A  History  of  Indonesia’s  Armed  Forces  and     Analysis  of  Military  Reform     during  the  Reformasi  Period  (1998-­‐2012)                         A  Thesis   Presented  to  the  Faculty  of  the  Graduate  School   of  Cornell  University   In  Partial  Fulfillment  of  the  Requirements  for  the  Degree  of     Master  of  Arts                     by   John  Matthew  Sova   January  2013                                                   ©  2013  John  Matthew  Sova      ABSTRACT       21  May  1998  was  a  seminal  moment  in  Indonesian  history.    After  more  than  thirty-­‐ one  years  of  centralized  military  authoritarianism,  President  Suharto  was  unable  to   recover  from  a  confluence  of  national  problems  and  abruptly  announced  his  resignation.     The  ensuing  Reformasi  (reform)  period  ushered  in  many  reforms  against  Suharto’s  regime,   including  transitioning  to  a  democracy  and  implementing  military  reform.       This  thesis  has  two  aims.    The  first  is  to  investigate  the  historic  influences  of  the   Indonesian  military  and  trace  its  evolution  to  its  New  Order  pre-­‐Reformasi  condition  in   order  to  best  analyze  the  ongoing  military  reform  movement.    The  second  is  to  examine  the   effects  of  military  reform  during  the  first  fourteen  years  of  the  Reformasi  period  (1998-­‐ 2012)  and  identify  successful  practices  for  future  reform.    One  tool  that  I  use  to  construct   my  argument  is  an  exploration  of  the  military's  traditional  functions  and  roles  in  society,   specifically  through  its  dual-­‐function  doctrine  and  territorial  command  system.     My  research  shows  that  structures  and  systems  created  for  specific  functions  have   been  adjusted  to  meet  changing  political,  social,  and  security  challenges  and  priorities,  and   have  subsequently  become  institutionalized.    The  central  questions  I  ask  are  why  are  some   aspects  of  military  reform  in  Indonesia  difficult  to  implement  while  others  are  not?    Why,  in   a  democracy  in  which  the  civilian  national  leaders  are  elected  in  free  and  fair  nations   elections  and  have  supremacy  over  the  armed  forces,  does  military  reform  still  appear   negotiable?    And  finally,  how  has  the  Indonesian  military’s  doctrine  evolved  in  response  to   the  changing  political  climate?    I  argue  that  because  of  the  Indonesian  military’s   autonomous  institutional  culture  and  historic  legacies  as  a  sociopolitical  force,  reforming       some  parts  cannot  be  satisfactorily  completed  as  quickly  as  the  civilian  government  has   required  through  legislation.                     BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH         Matt  Sova  was  born  in  Syracuse,  New  York  and  grew  up  in  the  northern  Virginia   suburbs  of  Washington  DC.    After  graduating  from  Providence  College  in  2000  with  a  B.A.  in   mathematics,  he  began  a  career  in  the  United  States  Army  where  he  continues  to  serve  as  a   Southeast  Asia  Foreign  Area  Officer.    He  is  supported  by  his  patient  wife  Rachel  and  two   beautiful  children,  Leo  and  Harper.    They  have  greatly  enjoyed  their  time  in  Ithaca  together   and  look  forward  to  many  new  adventures  and  experiences  in  Southeast  Asia.     iii     ACKNOWLEDGMENTS         I  would  like  to  thank  all  the  wonderful  professors  and  staff  at  Cornell  University   who  inspired  my  while  I  was  here,  including  Tamara  Loos,  Kaja  McGowan,  Thomas   Pepinsky,  Jeff  Peterson,  Maria  Theresa  Savella,  Eric  Tagliocozzo,  and  Keith  Taylor.     Coursework  with  all  of  them  has  been  an  enlightening  experience  and  has  greatly   influenced  the  way  I  think  about  Southeast  Asia,  including  issues  addressed  in  this  thesis.         I  especially  owe  thanks  to  the  members  of  my  graduate  committee,  Thomas   Pepinsky  and  Tamara  Loos,  for  their  patience  and  guidance  as  I  worked  on  this  thesis  and   to  Jeff  Peterson  for  his  support  as  I  navigated  the  Kroch  Library’s  Asia  Collection.    I  am  also   grateful  to  my  fellow  classmates  from  HIST  6162  for  their  encouragement  and  suggestions   as  I  developed  my  topic.         Lastly,  I  would  like  to  thank  my  wife  Rachel  and  our  two  great  children,  Leo  and   Harper,  for  their  endless  support,  patience,  and  love.                 iv     TABLE  OF  CONTENTS       Chapter  1:  Introduction                   Chapter  2:  The  History  of  the  Indonesia  Military:                 From  the  VOC  Era  to  Suharto               Chapter  3:  The  Indonesian  Military  During  Reformasi  (1998-­‐2004)       Chapter  4:  Indonesian  Military  Reform  During  the  Yudhoyono             Administration  (2004-­‐2012)   Chapter  5:  Conclusion                   Appendix  A:  List  of  Acronyms                     Appendix  B:  Cast  of  Characters                 Appendix  C:  Comparison  of  selected  Southeast  Asian  Countries  (2007-­‐2009)     Bibliography                           1   8       49   73   98   107   110   113   114     v     LIST  OF  TABLES         Table  1:  List  of  KODAMs                   Table  2:  Indonesia’s  Territorial  Command  Structure           Table  3:  Ranks  and  Commands  Associated  with  Territorial  Command  System  and     Operational  Units                   Table  4:  Military  Reform  Objectives  at  the  Start  of  Reformasi         Table  5:  Progress  of  Military  Reform  1998-­‐2004             Table  6:  Progress  of  Military  Reform  under  Yudhoyono           Table  7:  The  Indonesian  Military  (Prior  to  1998  and  the  Present)           34   36   37   57   72   88   99     vi     LIST  OF  FIGURES       Figure  1:  Indonesian  KODAMs                 35   Figure  2:  Defense  Budget  per  Capita               91   Figure  3:  Defense  Budget  as  a  Percentage  of  GDP             92   Figure  4:  Defense  Budget  per  Square  Kilometer             92             vii     Chapter  1:  Introduction           Only  months  after  Indonesian  President  Suharto  was  reelected  to  his  sixth  term,  his   New  Order  regime  came  to  a  sudden,  unexpected  end  on  21  May  1998.    With  the  end  of   three  decades  of  Suharto’s  authoritative  rule  came  many  new  beginnings.    Relieved  to   finally  be  free  from  Suharto’s  rule,  many  Indonesians  raced  forward  with  unbridled   optimism  in  the  post-­‐Suharto  Reformasi  (reform)  era.    The  country  started  its  measured   transition  to  an  open,  liberal  democracy  and  began  reforming  established  institutions  that,   under  the  New  Order,  were  considered  legitimate  expressions  of  Indonesian  political  and   social  culture.    Among  the  early  successes  of  the  Reformasi  movement  was  freedom  of   speech  and  the  freedom  of  the  press,  the  expansion  of  political  parties,  decentralizing   political  power  across  the  country,  and  new  and  fair  national  elections.         For  many  years,  Suharto’s  military-­‐authoritarianism  had  been  an  acceptable  trade   off  for  economic  development.    Under  Suharto,  the  Indonesian  military  had  expanded  its   role  in  society  to  include  active  participation  in  politics  and  direct  involvement  in  social   and  economic  issues  throughout  the  country  in  all  levels  of  society.    The  Indonesian   military  is  one  of  the  few  national  institutions  that  stretch  across  the  entire  Indonesian   archipelago  and  touch  most  aspects  of  Indonesian  daily  life.1    The  military  has  been  the   most  dominant  force  in  politics,  a  position  it  certainly  held  for  the  first  fifty-­‐two  years  of  its   history,  and  was  a  significant  part  of  the  Indonesia’s  social  fabric.    It  is  impossible  to  have  a                                                                                                                   1  The  Indonesian  military  was  called  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Republic  (Angkatan  Bersenjata  Republik   Indonesia,  or  ABRI)  until  the  end  of  Suharto’s  New  Order  regime.    It  was  renamed  the  Indonesian  National   Military  (Tentara  Nasional  Indonesia  or  TNI)  in  1999  after  the  police  were  separated.    To  avoid  confusion,  the   generic  terms  military  and  armed  forces  are  used  through  out  this  paper.     1     conversation  about  politics,  economics,  history,  or  security  in  Indonesia  without   recognizing  the  military’s  direct  influence.         After  Suharto’s  resignation,  the  Indonesian  military’s  central  position  in  Indonesia   was  also  challenged  and  military  reform  immediately  became  a  high  priority.    Parts  of   military  reform,  including  practices  that  had  existed  unchallenged  for  years  such  as  the   Dwifungsi  (dual  function)  doctrine  and  unelected  members  of  the  military  simultaneously   serving  in  parliament  proved  to  be  rather  easy  to  remove.    However,  fourteen  years  after   the  start  of  military  reform,  other  military  reform  goals  have  been  slow  and  unsuccessfully   implemented.       This  thesis  is  about  the  challenges  of  implementing  military  reform  in  Indonesia.     The  central  questions  I  ask  are  why  are  some  aspects  of  military  reform  in  Indonesia   difficult  to  implement  while  others  are  not?    Why,  in  a  democracy  in  which  the  civilian   national  leaders  are  elected  in  free  and  fair  nations  elections  and  have  supremacy  over  the   armed  forces,  does  military  reform  still  appear  negotiable?    And  finally,  how  has  the   Indonesian  military’s  doctrine  evolved  in  response  to  the  changing  political  climate?    To   answer  these  questions,  I  examine  the  historic  influences  of  the  Indonesian  military  and   argue  that  because  of  the  Indonesian  military’s  autonomous  institutional  culture  and   historic  legacies  as  a  sociopolitical  force,  reforming  some  parts  of  the  military  cannot  be   satisfactorily  completed  as  quickly  as  the  civilian  government  and  many  observes  may   want.         My  argument  contributes  to  existing  literature  by  concentrating  on  unfulfilled   reform  goals.    I  explain  the  existing  challenges  of  military  reform  in  Indonesia  and  why   some  reform  has  not  been  successful  to  date.    Existing  literature  looks  at  the  Indonesian     2     military  in  the  Reformasi  period  as  a  part  of  a  larger  political  movement.    This  paper   focuses  specifically  on  the  military  reform  with  the  intent  on  uncovering  the  best  ways  to   proceed  so  that  reform  goals  are  accomplished  in  a  successful,  permanent  way.    Lessons   learned  from  the  Indonesian  military  reform  process  may  also  serve  as  an  example  for   what  may  help  other  authoritarian  regime  transition  to  a  democracy  and  reform  their   militaries.     The  conclusions  are  not  intended  as  policy  recommendations  or  as  a  critique  of  past   efforts.    My  central  findings,  instead,  are  that  military  reform  is  difficult,  time  consuming,   and  that  future  success  will  be  built  on  past  experiences.    This  thesis  analyzes  the  available   data  on  the  Indonesian  reform  period  and  catalogues  what  the  major  issues  are,  what   works  and  does  not  work,  and  why.    The  human  spirit  is  incalculable  and  future   experiences  may  have  different  results.    The  object  is  to  look  specifically  at  the  military   reform  efforts  in  Indonesia  since  1998  and  to  identify  clear  commonalities  that  may  be   used  as  building  blocks  for  future  reforms.     This  thesis  also  makes  no  apologies  or  judgments  for  the  Indonesian  military’s  past   violence,  human  rights  violations,  and  gross  corruptive  behavior.    Although  these  are  all  a   part  of  the  military’s  history,  finding  fault  and  assigning  blame  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this   thesis.    Furthermore,  while  excessive  military  behavior  has  been  alleged  in  the  recent   decade  in  Papua,  Aceh,  Kalimantan,  and  Sulawesi,  my  research  will  show  that  most  of  the   Indonesian  military’s  excessive  corruption  and  violent  behavior  with  impunity  occurred   during  the  New  Order  regime  or  immediately  after,  such  as  the  case  of  East  Timor  in  1999.     Although  it  is  still  in  the  shadow  of  these  past  atrocities,  the  Indonesian  military  has  made   clear,  positive  institutional  changes.    All  accolades  and/or  criticism  of  key  figures     3     throughout  this  thesis  should  be  looked  at  solely  in  the  context  of  military  leadership,   acumen,  and  reform.           The  structure  of  the  modern  Indonesian  military  is  derived  from  earlier  examples   and  influential  force  structures,  including  some  that  predate  Indonesia’s  fight  for   independence.    Since  its  inception  in  the  1940s,  the  Indonesian  military  has  been  an   adaptive  learning  institution,  capable  of  absorbing  and  personalizing  new  ideas  and  taking   from  them  the  best  (and  worst)  practices.         My  research  will  show  that  Indonesia’s  modern  military  is  the  product  of  five   distinct  phases  spanning  hundreds  of  years.    Its  roots  begin  in  the  first  phase,  the  colonial   period  under  the  Dutch  East  Indies  Company  (or  Vereenigde  Oost-­Indische  Compagnie,   referred  throughout  this  paper  by  its  acronym  as  the  VOC)  and,  after  the  VOC  went   bankrupt,  by  the  Dutch  government.    The  period  of  European  corporate  and  Dutch  colonial   influence  is  followed  by  Japanese  influence  during  Japan’s  three  transformative  years  of   occupation  during  World  War  II.    The  third  phase  is  Indonesia’s  fight  for  independence   against  the  Netherlands  in  the  late  1940s.    It  was  here  where,  under  the  leadership  of   General  Sudirman,  that  the  modern  military  was  “born  out  of  the  independence  struggle”   (Layador  1999,  217)  and  created  out  of  trial  and  error  and  lessons  learned  from  all  its   previous  variations.    The  fourth  phase  is  the  early  period  of  Indonesian’s  sovereignty  and   the  military’s  social-­‐political  role  under  Indonesia’s  first  two  presidents,  Sukarno  and   Suharto.    The  last  phase  begins  on  21  May  1998  when  President  Suharto  abruptly   announced  his  resignation.    This  ended  over  thirty-­‐one  years  of  power  and  started  the   Reformasi  period,  which  continues  into  the  present.     4       As  the  world’s  largest  archipelago,  the  tyranny  of  distance  presents  numerous   challenges  for  the  military  and  is  a  significant  planning  concern  in  defending  its  territory.2     To  overcome  this  complexity,  the  military  organized  itself  into  territorial  commands,   permanently  deploying  army  units  throughout  the  archipelago  as  it  deemed  necessary   (Indonesia’s  territorial  commands  will  be  discussed  in  great  detail  in  the  following   chapter.)    This  structure  is  known  as  the  territorial  command  system,  and  its  origins  and   evolution  are  central  to  the  argument  of  this  thesis.    Controlling  territory  where  there  was   weak  to  no  central  government  representation  further  empowered  the  military  and  “its   leaders,  seeing  it  as  the  chief  founder  of  independence,  have  persistently  asserted  that  it   has  a  right  to  help  determine  the  course  of  state  policy”  (Feith  1964,  226).    The  transition  of   the  territorial  command  system  from  a  revolutionary  vanguard  to  a  political  actor  began  in   at  the  end  of  Sukarno’s  administration  and  was  solidified  in  Suharto’s  New  Order  regime.           The  Indonesian  military  grew  into  one  of  the  most  capable  institutions  in  the   country.    Three  main  reasons  have  continued  to  drive  the  armed  forces  high  standing  since   Indonesia’s  independence.    The  first  is  its  prominent  role  in  the  fight  for  independence   from  the  Dutch.    The  second  is  its  claim  as  the  savior  of  the  nation,  enforcing  the  five  tenets   of  Pancasila  and  ensuring  national  unity.3    The  third  is  the  systemic  weaknesses  of  civilian                                                                                                                   2  This  challenge  gave  birth  to  the  Wawasan  Nusantara,  or  Archipelagic  Outlook,  the  geographical  and  social   unity  of  the  nation.    As  an  example,  present  day  Indonesia  (which  did  not  exist  until  the  end  of  the  20th   century)  consists  of  more  than  17,500  islands  including  occupying  parts  of  the  second,  third,  and  sixth  largest   islands  in  the  World  (New  Guinea,  Borneo,  Sumatra  respectively).    From  east  to  west,  the  archipelago  spans  a   distance  larger  than  the  continental  United  States,  extending  over  3,100  miles  from  Aceh  in  the  northwestern   tip  of  Sumatra  to  Jayapura  on  the  easternmost  part  of  Irian  Jaya.    However,  approximately  only  3000  islands   are  inhabited  and  only  6000  have  been  officially  named.    See,  for  example  Robert  Cribb,  Historical  Atlas  of   Indonesia  (Richmond:  Curzon  Press,  2000),  10.   3  See,  for  example,  R.G.  Layador,  "Indonesia  and  the  Military  at  the  Crossroads",  INDONESIAN  QUARTERLY,  no.   27:  210.    Pancasila  is  the  national  philosophy  and  ideological  core  of  Indonesia.       5     leadership  and  the  failure  of  to  effective  governance  outside  of  Java.    This  last  reason  is  one   primary  justification  for  maintaining  an  active  presence  in  national  politics.                 Over  Indonesia’s  history,  its  military  evolved  into  a  powerful  political  body.     Scholars  including  Harold  Crouch  have  written  the  “expansion  of  the  military’s  political   role  was  not  a  planned  process”  but  “rather  a  form  of  a  series  of  responses  to  particular   crises  arising”  (Layador  1999,  220).    The  military  filled  a  void  created  by  an  immature   system  of  government  and  inexperienced  civilian  leaders.    Lawlessness,  rebellions,  and   riots  were  resolved  with  a  strong  Indonesian  military  presence  when  no  other  arm  of  the   government  was  able  to  do  so.    As  the  military’s  political  power  grew,  its  relationship  with   the  civilian  leadership  grew  to  resemble  a  partnership  rather  than  a  subordinate   relationship.       This  thesis  starts  with  a  historic  analysis  of  the  Indonesian  military  and  its   substantial  influences  from  foreign  and  domestic  experiences,  and  continues  to  military   reform  in  the  Reformasi  period  beginning  with  the  resignation  of  President  Suharto  in   1998.    In  chapter  two  I  will  describe  the  history  of  the  Indonesian  military  and  its  evolution   as  an  institution  deeply  entrenched  in  Indonesia’s  economic,  political,  and  social  life.    My   analysis  of  the  Indonesian  military's  evolution  spans  from  its  earliest  influences  under   Dutch  colonialism  through  events  in  the  20th  and  21st  century,  including  the  Japanese   occupation  during  World  War  II,  Indonesia’s  fight  for  independence  against  the   Netherlands,  and  its  first  six  decades  as  a  sovereign  country.    My  research  shows  that   structures  and  systems  created  for  specific  functions  have  been  adjusted  to  meet  changing   political,  social,  and  security  challenges  and  priorities,  and  have  subsequently  become   institutionalized.    I  will  specifically  examine  the  military’s  doctrine  and  territorial     6     command  system  organization  to  construct  my  argument  and  explore  the  military's   traditional  functions  and  roles  in  society.     In  chapter  three  and  four,  I  will  discuss  the  progress  of  military  reform  under  the   direction  of  the  four  presidents  following  Suharto:  Habibie,  Wahid,  Megawati,  and   Yudhoyono.    I  will  gather  together  my  conclusions  of  the  progress  of  military  reform  in   Indonesia  through  the  beginning  of  2012  in  chapter  five.    In  doing  so,  two  themes  will   emerge.    First,  military  reform  in  Indonesia  closely  reflects  the  power  of  the  president.     During  periods  when  the  executive  branch  of  the  government  is  strongest,  military  reform   has  had  the  most  traction.    When  the  president  is  weak  or  politically  diverted,  military   reform  stalls.    From  this,  I  conclude  that  for  any  future  reform  to  be  successful  and  lasting,   it  must  be  specifically  defined,  and  closely  nested  within  the  goals  of  the  civilian   democratically  elected  government.             The  second  theme  is  about  the  military’s  collective  definition  of  self  and  its   protection  of  what  it  sees  as  its  own  interests.    The  narrative  of  the  Indonesian  military  as  a   self-­‐created  army  of  the  people  has  justified  the  military  many  privileged  exceptions  that   have  solidified  over  time,  becoming  entitlements.    As  the  successes  and  failures  in  the   reform  movement  will  show,  the  military  is  very  sensitive  to  releasing  its  grip  on  some  of   its  traditional  roles  in  society.    For  continued  reform  to  be  successful,  the  Indonesian   military’s  professionalism  and  capability  must  be  improved.    In  this  sense,  military  reform   progresses  along  both  internal  and  external  lines  and  adequate  time  must  be  given  for  the   military  to  change  its  culture.    Civilian  supremacy  over  the  armed  forces  is  paramount  to   guiding  military  reform.    Creating  qualified  civilian  defense  leaders  and  restructuring  the   military  to  best  perform  its  mission  is  critical  to  military  reform  and  national  defense.     7       Chapter  2:  The  History  of  the  Indonesia  Military:     From  the  VOC  Era  to  Suharto           The  earliest  historic  influences  on  the  modern  Indonesian  armed  forces,  including   its  territorial  command  system,  occur  during  the  colonial  period  under  the  VOC  (Dutch  East   India  Company).4    While  the  VOC  was  initially  solely  interested  in  economic  issues  through   trade  and  extracting  resources,  it  was  the  first  central  power  in  the  Indonesian  archipelago   to  enforce  a  Westphalian  system  by  defining  and  defending  its  borders  with  an  active  duty   professional  military.5               Initially  the  Dutch,  through  the  VOC,  had  little  interest  in  controlling  and   administrating  the  archipelago  beyond  issues  that  affected  its  financial  prosperity.6    From   the  beginning,  the  Dutch  mindset  was  that  the  East  Indies  was  an  financial  opportunity  and   they  were  most  concerned  with  the  valuable  spices  clove,  nutmeg,  and  mace  found  in  the   eastern  islands  which  could  be  sold  at  twelve  times  their  purchase  price  in  European   markets  and  coffee  and  sugar  grown  on  Java.7    To  this  effect,  historian  John  David  Legge                                                                                                                   4  Europeans  started  arriving  in  the  Indonesian  archipelago  in  great  numbers  around  the  same  time  as  they   ventured  to  the  Americas.    A  major  difference  with  the  Americas  was  that  locals  in  Asia  were  already  used  to   foreign  merchants.    Frequent  exposure  over  time  to  other  societies  through  commerce  networks  is  one   reason  why  Asians  were  not  ravished  by  disease  the  way  the  Aztecs,  Incas,  and  other  “New  World”  people   were.       5  Including  the  territory  in  the  Dutch  East  Indies  made  the  Netherlands  the  third  largest  colonial  power  in  the   world,  behind  Great  Britain  and  France.   6  After  five  different  Dutch  companies  chartered  expeditions  to  Asia  return  with  a  400%  profit,  the  VOC   formed  in  March  1602  (over  two  years  after  the  British  East  India  Company  received  its  charter)  when  four  of   the  major  trading  companies  merged  and  were  charged  with  quasi-­‐sovereign  administrative  and  military   control  to  best  serve  the  Dutch  Republic’s  interests  in  Asia.    The  VOC  was  the  world’s  first  multi-­‐national   company.    As  such,  corporation  and  maximizing  profit  was  the  model  and  the  VOC  was  responsible  to  big   enterprise  and  to  its  shareholders  in  Europe.  See,  for  example,  M.C.  Ricklefs,  A  History  of  Modern  Indonesia   Since  c.  1200  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  2001),  30-­‐34.   7  Until  the  18th  century,  the  only  place  in  the  world  where  nutmeg  grew  was  on  the  Banda  islands.    In  the  late   19th  century  there  were  an  estimated  half-­‐million  nutmeg  trees  on  Banda,  which  could  produce  a  yearly   output  of  600,000  pounds  of  nutmeg  and  140,000  pounds  of  mace.    The  Dutch  were  also  interested  in   sandalwood,  sappanwood,  camphor,  and  the  (non-­‐indigenous)  pepper-­‐producing  area  of  southern  Sumatra.     8     commented  that  VOC  interests  were  to  “maintain  control  of  business  and  commerce,  while   the  Indonesians  were  left  to  cultivate  the  soil”  (Legge  1977,  8).     The  Company’s  interests  were  purely  economic  and  not  strategic  like  the  British   objectives  in  Burma  or  ideological  like  the  Spanish  in  the  Philippines.8    The  VOC   “deliberately  sought  to  avoid  territorial  responsibilities”  and  was  “not  interested  in  making   an  ideological  impact  upon  the  society  of  the  Indies”  (Legge  1977,  83).    However,  over  time   the  Dutch  inherited  administrative  responsibilities  and  expanded  their  reach  throughout   the  archipelago.         The  Dutch  and  the  VOC  had  no  initial  intention  of  forming  or  supporting  an   indigenous  military.    In  fact,  they  had  little  desire  to  have  much  of  a  military  presence  at  all   beyond  maintaining  naval  superiority  in  order  to  protect  trade  routes.    The  VOC   established  many  small  garrisons  throughout  the  archipelago  at  key  port  and  trade   locations,  but  maintained  them  at  the  lowest  levels  possible.9    A  very  small  garrison  of  the   VOC  army  was  stationed  in  Batavia,  the  center  of  gravity  for  administration  in  the  Dutch   East  Indies.10    This  garrison  totaled  only  seventy  soldiers  in  1618  and  one  hundred  forty   three  by  1622.    The  small  mercenary  security  force  was  a  combination  of  German,  French,                                                                                                                   8  Interestingly,  the  Dutch  did  make  all  Catholics  convert  to  Protestantism  but  did  not  bother  with  any  other   religions.    Converting  to  Islam  became  an  opportunity  to  be  in  opposition  to  Dutch  rule.   9  In  a  strange  irony  of  history,  the  Dutch  formed  a  military  to  protect  its  business  interests,  while  many  years   later  the  TNI  would  form  businesses  to  protect  its  military.    In  fact,  in  the  1950s  when  the  Dutch  businesses   were  nationalized,  most  were  taken  by  the  Indonesian  military  to  manage.   10  Benedict  Anderson  described  Batavia  as  a  “swampy  coastal  township”  when  the  Dutch  decided  to  base   their  operations  there.    Located  on  the  northern  coast  of  western  Java,  Batavia  is  protected  by  the  calm   waters  of  the  Java  Sea  as  opposed  to  the  rougher  water  in  the  Indian  Ocean.    It  is  also  one  of  the  best  ports  on   Java  and  has  easy  access  to  the  common  trade  routes  to  East  Indonesia,  the  Straits  of  Melaka,  the  South  China   Sea,  and  the  Indian  Ocean.    See  Benedict  Anderson,  “Old  State,  New  Society,”  Journal  of  Asian  Studies  (1983):   478.     9     English,  Dutch,  and  other  European  soldiers.11    Other  garrisons  throughout  the  archipelago   had  similar  multi-­‐national  representation,  but  were  always  led  by  Dutch  officers.12       The  first  military  reform  on  Java  started  when  Napoleon  Bonaparte  regime  occupied   the  Netherlands  and  selected  Marshal  Herman  Willem  Daendels  to  be  Governor  General  of   Batavia  in  1808.    Daendels  expanded  Batavia’s  direct  control  in  central  Java  and  increased   Dutch  military  forces  from  4000  to  18,000  by  hiring  Javanese  men  to  serve  in  military   units.13     The  Dutch  allocated  a  minimum  amount  of  combat  power  outside  of  Java,  and   Daendels’  defense  plan  essentially  ceded  the  outer  islands  if  they  were  aggressively   attacked.    The  three  security  sector  tasks  issued  by  the  Minister  of  the  Colonies  were:  “(1)   the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  within  the  East  Indies;  (2)  the  maintenance  of  neutrality   in  a  war  in  which  the  Netherlands  would  not  be  involved;  and  (3)  the  absorption  of  the  first   shock  of  a  direct  attack”  (Vandenbosch  1941,  345).    The  first  and  third  task  assigned  to  the   army  is  very  similar  to  the  responsibilities  of  the  Indonesian  army  today  through  TRIDEK   (Tri  Dharma  Eka  Putra,  three  missions  one  deed)  and  the  Total  People’s  Defense  and   Security  doctrine.14                                                                                                                   11  Soldiers  enlisted  for  a  minimum  of  five  years  like  the  other  civilian  merchants  and  employees  of  the  VOC.     Many  of  the  initial  soldiers  in  the  VOC  army  were  poor,  uneducated  men  or  orphans.  Often,  the  educated  men   in  the  military  seeking  adventure  and  proven  capable  of  greater  responsibility  were  allowed  to  transfer  and   work  as  merchants  in  the  VOC.    Much  later  in  the  19th  century,  the  Dutch  also  included  indigenous  soldiers   from  parts  of  the  archipelago  deemed  loyal  and  worthy,  such  as  Minhasa  and  Ambon.    During  the  Aceh  war   they  also  hired  soldiers  from  Africa  fighting  under  the  Dutch  flag.   12  See,  for  example,  Jean  Gelman  Taylor,  The  Social  World  of  Batavia:  European  and  Eurasian  in  Dutch  Asia   (Madison:  University  of  Wisconsin  Press,  1983),  ch.1,  and  C.R.  Boxer,  The  Dutch  Seaborne  Empire,  1600-­1800   (New  York:  Knopf,  1965),  80-­‐81.         13  Daendels  created  small  cavalry  units  that  were  integrated  into  the  Dutch  colonial  army  with  upper  class   recruits  that  were  stuck  in  a  purgatory  of  not  being  able  to  find  work  in  the  bureaucracy  but  too  noble  to   work  as  laborers,  farmers,  or  craftsmen.    See,  for  example,  M.C.  Ricklefs  2001,  143-­‐147.   14  The  Total  People’s  Defense  and  Security  doctrine  would  be  replaced  after  the  resignation  of  President   Suharto  with  the  New  Paradigm  after  the  separation  of  the  police  from  the  armed  forces.    But  the  possibility   of  mobilizing  civilians  is  still  present  in  the  army’s  defense  plan.     10       After  the  VOC  collapsed  in  bankruptcy  in  1800,  ending  two  centuries  of  continuous   operations  in  the  Indonesian  archipelago,  its  territory  and  trade  enterprises  were  taken   over  by  the  Dutch  government.    The  Netherlands  was  now  directly  responsible  for  its   administration  and  defense.    Formulating  a  defense  plan  for  the  Indonesian  archipelago   was  a  monumental  challenge  for  the  Dutch.    In  some  ways,  the  geographical  issues  with  the   Indonesian  archipelago  were  similar  to  those  faced  by  the  Netherlands  in  Europe,  only  on  a   much  grander  scale.    Both  the  Netherlands  and  the  Indonesian  territories  are  along  the   dominant  sea  route  used  for  transportation  and  especially  trade.    Also,  both  territories  are   geographically  located  between  other  military  powers.             In  March  1830,  Governor  General  Johannes  van  den  Bosch  formed  the  Royal   Netherlands  Indies’  Army  (or  in  Dutch,  the  Koninklijk  Nederlandsch-­Indisch  Leger  or   KNIL).15    This  semi-­‐autonomous  arm  of  the  Royal  Netherlands  Army  was  created  to  expand   the  colonial  rule  to  western  Sumatra  and  the  outer  islands  in  more  remote  areas  of  the   archipelago.    Military  officers  were  charged  with  administrative  control  over  the  civilian   population  outside  of  Java.    This  was  mostly  because  of  the  lack  of  civilian  administrators   qualified  and  willing  to  perform  the  duties,  a  common  occurrence  lasting  through  most  of   the  20th  century  in  Indonesia.    Military  officers  were  entrusted  with  a  great  deal  of   autonomy,  and  by  the  end  of  the  19th  century,  they  where  performing  duties  as  civil   administrators  in  Aceh,  Kalimantan,  Sulawesi,  Sumba,  Sumbawa,  and  Timor.16                                                                                                                   15  Van  Den  Bosch  also  introduced  the  Culture  System  in  Java  where  at  least  1/5th  of  every  peasant’s  output   was  collected  instead  of  tax  in  1830.   16  Appointment  of  military  officers  to  civilian  posts  was  often  at  the  great  displeasure  of  many  Dutch  civilian   authorities.    For  greater  detail,  see  HW  van  den  Doel’s  essay  “Military  Rule  in  the  Netherlands  Indies”  in  R.B.   Cribb,  The  Late  Colonial  State  in  Indonesia:  Political  and  Economic  Foundations  of  the  Netherlands  Indies,  1880-­ 1942  (Leiden:  KITLV  Press,  1994),  57-­‐77.    Common  criticisms  then  that  military  officers  were  not  culturally   attuned  and  too  busy  or  otherwise  distracted  to  effectively  govern  could  be  just  as  effectively  said  in  the   1990s.       11       Later  in  the  1830s  the  Dutch  needed  to  further  augment  their  security  forces,  so   they  created  professional  detachments  comprised  of  Indonesian  soldiers  and  led  by  a  few   carefully  selected  Indonesian  officers  with  assistance  from  European  officers  and  non-­‐ commissioned  officers.    These  detachments’  primary  duty  was  to  guard  warehouses,   prisons,  and  other  government  buildings  and  escort  prisoners  as  needed.    They  received   very  little  military  tactical  training.     By  the  end  of  the  19th  century,  the  Dutch  Army  force  structure  peaked  at  30,000   soldiers,  with  over  40  percent  stationed  on  Java.17    Half  were  Europeans  and  the  others   were  mercenaries  from  Africa  or  Asia  and  local  conscripts,  usually  from  Ambon,  north   Sulawesi,  or  one  of  the  other  areas  known  for  sympathy  for  Dutch  rule.18    Units  were   always  lead  by  Europeans  and  Indonesians  rarely  served  as  junior  officers.    For  example,   when  the  Dutch  surrendered  to  Japan  in  March  1942,  there  were  only  twenty  Indonesian   officers  out  of  over  twenty-­‐thousand  Indonesian  soldiers.19    The  most  senior  officer  was  a   major,  a  rank  impossible  to  achieve  without  also  having  a  high,  pre-­‐existing  social  status.   Finite  resources  and  high  sustainment  costs  were  not  conducive  to  large  military   garrisons  in  the  eastern  islands.    Forts  at  Timor,  Kalimantan,  Makassar,  Padang,  and  in   other  eastern  islands  were  merely  symbolic.    The  Dutch  treated  Indonesia  as  “a  group  of   essentially  separate  sub-­‐colonies  linked  to  the  administrative  center”  in  Batavia,  which   Kingsbury  argues  was  the  model  for  independent  Indonesia’s  central,  paternalistic  national                                                                                                                   17  The  Dutch  did  not  have  direct  authority  over  the  greater  archipelago  until  the  early  20th  century.    