

MUNICIPAL RESPONSES TO SYRIAN REFUGEE INFLOW TO LEBANON:  
STUDYING THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOPOLITICAL AFFILIATIONS ON POLICY  
RESPONSES

A Research Paper

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by

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## ABSTRACT

In a country where politics and religion are far from being separated, policies fall victim of stagnation and biases. The Lebanese government's response to the Syrian Refugee inflow is not an exception. However, the large number of refugees seeking refuge in the Lebanese towns and villages, leave local governments with a great challenge. Therefore, in this paper I study the impact of religiopolitical affiliations on municipalities' responses and survey the responses of 9 cases.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Siba was born and raised in the city of Saida in South Lebanon. Saida is home for the largest, most dense Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon. Growing up she became aware of refugees and sensitive to their concerns and sufferings. Siba moved to Beirut in 2006 to pursue a BS in Landscape Design and Eco-system Management at the American University of Beirut, where she focused her interests on working in lower income communities. After graduation, she worked at the Center for Civic Engagement and Community Service as a project Coordinator and Landscape consultant on projects targeting rural areas, refugee camps and lower income communities. In fall of 2012, Siba joined the Landscape Architecture Department at Cornell University, and in fall of 2013 she decided to join the City and Regional Planning department to pursue a dual degree in order to expand her knowledge and diversify her skills.

To my dad's memory,

A generous educator and curious learner till the last moment...

"ففز بعلم تعيش به حيا أبداً الناس موتى وأهل العلم أحياء"  
علي بن أبي طالب

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UNHCR: United Nations Higher Council for Relief  
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization  
MoSA: Ministry of Social Affairs  
UN: United Nations  
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization  
MOIM: Ministry of Interior and Municipalities  
USAID: United States Agency for International Development  
OTI: Office of Transition Initiatives  
IFES: International Foundation for Electoral Systems  
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency  
INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization  
GO: Governmental Organization  
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme  
CfW: Cash for Work  
CCECS: Center for Civic Engagement and Community Service  
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria  
HRW: Human Rights Watch  
SFCG: Search for Common Grounds  
ISF: Internal Security Forces  
LP: Lebanese Pounds  
USD: US Dollars

## PREFACE

This project focuses on two topics of my interest, local governments and refugee issues. Issues of refugees specifically have been an interest of mine since I was very young. However, I tried to avoid the topic for several months before I gave in. The increasing number of refugees that reached almost third of the Lebanese population and the news about the curfews that some Lebanese local governments are implementing were very intriguing. Therefore, I wanted in this research to look more into the responses of local governments and the reasons behind them. I had two goals: one is educational as I wanted to learn more about the governance system and the work of local governments in Lebanon especially in emergency situations, the second is investigational, to know whether the reason behind governments responses is sectarian or not given the close connection between religion and politics in Lebanon.

## Introduction:

“ربيع العرب، حين يزهر في بيروت، إنما يعلن أوان الورد في دمشق.”  
“*The Arab spring, when it blossoms in Beirut, it declares the time of roses in Damascus.*”  
Samir Kassir<sup>1</sup>


Syria and Lebanon, neighbors in geography and partners in history, have always had tight relations that govern their destinies. Throughout the years this relation has been for better or for worse, or, well, mostly for worse. When Samir Kassir wrote these words in 2005, he was highlighting the critical relation between Lebanon and Syria. What’s good for one is good for the other and vice versa.

Syria’s fight for freedom that started in March of 2011 has expanded into a sectarian war, tearing the country apart. As a result, around 4 million Syrians (UNHCR-Regional Response) fled the country in search for their security, seeking refuge in neighboring countries. According to UNHCR, the majority of refugees are divided between Turkey, with around 1,600,000 refugees, and Lebanon, with around 1,200,000. The large numbers of refugees leaves a great impact on these host countries.


Lebanon ranks first, worldwide, on refugee density with 257 refugees per 1000 inhabitants. Figure (2) below shows the huge gap between Lebanon and Jordan, the second ranking country. In the ‘2014 Mid-Year Trends’ report, UNHCR notes the severity of the Syrian refugee issue on Lebanon, “Lebanon has thus moved from being the 69th largest refugee-hosting country to second largest within a span of just three and a half years” (Midyear trends-UNHCR). Also, Lebanon ranks 11<sup>th</sup> worldwide, in number of refugees per 1 USD GDP per capita, and first among countries hosting Syrian refugees with 63 refugees per 1 USD GDP per capita.

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<sup>1</sup> Samir Kassir (1965-2005) was a Lebanese-French historian and political writer of Syrian and Palestinian descent. He was known for his opposition for the Syrian Regime. Kassir was assassinated in 2005. He wrote his article ‘Beirut is the Spring of Arabs’ after Lebanon’s ‘Independence Intifada’ or ‘Cedar Revolution’ in March, 2005 when more than a million came out to the streets against the Syrian Army presence in Lebanon. This led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces in April 2005.




**Figure 1: MENA region Map**



**Figure 2: Number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants**

Data source: UNHCR MID-Year trends



**Figure 3: Registered refugees increase – Jan '12 to Jan '15**  
Data source: UNHCR

Despite the size of this problem and its impact, the Lebanese government has been following a ‘neutrality’ strategy. In other words, due to political sensitivities, the government has not set any clear policies in response to this major issue. Borders are left open for all refugees, but, on the other hand, strategies for providing for them or coping with their needs are not set. Yet, this is only half of the problem. The political and sectarian complexity of the situation has led to major spillovers into the Lebanese social fabric. Instead of being only humanitarian hosts, Lebanese citizens became biased partisans, participating physically in the battlefield or politically from Lebanon. Unlike Kassir’s hopeful statement above, many today see Syria’s ‘war’ as their chance for a political win, an expansion for their power, or simply their path for independence and sovereignty. The Syrian regime has played a major role in Lebanese politics for the last 4 decades. It was involved in the civil war, the amendment of the constitution in 1990 after the end of the civil war and it always had a say in major political events like the election of the Lebanese president. Therefore, many see in the regime’s fall a major step for achieving Lebanese independence and sovereignty.

The absent clear, unifying national policies increased burden on local governments. Responsibilities were unintentionally delegated to municipalities that are in the front line of the issue. However, given the sectarian diversity in Lebanon and its direct attachment to political diversity, responses from the different municipalities have not been homogenous. In this paper, **I study responses of 9 municipalities in relation to**

**their religious (religiopolitical) affiliations. I test the hypothesis that municipalities' actions and responses are shaped by the religious affiliations of their populations.** I do so by a quantitative analysis comparing the relation between refugee population distribution and religious communities' distribution. In addition I conduct a qualitative analysis based on interviews with sample municipalities. My aim is to 1) test if any trend appearing in the general district data persists in the municipal cadastral level and 2) survey the different responses and actions that sample municipalities are implementing to infer lessons for future action.

### **Background: History and Context**

“In my Father’s house are many mansions.” John 14:2

‘A house of many mansions’ as historian Kamal Salibi<sup>2</sup> describes it, Lebanon has always been a haven for minorities and oppressed groups in the Middle East. Today, these groups constitute the diverse demographic of Lebanon<sup>3</sup>. The small country is home for 18 officially recognized religious sects where the majority is not dominated by a single religion or sect. Since the establishment of Lebanon<sup>4</sup>, these 18 sects have played a major role in defining political distributions, parliamentary seats and executive government positions. Despite the fact that the first constitution, outlined in 1926, is secular ‘*par excellence*’, the National Pact<sup>5</sup> defines a system based on confessionalism to recognize fears and concerns of the different groups. Confessionalism is a ‘sectarian power-sharing system’ that proportionally allocates political power among a country's

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<sup>2</sup> Kamal Salibi (1929-2011) was a Lebanese historian. In his book ‘A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered’ Salibi presents a critical study of the different views of Lebanese history as perceived by the diverse Lebanese religious groups. He argues that these groups lack a common history.

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix A for Map.

<sup>4</sup> ‘Greater Lebanon’, the Lebanese state in its modern geographic boundaries, was declared in 1920 under the French mandate. Later, it was transformed into a republic modeled after the French Third Republic.

<sup>5</sup> The National Pact is an unwritten gentlemen's agreement between the country’s sectarian/ political elite. It established the foundations of the Lebanese independent government after independence in 1943 (Salamy, 2014).

communities—whether religious or ethnic—according to their percentage of the population (Majed, 2013). Therefore, Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic within a framework of ‘consociationalism’. The American-Dutch scholar, Arendt Lijphart defines consociationalism as a ‘democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority’ (Lijphart, 1999). It is a democracy that is based on power sharing arrangements between ethnic or sectarian groups. He identifies four features that characterize these arrangements: a grand coalition, a mutual veto, proportional and segmental autonomy. Therefore, cabinets are usually inclusive and require wide consensus to avoid repression by one communal group against another. Lijphart notes that immobility is one of the major threats of consociational systems as they require accommodation among all groups (Salamy, 2014), (Lijphart, 1999).

In cases like Lebanon where there is a deep divide between the different sectarian groups in political orientation and national identity and no clear, geographical demarcation exists between these groups, consociationalism, which is a type of consociationalism, seems the most viable and practical solution (Salamy, 2014), (Harb, 2006). However, consociationalism failed in Lebanon. It didn’t close the gap, curb fears or prevent confrontations. Sectarian differences resurfaced with every major political event. The 15- year-long brutal war where Muslims and Christians fought against each other as well as within each other, clearly reveals this failure. One of the defining events remains the flow of Palestinian refugees. After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, large numbers of Palestinians were forced to flee their villages into neighboring countries, including Lebanon. These refugees settled in camps in different Lebanese cities. Their presence was not welcomed by everyone and



became a major player in the Lebanese politics—and the direct trigger for the civil war<sup>6</sup>. Especially after the rise of the ‘Palestine Liberation Organization’ (PLO)<sup>7</sup> in Lebanon, Lebanese were divided between sympathizers, including Islamic and left-wing groups—and opposers, including right-wing Christian groups<sup>8</sup>. The two-word description of this complex situation remains ‘demographic concerns’. The fact that the majority of Palestinian refugees are Sunni Muslims alarmed Christians in Lebanon, especially as time passed and hopes for Palestinians to return to ‘Palestine’ were lost. In addition, the Lebanese government has naturalized the majority of Christian Palestinian refugees.

