

This page is intentionally left blank.

EZRA'S ARCHIVES

A PUBLICATION
OF THE
CORNELL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

TENTH EDITION

2020

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Editorial Board is deeply grateful for the generous support of our wonderful faculty advisor, Professor TJ Hinrichs, the Executive Board of the Cornell Historical Society, and our dedicated editors, without whom this project would have been impossible. We are particularly thankful that our editors lent us their time and energy during a remarkably difficult spring semester. We are likewise indebted to Elle Rothermich, for her assistance in the completion of this year's edition of Ezra's Archives. We would also like to thank Judy Yonkin, the History Department at Cornell University, the Student Activities Funding Commission, the authors featured in this edition, and the many students who took the time to submit their work to this publication.

THE EDITORIAL BOARD

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

Maximilian Fernandez '20

Regan Murray '20

LAYOUT EDITORS

Carolyn Bell '20

Stephanie Bell '20

SENIOR EDITORS

Carolyn Bell '20

Stephanie Bell '20

Basia Van Buren '21

Ian Wallace '20

Sarah Xu '20

HEAD COPY EDITOR

Basia Van Buren '21

STAFF EDITORS

Hayli Bazan '20

Atharv Garje '21

Michael Rones '20

William Biederman '22

Wesley Kang '22

Alex Siegenthaler '22

Faith Chen '21

Sabrina Lourie '20

Zhiyuan Zhou '23

Julie Cotton '21

Karl Mobed '21

ON THE WRITERS

REGAN MURRAY is a senior at Cornell University. She is primarily interested in early twentieth-century intellectual and political history. Regan received early exposure to history during her childhood spent in the Boston area.

GIACOMO McCARTHY graduated from Duke University this May with degrees in History and Middle Eastern Studies. He will be spending the next two years as a Venture For America fellow working to learn about agricultural systems before returning to graduate school. He is originally from Pasadena, California, where he is holed up in quarantine and would love to be entertained by your thoughts, comments, criticisms, or questions about his paper. You can contact him at giacomo.mccarthy@duke.edu.

BISHOY N. MEGALLA is a senior studying Economics and History at Yale University. His primary interests are in the Early American Republic and the intersection between economics and history as they relate to financial crises. A first-generation American from Egypt, he spends a lot of time telling people he's from New Jersey, reading narrative history, and listening to hip-hop.

CAMRYN BELL graduated from UC Berkeley in 2019, majoring in history—with a concentration on Bay Area history and the history of information—and minoring in Portuguese Language and Literature. During her undergraduate studies,

she also served as a peer advisor in the UC Berkeley History Department and was a fellow at the Berkeley Center for New Media. She currently lives in Washington, D.C., and works for the Arlington Public Library's Center for Local History, conducting archival research and administering their oral history program.

KEVIN DIESTELOW is a rising senior at the College of William & Mary studying early American history and government. In the future, he hopes to go on to study history at the graduate level. In his free time he enjoys hiking, historical re-enacting, and watching the Philadelphia Phillies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS	9
AMERICAN CHAMBERLAIN: The Relationship Between Sinclair Kennedy's Pan-Angleism and British Protectionism REGAN MURRAY	11
MSG, CHINESE RESTAURANT SYNDROME, AND MORAL PANIC: The Hidden Contagion GIACOMO MCCARTHY	42
ALBERT GALLATIN AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON: Microcosms of National Political Change BISHOY N. MEGALLA	71
"WHAT YOU WANT IS REVOLUTION. HOW? GO LOOK IT UP IN THE LIBRARY": Democratizing Information and Space Through the Bay Area's Informal Libraries CAMRYN BELL	95
A PASTIME FOR WARTIME: World War I, Major League Baseball, and the New Obligations of Cultural Citizenship KEVIN DIESTELOW	130

FROM THE EDITORS

It is with great pleasure that we present the tenth edition of Ezra's Archives. This journal represents the hard work of a small group of undergraduates dedicated to carrying on the tradition that Maya Koretzky and Andrew White began in Spring 2011 when they sought to provide a space for undergraduates to share exemplary historical research. In their original letter from the editors, published in the very first edition of Ezra's Archives, Maya and Andrew asked two simple questions: Why study history? Why write and read history? They rightly observed that the practice of studying history, of putting it into words and sharing it with others, gives us the context necessary to understand our present.