For   example,  Bali  was  not  occupied  and  under  Dutch  administration  until  1906,  Ache  until  1908,  and  they   effectively  ignored  central  Kalimantan  and  Sulawesi  until  1900-­‐1910.    For  further  examples,  see  Damien   Kingsbury,  The  Politics  of  Indonesia  (second  edition)  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2002),  27-­‐33.         18  It  is  not  a  coincidence  that  these  parts  in  Indonesia  were  dominant  Christian  areas.   19  Some  of  the  Indonesian  officers  serving  in  KNIL,  such  as  General  Abdul  Harris  Nasution,  Tahi  Bonar   Simatupang,  and  Alex  Kawailarang  would  have  important  roles  in  the  military  after  Indonesia’s   independence.     12     political  identity.20    Using  the  economy  of  force  principle  -­‐  allocating  minimum  combat   power  to  secondary  interests  -­‐  the  Netherland’s  defense  plan  for  the  colony  was  to   concentrate  on  protecting  Java,  using  its  army  strategically  located  in  the  major  urban   areas.             The  Dutch  model  reflected  the  span  of  control  challenges  caused  by  the  Indonesian   archipelago’s  unique  geography.    The  VOC  and  KNIL  had  to  overcome  the  challenge  of   defending  the  world’s  largest  archipelago  with  limited  funding  and  resources.    The  Dutch   responded  by  delegating  responsibility  to  the  local  commanders,  a  decision  that  would   influence  the  doctrine  and  task  organization  of  the  modern  Indonesian  armed  forces.    The   semi-­‐autonomous  military  territorial  command  system  and  assignment  of  responsibility  to   military  officers  to  serve  as  a  form  of  government  foreshadows  A.H.  Nasutions’s  “Middle   Way”  and  later  the  TNI’s  dwifungsi  mission.       The  Dutch  armed  forces  also  provided  the  first  prolonged  exposure  Indonesia  had  to   modern  military  equipment  and  Western  military  tactics.    The  prolonged  colonial   experience  superseded  indigenous  military  experience  and  the  martial  traditions  that   existed  in  the  scattered  former  kingdoms  throughout  the  archipelago.21    The  Dutch   military,  with  its  professional  active  duty  soldiers,  leadership  hierarchy  with  multiple   layers  of  command,  advanced  weapons,  and  logistical  support  operations  on  a  grand  scale   were  new  and  informative  to  Indonesian  military  minds.    The  Dutch  also  were  the  first  to   employ  the  modern  principles  of  warfare,  specifically  economy  of  force,  in  Indonesia.    This   has  become  a  cornerstone  of  the  TNI’s  defense  doctrine.                                                                                                                             20  Kingsbury  2002,  33.   21  See,  for  example,  Salim  Said,  Genesis  of  Power:  General  Sudirman  and  the  Indonesian  Military  in  Politics,   1945-­49  (Singapore:  Institute  of  Southeast  Asian  Studies,  1991),  ch  1.     13           Influence  from  the  Japanese  occupation  through  PETA         The  1940s  was  a  period  of  change,  in  Indonesia  and  around  the  world.    At  the  start   of  the  decade  among  the  ten  countries  that  now  comprise  ASEAN,  only  Thailand  was  an   independent  nation.    In  the  next  few  years  the  region  would  see  Japan’s  military  march   through  or  occupy  parts  of  every  country  in  Southeast  Asia,  only  to  see  Allied  forces  fight   them  back.    By  the  end  of  the  decade,  five  countries  would  be  independent  and  free  from   colonial  rule.22           Japan’s  military  invaded  Indonesia  in  January  1942.    By  early  March,  Japan  had   defeated  all  the  remaining  Dutch  troops,  culminating  in  the  Battle  of  the  Java  Sea.    On  9   March  1942  the  Dutch  military  commander  and  Governor  General  surrendered,  effectively   signaling  the  end  of  the  Netherland  East  Indies.    The  Netherlands  could  do  little  to  defend   their  colonies;  Germany  had  occupied  the  Netherlands  since  May  1940  and  its  military  in   the  Indonesian  archipelago  was  too  thinly  spread  and  too  poorly  equipped  to  defend   against  a  superior  Japanese  force.    The  Japanese  occupation  period  includes  some  of  the   most  critical  years  in  shaping  the  Indonesian  military’s  history,  and  provided  a  new   framework  for  the  future  development  and  spirit  of  its  military.       Soon  after  establishing  military  dominance  in  Java  and  Sumatra,  the  Japanese   arrested  most  of  the  European  permanent  residents  and  placed  them  in  detention  camps.23                                                                                                                     22  The  new  countries  and  their  dates  of  independence  are  Indonesia  (17  August  1945),  Vietnam  (2  September   1945),  Philippines  (4  July  1946,  but  the  government  of  the  Philippines  later  changed  the  date  to  12  June)   Burma  (4  January  1948),  and  Laos  (19  July  1949).    Cambodia  received  its  independence  on  9  November  1953   and  Malaya  on  31  August  1957.   23  See,  for  example,  Herbert  Feith  “Part  Three:  Indonesia”  from  George  Kahin  (editor),  Governments  and   Politics  of  Southeast  Asia  (Ithaca,  N.Y.:  Cornell  University  Press,  1964),  197  or  Adrian  Vickers,  A  History  of   Modern  Indonesia  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2005),  86-­‐88.    Over  100,000  civilians  were  placed   in  prison  camps  and  another  80,000  Allied  soldiers  were  held  in  prisoner-­‐of-­‐war  camps  in  Indonesia.     14     This  was  effective  in  removing  all  foreign  leaders,  but  also  caused  problems  for  the   Japanese  administration  of  the  territory.    Without  a  working  system  in  place,  Japanese   officers  had  to  take  control  of  government  services  and  activities.    However  the  vastness  of   Indonesia  combined  with  Japan’s  finite  number  of  soldiers  created  a  new  challenge.    This   led  Japanese  authorities  to  look  for  Indonesian  leaders  who  could  work  with  them  to  help   maintain  order,  something  that  had  only  been  done  in  limited  measure  and  with  heavy   supervision  under  Dutch  authority.       Hoping  to  win  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  Indonesians  and  build  a  sympathetic,  if   not  loyal,  base  of  support,  Japanese  leaders  combed  the  population  for  their  ideal   candidates.    Japan  had  not  yet  disclosed  its  plans  for  the  future  of  Indonesia  after  the  war   was  over,  but  the  Japanese  did  prefer  leaders  from  the  nationalist  movement  and  of  Muslim   organizations  (the  common  theme  the  Japanese  were  trying  to  instill  was  that  Indonesia   was  better  off  led  by  other  Asians  than  by  Europeans  or  Westerners).24    Many  leaders,   including  future  president  Sukarno  and  the  first  vice-­‐president  Mohammad  Hatta,  were   more  than  willing  to  cooperate.     As  the  tide  of  the  war  changed  to  the  Allies  advantage  and  Japan’s  forces  spread  over   much  of  Asia,  Japan  also  executed  an  economy  of  force  mission  and  assumed  risk  in  the   outer  islands  with  minimal  defense  assets.    Unlike  its  earlier  battles  against  China  and   Russia,  Japan  now  had  to  prepare  for  possible  invasions  by  forces  led  by  the  United  States   and  Great  Britain  –  two  highly  industrialized  nations  with  better  naval  power  and  air   superiority.                                                                                                                   24  Many  Indonesians  were  extremely  optimistic  and  hopeful  when  Japan  first  invaded  and  removed  the  Dutch.     Often  in  the  first  few  weeks  Japan  was  respectfully  referred  to  as  Indonesia’s  “older  brother”.     15       Japan’s  generals  stationed  in  Indonesia  began  preparing  for  possible  invasions  from   Australia  or  via  Sulawasi  and  Borneo  and  the  Java  Sea.25    Without  the  possibility  of   reinforcements,  they  had  to  be  creative  in  stretching  their  defense  as  much  as  possible.     The  best  solution  was  to  include  the  Indonesians  themselves  as  part  of  the  military  defense   effort.    This  concept  was  not  new  to  Japan.    The  Japanese  had  already  formed  non-­‐Japanese   military  forces  in  Burma  (the  Burma  Independence  Army)  and  in  Malaya  (in  December   1941),  consisting  of  local  nationalists  aligned  with  mutual  interests  against  the  British.     Although  the  Japanese  controlled  these  units,  they  had  their  own  local  leaders  as  officers.     In  Indonesia,  the  Japanese  formed  two  types  of  military  units  in  which  Indonesians   served.    The  first,  started  in  April  1943,  was  called  heiho  (soldier  auxiliary)  and  was   designed  solely  with  a  military  objective  in  mind.    In  these  units  Indonesian  soldiers   worked  side  by  side  with  Japanese  soldiers  as  manual  laborers  on  military  construction   projects.    They  served  and  fought  with  the  Japanese  all  over  Southeast  Asia,  including  in   Thailand,  Burma,  the  Solomon  Islands,  and  parts  of  Indonesia  defending  against  the   Australians.26    Heiho  soldiers  were  imbedded  in  Japanese  units  and,  through  shared   hardship  and  experience,  came  to  be  greatly  respected  by  the  Japanese.         The  second  units  formed  were  called  Pembela  Tanah  Air  (Defenders  of  the   Homeland),  more  commonly  known  by  the  acronym  PETA.27    PETA  was  formed  to  satisfy   two  primary  concerns  of  the  Japanese.    One  was  the  need  to  organize  native  military  units                                                                                                                   25  The  Japanese  themselves  invaded  along  this  route  and  were  met  with  very  little  military  resistance.    When   Japan  invaded  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  Germany  already  occupied  the  Netherlands  and  there  was  very  little  the   Dutch  could  do  to  defend  their  colony,  especially  with  the  few  military  forces  it  had  remaining  in  Southeast   Asia.   26  See,  for  example  Nugroho  Notosusanto,  The  PETA  Army  During  the  Japanese  Occupation  of  Indonesia   (Tokyo:  Waseda  University  Press,  1979),  79-­‐80.   27  The  unit  was  originally  named  Tentara  Sukarela  but  its  name  was  permanently  changed  to  PETA  a  few   months  later  in  1944.     16     to  overcome  Japan’s  lack  of  soldiers  and  the  slim  possibility  of  receiving  reinforcements.       The  other  reason  was  for  political  and  propaganda  purposes.    Japan  hoped  to  instill   in  Indonesians  what  the  Dutch  never  wanted  to  do:  a  stake  in  defending  their  country  for   their  own  (eventual)  independence.    This  strategy  required  local  support,  and  the  only  way   to  do  that  was  to  make  Indonesians  active  stakeholders  in  the  defense  effort.    “To  win  the   support  of  the  occupied  peoples  they  must  be  given  a  stake  in  the  war,  a  feeling  that  the   Pacific  War  was  their  war  and  that  they  had  to  defend  their  respective  countries  to  avoid   the  return  of  the  hated  Western  colonialists.”28    Japanese  General  Inada  thought  that   Indonesians  could  not  embody  this  attitude  and  belief  without  their  own  army.    (This  was   one  reason  the  Dutch  failed  in  their  efforts  against  Japan;  Indonesians  had  little  to  gain  in   defending  Dutch  colonialism  in  their  country  and  in  fighting  along  the  sides  of  the  Dutch  for   whom  they  had  little  respect.)           Japanese  leaders  also  believed  that  it  was  important  for  Indonesia  to  have  the   resemblance  of  an  army  as  a  symbol  of  its  fight  for  independence,  but  still  be  in  the  shadow   of  Japanese  control.    The  idea  may  be  credited  in  part  to  Japan’s  Lieutenant  General  Inada   Masazumi  and  his  staff,  but  Indonesian  leaders  also  supported  it  in  order  to  avoid  possible   conscription.29    Thus,  PETA  was  formed  with  four  critical  tenants:  the  PETA  army  would   only  have  Indonesian  membership,  Japanese  military  personnel  would  only  be  used  in  a                                                                                                                   28  Nugroho  Notosusanto  1979,  89.   29  See,  for  example,  Raden  Gatot  Mangkupradja,  Harumi  Wanasita  Evans,  and  Ruth  McVey  "The  PETA  and  My   Relations  with  the  Japanese:  A  Correction  of  Sukarno's  Autobiography,"  Indonesia  no.  5  (1968):  105-­‐134.    Not   all  of  the  Japanese  officers  thought  PETA  would  be  welcomed  with  fanfare  from  Indonesians,  yet  alone  be   successful.    An  example  of  the  differing  opinions  among  the  Japanese  is  a  bet  between  two  officers,  Captain   Maruzaki  and  Mr  Yangawa.    Once  PETA  proved  to  be  flourishing  and  Captain  Maruzaki  was  on  the  losing  side   of  the  bet,  he  cut  off  his  little  finger  in  front  of  his  command  with  his  own  samurai  sword.  The  Japanese  tried   to  reinforce  a  dominant  Muslim  nature  in  PETA,  including  incorporating  prayer  time  into  the  training   schedule  as  much  as  possible.    In  fact  much  of  its  recruiting  base  came  from  persuasion  and  enthusiasm  from   Muslim  leaders.    However,  there  were  certain  qualities  about  the  Japanese  that  were  inherently  offensive  to   the  religious  hardliners,  such  as  the  Japanese  soldier’s  heavy  drinking  and  insistence  that  soldiers  pay  respect   through  a  deep  bow  towards  Japan  in  honor  of  the  Emperor.     17     training  and  advisory  capacity,  the  PETA  army  would  be  directly  subordinate  to  the   Supreme  Commander  and  independent  of  any  other  agency,  and  the  PETA  army  would  be  a   territorial  army  tasked  with  the  defense  of  its  respective  regions.30     Although  future  versions  of  the  Indonesian  military  would  be  very  different  from   PETA,  some  of  these  principles  remain  as  part  of  its  core  ideology.    As  we  shall  see,  the   concept  of  the  military’s  semi-­‐independence  and  territorial  orientation  continued  after  the   war  and  into  the  Reformasi  period.    These  two  are  the  best  examples  of  what  the  Indonesia   scholar  Ruth  McVey  means  when  she  wrote  “the  initial  force  from  which  the  Indonesian   army  sprang  was  the  PETA,  a  paramilitary  body  created  in  1943  in  the  expectation  of  an   Allied  invasion  of  Japanese  occupied  Java”  (McVey  1971,  133).       The  Japanese  generals  in  Indonesia  received  approval  from  their  headquarters  in   Tokyo  to  form  PETA,  but  it  came  with  the  understanding  that  no  additional  equipment  or   men  would  be  sent  to  assist  them.    To  arm  the  new  soldiers,  Japanese  generals  in  Indonesia   were  to  use  confiscated  Allied  equipment,  and  the  first  training  centers  for  PETA  officers   took  place  in  abandoned  Dutch  military  bases.  Indonesian  army  units  officially  formed  in   September  1943,  and  the  first  battalion-­‐sized  units  in  Java  were  created  by  December   1943.         PETA  units  were  formed  up  to  the  battalion  level.    Tactically,  if  the  Allied  forces   invaded  Indonesia,  PETA  units  were  supposed  to  operate  as  a  decentralized  guerilla  force   within  their  sectors,  harassing  the  enemy  until  Japanese  forces  could  arrive  for  a  counter   attack.    Each  battalion  (called  a  daidan)  had  four  companies  (chudan),  which  had  three                                                                                                                   30  For  more  detail  see  Notosusanto  1979,  99-­‐100  or  Guy  J.  Pauker,  “The  Role  of  the  Military  in  Indonesia”  from   John  J.  Johnson,  The  Role  of  the  Military  in  Underdeveloped  Countries  (Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University   Press,  1962),  189-­‐192.     18     platoons  (shodan)  consisting  of  four  squads  (bundan).31    By  the  end  of  the  war  there  were   sixty-­‐six  battalions  in  Java  and  three  in  Bali.32         Each  PETA  unit  was  solely  comprised  of  and  led  by  Indonesians  from  top  to  bottom   (compared  with  heiho  where  all  the  Indonesian  soldiers  were  in  Japanese  units  led  by   Japanese  officers).    However,  there  were  several  Japanese  officers  and  non-­‐commissioned   officers  serving  as  advisers  assigned  to  each  battalion.33    “The  Indonesia  auxiliary  troops   during  the  Japanese  Occupation  were  neither  colonial  troops  nor  armed  forces  of  a  new   nation”  (Notosusanto  1979,  113).    Officers  in  PETA  received  a  little  formal  military   education  in  consolidated  centers  before  they  were  assigned  to  their  unit.34    Soldiers  were   trained  at  their  units  at  their  commander’s  discretion,  with  no  centralized  training  center   or  basic  training  format.     It  is  important  to  note  that  PETA  was  not  a  meritocracy.    Senior  officers  of  each  unit   were  carefully  selected  and  were  already  prominent  men  with  established  credibility  and   prior  leadership  experience  as  civilian  community  leaders.    The  younger  officers,  usually  in   their  mid-­‐twenties,  had  usually  received  formal  education  or  were  recent  graduates  and   drawn  largely  from  the  “more  privileged  strata  of  Indonesian  society”  (McVey  1971,  133).   This  practice  played  into  the  Asian  values  of  respect  for  seniority,  but  created  unofficial   glass  ceilings  and  allowed  little  upward  movement  from  within  the  ranks  for  younger                                                                                                                   31  An  ideal  battalion  size  was  approximately  five  hundred  and  thirty  five  soldiers.    A  company  would  have  one   hundred  and  thirty  two,  and  a  platoon  forty-­‐four  soldiers.     32  There  are  varying  estimates,  but  by  the  time  the  Japanese  surrendered  in  1945  there  were  between  40,000-­‐ 55,000  soldiers  in  PETA  (as  many  as  35,000  in  Java  and  20,000  in  Sumatra)  and  an  estimated  42,000  soldiers   in  heiho  units.    In  Kahin’s  book  Nationalism  and  Revolution  in  Indonesia  on  page  109  he  estimates  that  “at  its   peek  strength  in  the  middle  of  1945  it  numbered  about  120,000  armed  men.”       33  By  the  end  of  the  Japanese  Occupation  there  were  approximately  three  hundred  and  fifty  Japanese  officers   and  many  more  non-­‐commissioned  officers  embedded  in  PETA.       34  The  first  Indonesian  officers  in  PETA  graduated  from  a  two-­‐month  Japanese-­‐led  officer-­‐training  course  in   December  1943.    The  school  was  located  in  Bogor,  just  outside  Jakarta,  in  a  former  Dutch  military  base.     19     motivated  soldiers.    Most  non-­‐commissioned  officers  had  a  secondary  education,  implying   that  they  also  came  from  families  that  were  relatively  wealthy.    However,  it  is  worth  noting   that  they  were  usually  not  from  the  university-­‐educated  population,  which  tended  to   gravitate  towards  service  in  the  civilian  administration.     Japan’s  fearless  and  aggressive  military  culture  resonated  deeply  with  many   Indonesians,  once  they  had  prolonged  exposure  to  it.    Similar  to  how  centuries  before  the   Indonesian’s  embraced  Islam  and  incorporated  it  with  existing  Hindu  and  Buddhist   practices,  the  soldiers  of  PETA  were  attracted  to  Japan’s  samurai  or  “bushido”  (the  way  of   the  warrior)  lifestyle.    Bushido  exemplifies  many  respected  attributes  and  already  familiar   and  present  in  Indonesian  culture  and  often  represented  by  wayang  characters  in  public   performances.35         Although  most  Indonesian  soldiers  were  not  ideologically  aligned  with  the  Japanese,   they  did  have  great  respect  for  Japan’s  military  acumen,  especially  after  witnessing  first-­‐ hand  Japan’s  quick  and  complete  defeat  of  the  Dutch  (the  Dutch  military  capitulated  less   than  three  months  after  Japan’s  first  strike).    Japan’s  military  was  stronger  and  more   sophisticated  than  the  Dutch.    This  memory  would  not  fade  after  the  end  of  WWII,  and  the   training  that  Indonesian  soldiers  received  from  the  Japanese  soldiers  was  greatly  valued,   boosting  their  confidence  and  moral.         Indonesian  soldiers  were  also  greatly  impressed  by  Japan’s  military  and  economic   accomplishments.    Japan  had  never  been  colonized  and  had  recently  defeated  Russia,  a                                                                                                                   35  Two  examples  in  particular  are  worth  noting.    The  first  is  the  character  Kumbakarna,  who  in  the  epic   Ramayana,  once  it  was  clear  war  was  unavoidable,  fights  bravely  and  with  honor  for  his  country  and  king   until  he  dies  in  battle.    The  second  is  Karna,  who  is  the  older  half  brother  of  the  Pandawa’s  but  despite  the   blood  relation  through  their  mother  Kundi,  fights  against  them  allied  with  the  Korawa’s.    See,  for  example,   Benedict  Anderson,  Mythology  and  the  Tolerance  of  the  Javanese  (Ithaca,  N.Y.:  Modern  Indonesia  Project,   Southeast  Asia  Program,  Department  of  Asian  Studies,  Cornell  University,  1965).     20     European  power.    Indonesian  officers  in  PETA  did  not  accept  all  of  Japan’s  samurai  values,   but  they  served  as  motivation  to  return  to  their  own  cultural  values  and  inspiration  to   create  their  own  military  identity.    This  mindset,  not  the  centuries  of  colonial  influence,   would  carry  into  the  future  and  be  the  “formative  ideological  experience”  of  the  Indonesian   army.36       The  militarization  of  the  Indonesian  population  during  these  few  years,  through   military  units  like  PETA,  had  lasting  effects  beyond  the  Japanese  occupation.    The  military   framework  the  Japanese  provided  a  blueprint  that  future  Indonesian  military  leaders   would  use  to  create  their  own  units.    After  the  Dutch  civilian  leaders  were  so  easily   displaced  by  the  Japanese,  Indonesian  nationalist  leaders  found  new  hope  that  their  cause   was  achievable.           Japan  singularly  wiped  out  the  Dutch  colonial  grasp  of  Indonesia,  strengthening   Indonesians’  demand  for  independence.37    The  military  training  and  experience  PETA   soldiers  received,  as  limited  as  it  was,  empowered  them  with  confidence  they  had  never   had  under  Dutch  occupation.    Through  the  PETA  experience,  the  Japanese  stirred  a   militaristic  impulse  that  had  been  dormant.    Indonesia  scholar  Damien  Kingsbury   suggested  that  one  of  the  lasting  influences  of  the  Japanese  military  in  Indonesia  was  the   “introduction  of  the  notion  that  society  could  and  should  be  controlled”  (Kingsbury  2002,   30).    Furthermore,  the  tactical  positioning  of  military  units  throughout  the  country  in  active   defensive  positions  became  the  framework  for  the  future  Indonesian  military’s  territorial   command  structure.                                                                                                                   36  Ruth  T.  McVey,  "The  post-­‐revolutionary  transformation  of  the  Indonesian  army"  Indonesia  no.  11  (1971):   132   37  Fighting  for  Independence  was  nothing  new  in  parts  of  Indonesia.    There  were  numerous  rebellions  against   the  Dutch  for  years,  but  they  were  uncoordinated  and  unsuccessful.     21       Fight  for  Independence  and  Birth  of  a  National  Military         On  15  August  1945,  nine  days  after  the  first  atomic  bomb  over  Hiroshima,  Japan’s   Emperor  Hirohito  announced  complete  and  unconditional  surrender  to  the  Allied  Forces.     Two  days  later  President  Sukarno  seized  the  advantage  created  by  the  ensuing  power   vacuum.    In  the  name  of  the  people  of  Indonesia,  President  Sukarno  read  a  proclamation  of   independence  signed  by  himself  and  vice-­‐President  Mohammad  Hatta  from  the  verandah  of   his  house  in  Jakarta  to  an  assembly  of  about  a  thousand  people.38    This  moment  at  10  am  on   Friday,  17  August  1945  marks  the  beginning  of  Indonesia’s  claim  of  independence.39         When  Sukarno  declared  Indonesian  independence,  the  country  did  not  have  a   government,  military,  or  even  a  consensus  of  what  the  boundaries  of  its  territory  would   be.40    As  Sukarno  and  Hatta  concentrated  first  on  organizing  the  government,  they  agreed   that  they  did  not  even  want  a  military.    Civilian  leaders  feared  it  would  draw  unwanted   attention  and  solicit  a  military  response  from  the  Allied  Forces  in  Southeast  Asia  to  which   they  were  incapable  of  reacting.         Sukarno  and  Hatta  adopted  a  cautious,  pacifist  policy  based  on  diplomacy  and   maintaining  a  low  profile  instead  of  confrontation.    They  both  agreed  that  forming  a   military  would  be  perceived  as  a  sign  of  aggressiveness  and  draw  a  heavier,  faster  response                                                                                                                   38  The  proclamation  was  only  two  sentences  and  began  “We  the  people  of  Indonesia”,  a  concept  that  was   unimaginable  under  the  Dutch  because  the  Dutch  never  saw  the  Indonesian  archipelago  as  one  homogenous   group.    As  much  as  it  was  meant  for  Indonesian  citizens,  Suharto’s  statement  was  also  directed  at  the  Dutch   and  the  Allies.    The  Dutch  were  eager  to  get  their  lost  territory  back,  but  did  not  have  the  resources   immediately  available  to  take  it.    Allied  conditions  of  Japan’s  surrender  expressed  that  everything  was  to   return  to  its  pre-­‐war  status.    Soldiers  from  PETA  units  were  securing  Sukarno’s  house  as  he  read  the  short   statement,  not  knowing  that  every  PETA  unit  would  be  permanently  disbanded  the  following  day.   39  This  date  is  celebrated  as  Indonesia’s  Independence  Day  and  cleverly  depicted  in  the  national  symbol  of  the   Garuda.    On  the  Garuda’s  neck  there  are  45  feathers  (representing  1945).    Its  tail  has  8  (for  August,  the  8th   month)  and  there  are  a  total  of  17  on  its  wings.             40  PETA  was  officially  disbanded  by  the  Japanese  on  18  August  1945.    In  a  meeting  on  29  August,  the  civilian   leadership  decided  that  the  territory  of  Indonesia  would  be  everything  from  the  former  Dutch  East  Indies.     22     from  the  Allied  Forces  still  in  Asia.    Sukarno  was  so  concerned  about  this  that  he  omitted  a   position  for  Minister  of  Defense  when  he  announced  his  first  presidential  cabinet.    A  month   later  he  appointed  a  person  that  had  been  missing  for  months  (and  was  never  found)  to   serve  as  Minister  of  Security.41           The  new  government’s  security  strategy  was  not  popular  with  large  portions  of  the   population,  especially  hardline  nationalists  and  youth.    Many  of  the  men  in  this   demographic  had  recent  military  experience  training  in  militias,  primary  school,  or   organized  units  like  PETA,  heiho,  or  earlier  from  the  days  of  KNIL.42    Rooted  in  a  common   theme  of  the  need  to  arm  themselves,  but  not  nested  within  a  higher  mission,  individuals   took  initiative  and  formed  numerous  localized  groups  with  a  military  purpose.    In  the   beginning  there  was  no  feature  that  distinguished  the  freedom  fighters  and  nationalists   from  the  average  civilians.         One  of  the  first  of  the  armed  units  to  form  called  itself  the  People’s  Security   Organization  (Badan  Keamanan  Rakyat,  or  BKR).43    BKR  started  with  volunteer  members   that  were  mostly  former  PETA  soldiers  who  joined  units  in  their  hometowns.    The  BKR  was   a  regrouping  of  former  soldiers  that  identified  itself  as  freedom  fighters  and,  critically,  not  a   military  arm  of  the  new  government.    However,  the  only  similarities  between  PETA  and  the   BKR  were  a  shared  warrior  ethos  and  a  vague  concept  among  some  officers  about  what  a                                                                                                                   41  Suprijadi,  a  former  PETA  officer,  was  the  appointed  minister  who  had  not  been  accounted  for  in  months   and  was  never  seen  again.    It  is  widely  believed  that  he  was  captured  by  the  Japanese  after  leading  a  small   revolt  and  tortured  to  death.    See,  for  example,  Gotō,  Kenʼichi  and  Paul  H.  Kratoska,  Tensions  of  Empire:  Japan   and  Southeast  Asia  in  the  Colonial  and  Postcolonial  World  (Athens,  Ohio:  Ohio  University  Press,  2003),  100-­‐ 101  or  Salim  Said,  Genesis  of  Power:  General  Sudirman  and  the  Indonesian  Military  in  Politics,  1945-­49   (Singapore:  Institute  of  Southeast  Asian  Studies,  1991),  ch.  1.   42  The  Japanese  thought  very  highly  about  the  effects  of  military  discipline  and  mandated  time  to  be  spent  on   basic  drill  and  ceremony  in  public  schools.     43  Other  groups  that  formed  from  soldiers  trained  by  the  Japanese  and  were  active  in  fighting  for   independence  were  called  The  Army  of  God  (Hisbullah)  and  Vanguard  Corps  (Barisan  Pelopor).     23     higher  command  looked  like  and  was  able  to  achieve.    There  was  “not  a  single  case  known   of  PETA  units  being  reestablished  in  their  original  form”  (Notosusanto  1979,  180).     BKR  units  were  formed  in  the  haste  and  confusion  of  a  revolutionary  moment  and   without  deliberate  planning  by  experienced  leaders.    Leadership  positions  within  BKR   were  taken  by  any  credible  person  with  a  military  background,  regardless  of  the  source  of   his  training  and  experience.    During  the  four  years  that  Indonesia  fought  against  the  Dutch   “a  combat  officer’s  effectiveness  and  reputation  had  rested  largely  on  his  ability  to  attract   and  keep  a  following  of  soldiers”  and  the  “strength  of  the  leader  depended  on  the  strength   of  his  personality  and  ability  to  appear  as  a  father  figure”  (McVey  1971,  142).     Former  PETA  officers  were  more  successful  than  heiho  or  KNIL  soldiers  in  acquiring   these  positions  because  there  were  more  of  them,  and  because  they  were  accustomed  to   fighting  and  training  with  limited  resources  (in  contrast  to  the  few  Dutch-­‐trained  officers).     The  BKR  was  a  simple,  locally  oriented  force  without  central  organization,  an  overarching   long-­‐term  strategy,  or  an  operational  command  hierarchy  above  the  smallest  tactical  level.     They  armed  themselves  with  anything  they  could  acquire,  and  by  commandeering  weapons   from  the  Japanese  before  the  Allied  Forces  could  disarm  them.         Two  months  after  declaring  Indonesia’s  independence,  the  civilian  leadership   changed  policy.  On  5  October  1945  President  Sukarno  officially  endorsed  the  formation  of   the  armed  forces  and  the  BKR  became  the  nucleus  of  the  new  Army.    The  Indonesian  armed   forces  was  first  called  the  People’s  Security  Army  (Tentara  Keamanan  Rakyat,  or  TKR).    The   military  changed  its  name  three  months  later  to  the  Army  of  the  Republic  of  Indonesia   (Tentara  Republik  Indonesia,  or  TRI).    It  took  another  18  months  for  most  of  the  other   smaller  militia  organizations  to  merge  or  be  absorbed  by  the  TRI  and  for  the  armed  forces     24     of  Indonesia  to  be  consolidated  under  one  command.    This  change  occurred  for  a  few   reasons,  including  pressure  from  nationalist  groups  and  reassurance  from  the  first  Allied   Forces  that  landed  in  Java  that  they  were  not  going  to  meddle  in  internal  affairs.44     Despite  Sukarno’s  endorsement,  the  TRI  began  to  form  an  identity  that  was  separate   from  central  government.    For  these  reasons  the  Indonesian  military  is  known  as  a  “self   created”  army,  “born  out  of  the  revolution  for  independence”  (Widjojo    2000,  1).    It  was  not   formed  by  a  government  or  a  political  party,  or  to  serve  a  government  or  political  party,  but   from  a  collective  need  of  the  Indonesian  people.45    Sukarno  might  not  have  realized  it  at  the   moment,  but  this  was  a  delicate  situation  in  which  the  government  he  represented  could   not  live  without  the  military,  but  the  military  was  willing  live  without  his  government.     Military  leaders  “had  refused  from  the  outset  to  accept  the  principle  of  civilian   control  over  military  affairs  and  the  course  of  the  revolution  did  nothing  to  convince  them   that  they  had  been  wrong  in  maintaining  their  independence”  (McVey  1971,  131).    An   example  of  the  power  struggle  and  divide  between  the  military  and  civilian  leadership  took   place  on  11  November  1945  in  Yogyakarta  when  all  the  regional  commanders  of  units  from   Java  and  Sumatra  were  summoned  to  meet  in  a  historic  military  conference.         At  the  conference,  without  approval  or  input  from  the  civilian  government,  the   military  representatives  determined  that  the  military  needed  to  be  consolidated  under  one   unified  command.    They  elected  the  young,  patriotic  and  charismatic  29-­‐year  old  Sudirman                                                                                                                   44  The  mission  of  the  first  European  military  units  that  arrived  in  Indonesia  after  the  end  of  World  War  II  was   to  oversee  the  disarming  of  Japanese  forces  and  receive  the  prisoners  of  war.    The  British  were  the  first  to   arrive  via  Singapore  and  although  they  would  eventually  be  involved,  they  were  initially  totally  uninterested   in  reestablishing  European  colonial  authority  anywhere  in  the  Indonesian  archipelago.   45  See  also  Robert  Lowry  1996,  46-­‐47,  99  or  R.G.  Layador  "Indonesia  and  the  Military  at  the  Crossroads"   INDONESIAN  QUARTERLY,  no.  27  (1999):  217.     25     to  be  the  Panglima  Besar,  the  first  commander-­‐in-­‐chief  of  the  military.46    This  election  set   the  precedent  that  the  military  could  and  would  do  as  it  wished,  and  began  an  era  of  dual   leadership  where  the  military  acted  with  relative  autonomy  and  more  as  a  partner  than  as   a  subordinate  to  the  civilian  government.    The  military’s  relationship  would  continue  this   way  until  1998,  with  the  end  of  Suharto’s  New  Order  regime  and  beginning  of  the   Reformasi  period.     The  election  of  Sudirman  also  represented  a  changing  of  the  guard  in  the  military   culture.    The  few  years  of  Japanese  occupation  were  just  long  enough  for  the  Japanese   military  example  to  leave  an  impression,  but  short  enough  that  Indonesians  still   remembered  Dutch  rule.    This  was  especially  true  among  military-­‐aged  males  who  were   still  recovering  from  the  colonial  experience,  and  who  disregarded  the  Dutch  military  as   weak.       KNIL-­‐trained  soldiers  and  especially  officers  were  often  met  with  suspicion.    This  is   another  reason  why  the  military  leaders  present  at  the  conference  could  circumvent  their   cultural  deferral  to  elders  and  elect  a  young  officer  like  Sudirman  over  a  more  senior  cadre   of  potential  leaders  such  as  Urip  Sumoharjo  and  A.H.  Nasution.    