Years after independence, demographic changes and civil war have led to a new constitution that redistributed shares evenly between sects. Though it calls for abandoning confessionalism, the new configuration fails to achieve this goal. The Political orientations are still tightly connected to religious affiliations. Major parties can be synonymous with the religious sects they represent, creating religiopolitical groups. Attitudes towards the Syrian revolution followed a similar pattern to that adopted towards Palestinian refugees. Though presence of militants is very limited geographically compared to the pre-civil war period, the case of Syrian refugees today brings bad memories back to Lebanese minds.

In an attempt to avoid importing the Syrian conflict into Lebanon due to lack of common grounds between the different components of the cabinet<sup>9</sup>, the Lebanese government made the decision to stay ‘neutral’. The government drafted a management

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<sup>6</sup> On April 13, 1975, a failed attempt on the life of a major Christian militia leader by masked gunmen killed 2 Christian gunmen. Believing the assassins to be Palestinian, Christian militiamen attacked a bus carrying Palestinian passengers killing 26 and marking the beginning of the Lebanese civil war.

<sup>7</sup> PLO is a loose confederation of militant groups, trained, financed and supported by USSR. Along with a left-wing alliance, they became the most potent fighting force. (Salamy, 2014)

<sup>8</sup> Please note that this is an oversimplification of the actual situation. For example, Shia Muslim militias were among opponents yet they were in a separate group and not in the same alliance as Christian militias.

<sup>9</sup> Most cabinets in Lebanon are not based on parliamentary majority. They include a representation of the major political parties in the country. Ministerial positions are divided proportionally among the different religiopolitical groups. Therefore, decisions need full consensus that is often absent. As a result, cabinets are dysfunctional to a large extent.

plan in December, 2012 to divide tasks between Ministries of Social Affairs (MoSA), Health and Education and UNHCR. However, it failed to implement this plan. Today, the UNHCR and other UN agencies are coordinating humanitarian response along with MoSA (Boustani, 2014) while no clear policy defines the process. Policy-makers, analysts, and NGOs describe this situation using different terms like ‘non-intervention’ (Naufal, 2012), policy of no-policy (El-Mufti, 2014) or ‘neutrality’. Karen Jacobson in her piece, ‘Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugees Influxes’ describes factors defining a host governments’ response as including the following, “...the costs and benefits of accepting international assistance, relations with the sending country, political calculations about the local community's absorption capacity, and national security considerations.” However, she argues, “Host governments also struggle with bureaucratic politics, the position of refugees in domestic politics, power struggles between government ministries and among decisionmakers, paucity of information, bureaucratic inertia, and other complications that must be teased out at the empirical level” (Jacobson, 1996). These struggles describe the Lebanese case aptly.

‘The position of refugees in domestic politics’ has had precedents in Lebanon. Lebanon’s refugee population became established over time by various groups. Each group was treated differently by the Lebanese authorities, and these experiences offer distinct lessons. The main groups include: Palestinian refugees – arriving around 1948 and 1967, Iraqi refugees – arriving in the 1980s, and 2000s; and the Syrian refugees arriving from 2011 onwards. The greatest problem involved the treatment of the Palestinian refugees who are predominantly Sunnis. They still face discrimination from the Lebanese government due to fear of naturalization. Naturalisation of Palestinian refugees ‘would threaten the country’s confessional balance’ (Hanafi, 2012). If Palestinians were naturalized, the percentage of Sunni Muslim citizens would increase substantially, threatening any existing balance.

As for ‘bureaucratic politics and inertia’, they are present in the sectarian, centralized administrative system. Under the central government, Lebanon is divided into 8 governorates that oversee 26 districts. The central government oversees around 985 municipalities and 45 unions of municipalities. Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MOIM) guides the work of municipalities and manages their funding and resources. According to Articles 47-51<sup>10</sup> in the Municipal Law, municipalities, represented by their council, have a long list of responsibilities. However, resources given by the government to exercise this authority are very limited, partly due to the government's limited resources and partly due to hindrance in municipal law. Article 87 under ‘Municipal Finances’ states that ‘The revenues of the common allowances of all municipalities shall be deposited in trust in an independent municipal fund at the Ministry of Interior.’ This imposes bureaucratic and political obstacles on the distribution of these funds. The Lebanese government is often in stalemate. Political conflict leads to indecision, delaying or even prohibiting any operations. For example, the Lebanese government has only recently approved the 2014 budget. Because the country has been without a president for more than 10 months now, more operations are delayed. This leaves municipalities without the means to function. André Sleiman, an ex-manager at USAID’s OTI in Beirut—that currently trains municipalities on municipal law—described the limitations that municipalities face by saying, “80% of municipalities have 2 employees. They don’t have the money, staff or know-how to lead their municipalities. We give them trainings, yet they say, ‘Perfect! We know how to do it now, but we need the money to do so.’”

**Method:**

To answer my question, I used two methods, quantitative and qualitative. Lack of data in Lebanon limits the scope of quantitative research, therefore by mixing methods

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<sup>10</sup> Please see Appendix A for Articles 47-51 of Chapter IV of municipal act on municipal council competence.

with qualitative personal interviews I try to strengthen my research and fill the gaps. Lack of data has imposed alterations on my initial plan. As I am targeting the responses of local governments I wanted to compare refugee population distribution to the religious distribution of the Lebanese population on the municipal level. Ideally, I would compare the percentage of refugees within each municipality to the percentage population of each religious sect in that municipality. The aim is find if there is a correlation between the distribution of refugees and the religious majority of each municipality.

However, I was only able to find the Syrian refugee distribution on the municipal level as it is collected, mapped and published online by UNHCR. As for Lebanese population and religious distribution, Lebanon lacks an accurate survey. The last official census was done by French mandate administration in 1932. Since then the Lebanese government avoids a current census fearing that it could trigger a new round of denominational conflict. Therefore, official numbers are based on projections, CIA world fact-book data or from other INGO's. Therefore, I had to alter my quantitative research to target the district level where data is more available for Lebanese population.

So the quantitative section tests the hypothesis that refugee population distribution is related to the religious distribution of the Lebanese population within districts. I compare the percentage population of refugees in the 26 districts with the percentage population of each religious community. In the qualitative section, I focus on specific cases on the municipal level. Though the two studies are on different scales, they can still support each other. The quantitative study tests the general situation of the refugee distribution, while the role of the qualitative study becomes more important and focuses on specific cases to provide a more accurate description.

To cover the gap imposed by the lack of data, I chose cases that represent samples from the different religious groups. For each group, I picked outlier district(s) and a trend

district. I identified 10 cases.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, some obstacles like weather, busy schedules of some mayors and the sensitivity of the subject required some alterations.<sup>12</sup> I interviewed the mayor, deputy mayor or council member of 9 cases about the situation of Syrian refugees in his/her city, town, or village and **how his/her municipality is responding to the situation.**

### **Quantitative Evidence:**

To test the relation between the distribution of Syrian refugees and the religious affiliation of the different districts I applied simple regressions of the percentage refugees within each district versus the percentage population of a certain religious sect in that district. The regressions target six out of the 18 sects. These represent the major sects that have dominance in one or more of the districts. The rest are not determining as they have very low percentages within only two or three districts. The religious groups are Maronite Catholic, Sunni Muslim, Shi'a Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Druze.

### Background:

Below, I briefly describe the 6 religious groups I study. The description summarizes the political status and history of each and focuses on elements that shape each group's perceptions, fears and identity<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> Please see Appendix B for selection criteria.

<sup>12</sup> In some of the bigger cities, deputy mayors or certain council members are in charge of the Syrian refugees issues.

<sup>13</sup> Disclaimer: These descriptions provide a general overview of the majority. They definitely do not represent 100 % of individuals in each community. Many do not identify intellectually or politically with a sectarian community however, though the government still identifies them based on their religious backgrounds.

### Maronite Catholic:

The Maronite Catholic Church is one of the eastern rite<sup>14</sup> Catholic churches in the near east. The Maronite Church was established in Lebanon and many relate the creation of Lebanon to Maronites and their presence in Mount Lebanon<sup>15</sup>. Their presence is largely limited to Lebanon, which differentiates the country's identity within the predominantly Muslim surrounding. Today, Maronite Catholics represent around 21%<sup>16</sup> of the Lebanese population, and 34 of the parliament seats. According to the 1943 National Pact, the Lebanese president is always elected to be Maronite Catholic. Despite their prominence in the country, being a minority in the region has increased their fear of demographic changes that might risk their presence, especially because the majority of Lebanese Maronites don't identify themselves as Arabs, but rather distinguish themselves from their surroundings. Therefore, they have a strong attachment to the Lebanese entity and its institutions. Maronites take diverse stands on the Syrian revolution depending on their political affiliation. Yet, they all share demographic concerns over the large number of Syrian Refugees entering Lebanon.

### Shi'a Islam:

Shia Islam is the second biggest branch of Islam. It comprises 10-20 % of Muslims around the world, but around 27% of Lebanese population. Shia Muslims have 23 seats in the parliament and are granted the Speaker of parliament position by National Pact. Since establishment of Lebanon, the Shi'a community has claimed to be marginalized by the government, especially because the Shiite community in Lebanon is

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<sup>14</sup>. Eastern rite church, also called Eastern Catholic Church, is any of a group of Eastern Christian churches that trace their origins to various ancient national or ethnic Christian bodies in the East but have established union with the Roman Catholic Church. In this union they accept the Roman Catholic faith, keep the seven sacraments, and recognize the pope of Rome as supreme earthly head of the church. (Encyclopedia Britannica).

<sup>15</sup> Due to unique religious configuration in Mount Lebanon, it was given self-governance under the Ottoman Empire. Later it became the nucleus of Greater Lebanon declared by France, giving prominence to Maronite Catholics.

