the 1960s, even though the two remained in Japan in the immediate postwar period, when they struggled financially as the annual allowance stopped for royal families reduced to commoner status. In 1960, *Fujin Kurabu* published a series of memoir written by Ri Masako, in which she recollected her memories from the time she was born to her recent experiences visiting her son studying in the United States, describing her life as living amidst the “storm.”⁵ *Fujin Kurabu* published her story again in 1962 during Ri Masako’s visit to South Korea, with the cooperation from the South Korean government: in 1963, under Park Chunghee’s regime, the couple returned to Korea—for the first time in fifty-six years for Yi Ŭn who was initially taken as a hostage.⁶ After moving to South Korea, *Fujin Kurabu* published a follow-up story on Ri Masako, who dedicated her life to help disabled children in South Korea after her husband passed away.⁷ In addition to publishing her life story in the magazines, Ri

⁵ Ri Masako, “Dōran no nakano ōhi 1” [Princess amidst the storm 1], *Fujin Kurabu* 41.1 (1960): 133–144; “Dōran no nakano ōhi 2” [Princess amidst the storm 2], *Fujin Kurabu* 41.2 (1960): 122–128; “Dōran no nakano ōhi 3” [Princess amidst the storm 3], *Fujin Kurabu* 41.3 (1960): 178–184; “Dōran no nakano ōhi 4” [Princess amidst the storm 4], *Fujin Kurabu* 41.4 (1960): 122–128.

⁶ Ri Masako, “Kankoku ni wagako no haka o tazunete” [Visiting our child’s grave in Korea] *Fujin Kurabu* 43.10 (1962): 134–137; Osodo Masako, “Nashimotomiya Masako,” *Rekishi to Tabi* 23.18 (1996): 252–259.

⁷ “Nikkan no kakehashi to shite dōran no naka ni ikita Ri Masako-san” [Ri Masako, who has lived amidst the storm as a bridge between Japan and Korea], *Fujin Kurabu* 50.2 (1969): 222–224.

Masako also published several autobiographies, such as *Dōran no naka no ōhi* (Princess amidst the storm), which was published in 1968 from Kōdansha, the same publishing company that released the magazine *Fujin Kurabu*. Although Ri visited Japan at least once in 1966 and in 1984 as part of her fundraising campaigns, she chose to remain in South Korea permanently to support Korean children in need, and it was her charity work that gained the most attention in the postwar period. When she passed away in 1989, the same year as the death of the Shōwa emperor, her death was reported with pity.⁸ Postwar stories of Ri Masako would fall under the tragedy narrative as a victim of Japanese imperialism, with commemoration of her efforts in the postwar period despite hardships.

The second well-known case of Japanese-Korean marriage, is that between Tauchi Chizuko (aka Yun Hak-ja) and Yun Chi-ho. Although Tauchi was not a member of the royal family, her life shared many similarities with that of Ri Masako. Tauchi was a daughter of a Japanese bureaucrat in the Government General of Korea, originally born in Kōchi prefecture in Japan. A Christian, Tauchi married Yun, also a Christian and of an aristocratic origin who ran an orphanage, in 1939. They managed the orphanage in Mokpo together until Yun's disappearance during the Korean War, after which Tauchi ran the orphanage herself.⁹ Her work was then recognized by the South Korean government in 1963, also under Park Chunghee's regime, when she

⁸ Hosaka Masayasu, "Ri Masako-san no shi" [The death of Ri Masako], *Ushio* 366 (1989): 248–267.

⁹ Yun Chi-ho was initially kidnapped and persecuted by the North Korean side for helping refugees escaping from North Korea, but subsequently accused of collaborating with the Communists from the South Korean side after he worked with the North Korean side in order to secure food for the orphans.

became an honorary Korean citizen.¹⁰ In the following year, Tauchi also visited Japan as part of her efforts to raise awareness about the orphans in South Korea and raise money for the orphanage, because the then-Korean government did not have enough funds to support the orphans.¹¹ The Japanese media covered her visit in 1964, and subsequently during her re-visit to Japan in 1966 and 1967, until she passed away in 1968.¹² Tauchi did not publish an autobiography of her own, but her biography was published in 1983, titled *Shinju no uta: Kankoku koji no haha, Tauchi Chizuko no shōgai* (Song of a pearl: Life of Tauchi Chizuko, mother of Korean orphans) written by Reverend Moriyama Satoshi, commissioned by Tauchi's son, Tauchi Motoi. According to Moriyama, the biography was initially going to be published by *Shufu no Tomo* company, but switched to be personally published by Moriyama, so that the proceeds could be used to support the orphanage in Mokpo.¹³ Similar to how Ri Masako's work in South Korea was commemorated, Tauchi's dedication to help

¹⁰ According to her son, Tauchi Motoi, who took after the orphanage, Yun Chi-ho married into Tauchi's family upon Tauchi's family's request, so Tauchi would still have been Japanese in terms of citizenship. Tauchi Motoi, "Haha, Tauchi Chizuko" [Mother, Tauchi Chizuko], *Tosashidan* 208 (1998): 58–70.

¹¹ Tauchi's son claims that her visit to Japan in 1964 during Tokyo Olympics was instrumental in leading to the amicable relationship between Japan and Korea in 1965, meeting the then prime minister Ikeda and other important figures in political, financial, and cultural spheres.

¹² Takamura Chōji, "Kankoku no koji ni ai o sasageta Nihonzuma" [A Japanese wife who dedicated her love to Korea's orphans], *Fujin Kurabu* 45.9 (1964): 218–222. It was in the 1990s, however, that she gained further and wider attention, after her interview was aired on television in 1992. And in 1993, there was a collaboration between Japan and Korea to make a film of Tauchi's life story (titled *Ai no mokushiroku* [Love's apocalypse]), and presented to the public in Japan in 1995, and in Korea in 1999. Her life story received additional coverage before and after the film. For example, see Kobayashi Keiji, "Tauchi Chizuko," *Rekishi to Tabi* 23.18 (1996): 245–251.

¹³ Moriyama Satoshi, *Shinju no uta: Kankoku koji no haha Tauchi Chizuko no shōgai* [Song of a pearl: Life of Tauchi Chizuko, mother of Korean orphans] (Tokyo: Shinju no Uta Kankō Inkai, 1983), 397.

Korean children by remaining in South Korea even after the husband's death and when Koreans did not view Japanese favorably in the postwar period, was praised.

The stories of Japanese-Korean marriages, however, were not limited to the Japanese wives leaving for North Korea and stories of Ri Masako and Tauchi Chizuko. In 1961, the Japanese and South Korean governments made an agreement to allow Japanese who were married to Koreans and living in South Korea to return to Japan for one year. The return of the Japanese wives was reported in major Japanese newspapers, such as *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper* and *Mainichi Newspaper*.¹⁴ And since then, Japanese women who intermarried and were living in South Korea post-1945 slowly started to emerge in the Japanese media in the 1960s, coinciding with the establishment of the Fuyōkai (*Puyonghae*) and the opening of the Japanese embassy in South Korea in 1965, which, although little, provided financial aid to Japanese women struggling to survive in South Korea.¹⁵

The stories of Japanese wives who were found in the 1960s were told in a tragedy narrative. Reporter-critic, historian, and a repatriate from Korea, Fujisaki Yasuo, was one figure who has repeatedly wrote about the state of Japanese wives living in South Korea. In 1969, he published an article titled “Naisen kekkon

¹⁴ “Kankoku no Nihonjinsuma ga satogaeri” [Japanese wives in Korea return], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 15 July 1961: 7; “Saikai o machiwabiru Kankoku no ‘Nihonjinsuma’” [“Japanese wives” in Korea who eagerly wait for reunion], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 17 July 1961: 7; “‘Nihonjinsuma’ ni ichiji kikoku yurusu Kankoku gaimubu happyō” [Temporary return home approved for “Japanese wives,” Korea’s foreign office announces], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 1 August 1961: 7. In addition to *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, *Mainichi Newspaper* also covered the stories of Japanese women who were able to temporarily return to Japan, and others who could not return.

¹⁵ Makita Kiyoshi, “Souru no zaikan Nihonjinsuma no kai ‘Fuyōkai’ o tazuneru” [Visiting Seoul’s “Fuyōkai,” an organization of Japanese wives residing in Korea], *Asahi Journal* 30.18 (1988): 52–54.

nijūsannen no higeki” (Japanese-Korean Marriages, twenty-three years of tragedy), in another one of the major women’s magazines, *Fujin Kōron* (*Women’s Review*). In this article, Fujisaki explained the “tragedy” faced by both Japanese and Koreans in South Korea, who intermarried when the government “promoted” *naisen kekkon* before 1945. He focused on families that were separated at the end of World War II and have been living in South Korea since then.¹⁶ Introducing Japanese wives “thrown away by their husbands, lost their children because they could not obtain food, old couples who lived in caves, Japanese wives struggling to live with an ill husband,” Fujisaki called for the Japanese government to take action and also for the Japanese people in Japan to offer help, both of whom seemed to have forgotten about the promotion of Japanese-Korean marriages when Japan ruled over Korea as its colony.¹⁷

The tragedy narrative, in which people who intermarried are viewed as victims, continued in the 1970s. In 1972, Fujisaki also contributed to a special feature on Japanese wives in Korea, who were described as “*kimin*” (abandoned people) in the journal *Ushio*, which featured commentaries critiquing the Japanese government and its imperial past by *zainichi* Korean author Lee Hoesung (Ri Kaisei) and social critic Ōta Ryū along with testimonies, mostly of Japanese wives who intermarried and were struggling to survive in Korea after 1945. Those giving the testimonies also viewed themselves as victims, forgotten by the Japanese government after being forced into

¹⁶ Fujisaki Yasuo, “Naisen kekkon nijūsannen no higeki” [Japanese-Korean marriages, twenty-three years of tragedy], *Fujin Kōron* 54.2 (1969.2): 130–139. In the article, Fujisaki also introduces the Fuyōkai (*Puyonghae*), which was established eight years ago (1961), described to have been a social organization for Japanese wives in Korea, where at that time, there was not enough to rescue those in poverty (137).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 136, 138–139.

intermarriage.¹⁸ A year later, *Ushio* featured another article by journalist-producer Okamoto Yoshihiko, who introduced the stories of Japanese wives in Korea who married Korean men because the government used to “promote” Japanese-Korean marriages, but then “abandoned” and “forgotten” by the same government in the postwar period.¹⁹ What these stories that call for Japanese government and people to recognize the existence of Japanese women reveal, was that by the 1960s, the government and Japanese people in Japan had largely forgotten about Japanese-Korean marriages that took place prior to 1945.

In the 1970s, there was a slight addition to the tragedy narrative. In 1972, some of the Japanese wives who wished to return and were able to do so, “fought” with the Japanese government to accept repatriation of Japanese wives and their families.²⁰ Articles by journalists, reporters, and academics featured Japanese wives once they returned to Japan: because not all women had families or relatives to accept them in Japan, this resulted in some to rely on welfare benefits. With their children being unable to speak Japanese, and Korean husbands being unable to join the women and their children in Japan, the theme of Japanese women as objects of pity continued. However, one can also find an increasing call for the need of the Japanese government to acknowledge them *and* take responsibility—not only for the women, but also for

¹⁸ “‘Kimin’ ni sareta Kankoku no Nihonjinsuma no shōgen” [Testimonies of Japanese wives abandoned in Korea], *Ushio* 153 (1972.5): 253–275.

¹⁹ Okamoto Yoshihiko, “Naze Nihon no hata ga tatanaino” [Why isn’t a Japanese flag put up], *Ushio* 172 (1973.10): 282–295.

²⁰ Koyama Takeshi, “Zaikan Nihonjinsuma no ikizuku sakebi” [Desperate calls of Japanese wives residing in Korea], *Gendai no Me* 13.10 (1972): 126–135; Nishiyama Umeko, “Hō no kabe wa atsukutomo” [Though the legal wall may be impenetrable], *Asahi Journal* 14.50 (1972): 16–21.

the general consequences of Japanese imperialism and colonization of Korea falling onto the people, such as the Japanese wives found in South Korea. For example, on August 13, 1973, Fujisaki published a newspaper article in *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, addressing *naisen kekkon* and introducing the stories of nameless Japanese women he encountered in South Korea while writing his book, *Kimin* (Abandoned people), published in 1972. Fujisaki discussed the problem of abandoned Japanese wives in Korea, along with stories of Koreans who were persecuted for war crimes, because they were considered Japanese during the wartime. Fujisaki also drew parallels with the Korean *hibakusha*, victims of the atomic bombs. Here, Fujisaki took readers' attention to other victims besides Japanese wives, who were affected by the Japanese government and the San Francisco Peace Treaty that caused changes in people's nationalities in the postwar period.²¹

The tragedy narrative of Japanese-Korean marriages focused on Japanese wives further continued in the 1980s, when scholarly research on Japanese wives emerged.²² Similar to the coverage of Japanese wives in the popular press, academic studies of Japanese wives aimed to recover them from becoming buried and forgotten in history.²³ It was also in 1982 that nonfiction writer Kamisaka Fuyuko's book,

²¹ Fujisaki Yasuo, "Nihon to Kankoku 'kokuseki' no hazama de" [In the loophole of "nationality" between Japan and Korea], *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 31 August 1973: 5.

²² For example, Kin Ōretsu's "Zakikan Nihonjinsuma no hinkon to seikatsu fuan" [Poverty and life insecurity of Japanese wives residing in Korea], *Shakai Rōnengaku* 17 (1983): 67–82; Kobayashi Takayuki's "Sengo no zaikan Nihon fujin ni tsuite no kisoteki kenkyū" [Basic research on Japanese women residing in Korea in the postwar period] *Fukuoka Kyōiku Daigaku Kiyō* 36 (1986): 21–36. The research on Japanese wives do not end at 1980s and can also be found in the 1990s.

²³ Cameraman Makita Kiyoshi phrased it as women who would "eternally be buried in history" unless people pay attention to them right now (Makita (1988): 54). Similar sentiment

Keishū Nazare'en: Wasurerareta Nihonjinzumatachi (Gyeongju Nazareth Gardens: Forgotten Japanese wives)²⁴ further raised awareness about the existence of Japanese women living in South Korea post-1945.²⁵ The continuation of the efforts to raise awareness since the 1960s reveals that there was still a lack of awareness and knowledge in the 1980s about the history of Japanese-Korean marriages. Yet what differed from the 1960s, was an increased scrutiny of Japanese government's responsibility and neglect in the tragic life experiences of Japanese wives in and from South Korea.

The tragedy narrative of Japanese wives as victims, not only of their neglect in South Korea but also by the Japanese government, perpetuated into the 1990s, when the stories of “comfort women” and others forgotten in imperial Japanese history began to emerge in the public, and the word “naisen kekkon” appeared slightly more frequently in archival and library databases. There developed a closer examination of the role of Japanese women as victims *and* victimizers who were co-opted by the state,

voiced by Kasetani Tomo'o in “Zaikan Nihonjinsuma no seikatsu sekai: Esunishitī no henka to iji” [Lifeworld of Japanese wives residing in Korea: Change and preservation of ethnicity], *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū* 10 (1998): 33–47, as research on Japanese wives in Korea from an academic perspective continued into the 1990s. The 1988 Seoul Olympics also appeared to have peaked attention according to Konno of *Yomiuri Newspaper*, who featured stories of Japanese wives in Korea and worked with Fuyōkai in finding them, then raised enough funds with the cooperation of the Korean government and Japanese civilians in helping the Japanese wives return to Japan (e.g., Konno Keisuke, “Bōkyō no nen tsuzuru ittū no tegami kara” [From a letter inditing homesickness], *Shinbun Kenkyū* 423 (1986): 15–17.)

²⁴ Kamisaka Fuyuko. *Keishū Nazare'en: Wasurerareta Nihonjinzumatachi* [Gyeongju Nazareth Gardens: Forgotten Japanese wives] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1982).