During  the  revolution,  the   spirit  of  the  nascent  Indonesian  military  was  best  captured  by  optimistic  enthusiasm  of  the   new  generation  of  leaders  who  demanded  action.         The  self-­‐congratulations  were  short  lived,  however,  and  the  new  military  was   quickly  put  to  test.    The  Dutch  refused  to  recognize  Indonesian  independence  and,  with  the   help  of  the  British,  arrived  to  retake  the  Indies.    Indonesians  now  had  to  fight  for  the                                                                                                                   46  Sudirman,  a  former  PETA  officer,  was  selected  over  older  officers  such  as  Urip  Sumoharjo,  a  former  Major   in  the  KNIL.    Urip  would  become  the  chief  of  staff  under  Sudirman.    See,  for  example,  Tjokropranolo,  Elizabeth   Krahling,  Bert  Jordan,  Steve  Dawson,  and  Ian  MacFarling,  General  Sudirman:  the  Leader  Who  Finally  Destroyed   Colonialism  in  Indonesia  (Canberra:  Australian  Defence  Studies  Centre,  1995),  50-­‐53.     26     independence  that  they  had  already  declared.    At  first  the  military  tried  to  fight  by   employing  a  linear  defense  strategy,  in  which  the  Indonesian  military  tried  to  hold  specific   ground  against  the  Dutch.    The  Dutch  military  -­‐  better  organized,  experienced,  and  with   superior  weapons  and  equipment  -­‐  was  able  to  decisively  win  early  battles  and  firmly   establish  itself  in  key  cities  in  Java.    By  1947  there  were  over  150,000  Dutch  soldiers  in   Indonesia  and  they  controlled  most  of  the  large  cities  in  Java  and  Sumatra.       After  a  series  of  defeats,  the  Indonesians  modified  their  strategy  into  a  non-­‐linear   defense  centered  on  guerilla  warfare  tactics,  marking  the  beginning  of  the  territorial   defense  doctrine.    Indonesia’s  geographic  challenges,  poor  infrastructure,  and  limited   military  resources  made  it  very  difficult  for  the  emergent  Indonesian  government  to  have   centralized  control.    The  result  was  the  military’s  territorial  commanders  had  “great   independence  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  Jakarta  and  the  army’s  relationship  to  them  was  more  one  of   negotiation  than  of  command”  (McVey  1971,  147).     A  decisive  challenge  to  the  Indonesian  military,  and  a  seminal  moment  in  both  civil-­‐ military  relations  and  defense  doctrine,  occurred  in  mid-­‐December  1948.47    Jakarta  could   not  be  defended  against  the  returning  Dutch,  so  the  newly  formed  government  moved  to   the  central  Java  city  of  Yogyakarta.    On  19  December,  Dutch  forces  attacked  Yogyakarta,   capturing  President  Sukarno  and  much  of  the  civilian  leadership.48    Sudirman  did  not   surrender,  retreating  instead  to  the  countryside  with  his  soldiers,  where  they  began  a  six-­‐                                                                                                                 47  The  name  of  the  Dutch’s  offensive  was  Operatie  Kraai  (Operation  Crow).    It  was  prompted,  in  part,  when  the   Indonesian  military  guerilla  forces  crossed  the  Van  Mook  line.    This  was  a  violation  of  the  Renville  Agreement,   a  cease-­‐fire  brokered  by  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  and  signed  by  Suharto  and  Hatta.    (The   agreement  was  signed  aboard  the  USS  Renville,  a  455-­‐foot  long  transport  on  17  January  1948.)    See,  for   example,  George  Kahin,  Nationalism  and  Revolution  in  Indonesia  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press,  1952),  ch.  7.         48  Some  historians  have  argued  that  Suharto  and  Hatta  choose  to  stay  and  be  captured  in  an  act  of  martyrdom,   hoping  to  raise  international  awareness  and  garner  sympathy.         27     month  guerilla  warfare  campaign  against  the  Dutch,  operating  in  hideouts  in  the  slopes  of   the  surrounding  mountains.49     While  Indonesia’s  political  leadership  was  locked  away  in  a  prison  camp  in  Sumatra,   the  military  was  the  sole  remaining  national  institution.    As  the  commander  the  army,   Sudirman  realized  he  did  not  have  the  resources  for  a  conventional  war  strategy  and   attacked  the  Dutch  army  with  smaller,  quicker  forces  and  avoided  direct  combat  in  open   territory.50    General  Sudirman,  with  help  from  Colonel  Nasution,  codified  this  tactic  in  his   Tactical  Order  Number  1  issued  in  December  1948  following  the  Dutch  attack  on   Yogyakarta.    The  order  specifically  stated  to  (1)  not  fight  in  a  linear  defense,  (2)  form  self-­‐ sufficient  military  cells  in  every  district  based  in  mountain  ranges  in  order  to  conduct   guerilla  warfare,  and  (3)  turn  the  entire  island  of  Java  into  a  giant  battlefield.51    This   method  became  the  basic  fighting  style  of  the  Indonesian  army  and  is  still  part  of  the   Indonesian  military  psyche.    It  has  evolved  into  the  doctrine  of  the  Total  People’s  Defense.52     This  campaign  was  ultimately  successful.    In  May  1949  a  ceasefire  was  declared  and   the  Dutch  officially  ended  their  fight  in  August.    Although  never  decisively  defeated   militarily,  political  pressure  from  the  United  Nations  Security  Counsel  and  the  United  States   through  the  Marshall  plan  weakened  the  Netherlands’  resolve.53    On  December  1949,  more                                                                                                                   49  Sudirman’s  deputy  commander  was  A.H.  Nasution,  a  former  KNIL  officer.   50  By  this  point,  General  Sudirman  was  severely  weekend  by  tuberculosis  and  had  to  be  carried  on  a  stretcher   across  the  countryside  as  he  led  the  resistance.           51  See  Elizabeth  Krahling  Tjokropranolo,  Bert  Jordan,  Steve  Dawson,  and  Ian  MacFarling,  General  Sudirman:   the  Leader  Who  Finally  Destroyed  Colonialism  in  Indonesia  (Canberra:  Australian  Defence  Studies  Centre,   1995),  101.   52  See,  for  example,  Angel  Rabasa  and  John  Haseman,  The  Military  and  Democracy  in  Indonesia:  Challenges,   Politics,  and  Power  (Santa  Monica:  RAND,  2002),  9-­‐12.    The  Total  People’s  Defense  emphasizes  mass  public   mobilization  and  for  the  Army  to  fight  a  mixture  of  conventional  and  guerilla  warfare  until  reinforcements   (now  called  KOSTRAD)  arrive  or  the  enemy  quits.       53  See,  for  example,  Adrian  Vickers,  A  History  of  Modern  Indonesia  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,   2005),  100,  111-­‐112.    He  states  that  between  1945  and  1949  only  700  British  and  Dutch  troops  were  killed  in     28     than  four  years  after  the  end  of  World  War  II,  the  Dutch  finally  acknowledged  Indonesia’s   independence.     Many  Indonesians,  both  in  and  out  of  uniform,  considered  the  initial  hesitancy  of  the   government  to  form  a  military  and  at  least  prepare  for  future  combat  operations  an   unforgivable  weakness.    This  was  highlighted  throughout  the  revolution  by  the   government’s  general  ineffectiveness  in  both  controlling  the  military  and  preventing  the   Dutch  from  re-­‐entering  Indonesia.    The  military  was  the  only  institution  that  was  willing   and  able  to  resist  Dutch  occupation.    In  some  areas,  especially  during  1945-­‐1949,  the   military  was  the  government.    These  events  led  to  the  military’s  claim  to  a  special  bond   with  the  people  of  Indonesia  highlighted  in  the  slogan  “Asal  rakyat,  milik  rakyat,  bagian   rakyat”  (from  the  people,  owned  by  the  people,  part  of  the  people).       The  struggle  for  independence  against  the  Dutch  after  World  War  II  gave  the   Indonesian  military  its  current  identity.    For  the  first  time,  military  units  comprised  of  and   led  by  Indonesians  were  fighting  for  freedom.    This  experience  in  battle  bonded  the   soldiers  under  a  single  cause  and  a  common  national  identity.    PETA,  KNIL,  heiho,  and  other   military  groups  evaporated.         Furthermore,  this  experience  refined  the  military’s  tactics  and  defined  its  defense   doctrine.    The  army  adopted  a  circle  defense  strategy  nested  with  a  strategy  of  Total   People’s  Defense.    Units  were  already  positioned  across  much  of  the  country  and  Indonesia   did  not  have  the  capability  to  transport  or  project  its  forces  in  mass  quickly,  which   necessitated  a  static  defensive  posture.    This  further  entrenched  the  territorial  command   system  in  Indonesian  defense  doctrine.                                                                                                                     Indonesia,  but  estimates  there  were  between  45,000  and  100,000  Indonesians  soldiers  and  an  equal  number   of  civilians  killed,  plus  over  7  million  displaced  on  Java  and  Sumatra  alone.     29       Post  Revolution:  The  Territorial  Command  System  and  Dwifungsi  during  the  Guided   Democracy  and  New  Order  periods  (1949-­1998)         With  international  recognition  of  independence  and  the  cessation  of  fighting  against   the  Dutch,  the  Indonesian  military  was  for  the  first  time  without  an  enemy  inside  its   borders.    Peace  can  be  an  interesting  time  for  a  large  military,  especially  one  that  is  defined   by  aggressive  initiative  and  action.    The  military  now  had  to  develop  a  non-­‐combat  role  in  a   free  Indonesian  society.    The  strengths  of  the  military  to  this  point  were  its  nationalist   guerilla  fighters  and  their  fighting  spirit.54    Military  leaders  now  faced  the  new  challenge  of   peacetime  while  also  having  to  organize  the  military  and  consolidate  it  under  a  unified   command.    This  was  especially  challenging  after  the  death  of  General  Sudirman,  the  face  of   the  armed  forces  and  prominent  military  personality.     Without  a  common  enemy,  factionalism  also  became  a  bigger  problem.    In  the  years   after  independence,  internal  divisions  and  differing  loyalties  were  common.    Senior  officers   commanding  units  in  the  new  military  now  came  from  three  different  periods:  most  of  the   older  officers  had  received  their  formal  training  by  the  Dutch  before  1942,  others  joined   during  the  Japanese  occupation  period  between  1943  and  1945,  and  still  others  joined   during  the  fight  for  independence  between  1945  and  1949.    Generally  speaking,  the  older   generation  favored  a  smaller,  professional  force  organized  in  the  image  of  European   militaries.    They  were  accustomed  to  a  military’s  subservient  role  to  the  civilian   government.    The  younger  generation  favored  the  type  of  military  used  in  the  fight  for   independence.    They  valued  comradery,  power,  and  the  opportunities  afforded  to  them                                                                                                                   54  This  is  a  direct  influence  from  the  Japanese,  unharnessed  through  exposure  to  the  Japanese  warrior  ethos   by  Indonesians  serving  in  heiho  and  PETA.    The  soldier’s  fighting  spirit  was  considered  more  important  that   technical  or  formal  training.    See,  for  example,  Pauker  1962,  198-­‐199.     30     through  the  military’s  strong  presence  in  society.    This  group  saw  the  separation  of  the   military’s  security  role  from  its  other  functions  as  a  wasteful  and  unnecessary.55                 Internal  posturing  was  further  affected  by  the  concentrated  power  of  Sukarno’s   unitary  government  and  its  focus  on  economic  development.    The  geopolitical  landscape  in   Southeast  Asia  did  not  warrant  a  high  defense  budget  and  a  large  standing  army  was  not   sustainable,  especially  with  the  massive  debt  burden  Indonesia  inherited  from  the   Netherlands.     At  the  high  water  mark  during  its  fight  against  the  Dutch,  the  estimated  size  of  the   Indonesian  military  was  greater  than  450,000  soldiers.    Army  chief  of  staff  A.  H.  Nasution   and  Tahi  Bonar  Simatupang,  General  Sudirman’s  replacement  and  second  commander  of   the  recently  renamed  Indonesian  Armed  Forces  (Angkatan  Bersenjata  Republik  Indonesia   or  ABRI),  spearheaded  the  reorganization,  hoping  to  modify  ABRI  into  a  more  modern,   professional  force.    Initially  the  size  of  the  active  duty  force  was  reduced  to  160,000,  with   plans  to  further  reduce  the  number  below  60,000.56    The  ideal  size  of  the  active  duty  force   was  designed  to  operate  and  conduct  tactical  operations  remotely  in  battalion-­‐sized   combat  teams.    This  tactic,  called  a  “mobile  offensive  system”  by  George  Kahin,  allowed   military  formations  to  be  mobile  and  fast  without  complex  logistic  support.57    This  military   strategy  is  still  used  in  the  unit  currently  called  Komando  Strategis  Cadangan  Angkatan   Darat  (KOSTRAD,  Indonesian  Army  Strategic  Reserve  Command).                                                                                                                   55  See,  for  example,  Hamish  McDonald  1980,  ch.  2.   56  Discharged  veterans  were  often  given  job  training  or  other  help  by  programs  overseen  by  the  Minister  of   Youth  and  Reconstruction.    However  many  officers  and  soldiers  were  against  the  reduction  and  disbandment   and  had  to  be  forced  to  do  so  by  other  military  units.    See,  for  example,  George  McTurnan  Kahin,  Nationalism   and  Revolution  in  Indonesia  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press,  1952),  ch.  9.   57  See  Kahin  1952,  263.    As  Indonesian  military  leaders  conducted  their  threat  analysis,  the  enemy  they  were   preparing  to  have  to  fight  was  the  Dutch  if  they  decided  to  attack  again.     31       The  small,  mobile  force  was  augmented  with  a  wide  network  of  territorially  aligned   forces  would  act  as  a  first  line  of  defense.    The  territorial  defense  concept  in  Indonesia   originates  from  the  circle  defense  strategy  used  under  General  Sudirman  in  Java  fighting   the  Dutch,  and  the  guerilla  tactics  used  in  the  1948  during  the  war  of  independence  against   the  better-­‐equipped  and  organized  Dutch  army.58    The  new  territorially  aligned  forces  were   comprised  of  peasants  and  other  local  citizens  that  would  receive  basic  military  training  as   part-­‐time  soldiers.    As  an  example,  the  Defense  Act  of  1954  ensures  all  Indonesians  were   aware  of  their  specific  defense  requirements  through  basic  military  training  and  required   classes.59    This  strategy  became  known  as  Total  People’s  Defense  because  of  its  inclusion,  if   not  reliance  on,  civilians  and  part-­‐time  soldiers.    These  defense  strategies  divided   Indonesia’s  military  into  units  that  were  tactically  and  territorially  oriented.60     Indonesia’s  defense  doctrine  developed  as  a  direct  result  of  its  vast  geography  and   limited  military  capability.    Its  territory  could  never  be  centrally  defended  with  the  limited   number  of  soldiers  and  equipment  available.    The  air  force  and  navy  were  poorly  equipped   and  incapable  of  preventing  an  enemy  landing  -­‐  something  that  the  Japanese  and  Dutch   (with  assistance  from  the  British  navy)  had  done  in  the  1940s.    Therefore  the  defense                                                                                                                   58  See  Agus  Widjojo,  “Security  Sector  Reform  and  the  Territorial  Command”  from  Beni  Sukadis,  ed.    Almanac   Indonesia  2007  security  sector  reform  (Jakarta:  LESPERSSI,  2007),  120  or  Ian  MacFarling,  The  Dual  Function  of   the  Indonesian  Armed  Forces:  Military  Politics  in  Indonesia  (Australia:  Australian  Defence  Studies  Centre,   1996),  132-­‐137.   59  See,  for  example,  Robert  Lowry,  The  Armed  Forces  of  Indonesia.  (St  Leonards,  NSW:  Allen  &  Unwin,  1996),   31.   60  This  practice  continues  in  the  present.    Approximately  twenty  five  percent  of  the  Indonesian  army  is   assigned  to  its  tactical  units,  KOSTRAD  and  KOPASSUS.    The  rest  are  either  assigned  to  territorial  commands,   training  centers,  or  central  headquarters.    For  a  more  detailed  breakdown  of  its  force  structure,  see  Robert   Lowry,  The  Armed  Forces  of  Indonesia  (St  Leonards,  NSW:  Allen  &  Unwin,  1996)  or  Angel  Rabasa  and  John   Haseman  The  Military  and  Democracy  in  Indonesia:  Challenges,  Politics,  and  Power  (Santa  Monica:  RAND,   2002),  ch.  2.     32     strategy  was  designed  to  ensure  that  if  any  part  of  the  country  were  overtaken,  fighting   would  continue.61       For  a  guerilla-­‐style  defense  strategy  to  be  successful,  the  military  first  requires  the   complete  support  of  the  local  population  and  intimate  knowledge  of  the  terrain  and  other   available  resources.    General  Nasution  captured  this  sentiment,  stating  that  fighting  this   kind  of  war  “absolutely  requires  territorial  support  and  service  from  the  whole  people  in   the  territory”  (Nasution  1964,  39).    Considering  the  challenge  of  defending  the  world’s   largest  archipelago,  the  doctrine  justifies  a  continued  military  presence  throughout  the   country.    During  the  1950s  this  gave  rise  to  the  military’s  establishment  of  a  system  of   territorial  commands  in  which  the  country  is  divided  geographically  and  each  command  is   responsible  for  defense  within  its  sector.    Later,  during  Suharto’s  New  Order  regime,  the   territorial  command  system  was  justified  as  necessary  to  defend  and  provide  security  for   the  entire  archipelago,  but  in  reality,  it  was  maintained  in  order  to  continue  Suharto’s   loyalty-­‐based  political  system.62         The  territorial  command  system  divides  Indonesia  into  military  territories   paralleling  the  civilian  government,  each  assigned  to  a  military  commander  as  an  area  of   responsibility.63    This  system  absorbs  the  lion’s  share  of  the  Indonesian  army,  with   anywhere  between  fifty  and  seventy  percent  of  the  forces  assigned  (the  remaining  force  is   assigned  to  operational  units  in  KOSTRAD  or  KOPASSUS,  or  to  training  and  logistical   assignments).    The  twelve  territorial  commands  (see  Table  1)  duplicate  the  organization  of                                                                                                                   61  See,  for  example,  Hamish  McDonald,  Suharto's  Indonesia.  (Blackburn,  Vic:  Fontana  Books,  1980),  32-­‐34.     62  Rieffel  and  Pramodhawardani  2007,  91.   63  See  Sebastian  and  Iisgindarsah,  RSIS  Working  Paper  No.  227,  “Assessing  12-­‐year  Military  Reform  in   Indonesia:  Major  Strategic  Gaps  for  the  Next  Stage  of  Reform”  (Singapore:  S.  Rajaratnam  School  of   International  Studies,  2011),  4.     33     the  local  government  and,  continuing  to  the  present,  are  actively  involved  in  daily  life.    See   figure  1  below  for  a  breakdown  of  the  KODAMs  in  1999  (this  map  was  created  prior  to  East   Timor’s  independence).    Two  additional  KODAMs  have  been  added,  one  centered  in  Ambon   covering  the  eastern  islands  south  of  KODAM  VIII,  and  another  in  Aceh,  northwest  of   KODAM  I,  covering  northern  Sumatra.    Jakarta  has  its  own  KODAM.     Table  1     KODAM  name   Provinces  Included   KODAM  Iskandar  Muda   Aceh   KODAM  I  Bukit  Barisan  (Mountain  Chain)   North  Sumatra,  West  Sumatra,  Riau  Islands   KODAM  II  Sriwijaya   South  Sumatra,  Jambi,  Bengkulu,  Lampung,  Bangka   Belitung   KODAM  Jaya  (Victory)   Jakarta   KODAM  III  Siliwangi   West  Java,  Banten   KODAM  IV  Diponegoro   Central  Java,  Yogyakarta   KODAM  V  Brawijaya   East  Java   KODAM  VI  Tanjungpura   East,  South,  West,  and  Central  Kalimantan   KODAM  VII  Wirabuana   Southeast,  South,  West,  North,  and  Central  Sulawesi   KODAM  VIII  Trikora  (Succession)   Papua,  West  Papua   KODAM  IX  Udayana   Bali,  NTB,  NTT   KODAM  XVI  Pattimura   Maluku,  North  Maluku   Source:  Agus  Widjojo,  “Security  Sector  Reform  and  the  Territorial  Command”  in  Beni  Sukadis,  ed.  Almanac   Indonesia  2007:  Security  Sector  Reform  (Jakarta:  LESPERSSI,  2007),126.           34     Figure  1:  Indonesian  KODAMs     Source:  Federation  of  American  Scientists,  September  13,  1999.    Accessed  November  1,  2012,   http://www.fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/adri.htm               The  largest  command  area  is  equal  to  or  above  the  provincial  level  and  is  known  as  a   Kommando  Daerah  Militer  (KODAM).    It  is  usually  commanded  by  a  two-­‐star  general  with  a   headquarters  of  between  700-­‐800  personnel.    Each  KODAM  is  responsible  for  defending  its   particular  sector  of  the  archipelago.64    The  KODAM  commander  has  unmatched  visibility   and  awareness  of  daily  activities  in  his  region  because  of  the  military  intelligence   component  of  his  command,  and  he  generally  has  greater  situational  awareness  of  local                                                                                                                   64  See  Angel  Rabasa  and  Peter  Chalk,  Indonesia’s  Transformation  and  the  Stability  of  Southeast  Asia  (Santa   Moncia:  RAND,  2001),  56-­‐58  or  Abdul  Haris  Nasution,  Towards  a  People’s  Army  (Djakarta:  c.v.  Delagsi,  1964).    It  is  important  to  note  that  general  Nasution  sees  no  distinction  between  external  defense  and  internal   security.     35     religious  activities,  student  movements,  political  dissent,  and  other  daily  activities  than  the   civilian  government.65     The  KODAMs  are  divided  into  sub-­‐regional  commands  (Komando  Resort  Militer,  or   KOREM),  each  commanded  by  a  colonel  with  a  headquarters  of  approximately  350   personnel.    Beneath  these,  district  commands  (Komando  Distrik  Militer,  or  KODIM)  are   commanded  by  a  lieutenant  colonel;  KODIM  are  again  divided  into  smaller  units  paralleling   the  civilian  forms  of  government.    The  lowest  level  of  the  system  was  at  the  sub-­‐district  or   village  level,  where  a  junior  officer  or  non-­‐commissioned  officer  (Bintara  Pembina  Desa  or   BABINSA)  is  assigned  to  offer  guidance  and  supervision.66    See  Table  1  below  depicting  the   military’s  territorial  command  structure  and  Table  2  depicting  the  levels  and  associated   senior  ranks  for  the  territorial  command  system  and  operation  units.     Table  2     Civilian  Government  Equivalent   Territorial  Command   Number  in  Indonesia   Name       Province  /  Region   KODAM   12   Sub-­‐Region,  multiple  Districts   KOREM   39   District     KODIM   271   Sub-­‐District   KORAMIL   3818   Village   BABINSA   Between  27,000  and  30,000   Source:  Lowry  1996,  229  and  Rabasa  and  Haseman  2002,  12-­‐14.                                                                                                                     65  See  MacFarling  1996,  140.   66  See  Bilveer  Singh,  Dwifungsi  ABRI:  The  Dual  Function  of  the  Indonesian  Armed  Forces  (Singapore:  Singapore   Institute  of  International  Affairs,  1995),  78-­‐82  or  Rabasa  and  Chalk  2001,  58-­‐59.     36     Table  3     Rank   Territorial  Command   Operational  Unit   United  States  Army   System   Equivalent     Non-­‐Commissioned   BABINSA     Squad  Leader,  Platoon   Officer   Sergeant     Second  Lieutenant   KORAMIL  Commander   Team  Leader   Platoon  Leader     First  Lieutenant   KORAMIL  Commander   Battalion  Staff  Officer   Platoon  Leader     Captain   KORAMIL  Commander  or   Company  Commander   Company  Commander   Staff  Officer   or  Battalion  Staff   Officer     Major   Staff  Officer   Brigade  or  Division   Battalion,  Brigade,  or   Staff  Officer   Division  Staff  Officer       Lieutenant  Colonel   KODIM  Commander   Battalion  Commander   Battalion  Commander     Colonel   KOREM  Commander   Brigade  Commander   Brigade  Commander       Brigadier  General   KODAM  Chief  of  Staff   Army  Staff   Assistant  Division   Commander     Major  General   KODAM  Commander   Division  Commander   Division  Commander           The  defense  doctrine  that  accompanies  the  territorial  command  system  has  three   levels.    First  is  conventional-­‐style  war  in  which  the  active  army  has  the  lead  responsibility.     Second  is  unconventional  guerilla  war,  or  “people’s  resistance,”  in  which  civilians  are  called   on  to  actively  participate  as  a  militia  fighting  under  the  army’s  leadership.    The  third  is   called  “civil  resistance,”  and  includes  the  entire  population,  with  every  civilian  asset   assisting  the  military  effort.    In  this  last  situation  the  local  population  may  be  forced  to   leave  their  villages  and  take  refuge  wherever  they  can  safely  provide  support  to  the   military.67             The  modern  territorial  command  system,  created  by  then-­‐Army  Chief  of  Staff                                                                                                                   67  See  Nasution  1964,  51-­‐56.     37     Colonel  A.H.  Nasution,  was  officially  established  seven  months  after  Indonesia  achieved   independence  and  was  key  to  implementing  the  “total  people’s  defense  and  security”   doctrine.68    The  three-­‐level  defense  strategy  and  doctrine  still  exists  and  in  times  of  peace   “the  function  of  the  TNI  is  to  prepare  available  combat  units  for  the  defense  of  the  country   in  the  advent  of  war”  (Widjojo  2007,  121).       Critically,  at  this  time  the  police  was  still  part  of  the  armed  forces,  and  that  the   territorial  system  was  also  designed  to  react  to  internal  threats  which  were  identified  as   coming  from  four  types  of  problems.    These  are  labeled  “SARA  issues”  and  include   disturbances  related  to  ethnicity,  religion,  race,  or  class.69         The  territorial  command  system  was  also  responsible  for  monitoring  local  issues   and  influencing  local  politics  and  economic  development.    For  example,  the  intelligence   arm  of  the  command  paid  close  attention  to  civilian  leaders  and  social  groups,  looking  for   any  signs  of  rebellion  or  separatist  movements.    The  system  and  doctrine  were  designed  to   control  the  “activities  of  political  parties,  trade  unions,  religious  organizations,  student   groups,  the  press,  and  non-­‐governmental  organizations  to  ensure  that  challenges  to  the   government  were  nipped  in  the  bud”  (Crouch  2010,  129).     The  military  presence  under  the  territorial  command  system  was  deliberately   public,  and  officers  were  involved  in  all  aspects  of  civilian  life.    The  territorial  command   system  gave  the  military,  empowered  by  the  Dwifungsi  doctrine,  access  and  influence  over   the  entire  country.    Dwifungsi  significantly  expanded  the  role  of  the  military  and  involved  in                                                                                                                   68  Benedict  R.  O'G  Anderson  and  Audrey  Kahin,  "Indonesian  Army  Territorial  Commanders  1950-­‐March   1983",  Indonesia  no.  35  (1983):  109.    A.H.  Nasution  was  one  of  the  few  Indonesian  soldiers  trained  by  the   Dutch  Military  Academy  in  Breda  to  serve  as  an  officer  in  the  KNIL  (the  soldiers  were  Indonesian  while  most   of  the  officers  were  Dutch.)    He  would  go  on  to  serve  as  the  commander  of  the  Indonesian  Armed  Forces  and   had  contentious  relationships  with  both  Presidents  Sukarno  and  Suharto.   69  See  MacFarling,  1996,  135.    SARA  is  an  acronym  for  Suku  (tribe),  Agama  (religion),  Ras  (race),  and   Antargolongan  (interest  group)  disputes.       38     “setting  the  national  agenda  and  directions  with  the  key  positions  held  by  the  military”   (Singh  1995,  56).       In  sum,  the  central  preoccupation  of  the  territorial  command  system  was  security.     But  in  reality,  military  leaders,  through  an  amalgam  of  dominant  personalities,   organizational  skills,  and  access  to  numerous  logistic  and  commercial  networks,  began  to   dominate  local  politics  and  businesses.    This  system  also  proved  to  be  highly  effective  and   profitable,  facilitating  some  of  the  military’s  illegal  and  illicit  businesses.    In  the  1950s  and   early  60s,  “the  political  reality  in  most  of  the  areas  outside  Java  is  that  the  army   commander  is  the  most  powerful  person”  (Feith  1964,  263),  although  regional   commanders  could  not  overstep  their  authority  and  were  still  subordinate  to  central  army   leadership.           Thus,  the  function  of  the  Indonesian  military  grew  to  include  “secur[ing]  the  state   internally,  rather  than  protect[ing]  it  from  external  aggression”  (Kingsbury  2002,  23).   Through  installing  a  military  presence  throughout  the  country  and  at  every  layer  of  the   civilian  political  hierarchy,  the  military  was  able  to  expand  its  power  and  influence  and   become  politically  active  throughout  archipelago.    The  military  believed  that  unless  it  was     embedded  politically  throughout  the  countryside,  Indonesia  would  not  continue  to  exist.70       With  the  strong  military  presence  throughout  the  country,  the  military  was  a  visible   sign  of  national  identity.    Often  it  was  the  only  arm  of  the  state  that  extended  into  the   remote  areas  of  the  countryside.    At  a  time  when  the  idea  of  one  unified  Indonesia  was  still   fragile  and  uncertain,  the  military  was  the  bond  that  forced  it  together.71    The  tasks  of                                                                                                                   70  See  Kingsbury  2002,  274-­‐275.   71  Unfortunately  this  was  often  done  violently  and  on  occasion  against  its  own  rough  or  sympathetic  military   units.     39     projecting  nationalism  and  providing  training  and  civic  action  programs  drew  many  local   populations  together.    Similar  to  the  intentions  of  the  Japanese  officers  during  the   occupation  period  in  World  War  II,  the  Indonesian  military  made  local  populations  active   stakeholders  in  territorial  defense.         Through  the  processes  detailed  above,  the  military  was  able  to  establish  a  strong   foothold  as  an  institution  of  power.    By  the  end  of  the  1950s,  it  had  thrust  itself  again  into   the  national  spotlight.    After  parliamentary  democracy  was  abandoned  in  March  1957,   there  was  a  threat  of  civil  war,  and  the  military  strongly  sided  with  Sukarno’s  plan  for   Guided  Democracy.    Sukarno,  in  turn,  supported  Army  chief-­‐of-­‐staff  Major  General  A.H.   Nasution’s  nationwide  declaration  of  marital  law  on  14  March  1957.    This  act  created  the   legal  basis  for  the  Indonesian  military  to  be  involved  in  civilian  affairs.72           The  13  December  decree  authorized  army  commanders  to  take  over  control  of  the   business  enterprises  that  were  previously  owned  by  the  Dutch.73    After  nationalization,   Dutch-­‐owned  businesses  came  under  direct  ABRI  control;  at  the  time,  Feith  wrote  that  “the   huge  Dutch  business  establishment  has  all  but  formally  become  Indonesian  government   property”  (Feith  1964,  211).    In  1958,  Nasution  introduced  his  “Middle  Way”  concept  that   elevated  the  military’s  role  in  society  beyond  a  simple  fighting  force,  sanctioning  its  role  in   politics.    Nasution’s  “Middle  Way”  obligated  the  military  to  participate  in  political,   economic,  and  social  affairs.    During  the  first  years  of  Sukarno’s  Guided  Democracy,   military  territory  commanders  “had  begun  to  make  extensive  use  of  their  martial  law                                                                                                                   72  Sukarno  agreed  in  part  so  that  the  military  could  deal  with  rebellious  commanders  that  had  gone  rogue  and   enacted  bloodless  coups  in  parts  of  Sumatra,  Sulawesi,  and  other  outer  islands.     73  See  Kingsbury  2002,  291  and  Feith  1964,  210-­‐211.     40     powers  to  exercise  control  over  civilian  administration  and  political  affairs”  (Feith  1964,   213).       The  military’s  territorial  command  system  and  the  “Middle  Way”  concept  became  a   pillar  of  Indonesian  society  by  the  early  1960s.    As  the  military’s  strength  and  influence   grew,  it  became  embedded  in  the  social  fabric  of  Indonesia.    However,  it  is  during  the   regime  of  Indonesia’s  second  president  that  both  would  become  truly  powerful  in   themselves.       The  New  Order       The  end  of  Sukarno’s  Guided  Democracy  and  Suharto’s  rise  to  power  marks  a   significant  period  in  modern  Indonesian  history.    Suharto’s  seizure  of  national  power  began   after  a  failed  coup  attempt  allegedly  initiated  by  the  Indonesian  Communist  Party  (PKI)  on   30  September  1965.74    At  that  time,  Major  General  Suharto  was  in  control  of  the  Army’s   Strategic  Reserve  Command  (KOSTRAD),  and  according  to  the  legend  propagated   throughout  his  rule,  he  saved  the  country  from  crumbling  into  a  collapsed  communist                                                                                                                   74  The  coup  still  remains  highly  controversial  and  the  truth  about  the  PKI’s  involvement  may  never  be  known.     For  an  example  of  the  army’s  “evidence”  see  John  Roosa’s  essay,  "The  truths  of  torture:  victims'  memories  and   state  histories  in  Indonesia"  Indonesia  no.  85  (2008):  46-­‐49.    The  fact  that  is  not  argued  is  that  mid-­‐ranking   officers  commanded  by  President  Sukarno’s  bodyguard,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Untung,  murdered  six  senior   generals  on  the  night  of  30  September  1965  (later  called  the  “30  September  Movement”).    In  a  different  essay,   Roosa  claims  that  the  two  leading  conspirators  of  the  coup,  Colonel  Latief  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Untung   were  good  friends  of  Suharto  and  that  they  had  informed  him  ahead  of  time  about  the  plot.    See  John  Roosa’s   "Suharto  (June  8,  1921-­‐January  27,  2008)"  Indonesia  no.  81  (2008),  139.    Cornell  professors  Benedict   Anderson,  Ruth  McVey,  and  Frederick  Bunnell  published  a  paper  (later  known  as  the  “Cornell  Paper”)  that   proposed  the  coup  was  engineered  from  within  the  Army  as  a  way  of  cleansing  certain  leaders  that  were   allegedly  working  with  the  United  State  Central  Intelligence  Agency.    See  Benedict  R.  O’G  Anderson,  Ruth   Thomas  McVey,  and  Frederick  P.  Bunnell,  A  Preliminary  Analysis  of  the  October  1,  1965,  Coup  in  Indonesia   (Ithaca,  N.Y.:  Modern  Indonesia  Project,  Cornell  University,  1971).     41     state.75    Suharto  was  rewarded  for  his  actions  two  weeks  later  with  a  promotion  to  the   Army  Chief  of  Staff.76             Following  the  events  of  30  September,  Indonesia  was  in  a  period  of  confusion  and   disorder.    Perhaps  foreshadowing  events,  Sukarno  had  an  affinity  for  and  was  fond  of   quoting  United  States’  President  Abraham  Lincoln,  often  saying  during  this  period  “a  nation   divided  against  itself  cannot  stand”  (Crouch  1978,  156).    