<sup>16</sup> CIA- World Factbook estimation in 2012. Other Sources indicate other percentages.

concentrated in marginal areas like South Lebanon and North Bekaa that are remote from the center of government. Also, South Lebanon was under Israeli occupation for 25 years and this prohibited the central government's access to the primarily Shiite villages and towns. During Lebanese Civil War, some Shi'a affiliated political parties managed to gain political and armed power in the country, mainly supported by Iran. The major party that claims to represent a majority of the Shiite population in Lebanon, Hizb-Allah<sup>17</sup>, has had a major role in the Syrian conflict since the start of the revolution in 2011<sup>18</sup>. The party is a strong ally of Iran and the Syrian regime. The fact that the Syrian regime leader is Alawite, a branch of Shia Islam, has been a major role in the mutual support.

#### Sunni Islam:

It is the orthodox branch of Islam. It constitutes majority of Muslims around the world and around 27% of the Lebanese population. Sunni Muslims have 23 seats in the parliament and are granted the Prime minister position by National Pact. Sunnis are proud of their Arab heritage and affiliate strongly with Sunni, Arabs in surrounding countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Until 2005, Sunni community in Lebanon did not have serious denominational concerns, and many supported the Syrian regime and its 'presence' in Lebanon. After the assassination of ex-prime minister Rafic Hariri<sup>19</sup>, Sunni concerns started to arise. The basis of their fear is the Shiite armed Hizb-Allah and the significant support it receives from Iran and the Syrian Regime. They generally support the Syrian revolution mainly as it's the revolt of the predominantly Sunni Syrian population against the Alawite Assad regime.

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<sup>17</sup> Hizb-Allah was one of the few militias that did not disarm after civil war, due to their alliance with Syrian regime, in power at that time, and to their role in resisting the Israeli occupation. After Israel withdrew in 2000, Hezbollah resisted pressure to disarm and continued to strengthen its military wing, the Islamic Resistance. In some ways, its capabilities now exceed those of the Lebanese army. (BBCNEWS)

<sup>18</sup> Hizb-Allah militia are actually fighting in Syria next to the Syrian regime Army. They base their fight on religious mission to rescue Shiite shrines in Syria.

<sup>19</sup> Syrian regime is accused of the assassination.

### Greek Orthodox:

This orthodox branch of Christianity represents the adherents of the Greek Orthodox Eastern church in Lebanon. The Greek orthodox community in Lebanon comprises around 8% of the total population and 14 seats in the Lebanese parliament. They are granted positions of Deputy Speaker and Deputy Prime Minister by the National Pact. The church also exists in many parts of the Arab World. In addition to Lebanon, 'Palestine', and Syria, Jordan and Egypt are home for a big Greek Orthodox community, and the patriarchate is based in the Syrian capital. A big number of the Orthodox community trace their origins to renowned Arab tribes. Therefore its followers have pan-Arab and pan-Syrian leanings. The Orthodox community is mostly urbanized. Most of the population resides in the cities of Beirut and Tripoli. Greek orthodox prominent figures have been strong opponents to the Syrian regime and its 'presence' in Lebanon. Since the start of the revolution they adopted different stands based on political affiliations, yet they share some demographic concerns with Maronites.

### Greek Catholic:

The Greek Catholic church is an eastern rite Catholic Church. The Greek Catholic community in Lebanon comprises around 5% of the population and 8 seats in the Lebanese Parliament. Zahle, Lebanon is the region's largest Catholic city. Greek Catholics are rooted in the Near East and Lebanon. They succeeded in achieving a balance between their Arab heritage and their identification with the West, and western Catholic Church. Their stands on the revolution in Syria are similar to that of the Orthodox community. However, the catholic community especially in Zahle, still holds the bad memory of the Syrian Regime siege for their city in 1980-1981.



### Druze:

Druze are an early branch of Shi'a Islam. However, they don't totally identify themselves as Muslims. Their religion incorporates elements of Gnosticism, Neoplatonism and Pythagoreanism (Khuri-Hitti, 1966). Druze maintain a closed religion and a close-knit community which limits their population expansion. Druze mainly reside in Mount Lebanon, Druze Mountain in Southern Syria and Northern Israel. They comprise 5.6% of the Lebanese population and 8 seats in the Lebanese Parliament. They played an important role in the creation of Lebanon due to their prominence in Mount Lebanon. Preserving their existence as a community is key for Druze. The two major Druze political parties disagree on most of local political issues, but manage to coordinate on issues that would ensure their continuity. Druze leaders that represent the Lebanese Druze have had unclear, mostly neutral stands on the Syrian Revolution. This copies to a large extent the position of Druze in Syria. This position is a means of protecting the community from involvement in the conflict.

### Data:

This study required three sets of data; Lebanese population in districts, their religious distribution and Syrian refugee population in districts. The Lebanese population data is from a Lebanese-French organization 'Localiban'. The organization's website provides profiles of each district and its population estimate from 2011. The religious distribution data based on a report by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) that shows percentage of voters in each district by religious confession in 2011<sup>20</sup>. Syrian refugee data is easier to collect. UNHCR, provide on their website, monthly-

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<sup>20</sup> In the latest parliamentary elections, electoral districts matched administrative districts except for West bekaa-Rachaye and Hermel-Baalbeck that are a merge of 2 administrative districts, while Saida and Zahrani electoral districts are both under one administrative district, Saida. These changes were made by Lebanese legislators to ensure representation of specific religious sects.

updated maps of the refugees distribution on district and cadastral scale. For this study, I use data from November 2014<sup>21</sup>.

Hypotheses:

In this study, I am testing if numbers of refugees differ based on religious affiliations of population. Based on the historic backgrounds and political stands of each religious group I test a set of hypotheses.

1. The number of refugees decreases as the percentage of Maronite population increases.
2. The number of refugees decreases as the percentage of Shiite population increases.
3. The number of refugees increases as the percentage of Sunni population increases.
4. The number of refugees decreases as the percentage of Greek Orthodox population increases. However, I expect a weaker correlation.
5. The number of refugees decreases as the percentage of Greek Catholic population increases. However, I expect a weaker correlation.
6. The number of refugees increases as the percentage of Druze population increases. However, I expect a weaker correlation.

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<sup>21</sup> Please see Appendix C for map.

Results:

**Table 1: Regression Results**

N= 26

Predictor	Coef.	Std. Err.	Adj. R2
<b>Maronite</b>	-0.03913	0.024692	0.057
<b>Sunni</b>	0.050991	0.030518	0.0669
<b>Shiite</b>	-0.01448	0.025022	-0.0273
<b>Catholic</b>	0.231695	0.157836	0.0442
<b>Greek</b>	-0.06084	0.063312	-0.0031
<b>Druze</b>	-0.0104	0.065526	-0.0406

**Table 2: Correlation Matrix**


	Refugees	Sunni	Shiite	Maronite	Catholic	Greek	Druze
<b>Refugees</b>	1.0000						
<b>Sunni</b>	0.3228	1.0000					
<b>Shiite</b>	-0.1173	-0.3258	1.0000				
<b>Maronite</b>	-0.3078	-0.4864	-0.4864	1.0000			
<b>Catholic</b>	0.4087	-0.0928	0.0396	-0.1002	1.0000		
<b>Greek</b>	0.0275	0.0686	-0.3776	-0.0884	-0.1461	1.0000	
<b>Druze</b>	0.0764	-0.0676	-0.2023	-0.1063	-0.0737	0.0504	1.0000

Bivariate regressions results, agree, to a large extent, with my hypotheses.


Correlation between the percentage refugees and the percentage Maronites within each district is ‘-0.3’ indicating an inverse relation between the two components. As percentage of Maronite Catholic population increases in a certain district, the percentage of refugees is decreasing. Similarly for the Shiite population, there is a negative correlation. The correlation between the percentage refugees and the percentage of Shiite population within districts is -0.117 confirming an inverse relation between the two. However, the relation is weaker than that in the Maronite case. The correlation value is low and the downward sloping trend line is flatter. This makes sense, as Shiite community is less sensitive towards the issue. Also, in 2006, during the Israeli war on Lebanon, Syrians hosted a good number of Shiite families from South Lebanon that fled to Syria seeking refuge. For districts with Sunni Muslim majority, the quantitative test

proves the positive relation true. The correlation is positive '0.32' while the trend line has a steep, positive slope. Here the relation is as strong as that in the Maronite case. Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic and Druze population regressions show a direct relation to the refugee distribution.


For the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic cases, these results oppose the hypotheses. Yet, correlations are weak. Regression for Greek Orthodox cases is as low as 0.027, while that of Druze cases is 0.076. As for Greek Catholic cases, though the correlation is a decent 0.4, when removing Zahle district, which hosts the biggest number of refugees in Lebanon and is home for the biggest Catholic city in Lebanon, the results change. As shown in the charts below (Figures 4 and 5), the regression line become almost flat and correlation drops to 0.01. Looking through the distribution within Zahle, I notice that the majority of refugees in the district settle in two Sunni towns and not in the city of Zahle. The histogram below (Figure 6) shows the distribution skewness. Knowing that the city of Zahle is the largest city in the Bekaa governorate. These weak correlations are affected by the fact that these sects comprise a minority and are not present in a big number of districts. But, it also reflects the 'neutral' or indifferent attitude that some of these groups might have towards the issue. In general, all correlations are not strong. Table 1 shows low coefficients and adjusted R-squared value of the regressions. All, except for Catholic- Refugee regression coefficients range from 0.01 to 0.06. While the Catholic-refugee regression, that has a slightly higher coefficient of 0.2 has a higher standard error indicating a lower accuracy. These weak relations are an indicator that there are other factors impacting distribution of refugees like the size of the town, location and others. However, diverse relations and the fact that they highly agree with the hypotheses, indicate that religiopolitical affiliation may be a factor.



**Figure 4: Catholic distribution vs refugee distribution with Zahle**



**Figure 5: Catholic distribution vs refugee distribution without Zahle**



**Figure 6: Refugee Distribution within Zahle**

Data source: UNHCR MID-Year trend

**Case Studies:**

Kamel Kozbar, Council member for the city of Saida explains what he thinks is the major factor behind the central government’s failure in responding to the Syrian refugee issue saying, “Until today they call them migrants and not refugees, as if they are still in the same county, as if Lebanon is part of Syria.”

While Nabatiye Mayor, Dr. Ahmad Kheil started his interview by correcting me saying, “I would use the term Syrian migrants—Refugees does not describe the situation accurately.”