Ezra's Archives, however, does not operate in a bubble. The past several months have proven especially difficult. We are dealing with the ramifications and fallout of a global pandemic. There is no way to deny that we are in a historic moment. For many of us, new circumstances have forced us to evaluate what matters and why we do what we do, including why we study history. History, of course, is not an instruction manual. We cannot look to the past to find neat morals or lessons. Regardless, we believe that looking to the past is one of the ways that we can best understand the present and imagine a new future. In moments like these, the mission of history because particularly important.

This is why the editors of Ezra's Archives have always aimed to provide a platform for undergraduate historians working in under-studied areas. Since the first issue, the journal has showcased research on diverse topics, from Christian polemics in Umayyad Spain, the economy of the Viceroyalty of Peru, blood and

militarism in colonial Hawai'i, and even German water policy in Quindao between 1898-1914.

As in past years, we received a variety of submissions from undergraduates across the country studying at institutions both large and small, and we were delighted to receive our first international submission. This year, we are proud to offer new research on Pan-Angleism and British Protectionism, the so-called Chinese Restaurant Syndrome, Albert Gallatin, Bay Area activism and Library Spaces, and Baseball and citizenship during World War I.

Looking forward, we hope to expand the scope of the journal and the diversity of our authors. To do so, we plan to lengthen Ezra's Archives' submission period, increase the number of schools to which we extend our call for submissions. We appreciate all of the support we have received, both from the editorial team of Ezra's Archives as well as members of the Cornell Historical Society, and faculty members. We are pleased to present to you the tenth edition of Ezra's Archives, and we hope you enjoy.

Sincerely,
Max and Regan

AMERICAN CHAMBERLAIN

The Relationship Between Sinclair Kennedy's Pan-Angleism and British Protectionism

Regan Murray

Just prior to the outbreak of World War I, American political theorist Sinclair Kennedy published *The Pan-Angles: A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-Speaking Nations* (1914). The book afforded a far-sweeping vision of Anglophone unification in the name of cooperation and mutual defense. If accomplished, the Pan-Angle federation Kennedy imagined would have taken the form of a shared government, favorable trade relations, and knowledge exchange between Britain, the United States, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Kennedy's theory drew heavily on late-19th and early-20th century British economic theory and imperialist discourse, bearing strong ties to British tariff reformer Joseph Chamberlain's protectionist proposals and British imperialist Cecil Rhodes' visions of empire. To suggest the feasibility of this unprecedented combination of seven distinct nations under one governing body, Kennedy crafted a sociological argument for the nations' racial and political homogeneity, claiming the English language as a unifying force due to a singular ability to express the ethics and ideas of democracy. Owing to the power Kennedy attributed to ideas expressed in English, Kennedy borrowed from the founding principles of the Rhodes Scholar program to devise a system of knowledge-sharing between member nations. From Chamberlain's protectionist plan of colonial preferences, Kennedy derived a foreign policy for the Pan-Angle federation that operated based on a racial hierarchy of nations and imagined exploitive trade relations with non-white states.

This intellectual overlap between Kennedy's Pan-Angleism and elements of British social and political thought, the result of his open consultation of Rhodes' and Chamberlain's writings and speeches, proves a compelling point of study not because it suggests the plausibility of Pan-Angleism; federation remained an outrageous plot, ignoring rifts in the two nations' political structures and economic agendas. Its importance instead owes to how it reveals Kennedy's outlandish racism as unexceptional, reflected in social theory of his era and interconnected to transnational political and economic theory of the early 20th-century. Analyzing Kennedy's work also shows that British and American thinkers noted the international economic and political tensions of the pre-war period but that many of their plans for establishing peace rested on maintaining Anglo-Saxon hegemony rather than promoting greater communication and power-sharing among nations. In essence, Pan-Angleism hoped to cement Anglo-Saxon racial dominance by reproducing the former scope of the British Empire and placing English speakers under a coalition government weighted towards American power and supporting a protectionist economic platform.