As  Muslim  organizations,  student   groups,  academics,  and  many  of  the  middle-­‐class  turned  against  President  Sukarno,   Suharto  seized  emergency  governing  authority.77    The  accompanying  political  instability   culminated  with  the  arrest  of  more  than  100,000  political  prisoners  and  the  deaths  of   hundreds  of  thousands  of  people  in  just  a  few  months.78     Aided  by  his  military  and  business  connections  and  powerful  personality,  Suharto   consolidated  power  and  established  himself  as  head  of  state.79    In  the  next  few  years  he   secured  his  military  base,  filling  critical  leadership  positions  with  his  most  loyal   supporters.80                                                                                                                     75  According  to  Suharto,  he  was  unaware  anything  was  going  to  happen  and  was  at  the  hospital  the  night  of  30   September  to  see  his  4-­‐year  old  son  Tomy  who  was  recovering  from  burns  from  an  accident  with  hot  soup.     Upon  hearing  about  the  incident,  Suharto’s  forces  quickly  intervened  and  prevented  LTC  Untung  from  any   further  disturbance.    For  more  information,  see  G.  Dwipayana  Soeharto,  Soeharto,  My  thoughts,  Words,  and   Deeds:  an  Autobiography  (Jakarta:  Citra  Lamtoro  Gung  Lamtoro  Gun  Persada,  1991),  99-­‐110.     76  Suharto  was  promoted  to  Lieutenant  General  a  few  months  after  his  intervention,  and  promoted  again  to   General,  the  highest  military  rank,  in  July  1966.    He  officially  retired  from  the  military  in  1978.   77  See  Tineke  Hellwig  and  Eric  Tagliacozzo,  The  Indonesian  Reader  (Durham:  Duke  University  Press,  2009),   352.   78  Reliable  figures  for  casualties  for  the  1965-­‐1967  massacres  do  not  exist.    Reasonable  estimates  are  between   400,000  and  1  million.    For  more  information,  see  Robert  Cribb,  Historical  Atlas  of  Indonesia,  (Richmond:   Curzon  Press,  2000),  170-­‐172  or  Jean  Gelman  Taylor,  Indonesia:  Peoples  and  Histories  (New  Haven:  Yale   University  Press,  2003),  355-­‐360.   79  Suharto’s  regime  unofficially  began  on  11  March  1966  when  he  received  “orders”  to  restore  order  and   stability  in  exchange  for  personal  protection  for  President  Sukarno  who  was  isolated  (and  later  placed  under   house  arrest)  in  his  Bogor  summer  palace.    Suharto  was  formally  named  president  a  year  later  on  12  March   1967.     80  One  of  the  first  generals  Suharto  replaced  was  A.H.  Nasution,  an  early  reformer  who  in  1959  relieved   Suharto  (then  a  Colonel)  from  his  assignment  as  punishment  for  Suharto’s  involvement  in  smuggling  and  sent   him  to  work  in  the  Army  Command  and  General  Staff  College  in  Bandung.    There,  Suharto  worked  with  other     42         Under  Suharto’s  thirty  two-­‐year  regime,  dubbed  the  “New  Order,”  the  armed  forces   of  Indonesia  maintained  its  distinct  social-­‐political  role.81    Suharto  sought  economic   development  believed  that  political  stability  throughout  the  country  was  a  precondition  for   this.82    He  also  believed  that  national  security  and  national  development  were  equal,   parallel  goals,  and  charged  the  armed  forces  with  responsibility  for  both.    Suharto  made   sure  to  distribute  the  fruits  of  economic  growth  to  his  loyal  followers,  including  many  men   in  uniform.       Under  President  Suharto  the  “Middle  Way”  evolved  into  the  doctrine  known  as   Dwifungsi  (Dual  Function).    Dwifungsi  mandated  that  the  Indonesian  military  had  two   equally  important  functions:  defense  and  security,  and  an  active  social-­‐political  role.    As  a   result,  the  Indonesian  military  was  now  assigned  the  equal  responsibilities  of  providing   external  defense,  political  stability,  and  economic  development.    Dwifungsi  “cannot  be   regarded  as  merely  a  buzzword  or  an  excuse  to  justify  the  Indonesian  armed  forces’   involvement  in  politics”  (Lee  2008,  497);  it  was  codified  into  law  in  1966,  and  its  legal   authority  was  further  expanded  in  later  years.    Law  20  in  1982,  for  example,  states  that  the   “Armed  Forces  are  directed  to  raise  and  strengthen  National  Resilience  by  participating  in   the  decision  making  on  national  and  government  maters,  implementing  Pancasila                                                                                                                   senior  officers  implementing  Nasution’s  “Middle  Way”  but  otherwise  disenfranchised  with  Nasution’s   idealism.    See,  for  example,  Hamish  McDonald,  Suharto's  Indonesia  (Blackburn,  Vic:  Fontana  Books,  1980).   81  The  term  New  Order  (Orde  Baru)  came  to  be  in  1966  just  after  the  transition  of  power  as  a  way  to   distinguish  between  supporters  of  Suharto  and  the  displaced  Sukarno.    Born  amidst  tragedy  and  violence,   Suharto  managed  to  include  Sukarno’s  five-­‐principle  Pancasila  ideology,  which  justified  and  legitimized  his   rule.  Through  political  pressure  and  legislation,  President  Suharto  ensured  Pancasila  was  accepted  as  the  sole   government  philosophy  and  charged  the  military  with  defending  it.    See,  for  example,  Resy  Canonica-­‐ Walangitang,  The  End  of  Suharto’s  New  Order  in  Indonesia  (Frankfurt  am  Main:  Peter  Lang  GmbH,  2003).       82  See  R.E.  Elson,  Suharto:  A  Political  Biography  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2001),  175.     43     Democracy  and  supporting  constitutional  like  based  on  UUD45  in  all  activities  associated   with  national  development”  (MacFarling  1996,  143).       The  social-­‐political  aspect  of  the  Dwifungsi  doctrine  affected  the  military  in  three   distinct  ways.    First,  it  codified  the  duality  of  the  military’s  distinct  functions.    The  military   continued  to  be  responsible  for  Indonesia’s  external  defense  and  internal  security.     Dwifungsi  added  the  military’s  social-­‐political  role,  in  which  the  military  was  one  of  many   different  active  government  elements  of  society  and  works  side-­‐by-­‐side  to  promote  mutual   development.       The  second  effect  of  dwifungsi  on  the  military  was  that  the  military  was  now  an   element  of  national  power,  not  an  entity  that  was  subordinate  to  a  civilian  government.     The  interpretation  of  Indonesia’s  1945  Constitution  and  the  continued  opinion  of  senior   military  officers  was  that  “in  civil-­‐military  relations  in  Indonesia  there  is  no  civil  supremacy   over  the  military  and  no  military  supremacy  over  the  civilian”  (Singh  1995,  122).    The   guiding  conviction  behind  the  Dwifungsi  doctrine  was  “based  on  the  familial  principle  with   the  object  of  promoting  the  interests  of  the  whole  community”  (Singh  1995,  60).    The   military  considered  itself  a  protective  father  figure  whose  influence  should  legitimately   pervade  all  aspects  of  society.       The  third  effect  of  dwifungsi  on  the  military  was  the  tenet  of  shared  responsibility.     This  evolved  from  similar  ideological  principles  found  in  Sukarno’s  Guided  Democracy   where  all  citizens  were  part  of  a  greater  community.    According  to  Suharto’s  vision,  every   Indonesian  was  tasked  with  national  development  and  defense.    Under  dwifungsi,  the   military  was  supposedly  more  loyal  to  the  citizens  of  Indonesia,  providing  necessary   oversight  and  organization  as  needed.    As  Colonel  Sukowati  explained  in  the  1960s  “the  TNI     44     is  the  army  of  the  people,  it  comes  from  the  common  people  and  always  lives  in  the   environment  of  the  people”  (Elson  2008,  237).    This  meant  that  what  was  best  for  society  at   large  was  also  best  for  the  military.         President  Suharto  elevated  the  role  of  the  military  in  Indonesian  politics  because  he   believed  that  the  military  was  essential  to  maintaining  his  government  and  providing   political  legitimacy.    Mandatory  instruction  of  basic  military  discipline,  territorial  defense,   and  general  tactics  were  codified  into  the  public  education  system.    This  was  further   emphasized  through  the  organization  of  the  national  police  as  part  of  the  military.    Until  the   separation  of  the  police  force,  the  two  components  were  essentially  indistinguishable.83     The  military  was  assigned  responsibility  for  safeguarding  territorial  integrity  against  both   external  and  internal  threats,  while  the  police,  or  polri,  was  charged  with  enforcing  law  and   order  domestically.84    This  organization  structure  would  remain  until  1999,  when  the   police  and  military  were  formally  separated  as  part  of  the  reform  process.85           Indonesia  was  remarkably  stable  during  Suharto’s  New  Order  government,  and  the   territorial  command  system  and  the  political  power  of  the  military  through  dwifungsi   contributed  to  this  stability.    While  some  individuals  acted  in  their  personal  self-­‐interest,   many  military  commanders  supported  and  developed  projects  that  benefited  the  local                                                                                                                   83  This  is  actually  a  common  practice.    For  example,  the  Philippine  Constabulary  was  part  of  the  Ministry  of   Defense  until  1991,  five  years  after  the  EDSA  I  revolution  and  removal  of  President  Marcos.   84  See,  for  example,  A.  Hasnan  Habib,  Lt.  General  (Ret),  “The  Role  of  the  Armed  Forces  in  Indonesia’s  Future   Political  Development”  from  Harold  Crouch  and  Hal  Hill,  eds.  Indonesia  Assessment  1992:  Political  Perspectives   on  the  1990s  (Canberra:  Australian  National  University,  1992),  84.   85  When  the  police  force  was  separated  from  the  Armed  Forces,  the  military  changed  its  name  from  ABRI  to   TNI.     45     community.86    Indonesia’s  economy  grew,  averaging  more  than  seven  percent  growth  per   year  during  the  1970s  and  more  than  four  percent  yearly  growth  in  the  1980s.       Consolidating  power  under  Suharto’s  New  Order  involved  removing  political   challengers.    Suharto  did  this  by  replacing  his  political  opponents  with  loyal  military   officers.    Suharto  himself  remained  on  active  duty  for  most  of  the  1970s  and  the  military   culture  of  respecting  senior  officers  empowered  him  to  oversee  personnel  assignments.87     Suharto  further  rewarded  military  allies  with  key  positions  that  “offered  the  opportunity   for  financial  advantage,  either  through  corruption  or  indirectly  through  privileged  access”     (Cribb  2000,  172).    These  additional  streams  of  revenue  compensated  for  the  paucity  of   funds  available  through  the  national  budget,  and  rewarded  Suharto’s  most  ardent   supporters.       Interestingly,  because  of  the  military’s  new  social-­‐political  responsibilities,   members  of  the  military  were  not  allowed  to  vote  -­‐  so  that  there  would  never  be  any   dissention  within  the  military.88    The  military  was  instead  handsomely  compensated  with   automatic  seats  in  parliament.    While  the  armed  forces  constituted  less  than  one-­‐half   percent  of  the  total  population  of  Indonesia,  the  president  was  allowed  to  appoint  twenty   percent  of  the  members  of  Parliament.89    This  ensured  that  Suharto  would  always  have  a   strong  block  that  unconditionally  supported  him  in  parliament;  the  military  would  retain   this  privilege  until  2004,  six  years  into  the  Reformasi  period.                                                                                                                   86  See,  for  example,  Herbert  Feith  “Part  Three:  Indonesia”  from  George  McTurnan  Kahin  (editor),  Governments   and  Politics  of  Southeast  Asia.  (Ithaca,  N.Y.:  Cornell  University  Press,  1964),  263.   87  Suharto  retired  from  the  military  in  1978  after  he  was  “re-­‐elected”  to  his  third  presidential  term.   88  Bilveer  Singh,  Dwifungsi  ABRI:  The  Dual  Function  of  the  Indonesian  Armed  Forces  (Singapore:  Singapore   Institute  of  International  Affairs,  1995),  55-­‐56.    Members  of  the  military  and  police  are  still  not  allowed  to   vote  for  the  same  reason.   89  The  extreme  disproportional  representation  had  many  critics,  including  some  senior  military  officers  such   as  General  A.H.  Nasution  and  Sri  Bintang.    Many  of  the  critical  officers  believed  that  the  military  should  have  a   purely  professional  and  technical  role.                 46       Through  dwifungsi  and  the  territorial  command  system,  the  military  cemented  its   political  role  during  the  1980s  and  1990s.    Indonesia  did  not  face  any  external  threats   during  the  1970s,  1980s,  and  1990s,  so  the  military  gravitated  towards  its  social-­‐political   role.      Some  military  officers  were  so  involved  in  domestic  politics  they  behaved  more  like   politicians  than  soldiers.90    According  to  research  and  interviews  by  Harold  Maynard  and   Ian  MacFarling,  many  officers  believed  that  the  military  added  value  to  Indonesian  society,   especially  in  the  rural  communities,  in  a  way  the  civilian  government  was  not  willing  or   capable  to  do  because  of  limited  resources  or  personnel.91    These  civil  service  projects   included  building  or  improving  roads,  irrigation  systems,  retaining  walls,  and  public   buildings.         Conclusion     In  Western-­‐style  democracy,  military  participation  in  politics  is  illegitimate.    During   the  New  Order,  military  policy  legitimized  the  Indonesian  military’s  activities,  viewing  the   military’s  social  and  political  roles  as  provided  a  stabilizing  force  in  Indonesia.    The  military   saw  its  role  as  analogous  to  a  drummer  in  a  band,  constantly  beating  and  keeping  rhythm   in  order  for  the  country  to  keep  pace  as  it  continued  to  develop.    The  Indonesian  military   viewed  itself  as  providing  a  service,  not  exploiting  an  entitlement.    Nevertheless,  the  degree   of  military  involvement  in  domestic  politics  was  staggering,  as  catalogued  by  authors  such   as  Harold  Crouch,  Damien  Kingsbury,  and  Ulf  Sundhausen.92    Harold  Crouch  has  argued                                                                                                                   90  See  Ian  MacFarling  1996,  chapter  8.   91  Ibid,  162-­‐166.   92  See,  for  example,  Harold  Crouch,  The  Army  and  Politics  in  Indonesia  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press,  1978),   Damien  Kingsbury,  The  Politics  of  Indonesia  (Melbourne:  Oxford  University  Press,  1998),  and  Ulf   Sundhaussen,  The  Road  to  Power:  Indonesian  Military  Politics,  1945-­1967  (Kuala  Lumpur:  Oxford  University   Press,  1982).         47     that  after  the  1971  elections  two-­‐thirds  of  these  positions  were  filled  by  military  officers,   and  according  to  Indonesian  scholar  Marcus  Mietzner,  the  percentage  increased  to  80   percent  within  the  decade.93                   Under  the  New  Order  regime,  the  Indonesian  military  completed  it  transition  from  a   revolutionary  vanguard  to  a  full  time  political  actor.    The  military  was  widely  dispersed   across  the  country  in  the  territorial  command  system,  and  Dwifungsi  empowered  the   military’s  active,  direct  involvement  in  local  politics,  business,  and  other  activities.    The   original  purpose  of  the  territorial  command  system  was  to  give  the  military  the  ability  to   engage  in  military  operations  anywhere  in  the  country  and  to  finance  the  military  through   natural  resource  extraction.94    Yet  as  the  military’s  power  and  authority  grew  in  this  period,   so  did  its  overt  political  and  economic  involvement.    Towards  the  end  of  the  New  Order,  the   began  to  reduce  its  involvement  in  politics  –  a  self-­‐preserving  reaction  to  the  growing   unpopularity  of  Suharto  and  his  children’s  unabashed  greed  –  but  the  military  remained     the  backbone  of  Suharto’s  regime.    This  political  dominance,  and  the  territorial  command   structure  that  enabled  it,  became  impossible  to  ignore  under  a  democratic  regime,  and   became  a  central  focus  for  military  reform  in  the  Reformasi  period.                                                                                                                   93  See,  for  examples,  Crouch  1978,  244  or  Mietzner  2009,  59.   94  See  Agus  Widjojo,  “Security  Sector  Reform  and  the  Territorial  Command”  in  Beni  Sukadis  Almanac   Indonesia  2007,  Security  Sector  Reform  (Jakarta:  LESPERSSI,  2007),  120-­‐121.     48     Chapter  3:  The  Indonesian  Military  during  Reformasi  (1998-­2004)     The  Fall  of  Suharto  and  the  Beginning  of  Transition     Only  months  after  he  was  reelected  to  his  sixth  term  in  1998,  President  Suharto’s   administration  came  to  a  sudden,  unexpected  end.    The  year  prior,  events  in  another   country  were  set  in  motion  that  would  prove  to  be  unrecoverable  for  Suharto’s  regime.     Investors  in  Thailand  were  overextended  and  unable  to  pay  off  their  debts.    International   investors  worried  about  the  region’s  economic  stability  and  began  to  pull  their   investments,  negatively  affecting  the  currencies  and  economies  of  every  country  in   Southeast  Asia,  starting  what  is  now  called  the  Asian  Financial  Crisis.95         The  legitimacy  of  Suharto’s  government  was  tied  to  national  economic  performance.     As  long  as  the  economy  was  prosperous  and  the  standard  of  living  was  rising,  most   Indonesians  were  willing  to  tolerate  having  fewer  political  rights  and  living  in  an   authoritarian  regime.    Suharto’s  government  was  not  built  on  ideology,  religion,  or  military   strength.    It  was  built  on  money,  and  it  took  a  money  problem  to  topple  it.     Suharto  failed  to  implement  International  Monetary  Fund  requirements,  and  his   administration  received  incessant  criticism  for  its  economic  policies.96    This  resulted  in   Indonesia’s  currency  losing  eighty  percent  of  its  value  and  extremely  high  levels  of                                                                                                                   95  In  his  book  Suharto,  author  R.E.  Elson  reports  that  many  commentators  thought  Indonesia’s  economic   fundamentals  were  sound  in  the  1990s.    Ross  H.  McLeod  disagrees  and  described  Indonesia’s  economic   situation  as  a  “disaster  waiting  to  happen”  despite  a  decade  of  sustained  growth  and  over  $11  billion  in  a   government  nest  egg.    McLeod  speculates  that  the  financial  crisis  would  have  happened  eventually  regardless   of  the  devaluation  of  the  Thai  baht  because  of  deficiencies  in  its  macroeconomic  policy.    For  more,  see  Ross  H.   McLeod,  “Indonesia”  in  East  Asia  in  Crisis  (New  York:  Routledge,  1998).    The  quote  in  this  footnote  is  from   page  35.       96  For  further  information,  see  McLeod  1998,  31-­‐47,  Cribb  2000,  188,  or  Vickers  2005,  200-­‐204.     49     unemployment.97    The  confluence  of  Suharto’s  weakening  health  (he  was  seventy-­‐six  years   old  and  had  a  stroke  in  December  1997),  his  unpopular  political  moves  in  the  March  1998   election,  the  excessive  greed  of  Suharto’s  children  in  a  time  of  national  economic  crisis,  and   an  unfortunate  El  Nino  drought  that  caused  a  nation-­‐wide  food  shortage,  created  a  tipping   point.         This  abundance  of  problems  added  to  the  public’s  growing  dissatisfaction  with  the   government  and  manifested  itself  in  student-­‐led  protests.    Although  peaceful  at  first,  the   protests  quickly  turned  into  violent  riots  after  members  of  the  army  or  police  (it  has  never   been  determined,  and  at  the  time  they  were  consolidated  under  one  centralized  military   command)  shot  and  killed  four  student  protesters  at  Trisakti  University,  a  respected   private  university  in  downtown  Jakarta,  on  12  May.    Anti-­‐Suharto  sentiment  fueled  by  an   increasingly  frustrated  population  (twenty  million  were  estimated  to  be  unemployed  and   up  to  seventy  percent  of  the  country  was  living  in  poverty  because  of  the  drastic  fall  of  the   rupiah)  grew  and  overtook  the  city.98    In  the  following  days,  the  rioting  and  widespread   looting  in  Jakarta  resulted  in  over  1200  Indonesians  killed  and  thousands  wounded  (ethnic   Chinese  Indonesians  were  specifically  targeted).    Later  in  the  week,  thousands  of  student   protesters  occupied  the  parliament  building  in  Jakarta  and  their  protests  became  the   subject  of  international  media  attention.99                                                                                                                       97  See  McLeod  1998,  42.    Between  July  1997  and  January  1998,  the  rupiah’s  value  fell  from  Rp  2,430/$1  to  Rp   17,000/$1.   98  See  Dewi  Fortuna  Anwar,  “The  Habibie  Presidency”  in  Geoff  Forrester,  ed,  Post-­Soeharto  Indonesia:  Renewal   or  Chaos?  (Leiden:  KITLV  Press,  1999),  37.   99  Terence  Lee  comments  in  “The  Military’s  Corporate  Interests”  (Armed  Forces  &  Society.    vol.  34,  no.  3,  2008)   that  the  military  under  the  command  of  General  Wiranto  “were  consistently  conciliatory  to  the  student   protestors  from  February  to  May  1998”  and  that  “members  of  the  military  officers’  wives  club  were  also  seen   distributing  food  and  snacks  to  the  student  protestors.”    The  quotes  are  from  page  655.     50       In  a  short  span  of  a  few  days,  Suharto,  who  feared  being  replaced  and  had  never   bothered  to  groom  a  successor,  realized  he  had  lost  his  legitimacy  and  his  ability  to  rule   was  no  longer  tenable.100    Early  in  the  morning  on  21  May  1998  at  the  Merdeka  Palace,   dressed  in  a  dark  suit  and  without  any  trace  of  emotion,  he  read  a  short  statement  in  which   he  apologized  for  his  mistakes.    Then  in  front  of  vice-­‐president  Bacharuddin  Jusuf  (B.J.)   Habibie,  senior  military  officers  and  members  of  the  Supreme  Court,  he  announced  his   resignation.    Just  like  that,  at  nine  in  the  morning  on  21  May  1998,  Suharto’s  thirty  two-­‐ year-­‐rule  as  President  of  Indonesia  and  one  of  the  world’s  longest  military  governments   was  over.       B.J.  Habibie,  who  had  been  elected  vice  president  only  two  months  previously,   assumed  the  presidency  in  accordance  with  the  normal  transfer  of  executive  powers  under   the  Indonesian  constitution.    This  may  have  been  Suharto’s  final  gift  to  the  military.    By   allowing  a  peaceful,  constitutional  transfer  of  authority  instead  of  resisting  by  declaring   martial  law  and  certain  further  violence  by  the  hands  of  the  military,  Suharto  essentially   protected  the  military  from  doing  further  harm  to  itself  in  the  eyes  of  the  general   population.    Suharto’s  decision  to  just  let  go  prevented  a  total  regime  collapse  such  as  the   recent  Arab  Revolution  examples  in  Egypt,  Libya,  and  Tunisia.       President  Habibie  faced  immediate  criticism.    He  was  widely  unpopular  and  not   trusted,  viewed  by  many  as  a  puppet  of  Suharto.    Unable  to  escape  the  previous   administration’s  ties  to  Indonesia’s  worst  economic  crisis  in  thirty  years,  many  observers                                                                                                                   100  See  R.E.  Elson,  Suharto:  A  Political  Biography  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2001),  292.     Sometime  between  8  and  11  pm  on  20  May  Suharto  realized  that  his  32-­‐year  rule  was  coming  to  a  crashing   halt.    Suharto’s  half-­‐brother  Probosutejo  was  with  him  then  and  reported  Suharto  succinctly  lamenting  “Well,   that’s  it,  then.”    Some  scholars  believe  Suharto  was  grooming  his  oldest  daughter  Siti  Hardiyanti  “Tutut”   Rukamana  as  a  possible  successor,  but  her  political  career  was  only  just  beginning  in  the  1990s.       51     believed  that  his  administration  would  be  short  lived.101    One  of  Habibie’s  first  intentions  as   president  was  military  reform.102    He  immediately  began  to  distance  himself  from  Suharto’s   more  unpopular  domestic  policies,  which  focused  on  the  Dwifungsi  doctrine  and  Suharto’s   familial  network  of  business  partners.103       During  the  tumultuous  two-­‐week  period  in  mid-­‐May  1998  of  violent  public  outrage   and  Suharto’s  resignation,  the  military  was  caught  in  a  difficult  position.    Would  the  senior   military  leaders  remain  loyal  and  support  their  president  and  supreme  commander,   possible  going  down  with  the  proverbial  sinking  ship?    Or  would  they  return  to  their   historic  roots  of  serving  in  an  army  “of  and  for  the  people”?    Were  the  current  events  a  test   of  character  or  another  chance  to  rescue  the  country?     These  competing  choices  again  uncovered  factionalism  within  the  ranks  of  the   military.    The  two  sides  are  best  represented  by  a  power  struggle  rivalry  between  two   senior  officers,  General  Wiranto,  the  military’s  commander-­‐in-­‐chief  personally  selected  by   Suharto,  and  Lieutenant  General  Prabowo,  Suharto’s  ambitious  yet  impulsive  son-­‐in-­‐law   whom  Suharto  had  already  rapidly  advanced  through  the  ranks  to  the  position  of                                                                                                                   101  See  Adrian  Vickers,  A  History  of  Modern  Indonesia  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2005),  207.     Vickers  notes  that  many  officials  never  bothered  to  print  new  photographs  of  President  Habibie  once  he   assumed  office,  choosing  instead  to  apply  white  out  over  the  word  vice  on  his  official  photograph  expecting   that  he  would  be  out  of  office  soon.   102  B.J.  Habibie  started  his  professional  career  as  an  aircraft  engineer  and  aeronautical  researcher  and  became   a  leader  in  technological  and  economic  development.    It  is  worth  noting  that  he  does  not  come  from  a  military   background  unlike  the  previous  vice  presidents  since  the  end  of  Adam  Malik’s  term  in  1983,  however  he  had   served  as  the  research  and  technology  minister  under  Suharto  for  two  decades.    Among  his  most  notable   reform  issues  included  allowing  free  press,  agreeing  to  presidential  term  limits,  allowing  the  special   referendum  for  East  Timor’s  independence,  and  holding  Indonesia’s  first  free  general  election  in  1998,  in   which  he  lost  to  Abdurrahman  Wahid  (also  known  as  Gus  Dur).           103  See,  for  examples,  Research  Institute  for  Peace  and  Security,  Asian  security:  1999-­2000,  (Tokyo:  Research   Institute  for  Peace  and  Security,  2000),  109-­‐110.    Listed  are  some  of  President  Habibie’s  “De-­‐Suhartoization”   policies  such  as  releasing  some  political  prisoners,  allowing  the  formation  of  labor  unions,  easing  restrictions   on  the  media,  and  speeding  up  the  ratification  process  for  human  rights  treaties.     52     commander  of  KOSTRAD.104    Prabowo,  with  grand  aspirations  including  becoming  the  next   military  commander-­‐in-­‐chief,  desperately  wanted  to  seize  power  and  prestige  amidst  the   chaos.  105    He  wanted  emergency  authority  and  to  use  his  KOSTRAD  forces  to  restore  order   in  Jakarta.    General  Wiranto  was  more  reserved  and  calculating,  willing  to  let  the  situation   develop.    He  resisted  the  urge  to  use  the  military  against  popular  demand  any  more  than   was  absolutely  necessary.106    While  publically  not  taking  an  opinion  and  downplaying  the   statements  of  other  key  political  leaders,  Wiranto  was  hedging  his  bets  and  had  an   agreement  with  B.J.  Habibie  in  which  they  would  mutually  support  each  other  in  a  post-­‐ Suharto  administration.       Despite  this  divide  at  the  very  top,  the  military  as  an  institution  held  together  and   weathered  the  May  riots  and  political  storm,  however  it  did  not  escape  unscathed.    The   public’s  voice  was  louder  and  stronger  and  the  move  towards  military  reform  had  already   begun.    During  the  New  Order  regime,  the  Indonesian  military  had  established  a  violent   reputation  and  was  accused  of  numerous  human  rights  violations.107    After  the  fall  of                                                                                                                   104  These,  of  course,  were  not  the  only  two  senior  officers  taking  sides.    In  April  1998  Chief  of  Staff  of  Socio-­‐ Political  Affairs  and  future  President  Yudhoyono  and  Generals  Agus  Widjojo  and  Agus  Wirahadikusumah   agreed  with  General  Wiranto  that  Suharto’s  presidency  was  short-­‐lived.    Other  generals  like  Hartono  and   Feisal  Tanjung  agreed  with  Prabowo  and  wanted  Suharto  to  declare  martial  law.     105  See  Emmerson  1999,  306-­‐312.    Prabowo  has  continued  is  political  ambitions.    He  finished  as  runner-­‐up  for   the  Golkar  party’s  presidential  candidate  to  Wiranto  in  2004,  ran  as  Megawati’s  Vice-­‐President  in  her   unsuccessful  2009  election  finishing  second  with  over  thirty-­‐nine  percent  of  the  popular  vote  to  the   incumbent,  President  Yuhoyono.    Prabowo  has  announced  his  intension  to  run  in  the  2014  Presidential   election  and  is  backed  by  his  business  partner  and  brother  Hashim  Djojohadikusumo.    Hashim  is  an  oil  tycoon   whom  Forbes  Magazine  lists  as  Indonesia’s  32nd  most  wealthy  man  in  2011,  with  a  net  worth  close  to  $800   million  (see  “Indonesia’s  40  Richest”,  accessed  September  28,  2012,   http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/80/indonesia-­‐billionaires-­‐11_rank.html).     106  There  exists  interesting  speculation  about  Wiranto  and  Prabowo’s  actions  in  the  mid-­‐May  Jakarta  riots,   especially  while  Suharto  was  abroad  at  a  conference  in  Cairo.    One  argument  is  that  Prabowo  and  his  supports   initiated  or  at  least  allowed  the  violence  in  Jakarta  to  continue  in  hopes  that  Wiranto  would  receive  the  blame.     Another  is  that  Wiranto  specifically  did  not  want  the  military  to  be  explicitly  involved  to  avoid  another   Trisakti  University  event.    It  also  may  have  been  the  case  that  the  security  forces  were  caught  unprepared  and   not  equipped  to  safely  handle  the  mass  of  violence,  rioting,  and  looting.       107  Most  Indonesians  were  not  aware  of  the  severity  of  violence  occurring  within  their  own  country.    So   controlled  was  the  public  relations  message,  many  Indonesian’s  formed  their  opinion  about  the  brutal     53     Suharto,  the  depth  and  severity  of  the  violations  were  further  publicized,  as  more  and  more   cases  of  abuse  were  disclosed.    As  the  new  reports  about  past  abuses  of  power  and  human   rights  violations  emerged,  the  military’s  reputation,  especially  the  army’s,  was  at  an  all-­‐ time  low.108    The  fall  of  Suharto  proved  to  be  the  tipping  point  after  which  the  military   reform  movement  could  not  be  reversed.       Reforms  Under  the  Habibie  and  Wahid  Presidencies:  The  New  Paradigm  and   Reformasi       To  better  comprehend  military  reform  during  the  Reformasi  movement  and  chart  its   progress  and  shortcomings,  it  is  best  to  view  the  next  few  years  of  Indonesia’s  recent   history  chronologically  by  administration.    Since  President  Suharto,  there  have  been  four   presidents  that  have  each  affected  the  military  reform  process  in  a  different,  often   inconsistent  way.    What  will  be  clear  after  a  review  of  this  period  is  that  military  reform  in   Indonesia  closely  reflects  political  reform  and  the  intensity  of  military  reform  is  inversely   related  to  the  strength  of  the  civilian  leaders.    While  many  changes  have  occurred,  with   varying  levels  of  success,  some  institutional  legacies  such  as  the  territorial  command   structure  remain  essentially  untouched.               What  will  also  be  evident  is  that  the  cleavages  among  the  military’s  elite  during  the   change  in  government  did  not  weaken  the  military  as  an  institution.    In  fact,  in  the  early   years  of  reformasi,  the  military  was  still  one  of  the  stronger  sectors  of  government  and  was   able  to  actively  shape  its  own  reform  path.    Evidence  of  this  is  how  most  of  the  senior                                                                                                                   military  practices  from  foreign  media.    The  was  especially  true  after  images  from  the  1991  Santa  Cruz   Massacre  in  Dili,  East  Timor  were  smuggled  out  of  the  country  and  quickly  became  an  international  headline   story.    See  also  Sukma  and  Prasetyono  2003,  21.   108  The  military’s  reputational  nadir  would  be  the  following  year  after  its  ruthless  role  in  East  Timor  reached   international  attention.     54     military  leaders  from  the  days  of  Suharto  stayed  in  positions  of  power  within  the  military.     Relieving  outspoken  generals  like  Prabowo  seemed  to  soften  the  public’s  distrust  and   anger  towards  the  military,  which  in  turn  prevented  sweeping  clean-­‐house  personnel   changes.     Under  the  New  Order  regime  the  military  evolved  in  order  to  satisfy  its  own   institutional  interests,  which  chiefly  comprised  of  making  money  and  staying  in  power.109     By  the  1980s  the  generation  of  officers  from  the  independence  revolution  had  reached   retirement  age  and  many  had  already  transitioned  to  more  lucrative  professions,  including   politics.    The  younger  cohorts  of  officers  out  of  the  military  academy  were  less  idealistic   and  quickly  integrated  into  Suharto’s  patronage  network,  considering  personal  financial   perks  and  incentives  an  entitlement.110    It  may  be  said  that  many  of  these  officers  were   businessmen  in  uniform.       The  military’s  ideology  under  Suharto  was  Machiavellian  in  that  priority  was  based   on  outcomes,  not  techniques.    Results  were  all  that  mattered,  and  the  means  by  which  they   were  achieved  were  only  valued  by  their  speed  and  degree  of  difficulty  to  perform.    The   government  controlled  the  press,  and  therefore  also  its  message  and  what  was  reported.     The  judicial  system  was  weak,  and  the  military  was  able  to  act  with  impunity  as  it  deemed   fit.    While  the  military  was  clearly  subordinate  to  Suharto,  it  was  only  in  a  system   resembling  a  military  chain  of  command.    In  the  past  decisions  were  made  unilaterally   without  regard  for  public  opinion.    It  justified  its  need  of  autonomy  from  civilian  authority                                                                                                                   109  Some  critics  have  called  this  perception  the  Army’s  third  function,  or  “trifungsi.”   