The discrepancy in referring to the Syrian groups in Lebanon represents the deeper gap in municipalities’ positions and its impact on their responses. Interviews on the municipal level helped me gain a better understanding of the situation and the different responses. The cases<sup>22</sup> represent a variety of districts, municipality size, refugee population and religiopolitical affiliations. I use these interviews to try and analyze any existing trends and the reasons behind them. I compare and study the 9 cases based on four topics. These topics were highlighted by all interviewees as the main aspects of the Syrian refugee situation they are facing. They show similarity in issues and differences in

<sup>22</sup> Please See Appendix D for list of cases.

responses from municipalities and urge a deeper thinking about possible drivers of these differences. The topics are: (1) challenges that municipalities face, (2) Refugees' shelter type and conditions, (3) Type and level of security control, and (4) the municipalities' relation with GOs and NGOs.

1. Challenges:

Marj Mayor, Nazim Saleh summarizes the challenges his municipality is facing as follows, "We were planning to have 16000-17500 residents in ten years [from today]. Now, in 1 year, we have additional 18000."

The large flow of refugees residing in Lebanese cities and towns has imposed great challenges on Lebanese local governments. As mayor Saleh describes above, the sudden increase in population exceeds what municipalities planned for, especially because municipalities already face many challenges due to limited resources and support. All nine cases discuss a similar set of challenges. With security concerns being the priority, the list includes shelter, infrastructure, and competition. I discuss security and shelter responses in depth within the coming sections, therefore this section focuses on infrastructure and competition issues.

Infrastructure conditions in Lebanon have always faced many challenges. The 15 year long civil war has paralyzed the young country's development and weakened the little that was established. Attempts for reconstruction and development were always limited by small budgets<sup>23</sup> and mainly focused in priority regions like Beirut. Therefore, we see Lebanon's infrastructure struggling to provide for current Lebanese population. Previous Economy and Finance Minister Mohamad Safadi described the situation to Reuters in 2010 saying, "You're not talking about less than \$20 billion ... to get these areas to basic (levels). We're not talking about [infrastructure] expansion needed for the

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<sup>23</sup> Public debt was projected to continue to rise and exceed 140 percent of GDP by the end of 2014. (8)

future, [we don't have what's needed] just to cope with demand today" (Bayoumy, 2010).

So, one can only imagine how the situation has worsened since then.

Head of Jezzine Union of Municipalities, Jezzine Mayor Khalil Harfouch describes his infrastructure challenges by saying, "...the main problem is that we're not ready to receive 30% of the population, [with] no infrastructure."

Mayor Harfouch's concerns reflect on Lebanon's infrastructure un-readiness to accommodate for the sudden population growth. All cases describe the huge impact on an infrastructure that, in some cases, might not even exist. Sewage, solid waste collection, electricity and water supply are all services that severely struggle under the added load. According to UNDP's impact report, over the period of 2012-14, the fiscal cost of the Syrian conflict on infrastructure is estimated at USD 589 million (UNDP, 2013). This is reflecting on municipalities' ability in service delivery.

Water and electricity shortages in Lebanon are definitely not new. However, the overload of refugees increased demand on these resources. For example, most refugees receive electricity in their rental apartments or rooms. However, only few pay for it and many others resort to illegally connect to public electricity lines. This affects both refugees and locals as it damages and weakens electricity lines. Similarly, additional load overwhelms the poorly functioning sewage network. Many of the cases are not connected to sewage networks to start with. It is surprising, even for me, to know that at least 4 out of 9 cases use septic tanks or cesspools. Therefore, any overload risks an overflow if maintenance is not increased. For example, Ayoub Bark, deputy mayor of Byblos Municipality explains, "We don't have a sewage network...the increase [in use] affects the water table because of leaks."



As for solid waste collection, the overload requires additional trucks, bins and manpower. Municipalities try to cope with the challenge and in some cases, they receive support from UNHCR or UNDP.

Fouad Mchawrab, Bissarieh's mayor also describes his municipality's challenges in receiving resources and support, "In Biseraiieh, we have 6500 registered population. However, we have 7000 residents and 6000 Syrian refugees, so we have 21000 [19,500] individuals that we're providing services for, while we're receiving resources [from the central government] for 6500 only."

Due to limitations on time and resources, most of the 'solutions' are instant reactions to the increased demand. Other than a sewage network project that is initiated and implemented by UNDP in Marj, South Lebanon, all other responses are limited to investing in new collection trucks and trash bins. On the other hand, in addition to the increased load, differences in cultural backgrounds or lifestyles seem to have an impact on this issue.

Mayor Mchawrab raised another interesting point during his interview when he said, "They [refugees] produce garbage double that the Lebanese produce!"

Though surprising or even appalling to hear, several cases mention that refugees are throwing more trash in unauthorized places, on the streets, in sewage and even in rivers. As this is hard to explain or support, one of the cases offers a different story. Marj's mayor suggests that when refugees first started settling in his town, locals noticed that they would have their trash bags left by the roadside all day. Later the locals realized that the refugees were not aware of the collection truck schedule. This shows how simple misunderstandings can lead to deeper misconceptions.

Another big challenge is competition. In addition to competition for infrastructure, resources and space, many Lebanese feel that Syrian refugees create direct

economic competition. Most municipalities explain that locals complain about competition for jobs as well as for support from international organizations.

Kamel Kozbar describes some of the Saida residents' complaints on this issue this way: “[Locals say to us] ‘we only see Syrians getting packages, nothing for the Lebanese?!’ ”

Syrian refugees receive several forms of support from UNHCR; packages, money, and housing. Lower income Lebanese families see that they are eligible for support as well due to their condition. Some find this especially true for host communities since hosting refugees is affecting the community's ability to support lower income groups. Since local governments don't have a say in the support distribution process, all they can do is move distribution locations to less visible spots to avoid any pressure, added complaints and potential trouble. At the beginning, distribution took place in a central visible location. Later, some municipalities decided to relocate distribution sites. For example, Saida moved distribution to an area next to the municipal soccer field that is located towards the northern end of the city. Kamel Kozbar explains that locals don't understand how big the number of refugee families is and how little support they receive. He says, “They see Syrians picking packages every week, but they don't realize that each family is receiving packages only every other month.” So, municipalities could only avoid confrontations. As for job competition, the situation is more complicated, but UNDP seems to be trying to alleviate some of the pressure.

Ayoub Bark summarizes the job dilemma in three sentences: “A Syrian refugee living here has to look for a job—He won't be sitting doing nothing. He has to find a job spot, which means he'll be taking other people's spots. We don't want this to grow—We need foreign workers, but we don't want them to replace Lebanese [workers].”

Given their economic situation and limited support, many Syrians are joining the labor force in Lebanon. In addition to refugees residing in Lebanon, the deteriorating economic situation in Syria pushes more workers to neighboring countries. Job competition mostly takes place in two sectors, construction and agricultural labor and

small businesses like workshops and restaurants. As many of the interviewees mention, there is not much that municipalities can do. It is usually up to employers to pick workers, and up to the national government to give licenses for small businesses. Many argue that Syrians offer cheaper services, consequently imposing very tough competition on Lebanese workers. But, this is not new. Syrian workers have been, for decades, the go-to people for these positions in Lebanon. So some argue that Syrian workers are filling a gap by taking jobs that Lebanese are not likely to take anyways.

One of the major attempts at alleviating this dilemma is the ‘Cash-for-Work’ (cfw) program by UNDP. Cfw, provides refugees with a fixed salary in return for a certain number of work hours that the municipality assigns. This program requires a 20% quota for including Lebanese workers. Dr. Kheil, Nabatiye’s Mayor explains the benefits of this program saying, “...cash-for-work is very helpful. Instead of asking for help, refugees are working, helping the host community and earning money. Instead of passive giving, this is an active way for help.” So, the program helps municipalities by relieving some of the pressure imposed by refugees as well as providing jobs for locals.

## 2) Shelter:

Ahmad Kheil explains Nabatiye’s approach to shelter saying, “In Nabatiye, we refused the shelter [camps]. We have a previous experience with Palestinians. The right alternative for any shelter is that they go back to their homes. So shelters [camps] should not become an alternative homeland.”

Providing shelter for refugees is a major aspect of a host government’s role. In Lebanon’s case, it is very critical too. Countries hosting a large number of Syrian refugees like Turkey and Jordan have assigned camps to border areas to host these refugees. However, the Lebanese government did not assign official refugee camps (El-Mufti, 2014). Haunted by the Palestinian experience in Lebanon, officials opposed any kind of formal camps (Baker, 2013). Therefore, refugees spread throughout Lebanon to

find shelter depending on availability, their economic ability and the flexibility of the host municipality. Cases I study in this paper represent a broad spectrum of the different shelter types that refugees occupy.

Ayoub Bark categorizes refugees' shelter in Byblos based on their economic status: "There are two groups of Syrians in Jbeil [Byblos]. A group that is very economically comfortable, and these are renting or even buying apartments. Another group is renting small rooms that are in bad shape. These represent the largest number."

The majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon rent their living space. Some are renting luxury apartments, while others rent a room, a tent or even a garage. The case in Byblos is typical of cases like Kousba, Abra, and Ras el Matn. Refugees look for available spaces that match their abilities. However, refugees' desperate need and their limited resources lead some Lebanese landlords to abuse the situation.

Mayor Harfouch gives an example about the living situation of some refugees in Jezzine saying,

The problem is that they [refugees] are living in garages, and this is illegal. Also, they are all paying rents. For example, 5 individuals [live] in one room for \$ 200, because it's affordable for them. I am trying to impose some control.

In Jezzine landlords rent out rooms or underground garages that don't provide hygienic conditions for a large number of individuals. In response, some municipalities are imposing limitations to define rentable space and control numbers of refugees per space. For example, Kousba municipality drafted a law to regulate living conditions for refugees, limiting rentable spaces and the number of individuals per Meter Square. However, they failed to implement this regulation so far, because refugees are constantly moving and some Lebanese landlords are greedy and uncooperative. In addition, Jezzine has limited the number of refugees on the town level, banning additional refugees from entering. Mayor Harfouch explains, "We don't have any additional rooms or places to

host them. Any additional refugee will be an overload. It means they will either build tents or live 20 [individuals] per room.” By limiting the number of refugees entering the town, the municipality is hoping to minimize and avoid abuses.