In the early 1900s, Chamberlain, beloved for his authoritarian administration of South Africa, turned away from the free trade platform that dominated British politics to become British protectionism's foremost advocate. His protectionist agenda proposed creating an "imperial union" between Britain and her colonies by lowering tariffs on trade between them to encourage economic interdependence.¹ His opponents criticized his sudden support for protectionism as a means of satisfying his ego by rousing the British people to his side through "flag-waving, clap-

¹ Alexander Mackintosh, *Joseph Chamberlain: An Honest Biography*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1914), 265; Cobden Club, *Fact Versus Fiction: The Cobden Club's Reply to Mr. Chamberlain*, (London: Cassel & Company, 1904), 4.

trap, any appeal to racial vanity.”² This is not to suggest, of course, that Chamberlain’s opponents had a legitimate claim to higher moral ground. Their preference for free trade owed to their desire to hold on to Britain’s privileged position as the world’s only free trade nation rather than to their opposition to imperialism or the racism integral to it. Free traders also wanted white hegemony, but they were confident that no policy changes were necessary to maintain it. This mindset contrasted with Chamberlain’s fears that the nascent industries of younger nations posed an immense threat to Britain’s own and that securing British economic primacy would thereby require tariffs to protect British industry. As this paper will further detail, Kennedy acted as a sort of “American Chamberlain,” arguing for British protectionism and empire from the wrong side of the Atlantic, and his work reveals the intimate and transnational connections between racism, democracy, and economic theory.

Born in Roxbury, MA in 1875 to a father who was a Harvard-educated botanist known for an expansive book collection, Kennedy was primed from a young age for a life of study. After graduating from Harvard Law School in 1906, he occupied his time traveling, a pastime he likely borrowed from his globetrotting father. Kennedy also seems to have borrowed his interest in British authors and intellectual traditions from his father, who indexed plant references in the works of William Shakespeare and Francis Bacon as a lifelong pet project. The Kennedy family’s Scottish heritage suggests that Kennedy’s favorable view of protectionism also owed to familial influences. Throughout the late-19th and early-20th centuries, the Scots favored protectionist platforms. Whereas Chamberlain’s Unionist party remained a vocal minority in British politics, the Liberal

² J.M. Robertson, *The Great Question: Free Trade or Tariff Reform?*, (London: Sir I. Pitman and Sons, Ltd., 1909), 59.

Unionists gained a majority of Scottish Parliamentary seats in the 1900 Khaki election. Scottish voters aided in the election of Alfred Balfour, a political ally of Chamberlain, as British Prime Minister in 1902. By 1912, the Scottish Liberal Unionists had allied with the Conservatives to form Scotland's Unionist Party, which offered a substantial counterweight to England's liberal-dominated free-trade politics. Kennedy's theory of Pan-Angleism, therefore, seems to bear the impact of the affection for British culture and conservative politics that likely shaped his household.

Pan-Angleism rested on a narrative of British racial homogeneity. Kennedy claimed that the Norman conquest had "crushed the Angles, Danes, and Saxons into one people," a singular Anglo-Saxon race accustomed to rule based on "the instinct for self-government" and grounded in "the framework of the [English] language."³ Given that he rooted British and American governing principles in Norman conquest, Kennedy's choice to emphasize "Angle" in his title seems intended to draw attention to the English-speaking character of the proposed federation's member states. Kennedy incorporated Americans into this homogeneous race by defining them as primarily British aside from a mixture of Germans and Celts who would eventually coalesce to reproduce Anglo-Saxon ethnic composition.⁴ Kennedy's narrative of racial "crushing" grounded his claims of the unity of English-speaking whites by fusing race and ethnicity under the banner of British nationality. The racial preoccupation and racism of Kennedy's political ideas borrow from the pervasive discourse of competition between the races, what scholars have since termed "social Darwinism," that shaped Progressive-Era American reform politics.⁵ He described the race