²⁵ Makita (1988); Utakawa Reizō, “Keishū ni Nazare'en o tazuneru: Koto ni ikiru Nihonjinsuma” [Visiting the Nazareth Gardens in Gyeongju: Japanese wives living in an ancient city], *Zaikai* 48.12 (2000): 162–164. Narita also brings attention to this book as an example of a book that included victimizers into the narrative of the past. Narita Ryūichi, “*Sensō keiken*” no sengoshi: katarareta taiken, shōgen, kioku [Postwar history of “war experience”: Of experiences, testimonies, and memories told] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 164.

for example, in Suzuki Yūko's *Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon* (1992).²⁶ Kim Yōngdal's research from 1999 further challenged the view of people who intermarried as victims of the intermarriage policy.²⁷

Compared to Japanese-Korean marriages, stories of and related to Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were extremely limited and difficult to find in postwar Japan: whereas Japanese wives in Korea gained the most attention in the discussion of Japanese-Korean marriages, stories of Japanese wives in Taiwan could not be found in newspapers, journals, nor magazines in Japan. One story that I was able to locate, is an article in *Mainichi Newspaper* from 1960, in which a youth in Taiwan with a Japanese nationality born to a Taiwanese mother who passed away, wished to see his Japanese father who repatriated back to Japan.²⁸ Another is from a book on Taiwan written by Tomisawa Shigeru, who was a soldier stationed in Taiwan during 1944. Reliability of Tomisawa's information is somewhat questionable—as Tomisawa says only Japanese men could intermarry in Taiwan, which was untrue—but Tomisawa's book included a story of a man born to a Japanese mother and a Taiwanese father, whom Tomisawa met in Taiwan post-1945.²⁹ He additionally introduced a romance story, supposedly

²⁶ Suzuki Yūko, *Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon* [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992).

²⁷ Kim Yōngdal, "Nihon no Chōsen tōchi-ka ni okeru 'tsūkon' to 'konketsu'—iwayuru 'naisen kekkon' no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite" [Japan's "intermarriage" and "blood mixing" in colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called "Japanese-Korean marriage"], *Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō* 39 (1999): 44.

²⁸ "Byōshō kara chichikoishi: Taiwan ni naku Nihonjin seinen" [Yearning his father from a sickbed: Japanese youth crying in Taiwan], *Mainichi Newspaper*, morning ed., 15 February 1960: 9.

²⁹ Tomisawa Shigeru, *Taiwan shūsen hishi: Nihon shokuminchi jidai to sono shūen* [Hidden history Taiwan's end of war: Japanese colonial period and its end] (Tokyo: Izumi Shuppan, 1984), 19, 138–139.

based on a true story, of a Japanese woman who threw herself off the boat after being forcibly repatriated back to Japan, because she was separated from her Taiwanese lover, who also later died by suicide.³⁰ Although it is difficult to find a running theme with the limited stories, both of these stories follow the main themes in narrating the history of Japanese-Korean marriages, as either a tragedy or a romance. The studies on Japanese-Taiwanese marriages from the pre-1945 period that developed in the 2000s also share similarities with the studies on Japanese-Korean marriages, in that intermarriage policy is viewed as a part of the Japanese assimilationist efforts in the colonies.

The postwar coverage of intermarriage that occurred during the imperial period have focused on Japanese wives who married Korean men and remained in South Korea after the fall of the Japanese empire, with a mix of tragic and romantic stories. This, however, does not mean that all the couples who intermarried left Japan after 1945: there are evidences of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples who remained in Japan, found in the American occupation documents from the immediate postwar period and in legal discussions of nationality and household registration from the mid-1950s onward.

The existence of couples who intermarried and remained in Japan, at least the Japanese-Korean couples, can be found in the petitions sent to the American occupation authorities in the immediate postwar period. For example, a Korean woman named Gen Go Kichi and her two children were arrested for illegally entering

³⁰ Ibid., 139–140.

Japan in 1949, after she left Japan to take care of her sick grandfather in Korea. She applied to enter and remain in Japan, so that she could take care of her husband, Kio Yoshihiko, who became ill during Gen's trip to Korea. Fortunately, her application was accepted on the grounds that she "has proven to be a good citizen...there is no apprehension of her disturbing public safety...if she is compulsorily deported, her family life must be materially broken, husband and wife, parent and children having to live apart from one another."³¹

The others were not so fortunate: for example, a Korean man named Kyo Yu Sei was indicted for leaving Japan without returning the Alien Registration Certificate, then attempting illegal entry into Japan along with stowaways. He thus filed a permission to stay in Japan in 1950, which included information on his marital status indicating his marriage to a Japanese woman named Mori Toshie. The application also listed their one-year-old daughter named Junko. His application, however, was denied and Kyo was ultimately deported, because his offense, which included charging the stowaways to be taken into Japan, was considered to be "of pretty bad nature."³² Another petition also denied, was a petition by a Japanese woman Hayashi Kuniko. Hayashi petitioned on behalf of her husband, Cho Gaku Rai in 1950, so that he could remain in Japan when Cho was imprisoned in Nagasaki for illegally entering into

³¹ "Results of Investigation concerning Person filing Application for Permission to Stay in Japan: Gen Ko Kichi," 1950, *GHQ/SCAP Records*, Box 1418, Folder title/number: 091C, Korean (13).

³² "Results of Investigation concerning Person filing Application for Permission to Stay in Japan: Kyo Yu Sei," 1950, *GHQ/SCAP Records*, Box 1418, Folder title/number: 091C, Korean (13).

Japan after he left to take care of his sick mother in Korea.³³ Her petition was also denied, however, for “security reasons...Cho Gaku Rai [was] a known member of the Japan Communist Party and was a member of the leftist Korean Democratic Youth League in Japan until its dissolution as a terroristic organizations.”³⁴ Therefore although not all petitions and permissions to stay in Japan submitted by the spouses of couples who intermarried prior to 1945 were accepted, these documents from the American occupation period demonstrate that even though some may have been forcibly separated, there were people who intermarried before 1945 and remained in Japan after 1945. And those who remained were not restricted to the pairings between Japanese women and Korean men, but also between Korean women and Japanese men.

Evidences of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples remaining in postwar Japan are also in legal discussions regarding nationality and the household registration system from the mid-1950s. For example, one of the earliest discussions of intermarriage from the pre-1945 period appeared in *Hanrei Jihō* (*Legal Precedent Times*), which featured legal precedents and cases along with descriptions of why the cases were ruled in a particular way, intended for legal professionals as well as to interested non-professional persons.³⁵ Between 1955 and 1956, there was a correspondence between Hiraga Kenta of the Ministry of Justice and judge Yabuta

³³ “A Written Petition,” 1950, *GHQ/SCAP Records*, Box 1418, Folder title/number: 091C, Korean (13).

³⁴ “Transmittal of Petition for Stay of Deportation,” 1950, *GHQ/SCAP Records*, Box 1418, Folder title/number: 091C, Korean (13).

³⁵ “*Hanrei Jihō* towa” [About *Hanrei Jihō*], *Hanrei Jihōsha*, www.hanreijiho.co.jp/about.html.

Yasuo, who argued over a ruling concerning a Japanese woman who married a Taiwanese man prior to 1945, and whether her nationality should be Japanese or not.³⁶ Also in 1956, there was an introduction of a case in which a Japanese woman who married a Taiwanese man in 1943 and sought divorce in 1947.³⁷ Within *Hanrei Jihō*, articles on the nationality of Japanese women who married Korean or Taiwanese men continued into the 1960s. Similar to the stories covered in the popular presses, the focus was on Japanese women—although the cases concerned women in Japan, not in Korea or Taiwan.³⁸ The focus on Japanese women comes as no surprise considering that there were more Japanese women who intermarried than Japanese men during the imperial period. But what these legal discussions concerning Japanese women’s nationality reveal, is that many intermarriages were not so successful, leading people

³⁶ Hiraga Kenta, “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Taiwanjin matawa Chōsenjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese or Koreans before the enactment of the peace treaty], *Hanrei Jihō* 61 (1955.11.1): 1–2; Yabuta Yasuo, “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Taiwanjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki ni tsuite” [Regarding nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese before the enactment of the peace treaty], *Hanrei Jihō* 68 (1956.2.1): 1–2; Hiraga Kenta, “Futatabi heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Taiwanjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki ni tsuite” [Regarding nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese before the enactment of the peace treaty again], *Hanrei Jihō* 71 (1956.3.15): 1–2.

³⁷ “Taiwanjin ni kashita Nihon zaijū no Nihonjin no rikon no uttae to saiban kankatsu” [Divorce suit and jurisdiction of Japanese who married Taiwanese living in Japan], *Hanrei Jihō* 71 (1956.3.15): 21–22.

³⁸ “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Chōsenjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Koreans before the enactment of the peace treaty], *Hanrei Jihō* 208 (1960.1.1): 41–44; “Nihonkoku to no heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Chōsenjin danshi to kon’in shita naichijin joshi wa gaikokujin to ieruka” [Whether Japanese women who married Korean men before the enactment of the peace treaty with Japan can be considered foreigners], *Hanrei Jihō* 227 (1960.7.11): 34–36; “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Chōsenjin otoko to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Korean men before the enactment of the peace treaty], *Hanrei Jihō* 257 (1961.5.11): 7–13; “Chōsenjin danshi to kon’in shita naichijin joshi no heiwa jōyaku hakkōgo no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Korean men after the enactment of the peace treaty], *Hanrei Jihō* 414 (1965.8.11): 19–20.

to divorce—hence the debate over whether Japanese women who intermarried remained Korean or Taiwanese after the divorce, when they have entered the household registries of their husbands when they married.

Besides *Hanrei Jihō*, another legal journal that discussed both Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages was *Koseki (Household Registry)*, which began running from 1949.³⁹ One of the first articles that addressed intermarriage in *Koseki*, was an introduction of several cases that concerned the nationality of Japanese women who married Korean men prior to the issuance of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.⁴⁰ Then in 1969, there was a series of five articles that introduced the cases of intermarriage between *naichijin* (Japanese) and *gaichijin* (Koreans, Taiwanese, and people from the outer territories of the Japanese empire). This series particularly focused on marriages between Japanese women and Korean men, but also described what happened to the nationality of former colonized people in general.⁴¹ Then in the 1980s, between 1983 and 1988, there was a series of “lectures” on former *gaichi-hō*, laws that governed the colonies and those in and from the colonies. According to the

³⁹ “*Koseki*,” *Teihan*, www.teihan.co.jp/contents/koseki.htm.

⁴⁰ Yokoyama Minoru, “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō mae Chōsenjin otoko to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki ni tsuite” [Regarding nationality of Japanese women who married Korean men before the enactment of the peace treaty], *Koseki* 120 (1958): 7–11.

⁴¹ Kōzuma Arata, “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 1” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 1], *Koseki* 271 (1969): 17–26; “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 2” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 2], *Koseki* 272 (1969): 27–32; “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 3” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 3], *Koseki* 273 (1969): 10–15; “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 4” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 4], *Koseki* 274: 22–26; “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 5” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 5], *Koseki* 275 (1969): 13–19.

lecturer, Mukai Hidehiro of the Ministry of Justice, he intended these lectures to provide information on laws related to Korea and Taiwan, and their relationship to Japanese nationality and household registration system and laws, because people tended to avoid learning about them when trying to educate themselves. The reason why people avoided learning about the *gaichi* laws, was due to the difficulty of understanding the laws, but Mukai argued that individuals involved in the management of nationality and household registries needed to learn the past laws, since matters related to the household registry of Koreans and Taiwanese “still [took] up considerable weight” in the 1980s.⁴²

While *Koseki* focused more on Japanese women who married Korean men in their introduction of legal cases involving intermarriage, *Koseki Jihō* (*Household Registry Times*) featured cases concerning nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese men both pre- and post-1945.⁴³ And similar to *Koseki* that featured a series of lectures on colonial laws in the 1980s, *Koseki Jihō*, too, ran a series of eighteen articles on *gaichi-hō* beginning from 1984, and ending in 1988, accompanied by a detailed timeline intended to better inform individuals who were responsible for managing the household registries. The articles also pointed to the “general difficulty

⁴² Mukai Hidehiro, “Kōyū gaichi-hō kōgi” [Former colonial law lecture], *Koseki* 472 (1983): 30–44.

⁴³ For example, see Tokunaga Hideo, “Shūsengo Taiwanjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese after the war], *Koseki Jihō* 56 (1963.1): 40–45; Tokunaga Hideo, “Shūsenmae Nihonjin onna to nyūfu kon’inshi shūsengo rikon shita Taiwanjin otoko to heiwa jōyaku hakkōmae dōjin to kon’inshita naichijin onna no Nihon kokuseki no umu” [Whether or not a Taiwanese man who married a Japanese woman before the end of war but divorced after the war and a Japanese woman who married the said person before the enactment of the peace treaty have a Japanese nationality], *Koseki Jihō* 64 (1963.9): 30–36.

in comprehending” the *gaichi-hō*, and aimed to ease the process of understanding how laws that governed Korea and Taiwan and people from the former colonies worked.⁴⁴ *Koseki Jihō* in the 1990s additionally published a separate series of lectures on the former *gaichi-hō*, because according to the lectures, cases concerning how to manage the household registration and nationality of Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese who intermarried before the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect “appear[ed] frequently.”⁴⁵

Making a change to *koseki* occurs when there is a marriage or a divorce, as well as when there is a birth of a child, adoption, and recognition of an illegitimate child. The continued relevance of colonial laws in Japan, even in the 1980s and the 1990s, thus reflect the presence of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples who married before 1945, remained in Japan, then had children and/or divorced since 1945. Combined with the documents from the American occupation period, articles on legal matters demonstrate the existence of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples living in Japan post-1945, besides Japanese wives found in South Korea since the 1960s: it thus becomes difficult to argue that the history of intermarriage during the imperial period was forgotten in postwar Japan, simply because they left Japan. Then what led to the selective remembering of intermarriage that spotlighted Japanese wives in South Korea, and erasure of the presence of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-

⁴⁴ Konno Kiyoyuki, “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 1” [A survey of former colonial law history 1], *Koseki Jihō* 312 (1984.3): 8–13. There is a total of eighteen articles in this series published between 1984 and 1988.

⁴⁵ Yoshioka Seiichi, “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 1” [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 1], *Koseki Jihō* 417 (1992.11): 55–64. This series consists of four articles that was published between 1992 and 1993.

Taiwanese couples in postwar Japan?

Selective Remembering and Forgetting

The absence of Koreans and Taiwanese from Japanese memory of the imperial period in postwar Japan is not limited to the cases concerning Japanese-Korean and Japanese Taiwanese marriages. According to Japan historian Carol Gluck, one of the “custodians” and an “agent of public memory” are “individual memories, the life stories, the personal pasts of people whose lives were ineluctably intertwined with the events of history with a capital H.”⁴⁶ I thus searched for stories of intermarriage in the memory of others when I could not find stories from individuals who intermarried. But as Gluck points out how individual memories of people in Japan in the postwar period focus on the Japanese people, the presence of Koreans and Taiwanese, in general, was absent. For example, while at Kyoto University, I explored the writings by Japanese women in the postwar period during the *seikatsu kiroku/tsuzurikata undō* (life recording movement), led by sociologist and one of the prominent postwar intellectuals, Tsurumi Kazuko, who worked on collecting women’s wartime experiences in the 1950s by urging them to write. One of such collections is *Enpitsu o nigiru shufu* (Pencil-holding housewife) published in 1954, which included essays by women from various backgrounds—factory and office workers, elite intellectuals, teachers, housewives, and students—who wrote about their wartime and immediate postwar experiences. In this collection, one woman recollected her memory of meeting

⁴⁶ The other “custodians” are progressive intellectuals, conservative intellectuals, and popular media. Carol Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” *Postwar Japan as History*, edited by Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993): 64–95.

a Korean man from a “*Chōsenjin apāto*” (Korean apartment), which was subject to discrimination from Japanese neighbors. The woman, Serigawa Kakuko, recalled meeting a Korean man, who informed her that the propaganda leaflets she picked up calling for surrender during the wartime were true. She feared being stopped by the police for reading the pamphlets and speaking to a Korean man, so she left, but after hearing celebrations from the “Korean apartment” at the end of war, Serigawa reflected that the pamphlets and the man were true.⁴⁷ Another woman recounted her recent encounter with a neighbor, who observed and was concerned about the increasing number of “*konketsuji*” (mixed blood children) while children of “*yūshū minzoku*” (“superior ethnicity,” referring to the Japanese) were increasingly having abortions.⁴⁸

These essays exposed Japanese discrimination against non-Japanese before and after 1945, as well as the absence of Koreans and Taiwanese in postwar Japan and Japanese memory. Finding the absence of Koreans and Taiwanese in the immediate postwar records of the wartime led to the question of why they were forgotten, as were the Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese who intermarried and remained in Japan.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Serigawa Kakuko, “Hanayome ishō” [Bridal costume], *Enpitsu o nigiru shufu* [Pencil-holding housewife], edited by Tsurumi Kazuko (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1954): 104–121.

⁴⁸ Nakamoto Atsuko, “Akachan” [Baby], *Enpitsu o nigiru shufu* [Pencil-holding housewife], edited by Tsurumi Kazuko (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1954): 194–204.