Though the majority of Syrian refugees pay for living, many benefit from UNHCR’s rent reimbursement and cash support. Also, in some cases, employers provide their Syrian workers with a place to live. However, in most of these places, like construction sites or shops, don’t provide good living conditions. In another case, like that of Saida, the municipality assigns vacant apartments to refugees without any return. The municipality in Saida also coordinates with neighboring villages within the federation of municipalities to distribute the big number of refugees that Saida is receiving. Council member Kamel Kozbar explains, “Saida is small. If they wanted to build tents, we don’t have a space, and [therefore] we didn’t allow any tents... We tried to find some places for them in empty buildings.” As municipalities like Saida try to avoid camps within their boundaries due to lack of space, or security concerns, other municipalities are renting out land in their vicinity for refugees to build camps. Since the government didn’t pair its no-camp policy with an alternative, the de facto rule imposed itself in some villages hosting a large number of refugees (El-Mufti, 2014).

Marj mayor Nazim Saleh described the living situation of refugees in his town saying,

50 percent of refugees [in Marj] live in tents on rented private land. They pay around 50,000 LP [USD33/month] for the land [to place a tent].

Marj is one of the few municipalities that have camps in their vicinity. They are located on agricultural land outside the residential area. Marj hosts a large number of refugees (18,000) that is even larger than the local population (15000). Therefore, providing shelter for everyone within apartments would be impossible, especially since

renting land is more affordable. However, the mayor explains that they recently stopped accepting new refugees in camps to control the ‘chaos’. Similarly, the second case that has camps is Bissarieh. It also hosts a decent number of refugees. Nevertheless, camps in Bissarieh differ in nature from those in Marj. These settlements, as Mayor Mchawrab describes, are built by local residents<sup>24</sup> in the form of rooms and then rented out to refugees. Some date back to the 50’s, before the municipality was established. The largest number is located outside the village center on the main road connecting Bissarieh to a neighboring Sunni village. A third type of camp is the one located in Abra. This camp is built by a Saida-based Islamic NGO that owns land in Abra. The municipality and locals in Abra oppose building camps within their village. However, since the land is privately owned, the municipality decided to coordinate with the NGO. The municipality’s role is limited to the boundaries of the camp by ensuring security, while the NGO is responsible for registration, infrastructure, and livelihoods of the refugees inside.

Bad conditions within these unofficial camps, especially in winter<sup>25</sup>, has encouraged organizations to work on providing a more viable alternative to the typical tent. One alternative was developed by the Center for Civic Engagement and Community Service (CCECS) which is a Beirut-based research center. Their proposal, ‘Ghata’ (Arabic for cover), now implemented in two settlement camps, provides more hygienic living conditions and better temperature insulation. This proposal also provides restrooms and classrooms. Another proposal is by UNHCR and IKEA Foundation. It provides a light, flexible, and portable structure that can provide a private and safe shelter for refugees. Also, they can take it with them when they go home. However, this proposal was rejected by the Lebanese government, before the reality of camps required rethinking

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<sup>24</sup> Some of these residents are Palestinian and Syrian but were already living in Bissarieh.

<sup>25</sup> UNHCR have identified many death cases in camps, especially among babies and toddlers due to harsh cold weather.

the decision. In December, 2013, the Lebanese government approved the proposal and UNHCR and IKEA started implementing trials (Baker, 2013).

### 3) Type and level of control:

Kamel Kozbar describes the main challenge that his municipality faces at the control level saying, “Let’s say we place x in a certain location, after a while we ask about him and we find out that he left. ‘What? [Left from] Where? From Saida? From Lebanon?’ ”

One of the biggest issues facing municipalities in Lebanon or any country that is hosting refugees is keeping control while respecting refugees’ freedom of living and mobility. As council member Kozbar describes above, they are mobile and hard to keep track of in order to manage their needs. Sample municipalities I study in this paper show major differences in the way they handle this issue. Some are practicing strict control measures while others have more lenient measures or none. These measures include surveying and registration, curfews, housing regulations and population restriction. Differences in reaction could be a sign of certain political fears and demographic concerns—or be based on the number of refugees they host.

Mayor Harfouch states his constituency’s concerns, It’s very crucial that we keep our eyes open—we need to confirm for locals that, ‘Guys, if he’s Syrian, he’s not necessarily terrorist, or ISIS. *’For me this is a strategy to protect Lebanese as well as Syrians.*

In these target cases, fear of refugees was evident. However, it varied from one case to the other. Jezzine is one of the cases where political and security concerns are dominant. When every refugee is seen as a threat to the town’s security and its resident’s safety, according to Jezzine’s mayor, a certain degree of control is necessary. However, what is the necessary degree of control and what are acceptable tools for control? The nine cases are using several methods for security control. In the discussion below I discuss four of the most highlighted tools by majority of the cases: Raids and arrests, curfews, registration, and enforcement & communication.

Raids and arrests are among the main tools of control used ‘against’ the Syrian refugees. They include raiding settlements or apartments that house groups of Syrian refugees. Most of the cases that mentioned similar actions specified that the raids are performed on male, single—or not accompanied by families—workers. Raids and arrests are performed by the Lebanese army with varying degrees of participation from the different municipalities. Some municipalities choose to participate while others don't.

Mayor Harfouch adds explaining one of the control tools his municipality participates in saying,

We did some raids and arrests with the army for places that house more than 50 refugees. We knew there wouldn't be any problems but it was a precaution. Some had pictures of Daa'ish (ISIS) on their phones—these were for their friends—they were innocent. They [the Lebanese army intelligence] did investigations, and then they let them go.

As Harfouche mentions above, these actions are most of the times precautionary and not in response to security issues caused by Syrian refugees. Though performed by the army, Jezzine municipality took part in the process, unlike the municipality of Kousba that decided to keep a distance. As Lydia Farah, a member in Kousba's municipal council states, “Sometimes the police or army come in, but we don't know exactly why. We heard they caught a group of people, it might be [because of] a big or a small issue.”

A controversial tool used by some municipalities is curfews. During summer of 2013, some villages placed banners asking ‘foreigners’ to refrain from going out on the streets of the village after a certain hour of the night. Many activists, including Human Rights Watch, condemned the move. In 2014, HRW reported that at least 45 Lebanese towns and villages had implemented this action (HRW, 2014). Most of the 9 cases



mentioned curfews however cautiously and only after being asked about it. Opinions were diverse, ranging from supporters to condemners.

Mayor Harfouch explains his municipality's point of view on this matter saying,

Another thing we did—it was not very agreeable but I had to do it—is prohibiting them [the refugees] from going out after 8:00 pm, if they had no work to do. What if a bunch of guys gathered and a girl passes by and they followed her and, God forbid, something happened—then it's a big issue, we'll have casualties. It is not agreeable, I know, I can tell you this is sort of harsh, but this is the only harsh action we took. We have to be objective and scientific, it is a precaution to avoid any issues between locals and refugees.

Despite his awareness about the sensitivity of such action, Jezzine mayor argues that it is the only option 'to avoid any issues'. So the curfew is a tool to avoid an 'expected' threat from refugees. The curfew is also seen as a tool to protect the Syrian refugees themselves. Municipalities implementing curfews mentioned that curfews are for the refugees' security as well. For example, Abra mayor, Walid Mchantaf explains, "I gathered them in the municipality, to let them know of our decision. This is for your best and security so that people don't have reactions against you in case something happened." Most of the municipalities implementing curfews highlighted the precautionary nature of the strategy, not only to prevent Syrians from causing problems but also to prevent reactions from Lebanese groups. Since Syrians are seen as a threat regardless, they are accused of any issue that takes place. Jezzine mayor describes one of the cases saying,

The problem is that no matter how small the issue is, the 'guys' [the Lebanese young men] are provoked. The other day a Lebanese woman ran out of her home. The guys in Jezzine were insisting that she was kidnapped by a Syrian guy, though she has ran away with a Lebanese guy from Batroun that she has met earlier. The guys here were provoked and took weapons and wanted to go shoot Syrians.

So, technically the curfew is not targeting the origin of the problem. It will not prevent any security event from happening unless one assumes that all ‘troublemakers’ are Syrians and all Syrians are respecting curfews. Therefore, similar to Byblos, many other municipalities chose other tools over curfews. On the other hand, there are many that don’t see the benefits of curfews. They believe that other tools are more efficient.

Ayoub Bark explains Byblos’s decision to avoid curfew saying,

All surrounding towns and villages have set a curfew policy. We didn’t find it appropriate towards them or for us. Other municipalities considered that the direct danger is from them. So they put these announcements to diminish incidents but if someone wants to do something he’ll do it no matter. We replaced it with strengthening the police and security measures and members. They control the situation.

In Byblos, the municipality made a decision to avoid curfews despite the supporting environment. This highlights another approach based on a different concern. Byblos is one of the most successful municipalities and it celebrates an international touristic status<sup>26</sup>. The city’s image plays an important role in defining its municipality’s policies. Therefore, a controversial action condemned by Human Rights Watch is seen harmful for the city rather than protective. Inversely, other municipalities implemented the curfew due to people’s wishes despite some of the council members’ opposition. Examples are Ras El-Matn and Kousba. Lydia Farah a member in Kousba’s municipal council explains the reasons behind her opposition to the municipality's decision saying,

I was against the curfew [that the municipality implemented]. I am a lawyer and I know that it is illegal and non-implementable. But people demanded it. So the municipality asked Syrians to refrain from going out after 8:00 [pm], but it’s not really implementable.

She clarifies that it is not only illegal but also ineffective. Municipalities do not have the authority to enforce the curfew. However, municipal police tries to stop any individual breaking the curfew to ask about their destination and sometimes force them to go back

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<sup>26</sup> Byblos (Jbeil) is a UNESCO world heritage site.

to their ‘houses’. In other cases, the municipality asks them to declare their travels either before or after in cases of emergency. So, the implementation is mainly dependent on the fear factor or the symbolic authority of the municipality. Syrian refugees respect curfews to avoid problems and accusations.