³ Sinclair Kennedy, *The Pan-Angles* (New York: Longman & Green, 1915), 5-6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁵ Thomas C. Leonard, "Origins of the myth of social Darwinism: The ambiguous legacy of Richard Hofstadter's *Social Darwinism in American Thought*," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 71 (2009), 39.

conflicts in South Africa and America as a battle to determine which race—white or black—had the evolutionary advantage. Kennedy proved preoccupied with assuring the survival of a pure Anglo-Saxon race, claiming Pan-Angles' right to marry only fellow Pan-Angles as central to Pan-Angle individualism and the security of Pan-Angle society.⁶ The connections between Kennedy's Pan-Angleist theory and social Darwinist rhetoric reveal his proposed Anglophone political union as intrinsically constructed to also establish white racial dominance.

In a testament to the racism underpinning Pan-Angleism, Kennedy claimed American democracy as a white institution. He applauded how, in “each nation, whenever non-whites appear[ed] to endanger the success of white local self-government, [were] [sic] able to exclude from the privilege of the franchise any non-assimilable inhabitants.” He thereby lauded voter suppression in English-speaking nations as a means of ensuring that the political thought of Pan-Angles, “the cream of the earth,” as he described them, rose to the top. He praised post-Reconstruction Southern politicians whom he claimed had been “forced in self-defense to become lawbreakers...to undo the mistake” of the Fifteenth Amendment that made race-based voter discrimination illegal “and re-establish there the will of the Pan-Angle community” through “grandfather clauses.”⁷ He claimed that their actions had paved the way for all Pan-Angle communities to feel justified in denying suffrage to non-white voters. By presenting the suppression of voters of color as a valuable practice inherent to the suffrage policies of English-speaking nations, Kennedy afforded himself a basis on which to claim democracy as a political ideology solely practiced by white Anglo-Saxons.

6 Kennedy, 73.

7 Ibid., 66.

Kennedy and his contemporaries saw the problem of assimilability as affecting not only non-white citizens of America but non-white immigrants who reached the nation's shores. The assimilability problem attracted scholarly attention, including that of Columbia sociology professor Franklin Giddings, who posited an ideological cohesion among Anglo-Saxons in *Democracy and Empire* (1900). Giddings translated the idea of "non-assimilable" subjects into a similar one of "non-assimilable" "alien elements." He believed that American morality had to be preserved through immigration politics attentive towards preventing the entry of populations whose racial composition and culture would threaten the American national identity.⁸ Fear of immigrants as sources of crime, disease, moral degradation, and economic competition pervaded the period and would soon coalesce in mass deportations during World War I and the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924. Kennedy embraced this pervading xenophobia and believed that racial inferiors living within the British empire and the American continent should be forced to learn English to make them subservient to the democratic "theory of law and government" that was "peculiar to Pan-Angle psychology."⁹ He maintained, however, that English could merely control immigrants of color and that their non-whiteness barred them from achieving full ideological assimilation with white citizens.

For Kennedy and his peers, the determination of an individual's whiteness rested largely on their nationality. The racial coding of nations mattered not only as a determinant of immigrant assimilability but as the basis for how Kennedy theorized American foreign relations. He advocated favorable relations with European nations he saw as white and claimed that America

⁸ Giddings, 52, 274.

⁹ Sinclair, 25, 26.

had always held sympathy for its European brethren, arguing that the Monroe Doctrine, perceived by many Europeans as a document of American aggression, was widely misunderstood and merely stood for American safety, not anti-European sentiment.¹⁰ Kennedy developed a hierarchy of foreign nations with white-coded European nations at the top and positioned Anglo-Saxons as the fifth white nation to establish international dominance in modern history, after Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France, and the most likely to maintain it. His commentary on the diminished international power of these four white nations mingled praise for “their strength [that] procured lands for [Pan-Angles]” and dismissiveness, as he regarded it impossible that they could ever approach the prowess of Britain and the US again.¹¹ Next in Kennedy’s hierarchy came another, newer white nation: Germany.