⁴⁹ Disclaimer: By mentioning that Koreans or Taiwanese were absent from Japanese women’s memoirs, I am not critiquing people for forgetting to mention them, especially considering the facts that Japanese colonization of Korea and Taiwan were not included in the postwar Japanese history textbooks in the immediate postwar period, and depending on where one lived in Japan, the chance of encountering Koreans and Taiwanese would have been remarkably different, with higher chances in the cities. I am also not discrediting the experience of Japanese people in the postwar period either—I understand that they had to struggle to survive, too. Moreover, the number of intermarriages was small—even if the actual numbers may have been higher than recorded, the chance of knowing someone who

Considering the selective remembering of intermarriage that focused on Japanese wives in South Korea, treated as victims in a tragedy narrative, this section explores why recognition of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in Japan “disappeared” in the postwar period. I argue that the factors that contributed to their disappearance in the postwar period were the shift in the population policy, changes to the nationality and household registration laws, and the increased visibility of Americans.

One reason behind the erasure of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples in the postwar period, could be attributed to the change in the population policy. The earlier chapters explained that imperial Japan continued to sanction intermarriages despite oppositions from Japanese men involved in policymaking, because of concerns over the quality and quantity of the Japanese population during the wartime. With research on mixed children revealing no biological problems with “race” mixing, intermarriage could not be banned—especially when Japan was taking into consideration of intermarriage policies in other imperial countries and how the other countries were looking at Japan that claimed itself different from the Western powers. When Japan claimed to liberate colonized countries in Asia from white colonial rule, condemnation of intermarriages would have undermined its propaganda efforts. Just as the population policy was one of the reasons why intermarriage was sanctioned in Japan but never promoted, it was also the reason why intermarriage

intermarried was limited. The lack of mentions about the colonies and people from the colonies in the postwar period has been noted by other scholars. For example, see Narita (2010).

could be ignored in the postwar period.

The shift in the postwar population policy is evident in the writings of Koya Yoshio, the medical doctor who was instrumental in drafting the wartime population policy and made a proposal to suppress intermarriage in its drafts. During the wartime period, Koya was appointed as an expert in the Ministry of Welfare in 1939, and subsequently became the head of the Ministry of Welfare's Research Center in 1942. This Research Center (*Kōseishō Kenkyūjo*) became the National Institute of Public Health (*Kokuritsu Kōshū Eisei'in*) in 1946.⁵⁰ According to Koya's memoir, he was appointed to head the National Institute of Public Health, which was in charge of researching matters related to public health and to develop leaders of public health, until he resigned in 1956 when Koya then became the leader of the Family Planning Federation of Japan (*Nihon Kazoku Keikaku Renmei*).⁵¹ In the immediate postwar period, Koya was also a member of the Population Problem Council (*Jinkō Mondai Shingikai*), where members submitted proposals on matters related to the population to the government.⁵² The Population Problem Council formed because after 1945, the

⁵⁰ “Jinkō, kazoku keikaku bunya no rīdā, Joiseifu shodai rijichō: Koya Yoshio (1890–1974)” [Leader in the field of population and family planning, JOICFP's first chief director: Koya Yoshio (1890–1974)], 30 June 2016, *JOICFP* [Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning], www.joicfp.or.jp/jpn/2016/06/30/33774/. He later became the head of the Family Planning Federation of Japan (*Nihon Kazoku Keikaku Renmei*), publishing a memoir in 1970, having been a major figure in the Family Planning Movement (*kazoku keikaku undō*) in the postwar period [e.g., contribution to the IPPF (*Kokusai Kazoku Keikaku Renmei*)]. Koya did not mention his involvement in the wartime population policy in-depth, but he did complain about the research center's lack of funding from the Ministry of Welfare (see chapter 3 of Koya Yoshio's *Rōgakkyū no techō kara* [From the notebook of an old scholar] [Tokyo: Nihon Kazoku Keikaku Kyōkai, 1970], 40–51). Parts of the book were published earlier in *Nihon Iji Shinpō* [*Japan Medical News*] between 1967 and 1968 under the same title.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, chapters 3 (40–51) and 5 (65–77).

⁵² *Ibid.*, chapter 5 (65–77).

birth rate became too high, and with the decreasing death rate, led to a natural population increase in Japan: whereas this was the population policy goal during the wartime, increasing population became a problem in the postwar period.⁵³

To address the growing population, Koya studied ways to address the issue in the United States: American occupation authorities initially scrutinized Koya for collaborating with the wartime government, but after escaping accusations, sent Koya along with other experts of the Ministry of Welfare in 1951 to observe the American public health administration (*eisei gyōsei*), because the Japanese public health administration was in a poor state after the war.⁵⁴ In Koya's memoir, the US occupation authorities' take on administration of public health in Japan was to keep things the same as they previously were.⁵⁵ Likewise, Koya's view on *minzoku*, concern over possible decrease in population, and abortion remained the same, revealing the continuity between the wartime and the postwar period. Koya, for example, believed that there were particular characteristics that were unique to different *minzoku*, such as identifying Japanese as a peace-loving *minzoku* with a weed-like survival spirit.⁵⁶ He remained concerned about the possible decrease in the

⁵³ Koya Yoshio, "Kazoku keikaku to sekai no jinkō mondai" [Family planning and the world's population problem], *Nihon Ishikai Zasshi* 42.5 (1959.9): 284–285.

⁵⁴ *Rōgakkū no techō kara*, chapter 6 (78–94). Interestingly, Koya explained his interest in observing the "black people problem," which he has been interested in for a long time and wanted to see the situation from the inside (in the US). It may have been that he was interested in studying American policy on black people, which aimed to reduce the living disparity between white and black Americans and to improve the health and hygiene of black people through modernization of their living. Koya judged this as a good policy, because it could help reduce the population's growth rate. Perhaps he was thinking about applying a similar policy in Japan, experiencing an increase in birthrate.

⁵⁵ There were changes to the personnel. *Ibid.*, chapter 5 (65–77).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, chapters 9 (132–147) and 11 (163–178).

Japanese population, the same concern from the interwar period.⁵⁷ Moreover, even though abortion was no longer illegal, Koya still opposed it as he had from the prewar period.⁵⁸ Other things that remained unchanged included his opposition to consanguineous marriages and the disregard of the lower classes: Koya worried about the use of birth control and the spread of venereal diseases among women of upper, intellectual classes, but never the lower classes.⁵⁹ Furthermore, Koya switched from *eiseigaku* (hygiene studies) and *jinshu eiseigaku* (racial hygiene studies, or eugenics)⁶⁰ to *kōshū eisei* (public health), which he differentiated on the basis of the former focusing only on biological perspective and preventive medicine that ignored the social perspective, and the latter combining preventive medicine *and* care/treatment medicine.⁶¹ Yet his perspective did not change completely, as he still valued the quality and quantity of the Japanese population—hence his aim to reduce the high death rate for the future of Japanese *minzoku*'s development.⁶²

⁵⁷ Koya Yoshio, “Taishitsu to tōta” [Physical constitution and selection], vol. 1 of *Kōshū eiseigaku* [Public health] (Tokyo and Osaka: Nihon Rinshōsha, 1950), 149.

⁵⁸ *Rōgakkyū no techō kara*, chapter 11 (163–178).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 252–260. Koya cared little about venereal diseases among working women, movie actresses, dancers, and female waitresses, because these people having less children would not have a negative and bad effects on a *minzoku*'s selection process. Koya Yoshio, “Seidōtoku to yūseigaku” [Sexual morality and eugenics], *Sei to seimei* [Sex and life], edited by Numanoi Haruo (Tokyo: Aoyama Shoin, 1948), 250.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 242.

⁶¹ Koya Yoshio, *Kōshū eisei gairon* [Introduction to public health] (Tokyo: Nihon Isho Shuppan, 1947).

⁶² Koya Yoshio, “Nōson kekkaku no genjō” [Present state of tuberculosis in rural communities], vol. 1 of *Nōkō mondai kenkyū* [Agricultural and industrial problem research], edited by Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai (Tokyo: Keiei Hyōronsha, 1947), 213–237. As the head of the Family Planning Federation of Japan established in 1952, Koya was involved in supporting the work of the government, which included: 1) protecting maternity (*bosei*) from the harmful effects of abortion; 2) making [women] give birth to appropriate number of children in an appropriate time and spacing between the births; and 3) making [women] give birth to children of good qualities (and addressing the problem of juvenile delinquents). Thus we can see that his focus on improving the quality of the Japanese *minzoku* remained

Despite the continuities, there were things that changed besides the natural population growth: the baby boom was compounded by people repatriating from the former Japanese colonies and territories.⁶³ This led to the concern of how to feed the increasing population, when production facilities have been damaged during the war, because if the majority of the population was starving, then rebuilding the Japanese economy was expected to be difficult. To address the population growth, also as a result of scientific and medical advances, access to abortion expanded by decriminalizing it for safer access to women,⁶⁴ even though the original purpose may not have been to curve or control the Japanese population, as Koya insisted he was against population policies with goals aiming to limit and control the population.⁶⁵ If a pregnancy could harm the mother physically or economically, she could access abortion under the Eugenic Protection Act (*yūsei hogo-hō*) of 1948, the year when the population increase was identified to be a major problem. This was a significant change from the wartime, when the government put effort into promoting marriage so

unchanged. See Koya Yoshio, “Korekara no kazoku keikaku” [Family planning from now on], *Rinshō Fujinka Sanka* 19.2 (1965): 129–130.

⁶³ Koya Yoshio, “Nihon no jinkō mondai” [Japan’s population problem], *Nihon Ishikai Zasshi* 23.11 (1949.11): 738.

⁶⁴ Koya, who took pride in Japan being the first country to take up family planning as a national policy, argues that although other countries critiqued Japan for population control through legalization of abortion, what Japan did was “family planning” and not “population control.” Abortion did not cause the decrease in the growth rate; instead, abortion rate actually decreased at the same time the growth rate decreased (see *Rōgakkū no techō kara*, chapter 11 [163–178]). The purpose of family planning was not to control the population (*Rōgakkū no Techō kara*, chapter 13 [192–207]).

He also frequently critiqued the Ministry of Welfare’s decision to allow uncontrolled abortion, claiming that despite arguing against it, the Ministry did not listen. Koya Yoshio, “Jinkō kaigi no omoide” [Recollections of the population conference], *Kōsei* 11.12 (1956.12): 23.

⁶⁵ The “birth control movement” (*jutai chōsetsu undō*) became “family planning movement” (*kazoku keikaku undō*) in the 1950s. Koya Yoshio, “Seikatsu sekkei wa kazoku keikaku kara” [Life planning from family planning], *Shufu to Seikatsu* 10.11 (1955.11): 177; Koya Yoshio, “Watashi ga kōsei daijin ni nattara” [If I become a welfare minister], *Kōsei* 8.1 (1953.1): 3.

that more children would be born.⁶⁶

With the shift from the wartime promotion of marriage that aimed to increase the population, to the postwar sanctioning of abortion that sought to address the population growth,⁶⁷ there was no longer a need to promote marriage, and along with it, a need to debate whether to encourage or discourage intermarriage between Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese in Japan. I thus attribute the shift in the population policy as one reason why Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples “disappeared” in the postwar period.⁶⁸

The second reason for the “disappearance” of couples who intermarried and remained in Japan in the postwar period, could be attributed to the erasure of Koreans and Taiwanese in terms of nationality and citizenship. During the imperial period, Koreans and Taiwanese, regardless of their location in the metropole or the colonies,

⁶⁶ Family planning became part of national policy in Japan since 1951. Koya Yoshio, “Keikaku shussan moderu mura no hanashi” [A story of a model planned parenthood village], *Katei Iji Shinpō* 23.471 (1952.11): 5; Koya Yoshio, “Kazoku keikaku to sekai no jinkō mondai,” 285.

⁶⁷ *Rōgakkyū no techō kara*, chapter 6 (78–94). There were criticisms about this change. For example, Koya encountered a labor leader who called out the change in the government policy that previously enforced the *umeyo fuyaseyo* campaign to use humans in place of bullets, but now said babies should not be born, placing responsibilities on reducing the population to the same people who were expected to reproduce only a few years earlier (Koya Yoshio, “Kigyōtai no kazoku keikaku” [Family planning in corporate entity], *Sangyō Eisei Kango* 1 (1957.1): 22).

⁶⁸ Side note about Koya and Christianity: To those who ask if Japanese Christians were less discriminatory than Japanese who were non-Christians, my answer is no. Although there may have been intermarriages through church, Koya Yoshio, who opposed race mixing and intermarriage, was also Christian. We do not know if he discriminated against Koreans and Taiwanese in daily interactions, but because he saw them potentially lowering the quality of the Japanese *minzoku*, it is difficult to claim that Japanese Christians were less discriminatory just because of their religious beliefs. Furthermore, if Christians were less discriminatory than non-Christian Japanese, then that cannot explain why anti-miscegenation laws existed in places like the US.

were considered Japanese subjects (*Nihon shinmin*) and had Japanese nationality.⁶⁹

Thus Koreans and Taiwanese were technically Japanese, although they were differentiated by *honseki* (domicile, or place of registry) in their family registration records, which system was first created in 1871, and implemented since 1872.⁷⁰

Intermarriage became one way for Koreans and Taiwanese to change their *honseki*, by entering the registry of their Japanese spouse after legalization of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages. Alternatively, Koreans or Taiwanese could become “Japanese” through adoption and/or recognition as a child by a Japanese parent/family.⁷¹

According to one GHQ/SCAP document, there were approximately 1,500,000 Koreans and 30,000 Taiwanese (Formosans) residing in Japan as of August 1945.⁷² All of these individuals were “Japanese” before August 1945. After the fall of the Japanese empire and liberation of Korea and Taiwan, many repatriated to their countries of origin, but those who remained in Japan and not registered in the Japanese

⁶⁹ Having Japanese nationality did not make one a citizen—thus possession of nationality did not guarantee equal rights as citizens to all imperial subjects. See Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Beyond Racism: Semi-Citizenship and Marginality in Modern Japan,” *Japanese Studies* 35.1 (2015): 67–84.

⁷⁰ Endō Masataka, “Shokuminchi shihai no nakano kokuseki to koseki” [Nationality and family register in colonial rule], *Waseda Seiji Kōhō Kenkyū* 68 (2001): 294–296. Mizuno Naoki explains that the difference between *naichi-seki*, *Chōsen-seki*, and *Taiwan-seki* is what differentiated *naichijin* from colonized peoples (see Mizuno Naoki, “Kaisetsu” [Commentary], *Senjiki shokuminchi tōchi shiryō* [Wartime colonial rule documents] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1998), 7–29.

⁷¹ Endō (2001): 295. If Japanese who married Koreans and Taiwanese entered the registries of their non-Japanese partner, then they became Korean or Taiwanese (only limited to Japanese women, because Japanese men subject to conscription could not enter the registries of their Korean or Taiwanese spouses).

⁷² Foreign Office, Japanese Government, “Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the Peoples of Those Territories Residing in Japan,” February 1948, *GHQ/SCAP Records*, Box 1404, Folder title/number: Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the Peoples of Those Territories Residing in Japan (2), 6, 9.

household registration system through marriage or adoption lost their Japanese nationality. If Koreans and Taiwanese wanted to keep their Japanese nationality, they had to naturalize as a result of the changes made to the Nationality Law (*kokuseki-hō*) and the Household Registration Law (*koseki-hō*) in the immediate postwar period, when Japanese nationality came to be determined on the basis of one's household registry.⁷³

Because the new Nationality Law, promulgated on May 4, 1950 and enforced from July 1, 1950 did not permit dual citizenship, if one wanted to naturalize as Japanese, then Koreans or Taiwanese had to give up their Korean or Taiwanese (Chinese) nationality.⁷⁴ Taiwanese who remained in Japan and chose not to naturalize as Japanese in the postwar period could have claimed Chinese (ROC) nationality, under the Chinese Government that declared “all Formosans living abroad, including those in Japan, should recover their Chinese nationality as from the 25th of the month” in October 1945.⁷⁵ Some Taiwanese remaining in Japan chose to obtain Chinese nationality, because there were benefits for the Taiwanese, such as being treated the same as Allied nationals and gaining access to the same food rations, exemption from the obligation to pay capital tax, and exclusion from the Japanese criminal

⁷³ Endō (2001): 303. For conditions of naturalization, see Section of Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government, “Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, Volume VI, On Aliens (March 1951),” in vol. 6 of *Nihon senryō jūyō bunsho* [Important documents from the occupation of Japan] (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentā, 1989), 246.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 247.

⁷⁵ “Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the Peoples of Those Territories Residing in Japan,” 9. The adoption of Chinese nationality, however, was not mandatory. Also see “Treatment of Formosans,” December 1945–September 1950, *GHQ/SCAP Records*, Box 1419, Folder title/number: 091K: Formosan-Chinese (Status in Japan) (10).

jurisdiction.⁷⁶ Koreans remaining in Japan, on the other hand, did not gain the same benefits as the Taiwanese if they chose Korean nationality, because they were not considered United Nations nationals nor exempted from Japanese criminal jurisdiction like their Taiwanese counterparts.⁷⁷ Yet if they chose a non-Japanese nationality, they became “foreigners.”