110  Harold  Crouch,  Political  Reform  in  Indonesia  After  Soeharto,  (Singapore:  ISEAS  Publishing,  2010),  130.     55     because  of  a  constant  internal  security  threat  and  need  to  maintain  national  integrity,  and   no  civilian  power  had  the  ability  to  contest  this.111             The  bottom-­‐up  student-­‐led  movement  to  replace  Suharto  sent  a  signal  that   Indonesia  was  clearly  primed  for  change.    President  Habibie  fully  embraced  the  Reformasi   movement,  knowing  that  his  political  survival  depended  on  tangible  change,  and  even  tried   to  take  credit  for  spearheading  the  reform  initiative.    Habibie  started  to  view  his   administration  as  a  transitional  government  in  a  critical  period  of  Indonesia.    Habibie  had   to  deconstruct  the  very  political  power  structure  that  placed  him  in  power,  and  eliminating   the  political  role  of  the  military  was  paramount  to  successful  democratic  reform.    Reform   became  his  platform,  and  this  included  overseeing  an  overhaul  of  the  military.    The   following  chart  summarizes  some  of  the  major  issues  of  the  Indonesian  military  requiring   reform  at  the  beginning  of  Habibie’s  presidency.112           President  Habibie  inherited  a  military  that  was  used  to  being  a  political  instrument   and  having  an  active  role  in  politics.    For  example,  as  noted  in  the  above  chart,  seventy-­‐five   of  the  500  seats  in  Parliament  were  uncontested  and  reserved  for  the  military  (this  number   was  reduced  to  thirty  eight  in  the  1999  election  and  to  zero  in  2004).113    This  alone  gave   the  military  a  fifteen  percent  share  of  Parliament,  and  since  they  tended  to  vote  in   solidarity  made  them  a  considerable  voice  in  all  legislative  matters,  often  legitimizing   Suharto’s  agenda.    Interestingly,  members  of  the  Indonesian  military  and  police  were  then                                                                                                                     111  Edward  Schneier,  "Reformasi  and  the  Indonesian  'War  on  Terror':  State,  Military  and  Legislative-­‐Executive   Relations  in  an  Emerging  Democracy"  The  Journal  of  Legislative  Studies  no.  15  (2009):  294.   112  The  issues  are  selected  by  the  author,  while  goal  is  that  of  the  Indonesian  government.      This  chart  is  based   on  specific  areas  within  the  Indonesian  military  that  fit  into  broad  concepts  of  military  reform  theory.    See   Cottey  et  al,  “The  Second  Generation  Problematic:  Rethinking  Democracy  and  Civil-­‐Military  Relations”  (Armed   Forces  &  Society,  vol.  29  no.  1,  Fall  2002)  and  Mietzner  2006.       113  At  this  time  the  police  force  was  still  part  of  the  military.       56     Table  4   Issue   Discussion   Goal     Military’s  Presence  in   Seventy-­‐five  of  the  500  seats  (15%)  in  Parliament  were   -­‐Remove  the  military  from  non-­‐defense  and  security   Government   uncontested  and  reserved  for  the  military.    The  Dwifungsi   doctrine  thrust  the  military  into  politics.   related  responsibilities   -­‐Remove  the  military’s  un-­‐elected  presence  in  the   legislative  branch.   -­‐Remove  the  undemocratic  nature  of  military   leaders   Civil-­‐Military  Relations   Habitually  the  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  of  the  military  was   and  Civilian   also  the  Minister  of  Defense  and  reported  directly  to  the     -­‐Divide  the  position  into  two  with  the  chief  of  the   military  subordinate  to  a  civilian  Minister  of   Supremacy  Over  the   Military   President.    Military  officers  held  key  positions  that  drove   policy  and  regulation  of  the  military.   Defense.   -­‐Create  civilian  positions  within  the  defense   department  with  the  responsibility  to  form  and   enforce  regulations   -­‐Formulate  a  grand  defense  strategy  that  uses  all   External  versus   The  military  is  responsible  for  internal  and  external   elements  of  national  power     -­‐Separate  the  military  and  police  forces.    Place   Internal  Threats   security  and  maintaining  the  integrity  of  the  nation.     domestic  security  under  a  civilian-­‐led  agency  and   unburden  the  military  with  internal  security  issues.   Professionalize  the   Soldiers  are  distracted  with  their  heavy  involvement  in     -­‐Soldiers’  focus  should  be  performing  their  duties   Military   local  politics  and  businesses  and  not  solely  focused  on   defense  operations.   with  integrity,  technical  competence,  and  proficiency   and  abiding  to  the  rule  of  law.     Accountability     The  military’s  respect  for  human  rights  and  rule  of  law  is   highly  suspect.    The  military  judicial  system  had  no   credibility  and  was  completely  ambiguous.    Military   -­‐Place  the  military  under  the  authority  of  civilian   courts  with  the  authority  to  oversee  military   conduct.       commanders  had  the  power  to  decide  if  a  soldier  should  be     punished.    Soldiers  operated  with  impunity  in  regards  to   human  rights  violations,  corruption,  and  general   misconduct.     Budget  and  Funding   Source  Under  the   The  government  does  not  have  full  control  over  the   military’s  budget  and  only  has  cursory  oversight.     -­‐End  the  military’s  involvement  in  businesses  and     cease  off-­‐budget  revenue.   Central  Government   -­‐Create  a  transparent  budget  and  procurement   process.     Territorial  Command   Structure   Overemphasis  on  territorial  commands  gives  the  idea  that   -­‐Dissolve  the  territorial  command  structure  and   internal  threats  are  more  likely  and  dangerous  than   permanently  abolish  the  military’s  socio-­‐political   external  attacks.    Also  allows  off-­‐budget  funding   opportunities  and  influence  in  local  politics.       role.         and  are  still  restricted  from  voting  in  national  elections.114    One  of  the  first  challenges  faced   by  the  new  Indonesian  government  was  how  to  sever  the  political  ties  of  the  armed  forces.                                                                                                                     114  See,  for  example,  Bawono  Kumoro,  “For  the  Sake  of  the  Nation,  Allow  Military  and  Police  to  Cast  Votes.”     Jakarta  Globe,  July  23  2012.    Accessed  October  31,  2012,  http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/commentary/for-­‐ the-­‐sake-­‐of-­‐the-­‐nation-­‐allow-­‐military-­‐and-­‐police-­‐to-­‐cast-­‐votes/531992.    In  this  article,  President  Yudhoyono   said  Indonesia  was  not  ready  for  the  military  to  have  the  right  to  vote  and  worried  that  it  would  lead  to   disunity  within  the  military.    Interestingly,  five  of  the  leading  candidates  to  replace  him  in  the  2014   presidential  election  are  former  senior  military  officers.     57     The  military’s  distinct  role  in  politics  was  now  viewed  as  an  obstacle  to  democracy,  and  its   roles  unrelated  to  security  were  seen  as  needing  to  be  separated  from  civilian  affairs.115     Another  significant  issue  on  the  reform  agenda  was  the  need  for  civilian  supremacy   over  the  military.    The  TNI  commander-­‐in-­‐chief  was  influential  and  drove  military  policy.     He  only  had  to  answer  to  the  President.    Habitually,  he  also  served  as  the  Minister  of   Defense  and  Security  and  was  responsible  for  the  internal  and  external  security  of  the   entire  country,  as  well  as  for  nominating  individuals  for  senior  positions.116    Civilian   leadership  within  the  defense  ministry  was  almost  non-­‐existent,  and  active  duty  officers   between  field  commands  held  most  bureaucratic  positions.    The  lack  of  civilian  defense   experts  is  troubling  in  that  it  is  difficult  to  articulate  the  problems  and  advance  a  national   debate  about  military  reform.    Furthermore,  the  military  did  not  have  a  grand  defense   strategy  or  a  specific,  overarching  guidance  for  defense  that  would  direct  the  resources  of   the  military  toward  a  unified  objective  nested  within  other  elements  of  national  power.     Military’s  perform  best  when  operating  under  clear  guidance  and  a  mission  statement.               Part  of  the  need  for  reform  is  to  shape  the  military  into  a  professional  organization.     This  includes  turning  the  military  into  a  force  that  is  not  involved  in  politics  or  economics.     The  freedom  from  civilian  authority  of  the  Indonesian  military  is  obtained  from  its   separate,  off-­‐budget  revenue.    Maintaining  its  independent  business  activities  also  takes   time  and  energy  away  from  the  military  training  and  performing  their  primary  mission.    It   also  means  turning  the  military  into  a  competent  fighting  force  with  resources  to  train   soldiers  and  focus  on  protecting  its  borders.    The  promotion  system  should  move  towards  a                                                                                                                   115  Rizal  Sukma  and  Edy  Prasetyono,  “Working  Paper  9:  Security  Sector  Reform  in  Indonesia:  The  Military  and   Police”  (Netherlands  Institute  for  International  Relations,  2003),  21.   116  For  example,  this  would  loosely  translate  to  the  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  also  serving  as  the   Secretary  of  Defense  in  the  United  States  and  all  the  service  secretaries  also  being  active  duty  officers.     58     meritocracy,  based  on  technical  and  tactical  potential,  competence,  and  abiding  by  a   warrior  ethos  based  on  a  system  of  values,  combat  skills,  and  codes  of  conduct.     Striving  for  professionalism  is  different  from  seeking  to  modernize,  but  the  two  may   overlap.    Serviceable  equipment  is  needed  for  a  military  to  do  its  job.    For  example,   Indonesia’s  navy  must  defend  one  of  the  world’s  longest  of  coastlines  and  six  million  square   miles  of  water  with  only  117  ships,  of  which  only  thirty  percent  are  actually  seaworthy.117     Likewise,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  maintain  currency  for  elite  and  airborne  units  when   less  than  half  the  airlift  airplanes  required  for  training  are  operational.    The  question  thus   becomes,  if  the  soldiers,  sailors,  and  airmen  cannot  perform  their  duties  because  they  do   not  have  the  equipment  to  do  so,  what  do  they  do  instead?         A  military  with  advanced  equipment  requires  specialization  and  dedication.     Advanced  weapon  systems  are  most  effective  when  supplementing  an  advanced  strategy.     Integrating  battle  systems  aid  in  the  command  and  control  element  of  warfare.    Operating   on  a  professional  level  requires  constant  training  and  development  of  standard  operating   procedures  and  lessons  learned  form  tactics,  techniques,  and  procedures  (TTPs),  leaving   little  time  for  non-­‐operational  activities,  especially  politics  or  running  a  business.     One  of  Habibie’s  biggest  military  reform  challenges  was  that  for  years  Indonesia’s   military  had  institutional  autonomy  and  was  not  subordinate  to  civilian  leaders.118    Military   leaders  were  aware  of  their  unpopularity  after  Suharto  and  initiated  a  form  of  damage                                                                                                                   117  See  Sebastian  2006,  240.    See  also  figure  4  in  chapter  4.    Of  the  117  ships  in  the  Indonesian  navy,  two  are   submarines  and  forty-­‐four  are  tankers  or  other  support  ships.    Considering  Indonesia’s  vast  waters  and   maritime  borders  with  six  countries,  this  is  hardly  ideal  for  security  operations.    Most  military  funding   provided  by  the  United  States  is  towards  creating  a  network  of  remote  radar  sites  to  secure  and  over  watch   the  maritime  border.    Recent  1206  funds  have  mostly  been  used  in  northern  Sulawesi  and  Northern  Sumatra   oriented  on  the  Straights  of  Malacca.   118  David  Pion-­‐Berlin  defined  this  as  “the  military’s  professional  independence  and  exclusivity.”    See  David   Pion-­‐Berlin,  "Military  Autonomy  and  Emerging  Democracies  in  South  America"  Comparative  Politics  no.  25   (1992):  84.     59     control.    Military  reform  after  the  Suharto’s  presidency  began  from  within  the  military.    As   a  way  to  restore  their  reputation  and  avoid  a  larger  public  outcry,  they  wanted  to  be   publically  seen  as  making  progress  in  reform  while  giving  up  as  little  actual  power  as   possible.    Thus,  the  military  and  not  orders  from  the  president  or  legislation  from   parliament,  was  the  pioneer  of  military  reform,  even  if  it  was  for  an  altruistic  purpose.     President  Habibie  and  the  military  had  a  mutually  supportive  relationship.    The   military  needed  Habibie’s  support  to  give  it  credibility  in  a  post-­‐authoritarian  era.    Habibie   needed  the  military’s  support,  both  in  helping  maintain  security  while  he  focused  on  social   and  political  issues  and  in  thwarting  individuals  from  undermining  his  programs.    However   the  military,  with  most  of  the  senior  leadership  still  intact,  maintained  its  influence  within   Habibie’s  administration  and  was  able  to  guide  its  own  reform  from  within,  keeping  the   certain  issues  like  reforming  the  territory  command  system  off  the  agenda.    Habibie  was   content  with  steady  progress  and  not  willing  to  overstep  his  means  and  risk  losing  the   support  and  political  safety  net  the  military  provided.     At  a  military  seminar  in  September  1998,  leaders  developed  a  “New  Paradigm”   which  formally  changed  the  direction  of  the  military  and  ended  the  Dwifungsi  doctrine.     This  plan,  supported  by  the  equable  then-­‐Chief  of  Staff  for  Social  and  Political  Affairs  Susilo   Bambang  Yudhoyono  (commonly  known  as  SBY),  provided  formal  guidance  to  the   Indonesian  military  and  called  for  it  to  express  its  influence  indirectly  rather  than  directly.     The  “New  Paradigm”  was  based  on  four  principles:  (1)  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  military  to   be  at  the  forefront  of  politics,  (2)  the  military  no  longer  seeks  to  ‘occupy’  positions  in  the   state  but  would  only  ‘influence’  government  decisions,  (3)  the  method  of  influence  would   be  indirect  instead  of  direct,  and  (4)  the  military  would  act  upon  the  principle  of  role     60     sharing  with  other  national  components.  119    The  Dwifungsi  doctrine  was  officially   abandoned  in  2000,  marking  a  new  chapter  for  the  military.    Notably  absent  is  any  mention   of  reforming  the  territorial  command  structure.    The  military  was  is  not  yet  willing  to   concede  its  political  and  economic  activity  outside  of  the  Jakarta  spotlight.120     Habibie  successfully  implemented  many  reforms,  such  as  widening  the  freedom  of   the  press  and  overseeing  new  general  elections  with  multiple  political  parties  participating.     One  of  his  most  surprising  decisions  was  occurred  in  1999  when  he  opened  Pandora’s  box   by  announcing  that  he  would  allow  East  Timor  to  hold  a  referendum  for  independence  on   11  March  1999.121    Despite  his  attempt  at  reform,  Habibie  was  unable  to  sufficiently  shake   his  associations  with  the  New  Order  regime  and  lost  the  1999  presidential  election  to   Abdurrahman  Wahid  (known  by  his  nickname  Gus  Dur).         On  20  October  1999,  Wahid  became  Indonesia’s  fourth  president,  and  the  third  in   eighteen  months.122    Wahid  desperately  wanted  to  continue  with  military  reform  and  filled   his  cabinet  with  many  senior  military  officers,  including  General  Wiranto  as  Minister  of   Politics,  Social,  and  Security,  General  Yudhoyono  as  Minister  of  Mines  and  Energy,  General   Suryadi  as  Minister  of  Home  Affairs,  and  General  Agum  Gumelar  as  Minister  of   Transportation.    Wahid’s  appointment  to  cabinet  level  positions  of  military  generals,  even                                                                                                                   119  See  Sukma  and  Prasetyono  2003,  22  or  Mietzner  2006,  11.     120  See  R.G.  Layador,  "Indonesia  and  the  Military  at  the  Crossroads"  INDONESIAN  QUARTERLY,  no.  27  (1999):   216.   121  President  Habibie  believed  the  occupation  of  East  Timor  was  too  taxing  on  the  Indonesian  military  and   causing  too  much  negative  international  attention.    This  came  at  a  complete  surprise,  he  had  not  consulted  his   own  cabinet  or  the  military  prior  to  making  the  official  announcement.  The  referendum,  sponsored  by  the   United  Nations,  took  place  on  30  August  1999.    Turn  out  was  extremely  high  with  98.5  percent  of  eligible   voters  participating  and  78.5  percent  voting  for  independence.    See,  for  example,  Douglas  Kammen,  “The   Trouble  with  Normal:  The  Indonesian  Military,  Paramilitaries,  and  the  Final  Solution  in  East  Timor”  in   Benedict  Anderson,  ed.,  Violence  and  the  State  of  Suharto’s  Indonesia  (Ithaca:  Cornell  Southeast  Asia  Program   Publications,  2001).   122  Wahid  was  elected  president  by  MPR,  the  legislative  branch  of  the  Indonesian  government.    He  received   373  votes,  narrowly  beating  Megawati.    The  day  following  his  victory,  with  a  political  conciliatory  move,  he   supported  Megawati  as  she  was  elected  vice-­‐president.       61     those  who  were  willing  to  continue  military  reform,  highlights  the  point  that  there  were   few  qualified  civilian  leaders  capable  of  serving  in  these  top  level  positions.      Wahid  took  office  a  month  after  the  East  Timor  referendum  and  the  violent   response  from  some  army  units  and  supported  militias.    The  international  attention   spawned  from  the  violence  and  human  rights  violations  in  East  Timor  brought  the   military’s  reputation  to  an  all-­‐time  low.    Riding  this  momentum  with  many  pro-­‐reform   senior  military  officers  in  his  administration,  and  his  own  unbridled  optimism,  Wahid  set   off  on  an  aggressive  goal  to  completely  subjugate  the  military  under  civilian  authority,  end   its  political  role  and  links  to  business  and  illegal  activities,  and  dismantle  the  territorial   command  structure.123     Wahid  wanted  swift,  far-­‐reaching  reform.    After  his  election,  Wahid  appointed   Juwono  Sudarsono,  the  first  civilian  in  50  years,  to  serve  as  the  Minister  of  Defense,  and   began  cleaning  house  by  removing  officers  that  still  had  questionable  loyalties  to  Suharto’s   New  Order  military.124    This  was  the  first  time  since  the  Department  of  Defense  was  created   in  1945  that  the  position  of  Minister  of  Defense  and  Commander  of  the  military  was  split   into  two  separate  appointments.125    Wahid  mandated  all  non-­‐military  positions  in   government  to  be  filled  by  civilians,  requiring  military  officers  selected  to  fill  those   positions  to  retire  from  active  duty.    After  removing  Wiranto  as  the  leader  of  the  TNI,   Wahid  promoted  navy  Admiral  Widodo  Adi  Sutjipto  to  the  highest  military  post.    This                                                                                                                   123  See,  for  example,  Kingsbury  2002,  100.   124  Juwono  Sudarsono  would  serve  as  Minister  of  Defense  twice,  first  from  1999-­‐2000  and  later  for   Yudhoyono’s  entire  first  term  from  2004-­‐2009.    He  is  a  well-­‐respected  academic  and  taught  at  the  University   of  Indonesia  and  Columbia  University  prior  to  public  service.    He  was  also  Megawati’s  Ambassador  to  the   United  Kingdom.   125  See  Kusnanto  Anggoro,  “The  Department  of  Defense  of  the  Republic  of  Indonesia  Ineffective  Civilian   Control”  in  Beni  Sukadis  (ed)  Almanac  Indonesia  2007:  Security  Sector  Reform,  (Jakarta:  LESPERSSI,  2007),  5-­‐ 6.     62     action  was  significant  at  the  time  because  it  started  the  informal  policy  of  rotating  the   position  between  the  three  major  services.126    He  also  promoted  the  heterodox  General   Agus  Wirahadikusumah,  an  opinionated  military  reformer  and  one  of  the  most  outspoken   military  reformers  in  the  early  2000s,  to  command  KOSTRAD.127    Supported  by  president   Wahid,  the  brazen  idealist  General  Wirahadikusumah  was  almost  successful  in   implementing  a  pilot  project  that  would  have  removed  the  lowest  levels  (KOREM  and   below)  of  the  territorial  command  system  in  selected  urban  areas  with  the  ultimate  goal  of   completely  liquidating  the  military’s  territorial  structure.128    Military  reformers  like   General  Wirahadikusumah  believe  that  adherence  to  the  territorial  system  signaled  failure   to  adjust  to  the  global  strategic  environment  and  adapting  to  the  security  needs  of  modern   times.129     However  political  differences  with  parliament  distracted  president  Wahid  and   created  space  for  conservative  military  officers  to  stall  the  changes.    Their  argument  was   that  the  territorial  command  system  is  “an  indivisible  feature  of  the  TNI  and  must  remain   unchanged  because  it  is  a  historic  and  permanent  feature  of  the  Indonesian  Army”  (Widjojo   2007,  123).    Part  of  the  reason  it  is  an  indivisible  feature  is  due  to  the  lack  of  sufficient  and   modern  weapon  systems  and  military  equipment  to  deal  with  external  threats  in  a                                                                                                                   126  The  three  services  are  the  army,  navy,  and  air  force.    In  the  past,  an  army  general  always  held  this  position.   127  General  Agus  Wirahadikusumah  is  a  member  of  Indonesia’s  military  class  of  1973  (the  same  graduating   class  as  current  president  Yudhoyono)  and  studied  at  Harvard  University.    He  is  the  nephew  of  Umar   Wirahadikusumah,  a  soldier  in  PETA,  adjutant  to  General  Nasution,  and  the  fourth  vice-­‐president  of  Indonesia   from  1983-­‐1988.   128  See  Benedict  Anderson,  et  al,  "Changes  in  civil-­‐military  relations  since  the  fall  of  Suharto"  (Indonesia  no.  70   (2000):  135  or  Mietzner  2006,  20-­‐22.   129  See  Usman  Hamid  and  Syaiful  Haq,  “TNI  Reform:  No  More  Business  as  Usual”  The  Jakarta  Post,  October  17,   2008.    Accessed  September  28,  2012,  http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/10/17/tni-­‐reform-­‐no-­‐ more-­‐business-­‐usual.html.     63     conventional  manner  and  protect  Indonesia’s  territorial  integrity.    Hence  they  must  rely  on   the  territorial  concept  of  defense.130     In  hindsight,  the  problem  with  Wahid  and  Wirahadikusumah’s  rapid,  big-­‐bang,   wide-­‐reaching  reform  may  have  been  their  over-­‐eagerness,  which  over-­‐stretched  their   reach.    While  highly  intelligent  and  idealistic,  neither  was  a  man  of  prowess  with  the   necessary  tact  or  loyal  following  that  was  required  to  push  the  reform  through  the   numerous  pockets  of  resistance.    Wahid  and  Wirahadikusumah  lacked  the  charisma  to   motivate  the  neutral  block  into  following  them.         Many  conservative  officers  felt  that  military  reform  to  date  was  sufficient.    Wahid’s   reform  proposals  were  a  direct  threat  to  the  livelihood  of  many  officers  who  were   comfortable,  living  of  the  dividends  from  existing  patronizing  networks.    Wahid’s  rapid   whole-­‐scale  reform  did  not  allow  time  for  the  required  cultural  shift  within  the  military.     For  his  reform  to  take  root,  he  needed  an  effective  social  marketing  campaign  to  gain   support  and  convince  reluctant  officers  that  this  was  in  fact  the  right  direction  in  which  to   proceed.    In  the  short  period  of  time  that  he  had  given  himself,  Wahid  was  not  strong   enough  to  force  his  way  through,  and  could  not  produce  a  sufficient  incentive  that  was   worth  the  old  guard  giving  up  the  traditional  roles  and  benefits.    Furthermore,  the   aggressive,  intense  pace  of  Wirahadikusumah’s  reforms  caused  immediate  pushback  within   the  military  and  became  a  threat  to  the  cohesion  and  integrity  of  the  military.    Many   conservative  officers  did  not  want  to  reform  and  did  not  like  the  direction   Wirahadikusumah  was  taking  the  military.    Growing  pockets  of  unrest  and  dissent  were                                                                                                                   130  Imanuddin  Razak,  “TNI  Reforms:  Between  Expectation  and  Reality”  The  Jakarta  Post,  April  1,  2004.     Accessed  September  28,  2012,  http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/04/01/tni-­‐reforms-­‐between-­‐ expectation-­‐and-­‐reality.html.     64     threatening  to  undermine  the  military  chain  of  command.    While  Wirahadikusumah  style   might  work  in  other  situations  or  at  other  times,  the  Indonesian  military  was  collectively   not  ready  to  absorb  such  a  shock  to  its  established  system.     A  combination  of  political  miscalculations  and  entrenched  resistance  to  change  on   the  part  of  conservative  military  officers  prevented  Wahid  form  implementing  his  reform   initiatives.    Conflicts  with  parliament  diverted  Wahid’s  attention  and  weakened  his  support   base.    With  the  lack  of  unity  among  the  civilian  government’s  leadership,  the  military  was   able  to  stall  reform  projects.         In  2000  Wahid  became  more  politically  erratic  and  irrational.    A  contributing  factor   to  was  the  lack  of  support  from  the  conservative  sections  of  the  military.    Tensions  between   Wahid  and  parliament  grew  irreversible,  and  in  February  2001  the  process  to  impeach  him   began.    In  a  final  act  of  desperation,  Wahid  wanted  to  declare  a  state  of  emergency,  but  had   already  lost  the  support  of  the  military,  which  refused  his  request.    Ironically,  Wahid  gave   the  military  a  convenient  exit  strategy  it  desperately  needed  without  having  to  damage  its   reputation.    Now,  instead  of  being  seen  as  opposing  reform  because  of  their  own  self-­‐ interest,  the  military  would  be  seen  as  protecting  the  democratic  process.    The  military’s   inaction  in  supporting  Wahid’s  unpopular  demands  was  also  spun  through  public  relations   to  highlight  the  New  Paradigm’s  doctrine  of  political  party  neutrality.             While  the  military  at  large  was  generally  unsympathetic  towards  president  Wahid,   his  opponents  were  still  soliciting  its  support.    Again  the  military  was  at  the  center  of   attention,  only  this  time  it  was  seen  as  the  calming,  stabilizing  force.             Vice  President  Megawati  was  also  a  beneficiary  of  Wahid’s  fall  from  popularity.     Although  she  remained  loyal  to  Wahid  longer  than  most,  she  was  careful  not  to  closely     65     associate  with  the  increasingly  unpopular  president.    On  23  July  2001,  the  parliament  voted   unanimously  to  remove  Wahid,  and  Megawati  became  Indonesia’s  fifth  president.    Thus   Wahid,  an  unabashed  champion  of  rapid  reform  who  was  able  to  clearly  articulate  his   military  reform  objectives,  witnessed  his  administration  fizzle  and  then  collapse  prior  to   implementing  most  of  his  military  reforms.       The  Megawati  Administration:  The  End  of  Reformasi?         Megawati  ascended  to  the  presidency  after  a  year  of  political  turmoil  and  division   between  her  predecessor  and  the  parliament  and  she  inherited  a  military  that  was  growing   in  strength  relative  to  the  civilian  government  because  of  the  ongoing  political  tension.     Megawati  seemed  apathetic  towards  military  reform,  mindful  of  the  role  of  the  military  in   Wahid’s  forced  exit  from  office.    Almost  immediately  after  she  became  president,  she  had  to   deal  with  new  security  issues  that  were  beyond  her  control  and  would  greatly  affect  the   direction  and  degree  of  military  reform.    Two  new  security  issues  in  Indonesia  trumped  the   torpid  military  reform  movement  during  her  administration  and  resulted  in  the  stalling   and  even  regression  in  many  of  Habibie  and  Wahid’s  initiatives.             The  first  issue  arose  less  than  two  months  after  she  became  president  when  the   world  changed  with  the  September  11th  terrorist  attacks  in  the  United  States.131    The  next   year,  terrorism  reached  Indonesia  with  the  12  October  2002  Bali  night-­‐club  bombings,                                                                                                                   131  On  20  September  2001,  Megawati  was  in  Washington  D.C.  on  a  preplanned  trip.    She  was  the  first  head  of   state  from  a  majority  Muslim  country  to  visit  the  U.S.  and  condemn  the  attacks  after  September  11th.       66     followed  by  a  bombing  at  the  Marriot  Hotel  in  Jakarta  in  2003  and  further  bombings  at  the   Australian  embassy  on  9  September  2003.132       The  combination  of  these  events,  especially  the  public  anxiety  caused  by  terrorist   activities  within  its  own  boarders,  changed  the  focus  of  reform.    The  issue  of  security  was   no  longer  theoretical.    Now  it  was  real,  and  for  all  sectors  of  Indonesian  society,  including   the  president,  parliament,  media,  and  the  public.    Megawati’s  response  was  to  include  the   military  in  counterterrorism  units,  augmenting  and  sometimes  leading  police  efforts.     Conservative  officers  in  the  military  that  were  against  reform  were  able  to  capitalize  on  this   and  push  reform  initiatives  aside.    Scholar  Rita  Smith  Kipp  commented  about  this  point,   writing  “at  the  very  least,  the  threats  of  terrorism  and  separatism  have  allowed  the  military   to  resist  overhauling  a  territorial  command  structure”  (Kipp  2004,  68).    The  military  knew   they  were  needed  and  its  new  leadership  was  going  to  exploit  this  as  much  as  possible.         Megawati  did  not  push  back,  supporting  placing  officers  and  civilians  who  were  not   interested  in  immediately  furthering  reform  or  energizing  existing  proposals  to  senior   positions.    For  example,  Megawati  appointed  Matori  Abdul  Djalil,  a  career  politician  with  a   limited  understanding  of  military  issues,  as  Minister  of  Defense.    (Matori  died  while  still  in   office  in  August  2003  and  the  Minister  of  Defense  remained  vacant  until  after  the  October   2004  election  and  the  new  administration  selected  Juwono  Sudarsono  again.)    In  2002   General  Endriartono  Sutarto,  an  advocate  of  the  territorial  command  structure  and  former                                                                                                                   132  The  Bali  bombings  by  members  of  the  terrorist  group  Jemaah  Islamiyah  (JI)  was  a  significant  awakening   moment  and  elicited  a  hasty  response  by  the  Indonesian  government.    Prior  to  this  event  Indonesia  was  not   as  enthusiastic  or  serious  as  other  Southeast  Asian  nations  in  joining  the  U.S.  in  fighting  terrorism,  thinking   the  problem  did  not  affect  them  directly.    After  the  bombings,  Bali  was  now  mentioned  along  with  the  cities   Madrid,  London,  Riyadh,  and  Istanbul  as  victims  of  the  worldwide  reach  of  al-­‐Qaeda’s  ideology.      The   bombings  took  place  in  Kuta,  Bali  at  Paddy’s  Bar  and  the  Sari  Club,  both  popular  and  frequented  by   Westerners.    A  total  of  164  foreigners  and  38  Indonesians  died  and  more  than  300  were  injured.    See,  for   more  information,  Rita  Smith  Kipp,  “Indonesia  in  2003:  Terror’s  Aftermath”  (Asian  Survey,  vol.  44,  no.  1,   2004).     67     commander  of  Suharto’s  presidential  guard,  became  the  commander  of  the  military.    Also,   General  Ryamizard  Ryacudu,  who  opposed  military  reform,  became  the  Army  chief  of  staff   in  2002.     The  second  security  concern  that  plagued  Megawati  was  the  growing  issue  of   separatism  in  Indonesia.    Many  nationalists  felt  East  Timor  had  been  allowed  to  slip  away   in  1999  and  the  military  and  police  were  stretched  thin  dealing  with  the  refugee  crisis  in   West  Timor.    Many  politicians  and  citizens  were  still  angry  about  East  Timor’s   independence  and  felt  that  a  precedent  had  been  set  in  which  future  regions  would  also  try   to  break  away.    Separatist  movements  and  a  low-­‐level  insurgency  on  Indonesia’s  eastern   and  western  territorial  extremes  (Papua  and  Aceh  respectively)  were  gaining  momentum   and  becoming  increasingly  violent.    Added  to  this  were  prolonged  vicious  ethnic  clashes  in   the  northern  islands  of  Maluku,  Sulawesi,  and  parts  of  Kalimantan  that  the  police  forces   were  not  able  to  suppress.    Maintaining  territorial  integrity  was  one  issue  upon  which  all   parts  of  the  quarrelling  civilian  government  could  agree.    It  had  always  been  a  paramount   focus  of  the  military,  and  conservative  sections  within  the  top  levels  of  military  leadership   took  advantage  by  dismissing  the  post-­‐Suharto  military  reform  rhetoric  in  order  to   maintain  their  interests.133     For  example,  by  April  2003  negotiations  between  the  Indonesian  government  and   the  Aceh  Freedom  Movement  unraveled  and  the  situation  in  Aceh  worsened.    On  19  May   2003,  Megawati  declared  martial  law  in  Aceh  and,  to  the  delight  of  the  TNI’s  leadership,   delegated  full  authority  to  the  military  to  control  the  situation.    The  military  responded                                                                                                                   133  See  Mietzner  2006,  40-­‐43.     68     with  a  full-­‐scale  military  operation,  sending  a  force  of  45,000  soldiers  and  police  into  the   area.    This  was  the  largest  mobilization  of  the  military  since  it  invaded  East  Timor  in  1975.     The  central  government  in  Jakarta  was  overstretched  and  was  incapable  of   sufficiently  responding  politically  to  control  the  numerous  situations.    The  military’s   answer  was  to  preserve  its  territorial  command  structure  and  its  presence  throughout  the   country,  especially  in  areas  where  the  government  had  little  reach.    Emboldened  by  this,   conservative  Indonesian  military  leaders  suggested  expanding  human  intelligence   collection  through  their  territorial  commands,  a  suggestion  which  was  well  received  by  the   government.134    The  threat  of  international  terrorism  and  shift  towards  cooperation  in  the   name  of  global  security  ended  the  international  pressure  for  Indonesia’s  military  reform.     For  example,  the  United  States  and  Australia  were  quick  to  try  to  resume  their  military   relationships  with  Indonesia.135    In  2003  the  Australian  Special  Airborne  Service  Regiment   resumed  joint  training  missions  with  its  Indonesian  equivalent,  KOPASSUS.    