Ras El-Matn Mayor and head of Federation of Upper Matn municipalities Raja

BouReslan explains his position on curfews saying,

I personally don't think curfew is the solution; maybe the municipality has a different opinion. Knowing where they [refugees] live and checking if they have weapons etc. is more important. Surveying and control are more important than stopping them from going out. They'll go out anyways.

In cases of major refugee inflow, host governments try to keep track of people entering the country to ensure they have legal status. However, this is difficult to attain especially when refugees are crossing borders from neighboring countries on a daily basis. Conflict spilling over borders, large numbers of refugees, and limited border controls in addition to the absence of national will or policy were reasons behind this issue in Lebanon. UNHCR has been registering Syrian refugees in Lebanon to ensure they receive aid from the agency. Up until end of 2014 UNHCR was the only data source for the numbers and locations of refugees in Lebanon. Since registration is voluntary, registered numbers do not reflect the actual refugee population. UNHCR identifies more than 10,000 refugees as ‘awaiting registration’. In addition there are thousands that are not registered (UNHCR, News Story). Though registration is a necessary condition for receiving aid<sup>27</sup> from UNHCR, some choose to deny themselves this right due to fear of political prosecution<sup>28</sup>. In fall of 2014, the heads of Lebanese districts ‘Qa’em-maqam’

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<sup>27</sup> UNHCR provides in-kind aid (food, blankets etc.) for newcomers on bi-monthly basis and distributes ‘winter cash cards’ that are ATM cards that UNHCR refills with monthly payments based on the recipient’s winter vulnerability.

<sup>28</sup> Some opponents of the Syrian regime were sent back to Syria by the Lebanese government upon request from the Regime.

required municipalities to survey refugees in their villages and towns and present numbers to the district. These surveys do not formalize the refugee's status, as they don't include any form of registration. Some municipalities, on the other hand, are trying to register and 'legalize' the status of refugees within the municipality by requiring registration with personal information, addresses, and registration of rental contracts in the municipality. Some are even issuing ID cards.

Dr. Ahmad Kheil, Mayor of the city of Nabatieh describes the strategy his municipality is using saying,

We started with an accurate registration for everyone coming in to the city in order to give them an ID that they can use anywhere, for support organizations, school or police etc. Even for babies, we'll take pictures and make an ID. This is of course not a replacement for registration at the UNHCR. It is a form of legalization of their presence in municipal terms. While actual legalization [by central government] includes formal residency procedures, which we're not even talking about.

To cover some of the gap existing due to lack of identification by the government, municipalities like Nabatieh, Ras el Matn and Byblos<sup>29</sup> started to issue ID cards to control the status of refugees residing within their vicinity. The role of these ID cards is to identify refugees and make them recognizable for municipal authorities as well as local community. They would also help refugees, as many of them have left behind all forms of identification documents they once had. On the municipal level, surveying and registration seem easy to achieve, however they still face obstacles. Municipalities have hard time keeping track of refugees due to the constant change in population. Refugees are still coming in, and some are going back to Syria or moving within Lebanese towns and villages. Also, municipalities that require registration of rental contracts are facing reluctance from some Lebanese apartment owners to register contracts in order to avoid municipal fees and taxes.

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<sup>29</sup> Byblos has limited ID cards distribution to workers.

A third form of control falls under the category of enforcement and communication. Whether implementing a curfew, issuing ID cards or following a different strategy, municipalities need to communicate and enforce these strategies. The level of enforcement differs based on the body of enforcement and available resources. Some are able to enforce their rules, while others only communicate them. Municipal police are the main agents of enforcement and communication by most municipalities. Due to their limited authority and resources, the municipal police's role is closer to that of security guards, and they are even sometimes called municipal guards. Municipal law defines the municipal police's role as follows, 'Ensuring security through the municipal police in its capacity as Judicial Police. They shall ask for the support of the Internal Security Forces in the event of any crime or any disturbance of the public security and proceed with the required investigations' (Municipal Law-Art.74). This limits any actual law enforcement to ISF. Though the government has recently allowed municipalities to increase men and arms to their police body, their role does not exceed communication of certain rules. When some municipalities added members, arms and resources to their police, others referred the matter to the dominating political party militia or other benign forms of communication.

Ayoub Bark describes Byblos's actions,

We have increased the number of municipal police members as much as we can. Our resources are limited. The minister said 'increase the number as much as you want, but [in reality] there is a [budget] limit that we cannot cross.'... 'Our role is not to replace the army or the police. They have their role and we help. 'Our guys' [municipal police] would tell us about people standing suspiciously and we inform the police etc. In case there were suspicions we inform the police and they take care of the situation... We don't want to give our municipal police more weapons, it's the job of the government police, and they have the skills and resources...They can inform the police rather than do the job themselves.

Byblos is an example of the cases that tried to strengthen their municipal police. As mentioned earlier, Byblos municipality chose strengthening municipal police over

imposing a curfew. Byblos deputy mayor described the process, its challenges, and limitations. Some of the limitations are traced back to the nature of the municipal police's role. In addition, Barq highlights that there is a need for ISF (Internal Security Forces) presence as concerns exceed municipal police's abilities.

Abra and Jezzine did not strengthen municipal police. However, the municipal police has the biggest role in the communicating municipality's decisions and actions. For example, municipal police go around every day to ensure the enforcement of curfew and every other week to check for registration. In the cases of Nabatiye and Bissarieh, political parties' militia are present. Though a sensitive issue, it is not a secret for the Lebanese that many political parties of the different groups have armed militias. These militias practice authority each in its 'territory'. However, not all parties share the same political power and arms.

Bissarieh mayor explains Amal Movement's <sup>30</sup>role saying, 'Amal men go around and ask for registration and bring in whomever they suspect. They don't have the authority to deal with issues themselves.'

The dominant party in the town, Amal, plays a part in the control process. A member of the party himself, Mchawrab defends this role as a limited support tool. So the political party's role here is in a way replacing the role of the municipal police which is anyways limited to two guards. Unlike Mayor Mchawrab's candor about the subject, others find it sensitive especially when the role is bigger.

Dr. Kheil, Nabatiye Mayor says, 'Things in Nabatiye are controlled in a certain way.'

In Nabatiye's case, the mayor was more discreet about the topic. However, all he had to say was 'a certain way' to clarify the role of Hizb-Allah, the dominating party in

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<sup>30</sup> Amal Movement is one of the two largest Shiite political parties in Lebanon, it is led by the current House Speaker. The party's militia had a big a role in the Lebanese civil war, fighting against Palestinian militia and Israeli Occupation at the same time. This militia is one of the few that were able to keep their arms by the end of the war mainly due to their support for Assad regime. The party is still loyal to Assad.

the city. Again a member in the powerful party, he couldn't go into more details about its role. In certain areas, Hizb-Allah exercises more power than the government. The party has its own policing group that ensures security and 'law' enforcement. In Hizb-Allah's 'security zones', the authority of the government forces is limited, if not absent.

On the other hand other municipalities follow more benign ways of communicating and enforcing their control strategies. Saida municipality, for example, provides each family with a mobile phone upon registering as a refugee in the city. The purpose is to communicate announcements via text messages. However, this method has its obstacles as well. Kozbar explains,

For example one refugee would leave Saida and move to Iklim [a neighboring district]. But NGO's have divided their tasks among districts. He'll get a message, and come down to Saida to receive the assistance package, yet again get one from Iklim. So we started a team that would go to the field and check if people are in their homes, if they left we would remove their names from our lists.

Others like Marj, for example, communicate with one contact person who's assigned by the refugee group. He's usually an elder person, or one that had a higher position back in Syria, a mayor for example. Finally, almost all municipalities that are enforcing a curfew use banners to communicate the times this curfew is in practice. The image below is from a town outside Byblos.



**Figure 7: Banner in the village of Fidar (near Byblos)**

It reads: "The municipality of Al-Fidar announces that there is a curfew for all foreigners inside the village every day from 8 pm to 5.30 am".

Source: Oriol Andrés Gallart/IPS (Gallart, 2014)

#### 4) Relation with NGO's and GO's:

Khalil Harfouche describes the importance of NGO's for his municipality, "The government doesn't have the means to provide us with support. However, there are NGO's that are giving them [the refugees] support."

International and local organizations have an eminent role in accommodating the Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Their role has been crucial in filling the gap implied by the absence of an established management plan by the national government. They provide refugees with basic needs and support host local organizations in keeping up with the added challenges. Therefore, municipalities welcome this role and share a positive attitude towards it.

UNHCR is responsible for the major tasks like registration, tents, in-kind and cash support. They coordinate with MOSA and municipalities to organize these processes. All the locals I interviewed appreciate UNHCR's role and its importance, and they collaborate with the organization to make its task easier. They mainly help UNHCR in the registration and support packages distribution. They provide the space in the



municipality or in another municipal facility for these processes or they communicate times and locations of distribution to refugees. Other international organizations like the Norwegian Relief Organization (NRC), or local ones like Al-Iman, focus on schooling and training support as they provide needed infrastructure and skilled trainers. Municipalities also collaborate and coordinate with these NGO's. Kamel Kozbar describes Saida's role saying,

The municipality played the role to coordinate between all these NGO's. We opened an office within the municipality called 'Itihad Aljama'iyat Al-Ighathiya' (Union of Relief Organizations). We provided an employee to collect needed data and help with the collaboration.

Another international organization is 'Search for Common Grounds' (SFCG). It focuses on dialogue and conflict resolution between locals and refugees. Jezzine is one of the municipalities that work with this INGO. SFCG has organized a football tournament in Jezzine including refugees and locals. Mayor Harfouch describes the results of this tournament saying,

It was a kind of a new page that we opened with them. Showing them that we don't hate them and they are welcome. However, they have to respect us, our traditions and habits... So this barrier does not exist anymore.

So, the goal here was to bring Syrians and Lebanese together and make sure they know more about each other so that any existing barriers disappear. One of the issues that create tension between locals and refugees is when support doesn't include Lebanese lower income groups. Therefore some NGOs that support Syrian refugees, like UNDP, make sure they include local groups in any development projects they implement.