Despite the benefits of obtaining Chinese nationality, some Taiwanese did not choose Chinese nationality as a political protest against the Republican rule of Taiwan. Similarly, Koreans opted out of Korean nationality as a form of protest against the division of Korea into the North and the South. Rejection to naturalize as Japanese also functioned as a form of protest. Yet those who did not choose any nationality became stateless and “aliens” under Japanese law once the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on April 28, 1952.⁷⁸ Thus the stateless individuals were neither Korean nor Taiwanese in legal terms.

Furthermore, according to *The Korean Minority Report* from 1951 written by Edward W. Wagner, who reported the status of Koreans in Japan for the American audience, “Legally in the eyes of the SCAP, there were no longer any Koreans in

⁷⁶ “Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the Peoples of Those Territories Residing in Japan,” 9–10. Also see Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., *Shoki tainichi senryō seisaku (jō)*, Asakai Kōichirō *hōkokusho* [Early occupation policy towards Japan (part one): Asakai Kōichirō report] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1978), 182, in which confusion of how to treat Taiwanese in the immediate postwar period is evident.

⁷⁷ “Jurisdiction of Japanese Police Over Koreans and Formosans,” December 1945–September 1950, *GHQ/SCAP Records*, Box 1419, Folder title/number: 091K: Formosan-Chinese (Status in Japan) (10).

⁷⁸ Common Law which enabled the transfers between Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese registries were thought to be in effect until the implementation of the SF Peace Treaty. Thus Koreans and Taiwanese who married Japanese could have entered a Japanese registry, and become a Japanese national to keep their Japanese nationality from the imperial period. See Yoshioka, “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 4”: 59–63.

Japan,” when they became Japanese nationals.⁷⁹ His report did not address the status of Taiwanese in Japan, but the same could also be said for the Taiwanese who chose Japanese nationality, when dual nationality was not possible. I argue that this legal disappearance of Koreans and Taiwanese through naturalization or exclusion from the category of “Japanese” as foreigners or stateless persons in postwar Japan after changes were made to the *kokuseki* and *koseki* laws contributed to the disappearance of Koreans and Taiwanese, as well as Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples in postwar memory of the imperial period, especially when one could no longer enter a Japanese household registry simply via marriage, and be both Japanese and Korean or Taiwanese.

The third explanation for the “disappearance” of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples in the postwar period, would be the American occupation of Japan between 1945 and 1952: if external presence during the imperial period is what led Japan to sanction intermarriage before 1945, then it was also the external presence that led Japan to forget interethnic marriages after 1945.

With the American occupation, the target of concern over race/ethnic mixing shifted to “GI babies” and *konketsuji* (“mixed blood children”) in postwar Japan and in the secondary sources.⁸⁰ For example, in revealing the “the problem of

⁷⁹ Edward W. Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan, 1904–1950* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), 58–59. This reveals more about the American attitudes toward the Korean minority as much as the situation of Korean minorities in Japan, there appears to have been a pity for Koreans for having being colonized and discriminated within Japan. Yet they are also framed as a nuisance, likened to black Americans in the US, with a tendency to be involved in crimes and causing disruption in society (perhaps a Japanese influence).

⁸⁰ Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 164.

miscegenation” that exposed the “mutual abandonment” of Japanese-American mixed children by Japan and the United States, Yukiko Koshiro cites the publicized lecture by “Furuya Yoshio” (Koya Yoshio) from 1953, in which he warned the dangers of miscegenation between Japanese and Americans, because compared to Japanese-Chinese and Japanese-Korean children, descendants would appear non-Japanese and potentially cause sociopolitical problems.⁸¹ Koya additionally warned about the potential consequences of miscegenation, as *konketsuji* could become social and political malcontents, based on observations of the “mulatto problem” in Haiti, the United States, and Indonesia.⁸² The argument about the dangers of mixing in decreasing the quality of the Japanese and mixed children as potential sociopolitical disrupters in Japanese society remained the same from the prewar and wartime period, but the discussion shifted from interethnic to interracial mixing, as postwar “*konketsuji* crisis” excluded children born to Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese parentage.⁸³

The similar shift also occurred in postwar Germany. According to historian Heide Fehrenbach in “Afro-German Children and the Social Politics of Race after

⁸¹ Koya Yoshio, “Konketsuji wa dō kaiketsu subeki ka” [How mixed blood children should be resolved], *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, February 2, 1953: 6. Cited in Koshiro (1999), 165

⁸² Koya Yoshio, “Konketsu monogatari: sekaiteki ni mita konketsuji mondai” [The story of blood mixing: The problem of mixed blood children seen globally], *Fuin Kōron* 39.4 (1953): 164–169. Cited in Kristin Roebuck, “Orphans by Design: ‘Mixed-Blood’ Children, Child Welfare, and Racial Nationalism in Postwar Japan,” *Japanese Studies* (2016): 6–7.

⁸³ Also see Roebuck (2016): 3, footnote 12. It is interesting to note that according to Koshiro, “a special committee on the problems of mixed blood children in Japanese society was formed under the direction of Furuya Yoshio,” on May 5, 1952 (Koshiro [1999], 168). However, Koya does not mention anything about this committee in his postwar memoir. In 1959, Koya came to identify attempts to strengthen the power of a country through increasing the population with imperialism (see Koya, “Kazoku keikaku to sekai no jinkō mondai”: 286). Perhaps his views on intermarriage and mixed children changed.

1945,” the preoccupation with “blackness” and *mischlinge* (“mixed-bloods”) born to white German women and African American men, led to the erasure and replacement of Jews who were racialized under the Nazi regime in postwar Germany. Thus the difference came to be defined with focus on “Negro/Colored” rather than Jewish heredity.⁸⁴ In the case of postwar Japan, it was the erasure and replacement of Koreans and Taiwanese who were racialized under the imperial Japanese regime, to the preoccupation with both “whiteness” and “blackness” and *konketsuji* born between Japanese women and American men affiliated with the bases. Therefore, in addition to the disappearance in terms of nationality, the Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples who intermarried prior to 1945 and children born to them also disappeared in terms of visibility post-1945.

In summary, the existence of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples from the imperial period could be forgotten in postwar Japan due to the changes in the population policy, nationality and household registration laws, and visibility of Koreans and Taiwanese. I argue that Japan and its people took advantage of this situation to ignore the history and existence of intermarriage post-1945—intentionally and unintentionally—because recognizing the presence of Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan, would have intervened in the development of victim consciousness and the myth of Japan as a homogeneous country, which contributed to the rebuilding of Japan in the postwar period. Stories of Japanese wives found in South Korea could be

⁸⁴ Heide Fehrenbach, “Afro-German Children and the Social Politics of Race after 1945,” in *German History from the Margins*, edited by Neil Gregor, Nils Roemer, and Mark Roseman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 226–251. For Nazi Germany’s policy on intermarriage, see Evan Burr Bukey’s *Jews and Intermarriage in Nazi Austria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

remembered, because it enabled framing Japan and the Japanese as victims of the war. The history and existence of intermarriage in Japan, however, would have been an inconvenient truth, in which Japan and the Japanese people would have been forced to recognize their position as a victimizer during the Second World War.

Epilogue: Forgetting History as a Privilege

This chapter traced the stories of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in postwar Japan because the existing studies often end at 1945, and also to answer the question of why racism in Japan is not recognized by Japanese people today. I connect the question about racism to selective remembering and forgetting of history, because remembering Japanese wives as victims while erasing Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples in postwar Japan, in which racism, among other factors, was at play, reflect the refusal and/or the inability to recognize racism and other forms of discrimination (sexism, ableism, classism, etc.) against minorities, including, but not limited to, resident Koreans and Taiwanese, as well as children of mixed heritage in Japan.

I thus aim to employ history in order to prompt those who cannot or do not acknowledge racism to recognize that they are being discriminatory: Being able to forget or ignore history, especially the history of individuals who are marginalized, excluded, and/or forgotten from history, is a privilege that one has, not earns, as a result of being associated with a particular group, such as “Japanese” and other dominant, majority groups with power in society. Just because one is responsible does

not mean that one is guilty,⁸⁵ yet what one observes in contemporary Japan, even at the end of the Heisei period, is the inability to separate the two. Whenever Japan's neighboring countries ask that Japan take its historical responsibilities, these are seen as personal attacks. And as a result of being unable to come to terms with one's privilege of being Japanese in Japan, relations with the neighboring countries never seem to improve, because the anger and frustration are misdirected outward instead of inward and facing historical responsibility. Since the current government already receives plenty of flak for contributing to this, I write to the "ordinary" Japanese people, regardless of political leanings, who are being complicit in the system that disadvantages minorities by not challenging the status quo, ignoring history, and being unaware of one's privilege. The lack of personal and familial connection to history may provide one explanation for the lack of interest in Japanese imperial/colonial past, but if one could become conscious of the privilege in forgetting the past, then I think it can lead to "introspection, education, and consciousness raising," which are the first steps of making a social change as illustrated in Bobbie Harro's *Cycle of Liberation* (Figure 5).⁸⁶

For example, Japan currently ranks 110th among 149 countries in terms of gender equity according to the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap

⁸⁵ Naoki Sakai, "Nihonshi to kokuminteki sekinin" [Japanese history and national responsibility], *Nashonaru historī o manabisteru* [Unlearning national history] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006), 178.

⁸⁶ Bobbie Harro, "The Cycle of Liberation," *Readings for Diversity and Social Justice*, edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 629.




Figure 5: Cycle of Liberation

Report.⁸⁷ There are Japanese women who voice their frustration and anger at the gender inequity and sexism in Japan, particularly when men refuse to recognize

⁸⁷ *The Global Gender Gap Report 2018*, December 17, 2018, World Economic Forum, www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf.

sexism as sexism. Women are also able to call out the victim blaming when it occurs, for example, in cases of sexual harassment. Yet when it comes to racism, ableism, classism, and other forms of discrimination, women participate in perpetuating the discrimination by victim blaming, too. Why can they not recognize that they are behaving in the same way as the men they critique are behaving, when viewing countries asking for reparations as “parasitic”? Why cannot Japanese women who think that Korean “comfort women” are “prostitutes” conspiring against Japan, understand that they are suffering under the same system from the imperial period, in which the Japanese women today are also suffering—the expectation to get married, bear children, work in and out of home, *and* take care of elderly parents and parents-in-law?

One would expect (at least I have naively expected) that if one was oppressed and/or a minority, one would be cognizant of one’s own privilege and be empathetic to the plight of others who are oppressed. Yet this is not the case and also not unique to Japanese people’s disregard of history. To give some examples: there is gatekeeping by gays and lesbians in the queer community that excludes people of other non-heterosexual and non-homosexual orientations, as well as people of low socioeconomic status who conform to the ableist rhetoric. They may not necessarily be doing so out of evil intent, but the lack of understanding not only between majority and minority groups, but also between minority groups, creates a competition to see who is more oppressed and lead to disavowal of others’ experiences, which then inhibit change.

In the “Cycle of Liberation,” the next major step after “getting ready” by

recognizing one's privilege and role in perpetuating systems that negatively affect society, is "building community." And I believe that it is here that history—inclusive history in particular—plays a role: by focusing on history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages that has been marginalized in modern Japanese history and history of the Japanese empire, one of the things that this project revealed was the structure that rewarded and recognized those who were Japanese, heterosexual, abled, (re)productive, and middle class or above, but punished or disregarded those who could not conform to the structure—non-Japanese, non-(hetero)sexual, disabled, non-(re)productive, and lower class—in the case of Japan. By revealing how different oppressed groups are oppressed under the same structure, then there is a potential for the various minority groups to build a coalition against the structure, rather than compete against each other, to move toward the next step in making a change.

The majority groups' denial of privilege, ignoring of history, and refusal to take responsibility of the past, is not unique to Japan: it is also seen in the United States, and other former imperial countries, where the dominant racial groups deny colonial and imperial responsibilities when pointed out by minorities within their countries and people from the former (and still) colonized and occupied countries. This dissertation therefore argued against viewing Japan as unique and an anomaly, so that the call for inclusive history could be applicable to other countries, their exclusive histories, and people who deny history, in hopes of "building community" across various boundaries and "creating change."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “A Window into the Early Shōwa Period—*Shashin Shūhō*: Weekly Photographical Journal, 1938–1945.” *Japan Center for Asian Historical Records*.
www.jacar.go.jp/english/shuhou-english/home.html.
- “A Written Petition.” 1950. *GHQ/SCAP Records*. Box 1418. Folder title/number: 091C, Korean (13).
- Adams, Maurianne, et al., eds. *Readings for Diversity and Social Justice*. Fourth edition. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Ahmed, Sara. *Living a Feminist Life*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2017.
- — —. *On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012.
- Aoki, Nobuharu. *Yūsei kekkon no hanashi* [Stories about eugenic marriage]. Tokyo: Ryūginsha, 1942.
- Arudou, Debito. *Embedded Racism: Japan’s Visible Minorities and Racial Discrimination*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016.
- “Atarashiki kekkon no rinri o kataru” [Discussion on new marriage ethics]. *Hōsō* 1.2 (1941.11): 14–20.
- Balibar, Etienne. “The Nation Form: History and Ideology.” *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, edited by Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein. London and New York: Verso, 1991. 86–106.
- Barclay, Paul D. “Cultural Brokerage and Interethnic Marriage in Colonial Taiwan: Japanese Subalterns and Their Aborigine Wives, 1895–1930.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 64.2 (May 2005): 323–360.
- Blunt, Alison, and Cheryl McEwan, eds. *Postcolonial Geographies*. London: Continuum, 2002.
- Bogaert, Anthony F. *Understanding Asexuality*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.
- Breger, Rosemary Anne, and Rosanna Hill, eds. *Cross-Cultural Marriage: Identity and Choice*. Oxford: Berg, 1998.
- “Busshi nadono hanashi hazumu fujin hōmen’iin, shushō fujin o tou” [Female district commissioners’ lively talk on resources and such, visit to the prime

- minister's wife]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, 29 October 1942: 3.
- Bukey, Evan Burr. *Jews and Intermarriage in Nazi Austria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York and London: Routledge, 1990.
- “Byōshō kara chichi koishi: Taiwan ni naku Nihonjin seinen” [Yearning his father from a sickbed: Japanese youth crying in Taiwan]. *Mainichi Newspaper*, morning ed., 15 February 1960: 9.
- Camiscioli, Elisa. *Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy, and Embodiment in the Early Twentieth Century*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.
- Caprio, Mark. *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009.
- Cerankowski, Karli June and Megan Milks, eds. *Asexualities: Feminist and Queer Perspectives*. New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Chapman, David, and Karl Jakob Krogness, eds. *Japan's Household Registration System and Citizenship: Koseki, Identification, and Documentation*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014.
- Chang, Yong Gyong. “Ilche malgi naisen kekkonronkwa chosōnin yukche” [Policy of Intermarriage, between people of the “Mainland”(Japan) and Joseon, during the Japanese occupation period, and the Joseon people's perception of “body”]. *Yōksamunjeyōn'gu* 18 (October 2007): 195–214.
- Chiba, Ryō. “Shinkō Taiwan no saininshiki” [Reacknowledgement of emerging Taiwan]. *Gaikō Jihō* 90.827 (1939): 137–151.
- “Chihō daihyō fujin hōmen'iin ni kiku” [Inquiring regional female district commissioner representatives]. *Fujin Kōron* 26.10 (1941.10): 174–184.
- “Chikaku keimusho de seishiki ni kekkonshiki” [Formal marriage ceremony to be held soon at prison]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 25 November 1925: 1.
- Chimoto, Hideki. “Kyoto-fu Kyōwakai to Uji no zainichi Chōsenjin” [Kyōwakai of Kyoto prefecture and Koreans in Uji]. *Rekishu Jinrui* 16 (1988): 173–215.
- Cho, Kyōngdal. *Shokuminchi Chōsen to Nihon* [Colonial Korea and Japan]. Tokyo:

Iwanami Shoten, 2013.

Chōsen Ginkō Keijō Sōsaiseki Chōsaka [Bank of Korea Keijō President-chaired Investigation Division]. “Naichi, Shina kakuchi zaijū no Hantōjin no katsudō jyōkyō ni kansuru chōsa” [Investigation on activities of Koreans living in Japan and China]. Vol. 24 of *Shokuminchi shakai jigyo kankei shiryōshū, Chōsenhen* [Colonial social work related documents collection, Korea edition]. Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 1999. 93–215.

“Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū Chōsakai dai ikkai sōkai ni okeru Koiso kaichō no aisatsu” [Greetings from committee chair Koiso at the first general meeting of the Investigating Committee on Political Treatments of Korean and Taiwanese Residents]. *Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū Chōsakai (1)*. Japan Center for Asian Historical Records. A15060167700.
www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M00000000000000324976.