The  United   States  has  also  resumed  training  exercises  with  selected  Indonesian  military  units,  focusing   on  counter-­‐terrorism  tactics,  techniques,  and  procedures.    The  United  Kingdom  helped   Indonesia  with  a  strategic  defense  review,  highlighting  security  threats  and  helping  to   guide  security  sector  reform  and  educate  civilian  defense  officials.    The  German                                                                                                                   134  Paranoia  about  terrorism  on  the  part  of  the  Indonesian  government  is  understandable  and  not  unique.     The  suggestion  to  increase  intelligence  collection  resources  is  not  unlike  the  USA  PATRIOT  Act,  signed  into   law  just  45  days  after  September  11th.               135  The  United  States’  perspective  and  priorities  changed  with  the  new  challenges  of  the  twenty-­‐first  century,   including  the  terrorist  attacks  on  the  United  States  on  11  September  2001  and  the  economic  and  political   emergence  of  China  as  a  regional  power  Security.    Concerns  over  hotspots  such  as  the  Taiwan  Straits,  South   China  Sea,  transnational  terrorist  networks  throughout  Southeast  Asia,  and  desire  to  partner  with  a   moderate,  secular  country  with  a  Muslim-­‐majority  nation  made  Indonesia  an  attractive  security  partner.     American  foreign  policy  has  pivoted  towards  Asia,  and  Indonesia  is  seen  as  a  significant  fulcrum  for  US   strategy,  evidenced  by  Secretary  of  Defense  Leon  Penetta  stating  the  United  States  was  “rebalancing  our   global  posture  and  presence,  emphasizing  the  Pacific  and  the  Middle  East”.    The  quote  is  from  US  Secretary  of   Defense  Leon  E.  Penetta  at  the  Defense  Strategic  Guidance  Briefing  Pentagon  on  5  January  2012.    (News   Transcript  from  the  US  Department  of  Defense,  accessed  April  14,  2012,   http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4953).     69     government  assisted  by  providing  internships  for  civilians  in  the  Ministry  of  Defense  and   conducting  seminars  that  teaches  the  principles  of  democratic  military  reform   management.           In  addition  to  these  security  challenges,  Indonesia  was  also  experiencing  a  stagnant   economy  with  high  unemployment.    Megawati  was  able  to  finish  her  term  and  began   campaigning  for  re-­‐election.    She  had  trouble  connecting  with  voters,  and  her   administration  was  considered  unresponsive  and  was  blamed  for  not  stimulating  economic   growth  or  doing  enough  to  curb  corruption.136    She  ran  in  the  2004  election  held  on  20   September  and  finished  second  with  39.4  percent  of  the  popular  vote  to  Yudhoyono’s  60.6   percent.137    President  Yudhoyono  was  seen  as  more  intellectually  capable  and  honest  than   Megawati,  and  better  suited  to  handle  the  economic  and  security  challenges  facing   Indonesia.     With  the  three  highest  positions  in  her  government  filled  by  men  who  were  either   ineffective  reformers  or  against  reform,  and  domestic  and  international  security  challenges   requiring  military  action  and  political  support,  it  is  not  surprising  Megawati’s   administration  is  seen  as  a  period  in  which  military  reform  stalled.    Maintaining  positive   relations  with  the  military  was  an  insurance  plan  for  Megawati.    In  a  climax  of  political   uncertainty,  pushing  reform  and  potentially  damaging  that  relationship  was  too  high  of  a   cost  for  Megawati.                                                                                                                   136  Public  anger  wasn’t  solely  pinned  on  Megawati.    In  the  elections  for  national  parliament  all  of  five  of  the   big  political  party’s  experienced  a  decrease,  but  the  biggest  loser  was  Megawati’s  Indonesian  Democratic  Part   of  Struggle  (PDI-­‐P).    Also,  seventy-­‐two  percent  of  the  550  member  parliament  were  elected  for  the  first  time.   137  The  2004  elections  were  viewed  as  extremely  successful  by  international  democratic-­‐watch  organizations.   President  Susilo  Bambang  Yudhoyono  had  lengthy  exposure  in  United  States  and  was  a  4-­‐time  graduate  of   U.S.  IMET  programs.    Also  interesting  to  note,  former  General  Wiranto,  who  was  previously  acquitted  for   charges  connected  to  the  1999  violence  in  East  Timor,  finished  third  in  the  first  round  of  presidential   elections  (only  the  top  two  candidates  proceed  to  the  second  round)  with  over  26  million  votes  (twenty-­‐two   percent).    Part  of  his  campaign  included  patriotic  songs  from  his  self-­‐released  CD.     70       The  movement  of  Indonesia’s  military  reform  since  Suharto,  threading  through   three  presidential  administrations,  was  still  a  work  in  progress  by  the  2004  presidential   election.    Indonesia’s  six  years  of  democratic  transition  suggest  how  difficult  it  is  to  create   change,  and  how  ingrained  the  military  is  in  many  facets  of  Indonesian  life.    While  some   clear,  tangible  steps  were  taken  toward  reform  (see  table  4  below),  the  progress  always   underachieved  its  established  benchmarks.    The  sluggish  movement  of  the  reform  agenda   and  enormous  inertia  required  for  many  reform  issues  questioned  the  political  will  and   commitment  of  the  civilian  leaders.    At  this  point,  many  ongoing  reform  issues  were  still   not  to  the  point  that  observers  are  willing  to  acknowledge  even  a  satisfactory  start.138    The   following  table  charts  the  military  reform  effort’s  achievements  and  unreached  goals  in   Indonesia’s  first  six  years  of  post-­‐authoritarianism.                                                                                                                     138  See  for  example,  a  bipartisan  letter  signed  by  forty-­‐five  members  of  the  U.S.  Congress  to  then  Secretary  of   State  Colin  Powell  about  the  failure  of  Indonesia’s  military  to  satisfactorily  provide  budget  transparency  and   enforce  accountability  for  human  rights  violations  and  the  military’s  continued  involvement  in  illegal   activities.    The  complete  letter  may  be  found  at  http://etan.org/news/2004/10housefmf.htm#Congress   (accessed  October  5,  2012).       71     Issue   Military  Presence  in   Government   Civilian  Supremacy  Over  the   Military   Threat  Management  (Internal   versus  External)   Professionalism  of  the  Military   Accountability  versus  Impunity   of  the  Military   Budget  and  Off-­‐budget  Revenue   Territorial  Command  Structure       Table  5     Subcomponent   1.  Removing  unelected  military  members  in  Parliament.     2.  End  military’s  active  role  in  politics.   1.  End  practice  of  active-­‐duty  officers  working  in  civilian   bureaucratic  positions.   2.  Separate  Minister  of  Defense  and  Commander  of  the   military,  appoint  civilian  Minister  of  Defense   3.  Pass  legislation  to  strengthen  Minister  of  Defense.   4.  Remove  active-­‐duty  officers  from  unnecessary  positions   in  central  government,  such  as  the  Minister  of  Interior.   5.  Publish  National  Grand  Defense  Strategy.   1.  Separate  the  Armed  Forces  and  the  Police   2.  Clearly  define  responsibilities  and  roles  for  defense   1.  Re-­‐establish  military-­‐to-­‐military  relations  with     1.  Establish  Supreme  Court  as  superior  to  military  Courts.   2.  Establish  Human  Rights  Courts   3.  Convict  military  members  on  past  human  rights  abuses.   1.  Pass  legislation  specifically  mandating  handling  over   military  businesses   2.  Begin  process  of  handing  over  military  businesses   3.  Provide  adequate  funding  for  defense  budget.   1.  Dismantle  territorial  command  structure.   Progress     1.  Complete.    Reduced  from  seventy-­‐five  to   thirty-­‐eight  in  1999  and  to  zero  in  2004.     2.  Complete.    The  Dwifungsi  doctrine  terminated   in  2000,  replaced  with  New  Paradigm.     1.  Complete,  1998  during  the  Habibie   administration.   2.  Complete,  1999  during  the  Wahid   administration.           3.  Initiated  but  incomplete.   4.  Complete,  under  the  Wahid  administration.     5.  Incomplete,  but  assigned  to  the  Department  of   Defense  in  legislation  passed  in  2002.         1.  Complete,  1999.   2.  Complete,  2000.139         1.  Working  issue,  started  but  not  complete.     1.  Complete,  2004.   2.  Complete,  2000.   3.  Incomplete.     1.    Complete,  2004  Armed  Forces  Act  of  2004   (Law  TNI  34/2004)   2.  Incomplete.   3.  Incomplete.     1.  Incomplete  (initiated  in  mid-­‐2000,  then   abandoned).                                                                                                                     139  In  2000,  parliament  passed  the  second  amendment  to  the  1945  constitution  that  spelled  out  the   differences  between  the  military  and  police.    The  military  was  an  instrument  of  the  state  responsible  for   defense  and  maintaining  national  unity.    The  national  police  was  responsible  for  security  and  public  order.     72     Chapter  4:  Indonesian  Military  Reform  during  the     Yudhoyono  Administration  (2004-­2012)         When  president  Yudhoyono  was  elected  in  2004,  he  began  a  new  series  of  firsts  for   Indonesia.    Yudhoyono  was  the  first  former  military  officer  to  become  president  since   Suharto  and  the  start  of  reformasi.    The  2004  presidential  election  was  also  the  first  time   the  president  was  directly  elected  by  the  public.140    Yudhoyono,  running  under  the  Partai   Demokrat  (Democrat  Party),  received  the  most  votes  in  a  democratic  election  in  the  world   when  he  defeated  Megawati.141    Yudhoyono  was  also  the  first  president  since  Suharto  to   finish  his  term  and  to  win  reelection.142       Continuing  military  reform  was  a  challenge  for  Yudhoyono,  but  his  campaign   centered  on  improving  the  economy.    He  targeted  the  seven  percent  economic  growth  rate   last  seen  under  Suharto,  and  spoke  more  about  reducing  corruption  within  the  government   than  reforming  the  military.       Yudhoyono’s  rise  to  Indonesia’s  highest  office  was  a  personal  success  story.    He   was  born  into  a  middle  class  Javanese  family  on  9  September  1949,  three  months  before                                                                                                                   140  It  is  perhaps  a  bit  of  irony  that  Indonesia’s  first  democratically  elected  president  is  a  former  general.    The   democratic  reform  that  specifically  targeted  ending  the  military’s  role  in  politics,  something  Yudhoyono   supported  as  an  officer,  is  the  very  vehicle  that  delivered  him  into  the  presidency.       141  The  2004  election  in  Indonesia  was  the  first  presidential  election  following  the  2002  Constitutional   amendment  where  the  president  would  be  elected  nationally,  and  the  candidate  with  the  most  national  votes   wins.    Prior  to  this  the  President  was  selected  by  the  parliament.    Yudhoyono  received  over  69,250,00  votes   with  60.6  percent.    Megawati  finished  second,  just  shy  of  45  million  votes  (that  same  year  George  Bush  only   received  62,040,000  votes).    The  Democrat  Party,  based  on  Pancasila,  began  in  2001  and  Yudhoyono  was  a   founding  member.   142  In  the  2009  election,  Yudhoyono  received  73,870,000  votes  in  a  three-­‐way  race.    Megawati  and  her  vice   president  candidate  Prabowo  (the  pair’s  portmanteau  was  Mega-­‐Pro)  finished  second,  receiving  32,500,000   votes  and  Jusuf  Kalla,  Yudhoyono’s  Vice  President  during  his  first  term,  ran  for  the  Golkar  party  and  finished   third  with  just  over  15  million  votes.    The  73  million  votes  Yudhoyono  received  are  more  than  any  other   democratically-­‐elected  world  leader  (Barack  Obama  received  just  over  69,450,000  in  2008).    The  successful   election  and  political  reform  to  date  established  Indonesia  as  the  only  country  in  Southeast  Asia  that  is  now   considered  “fully  free  and  democratic”  by  Freedom  House  (accessed  January  27,  2012,   http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-­‐types/freedom-­‐world).     73     the  Dutch  recognized  Indonesia’s  independence.    He  was  a  good  student  and  excelled  in   academics.    After  finishing  high  school  he  attended  the  Indonesian  armed  forces  academy   and  graduated  in  1973.    His  first  assignment  was  as  a  platoon  leader  in  an  airborne  unit  in   KOSTRAD.     Through  the  U.S.  IMET  program,  he  was  selected  to  attend  the  U.S.  Army  airborne   and  ranger  schools  in  1975  and  the  Infantry  Officer  Advance  Course  in  1981,  all  at  Fort   Benning,  Georgia.    In  1991  he  also  completed  the  Command  and  General  Staff  College,   where  he  took  additional  night  classes  and  finished  a  masters  degree  in  business  from   Webster  University.         Yudhoyono  had  a  very  successful  military  career,  rising  to  the  position  of  Army  Chief   of  Staff.    He  was  a  progressive  thinker  and  one  of  the  first  active  duty  officers  to  talk  about   moderate  military  reform  in  the  early  1990s.    He  was  as  intelligent  as  he  was  charismatic,   and  managed  to  deliver  his  message  in  a  way  that  was  not  overly  aggressive  or  threatening,   and  he  did  not  alienate  himself  from  hard-­‐line  non-­‐reformers.    Yudhoyono  has  a  long   history  as  a  moderate  military  reformer  and  was  adamant  that  military  reform  was   extremely  important  in  Indonesia’s  democratization  and  the  Reformasi  movement.    For   example,  after  the  fall  of  Suharto  he  was  a  leader  at  the  Bandung  conference  and  pushed   the  army’s  doctrinal  change  from  dwifungsi  to  the  New  Paradigm.    Yudhoyono  emphasized   moderate  reform  and  did  not  seize  the  moment  to  try  to  initiate  widespread  changes  the   way  Wirahadikusumah  wanted,  which  would  have  included  changing  the  territorial   command  system.    After  retiring  from  the  military,  Yudhoyono  continued  working  in  high-­‐ profile  positions,  serving  in  Wahid’s  cabinet  as  the  Minister  of  Mining  and  Energy  and   Coordinating  Minister  for  Political  and  Security  Affairs  and  again  in  Megawati’s     74     administration  in  the  same  position  as  the  Minister  for  Political  and  Security  Affairs  before   resigning  to  campaign  against  her.     Known  as  a  fair,  open-­‐minded  individual  (his  nickname  was  “the  thinking  General”   because  of  his  intelligence  and  that  he  did  not  always  give  the  party  line)  and  moderate   reformist  while  serving  in  the  military,  many  reformers  were  optimistic  that  Yudhoyono   would  reenergize  the  military  reform  movement.    In  the  years  since  he  has  been  president,   ardent  reform  observers  have  been  disappointed  in  the  lack  of  progress.    Eager  reformist   have  been  critical  of  and  disappointed  in  Yuhhoyono  because  of  how  few  tangible  military   reform  projects  have  been  achieved  so  far  in  his  administration.    However,  a  thorough   examination  of  Yudhoyono’s  actions  will  show  the  military  has  experienced  a  calculated,   measured  reform  during  his  presidency,  albeit  at  an  unhurried  pace.     The  Wahid  and  Wirahadikusumah  experience  showed  that  changing  the  Indonesian   military  culture  too  quickly  would  be  met  with  great  resistance  and  ultimately,  not  be   successful.    Yudhoyono  addressed  this  through  appointing  qualified,  forward-­‐thinking   officers  to  the  highest  positions  within  the  military.    After  his  first  election,  he  brought  back   Juwono  Sudarsono  as  minister  of  defense  and  retained  General  Endriartono  Sutarto  as  the   military  commander  past  his  mandatory  retirement  in  order  to  maintain  continuity  within   the  armed  forces.    Next,  he  rotated  the  position  to  the  Air  Force  in  2006  when  he  selected   Air  Chief  Marshal  Djoko  Suyanto,  who  unveiled  the  Tri  Dharma  Eka  Putra  (Three  Missions   One  Deed)  doctrine.143    In  2007  he  selected  General  Djoko  Santoso,  who  was  followed  in   2010  by  the  current  commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  Admiral  Agus  Suhartono.                                                                                                                     143  General  Djoko  Santoso  concentrated  on  professionalism  and  made  soldier’s  welfare  and  neutrality  in   politics  a  priority.    Suyanto,  a  fighter  pilot  and  former  territorial  commander,  was  the  first  officer  from  the  Air     75       More  important  than  the  names  of  the  previous  military  Commands-­‐in-­‐Chief  are  two   noticeable  trends.    The  first  is  that  there  was  no  dominant  personality  that  maintained   power  and  office  longer  than  at  the  pleasure  of  the  civilian  leadership,  and  all  had  a  clearly   subordinate  professional  relationship  to  the  president.    The  second  is  the  rotation  of  the   position  between  the  services,  selecting  the  most  qualified  officer  available  instead  of  the   senior  army  officer.    Before  Yudhoyono  (with  the  exception  of  Wahid’s  appointment  of   Admiral  Sutjipto  in  2000)  the  army  has  had  a  traditional  monopoly  on  the  top  leadership   posts  in  the  military.    Including  Navy  and  Air  Force  officers  widens  the  perspective  of  the   military.    As  Yudhoyono  exercised  his  control  over  senior  military  appointments,  he   effectively  prevented  the  more  conservative  officers  from  advancing  into  leadership   positions.    The  regular  rotations  and  changes  in  leadership  also  prevented  cliques  and   nepotistic  consolidations  of  military  influence.    Admiral  Agus  Suhartono,  the  current   Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief,  is  working  hard  to  increase  the  professionalism  of  the  military,   modernize  its  equipment,  and  enthusiastically  supports  military  reform  projects.     The  Tri  Dharma  Eka  Putra  doctrine,  introduced  by  Air  Chief  Marshal  Djoko  Suyanto,   specifies  the  military’s  role  in  defense  and  prohibits  active  involvement  in  politics.     Suyanto,  the  leader  and  senior  officer  of  the  Indonesian  military  in  2007,  confirmed  the   new  direction  of  the  military  stating,  “the  new  doctrine  bans  the  armed  forces  from  active   involvement  in  the  country's  sociopolitical  affairs”  (Soedarjo  2007).     Under  Yudhoyono,  the  professionalism,  modernization,  and  capability  of  the   military  have  steadily  improved.    The  limits  of  the  military’s  capability  were  exposed  a  few   month’s  into  his  administration  following  the  26  December  2004  tsunami  in  Aceh.    An                                                                                                                   Force  to  be  selected  as  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief.    He  also  attended  advanced  military  education  courses  in  the   United  States  and  Australia.    The  three  missions  are  those  of  the  army,  navy,  and  air  force.     76     earthquake  just  off  Sumatra’s  west  coast  measuring  between  9.1  and  9.3  on  the  Richter   scale  caused  a  devastating  tsunami  with  waves  over  thirty  feet  high.144    The  west  coast  of   Aceh,  including  the  large  city  Banda  Aceh,  were  the  hardest  hit,  destroying  80  percent  of   the  region’s  infrastructure  and  leaving  an  estimated  170,000  dead  and  many  more   displaced.145     Indonesia  was  unable  to  immediately  project  its  own  forces  within  its  borders  to   assist  with  disaster  relief  efforts  and  was  forced  to  rely  on  foreign  assistance.    The   Indonesian  Air  Force’s  cargo  and  lift  aircraft,  consisting  of  American-­‐made  C-­‐130  transport   airplanes,  were  crippled  from  years  of  poor  maintenance  due  to  an  inability  to  obtain  spare   parts  because  of  the  sanctions  related  to  the  Indonesian  military’s  past  human  rights   violations.    Operational  readiness  levels  for  its  C-­‐130  and  F-­‐16  airplanes  dropped  below   twenty  percent.146    The  inability  of  the  Indonesian  military  to  respond  to  a  domestic  crisis   and  conduct  internal  humanitarian  assistance  disaster  relief  operations  was  an  eye-­‐ opening  event  for  Indonesia.    In  the  most  recent  Indonesian  Defense  White  Paper,   published  in  2008,  the  military  was  directly  tasked  to  respond  to  natural  disasters  and   provide  humanitarian  aid  within  Indonesia.     Many  foreign  donor  countries,  including  the  United  States,  Australia,  Germany,   South  Korea,  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  recently  re-­‐established  military  relationships   focused  on  military  education  and  counterterrorism.    The  Indonesian-­‐United  States                                                                                                                   144  This  was  the  world’s  third  largest  earthquake  ever  measured  by  a  seismograph  and  the  largest  since  1964.   145  Scott  Baldauf,  “Post-­‐Tsunami  Aceh”  in  Tineke  Hellwig  and  Eric  Tagliacozzo,  eds,  The  Indonesian  Reader   (Durham:  Duke  University  Press,  2009),  440.   146  John  Haseman  and  Eduardo  Lachica,  The  U.S.-­Indonesian  Security  Relationship:  The  Next  Steps  (USINDO:   The  United  States-­‐Indonesian  Society,  January  2009),  37  and  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies,  The   Military  Balance  2010  (Oxfordshire:  Routledge,  2010),  384-­‐385.    The  military  capability  was  also  seen  as  a   victim  of  neglect  after  a  series  of  fatal  aviation  accidents  between  2006-­‐2009.    A  C-­‐130  airplane  that  crashed   in  Magetan  with  more  than  100  fatalities  and  helicopter  crashes  in  Cianjur  and  Bogor  were  attributed  to  poor   maintenance  and  outdated  equipment.     77     military  relationship  has  strengthened  every  year  since  2005.147    For  example,  between   2005  and  2009,  the  United  States  alone  has  contributed  more  than  $35.7  million  through   the  State  Department’s  Foreign  Military  Financing  (FMF)  program  for  Indonesia’s  military   to  modernize  its  equipment.         The  Indonesian  Air  Force  now  has  access  to  repair  parts  and  advanced  maintenance   and  has  increased  its  capability  since  the  Aceh  tsunami.    It  has  also  greatly  improved  its   ability  to  project  its  forces  within  the  archipelago  as  needed.    However,  the  low   serviceability  and  limited  procurement  of  new  equipment  continue  to  affect  the  Indonesian   military.148    While  the  global  war  on  terror  and  the  United  States’  energized  focus  on  Asia   have  headlined  the  improving  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Indonesia,  President   Yudhoyono’s  willingness  and  good-­‐faith  efforts  were  also  contributing  factors.     The  Indonesian  military  has  recognizes  that  it  can  no  longer  operate  above  the  law   and  must  operate  under  humanitarian  principles  in  accordance  with  ethics  and  the   international  law  of  war.149    Article  39  of  the  2004  Law  on  the  Indonesian  national  military   forbids  soldiers  from  becoming  members  of  political  parties  and  participating  in  politics  or   business.150    This  is  an  example  of  the  military’s  larger  focus  to  include  new  experiences   aimed  to  show  both  domestically  and  the  international  community  the  Indonesian  military   in  a  positive  light.    The  Indonesian  army  and  navy  have  recently  participated  in  United   Nations  missions  in  the  Congo,  Darfur,  Georgia,  Lebanon,  and  Liberia.    Yudhoyono’s   commitment  earlier  this  year  to  send  up  to  4,000  soldiers  in  support  of  United  Nation’s                                                                                                                   147  The  United  States  cited  “National  Security  Interests”  as  the  reason  for  lifting  military-­‐aid  sanctions  and   restoring  full  military-­‐to-­‐military  relations.   148  Recent  emphasis  on  new  items  bought  by  the  Indonesian  military  is  on  transportation  vehicles  for  use  in   humanitarian  assistance  and  disaster-­‐relief  operations.       149  See  Andi  Widjajanto,  “Transforming  Indonesia’s  Armed  Forces,”  UNISCI  Discussion  Paper  15,  (2007):  20.   150  See,  for  all  seventy-­‐eight  articles  of  this  law,  Sebastian  2006,  479-­‐501.       78     peacekeeping  missions  in  sub-­‐Sahara  Africa  makes  Indonesian  one  of  the  largest   contributors  in  the  world.    In  a  speech  this  year,  Yudhoyono  outlined  a  goal  for  Indonesia  to   join  the  nine  other  countries  in  the  world  that  contribute  at  least  10,000  service  members   to  international  peacekeeping  missions.151             In  2009,  Yudhoyono  inaugurated  the  Indonesian  Defense  University  (Univertas   Pertahanan  Indonesia).    The  goal  of  the  University  is  to  instruct  civilian  and  military   students  on  areas  of  national  security  such  as  modern  warfare,  military  strategy,  defense   budget  management,  weapons  procurement,  and  defense  policy.    The  University’s  goal  is  to   increase  professionalism  through  creating  security  experts,  ultimately  reducing  the   military  stronghold  that  influencing  defense  policy.152    Many  observers  hope  that  this  will   contribute  to  a  demilitarizing  of  the  national  government,  especially  in  the  Department  of   Defense,  which  still  has  a  large  amount  of  military  personnel  and  influence.    The  Defense   University  is  the  first  of  its  kind  in  Indonesia  and  only  the  third  in  Southeast  Asia.     Indonesia  joins  Singapore  and  Malaysia  as  the  only  ASEAN  countries  with  a  graduate-­‐level   university  to  educate  civilian  and  soldiers  together  on  defense  and  security  issues.       Yudhoyono  has  also  spearheaded  the  construction  of  the  Indonesian  Peace  and   Security  Center  (IPSC)  in  Sentul,  West  Java  (nineteen  miles  southwest  of  Jakarta).    The   center  will  train  soldiers  in  counterterrorism,  disaster  management,  and  peacekeeping   operations  as  well  as  teach  foreign  languages  and  appreciation  for  foreign  cultures.    The                                                                                                                   151  See  Jakarta  Globe,  “Indonesia  to  send  4,000  Troops,  Helicopters  to  UN  Peacekeeping  Missions”  March  20,   2012  (accessed  online  on  12  October  2012  at  http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/indonesia-­‐to-­‐send-­‐ 4000-­‐troops-­‐helicopters-­‐to-­‐un-­‐peacekeeping-­‐missions/506100).   152  See,  for  example,  the  Indonesia  Defense  University’s  official  website  at  http://idu.ac.id/.     79     center  is  still  under  construction,  but  was  inaugurated  by  Yudhoyono  in  January  2012  and   scheduled  to  be  fully  operational  in  2014.153     At  the  national  level,  the  reform  goal  of  civilian  supremacy  over  the  military  is   complete.    Military  leaders  are  now  formally  subordinate  to  civilian  leadership,  but  the  lack   of  funding  to  enforce  significant  change  prevents  the  change  from  permeating  the  lowest   levels  of  society,  especially  in  the  villages  and  regions  far  from  Jakarta’s  grasp  where  the   military  still  has  an  informal  presence.    Organizations  such  as  the  Indonesian  Working   Group  on  Security  Sector  Reform  have  strengthened  military  reform  awareness  among   politicians  and  civilian  government  employees.    However,  the  ingrained  military  culture,   especially  in  the  senior  ranks,  is  still  resistant  to  total  subordination  to  civilian  authority.     Changing  deep-­‐rooted  beliefs  takes  time,  but  as  long  as  the  civilian  government  grows   stronger  relative  to  the  military  on  security  matters  and  applies  constant  pressure  on   reform,  the  next  generation  of  officers  will  not  have  similar  outlooks.                   Indonesia’s  two  Defense  White  Papers,  published  in  2004  and  2008,  are  the  first   attempts  in  crafting  a  total  national  defense  strategy.    The  military  is  still  a  primary  actor,   but  for  the  first  time  it  is  included  with  other  elements  of  national  power  as  part  of  rather   than  leading  a  national  strategy.    The  2008  Defense  White  Paper  identified  additional  areas   of  increasing  concern  and  the  military  received  formal  guidance  to  concentrate  on   operations  other  than  war,  such  as  maritime  security,  humanitarian  assistance  and  disaster   relief,  and  terrorism.                                                                                                                   153  While  the  total  budget  for  constructing  the  IPSC  is  unknown,  Indonesia  has  received  money  for  this   complex  from  foreign  donors.    For  example,  Australia  has  helped  fund  the  language  center  and  the  United   States  has  helped  build  the  barracks.    When  complete,  the  IPSC  will  be  the  largest  United  Nations   peacekeeping  training  facility  in  Southeast  Asia.             80       During  Yudhoyono’s  administration,  the  military  and  police  have  continued  to  work   out  procedures  for  joint  operations,  specifically  in  counterterrorism.    By  charging  the  police   with  the  internal  counterinsurgency  mission,  there  is  considerable  mission  overlap  as  the   police  now  perform  many  roles  that  were  traditionally  done  by  the  military.    For  example,   in  2003  Detachment  88  was  formed  (with  $16  million  in  aid  from  the  United  States)  to  fight   terrorist  groups  with  top-­‐quality  weapons  and  advanced  training.154    While  Detachment  88   is  well  regarded  as  a  professional  unit  and  has  had  success,  it  duplicates  the  military’s   KOPASSUS’s  Unit  81,  whose  mission  is  essentially  the  same.155    The  responsibility  of   intelligence  collection,  especially  at  the  village  level,  is  another  task  the  police  are  taking   over  that  was  traditionally  done  by  the  military.156     While  the  police  are  now  the  primary  agency  for  domestic  security,  the  police  force   continues  to  be  undermanned  and  often  relies  on  the  military  for  support.    In  2008,  there   were  fewer  than  300,000  police  officers,  and  the  police  to  population  ratio  was   approximately  1:815,  over  twice  as  high  as  the  United  Nations  recommended  ratio  of   1:400.    Although  the  force  is  slowly  growing,  it  will  have  to  double  in  size  and  improve  its   effectiveness  before  the  military  is  no  longer  needed  to  supplement  internal  security.    The   present  challenge  for  the  civilian  leaders  is  how  to  implement  the  military’s  transition  role                                                                                                                   154  Detachment  88  is  a  police  force,  although  it  is  equipped  with  US-­‐supplied  military  weapons  such  as  the  M-­‐ 4,  AR-­‐10,  and  Remington  870  shotgun  and  uses  military  tactics  in  its  operations.    When  trained  by  the  US,   instructors  are  mostly  former  US  military  soldiers.    There  is  no  significance  to  its  name.    Some  consider  8  to   be  an  auspicious  number  associated  with  prosperity  and  wealth,  and  others  think  88  is  a  symbol  of  handcuffs.   See,  for  more  information,  Ken  Conboy,  Elite:  The  Special  Forces  of  Indonesia  1950-­2008  (Jakarta:  Equinox,   2008),  141.   155  One  difference  during  the  period  of  United  States  military  sanctions  is  that  KOPASSUS  was  subjected  to  the   military  aid  restrictions  along  with  the  rest  of  the  Indonesian  military,  while  the  police  were  not.   156  The  role  of  the  BABINSA,  a  military  non-­‐commissioned  officer  assigned  to  villages  to  monitor  and  report   on  suspicious  activity  was  reduced  after  the  separation  of  the  police  and  military.    The  BABINSA  is  still  there,   but  now  with  a  limited,  largely  administrative.    See,  for  example,  A’an  Suryana,  “Babinsa  ‘crucial’  to  Help   Stamp  Out  Terrorists”,  The  Jakarta  Press,  October  8,  2005.    Accessed  September  26,  2012,   www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/10/08/babinsa-­‐039crucial039-­‐help-­‐stamp-­‐out-­‐terrorists.html.     81     and  phase  out  its  function  in  domestic  security  as  the  police  gradually  build  capability  and   increase  their  proficiency.157             During  Yudhoyono’s  administration  the  judicial  system  has  also  strengthened.    By   2005,  the  Indonesian  Supreme  Court  had  full  authority  over  military  courts.    However,  the   military  still  has  full  jurisdiction  over  military  crimes  and  according  to  the  Indonesian   Criminal  Code,  there  are  no  guidelines  for  a  military  service  member  to  be  tried  under  a   civilian  court  the  same  way  a  civilian  would  be.158    Legal  accountability  and  human  rights   records  have  been  improving,  but  the  military  still  continues  to  face  allegations  of  human   rights  violations  in  West  Papua.    As  of  2009,  the  Military  Tribunal  Bill  (first  introduced  in   1997)  that  would  require  a  soldier  committing  criminal  acts  to  stand  trial  in  a  civilian  court   has  not  been  passed.     The  biggest  unresolved  military  reform  challenge  to  date  in  Yudhoyono’s  presidency   has  been  providing  adequate  budget  support  for  the  military.    The  military  attempts  to   bridge  this  gap  in  part  with  revenue  from  its  many  off-­‐budget  business  interests.    Military   revenue  from  non-­‐budgeted  means  is  generated  from  three  sources.    The  first  is  legitimate   businesses  owned  and  operated  by  branches  of  the  TNI.    These  include  majority  and   minority  ownership  interests  in  major  corporations,  including  banks,  airlines,  and  a   petroleum  company.159         The  second  source  comes  from  informal  activities,  which  ambiguous  yet  military-­‐ specific  services  the  military  provides.    Many  officers  charge  fees  for  consulting  and  helping                                                                                                                   157  See,  for  example,  International  Crisis  Group,  Indonesia:  Rethinking  Internal  Security  Strategy  (Jakarta:   International  Crisis  Group,  2004).   158  Kusnanto  Anggoro,  “Relative  Autonomy,  Interdependency  and  Change  at  The  Ministry  of  Defense”  in   Sukadis,  Beni,  ed.  Almanac  on  Indonesian  Security  Sector  Reform  2009  (Jakarta:  LESPERSSI,  2009),  27-­‐28.   159  Other  examples,  both  current  and  past,  are  beach  resorts  and  other  hotels,  golf  courses,  oil  refineries,   plantations,  and  sugar  mills.    See,  for  example,  Lowry  1996,  chapter  5  and  Rieffel  and  Pramodhawardani,   2007.     82     businesses  win  contracts  within  their  sphere  of  influence.    Also,  some  unit  commanders   will  negotiate  payments  for  insurance  with  private  compaines,  promising  that  there  will   not  be  any  problems  in  the  future.    These  contracts  most  often  occur  in  remote  areas   outside  of  Java  and  are  extremely  difficult  to  quantify  because  there  are  no  records  or   acknowledgment  that  they  occur.    