Kennedy’s hope that Pan-Angles would maintain friendly relations with Germany despite the economic competition it posed resonated with British protectionists’ favorable view of the newly-federated nation. Chamberlain and his allies held up Germany as an example of successful protectionism and envisioned the nation as an economic partner. L.M.S. Amery, whose argument for protectionism was published with J.A. Robertson’s argument for free trade in a 1909 volume entitled *The Great Question: Tariff Reform or Free Trade?*, lauded German’s ability to stave off agriculture’s decline in an industrializing world using protectionist tariffs.¹² Chamberlain further claimed that “there were interests to which Germany and England could agree to assist each other’s policy,” and that the “exclusive interests” of the British Empire could not be protected with the assistance of Germany and the US.¹³ Chamberlain himself borrowed these ideas in his case from

10 Kennedy, 126.

11 Ibid., 127.

12 L.M.S. Amery, *The Great Question: Free Trade or Tariff Reform?*, (London: Sir I. Pitman and Sons, 1909), 15; 16.

13 Mackintosh, 220.

Cecil Rhodes, whom several of Chamberlain's contemporaries identified as the source of his political thought. Chamberlain had worked alongside Rhodes in South Africa and adopted his call for a triple Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic alliance.¹⁴ Kennedy acted as a third link in the ideological chain extending from Rhodes to Chamberlain. While Kennedy feared that Germany's rapid industrialization would place it in economic conflict with Anglo-Saxon nations, he acknowledged his preference of the country to what he described as the "yellow" nations—Russia, China, and Japan—that he also viewed as posing threats to Pan-Angles and advocated diplomatic relations between the federation and the Kaiser. Giddings agreed, arguing that "antagonism toward Germany might seem justified were it not that the fear of these other three powers, so different from us, makes Germany our natural and civilizational ally," and envisioning a role for Germany as a buffer state between Pan-Angle civilization and Russia, China, and Japan to the east.¹⁵ For Kennedy and Giddings, Germany's whiteness outweighed the economic threat it posed.

Kennedy's friendliness towards Germany became a major criticism of his book, published shortly before the outbreak of World War I, when reviewers analyzed it during the war's early months. *Athenaeum* bemoaned that Kennedy's "thoughtful treatise [was] most unfortunate in one respect: its speculations [had] taken the wrong turning" upon the start of warfare between Germany and England.¹⁶ Kennedy's "vain effort in racial piety" seemed trivial and threadbare in a world thrust into the chaos of war, and in which the German nation he had praised was fighting against England.¹⁷ One should note, however, that Kennedy's idea of close German and Anglo-Saxon association was not a peculiar facet

14 *Chamberlain*, 58; Mackintosh, 220.

15 Franklin Giddings, *Democracy and Empire*. (New York: Macmillan, 1901), 154.

16 *The Athenaeum*.

17 *The Academy*, 428.

of protectionist thought nor a relic of pre-war economic theory. Hobson, writing in support of free trade in 1916, criticized how “England, Germany, and the United States [were] rivals, fighting for markets, and taking markets that ‘[belonged]’ to ‘[their nation]’ under the wartime global economy.¹⁸ He used such criticism to advocate free trade policy as a means of promoting greater international peace and mitigating the harmful effects of economic competition. Before the outbreak of war, protectionists and free traders alike, from both the United States and Great Britain, understood Germany as an ally in maintaining and furthering their nations’ control over the global economy.

While Kennedy advocated amiable relations with white-coded European nations, he framed the aforementioned “Asian” powers of Japan, Russia, and China as racial inferiors threatening Anglo-Saxon nations. He acknowledged the “thrift and industry” of these three nations not as a point of praise, but as an explanation for how the major “problem now [of]...how to prevent the yellow races from distributing [Asian] lands among themselves” had come to fruition.¹⁹ Kennedy perceived these nations as having mobilized the methods of Western modernity to empower their non-white populaces, a dynamic that incited his fear and resentment. He reserved both the most praise and the most contempt for Japan, a paradox that further uncovers the centrality of whiteness to determining foreigners’ assimilability to American life. Whereas Charles Pepper, the former Foreign Trade Advisor to the State Department, saw the United States and the Japanese as “ideally situated for mutual commerce” due to their success in mutually exclusive industries, Kennedy claimed that the Japanese did not present “ready adaptability to the spirit of [Anglo-Saxon] institutions.” He praised their modernization efforts

¹⁸ Hobson, 15.