“Chōsenjin danshi to kon’in shita naichijin joshi no heiwa jōyaku hakkōgo no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Korean men after the enactment of the peace treaty]. *Hanrei Jihō* 414 (1965.8.11): 19–20.

Cooper, Frederick, and Ann Laura Stoler, eds. *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé W. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics.” *The University of Chicago Legal Forum* 139 (1989): 139–167.

Chūō Kyōwakai [Central Harmony Association]. “Chūō Kyōwakai jigyo keikaku” [Central Harmony Association work plan]. 1938. *Tachi Collection*. Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library. PDFY100916009.

— — —. “Chūō Kyōwakai setsuritsu shuisho” [Prospectus of establishing the Central Harmony Association]. *Tachi Collection*. Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library. PDFY100916008.

— — —. *Kyōwa jigyo nenkan shōwa jūrokunenban* [Harmony work yearbook 1941 edition]. Tokyo: Chūō Kyōwakai, 1942.

Chūō Shakai Jigyo Kyōkai [Central Social Work Association]. *Nihon shakai jigyo nenkan shōwa jūyon, jūgonenban* [Japan social work yearbook 1939/1940 edition]. Tokyo: Bunsei Shoin, 1941.

- Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai kankei shiryō* [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia]. 4 vols. Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995.
- Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai [Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems]. “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, jōhen (miteikō)” [Measures for the construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, volume 1 (unfinished manuscript)]. 25 February and 11 March 1943. *Minobe Yōji Bunsho*, E:25:1 <000-0004445>.
- — —. “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, chūhen (miteikō)” [Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, volume 2 (unfinished manuscript)]. 25 February and 11 March 1943. *Minobe Yōji Bunsho*. E:25:2 <000-0004446>.
- — —. “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, gehen (miteikō)” [Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, volume 3 (unfinished manuscript)]. 1943. *Minobe Yōji Bunsho*. E:25:3 <000-0004447>.
- “Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai” [Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems]. *Kokusaku Kenkyūkai* (11 July 1942): 1–4.
- Dikötter, Frank, ed. *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997.
- Doak, Kevin M. *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People*. Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Dower, John W. *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York: Pantheon, 1986.
- — —. *Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World*. New York: New Press, 2012.
- Dudden, Alexis. *Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005.
- Endō, Masataka. *Kindai Nihon no shokuminchi tōchi ni okeru kokuseki to koseki: Manshū, Chōsen, Taiwan* [Nationality and family registration within modern Japan’s colonial territories: Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan]. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2010.
- — —. “Shokuminchi shihai no nakano kokuseki to koseki” [Nationality and family register in colonial rule]. *Waseda Seiji Kōhō Kenkyū* 68 (2001): 277–307.

- “Endōi musume no iku michi to michibikikata sōdankai” [Conference on the path of daughters with little prospect of marriage and how to guide them]. *Fujin Kurabu* 15.2 (1934): 164–177.
- Faison, Elyssa. “Gender and Korean Labour in Wartime Japan.” *Gender and Labour in Korea and Japan: Sexing Class*, edited by Ruth Barraclough and Elyssa Faison. London: Routledge, 2009. 27–43.
- Fehrenbach, Heide. “Afro-German Children and the Social Politics of Race after 1945.” *German History from the Margins*, edited by Neil Gregor, Nils Roemer, and Mark Roseman. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006. 226–251.
- Fischer-Tiné, Harald. *Anxieties, Fear, and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.
- Foreign Office, Japanese Government. “Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the Peoples of Those Territories Residing in Japan.” February 1948. *GHQ/SCAP Records*. Box 1404. Folder title/number: Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the Peoples of Those Territories Residing in Japan (2).
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*. New York: Vintage Books, 1990.
- Frühstück, Sabine. *Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- Fujimura-Fanselow, Kumiko, and Atsuko Kameda, eds. *Japanese Women: New Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present, and Future*. The Feminist Press at City University of New York, 1995.
- Fujisaki, Yasuo. “Naisen kekkon nijūsannen no higeki” [Japanese-Korean marriages, twenty-three years of tragedy]. *Fujin Kōron* 54.2 (1969.2): 130–139.
- — —. “Nihon to Kankoku ‘kokuseki’ no hazama de” [In the loophole of “nationality” between Japan and Korea]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 31 August 1973: 5.
- Fujitani, Takashi. *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.
- Fukkoku, Senjika Osaka-fu hōmen jōmuiinkai giji sokkiroku* [Reprinted, Wartime Osaka prefecture district standing committee conference proceedings record]. Osaka: Kinki Chiiki Fukushi Gakkai, Osaka Hōmen’iin Katsudō

- Shiryō Kenkyūkai, 1999.
- Gaichi Bunka Kyōkai. *Gaichi fujin seikatsu to kekkon* [Lives of women in the colonies and marriage]. Tokyo: Fujin no Iesha, 1942.
- Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed. *Shoki tainichi senryō seisaku (jō), Asakai Kōichirō hōkokusho* [Early occupation policy towards Japan (part one), Asakai Kōichirō report]. Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1978.
- Germer, Andrea, Vera Mackie, and Ulrike Wöhr, eds., *Gender, Nation and State in Modern Japan*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014.
- Ghosh, Durba. *Sex and the Family in Colonial India: the Making of Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Goodman, Diane J. *Promoting Diversity and Social Justice: Educating People from Privileged Groups*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2001.
- Gordon, Andrew. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*. Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- — —, ed. *Postwar Japan as History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Hall, Catherine, ed. *Cultures of Empire: A Reader*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000.
- Hall, Catherine, and Sonya O. Rose, eds. *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Hane, Mikiso. *Peasants, Rebels, Women, and Outcastes: the Underside of Modern Japan*. Updated second edition. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
- “*Hanrei Jihō towa*” [About *Hanrei Jihō*]. *Hanrei Jihōsha*.
www.hanreijiho.co.jp/about.html.
- “Harete mitomerareru, naitaijin no kyōkon” [Japanese-Taiwanese marriages to be lawfully permitted]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 17 September 1932: 3.
- Hastings, Sally A. *From Heroine to Patriotic Volunteer: Women and Social Work in Japan, 1900–1945*. East Lansing: Women in International Development, Michigan State University, 1985.

- “Heieki kankeisha no mukoiri kinshi” [Prohibition on people involved in military service marrying into wife’s family]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 26 November 1932: 3.
- “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Chōsenjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Koreans before the enactment of the peace treaty]. *Hanrei Jihō* 208 (1960.1.1): 41–44.
- “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Chōsenjin otoko to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Korean men before the enactment of the peace treaty]. *Hanrei Jihō* 257 (1961.5.11): 7–13.
- Higuchi, Yūichi, ed. *Kyōwakai kankei shiryōshū* [Harmony Association related documents collection]. 4 vols. Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1991.
- Hiraga, Kenta. “Futatabi heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Taiwanjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki ni tsuite” [Regarding nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese before the enactment of the peace treaty again]. *Hanrei Jihō* 71 (1956.3.15): 1–2.
- — —. “Heiwa jōyaku maeni Taiwanjin matawa Chōsenjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese or Koreans before the enactment of the peace treaty]. *Hanrei Jihō* 61 (1955.11.1): 1–2.
- Hirai, Miho. “Sorenhei no ‘sei settai’ o meijirareta otometachi no, nanajūnengo no kokuhaku” [Confessions of maidens who were ordered to “sexually entertain” Soviet soldiers, seventy years later]. 23 August 2017. *Gendai Bijinesu*. <https://gendai.ismedia.jp/articles/-/52608>.
- Hirota, Masaki. *Sabetsu kara miru Nihon no rekishi* [Seeing history of Japan through discrimination]. Osaka: Kaihō Shuppansha, 2008.
- hooks, bell. *Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000.
- Hosaka, Masayasu. “Ri Masako-san no shi” [The death of Ri Masako]. *Ushio* 366 (1989): 248–267.
- Hoshina, Hironobu. “Shokuminchi no ‘konketsuji’ — Naitai Kekkon no seijigaku” [“Mixed blood children” of the colonies: Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese marriage]. *Taiwan no Daitōa Sensō* [Taiwan’s Greater East Asia War], edited by Fujii Shōzō, Huang Yingzhe, and Tarumi Chie. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 2007. 267–294.

- Howe, Stephen, ed. *New Imperial Histories Reader*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Hozumi, Shigeto'o. "Nитай kyōkon" [Japanese-Taiwanese marriage]. *Yūkan Hōgaku*. Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1934. 182–186.
- Huang, Chiachi. "Dainiji Sekai Taisen zengo no Nihon ni okeru Taiwan shusshinsha to teijūka no ichikatei: Raifu kōsu no shiten kara" [A process of the Taiwanese resident's settlement into Japan before and after the World War II from the viewpoint of their life courses]. *Kaikō Toshi Kenkyū* 3 (March 2008): 129–141.
- — —. "Nитай tōchi jidai ni okeru nитай kyōkon no kōzō to tenkai" [The structure and development of marriage between Taiwanese and Japanese during the Japanese colonial rule period]. *Hikaku Kazoku Kenkyūshi* 27 (2013): 128–155.
- Hurtado, Sylvia, Josephine Gasiewski, and Cynthia Lua Alvarez. "The Climate for Diversity at Cornell University: Student Experiences." Higher Education Research Institute. University of California Los Angeles. March 2014. <https://diversity.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/uploaded-files/Qualitative-Study-of-Student-Climate-Full-Report.pdf>.
- Hyam, Robert. *Empire and Sexuality: the British Experience*. Manchester, NY: Manchester University Press, 1990.
- Ichikawa, Fusae, ed. *Fujinkai no dōkō* [Trends in women's world]. Tokyo: Bunmatsudō Shuppan, 1994.
- — —. *Ichikawa Fusae jiden* [Autobiography of Ichikawa Fusae]. Tokyo: Shinjuku Shobō, 1974.
- — —, ed. *Senji fujin dokuhon* [Wartime women's reader]. Tokyo: Shōwa Shobō, 1943.
- Igarashi, Tasuku. "Kyōwa jigyō to yūwa jigyō" [Harmony work and reconciliation work]. *Niigata Shakai Jigyō* 13.4 (1941): 59–60.
- "Ijinshu kekkon no hōmu" [Homes of interracial marriages]. *Fujin Kōron* (1916): 10–13.
- "Ijinshu to no kekkon makanarinaranu" [Marriage to a different race must not be allowed]. *Yūseigaku* 10.8 (1933): 22, 31.
- Ikuta, Hanayo. *Kekkon zengo* [Before and after marriage]. Osaka: Risseisha, 1944.

- Imai Konomi. “Naze hōmen’iin wa ‘Female Professional’ toshite seiritsu shinakattanoka: Osaka-fu no *Hōmen Fujin Hogo’iin* sōsetsuan no shiryō o tōshite” [Why district commissioners failed to establish as a “Female Professional”: Through Osaka prefecture’s *Hōmen Fujin Hogo’iin* establishment plan documents]. *Shakai Jigyōshi Kenkyū* 43 (2014): 5–26.
- Imanishi, Yoneshirō. “Kokumin seishin sōdōin to Kyoto-fu Kyōwakai no katsudō” [National spiritual mobilization movement and activities of Kyoto prefecture’s Harmony Association]. *Shakai Jihō* (1938.3): 29–31.
- Itagaki, Ryūta. “The Anatomy of Korea-Phobia in Japan.” *Japanese Studies* 35.1 (2015): 49–66.
- Ito, Yoshiko. “Social Work Development in Japan.” *Social Policy & Administration* 29.3 (1995): 258–268.
- “Jinkō, kazoku keikaku bunya no rīdā, Joisefu shodai rijichō: Koya Yoshio (1890–1974)” [Leader in the field of population and family planning, JOICFP’s first chief director: Koya Yoshio (1890–1974)]. 30 June 2016. *JOICFP* [Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning]. www.joicfp.or.jp/jpn/2016/06/30/33774/.
- “Jinkō seisaku kakuritsu yōkō (an)” [Guidelines for establishing population policy (draft)]. October 24, 1940. *Minobe Yōji Bunsho*. G:32:6 <000-0006695>.
- Jōhōkyoku [Cabinet Information Bureau]. *Daitōa kyōdō sengen* [Joint declaration of Greater East Asia]. Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 1944.
- “Joint Statement by Associations of History Scholars and Educators in Japan on the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue.” 25 May 2015. *Tokyo Rekishi Kagaku Kenyūkai*. www.torekiken.org/trk/blog/oshirase/20150525e.html.
- “Josei sōdan: Chōsenjin kara ai sareru” [Advice for women: To be loved by a Korean man]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 8 August 1931: 10.
- “Josei sōdan: Konketsu no seinen o shibo” [Advice for women: Yearning a mixed blood youth]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 14 August 1934: 7.
- “Josei sōdan: Museki yue kika ga konnan” [Advice for women: Difficulty naturalizing due to lack of registry]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 13 October 1934: 7.
- “Jurisdiction of Japanese Police Over Koreans and Formosans.” December 1945–September 1950. *GHQ/SCAP Records*. Box 1419. Folder title/number: 091K: Formosan-Chinese (Status in Japan) (10).

- Ka, Seiwa. “Shinajin to kekkon suru koto o osoreruna” [Do not fear marrying a Chinese]. *Shufu no Tomo* (1938.5): 250–254.
- Kamoto, Itsuko. *Kokusai kekkonron!?: Rekishihehen* [International marriage theory!?: History edition]. Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 2008.
- Kamisaka, Fuyuko. *Keishū Nazare'en: Wasurerareta Nihonjinzumatachi* [Gyeongju Nazareth Gardens: Forgotten Japanese wives]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1982.
- “Kankoku no Nihonjinzuma ga satogaeri” [Japanese wives in Korea return]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 15 July 1961: 7.
- Kano, Ayako. *Japanese Feminist Debates: A Century of Contention on Sex, Love, and Labor*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016.
- Kasetani, Tomo'o. “Zaikan Nihonjinzuma no seikatsu sekai: Esunishitī no henka to iji” [Lifeworld of Japanese wives residing in Korea: Change and preservation of ethnicity]. *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū* 10 (1998): 33–47.
- “Kekkon baikai no senmonka bakari no enmusubi no hōhō no zadankai” [Roundtable talk on ways to tie the knot with just the marriage mediation specialists]. *Shufu no Tomo* 19.7 (1935.7): 128–136.
- Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai [Marriage Patriotism Council]. “Jigyōjō ni okeru kekkon shōrei” [Promotion of marriage at the workplace]. 1942. *Tachi Collection*. Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library. PDFY09121648.
- — —. “Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai kaisoku” [Bylaws of the Marriage Patriotism Council]. July 1942. *Tachi Collection*. Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library. PDFY0921647.
- “Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai no setsuritsu” [Establishment of the Marriage Patriotism Council]. *Jinkō Mondai Kenkyū* 3.2 (1942): 58–61.
- “Kekkon kaizen zadankai 2” [Roundtable talk on improving marriage 2]. *Chōsen Shakai Jigyō* 13.6 (1935): 42–54.
- Kekkonshintaisei* [New system of marriage]. Tokyo: Seijisha, 1941.
- Kekkonshintaisei danwashū* [Conversations on new marriage system]. Tokyo: Asahi Shobō, 1941.
- Kelsky, Karen. *Women on the Verge: Japanese Women, Western Dreams*. Durham,

NC: Duke University Press, 2001.

Kim, Mee-young. “Ilchegangjōmgi naesōnyōnae(kyōrhon)sosōre natanan ilbonyōsōnge kwanhan pyosang yōngu” [A Study on the Representations about Japanese women as a Foreigner-lover or Wife for the Korean man in Korean Modern Novels in Japanese Imperial Period]. *Urimalgeul* 41 (December 2017): 239–264.

Kim, Mi-kyoung. “Remembering Tauchi Chizuko.” 30 July 2015. *The Korea Times*. www.koreatimes.co.kr:80/www/news/opinion/2015/09/197_183833.html.

Kim, So-Un. “Naisen kekkon no mondai” [Problems regarding Japanese-Korean marriages]. *Fujin Kōron* 25.10 (1940): 196–199.

Kim, Su Yun. “Racialization and Colonial Space: Intermarriage in Yi Hyo-sōk’s Works.” *Journal of Korean Studies* 18.1 (Spring 2013): 29–59.

— — —. “Romancing Race and Gender: Intermarriage and the Making of a ‘Modern Subjectivity’ in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945.” PhD Dissertation. University of California San Diego, 2009.

Kim, Yōngdal. “Nihon no Chōsen tōchika ni okeru ‘tsūkon’ to ‘konketsu’ — iwayuru ‘Naisen Kekkon’ no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite” [Japan’s “intermarriage” and “blood mixing” in colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called “Japanese-Korean marriage”]. *Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō* 39 (1999): 1–46.