Fouad Mchawrab describes one of UNDP's projects in Bissarieh, "UNDP has started a project to install around 2000 m of sewage network lines for houses that host Syrians. Our residents won't dream of having sewage network, the municipality won't be able to do it without UNDP.

An important, and sensitive aspect in municipalities' relation to NGO's is the support they provide—or don't—for host communities. NGO's support to host communities supports, indirectly, the municipality by relieving some of the challenges. Therefore, these municipalities value any steps by NGO's to include locals in their projects and they even view it as a—perhaps the only—positive consequence of the Syrian refugee issue. As mayor Mchawrab explains, limited resources and central government's absence have delayed or even prohibited implementing many basic infrastructure projects especially in some rural towns and villages. Therefore, when UNDP installed the sewage network, they solved one of Bissarieh's old challenges. This also, gives an insight on the municipality's relation with the central government and their impression of its departments.

Fouad Mchawrab also explains, “We prefer that NGOs take over and not the Government to avoid bureaucracy, otherwise we only get from the camel its ear<sup>31</sup>! Without the NGOs we would not do anything.”

Mayor Mchawrab expresses his frustration with government's performance. He doesn't hide his preference for expanding NGOs role to replace the government in certain aspects in order to ensure implementation and progress of development projects. He explains that his municipality trusts NGO's credibility. They follow schedules and commit to their promises. However, NGO's cannot replace the government in all aspects. Security is a major issue where distrust for the government and its abilities can be more apparent.

As shown in the previous section on control and security, municipalities follow different strategies to cover security gap. In addition to the variety of responses they implement, municipalities have different approaches on government's involvement. As

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<sup>31</sup> In reference to an old saying that describes attaining only a small portion of a bigger gain or profit. In this case it describes how, due to bureaucracy and corruption in the public sector, only small portion of a certain fund end up being used for the assigned project.

some like Byblos insists on leaving the issue for ISF, Nabatiyeh replaces police completely by HizbAllah militiamen.

Conclusion:

Qualitative analysis above shows general consistency with the quantitative analysis results. An in depth study for the responses of these 9 cases presents a noticeable diversity that in many cases matches their religiopolitical diversity. In addition, there are two major points that are worth highlighting. First, this analysis gives evidence of similarity between municipalities of different religiopolitical backgrounds especially in the challenges and concerns they are facing. Second, there are additional matters, other than religiopolitical affiliations, that are possibly impacting municipalities' responses.

The first section titled 'Challenges' presents a range of challenges that all 9 cases share. Though these cases present municipalities of diverse sizes, locations and budgets, they all face difficulty in accommodating for the population overload and its impact on infrastructure and workforce. On the other hand, these 9 cases also share security and shelter concerns, however, their responses differ. Municipalities follow a wide spectrum of assertiveness in defining and implementing any rules and regulations in response to their concerns.

Given the political sensitivity of security and shelter, I am not surprised to see more diversity in municipalities' responses, especially that the direction of these responses conforms, to a large extent, to trends highlighted in the quantitative results. Four out of the five Christian cases implement curfews that are the boldest and strictest. As for the two Shiite cases, they also implement strict control techniques where Bissarieh imposes a curfew while Nabatiyeh practices its own firm security system. On the other hand, Sunni cases practice milder response strategies that are mainly limited to minimal presence of municipal guards and cameras.

As for shelter, the pattern persists, though less obvious. Sunni cases seem more sympathetic and flexible, either by allowing camps such as the case in Marj, or providing housing such as the case in Saida, while other cases are more serious in their attempts to prevent camps, regulate the numbers of refugees and their places of residence. Nevertheless, municipalities are not able to fully control the situation. Since locals benefit from rents, they don't have the incentive to cooperate in controlling the refugees' presence. On the other hand, as time passes and the number of refugees increases, shelter concerns overcome religiopolitical affiliations of the municipality. For example, even a case like Sunni, pro-revolution, Marj that hosts camps and more than 18000 refugees, voices its concerns after 4 years of hosting. The mayor discusses his municipality's concerns and intent to limit the number of refugees in these camps saying, "We thought it was temporary, but it went on. Now we are prohibiting building camps and tents. We won't allow new ones, but what happened has happened. We cannot do much about it." So, as the crisis persists, more groups are perceiving Syrian presence as a 'threat' that they need to deal with.

The section on the relation with NGOs and GO's reveals deeper differences between the different municipalities, independent of the Syrian refugees' issue. The 9 cases have different levels of confidence in the central government. I notice that the pattern prevails in this topic as well. Shiite cases are not enthusiastic about a bigger role for the central government and prefer a detached approach. The complicated relation dates back to decades ago. For example, people in Nabatiye as well as other South Lebanon municipalities that were under Israeli Occupation, didn't have direct connection to the government for more than 25 years. They didn't pay any taxes, electricity or water bills.

On the other hand, Christian cases show attachment to the government's role whether in security or in other challenges. Byblos deputy mayor's emphasis on the role of the government forces in solving any security issue, or Abra and Jezzine mayors' support for the raids by the army are examples of this relation. Sunni cases, also refer to the importance of the government's role. However, they are more accusatory for the government's absence. For example, the Saida council member expresses his frustration over the limited role the government is playing by saying, "Usually actions start with MOSA and then move down to the municipalities. Yet, the government didn't recognize that there is a crisis in the first place to react to." So, he refers the governments' attitude to a political approach that supports Syrian regime, ignores the presence of a revolution or refugees.

#### **Takeaways:**

The analysis I perform in this paper shows that the absence of a clear policy and management plan by the government increases the pressure on local governments. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses give an evidence that religiopolitical diversity plays a noticeable role in shaping some of the municipalities' responses to this absence. These diverse responses comprise poor performance and even abuses in some cases. Therefore they highlight the need for an emergency response plan that guides the work of municipalities in any case of emergency especially in a vulnerable and exposed country like Lebanon. Nevertheless, diversity of these cases provides important lessons and takeaways. Municipalities' diverse experiences are an important asset for understanding what works and what doesn't in the relief world. From these experiences I extract a set of five conclusions and takeaways that I discuss below.

1. When hosting a large number of refugees, registration becomes an important tool. It provides protection for the hosting country as well as the refugees themselves. UNHCR defines refugee registration by the following,

...a tool of protection, including protection against refoulement<sup>32</sup>, protection against forcible recruitment, protection of access to basic rights, family reunification of refugees and identification of those in need of special assistance, and as a means to enable the quantification and assessment of needs and to implement appropriate durable solutions ( UNHCR, Conclusion on Registration).

But registration should not be limited to UNHCR. When registration and documentation on the Syrian/Lebanese borders becomes impossible, later registration has to be the alternative. Some of the cases created their own registration mechanism. They use it as a tool to survey numbers of refugees residing within their boundaries. They also use it to communicate with these refugees and ensure they follow rules and regulations. Registration allows municipalities to avoid strict illogical actions like curfews. They can now treat refugees as identified, respected individuals and not as a threatening group of unknown people that have to be confined to their tents or rented rooms. For example, the ID card that Nabatiyeh uses can be a good document benefiting both parties; the refugees and municipalities.

Also, municipalities seem more efficient in performing this task than a higher-level government would be. First, municipalities have limited number of refugees, and ease in identifying ‘newcomers’. Second, this can be an effective way in avoiding the prosecution fear that some refugees might have. Though politicized as well, refugees would feel more confident giving their information to a local government than the central government that communicates directly with Syrian authorities. The central government

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<sup>32</sup>Refoulement is the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be subjected to persecution. It is prohibited by International and EU laws under the principle of *non-refoulement* that is the cornerstone of asylum and international refugee law (UNHCR, 1997).

has to have a role in defining the guidelines of the registration process and providing unified documentation to avoid abuses and chaos.

2. When a country hosts large numbers of refugees many of whom have limited resources, avoiding camps seems unworkable. So, no matter what the government's policy is towards camps, many refugees would have the tent as their only refuge. Despite the distress, confinement and separation that camps cause for their residents, ignoring them as a reality would result in even poorer living conditions. Therefore, the government should assign appropriate locations, allow better shelter options, and provide guidelines for shelter installation and camp size in addition to sanitation, health and education requirements.

On the other hand, camps should not be the norm. UNHCR started realizing a new approach towards refugees that they outlined in their Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas report by the following, “...the new policy “marks the beginning of a new approach.” Refugees are now to be reconceived as people with autonomy” (Urban refugees). Refugees should not be confined to camps. UNHCR encourages them to leave. Cases in Lebanon show that when left to do so, the majority of refugees are renting based on their resources. Renting not only provides autonomy for refugees, it also maximizes their options, as it seems more welcomed by host communities. Unfortunately, welcoming attitude often comes with many abuses. Some cases, like Kousba, are trying to fight these abuses by defining rental guidelines, however facing implementation obstacles. I believe these guidelines are an important solution for limiting abuses. If defined by central government to avoid religiopolitical biases on the municipal level, guidelines defining rent, number of renters, rentable and non-rentable space, and sanitary and health requirements in addition to requiring a rental contract, would overcome most of the abuses happening right now.

3. Ensuring security and law enforcement without a proper presence from the central government and ISF is almost impossible. Given, ISF's limited number, they have to find alternatives. For example, training municipal guards or other security men employed by municipalities can fill this gap. It allows ISF to employ only few of its members to guide and oversee while trained municipal police can do most of the work.

Also, communication is an important tool. From the cases, I noticed that all security measures are a form of precaution. Municipalities perceive refugees as a threat regardless of the 'crime' or 'disorder' they are causing. So, using communication and dialogue brings both communities together, breaks stereotypes and preconceived ideas, and increases trust between them. When municipalities make communication and dialogue part of their response strategy, through NGO's like Search for Common Ground or through direct meeting with the refugees, they decrease defensive and offensive attitudes between both groups.