Payments  usually  go  directly  into  the  commander’s   discretionary  account,  and  it  is  custom  to  spread  the  wealth  around  within  the  unit.160    It   may  be  easy  for  an  outside  observer  to  label  these  actions  as  endemic  corruption.    But  in   doing  so,  the  deeper  problem  is  overlooked,  which  is  that  corruption  is  the  norm.    To  the   individual,  this  is  natural  behavior  and  the  benefits  are  instead  seen  as  entitlements  and   perks  associated  with  the  rank.         Other  examples  of  active  services  include  using  military  equipment  for   transportation  for  a  fee  (most  popular  in  remote  areas  during  harvest  season)  and  security   contracts  with  private  companies,  including  foreign  and  international  firms.161    Passive   informal  activities  generate  revenue  from  leases  on  military  property  or  the   commercialization  of  military  assets  (one  golf  course  outside  Jakarta  on  military  property   is  believed  to  generate  $8  million  a  year).         The  third  and  last  source  of  off-­‐budget  revenue  is  from  illegal  activities.    These   include  a  wide  range  of  activities  including  extortion,  illegal  resource  extraction  (mostly   logging,  mining,  and  sand),  smuggling  (oil  is  the  most  profitable),  illegal  tolls,  and  also                                                                                                                   160  See  Lowry  1996,  140-­‐142  and  Rieffel  and  Pramodhawardani  2007,  22.    Because  of  this  practice,  many   positions  (called  basah,  or  “wet  assignments”)  are  well  known  to  provide  significant  additional  financial   opportunities.    The  military  does  not  have  a  monopoly  on  access  to  off-­‐budget  revenue,  and  basah  positions   started  many  years  before  Indonesia’s  independence.         161  For  a  very  interesting  story  about  the  Indonesian  military  receiving  payment  for  security  services,  see  Jane   Perlez  and  Ramon  Bonner’s  New  York  Times  article  “Below  a  Mountain  of  Wealth,  a  River  of  Waste”,   December  27,  2005.    The  article  states  that  an  American  mining  company  called  Freeport-­‐McMoRan  Copper  &   Gold  paid  the  Indonesian  military  $20  million  between  1998  and  2004.    Accessed  September  7,  2012,   http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/27/international/asia/27gold.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).       83     includes  prostitution,  drugs,  gambling,  and  piracy.    Outside  of  Jakarta  and  away  from  the   reach  of  the  federal  government  and  intense  scrutiny  of  the  media,  the  military  is  able  to   get  away  with  more  unchecked  activity.    Undoubtedly,  Indonesia’s  military’s  territorial   command  structure  creates  the  opportunities  for  most  of  these  off-­‐budget  activities.         However,  while  Indonesia's  military  is  still  consistently  under  funded,  it  has   determined  that  its  soldiers’  involvement  in  economic  activities  weaken  their   professionalism.162    In  an  opinion  piece  in  the  newspaper  The  Jakarta  Post,  then-­‐Defense   Minister  Juwono  Sudarsono  stated,  “the  TNI  has  never  had  a  decent  budget  to  provide   security  and  defense  services”  (Sudarsono  2006).    The  deadlines  set  in  the  legislation  in   2004  to  transfer  military  businesses  to  the  government  have  not  been  implemented  and   the  military  has  been  keen  on  delaying  all  actions  as  long  as  possible.163         Current  Minister  of  Defense  Purnomo  Yusgiantoro  and  President  Yudhoyono  have   worked  on  closing  the  gap  between  the  needs  and  the  means  in  the  defense  budget,  but  the   difference  is  still  great.    The  defense  budget  has  been  increased  to  $5.2  billion  in  2010,  $6.5   billion  in  2011,  and  further  increases  (up  to  1.5  percent  of  GDP)  are  planned  for  2012-­‐ 2014.    However  these  increases  are  still  insufficient  for  the  military’s  personnel,   operational,  and  maintenance  costs.164    The  overall  dearth  of  funding  from  the  central   government  means  the  majority  of  funding  is  supplied  via  non-­‐transparent  off-­‐budget   sources  and  military  businesses.165    For  example,  the  2009  defense  budget  was  Rp  33.6                                                                                                                   162  Andi  Widjajanto,  “Transforming  Indonesia’s  Armed  Forces”  UNISCI  Discussion  Paper  15  (2007):  20.   163  See,  for  example,  Yuliah  Qotimah’s  essay  “The  Presidency  and  Security  Sector  Reform”  in  Beni  Sukadis,  ed.     Almanac  on  Indonesian  Security  Sector  Reform  2009  (Jakarta:  LESPERSSI,  2009).     164  The  military  receives  some  money  from  foreign  donors  for  modern  equipment  and  specific  needs-­‐based   military  education,  but  not  nearly  enough  to  train  and  equip  the  entire  armed  forces.   165  See,  for  example,  Jane’s  Information  Group,  accessed  October  11,  2012,   http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-­‐Sentinel-­‐Security-­‐Assessment-­‐Southeast-­‐Asia/Defence-­‐budget-­‐ Indonesia.html.     84     trillion  (approximately  $3.5  billion).166    While  this  may  seems  like  a  large  figure,  it  was  well   short  of  the  Rp  127  trillion  requested  by  the  Department  of  Defense.    Seventy  percent  of  the   funding  received  by  the  military  was  applied  directly  to  routine  expenditures,  leaving   insufficient  funds  for  planned  and  unplanned  maintenance,  military  education,  training   exercises,  and  weapons  procurement.    Indonesia’s  defense  budget  will  be  discussed  in   greater  detail  in  the  following  section.             Also  in  2009,  the  year  in  which  the  transfer  of  all  off-­‐budget  sources  of  revenue  for   the  military  was  supposed  to  be  complete,  the  estimated  total  value  of  military  business   activities  was  Rp  3.1  trillion  (approximately  $322.9  million).167    This  value  is  a  total  of   twenty-­‐three  foundations,  fifty-­‐three  limited  liability  companies,  and  1098  cooperatives.     The  cooperatives  alone  employ  over  8000  people,  of  whom  3500  are  TNI  personnel.168   Suhartono,  the  current  military  commander,  has  vowed  to  terminate  the  military’s   involvement  in  business  activities,  but  progress  has  been  slow.169    Indonesia  has  started  the   process  of  weaning  itself  off  its  many  off-­‐budget  sources  of  income,  but  the  military  is  far   from  ready  to  be  fully  supported  by  the  government.170                                                                                                                         166  The  exchange  rate  changes  daily.    For  continuity,  the  rate  used  for  all  conversions  from  the  Indonesian   Rupiah  to  the  United  States  dollar  was  1  USD  =  9,600  IDR,  which  was  the  approximate  value  in  December   2009  as  well  as  October  2012.   167  Five  days  before  the  final  day,  set  in  the  2004  Armed  Forces  Act,  in  which  all  business  were  supposed  to  be   handed  over  to  the  government,  president  Yudhoyono  extended  the  date  indefinitely.     168  See,  for  example,  Yuliah  Qotimah’s  essay  “The  Presidency  and  Security  Sector  Reform”  in  Beni  Sukadis,  ed.   Almanac  on  Indonesian  Security  Sector  Reform  2009  (Jakarta:  LESPERSSI,  2009),  17.    See  also  Alexis  Rieffel   and  Jaleswari  Pramodhawardani,  Out  of  Business  and  on  Budget:  the  Challenge  of  Military  Financing  in   Indonesia  (Washington,  D.C.:  United  States-­‐Indonesia  Society,  2007)  on  military  businesses.     169  See,  for  example,  a  Jakarta  Post  article  titled  “New  TNI  commander  vows  to  close  military  businesses”   written  on  September  29,  2010.    Accessed  September  26,  2012,   http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/09/29/new-­‐tni-­‐commander-­‐vows-­‐close-­‐military-­‐ businesses.html.   170  Military  business  is  not  exclusive  to  Indonesia.    Many  communist  countries  militaries,  such  as  China,  Cuba,   and  Vietnam,  have  also  been  very  active  in  the  economic  sector.    Interestingly,  examining  the  experiences  in   China  may  provide  a  successful  solution  for  Indonesia’s  military.    China  successfully  transitioned  thousands  of   military-­‐run  businesses  to  the  central  government.    The  government  aided  the  military  with  corresponding   budget  increases,  which  offset  the  initial  loses.    See,  for  example,  Rieffel  and  Pramodhawardani,  2007.     85       Many  Indonesian  soldiers  make  less  than  $200  a  month  and  are  from  poor   backgrounds.171    Salaries  have  recently  increased  by  as  much  as  forty  percent  between   2009  and  2011,  largely  due  to  Defense  Minister  Yusgiantoro  and  President  Yudhoyono’s   efforts.    However,  low  salaries  are  still  a  hindrance  to  reform  because  soldiers  often  look   outside  their  military  paycheck  to  supplement  their  standard  of  living.    Many  reformers   have  commented  on  this,  including  Widjajanto,  who  opined  in  2008,  that  if  the  military   salaries  are  not  "increased  substantially  it  will  decrease  standards  of  professionalism  and   morale.    It  should  be  the  first  priority  of  the  government  to  increase  soldier  welfare."172     While  increasing  the  salaries  is  certainly  not  the  only  change  that  will  prevent  soldiers  from   seeking  additional  sources  of  income,  a  higher  wage  will  remove  the  incentive  to  pursue   illegal  activities  or  tolerate  such  activity  in  their  unit  and  certainly  silence  the  military’s   excuse  for  participating  in  illegal  and  illicit  business  activities.       In  the  post-­‐Suharto  years,  the  military  has  had  tangible  success  in  reforming  and   completing  many  of  the  first  generation  milestones  transitioning  from  an  authoritarian   regime  to  a  democratic  system.    The  Indonesian  military  is  no  longer  a  significant  actor  in   politics  at  the  national  level.    Institutional  arrangements  for  democratic  control  of  the   armed  forces  have  been  established,  and  are  steadily  growing  in  capability.    The  legislative   branch  of  government  increasingly  provides  oversight  of  the  military,  and  there  is   emerging  civil-­‐society  engagement  on  defense  and  security  issues.173                                                                                                                     171  For  example,  according  to  the  2006  pay  scale,  the  salary  range  for  a  Lieutenant  Colonel,  who  could  expect   to  have  been  in  the  military  for  20  years,  is  between  $2400  and  $3000  a  year.    For  comparison,  the  CIA  World   Factbook,  according  to  2011  figures,  estimates  the  Indonesian  GDP  per  capita  at  $2,328  a  year.   172  Peter  Gelling,  “Reform  keeps  Indonesian  military  in  check”  New  York  Times,  October  28,  2008.    Accessed   October  13,  2012,  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/world/asia/28iht-­‐indo.1.17307298.html?_r=0.   173  See  Mietzner  2009  and  Crouch  2010.     86       However  not  all  critics  were  content  with  the  current  progress  (see  Table  6).     Reformers  such  as  Indonesian  criminologist  and  University  of  Indonesia  professor   Adrianus  Meliala  want  to  see  more  than  words  and  promises.    In  an  interview  in  2007  he   opined  the  “new  doctrine  must  be  carried  out  in  the  field”  and  observed  that  there  were   still  “many  territorial  commands  throughout  the  archipelago  that  involved  members  of  the   military  in  local  security”  instead  of  the  police.174    While  president  Yudhoyono  has   supported  military  reform,  it  has  continued  in  a  piecemeal  approach  and  his  administration   has  yet  to  produce  a  coherent  central  plan  for  future  reform.                                                                                                                   174  Alvin  Darlanika  Soedarjo,  “TNI  Unveils  New  Doctrine:  No  Politics,”  The  Jakarta  Post,  January  25,  2007   Accessed  September  26,  2012,  http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/01/25/tni-­‐unveils-­‐new-­‐ doctrine-­‐no-­‐politics.html.    Both  quotes  are  taken  from  this  article.               87     Table  6     Issue   Subcomponent   Progress     Military  Presence  in   Government   Civilian  Supremacy  Over  the   Military   Threat  Management   (Internal  versus  External   Professionalism  of  the   Military   Accountability  versus   Impunity  of  the  Military   Budget  and  Off-­‐budget   Revenue   Territorial  Command   Structure     1.  Further  distance  the  military  in  government  by   prohibiting  officers  from  an  active  role  in  politics.   1.  Strengthen  politicians  and  civilian  officials   awareness  and  understanding  of  military  reform.     2.  Publish  National  Defense  Strategy.     3.  Give  military  a  clear  mission  statement     1.  Establish  chain  of  command  for  joint   operations,  especially  domestic  counter-­‐ terrorism  missions.   2.  Build  police  force  capable  of  performing   assigned  mission.     1.  Restore  military-­‐to-­‐military  relations,   especially  with  donor  countries.   2.  Provide  graduate-­‐level  defense  education  to   active  duty  and  civilian  officials.     3.  Participate  in  United  Nation  Peacekeeping   operations.     1.  Pass  legislation  requiring  civilian  court   authority  for  criminal  acts  committed  by   soldiers.       1.  Consolidate  and  transfer  military-­‐owned   business  to  government.   2.  Approve  appropriate  defense  budget.     1.  Remove  military’s  political  (unofficial)   influence  at  the  local  level     2.  Disband  territorial  command  system.   1.  Complete,  2007  when  the  military  produced  the  Tri   Dharma  Eka  Putra  (Three  Missions  One  Deed)  doctrine.     1.  Complete,  during  the  Yudhoyono  administration,   through  organizations  such  as  the  Indonesian  Working   Group  on  Security  Reform.   2.  Complete,  2004  and  2008  Defense  White  Paper   released.   3.  Complete,  2004.    The  Military  is  responsible  for   upholding  state  sovereignty,  maintaining  territorial   integrity,  and  protecting  Indonesia  from  threats  and   disturbances.       1.  Working  issue.  Incomplete  but  not  prohibitive  to  other   reform  issues.   2.  Incomplete.    The  Indonesian  police  force  is  under   strength.       1.  Complete  and  improving.           2.  Complete,  2009  (Univertas  Pertahanan  Indonesia)     3.  Complete.           1.  Incomplete  but  working.    As  of  2007,  The  Military   Tribunal  Bill  (first  introduced  in  1997)  has  not  been   passed.   1.  Incomplete.    Deadline  for  transfer  of  military  business   extended  indefinitely.           2.  Incomplete.    Budget  is  increasing,  but  remains   insufficient.     1.  Working,  but  incomplete.    Local  elections  in  2005  were   the  first  time  local  politicians  were  elected  by  popular  vote.   Many  officers  ran  as  candidates  in  a  non-­‐active  status,  the   equivalent  of  a  temporary  sabbatical,  to  avoid  directly   violating  the  2004  law  prohibiting  soldier’s  involvement  in   politics.     2.  Incomplete,  no  progress  has  been  made.    After  a  debate   in  Parliament  in  2005,  a  compromise  was  reached  in  which   the  territorial  command  system  would  remain,  but  would   be  stripped  of  all  its  political  functions.175     The  Territorial  Command  System  Debate         The  territorial  command  structure  is  the  center  of  gravity  around  which  the  future   military  reform  in  Indonesia  will  orbit.    To  date,  there  has  been  no  serious  effort  since  Agus   Wirahadikusumah  in  the  Wahid  administration  to  implement  a  restructuring  of  the                                                                                                                   175  Salim  Said  2006,  251-­‐252.     88     territorial  command  system  and  it  remains  the  most  controversial  of  the  reform  topics  not   completed.    Indonesian  scholar  Geoffrey  Robinson  called  it  the  “most  important   institutional  base  of  military  power”  (Robinson  2001,  251).    Its  function,  necessity,  and   even  legitimacy  are  the  subjects  of  great  debate  because  it  includes  the  final  hurdle  of   reform,  and  ultimately  the  acknowledgment  that  the  Indonesian  military  is  truly   subordinate  to  the  central  government.    There  are  strong  differences  of  opinion  and  two   sides  of  the  argument,  which  split  over  the  issues  of  Indonesia’s  current  state  of   development  and  its  fiscal  constraints.    The  territorial  command  system  affords  the   Indonesian  military  wonderful  opportunities,  but  it  also  brings  considerable  baggage.    The   debate  over  the  need  to  reform  revolves  around  the  three  key  issues  of  defense  financing,   security  and  defense  doctrine,  and  government  competence.    Although  the  debate   continues,  no  measures  have  been  taken  to  change  the  territorial  command  system  and  its   reform  status  remains  in  stasis.         The  first  fundamental  yet  unresolved  issue  that  fuels  the  debate  is  the  poor   financing  and  lack  of  transparency  within  the  Indonesian  military.176    President  Yudhoyono   has  admitted  as  much,  remarking,  “the  defense  budget  at  the  moment  is  far  from  adequate   to  build  a  military  capable  of  defending  the  nation  and  carrying  out  other  defense   assignments”  (Qotimah  2009,  18).    By  share  of  gross  domestic  product  and  accounting  for   Indonesia’s  population  and  size,  the  Indonesian  military  is  one  of  the  least  funded  militaries   in  Southeast  Asia.    Using  the  most  current  data  available,  Indonesia’s  defense  budget  in                                                                                                                   176  The  Indonesian  budget,  and  particular  the  military’s  funding,  is  a  great  example  of  the  guns  versus  butter   model,  meaning  that  the  public  is  currently  more  interested  in  domestic  economic  issues  and  less  interested   in  military  issues.    It  is  important  to  be  mindful  that  Yudhoyono  was  elected  foremost  because  he  was  the   candidate  that  was  most  believed  to  be  able  to  improve  the  economy  and  standard  of  living  of  the  population.     However  Indonesia’s  relatively  low  tax  rates  have  been  increasing  every  year  since  2002  at  the  same  time  the   central  government  is  reducing  its  subsidies.    The  national  budget  is  expected  to  continue  to  increase,  and  it  is   reasonable  to  expect  the  defense  budget  to  increase  as  well.         89     2009  was  $14.57  per  citizen  (in  2009  in  Singapore  it  was  $1767.23)  or  $1838  per  square   kilometer  (in  2009  in  Thailand  it  was  $9997).177    See  Figures  2,  3,  and  4,  which  depict  the   defense  budget  relative  to  the  Gross  Domestic  Product,  populations,  and  territory  size  for   the  years  2007-­‐2009  for  selected  Southeast  Asian  countries.178         In  2000,  Defense  Minister  Juwono  Sudarsono  estimated  “over  seventy  percent  of   our  defense  spending  are  accrued  from  off-­‐budget  sources”  (Mietzner  2010,  213).    Two   years  later  in  2002,  International  Crisis  Group  estimated  the  same,  stating  that  only  thirty   percent  of  the  military’s  revenue  comes  out  of  Jakarta  via  the  official  budget.179    Sudarsono   stated  this  same  figure  again  in  2004  (although  he  admitted  someone  else  did  the  math).180     Since  its  inception,  the  territorial  command  system’s  design  has  been  to  tap  into  any   available  economic  resource  to  pay  for  the  army’s  operational  and  administrative  costs.181     It  is  worth  noting  that  the  Habibie  and  Megawati  administrations  never  attempted  to   address  military  businesses  as  part  of  their  reform  agenda.                                                                                                                       177  The  statistics  for  computing  the  cost  per  square  kilometer  are  based  only  on  the  country’s  land  size  and  do   not  reflect  the  additional  responsibilities  of  maritime  security  for  the  archipelagic  countries.    In  Leonard   Sebastian’s  book  Realpolitik  Ideology,  he  estimates  that  Indonesia  has  an  additional  6  million  square  miles.    If   that  area  is  included,  Indonesia’s  would  be  $200.63  per  square  kilometer.           178  Data  for  each  country’s  defense  budget  and  GDP  for  the  charts  was  taken  from  International  Institute  for   Strategic  Studies,  The  Military  Balance  2010  (Oxfordshire:  Routledge,  2010).    Malyasia’s  Defense  Budget  for   2009  is  uncertain  and  an  estimation  was  used  at  the  time  of  publishing.    The  statistics  used  for  population  and   area  for  each  country  is  taken  from  the  CIA  World  Factbook,  accessed  online  at   https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/.    Indonesia’s  defense  spending  percentage   relative  to  its  GDP  was  .82,  .67,  and  .62  respectively  for  2007,  2008,  and  2009.   179  See  Biddle  2002,  3.   180  See  Lowry  1996,  134-­‐146,  Sebastian  et  al  2011,  18  or  Rieffel  and  Pramodhawardani,  2007,  50-­‐53,  or   Widjajanto  2007,  31.    While  writing  before  the  seventy  percent  figure  became  the  public  perception,  Lowry   argues  the  highly  believed  percentage  of  off-­‐budget  revenue  is  a  misnomer  because  profit  is  often  linked  to   specific  individuals  and  not  units  or  the  aggregate  military.    Rieffel  and  Pramodhawardani  argue  that  while   military  business  is  pervasive,  this  figure  is  also  likely  too  high  and  does  not  accurately  represent  the  net   profits  of  military  businesses,  which  they  estimate  to  be  much  less,  between  $27  and  $73  million.    Widjajanto   estimates  it  to  be  between  $60  and  $120  million,  or  less  than  five  percent  of  annual  defense  spending.  One   takeaway  is  clear:  the  process  is  not  transparent  and  the  true  figures  are  not  feasible  to  obtain.   181  Mietzner  2010,  49.     90   $  US     Figure  2   180   160   140   120   100   2007   80   2008   60   2009   40   20   0   Indonesia   Malaysia   Philippines   Thailand   Vietnam   Defense  Budget  per  capita                   Source:  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies.  2010.  The  Military  Balance  2010.     (Oxfordshire:  Routledge),  394-­‐433.                            The  insufficient  funding  of  the  military  by  the  national  government  is  the  leading   public  reason  why  a  majority  of  the  military’s  senior  officers  want  to  maintain  the  status   quo  of  the  territorial  command  system.    The  system’s  economic  benefits  literally  provide   the  necessary  funds  in  order  to  keep  the  military  operational.    Unofficially,  many  in  the   military  desire  A  private  desire  to  keep  the  status  quo  is  that  the  off-­‐budget  revenue   enables  the  continuation  of  military-­‐run  businesses  and  easy  access  to  local  resources,   infrastructure,  and  customers.    In  a  perversion  of  military  culture  over  time,  many  senior   officers  in  Indonesia  consider  kickbacks  and  personal  reward  as  an  entitlement.    They  do   not  think  of  it  as  corruption  or  stealing,  but  rather  as  an  additional  benefit  of  attaining  a  key     91     Figure  3   Vietnam   Thailand   Philippines   Malaysia   Indonesia   2009   2008   2007   0.0%   0.5%   1.0%   1.5%   2.0%   2.5%   3.0%   3.5%   4.0%   4.5%   Defense  Budget  as  a  percentage  of  GDP    Source:  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies.  2010.  The  Military  Balance  2010.     (Oxfordshire:  Routledge),  394-­‐433.         14000   Figure  4   12000   10000   $  US     8000   6000   4000   2000   2007   2008   2009   0   Indonesia   Malaysia   Philippines   Thailand   Defense  Budget  per  square  kilomter   Vietnam     Source:  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies.  2010.  The  Military  Balance  2010.     (Oxfordshire:  Routledge),  394-­‐433.     position  or  senior  rank.    In  addition,  lower-­‐ranking  officers  also  see  it  as  a  future  reward.         This  observation  is  nothing  new.    In  a  1961  speech  to  army  officers,  General   Nasution  acknowledged  the  presence  of  corruption  amongst  senior  officers.182    However,                                                                                                                   182  Nasution  1964,  34.    General  Nasution  was  perhaps  a  bit  optimistic,  remarking  that  although  the  reports  of   corruption  may  be  true,  only  one  in  500  officers  are  excessively  benefitting  from  their  financial  involvement.         92     some  scholars  think  the  level  of  corruption  is  exaggerated,  or  at  least  overestimated,   because  many  officers  retire  and  then  conduct  business  with  contacts  they  made  when  they   were  in  active  duty.183         One  problem  in  confirming  the  exact  amount  of  funds  that  are  off  the  books  is  the   total  lack  of  transparency  when  outside  revenue  brought  into  the  military.    The  Armed   Forces  Act  of  2004  tried  to  remedy  this  by  mandating  the  transfer  of  military  businesses  to   the  government  by  2009.    However  semantic  loopholes  uncontested  by  weak  civilian   leadership  sidestepped  the  legislation,  as  194  of  the  219  core  businesses  were  exempt   because  they  were  deemed  crucial  to  the  welfare  of  the  soldiers.184    Until  the  civilian   leadership  can  accurately  enforce  its  legislation  and  properly  fund  the  armed  forces,   military  businesses  are  needed  to  run  the  military  in  its  current  configuration.    Although   not  ideal,  there  is  no  other  way  to  maintain  a  military  of  this  size.       A  second  issue  is  the  legitimacy  of  the  defense  strategy  incorporated  in  the   territorial  command  system.    As  already  mentioned,  the  territorial  command  system  is   essential  for  Indonesia’s  defense  doctrine.    Until  the  military  is  capable  of  sufficiently   projecting  its  forces  in  order  to  respond  to  a  credible  threat  or  other  mission  and  the  police   force  is  capable  of  executing  its  internal  security  mission.    The  task  organization  of  the   Indonesian  military  is  specifically  designed  for  this  purpose.    This  remains  the  most  salient   reason  for  maintaining  military  forces  spread  across  the  country  rather  than  consolidating   them  in  military  bases.    As  recently  as  September  2009,  then  army  chief  of  staff  General   Agustadi  Sasongko  defended  the  army’s  territorial  command  system,  claiming  it  is                                                                                                                   183  Lowry  1996,  145.   184  Mietzner  2006,  55.     93     fundamental  to  the  “Total  Defense  doctrine”.185    Further  proof  that  the  police  force  is  not   ready  to  handle  internal  security  and  the  necessity  of  the  military’s  presence  is  the  31   October  2012  deployment  of  500  military  soldiers.    They  were  sent  in  order  to  assist  the   national  police  in  the  South  Lampung  regency  (South  East  Java)  following  violence   resulting  form  ethnic  tensions  that  caused  fourteen  deaths  and  more  homes  were  burned   to  the  ground.186         However  some  reformist  officers  (especially  the  younger  generation  of  officers)   question  the  continued  need  for  this  strategy,  and  claim  that  the  military  hijacks  civilian   initiatives  in  the  name  of  security.    These  critics  believe  the  military  overplays  the  threat  of   insurrection  and  the  threat  to  national  unity,  claiming  “threats  of  terrorism  and  separatism   have  allowed  the  military  to  resist  overhauling  a  territorial  command  structure  that  gives  it   a  foothold  throughout  the  country  at  all  levels  of  government,  a  perk  that  also  permits   military  personnel  to  engage  in  the  many  businesses  –  some  of  them  illegal  –  that   underwrite  military  power”  (Kipp  2004,  68).     “National  Defense”  is  an  ambiguous  term  and  can  include  security  from  domestic   disturbances.    Even  after  the  police  were  separated  from  military  control,  Indonesia  has  no   distinct  legal  framework  that  delineates  how  to  prevent  and  respond  to  internal  security   threats.    While  the  police  force  is  responsible  for  maintaining  domestic  peace  and  security,   they  have  done  so  in  a  very  militaristic  way.    By  duplicating  the  military’s  efforts,  from                                                                                                                   185  See  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies,  The  Military  Balance  2010  (Oxfordshire:  Routledge,  2010),   384.   186  Oyos  Saroso  H.N.  and  Bagus  BT  Saragih,  “14  Dead  in  Lampung  Violence,”  The  Jakarta  Post,  October  31,   2012.    Accessed  October  31,  2012,  http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/10/31/14-­‐dead-­‐lampung-­‐ violence.html.    In  the  same  article,  President  Yudhoyono  was  quoted  “All  parties  must  care  for  and  work   toward  creating  peace  and  harmony.  Never  again  leave  it  to  the  police  and  TNI.”    Minister  Djoko  Su-­‐yanto  had   similar  remarks.    Clearly  the  President  and  senior  civilian  government  leaders  still  think  the  military  has  an   active  role  in  internal  peace  and  security.     94     intelligence  collection  cells  to  assault  teams,  the  police  force  taxes  the  already  thin   resources  and  funds  available.         Furthermore,  one  may  argue  that  the  police  are  incapable  of  fully  embracing  their   internal  security  mission  because  they  do  not  have  sufficiently  sized  forces  or  proper   training.187    As  of  2006,  estimates  place  the  total  size  of  the  national  police  force  at  250,000   for  the  entire  country.188    To  overcome  this  limitation,  maintaining  the  military’s  country-­‐ wide  presence  will  help  fight  terrorism.       The  final  issue  in  the  debate  is  the  effect  that  the  territorial  command  system  has  on   the  local  communities.    On  one  side  is  the  advocacy  for  a  clear  separation  of  civilian  and   military  powers.    However,  in  a  developing  country  as  geographically  and  economically   diverse  as  Indonesia,  many  regions  still  depend  on  leadership  and  guidance  habitually   provided  by  the  military.    Military  and  civilian  leaders  alike  agree  that  there  are  insufficient   civilian  local  government  presence  in  some  remote  areas  of  the  country.189         In  some  remote  areas  where  the  military  assistance  has  become  culturally   entrenched,  the  people  want  the  military’s  continued  presence.    If  the  military  left,  so   would  the  positive  contributions  it  makes  on  the  local  community,  such  as  improving   irrigation  systems,  building  farm-­‐to–market  roads,  schools,  providing  first  responders   following  natural  disasters,  and  other  civic  projects.    In  the  best  case,  the  military  brought   stability  and  at  its  worst,  it  was  the  devil  that  they  knew.    In  most  of  the  country  in  the   1970s  through  1990s,  Indonesia  was  remarkably  stable,  even  if  it  was  a  result  of  military                                                                                                                   187  Rabasa  and  Chalk  2001,  64.   188  See  US  House.  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  US  Senate.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  Country  Reports   on  Human  Rights  Practices  for  2006,  Vol.  I.    Accessed  April  4,  2012,  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-­‐ 110JPRT33723/html/CPRT-­‐110JPRT33723.htm.   189  Rabasa  and  Chalk  2001,  64.     95     rule.190    Economic  growth  and  prosperity,  not  democracy  in  a  maximalist  definition,  had   been  the  linchpin  in  Indonesian  society.    Under  Suharto  and  the  territorial  command   system  Indonesia’s  economy  experienced  a  steady  seven  percent  rate  of  growth.    Since   Yudhoyono  assumed  the  presidency  in  2004,  it  has  averaged  been  between  four  and  six   percent,  and  over  six  percent  the  past  eight  of  nine  most  recent  quarters  between  2009  and   2012.    There  is  also  a  large  population  that  over  time  had  established  close  ties  to  the  Army   and  benefited  greatly  from  traditional  business  relationships  with  local  officers  or  units.     The  lack  of  informed  civilian  input  on  defense  reform  in  the  first  years  of  the   Reformasi  era  has  enabled  the  military  to  resist  substantial  changes  to  the  territorial   command  structure.    Reformers  cite  the  Indonesian  military’s  unchecked  violent   reputation,  poor  human  rights  record,  and  history  of  impunity  as  reasons  to  dissolve  the   territorial  command  system.    Analysts  and  nongovernment  organizations  have  expressed   growing  concern,  as  Taufiqurrahman  and  Hari  noted  in  a  Jakarta  Post  article  on  30   September  2004  that  “the  decision  to  maintain  the  military's  territorial  role  would  lead  to  a   repeat  of  the  intimidation  that  occurred  in  the  past”  (Taufigurrahman  and  Hari,  2004).     Only  time,  patience,  and  consistent  progress  on  reform  objectives  can  change  this  image.       Agus  Widjojo,  a  former  army  general  and  leading  military  reformer,  has  suggested   two  ways  in  which  the  territorial  command  system  could  be  altered  from  its  present   configuration,  and  if  implemented,  they  could  lead  to  further  reform  in  the  future.191    His   first  suggestion  was  to  start  by  eliminating  the  lowest  levels,  from  districts  (KODIM,  or   Komando  Distrik  Militer)  to  villages  (BABINSA,  or  Bintara  Pembina  Desa).    This  would                                                                                                                   190  Damien  Kingsbury,  The  Politics  of  Indonesia  (second  edition),  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2002),  4.   191  Interestingly,  General  Widjojo  had  an  important  part  strengthening  the  territorial  command  system,   increasing  the  total  number  of  KODAMs  from  ten  to  seventeen  after  East  Timor  received  its  independence.         For  more,  see  Kingsbury  2002,  290-­‐291.     96     consolidate  the  military’s  presence  and  remove  its  influence  at  the  lowest  levels  of  civilian   administration.         Widjojo’s  second  solution  was  to  disband  it  completely  and  replace  it  with  a   conventional  military  task  organization  of  divisions  and  brigades  with  headquarters  at   large  military  bases  throughout  the  country.    This  is  similar  to  a  suggestion  that  the   Indonesian  military  should  form  joint  commands  of  integrated  army,  navy,  and  air  force   units  with  a  regional  focus.192         Presently,  both  of  these  have  fallen  on  deaf  ears  and  no  movement  has  been  made  to   implement  anything  along  the  lines  of  Widjojo’s  recommendations.    Changing  the  military   territorial  command  organization  into  operational  units  and  transferring  soldiers  and   military  equipment  to  centralized  locations  would  be  a  high  one-­‐time  cost  the  Indonesian   government  and  military  simply  cannot  afford.                                                                                                                       192  The  Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines  is  organized  this  way,  although  each  service  has  separate  bases  there   is  a  regional  joint  headquarters  at  the  three-­‐star  level.     