“‘Kimin’ ni sareta Kankoku no Nihonjinzuma no shōgen” [Testimonies of Japanese wives abandoned in Korea]. *Ushio* 153 (1972.5): 253–275.

Kin, Ōretsu. “Zaikan Nihonjinzuma no hinkon to seikatsu fuan” [Poverty and life insecurity of Japanese wives residing in Korea]. *Shakai Rōnengaku* 17 (1983): 67–82.

Kin, Tatsuju. “Sabetsu no kuni kara kibō no kuni e” [From the land of discrimination to a land of hope]. *Fujin Kurabu* 40.5 (1959): 104–107.

King-O’Riain, Rebecca C., Stephen Small, Minelle Mahtani, Miri Song, and Paul Spickard, eds. *Global Mixed Race*. New York and London: New York University Press, 2014.

Kitaba, Tsutomu. “Taishō-ki ni okeru hōmen’iin seido tanjō no shakaiteki haikai to imi ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu” [Social background and meaning of the hōmen’iin system born in the Taishō era]. *Study Report of Japan College of Social Work* 55 (2009.2): 3–37.

- Kitaoka, Juitsu. *Jinkō seisaku* [Population policy]. Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1943.
- Kobayashi, Keiji. “Tauchi Chizuko.” *Rekishi to Tabi* 23.18 (1996): 245–251.
- Kobayashi, Takayuki. “Sengo no zaikan Nihon fujin ni tsuite no kisoteki kenkyū” [Basic research on Japanese women residing in Korea in the postwar period]. *Fukuoka Kyōiku Daigaku Kiyō* 36 (1986): 21–36.
- “Kodakara hōkoku” [Childbearing patriotism]. *Shashin Shūhō* 152 (1941): 20–21.
- Komagome, Takeshi. *Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō* [Cultural integration of colonial empire Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996.
- Komai, Taku. “Kinshinkon to zakkon” [Consanguineous marriage and mixed marriage]. *Yūseigaku* 4.9 (1927): 11–18.
- — —. *Nihonjin o shu to shita ningen no iden* [Human genetics principally involving the Japanese]. Osaka: Sōgensha, 1942.
- Konno, Keisuke. “Bōkyō no nen tsuzuru ittū no tegami kara” [From a letter inditing homesickness]. *Shinbun Kenkyū* 423 (1986): 15–17.
- Konno, Kiyoyuki. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 1” [A survey of former colonial law history 1]. *Koseki Jihō* 312 (1984.3): 8–13.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 2” [A survey of former colonial law history 2]. *Koseki Jihō* 313 (1984.4): 4–15.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 3” [A survey of former colonial law history 3]. *Koseki Jihō* 315 (1984.6): 19–27.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 4” [A survey of former colonial law history 4]. *Koseki Jihō* 318 (1984.9): 33–40.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 5” [A survey of former colonial law history 5]. *Koseki Jihō* 319 (1984.10): 12–20.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 6” [A survey of former colonial law history 6]. *Koseki Jihō* 332 (1985.11): 32–43.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 7” [A survey of former colonial law history 7]. *Koseki Jihō* 335 (1986.2): 8–24.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 8” [A survey of former colonial law history 8]. *Koseki Jihō* 337 (1986.4): 2–8.

- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 9” [A survey of former colonial law history 9].
Koseki Jihō 340 (1986.7): 27–33.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 10” [A survey of former colonial law history 10].
Koseki Jihō 343 (1986.10): 18–30.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 11” [A survey of former colonial law history 11].
Koseki Jihō 345 (1986.12): 28–36.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 12” [A survey of former colonial law history 12].
Koseki Jihō 346 (1987.1): 30–36.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 13” [A survey of former colonial law history 13].
Koseki Jihō 347 (1987.2): 22–31.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 14” [A survey of former colonial law history 14].
Koseki Jihō 348 (1987.3): 23–34.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 15” [A survey of former colonial law history 15].
Koseki Jihō 349 (1987.4): 45–53.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 16” [A survey of former colonial law history 16].
Koseki Jihō 353 (1987.8): 24–30.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 17” [A survey of former colonial law history 17].
Koseki Jihō 358 (1988.1): 28–35.
- — —. “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 18” [A survey of former colonial law history 18].
Koseki Jihō 359 (1988.2): 27–36.
- “Korekara no kekkon wa kono yōni” [From now on marriage should be like this].
Shashin Shūhō 218 (April 29, 1942): 18–19.

Kōsei Rōdōshō [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare]. “Heisei nijūhachinendo jinkō dōtai tōkei tokushu hōkoku, ‘kon’in ni kansuru tōkei’ no gaikyō” [2016 specified report of vital statistics, overview of “statistics concerning marriage”]. 2017.
www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyuu/konin16/dl/gaikyo.pdf.

Kōseishō [Ministry of Welfare]. “Shiryō: Zainichi Chōsenjin ni taisuru dōka seisaku no ‘kyōwa jigyō’ (1943)” [Document: “Harmony work,” an assimilation policy for zainichi Koreans (1943)]. *Zainichi Chōsenjin Kenkyū* 17 (1987): 110–141.

“Koseki.” *Teihan*. www.teihan.co.jp/contents/koseki.htm.

- Koshiro, Yukiko. *Trans-Pacific Racisms in the U.S. Occupation of Japan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
- Kowner, Rotem, ed. *Race and Racism in Modern East Asia*. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
- Koya, Yoshio. “Jikyoku to minzoku seisaku” [Current state of affairs and minzoku policy]. *Gaikō Jihō* 105.914 (1943): 45–51.
- — —. “Jinkō kaigi no omoide” [Recollections of the population conference]. *Kōsei* 11.12 (1195.12): 22–23.
- — —. “Kazoku keikaku to sekai no jinkō mondai” [Family planning and the world’s population problem]. *Nihon Ishikai Zasshi* 42.5 (1959.9): 282–286.
- — —. “Keikaku shussan moderu mura no hanashi” [A story of a model planned parenthood village]. *Katei Iji Shinpō* 23.471 (1952.11):
- — —. “Kekkon to iden” [Marriage and heredity]. *Fujin Kōron* 18.12 (1933): 204–210.
- — —. “Kekkon to iden” [Marriage and heredity]. *Fujin Kōron* 23.1 (1938): 226–234.
- — —. “Kigyōtai no kazoku keikaku” [Family planning in corporate entity]. *Sangyō Eisei Kango* 1 (1957.1): 21–24.
- — —. “Konketsu monogatari: sekaiteki ni mita konketsuji mondai” [The story of blood mixing: The problem of mixed blood children seen globally]. *Fujin Kōron* 39.4 (1953): 164–169.
- — —. “Konketsuji wa dō kaiketsu subeki ka” [How mixed blood children should be resolved]. *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 2 February 1953: 6.
- — —. “Korekara no kazoku keikaku” [Family planning from now on]. *Rinshō Fujinka Sanka* 19.2 (1965): 129–130.
- — —. *Kōshū eisei gairon* [Introduction to public health]. Tokyo: Nihon Isho Shuppan, 1947.
- — —. “Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai (1)” [Various problems of national policy on minzoku (1)]. *Yūseigaku* 16.11 (1939): 3–13.
- — —. “Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai (2)” [Various problems of national policy on minzoku (2)]. *Yūseigaku* 16.12 (1939): 1–10.

- — —. *Minzoku seibutsugaku gairon* [Introduction to minzoku biology]. Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 1933.
- — —. “Minzoku yūseigaku ni kansuru shuju no gainenteki shiben” [Various conceptual speculations pertaining to minzoku eugenics]. *Tokyo Iji Shinshi* 2710 (1931): 31–38.
- — —. “Nihon minzoku no seibutsugakuteki hijōji” [Japanese minzoku’s biological crisis]. *Seikai Ōrai* 6.7 (1937): 39–44.
- — —. “Nihon no jinkō mondai” [Japan’s population problem]. *Nihon Ishikai Zasshi* 23.11 (1949.11): 738–742.
- — —. “Nōson kekkaku no genjō” [Present state of tuberculosis in rural communities]. Vol. 1 of *Nōkō mondai kenkyū* [Agricultural and industrial problem research], edited by Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai. Tokyo: Keiei Hyōronsha, 1947. 213–237.
- — —. *Rōgakkyū no techō kara* [From the notebook of an old scholar]. Tokyo: Nihon Kazoku Keikaku Kyōkai, 1970.
- — —. “Seidōtoku to yūseigaku” [Sexual morality and eugenics]. *Sei to seimei* [Sex and life], edited by Numanoi Haruo. Tokyo: Aoyama Shoin, 1948. 242–250.
- — —. “Seikatsu sekkei wa kazoku keikaku kara” [Life planning from family planning]. *Shufu to Seikatsu* 10.11 (1955.11): 177.
- — —. “Taishitsu to tōta” [Physical constitution and selection]. Vol 1. of *Kōshū eiseigaku* [Public health]. Tokyo and Osaka: Nihon Rinshōsha, 1950. 149–189.
- — —. “Watashi ga kōsei daijin ni nattara” [If I become a welfare minister]. *Kōsei* 8.1 (1953.1): 2–3.
- Koyama, Eizō. “Shizen minzoku ni okeru jinkō mondai: Konketsuji ni tsuite” [Population problem with regards to natural race: On mixed blood children]. *Jinkō Mondai Shiryō* 30 (1937): 73–81.
- — —. *Nanpō kensetsu to minzoku jinkō seisaku* [Construction of the South and minzoku population policy]. Tokyo: Dainihon Shuppan Kabushiki Gaisha, 1944.
- — —. “Zakkon oyobi dōka mondai” [Mixed marriage and assimilation problem]. 1943. *Kokusai Jōmin Bunka Kenkyū Sōsho* 11 (2015): 97–108.

- Koyama, Takeshi. “Zaikan Nihonjinzuma no ikizuku sakebi” [Desperate calls of Japanese wives residing in Korea]. *Gendai no Me* 13.10 (1972): 126–135.
- Kōzuma, Arata. “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 1” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 1]. *Koseki* 271 (1969): 17–26.
- — — . “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 2” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 2]. *Koseki* 272 (1969): 27–32.
- — — . “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 3” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 3]. *Koseki* 273 (1969): 10–15.
- — — . “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 4” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 4]. *Koseki* 274 (1969): 22–26.
- — — . “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 5” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 5]. *Koseki* 275 (1969): 13–19.
- Kubota, Toyozō. “Kekkon no kazu yori mitaru naitai dōka no jitsugen” [Attainment of Japanese-Taiwanese assimilation based on marriage numbers]. *Nihon Hōsei Shinshi* 17.1 (1920): 76–78.
- Kumar, Krishan. *Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.
- Kurihara, Jun. “Taiwan ni okeru koseki seido” [Household registration system in Taiwan]. *Chūgoku Kenkyū Geppō* 60.11 (2006): 47–49.
- “Kyōgaku kyōkon” [Mixed education, mixed marriage]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 16 January 1921: 3.
- “Kyōkonhō teishutsu ni kessu” [To decide on submitting the mixed marriage law]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 11 February 1921.
- Kyoto City International Foundation. *Kyoto ni ikiru zainichi Kankokujin, Chōsenjin* [Zainichi Koreans living in Kyoto]. Kyoto: Kyoto City International Foundation, 1994.
- “Kyoto-fu Kyōwakai” [Kyoto prefecture’s Harmony Association]. *Shakai Jihō* (1938.4): 46–52.

- Kyoto-fu Shakaika [Kyoto Prefecture Society Department]. *Kyoto hōmen'iin seido nijūnenshi* [Twenty years history of Kyoto's district commissioner system]. Kyoto: Kyoto-fu Gakumubu Shakaika, 1941.
- — —. *Kyoto shakai jigyo yoran shōwa jūyonendoban* [Kyoto social work directory 1939 edition]. Kyoto: Kyoto-shi Shiyakusho, 1940.
- Kyōwa jigyo nenkan (fukkokuban)* [Harmony work yearbook (reprinted edition)]. Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1990.
- Lee, Jeong-Seon. “‘Naisen Kekkon’ ni miru teikoku Nihon no Chōsen tōchi to koseki” [Imperial Japan's rule over Korea and household registration as seen in “Japanese-Korean marriage”]. *Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai Ronbunshū* 52 (2014): 69–97.
- — —. “Chōnshichejegi ilcheūi chongdongwōn jōngchaekkwā 'naesōnhonhyōl' munje” [The Total Mobilization System during Wartime and the Policy for the Japanese-Korean Hybrid Population]. *Yōksamunjeyōngu* 29 (April 2013): 217–255.
- Lee, Young-Ah. “I Ŭn-Nashimotomiya Masakoūi kyōrhon sōsarūl tonghan 'naesōngyōrhon' ūi nangmanjōng chaehyōn yangsang yōngu” [A study on the romantic representation of the marriage of Lee-Eun and Nashimotomiya-Masako]. *Taejungsōsayōngu* 17.1 (2011): 229–258.
- Levine, Philipa, ed. *Gender and Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Lie, John. *Multiethnic Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- Liao, Yuanchun. “Yìzúhūnyīn de fǎzhì yǔ wénhuà tiáoshì: Yǐ Rìzhì shíqí 'nèitáigònghūn' ànlì fēnxī wéi zhōngxīn” [The Law and Culture Adjustment of Interracial Marriages: A Case Study of Interracial Marriage Between Taiwanese and Japanese During the Colonial Period]. Master's Thesis. National Cheng Kung University, 2012.
- Liu, Herbert. “Social Work in Japan.” *Social Work in East Asia*, edited by Christian Aspalter. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2014. 15–32.
- Loftus, Ronald P. *Telling Lives: Women's Self-Writing in Modern Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004.
- Loomba, Ania. *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*. Second edition. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Mackie, Vera. “Picturing political space in 1920s and 1930s Japan.” *Nation and*

Nationalism in Japan, edited by Sandra Wilson. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002. 38–54.

Mahtani, Minelle. *Mixed Race Amnesia: Resisting the Romanticization of Multiraciality*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014.

Makita, Kiyoshi. “Souru no zaikan Nihonjinsuma no kai ‘Fuyōkai’ o tazuneru” [Visiting Seoul’s “Fuyōkai,” an organization of Japanese wives residing in Korea]. *Asahi Journal* 30.18 (1988): 52–54.

Matsumura, Hiroyuki. “‘Kokubō kokka’ no yūseigaku” [Eugenics in a “defense state”]. *Shirin* 83.2 (2000): 102–132.

McLelland, Mark. *Queer Japan from the Pacific War to the Internet Age*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

McLelland, Mark, and Vera Mackie, eds. *Routledge Handbook of Sexuality Studies in East Asia*. London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.

Mimura, Janice. *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011.

“Minzoku no junketsu o mamore” [Protect the pureblood of minzoku]. *Yūseigaku* 10.6 (1933): 33.

Miyazaki, Seiko. “‘Naitai kyōkon’ to shokuminchi ni okeru Taiwan josei seinendan no ichizuke” [“Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage” and the position of women’s organization in colonial Taiwan]. *Nantōshigaku* 70 (2007.11): 83–97.

Mizuno, Naoki. “Kaisetsu” [Commentary]. *Kyoto ni okeru Chōsenjin no rekishi, shiryōshū: “Shakai Jihō” kankei kiji* [History and documents collection of Koreans in Kyoto: *Shakai Jihō* related articles]. Kyoto: Sekai Jinken Mondai Kenkyūjo Sentā, 1997. xv–xxv.

— — —. “Kaisetsu” [Commentary]. *Senjiki shokuminchi tōchi shiryō* [Wartime colonial rule documents]. Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1998. 7–29.

Mizushima, Haruo. “Nihon minzoku no kōsei to konketsu mondai (1)” [Composition of the Japanese minzoku and the blood mixing problem (1)]. *Yūseigaku* 19.6 (1942): 2–7.

— — —. “Nihon minzoku no kōsei to konketsu mondai (2)” [Composition of the Japanese minzoku and the blood mixing problem (2)]. *Yūseigaku* 19.7 (1942): 2–6.