4. NGOs are a great asset, they have been filling the huge gap on relief and development levels, for decades now, long before the Syrian crisis. However, their efforts are in some cases selective. André Sleiman describes this saying, 'They are more focused on implementing projects that would lead to successful results.' He expands that most municipalities don't have the training or skills to pursue grants. Therefore, coordination with MOSA and providing proper training can limit bias and ensure that projects are targeting need. There are some interagency efforts organized by UNHCR that coordinate with MOSA. These efforts survey needs assessment data collected by UNHCR and targets them accordingly. Yet, they lack stronger leadership by MOSA and integration of municipalities. When the central government institutions take lead on similar projects, they gain trust from municipalities and local communities, and retain ownership and responsibility towards these communities. Also, integrated municipalities gain ownership



of projects, provide easier access for the NGO's and rebuild closer relations with the central government. On another level, refugees themselves, can be a great asset in the implementation of these projects. NGO's would provide jobs for refugees while ensuring an efficient implementation. Cash for work programs show success in the cases where they are implemented. UNDP along with MOSA and UNHCR can work on expanding its scope.


5. Coordination between municipalities and unions of municipalities is a great tool to overcome lack of resources and staff. Jezzine union of municipalities shares security resources, where union police does shifts around the villages in the union throughout the week. Also, municipalities in Saida exchange resources. The city of Saida coordinates with surrounding villages to provide available apartments and rooms to house refugees, while Saida provides support. Today, not enough municipalities in Lebanon share their resources. Given their limited resources, sharing would be of great benefit for them (Sleiman, 2014). Coordination between municipalities is key for this process.

These takeaways tend to distribute tasks among the different levels of authorities as I recognize that each level has its own strengths and weaknesses. Local governments have the ability to provide public services locally and avoid central government domination. One of the major characteristics of central government is its ability to unify local governments under a set of guidelines and rules. Therefore, central government would have the authority to define and implement major policies related to the Syrian refugee issue. To realize these takeaways, the Lebanese central government has to define certain guidelines and ensure their implementation by local governments or NGO's. So, first the central government can issue a list of guidelines that target registration, ID's and rental specifications. Then it can require that all local governments hosting refugees follow these guidelines and follow up by presenting detailed reports on numbers

registered and those renting to the district or governorate periodically. Second, the central government can create training programs and encourage training programs by NGO's. These programs would target local government employees as well as interested local residents. Their goal is to increase the number of skilled staff, potential staff and volunteers working with the local government and they can be on different levels, security, public finance, grant writing and other tasks. Finally, the central government can encourage service sharing between local governments by creating grants and funds. These grants and funds would not only incentivize service sharing but also provide a faster, less bureaucratic way to disseminate local government tax money.

Complexities of the Lebanese case make dealing with the issue of refugees even more challenging. As the takeaways I discuss above are still far from overcoming these complexities, they can break down the *status quo* and existing barriers for achieving solutions. The overwhelming nature of challenges that Lebanon is facing makes frustration and hopelessness easy. It's true that the situation is everything but perfect, yet working with it, as it is, is better than letting challenges accumulate like they always did.

APPENDIX A



RELIGIOUS SECTS DISTRIBUTION WITHIN LEBANESE DISTRICTS

## APPENDIX B

### Chapter IV: Municipal Council's Competence

#### Section 1: Scope

Article 47 - Each work of public character or interest, in the municipal area, falls within the scope of the Municipal Council's competence. The Municipal Council shall be entitled to express its recommendations and wishes in all subjects of municipal interest. It shall also mention its observations and suggestions related to the public needs in the municipal area. The President of the Council or his substitute shall notify the competent authorities in accordance to the procedures.

Article 48 - The rules promulgated by the Municipal Council regarding the issues falling within its competence shall be compulsory within the municipal area.

Article 49 - The Municipal Council shall be in charge, without limitation, of the following:

- 1- The municipal budget, including transferring and opening credits
- 2- Cutting off budget accounts
- 3- Different types of loans for carrying out specific projects that have been studied.
- 4- Assigning some of the municipal present and future returns to the borrower or the State in return for its guarantee of the debt and mentioning the annual due installments in the consecutive municipal budgets throughout the period of the said debt
- 5- Determining the rates of the municipal taxes according to the law
- 6- Specifications for deals regarding the supplies, works and services
- 7- Specifications for selling the municipal properties
- 9- Approval and rejection of donations and ordered funds
- 10- Public programs for works, aesthetics, cleaning, health affairs, water projects and lighting
- 11- Naming the streets in the municipal area
- 12- Planning, improving and expanding the streets, establishing gardens and public places and executing designs related to municipality as well as the Master Plan in cooperation with the Directorate General for Urban Planning with the observance of the provisions of the expropriation law, provided that the approval of both the Urban Planning Directorate and the competent municipality be bound to approve the project. In case of contradiction between the municipality and the Urban Planning Directorate, the Council of Ministers
- 13- Establishing shops, parks, racing places, playgrounds, toilets, museums, hospitals, dispensaries, shelters, libraries, popular residences, wash houses, sewers, and waste drainage
- 14- Contributing to the tuition fees related to the public schools pursuant to the provisions
- 15- Contributing to the fees of projects of public interest
- 16- Transferring municipal public property to private municipal property

- 17- Regulating transportation of all types, determining its fees if necessary within the municipal area, with observance of the provisions of the laws in force
- 18- Rescuing the needy and disabled people and assisting clubs, associations and other health institutions.
- 19- Organizing the systems related to the municipality servants and workers and determining
- 20- Enjoying the right to enter into contracts to conclude agreements with municipalities
- 21- Controlling educational activities and work progress in public and private schools as well as drawing up reports to the competent educational references.
- 22- Supervising public utilities and drawing up reports regarding the work progress thereof to
- 23- Approving the consideration according to which the streets resulting from a subdivision project, out of which more than six real estate belonging to different owners benefit fall within the scope of municipal public properties; the municipality shall be, therefore, entitled to carry out works
- 24- Ordering the beneficiaries of a construction project of which the study has been carried out to contribute to the fees of the said project in the event of the approval of the majority of at least the three quarters of the beneficiaries.

Article 50 - The Municipal Council shall be entitled, within its area, to establish or manage directly or indirectly, or contribute to or to help in the execution of the following works and


- 1- Public schools, nurseries and technical schools
- 2- Popular residences, toilets, public wash houses and swimming pools
- 3- Public hospitals, sanitariums, dispensaries and other health establishments and
- 4- Museums, public libraries, theaters, cinemas, amusement centers, clubs, playgrounds and other public and sports shops as well as social, cultural and artistic institutions
- 5- Local means of public transportation
- 6- Public shops for buying food, refrigerators for keeping them and threshing floors.

Article 51 - The Municipal Council shall give its consent to the following:


- 1- Changing the name of the village
- 2- Changing the boundaries of the village
- 3- Organizing traffic and public transportation
- 4- Carrying out projects for improving and delimitating highways in addition to general
- 5- Creating and transferring or closing public schools, governmental hospitals and
- 6- Measures related to public emergency
- 7- Creating charitable institutions and offices
- 8- Applications of exploitation permit for classified shops, restaurants, swimming pools, coffee shops, amusement centers and hotels.

## APPENDIX C


To choose my cases, I identified trend and outlier districts within the three groups representing districts of Maronite, Shiite or Sunni majority. Then I picked a random case within these districts.



Cases from Maronite majority districts are Jezzine, Jbeil and (Ras El-Matn) Baabda where Ras El-Matn represents a Druze case.



Cases from Shiite majority districts are Nabatiye and (Bissarieh) Sour.



Cases from Sunni majority districts are (Saida and Abra) Saida, and (Marj) West Bekaa. In this case I wanted to include Zahle (16.4). However, the mayor had busy schedule due to snow storm. Therefore, I picked the town of Abra as a Greek Catholic sample.


# APPENDIX D

## SYRIA REFUGEE RESPONSE LEBANON Syrian Refugees Registered as of 31 October 2014

UNHCR Lebanon - Beirut  
Country Office



Total No. of Refugees **1,133,006**  
 Refugees Registered **1,123,150**  
 Refugees Awaiting **9,856**



The boundaries, names, and designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement of the United Nations or UNHCR. All data used were the best available at the time of map production.


Data Sources:

- Refugee population and location data by UNHCR as of 31 October 2014. For more information on refugee data, contact Rana G. Ksaifi at [ksaifi@unhcr.org](mailto:ksaifi@unhcr.org)

- GIS and Mapping by UNHCR Lebanon. For further information on map, contact Jaid Ghosn at [jghosn@unhcr.org](mailto:jghosn@unhcr.org) or Aung Thu WIN at [wina@unhcr.org](mailto:wina@unhcr.org)




## APPENDIX E




Correlation = -0.30

Illustration 1




Correlation = -0.11

Illustration 2




Correlation=0.32

Illustration 3



Correlation=0.026

Illustration 4



Correlation =0.074

Illustration

## APPENDIX F

Municipality	Governorate	District	Religious Affiliation	Political Affiliation	population	Area km2	Refugee population	Interviewee
saida	South	Saida	Sunni	MB- FM(Rev)	80,000	7	15000	kamel Kozbar
jezzine	South	Jezzine	Maronite	FPM Pro-Assad	4,000	22	800	Khalil harfouch
abra	South	Saida	Catholic	FPM Pro-Assad	17000	1.98	1300	Walid Mchantaf
jbeil	Keserwan-Jbeil	Jbeil	Maronite	Phalange (Pro-rev)	40,000	4.16		Ayoub Barq
beisarieh	South	Zahrani	Shiite	Amal (Pro-assad)	7000	5.85	6000	Fouad Mchawrab
nabatiye	Nabatiye	Nabatiye	Shiite	HezbAllah (Pro-assad)	40,000	8	8000	Ahmad Kheil
kousba	North	Koura	Greek-Orth.	-	4300	6	1500	Lydia Farah
marj	Bekaa	West Bekaa	Sunni	FM Pro-Rev	15000	8.7	18000	Nazem Saleh
ras elmatn	Mt. Lebanon	Baabda	Druze/Orthodox	PSP	10000	13	500	Raja Abou Reslan

List of Political Parties and their religious affiliations:

MB: Muslim Brotherhood – Sunni

FM: Future Movement – Mostly Sunni

FPM: Free Patriotic Movement – Maronite

Phalange: Maronite

AMAL: Afwaj Almoqawama Al-Lubnaniya (Lebanese Resistance Detachment)- Shiite

Hezb-Allah: (Party of God) - Shiite

PSP: Progressive Socialist Party – Druze (Theoretically secular)

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