¹⁹ Kennedy, 141.

but staunchly denied that two generations of “Western methods” had “changed the Japanese racial characteristics” to facilitate their assimilation, stating that such a belief “ignore[d] the whole background of European history.”²⁰ Tying this outward-facing racism to institutionalized American racism, Kennedy grounded his argument against Japanese assimilation by highlighting how he believed it was a “great mistake” to assume “that the negro was a white man, with the accident of black skin.” For Kennedy, racial distinctions proved more than skin-deep. He harbored the deplorable assumption that intellectualism and political acumen was owed to Anglo-Saxon and Anglophone heritage and even non-whites who embraced Western ideology would never be able to achieve them.

Although Kennedy took pains to establish a relative parity between Britain and the United States to legitimate his calls for federation, his preoccupation with nationality makes it unsurprising that nationalist rhetoric also shaped the power dynamic he envisioned the two nations operating within. He maintained America, as the younger of the two nations, should have a superior position in the progress-minded federation. One must, therefore, acknowledge that, despite emphasizing British heritage, *The Pan-Angles* bears the impact of American nationalism. Kennedy’s explanation of American character as the result of Puritan moralism and “Yankee common sense”²¹ acknowledged ideological differences between America and Britain. Kennedy further presented Americans as a “Saxon-Norman” combination of British liberty, which “produced the individualized man,” and French fraternity, which produced “the socialized man.”²² He argued that Americans, by fusing these two intellectual and social traditions, stood within reach of “at

20 Ibid., 148.

21 Ibid., 276; 303.

22 Ibid., 305; 337.

last creating the inclusive, the universalized man.”²³ Owing to the unique social and political capacity Kennedy attributed to Americans, he foresaw expanding civilization and extending civil liberty throughout the world as “the task of the American people, rather than of any other nation.”²⁴ This favorable view of the US as a burgeoning world power suggests that Kennedy envisioned Pan-Angle federation as means of bolstering American hegemony rather than as a means of merely recreating the British Empire and restoring colonial relations between the United States and its former motherland.

Kennedy’s nationalism remained in tension with his belief that American democracy had British origins. Whereas many American proponents of nationalism viewed the American Revolution as an irreparable rupture between the former colonizer and the formerly colonized, Kennedy explained the war as a manifestation of the value of self-government which bound the two nations together. He claimed the Revolution as a necessary step towards Pan-Angle federation, as it “demonstrated that [American] citizens were the peers of the citizens of Great Britain.”²⁵ Kennedy’s understanding of the war as part of the broader narrative of English-speaking unity seems influenced by Rhodes, who thought that “the English-speaking race” had been “reft in twain by the declaration of American Independence.”²⁶ Kennedy’s understanding of the war as necessary to establish parity between the two nations, however, marks a departure from Rhodes’s expression of the war as a regrettable interlude that destabilized Anglo-Saxon progress. Kennedy’s use of the American Revolution in his argument, therefore, affords a glimpse of his British intellectual influences perilously bound with his American pride.

23 Ibid., 338.

24 Ibid., 306.

25 Ibid., 11.

26 Cecil Rhodes, *The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes*, ed. W.T. Stead (London: Review of Reviews, 1902), 63.