- Molony, Barbara, Janet Theiss, and Hyaewol Choi, eds. *Gender in Modern East Asia: An Integrated History*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016.
- Molony, Barbara and Kathleen Uno, eds. *Gendering Modern Japanese History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005.
- Moore, Aaron Stephen. *Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931–1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013.
- Morita, Seiya. “Overcoming Double Erasure: Japanese ‘comfort women’, nationalism, and trafficking,” translated by Caroline Norma. *The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 15.21.3 (November 1, 2017): apjif.org/2017/21/Morita.html.
- Morita, Yoshio. *Chōsen shūsen no kiroku: Beiso ryōgun no shinchū to Nihonjin no hikiage* [A record of the end of war in Korea: Advance of American and Soviet troops and repatriation of the Japanese]. Tokyo: Gannandō Shoten, 1964.
- Moriyama, Satoshi. *Shinju no uta: Kankoku koji no haha Tauchi Chizuko no shōgai* [Song of a pearl: Life of Tauchi Chizuko, mother of Korean orphans]. Tokyo: Shinju no Uta Kankō Iinkai, 1983.
- Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. “Beyond Racism: Semi-Citizenship and Marginality in Modern Japan.” *Japanese Studies* 35.1 (2015): 67–84.
- — —. *Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan's Cold War*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007.
- Motokawa, Tamayo. “Kokokuyo, mata itsunohika” [Dear homeland, one day again]. *Fujin Kurabu* 41.2 (1960): 112–115.
- Mukai, Hidehiro. “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgi” [Former colonial law lecture]. *Koseki* 472 (1983): 30–44.
- Myers, Ramon Hawley, Mark R. Peattie, and Qingqi Chen, eds. *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Nagai, Hisomu. “Jinrui no saisei to minzoku no seisui” [Regeneration of the human race and rise and fall of the minzoku]. *Fujin Eisei Zasshi* (1919): 1–37.
- — —. “Minzoku eisei yori mitaru kekkon no kairyō” [Improvement of marriage from the view of racial hygiene]. *Fujin Kōron* (1917): 50–61.

- — —. “Minzoku no konketsu ni tsuite” [On blood mixing among minzoku]. *Minzoku Eisei* 2.4 (1933): 55–56.
- Nagaoka, Masami. “Nihon tōchika Taiwan shakai jigyōshi kenkyū no igi to kadai” [Significance and challenges of research on Taiwan’s social work history under Japanese rule]. *Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, Taiwanhen bessatsu* [Colonial social work related documents collection, Taiwan edition, supplementary volume]. Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 2001. 5–42.
- Nagashima, Keizō. “Kyōwa jigyō no konponteki kaikaku shian” [Proposal on fundamental reform of harmony work]. July 1944. *Japan Center for Asian Historical Records*. B02031286800. www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image-j/B02031286800.282-290.
- “Naien kara honseki ni, yorokobu Taiwan” [From de facto to de jure, Taiwan rejoices]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 22 November 1932: 5.
- Naimushō Kanrikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs Administrative Bureau]. “Chōsen oyobi Taiwan zaijūmin seiji shogū ni kansuru shitsugi ōtō (miteikō)” [Q&A Concerning political treatments of Korean and Taiwanese residents (unfinished manuscript)]. 6 March 1945. *Japan Center for Asian Historical Records*. A15060169000. www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M0000000000000000324990.
- Naimushō Shakaikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs Society Bureau]. *Fujin hōmen’iin ni kansuru chōsa* [Survey concerning female district commissioners]. Tokyo: Naimushō Shakaikyoku Shakaibu, 1930.
- “Naisen Kyōwakai hakkaishiki” [Japan-Korea Harmony Association opening ceremony]. *Shakai Jigyō Kenkyū* 12.6 (1924): 100–102.
- “Naisenjin no kekkon gekizō” [Marked increase in Japanese-Korean marriages]. *Yūseigaku* 1.2 (1924): 30.
- “Naisenjin no kekkon shōkai” [Introducing Japanese-Korean marriage]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 25 November 1925: 1.
- “Naitaijin kyōkon no houkisei teian” [Proposing legal regulation of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 20 October 1932: 2.
- Nakamura, Akito, and Itai Takeo. *Kokumin kekkon dokuhon* [National marriage reader]. Tokyo: Nihon Seinen Kyōiku Shuppanbu, 1940.

- Nakamura, Shūichi. “Josei minsei’iin, jidō’iin no rekishiteki yakuwari to tokusei” [Historical functions and characteristics of female welfare commissioners and child welfare volunteers]. *Kyūshū Ōtani Kenkyū Kiyō* 32 (2006): 141–156.
- Nakao, Katsumi. “Minzoku Kenkyūjo no kōsō to ‘Minzoku Kenkyū Kōza’” [The Conception of Ethno Institute and its “Ethnic Studies Lectures”]. *Kokusai Jōmin Bunka Kenkyū Sōsho* 11 (2015): 355–374.
- Nam, Bujin. “‘Naisen Kekkō’ no bungaku: Jang Hyeokju no Nihongo sakuhin o chūshin ni” [Literature of “Japanese-Korean Marriage”: Focus on Japanese works of Jang Hyeokju]. *Jinbun Ronshū: Shizuoka Daigaku Jinbungakubu Shakaigakka, Gengogakka Kenkyū Hōkoku* 55.1 (2004): 181–210.
- Nanba, Monkichi. “Daitōa sensō to jinshu sensen” [The Greater East Asia War and the racial front]. *Gaikō Jihō* 101.893 (1942): 22–34.
- — —. “Minzoku no kōbō to jinkō mondai” [Rise and fall of the minzoku and the population problem]. *Gaikō Jihō* 86.805 (1938): 57–77.
- — —. “Minzokuteki yūgō no kihon mondai” [Basic problem of ethnic fusion]. *Gaikō Jihō* 86.800 (1938): 70–87.
- Narita, Ryūichi. “*Sensō keiken*” no sengoshi: Katarareta taiken, shōgen, kioku [Postwar history of “war experience”: Of experiences, testimonies, and memories told]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010.
- “‘Nihonjinsuma’ ni ichiji kikoku yurusu Kankoku gaimubu happyō” [Temporary return home approved for “Japanese wives,” Korea’s foreign office announces]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 1 August. 1961: 7.
- “Nihonkoku to no heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Chōsenjin danshi to kon’in shita naichijin joshi wa gaikokujin to ieruka” [Whether Japanese women who married Korean men before the enactment of the peace treaty with Japan can be considered foreigners]. *Hanrei Jihō* 227 (1960.7.11): 34–36.
- “Nikkajin kekkō no zehi!” [Propriety of Japanese-Chinese marriages!]. *Yūseigaku* 18.4 (1941): 8.
- “Nikkan gappei to kekkō” [Japan’s annexation of Korea and marriage]. *Tokyo Shin Kokkei* 19 (1910): 3.
- “Nikkan no kakehashi to shite dōran no naka ni ikita Ri Masako-san” [Ri Masako, who has lived amidst the storm as a bridge between Japan and Korea].

Fujin Kurabu 50.2 (1969): 222–224.

Nishiyama, Umeko. “Hō no kabe wa atsukutomo” [Though the legal wall may be impenetrable]. *Asahi Journal* 14.50 (1972): 16–21.

“Nissen dōka no kiso” [The basics of Japan-Korea assimilation]. *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, 4 August 1916.

Ogasawara, Yūji. “Hara Taiichi cho *Hōmen Jigyō* kaidai” [Bibliographical introduction to Hara Taiichi’s *Hōmen Jigyō*]. Vol. 11 of *Senzenki shakai jigyo bunkenshū* [Prewar social work document collection]. Tokyo: Nihon Toshō Sentā, 1995. 1–11.

Oguma, Eiji. *Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen* [The myth of the homogeneous nation]. Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995.

Oh, Tae-Young. “Naesōnilcheūi kyunyōltūl: Kim Sōngminūi 'Nokkiyōnmaeng’ul chungshimūro” [A Cracks of “Naisen Ittai” (Integration of Japan and Korea)—Focusing on Nokki Renmei (Green Flag League) by Kim Sung-Min]. *Sanghōhakpo* 31 (February 2011): 89–122.

Okakura, Yoshizaburō. “Kokusai kekkon o yumemiru hitobito e” [To people who dream of international marriage]. *Fujin Kōron* (1934): 264–265.

Okamoto, Yoshihiko. “Naze Nihon no hata ga tatanaino” [Why isn’t a Japanese flag put up]. *Ushio* 172 (1973.10): 282–295.

Osaka-fu Ishikai. “Minzoku eisei shisetsu ni kansuru” [On racial hygiene facilities]. *Yūseigaku* 5.6 (1928): 11–13.

Osaka-fu Shakaika [Osaka Prefecture Society Department]. *Osaka-fu hōmen’iin seido* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner system]. Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 192?.

— — —. *Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyo nenpō taishō kyūnen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1920]. Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1921.

— — —. *Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyo nenpō taishō jūsanen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1924]. Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1925.

— — —. *Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyo nenpō shōwa ninen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1927]. Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1928.

— — —. *Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyo nenpō shōwa gonen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1930]. Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1931.

- — —. *Osaka-fu hōmen'in jigyō nenpō shōwa hachinen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1933]. Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1934.
- — —. *Osaka-fu hōmen'in jigyō nenpō shōwa jūsanen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1938]. Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1939.
- — —. *Osaka-fu hōmen'in jigyō nenpō shōwa jūgonen* [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1940]. Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1941.
- Osaka-shi hōmen'in minsei'in seido gojūnenishi* [Osaka city's district commissioner and welfare commissioner system's fifty-year history]. Osaka: Osaka-shi Minsei'in Renmei, 1973.
- Osaka-shi Kita Kekkō Sōdanjo nijūgonen no ayumi* [Twenty-five years of Osaka city's Kita Marriage Consultation Center]. Osaka: Osaka Shiritsu Kita Shiminkan, 1967.
- Osaki, Tomohiro. "LDP lawmaker Mio Sugita faces backlash after describing LGBT people as 'unproductive'." 24 July 2018. *The Japan Times*.
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/07/24/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-lawmaker-mio-sugita-faces-backlash-describing-lgbt-people-unproductive/#.W62NvhNKgdU.
- Osodo, Masako. "Nashimoto-miya Masako." *Rekishi to Tabi* 23.18 (1996): 252–259.
- Ota, Satoshi. "Herbivorous Boys and Predatory Girls: Gender, Consumerism, and Low Birthrate in Japan." *Japan's Demographic Revival: Rethinking Migration, Identity and Sociocultural Norms*, edited by Stephen Robert Nagy. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2016. 219–248.
- Otabe, Yūji. *Ri Masako: Ichi Kankokujin to shite kuinaku* [Ri Masako: Without regret as a Korean]. Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 2007.
- Ōtomo, Masako. "Nihon tōchika Taiwan ni okeru shakai jigyō seisaku no tenkai"
 [Evolution of social work policies in Taiwan under Japanese rule].
Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, Taiwanhen bessatsu
 [Colonial social work related documents collection, Taiwan edition,
 supplementary volume]. Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 2001. 43–108.
- "Ouseishi denka no shingoten o gokenchiku" [Constructing the palatial home of his highness the prince]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 20 April 1920: 9.
- Ozawa, Yūsaku, ed. *Kindai minshū no kiroku: Zainichi Chōsenjin* [Modern people's

- memory: Zainichi Koreans]. Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1978.
- Park, Kwangjoon. “Hōmen’iin seido wa Kankoku ni oite naze shōgen shitanoka” [Why did the hōmen’iin system lapse in Korea]. *Bukkyo University Journal of the Faculty of Social Welfare* 11 (2015): 79–99.
- Peckham, Robert, ed., *Empires of Panic: Epidemics and Colonial Anxieties*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015.
- Pflugfelder, Gregory M. *Cartographies of Desire: Male-Male Sexuality in Japanese Discourse, 1600-1950*. Berkeley: University of California, 1999.
- “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe.” *Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister*. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. August 14, 2015.
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/1212349_9926.html.
- Pomfret, David M. “Raising Eurasia: Race, Class, and Age in French and British Colonies.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51.2 (2009): 314–343.
- Reinkowski, Maurus, and Gregor Thum, eds. *Helpless Imperialists: Imperial Failure, Fear, and Radicalization*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013.
- “Results of Investigation concerning Person filing Application for Permission to Stay in Japan: Gen Ko Kichi.” 1950. *GHQ/SCAP Records*. Box 1418. Folder title/number: 091C, Korean (13).
- “Results of Investigation concerning Person filing application for Permission to Stay in Japan: Kyo Yu Sei.” 1950. *GHQ/SCAP Records*. Box 1418. Folder title/number: 091C, Korean (13).
- Ri, Masako. “Dōran no nakano ōhi 1” [Princess amidst the storm 1]. *Fujin Kurabu* 41.1 (1960): 133–144.
- . “Dōran no nakano ōhi 2” [Princess amidst the storm 2]. *Fujin Kurabu* 41.2 (1960): 122–128.
- . “Dōran no nakano ōhi 3” [Princess amidst the storm 3]. *Fujin Kurabu* 41.3 (1960): 178–184.
- . “Dōran no nakano ōhi 4” [Princess amidst the storm 4]. *Fujin Kurabu* 41.4 (1960): 122–128.
- . “Kankoku ni wagako no haka o tazunete” [Visiting our child’s grave in

- Korea]. *Fujin Kurabu* 43.10 (1962): 134–137.
- Robertson, Jennifer. “Blood Talks: Eugenic Modernity and the Creation of New Japanese.” *History and Anthropology* 13.3 (2002): 191–216.
- Roebuck, Kristin. “Orphans by Design: ‘Mixed-Blood’ Children, Child Welfare, and Racial Nationalism in Postwar Japan.” *Japanese Studies* (2016): 1–22.
- Ronald, Richard, and Allison Alexy. “Continuity and change in Japanese homes and families.” *Home and Family in Japan: Continuity and Transformation*, edited by Richard Ronald and Allison Alexy. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011. 1–24.
- Ryang, Sonia, and John Lie, eds. *Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.
- “Saikai o machiwabiru Kankoku no ‘Nihonjinzuma’” [“Japanese wives” in Korea who eagerly wait for reunion]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 17 July 1961: 7.
- Sakaguchi, Naoki. *Senzen Dōshisha no Taiwan ryūgakusei: Kirisutokyō kokusai shugi no genryū o tadoru* [Taiwanese study abroad students at prewar Dōshisha: Tracing the source of Christian internationalism]. Tokyo: Hakuteisha, 2002.
- Sakai, Naoki, ed. *Nashonaru hisutorī o manabisuteru* [Unlearning national history]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006.
- — —. “Theory and Asian Humanity: On the Question of Humanitas and Anthropos.” *Postcolonial Studies* 13.4 (2010): 441–464.
- Sakai, Naoki, Brett de Bary, and Toshio Iyotani, eds. *Deconstructing Nationality*. Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2005.
- Sakai, Yūichirō. “Senzenki ‘baikaikon shugi’ no shisō to ronri” [The ideology and normative logic on marital mediation in prewar Japan]. *Keiō Gijuku Daigaku Daigakuin Shakaigaku Kenkyūka Kiyō: Shakaigaku Shinrigaku Kyōikugaku, Ningen to Shakai no Tankyū* 70 (2010): 91–111.
- Salesa, Damon Ieremia. *Racial Crossings: Race, Inter marriage, and the Victorian British Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- “Sankō shiryō” [Reference documents]. *Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū Chōsakai (1)*. Japan Center for Asian Historical Records. A15060169100.

www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M00000000000000324991.

- Sasaki, Yōko. *Sōryokusen to josei heishi* [Total war and female soldiers]. Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2001.
- Scales-Trent, Judy. “Racial Purity Laws in the United States and Nazi Germany: The Targeting Process.” *Human Rights Quarterly* 23.2 (2001): 259–307.
- Scott, Joan. “Gender as a Useful Category of Historical Analysis.” *American Historical Review* 91.5 (December 1986): 1053–1075.
- Section of Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government. “Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, Volume VI, On Aliens (March 1951).” Vol. 6 of *Nihon senryō jūyō bunsho* [Important documents from the occupation of Japan]. Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentā, 1989.
- Senda, Chiyoko. “Onna hōmen’iin no shuki” [Notes of a woman district commissioner]. *Fujin Kōron* (1931.10): 478–481.
- Seki, Kōjirō. “Naitai kyōkon mondai no kaiketsu ni tsuite (1)” [On solving the Japanese-Taiwanese marriage problem (1)]. *Hōsōkai Zasshi* 11.6 (June 1933): 31–40.
- — —. “Naitai kyōkon mondai no kaiketsu ni tsuite (2)” [On solving the Japanese-Taiwanese marriage problem (2)]. *Hōsōkai Zasshi* 11.7 (July 1933): 37–67.
- “Senjika no kekkon mondai” [Wartime marriage problems]. *Shūhō* 343 (1942.5.12): 21–24.
- Sensō to josei zasshi: 1931–1945* [War and women’s magazines: 1931–1945], edited by Kindai Josei Bunkashi Kenkyūkai. Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 2001.
- Shakai Jigyō Kenkyūjo [Social Work Research Center]. *Nihon shakai jigyo nenkan shōwa jūsanban* [Japan social work yearbook 1938 edition]. Tokyo: Chūō Shakai Jigyō Kyōkai, 1938.
- — —. *Nihon shakai jigyo nenkan shōwa jūhachiban* [Japan social work yearbook 1943 edition]. Tokyo: Chūō Shakai Jigyō Kyōkai, 1943.
- Shin, Ketsu. “Shokuminchi Taiwan ni okeru hōmen’iin seido no tenkai oyobi sono tokushitsu” [Evolution and characteristics of district commissioner system in colonial Taiwan]. *Shakai jigyo kankei shiryōshū, Taiwanhen bessatsu* [Colonial social work related documents collection, Taiwan edition,

- supplementary volume]. Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 2001. 109–132.
- Shisō Taisaku Kakari. “Hantōjin mondai (1944)” [Korean problem (1944)]. Vol. 7 of *Senjiki shokuminchi tōchi shiryō* [Wartime colonial rule documents], edited by Mizuno Naoki. Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1998. 274–324.
- Sinha, Mrinalini. *Colonial Masculinity: the ‘manly Englishman’ and the ‘effeminate Bengali’ in the late nineteenth century*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995.
- Smith, Bonnie G., ed. *Modern Empires: A Reader*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Soh, Sarah C. *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988. 271–313.
- Stevens, Carolyn S. *Disability in Japan*. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
- — —. “Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th Century Colonial Cultures.” *American Ethnologist* 16.4 (1989): 634–660.
- — —, ed. *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
- Sugiyama, Heisuke. “Shinajin to kekkon suruna” [Do not marry a Chinese]. *Shufu no Tomo* (1938.3): 272–282.
- Summerhawk, Barbara, Cheiron McMahon, and Darren McDonald, eds. *Queer Japan: Personal Stories of Japanese Lesbians, Gays, Transsexuals, and Bisexuals*. Norwich, VT: New Victoria Publishers, 1998.
- Suzuki, Yūko. *Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon* [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage]. Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992.
- Tai, Eika. “The Discourse of Intermarriage in Colonial Taiwan.” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 40.1 (Winter 2014): 87–116.