97     Chapter  5:  Conclusion         It  has  been  fourteen  years  since  Suharto  announced  his  resignation  and  his  New   Order  regime  came  to  an  abrupt  end.    While  the  euphoric  swell  of  emotion  following  the   transition  to  a  new  democratic  system  has  ended,  Indonesia’s  political  and  economic   progress  has  still  been  remarkable  during  this  time.    Indonesia’s  political  transformation   from  an  authoritarian  regime  to  a  free  and  fair  democracy  is  a  fait  accompli.    Indonesia  has   had  steady  economic  growth,  controlled  militant  Islamic  terrorist  groups,  improved  its   international  reputation  in  regards  to  human  rights  and  adherence  to  the  rule  of  law,  and   become  a  regional  diplomatic  power.    Indonesia’s  military  is  no  longer  subject  to  sanctions   from  donor  countries  for  human  rights  violations,  and  it  now  increasingly  benefits  from   foreign  economic  and  military  aid.               Indonesia’s  military  reform,  while  not  complete,  has  been  equally  remarkable.    The   process  of  establishing  civilian  supremacy  over  the  military  has  progressed  steadily,  and   the  military  is  increasingly  under  democratic  civilian  control.    This  is  especially  notable   considering  how  powerful  an  institution  the  military  had  been  for  the  entirety  of   Indonesia’s  history  and  the  domestic  and  international  security  threats  of  the  21st  century.     However,  this  thesis  has  shown  that  a  total  overhaul  of  the  Indonesian  military  is  unlikely   to  occur  quickly  because  of  the  government’s  lack  of  adequate  financial  resources  and  the   prevailing  institutional  strength  of  the  military,  which  allows  it  to  resist  reforms  it  does  not   want.    See  the  following  table  that  highlights  the  military  reform  progress  by  comparing  the   change  in  the  military  before  reformasi  and  at  the  present.         98     Table  7     Prior  to  1998   Present     Dwifungsi  Doctrine:  the  military  was  an  active   Tri  Dharma  Eka  Karma  Doctrine:  the  military  is   political  force.   prohibited  from  involvement  in  politics.       Fifteen  percent  of  seats  in  parliament  were  reserved   No  unelected  military  representation  in  government.   for  unelected  members  of  the  military.     The  military  was  strongly  affiliated  with  Golkar.   All  official  links  to  Golkar  have  been  severed.     Members  of  the  military  are  officially  neutral  in   politics,  especially  elections.     Military  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  reports  directly  to  the   The  military  is  subordinate  to  a  political  appointed   President.    Army  generals  repeatedly  serve   civilian  Minister  of  Defense.    There  is  an  established   simultaneously  as  the  Minister  of  Defense.   trend  of  a  civilian  defense  expert  serving  as  the   Minister  of  Defense,  position  and  office  increasingly   growing  stronger.     Few  civilian  defense  experts  capable  of  managing  the   Knowledge  of  defense  and  security  sector  among   defense  sector.    Civilian  leaders  kowtow  to  senior   civilian  leadership  drastically  increasing  through   military  officers  for  military  policy  and   domestic  programs,  institutions,  and  training  from   administration.         partner  countries.       Limited  military-­‐to-­‐military  relations  with  major   Military-­‐to-­‐military  relations  reestablished  and   foreign  militaries.   flourishing.    Indonesia’s  military  receives  millions  of   dollars  annually  in  equipment  and  training  and   conducts  numerous  annual  bilateral  training   exercises.     Armed  Forces  and  Police  under  unified  military   The  military  and  the  police  are  under  completely   command.   separate  chain  of  commands.         Military  Courts  are  autonomous  and  subordinate  to   Military  courts  are  subordinate  to  civilian  courts.   local  military  commanders  with  a  reputation  as  self-­‐ Teaching  soldiers  and  enforcing  the  rule  of  law  and   serving.    Soldiers  repeatedly  commit  human  rights   ethics  is  a  top  concern  of  military  leaders.   violations  with  impunity.       Military  focused  on  business  and  political  interests.   Military  focused  on  territorial  defense  and   operations  other  than  war  (HADR,  civic  projects,   other  aid  missions).    Military  legally  prohibited  from   external  business  activities.     Numerous  active  duty  military  officers  serving  in   Active  duty  officers  forced  to  transfer  or  permanently   civilian  positions  in  central  and  regional   retire  first  in  order  to  serve  in  government  positions.   governments.           This  thesis  has  found  that  Indonesia’s  political  landscape  is  such  that  only  strong   presidential  leadership  can  overcome  political  enmity  and  rivalries  within  national     99     institutions  to  advance  the  sensitive  issue  of  military  reform.    This  suggests  that  further   reforms  will  not  be  successful  without  savvy  presidential  leadership  capable  of  uniting  the   collective  political  will  to  push  for  reform.    A  concerted  effort  of  the  legislative  and  judicial   branches  of  government  and  senior  military  leaders  backed  with  public  support  is  also   needed  for  continued  reform  to  be  implemented.         Like  wet  rice  cultivation,  military  reform  is  a  labor  and  time-­‐intensive  process.     Many  people  are  required  to  work  together  towards  a  common  goal  for  it  to  be  successful.     The  success  of  future  reforms  depends  on  the  military’s  acceptance  of  reform  based  on   democratic  principles,  including  the  supremacy  of  civilian  leadership,  adherence  to  human   rights,  and  total  removal  of  the  military  from  politics  and  economics.    Although  the   Dwifungsi  doctrine  officially  ended  in  2000,  the  military’s  social  and  political  role  is  deeply   rooted  in  Indonesian  society  and  cannot  be  easily  erased.    Its  presence  is  most  noticeable  in   the  territorial  command  system,  which  has  been  impossible  to  quickly  dismantle.    The  New   Paradigm  doctrine  developed  in  1998  was  a  clean  break  from  dwifungsi  and  put  the   military  on  track  for  reform.    The  Tri  Dharma  Eka  Putra  doctrine  introduced  2007  provided   necessary  adjustments  towards  the  reform  goal.    These  are  promising  first  steps  upon   which  the  government  may  build  to  catalyze  future  reforms.     The  Indonesian  military  still  requires  improvement  in  terms  of  professionalism  and   equipment  modernization.    Greater  civilian  oversight  will  produce  long-­‐term  benefits  in   both  of  these  areas  by  keeping  the  military  focused  on  its  defense  and  security  mission.     The  Indonesian  saying  “Sekali  pedang  dihunus,  pantang  untuk  mundur”  (once  the  sword  is   unsheathed,  one  cannot  retreat)  is  applicable  to  current  military  reform  because  the     100     reforms  have  already  set  in  motion  permanent  changes.193    Indonesia’s  civilian  and  senior   military  leaders  are  now  best  placed  to  guide  reform  and  ensure  the  changes  are   sustainable  and  done  in  the  best  interests  of  its  citizens.     This  review  of  the  military  reform  process  from  1998  highlights  important  lessons.     The  first  and  most  important  conclusion  is  that  reforms  have  been  most  effective  when   done  at  a  pace  that  is  sustainable.    Reforming  an  institution  that  is  deeply  ingrained  in   society  is  a  slow  process.    Looking  forward,  it  will  behoove  reformers  to  be  mindful  of   pacing  and  not  allow  the  ends  to  exceed  the  financial  means.    For  future  reform  to  be   possible  without  creating  more  harm  and  instability,  Indonesian  politicians  would  benefit   from  recognizing  that  they  are  in  a  “second  best”  world.    The  Indonesian  democratic   government  does  not  yet  have  the  capability  of  achieving  its  ideal  military  posture,  and   until  it  can,  government  leaders  may  have  to  temporarily  support  or  at  least  tolerate  non-­‐ optimum  conditions.    This  may  explain  Yudhoyono’s  reluctance  to  commit  further  political   energy  towards  fast  reform,  such  as  quickly  turning  over  all  military-­‐run  business,  granting   members  of  the  military  and  police  the  right  to  vote,  and  ending  the  territorial  command   structure.                 Indonesia’s  military  culture  and  undemocratic  traditions  were  born  from   experiences  during  the  Dutch  colonization  period,  Japanese  occupation,  years  fighting  for   independence  with  little  government  support,  and  then  solidified  under  five  decades  of   authoritarian  rule.    This  reinforced  the  military’s  involvement  in  economics,  politics,  and   entrenchment  in  all  levels  of  social  life.    It  will  take  a  generation  or  longer  to  permanently   change  the  culture  of  the  military.                                                                                                                           193  Imanuddin  Razak,  “Let  the  TNI  Do  the  Job,  But  With  Restrictions,”  The  Jakarta  Post,  October  12,  2005.         101       President  Yudhoyono  grasps  this  concept,  but  other  reformers  and  critical   observers  in  the  past  have  not.    The  civilian  leadership  appears  to  have  learned  from   President  Wahid  and  General  Wirahadikusumah’s  failure  to  generate  reform  by  pushing   too  hard  and  too  fast  when  the  government  was  not  capable  of  financing  and  military  was   not  willing  to  absorb  the  changes.    This  suggests  that  failure  to  be  mindful  of  the  military’s   proud  history  of  autonomy  without  offering  suitable  alternatives  will  achieve  similar  poor   results.    An  examination  of  the  history  of  the  Reformasi  period  further  suggests  that  a   successful  solution  may  require  the  Indonesian  government  to  ignore  pressures  from   foreign  governments,  special  interests  organizations,  and  domestic  groups  with  specific   agendas  that  want  immediate  results.     A  second  conclusion  is  that  military  reform  has  been  most  successful  when  it  is   driven  by  events,  not  time  driven.    Specific  time-­‐driven  reform  benchmarks  have  proven  to   be  unsuccessful.    For  example,  the  2004  law  mandating  that  the  military  hand  over  all  its   businesses  to  the  central  government  within  five  years  has  been  a  failure,  and  its  last   minute  extension  is  considered  a  victory  by  non-­‐reformers.    The  government’s  inability  to   properly  fund  the  military  based  on  its  security  and  defense  expectations  and   powerlessness  in  enforcing  the  transfer  of  military  businesses  according  to  their  required   timeline  caused  the  government  to  lose  credibility.    By  contrast,  successful  examples  of   reform  include  moving  from  the  Dwifungsi  to  TRIDEK  doctrines  and  the  removal  of   unelected  military  members  from  parliament  at  the  start  of  reformasi.    These  were   completed  by  progressively  phasing  out  their  presence,  pausing  just  long  enough  to  allow   the  political  system  and  the  military  to  adjust.             It  is  possible  that  many  senior  military  officers  simply  do  not  know  how  to  be     102     apolitical  and  not  participate  in  business  activities.    While  it  may  be  possible  to  identify   some  officers  and  thin  them  out  of  the  military  through  alternative  incentives,  separation,   or  forced  retirement,  it  is  not  feasible  to  expect  them  to  change  immediately  on  their  own.     The  findings  in  this  thesis  indicate  that  it  may  take  a  generation  of  military  officers  and   civilian  leaders  brought  up  in  a  new,  democratic  system  before  this  entrenched  military   view  is  purged  from  the  Indonesian  military.       The  third  conclusion  from  the  military  reform  process  in  Indonesia  is  that  templates   work.    While  flawed,  the  New  Paradigm  doctrine  succeeded  in  redefining  the  role  of  the   Indonesian  military  in  a  changing  society.    This  clearly  separated  the  military  from  the   Dwifungsi  doctrine  that  was  cultivated  under  Suharto.    The  New  Paradigm  was  executed  in   a  way  that  so  its  results  were  permanent  and  did  not  wound  the  pride  of  the  military.    The   Tri  Dharma  Eka  Putra  doctrine  introduced  almost  a  decade  later  implemented  further   changes.    Codifying  military  reform  objectives  into  doctrine  proved  to  be  a  highly  effective   method  to  ensure  that  they  were  completed.    Where  reform  was  directionless  and   uncoordinated,  it  recalled  shooting  an  arrow,  painting  a  bull’s  eye  around  where  it  landed,   and  calling  it  success.       The  fourth  conclusion  is  about  the  sensitivities  of  militaries  following  an   authoritarian  regime.    The  Indonesian  military  –  and  especially  the  army  –  is  a  proud,   insular  institution.    Throughout  Indonesia’s  history  the  army  has  claimed  to  be  the  savior  of   the  country  and  protector  of  the  people.    Military  officers,  when  not  seeking  jobs  as   politicians,  have  often  seen  themselves  as  superior  to  politicians.    Even  after  fourteen  years,   military  reform  is  still  relatively  new.    For  most  senior  officers,  the  military  reform   movement  has  occurred  in  the  last  quarter  or  third  of  their  career.    Successful  reform     103     campaigns  have  been  mindful  of  this  attitude  and  developed  incentives  that  are  not   perceived  as  insulting.    Senior  military  leaders  have  been  more  excepting  of  reforms  when   offered  an  exit  strategy  that  did  not  offend  their  sense  of  pride.    President  Yudhoyono  has   been  successful  in  cooperating  with  senior  military  leaders  on  reform  issues,  and  careful   not  to  alienate  senior  leaders  like  President  Wahid  did  or  kowtow  to  them  like  Habibie  and   Megawati.         Indonesian  military  reform  has  also  been  about  the  military  becoming  a  more   professional  institution.    This  has  required  a  confluence  of  behavioral  and  structural   changes  within  the  military.    It  has  been  most  successful  when  the  civilian  leadership  has   balanced  its  expectations  of  reform  with  its  capability  to  provide  for  the  military.    The   desire  for  further  reform  cannot  exceed  its  ability  to  implement  the  reform.     The  final  conclusion  is  that  reform  is  most  successful  when  reformers  establish  a   clear  reform  objective  before  initiating  further  changes.    This  is  particularly  true  with   respect  to  the  territorial  command  system,  the  future  of  which  remains  to  be  debated.    This   thesis  has  shown  that  there  are  some  benefits  provided  by  the  territorial  command  system,   in  addition  to  its  vital  role  in  Indonesia’s  defense  and  security  strategy.    KODAM  and   KODEM  commanders  have  excellent  situational  awareness  and  are  most  capable  of  quickly   initiating  many  civil  action  projects  such  as  building  or  improving  health  centers,  places  of   worship,  roads,  bridges,  wells,  irrigation  systems,  and  other  infrastructure.    Now  that  the   military  is  subordinate  to  the  civilian  government,  the  increased  social  and  economic   integration  of  the  military  into  society  enforces  Jakarta’s  authority  throughout  the   archipelago  and  softens  differences  caused  by  regionalism  while  strengthening  the  spirit  of     104     Pancasila.194         This  thesis  has  shown  that  the  Indonesian  civilian  leadership  and  military  have  the   capacity  to  implement  further  military  reform.    Military  reform  will  be  most  successful   when  civilian  leaders  prevail  over  some  of  the  negative  residual  elements  of  the  New  Order   regime.    For  example,  implementing  effective  democratic  control  in  Indonesia  has  proven   to  be  a  challenge  because  there  is  a  dearth  of  suitable  civilian  expertise  with  military   matters.    Although  this  area  is  quickly  improving,  few  civilians  are  qualified  enough  or   knowledgeable  enough  about  defense  matters  to  lead  and  direct  military  policy,  and  they   still  have  to  overcome  dominant  military  personalities  who  are  resistant  to  change.    This   area  is  improving,  but  establishing  credibility  and  command  of  security  and  military  issues   may  take  years.    Politicians  who  are  not  former  military  officers  lack  experience  and   understanding  of  complicated  military  administration,  operations,  policy,  and  budget   needs.195    Most  military  and  defense  policy  and  doctrine  formulation  are  not  fully   incorporated  into  Indonesia’s  national  objectives,  and  are  still  delegated  to  the  leaders  of   the  military.           The  future  of  military  reform  in  Indonesia  and  the  status  of  the  territorial  command   system  are  unknown.    Future  reforms  will  target  illegal  and  illicit  activity  to  create  a  fair   system  that  holds  violators  accountable.    The  military  reform  movement’s  ideal  state  is  still   a  long  way  away,  but  this  thesis  has  shown  that  the  current  situation  is  not  conducive  to   rapid  reform.    The  first  stages  of  the  Reformasi  period  have  indicated  that  it  is  in   Indonesia’s  best  interest  to  take  patient,  deliberate  and  calculated  reform  steps.    In  the                                                                                                                   194  Bilveer  Singh,  Dwifungsi  ABRI:  The  Dual  Function  of  the  Indonesian  Armed  Forces  (Singapore:  Singapore   Institute  of  International  Affairs,  1995),  55.   195  See,  for  examples,  Sukma  and  Prasetyono  2003,  31-­‐32.     105     words  of  former  United  States  President  Bill  Clinton,  “progress  changes  consciousness,  and   when  you  change  people’s  consciousness,  then  their  awareness  of  what  is  possible  changes   as  well  –  a  virtuous  cycle.”    Steady  perseverance  may  be  the  only  way  to  ensure  the  change   will  be  sustainable.       106     ABRI         APBN     ARF                             ASEAN                     BABINSA       BKR                             BUMN       CARAT                   CJCS       DISAM   DPR       FMF             FMS         FOAA                                                                                             Appendix  A:  List  of  Acronyms  and  Key  Terms   (Angkatan  Bersenjata  Republik  Indonesia)    Indonesian  Armed  Forces     (see  also  TNI).   (Anggaran  Pendapatan  Belanja  Negara)  National  Budget.   ASEAN  Regional  Forum.    Focuses  on  matters  of  regional  security  in     Asia  and  the  Pacific.    The  main  objectives  are  to  promote  peace  and     security  through  dialogue,  cooperation,  and  preventive  diplomacy.       Membership  consists  of  the  10  ASEAN  countries,  Australia,       Bangladesh,  Canada,  China,  East  Timor,  the  European  Union,  India,     Japan,  North  Korea,  South  Korea,  Mongolia,  New  Zealand,  Pakistan,     Papua  New  Guinea,  Russia,  Sri  Lanka,  and  the  United  State.   Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations.    Membership  consists  of  the     ten  principle  Southeast  Asian  countries  including:  Brunei,  Burma,     Cambodia,  Indonesia,  Laos,  Malaysia,  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines,     Singapore,  Thailand,  and  Vietnam.    English  is  the  common  language     within  ASEAN.   (Bintara  Pembina  Desa)  Non-­‐Commissioned  Officers  offering       guidance  (and  supervision)  in  a  village.   (Badan  Keamanan  Rakyat)  People’s  Security  Body,  people’s  militia     formed  with  many  former  Peta  soldiers  after  the  end  of  World  War  II.       Indonesian  leaders  at  the  time  decided  against  forming  a  national     military  fearing  it  would  infuriate  the  Allied  Forces  and  did  not     believe  they  had  the  necessary  equipment  or  military  prowess  to     defeat  Allied  Forces  attempting  to  retrun  to  the  staus-­‐quo  prior  to  the     outbreak  of  the  war.   (Badan  Usaha  Milik  Negara)  State-­‐owned  enterprises.     Cooperation  Afloat  Readiness  and  Training.    Series  of  bi-­‐lateral  or     multi-­‐lateral  training  exercises  with  the  United  States  Navy  and     Marine  Corps  and  other  militaries  in  South  and  Southeast  Asia.       Objectives  include  building  regional  cooperation  and  strengthening     combat,  humanitarian  assistance,  and  disaster  relief  skills.   Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.   Defense  Institute  of  Security  Assistance  Management   (Dewan  Pertahanan  Nasional)  Indonesian  House  of  Representatives   Foreign  Military  Financing.    U.S.  provides  grants  in  order  for  the     recipient  country’s  military  to  purchase  specific  equipment  from  the     U.S.   Foreign  Military  Sales.    A  direct  country-­‐to-­‐country  sales  program   of  military  equipment,  maintenance,  support,  and  training.   Foreign  Operations  Appropriations  Act.    Annual  legislation  in  which     Congress  authorizes  funding  for  security  assistance  programs.    The     107           programs  are  controlled  by  the  State  Department  but  executed  by  the           Department  of  Defense.    FMF,  FMS,  and  IMET  are  subsets  of  the  FOAA.     GAM       (Gerakan  Aceh  Merdeka)  Aceh  Freedom  Movement.     IMET       International  Military  Education  and  Training  program.    A  U.S.             program  that  provides  funding  to  cover  the  costs  associated             (administrative,  travel,  and  living  expenses)  for  foreign  military           personnel  in  order  to  attend  a  professional  military  course  taught  in           the  United  States.    Past  beneficiaries  include  current  Indonesian           President  Susilo  Bambang  Yudhoyono.    In  FY2009,  the  U.S.  spent  over           $91  million  training  over  8000  foreign  students.    Indonesia’s             allocation  was  approximately  $1  million.           KKN         (Korupsi,  Kolusi,  dan  Nepotism)  Corruption,  Collusion,  and  Nepotism.   KNIL       (Koninklik  Netherlands-­‐Indische  Leger)  Dutch  Colonial  Army.   KODAM     (Komando  Daerah  Militer)    Regional  Military  Command.   KODIM     (Komando  Distrik  Militer)    District  Military  Command.   KOREM     (Komando  Resort  Militer)  Military  Command  Post.   KORMAR      Indonesian  Marine  Corps.    Possibly  the  most  popular  of  the  services           in  Indonesia  by  its  citizens.    Earned  credit  as  a  professional,             disciplined  force  during  relief  operations  in  Aceh  after  the  2004           tsunami.   KOSTRAD     (Komando  Strategis  Cadangan  Angkatan  Darat)    The  Indonesian  Army         Strategic  Reserve  Command.    It  has  been  historically  the  largest,  most           prestigious,  and  best-­‐equipped  command  in  the  Indonesian  Armed           Forces.    Prior  commanders  include  Major  General  Suharto.     ODC       Office  of  Defense  Coordination.    An  office  within  the  American             Embassy  that  manages  the  U.S.  security  assistance  program  under  the           supervision  of  the  Senior  Defense  Attaché  (U.S.  military  officer)  and           the  Ambassador.    Size  and  scope  of  the  budget  varies  by  country  and           over  time  depending  on  the  programs  under  administration.    The           current  office  in  Jakarta  consists  of  16  personnel,  including  four  active         duty  U.S.  military  officers.196     NDAA       National  Defense  Authorization  Act  (US).   NDU       Nation  Defense  University  in  Washington,  DC.     PACOM     U.S.  Pacific  Command.    The  oldest  and  largest  of  the  U.S.  military’s           major  Unified  Combatant  Command’s,  PACOM’s  headquarters  in  Camp         Smith  (Honolulu),  Hawaii.    Its  missions  statement  is  to  promote           security  and  peaceful  development  in  the  Asia-­‐Pacific  region  by                                                                                                                     196  Official  Briefing  conducted  with  the  ODC  on  March  17,  2011.    Verified  via  email  in   March,  2012.         108                                             PETA       PKI             POLRI         Sishankamrata           TKR                   TNI       TRI             TRIDEK                         UUD45       VOC         WAKSAD         deterring  aggression,  advancing  regional  security  cooperation,       responding  to  crisis,  and  fighting  to  win.    PACOM  is  typically       commanded  by  an  active  duty  four-­‐star  admiral  (although  it  may  be  a     general)  nominated  by  the  President  and  confirmed  by  Congress.       PACOM’s  area  of  responsibility  includes  South,  East,  and  Southeast     Asia  and  the  Pacific,  or  more  colloquially,  from  Hollywood  to       Bollywood.       (Pembela  Tanah  Air)  Defenders  of  the  Homeland.   (Partai  Komunis  Indonesia)  Communist  Party  in  Indonesia,  popular     under  Sukarno.   (Polisi  Republic  Indonesia)  National  Police.   (Sistem  Pertahanan  Keamanan)  Whole  People’s  System  of  Defense     and  Security.   (Tentara  Keamanan  Rakyat)  People’s  Security  Army.    Officially       endorced  by  President  Sukarno  on  October  5  1945.    Three  months     later  it  changed  its  name  to  Tentara  Republik  Indonesia.   (Tentara  Nasional  Indonesia)    Indonesian  National  Military   (Tentara  Republik  Indonesia)  Army  of  the  Republic  of  Indonesia.       Formally  TKR   (Tri  Dharma  Eka  Putra)  Three  missions  one  deed.    New  military     doctrine  initiated  by  Air  Chief  Marshal  Djoko  Suyanto  on  25  January     2007  which  prohibited  the  military’s  sociopolitical  involvement  and     business  activities.   (Undang-­‐Undang  Dasar  1945)  Indonesia’s  1945  Constitution.   (Vereenigde  Oost-­Indische  Compagnie)  Dutch  East  India  Company.   (Wakil  Kepala  Staf  Angkatan  Darat)  Deputy  Commander  of  the  Army.     109     Appendix  B:  Cast  of  Characters       Habibie:  Indonesia’s  third  president  and  successor  to  Suharto.     Hatta,  Muhammad:  (b.  1902,  d.  1980)  Indonesian  nationalist  and  first  vice  president   under  Sukarno.     Megawati:  Indonesia’s  fifth  president.    Daughter  Sukarno,  Indonesia’s  first  president.     Nasution,  Abdul  Haris:  (b.  1918,  d.  2000)  Professional  Indonesian  soldier  who  served  as   the  Indonesian  army’s  chief  of  staff  twice  (1949-­‐1952  and  1955-­‐1962).    Nasution  was   instrumental  in  formulating  the  Indonesian  military’s  doctrine  and  formal  involvement  in   politics.    His  “Middle-­‐Way”  concept  is  a  forbearer  to  the  Dwifungsi  doctrine.    He  also  served   as  an  officer  in  the  KNIL  before  Indonesia’s  independence.       Probowo,  Subianto:  (b.  1951)  Ambitious  Indonesian  Army  general  with  a  reputation  as   recklessly  unpredictable  and  prone  to  violence.    He  is  a  former  commander  of  KOPASUS   (Special  Forces)  and  KOSTRAD  (Strategic  Command)  and  also  a  former  son-­‐on-­‐law  of   Suharto.    Probowo  is  a  serious  candidate  for  the  2014  presidential  election.     Purnomo,  Agustadi  Sasongko:  Indonesian  Army  General  served  as  Army  Chief  of  Staff   from  2008-­‐2009.     Ryacudu,  Ryamizard:  Indonesian  Army  General  who  served  as  the  Indonesian  Army  Chief   of  Staff  from  2002-­‐2005.     Santoso,  Djoko:  Indonesian  Army  General  who  served  as  the  Indonesian  Chief  of  Staff  from   2005  –  2008.       Sudarsono,  Juwono:  First  civilian  Indonesian  Defense  Minister  in  the  Reformasi  era.    A   well-­‐respected  political  scientist  and  academic,  Sudarsono  served  as  Defense  Minister   under  President  Wahid  and  President  Yudhoyono.         Sudirman:  (b.  1916,  d.  1950)  As  a  child  he  was  deeply  influenced  by  a  convergence  of   ideologies  and  ideas  that  he  formed  into  his  own,  including  secular  nationalism,  Muslim   reformism,  and  military  tactics.    During  the  Japanese  occupation  of  Indonesian,  he  was  a   battalion  commander  (the  highest  rank  possible  for  and  Indonesian)  in  PETA  and   commanding  a  battalion  in  Banyumas.    After  World  War  II  he  was  a  leader  in  the  people’s   militia  Badan  Keamanan  Rakyat  (BKR,  People’s  Security  Body)  and  served  as  a  Division   commander  of  the  Banyumas  region.    After  the  numerous  fighting  groups  were   consolidated  and  unity  of  command  was  established,  General  Sudirman  was  elected  as  the   First  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  of  the  Indonesian  National  Army,  a  position  at  the  time  referred   to  as  panglima  besar.    He  was  instrumental  in  shaping  the  early  identity  of  the  armed  forces   and  maintaining  the  autonomy  and  respect  of  the  military  with  the  civilian  leaders  in     110     government.    General  Sudirman  died  at  the  early  age  of  thirty-­‐four  on  29  January  1950  and   was  soon  declared  a  National  Hero  of  Indonesia.       Sukarno:  (b.  1901,  d.  1970)  Indonesia’s  first  president.     Suharto:  (b.  1921,  d.  2008)  Indonesia’s  second  president  from  1967-­‐1998.    Suharto  was  a   member  of  the  KNIL  and  PETA  before  Indonesia’s  independence  and  a  general  in  the   Indonesian  army,  remaining  on  active  duty  for  ten  years  after  becoming  president.     Suhartono,  Agus:  Indonesian  Navy  Admiral  and  current  military  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief.     Sumoharjo,  Urip:  The  only  Indonesian  officer  to  reach  the  rank  of  Major  in  the  KNIL.    He   was  very  respected  by  the  other  Indonesian  KNIL  officers  and  many  frequently  went  to  him   for  advice.    He  maintained  a  low  profile  during  the  Japanese  occupation  but  was  a  central   military  figure  during  nationalist  movement  against  the  Dutch.    He  became  the  first  Chief  of   Staff  of  the  Indonesian  army  serving  directly  under  General  Sudirman.     Sutarto,  Endriartono:  Indonesian  Army  General  who  served  as  the  Indonesian  Army’s   Chief  of  Staff  from  2000-­‐2002  and  military  Commander  in  Chief  from  2002-­‐2006.    Sutarto   supports  military  territory  command  structure,  especially  the  intelligence  collection   capability  of  its  lowest  levels.     Sutjipto,  Widodo  Adi:  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  appointed  by  president  Wahid.    Sutjipto  was   the  first  navy  admiral  appointed  to  the  military’s  highest  position.     Sutrisno,  Try:  (b.  1935)  Indonesian  Army  general  from  east  Java.    Served  as  the  Indonesian   Army  Chief  of  Staff  from  1986-­‐1988  and  Head  of  Armed  Forces  from  1988-­‐1993.    Served  as   vice-­‐president  under  Suharto  from  1993-­‐1998.     Suyanto,  Djoko:  (b.  1950)  Indonesian  Air  Chief  Marshal  in  the  Indonesian  Air  Force.     Served  as  the  TNI  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  under  President  Yudhoyono  from  2006-­‐2007.       Recognized  as  a  reformist  and  mindful  of  the  military’s  public  perception,  he  strongly   supported  the  civilian  control  of  the  military,  introduced  the  Tri  Dharma  Eka  Putra  doctrine   (Three  Missions  One  Deed),  which  removed  the  military  from  domestic  politics.    However,   during  his  confirmation  hearing  with  the  House  of  Representatives  he  argued  it  was   necessary  to  maintain  the  military’s  territorial  command  structure  because  it  was  needed   for  unspecified  goals  and  would  only  be  used  to  support  military  operations.     Toisutta,  George:  Indonesian  Army  General  who  served  as  Indonesian  Army  chief  of  staff   from  2009-­‐2011.     Wahid:  Indonesia’s  fourth  president  and  most  radical  military  reformer.       Wibowo,  Pramono  Edhie:  Indonesian  Army  General  and  current  Indonesian  Army  chief  of   staff  since  2011.       111     Widjojo,  Agus:  Indonesian  army  Lieutenant  General  who  served  at  the  highest  commands   including  as  the  Chief  of  Territorial  Affairs  and  Commandant  of  SESKO  where  he  was   responsible  for  creating  the  Indonesian  military’s  political  and  security  doctrine.    He   graduated  from  the  Indonesian  military  academy  in  1970  and  was  also  the  recipient  of   professional  military  education  in  the  United  States  through  the  IMET  program,  including   graduating  from  CGSC  in  1988,  the  US  National  Defense  University  (NDU),  and  George   Washington  University  where  he  received  a  Master  of  Public  Administration  degree.     Wiranto:  Indonesian  Army  General  who  served  as  the  Indonesian  Army  Chief  of  Staff  from   1997-­‐1998.     Wirahadikusumah:  Army  General  and  radical  military  reformer.    President  Wahid   appointed  him  as  commander  of  KOSTRAD.     Yudhoyono,  Susilo  Bambang:  (b.  1949)  Current  President  of  Indonesia.    Elected  in  2004   and  re-­‐elected  2009.    Yudhoyono  is  a  retired  Army  general  and  key  leader  in  the  military’s   initial  internal  reform  movement.             112     Appendix  C:  Comparison  of  selected  Southeast  Asian  Countries  (2007-­2009)         2007   2008   2009   Indonesia   GDP   $433  B   $511  B   $559  B     GDP  /  per  capita   $1845   $2151   $2328     Defense  Budget   $3.57  B   $3.4  B   $3.5  B     Area   1904569  sq  km197       735,358  sq  miles     Population   232,000,000   237,512,255   240,271,522     Size  of  Active  Duty       302,000   302,000   Malaysia   GDP   $187  B   $222  B   $214  B     GDP  /  per  capita   $7529   $8792   $8321     Defense  Budget   $4.02  B   $4.18  B   $4.03  B     Area   328,657  sq  km198       126,895  sq  miles     Population   25,000,000   25,274,133   25,715,819     Size  of  Active  Duty       109,000   109,000   Philippines   GDP   $144  B   $168  B   $164  B     GDP  /  per  capita   $1583   $1758   $1680     Defense  Budget   $1.13  B   $1.42  B   $1.16  B     Area   300,000  sq  km199       115,831  sq  miles     Population   88,700,000   92,681,453   97,976,603     Size  of  Active  Duty       106,000   106,000   Singapore   GDP   $161  B   $182  B   $170  B     GDP  /  per  capita   $35345   $39554   $36454     Defense  Budget   $7.01  B   $7.66  B   8.23  B     Area   697  sq  km200       269  sq  miles     Population   4,600,000   4,608,167   4,657,542     Size  of  Active  Duty       72,500   72,500   Thailand   GDP   $245  B   $273  B   $259  B     GDP  /  per  capita   $3773   $4168   $3927     Defense  Budget   $3.33  B   $4.29  B   $5.13  B     Area   513,120  sq  km201       198,117  sq  miles     Population   65,000,000   65,493,298   65,998,436     Size  of  Active  Duty       306,600   306,600   Vietnam   GDP   $88  B   $91  B   $94  B     GDP  /  per  capita   $1034   $1042   $1061     Defense  Budget   $3.7  B   $2.9  B   $2.8  B     Area   331210  sq  km202       127,881  sq  miles     Population   85,100,000   86,116,559   88,576,758     Size  of  Active  Duty       455,000   455,000   Source:  CIA  World  Factbook,  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/  and  International  Institute   for  Strategic  Studies.  2010.  The  Military  Balance  2010.  (Oxfordshire:  Routledge),  394-­‐433.                                                                                                                 197  Indonesia:  land:  1,811,560,  water:  93,000,  54716  km  of  coastline   198  Malaysia:  land:  328,657,  water:  1,190     199  Philippines:  land:  298,170,  water:  1830   200  Singapore:  land:  687,  water  10   201  Thailand:  land:  510,890,  water:  2230   202  Vietnam:  land:  310070,  water:  21140     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