- Taihoku Hikakuhōgakkai, ed. *Hikaku kon'inhō dai ichibu* [Comparative marriage laws, part one]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1937.
- “Taiwan koseki jinjirei shingi” [Deliberation on Taiwan’s household registration and personnel ordinance]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 10 May 1921: 1.
- “Taiwan kyōkon chokureian” [Plan on imperial ordinance concerning Japanese-Taiwanese marriages]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 17 November 1932: 2.
- “Taiwanjin ni kashita Nihon zaijū no Nihonjin no rikon no uttae to saiban kankatsu” [Divorce suit and jurisdiction of Japanese who married Taiwanese living in Japan]. *Hanrei Jihō* 71 (1956.3.15): 21–22.
- “Taiwan no kyōkon mondai kettei” [Decision on Taiwan’s intermarriage problem]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, evening ed., 23 November 1932: 1.
- “Taiwanjin to kekkon” [Marriage to a Taiwanese]. *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper*, morning ed., 28 May 1896: 4.
- Takagi, Tomosaburō. “Nisshi minzoku no kekkon ni tsuite” [On Japanese-Chinese marriages]. *Jinkō Mondai Shiryo* 36 (1939): 351–354.
- Takamura, Chōji. “Kankoku no koji ni ai o sasageta Nihonzuma” [A Japanese wife who dedicated her love to Korea’s orphans]. *Fujin Kurabu* 45.9 (1964): 218–222.
- Takeda, Yukio. *Chūō Kyōwakai yōran* [Central Harmony Association directory]. Tokyo: Chūō Kyōwakai, 1940.
- — —. “Naichi zaijū hantōjin ni tsuite” [On Koreans residing in Japan]. *Jinkō Mondai Shiryo* 30 (1937): 460–465.
- Takenaka, Nobuko. *Shokuminchi Taiwan no Nihon josei seikatsushi* [Japanese women’s life history in colonial Taiwan]. Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1995–2001.
- Takeshita, Shūko. *Kokusai kekkon no shakaigaku* [Sociology of international marriage]. Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 2000.
- — —. *Kokusai kekkon no shosō* [Various aspects of international marriage]. Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 2004.
- Tamagawa, Masami. “Same-Sex Marriage in Japan.” *Journal of GLBT Family Studies*

12.2 (2016): 160–187.

Tamanoi, Mariko Asano. *Memory Maps: the State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009.

Tamura, Yoshio. “Honfu shakaika kankei shodantai no tōsei no nōritsu zōshin o mezashite” [Aiming for control and increase in efficiency of the head office’s different organizations related to the society department]. *Shakai Jihō* (1937.4): 8–12.

Tanaka, Stefan. *Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Tanaka, Takako. “Ai no kekkon seikatsu” [Love’s marriage life]. *Fujin Gahō* 1921.11.191 (1921): 38–41.

— — —. “Bosei no tachiba yori mitaru gunji kyōiku” [Military education from motherhood’s standpoint]. *Fujin no Tomo* 19.2 (1925): 15–18.

— — —. “Kekkon no aite o erabu ni wa” [On choosing a marriage partner]. *Fujin to Shūyō* 5.5 (1936.5): 38–39.

— — —, ed. *Kekkon sōdan* [Marriage consultation]. Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1943.

— — —. “‘Kekkon sōdan’ nijūnen: Enmusubi issenkumi no kobore banashi” [Twenty years of marriage consultation: Episodes of 1000 married couples]. *Kingu* 28.10 (1952.11): 344–347.

— — —. “Kekkon yori mitaru sesō” [Seeing society through marriage]. *Itoshiji* 6.4 (1934.3): 29–32.

— — —. “Korekara no kekkon to yūsei o kataru” [To talk of marriage and eugenics to come]. *Ie no Hikari* 17.1.3 (1941.1.3): 124–131.

— — —. “Oyomesan omukosan kouhosha hyōtenhō” [How to rate bride and groom candidates]. *Fujin Kurabu* 15.7 (1934): 194–155.

— — —. “Shokugyō fujin no katei seikatsu” [Working women’s family life]. *Haha to Ko* 19.1 (1938.1): 29–37.

Taniguchi, Toratoshi. “Konketsu mondai” [Mixed blood problem]. *Yūseigaku* 20.3 (1943): 17–19.

Tanimoto, Tomeri. “Konketsuji kenkyū no hoi” [Addendum to research on mixed

- blood children]. *Yūseigaku* 9.5 (1932): 2–8.
- — —. “Konketsuji ni tsuite” [On mixed blood children]. *Yūseigaku* 8.10 (1931): 2–6.
- Tauchi, Motoi. “Haha, Tauchi Chizuko” [Mother, Tauchi Chizuko]. *Tosashidan* 208 (1998): 58–70.
- The Global Gender Gap Report 2018*. December 17, 2018. *World Economic Forum*.
www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf.
- Thomas, Martin. *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire*.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Thrändhardt, Anna Maria. “Institutional Continuity and Functional Change: The Development of the System of Minsei-iin in the History of Social Welfare in Japan.” *Japan’s Socio-Economic Evolution: Continuity and Change*, edited by Sara Metzger-Court and Werner Pascha. Sandgate, Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library, 1996. 91–108.
- Tōgō, Minoru. “Daitōa kensetsu to zakkon mondai” [Construction of the Greater East Asia and the mixed marriage problem]. *Gaikō Jihō* 108.934 (1943): 5–13.
- — —. “Daitōa to minzoku mondai” [Greater East Asia and the minzoku problem]. *Gaikō Jihō* 106.925 (1925): 35–38.
- — —. “Shokumin seisaku to minzoku shinri” [Colonial policy and ethnic consciousness]. *Gaikō Jihō* 105.916 (1943): 23–32.
- Tokuda, Yukie. “Rìběn tǒngzhì xià Táiwān de ‘nèitáigònghūn’ — Rìběn yǔ Táiwān de ‘jiā’ zhìdù de chōngtú hé jiāoliú” [Taiwanese and Japanese interracial marriages: The familial challenges and culture conflicts during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan]. Master’s Thesis. Tamkang University, 2007.
- Tokuhiro, Yoko. *Marriage in Contemporary Japan*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010.
- Tokunaga, Hideo. “Shūsengo Taiwanjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese after the war]. *Koseki Jihō* 56 (1963.1): 40–45.
- — —. “Shūsenmae Nihonjin onna to nyūfu kon’inshi shūsengo rikon shita Taiwanjin otoko to heiwa jōyaku hakkōmae dōjin to kon’inshita naichijin onna no Nihon kokuseki no umu” [Whether or not a Taiwanese man who

married a Japanese woman before the end of war but divorced after the war and a Japanese woman who married the said person before the enactment of the peace treaty have a Japanese nationality]. *Koseki Jihō* 64 (1963.9): 30–36.

“Tokushū: ‘Kimin’ ni sareta Kankoku no Nihonjinsuma” [Special feature: Japanese wives rendered “abandoned people” in South Korea]. *Ushio* 153 (1972.5): 196–252.

Tokyo Asahi Shinbunsha, ed. *Josei sōdan* [Advice for women]. Tokyo: Kimura Shobō, 1932.

“Tokyo-shi kekkon sōdanjo hanjōki” [Sketches of Tokyo city’s marriage consultation center]. *Fujokai* 49.4 (1934): 80–81.

Tomida, Hiroko, and Gordon Daniels, eds. *Japanese Women: Emerging from Subservience, 1868–1945*. Kent: Global Oriental, 2005.

Tomisawa, Shigeru. *Taiwan shūsen hishi: Nihon shokuminchi jidai to sono shūen* [Hidden history of Taiwan’s end of war: Japanese colonial period and its end]. Tokyo: Izumi Shuppan, 1984.

“Transmittal of Petition for Stay of Deportation.” 1950. *GHQ/SCAP Records*. Box 1418. Folder title/number: 091C, Korean (13).

“Treatment of Formosans.” December 1945–September 1950. *GHQ/SCAP Records*. Box 1419. Folder title/number: 091K: Formosan-Chinese (Status in Japan) (10).

Tsukazaki, Masayuki. “Ajia Taiheiyō Sensōka no Osaka-fu Kyōwakai, Kyōwa Kyōryokukai, Kōseikai no katsudō to Chōsenjin” [Activities of Osaka prefecture’s Kyōwakai, Kyōwa Kyōryokukai, and Kōseikai during the Asia Pacific War and Koreans]. *Higashi Ajia Kenkyū* 54 (2010): 19–46.

— — — . “Senkyūhyakunijūnendai Osaka ni okeru ‘naisen yūwa’ jidai no kaishi to naiyō no saikentō” [Re-examination of “Japan-Korea harmony” era’s beginning and contents in 1920s Osaka]. *Zainichi Chōsenjinshi Kenkyū* 37 (2007): 23–52.

Tsurumi, Kazuko, ed. *Enpitsu o nigiru shufu* [Pencil-holding housewife]. Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1954.

Uchida, Jun. *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011.

- Uehara Carter, Mitzi. "Mixed Race Okinawans and Their Obscure In-Betweenness." *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 35.6 (2014): 646–661.
- Ueno, Chizuko. *Nashonarizumu to jendā* [Engendering nationalism]. Tokyo: Seidosha, 1998.
- Ukai, Satoshi, et al. *Reishizumu sutadīzu josetsu* [Introduction to racism studies]. Tokyo: Ibunsha, 2012.
- Unno, Yukinori. "Fujin hōmen'iin no kenkyū 1" [Research on female district commissioners 1]. *Shakai Jigyō* 12.7 (1928): 60–68.
- — —. "Nihonjinshu to Chōsenjinshu to no zakkon ni tsuite" [On mixed marriage between Japanese race and Korean race]. *Taiyō* 16.16 (1910): 98–104.
- — —. "Zakkon mondai" [Mixed marriage problem]. *Taiyō* 1914 (1913.11): 138–143.
- Utakawa, Reizō. "Keishū ni Nazare'en o tazuneru: Koto ni ikiru Nihonjinzuma" [Visiting the Nazareth Gardens in Gyeongju: Japanese wives living in an ancient city]. *Zaikai* 48.12 (2000): 162–164.
- Wagner, Edward W. *The Korean Minority in Japan, 1904–1950*. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951.
- Wakisaka, Sakujirō. "Boshi hogo no tettei to fujin hōmen'iin" [Thoroughness of mother-child protection and female district commissioners]. *Shakai Jigyō* 21.11.2 (1938): 51–53.
- — —. "Fujin hōmen'iin no shinshutsu" [Advancement of female district commissioners]. *Shakai Jigyō* (1939.8): 40–47.
- Walker, Gavin, and Naoki Sakai. "The End of Area." *positions* 27.1 (February 2019): 1–31.
- Walthall, Anne, ed. *The Human Tradition in Modern Japan*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Books, 2002.
- Wang, Hsiao-Yun. "Shōji Sōichi no 'Chen Fujin' ni miru haiburiddo bunka no kattō" [Tension of hybrid culture as seen in Shōji Sōichi's "Chen Fujin"]. *Ajia Shakai Buna Kenkyū* 8 (2007): 39–66.
- Watanabe, Yoshizō. "Zakkon no rigai" [Pros and cons of mixed marriages]. *Yūseigaku* 1.3 (1924): 16–17.

- Watt, Lori. *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan*. Harvard University Asia Center, 2009.
- Weiner, Michael, ed. *Japan's Minorities: the Illusion of Homogeneity*. Second edition. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Yabuta, Yasuo. "Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Taiwanjin to kon'in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki ni tsuite" [Regarding nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese before the enactment of the peace treaty]. *Hanrei Jihō* 68 (1956.2.1): 1–2.
- Yamada, Waka. *Shōwa fujin dokuhon* [Shōwa women's reader]. Tokyo: Bunkyo Shoin, 1927.
- Yamanouchi, Yasushi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Ryūichi Narita, eds. *Total War and Modernization*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2001.
- Yamashiro, Jane H. *Redefining Japaneseness*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2017.
- Yamauchi, Fukiko. "Nihon de saisho no fujin hōmen'iin" [Japan's first female district commissioners]. *Fujin no Tomo* 21.10 (1927): 85–86.
- Yamazaki, Tomoko. "Ajia josei kōryūshi kenkyū" [Research on Asian women's history of exchange]. *Minato no Hito*.
www.minatonohito.jp/products/020_02.html.
- — —. "Okisarareta Nihon josei tachi (jō) 'naisen kekkon' to 'tairiku hanayome'" [Japanese women left forgotten (part one) "Japanese-Korean marriage" and "continental brides"]. *Sekai* 762 (2007.3): 277–291.
- — —. *The Story of Yamada Waka: from Prostitute to Feminist Pioneer*. Tokyo: Kōdansha International, 1985.
- Yang, Peiwen. "Kuàyuè biānjiè de liú dòng yǔ rěn tóng: Rìzhì shíqí `nèitáigònghūn' yánjiū" [The study of interracial marriages between Taiwanese and Japanese during the colonial period]. Master's Thesis. National Chengchi University, 2009.
- Yasui, Hiroshi. *Senji kekkon kyōtei* [Wartime marriage manual]. Tokyo: Nagao Shuppan Hōkokukai, 1943.
- Yi, Bangja (Ri Masako). *Dōran no naka no ōhi* [Princess amidst the storm]. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1973.

- Yokoyama, Minoru. “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō mae Chōsenjin otoko to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki ni tsuite” [Regarding nationality of Japanese women who married Korean men before the enactment of the peace treaty]. *Koseki* 120 (1958): 7–11.
- Yoneyama, Lisa. *Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016.
- Yoshida, Kyūichi. *Shōwa shakai jigyōshi* [Shōwa social work history]. Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 1971.
- Yoshioka, Seiichi. “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 1” [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 1]. *Koseki Jihō* 417 (1992): 55–64.
- . “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 2” [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 2]. *Koseki Jihō* 421 (1993): 57–63.
- . “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 3” [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 3]. *Koseki Jihō* 424 (1993): 72–77.
- . “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 4” [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 4]. *Koseki Jihō* 430 (1993): 59–63.
- Young, Louise. *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- “Zaisen naichijin to jiyū kekkon” [Japanese in Korea and free marriages]. *Tokyo Shin Kokkei* 10.88 (1916): 6.
- Zen Nihon Hōmen’iin Renmei [All Japan League of District Commissioners]. *Hōmen jigyō nenkan shōwa jūnananendoban* [District work yearbook 1941]. Tokyo: Zen Nihon Hōmen’iin Renmei, 1943.
- “Zenkoku kekkon sōdanjo ichiranhyō” [A list of marriage consultation centers across the nation]. *Fujin Kōron* 28.7 (1943.7): 77–79.
- Zenshō, Eisuke. “Waga kuni gaichi imin no seisaku” [Our country’s policies on immigrants from the outer territories]. *Jinkō Mondai Shiryō* 36 (1939): 339–349.
- Ziomek, Kirsten L. “The Possibility of Liminal Colonial Subjecthood: Yayutz Bleyh and the Search for Subaltern Histories in the Japanese Empire.” *Critical Asian Studies* 47.1 (2015): 123–150.