Desiring to secure a formalized federation between the seven nations immune to commercial whims, Kennedy advocated the creation of an overarching government uniting all Pan-Angles. He argued that a reliance solely on abstract sentiments of goodwill to unite the Pan-Angles had resulted in the “separating” of Pan-Angle nations, and that “convergence” could only be achieved by overriding sentimental ties with legal ones wrought by a shared structure of governance. He failed to attend to how this “separation” may have already made the seven nations’ political and social structures irreconcilable. The five British dominions of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Newfoundland included in Kennedy’s plan already exerted a fair degree of autonomy in the early 20th century and a majority of their citizens were pressuring for greater independence, not stronger ties to their former imperial overlords. Australia and New Zealand had already achieved independence by *The Pan-Angles*’ 1914 publication date, and the other nations’ independence movements would find success in the following decades. Kennedy’s myopic understanding of total political federation as an achievable and desirable aim and his distaste for mere sentiment ties between the nations seems a response to Alfred Mahan’s and his 1898 book, *The Interest of America in Sea Power: Present and Future*. In it, Mahan acknowledged that the United States’ naval and economic competition with Great Britain should not bar Americans from pursuing a “cordial understanding” between the two nations. He nonetheless claimed that “formal alliance...[was] out of the question” and a cooperative “sentiment” borne out of “similarity of characteristics and ideas” would instead form the basis of any such understanding. Mahan noted that Great Britain’s power would perhaps eventually wane to the point where it desired “a great federation” with the United States, but claimed that the time was not yet “ripe” for such a development. Kennedy directly

criticized this limited, apolitical, and diffuse vision of potential Anglophone cooperation.

Kennedy attributed the idea of a shared Pan-Angle government to Joseph Chamberlain, the most prominent proponent of British tariff reform and foremost opponent of the nation's predominant pro-free trade sentiment around the turn of the century. In *The Pan-Angles* Kennedy included large block quotes from many of Chamberlain's speeches, including one he gave in Toronto in 1897 where he had stated that he "[refused] to think or speak of the United States of America as a foreign nation," as it possessed "the English tongue and the English love of liberty and law."²⁷ In such a statement, one can find the foundation for Kennedy's claim to the plausibility of Pan-Angle federation based on shared language and law. He was likely heartened to hear a prominent British politician speak with fondness of America and wished to imagine that the sentiment was shared by many British nationals. Chamberlain, however, made no mention of the possibility of the two nations sharing a government, a topic Kennedy immediately pivoted to in his commentary on the speech. Kennedy framed the quote as contributing to his point that "sentiment [was] not government," as mere feelings lacked the power to create lasting bonds between nations, and that politicians needed to think bigger towards creating shared institutions if they hoped for true unity.²⁸ Kennedy poorly grafted a justification for shared government onto Chamberlain's US sympathies, and the disjuncture between Pan-Angleism and Chamberlain's statement thereby revealed the loftiness of Kennedy's hopes of federation. A review of *The Pan-Angle* in *The Academy* journal gave a comedic but apt assessment of *The Pan-Angles* to this end, writing, "We can only commend his aspiration and dismiss it with the benevolent

²⁷ Kennedy, 160.

²⁸ Ibid., 188.

sympathy we should feel for a man who hopes to some day annex Saturn.”²⁹ Kennedy’s Pan-Angleism represented an astronomical distortion of Chamberlain’s friendly sentiments.

While an argument of the racial homogeneity of English-speaking people did some of the argumentative work towards legitimating a Pan-Angle federation, it did not do nearly enough to sketch out a basis for the political unification Kennedy called for. Indeed, Kennedy faced the impossible task of arguing that a political homogeneity existed among Britain, America, and the five other member nations. He rooted these claims of political homogeneity in British common law, which he claimed “the colonists carried out with them” as they sailed to their new homelands.³⁰ Common law, he argued, continued to serve as the defining principle of each of the seven nations’ political philosophies. While he acknowledged the fusion and common law with other, localized threads of political thought, with French law in the case of Louisiana and with “Roman-Dutch law” in South Africa, he maintained that the superiority of common law to address Anglo-Saxons’ needs meant that “the law of any Pan-Angle nation tend[ed] to conform to the practices of our whole civilization.”³¹ This notion of Anglo-Saxon law as waging and winning a Darwinist struggle in the political realm underscores the relationship Kennedy saw between political ideology and race. Kennedy further used his discussion of common law to reiterate the role of race to political homogeneity by arguing that the democratic character of the Common Law could only come from the minds of Anglo-Saxons who were the product of the “crossing of the Germanic and Celtic stocks.”³² For him, Common Law was both a political unifier and, owing to its persistence as

29 “Reviews: The Future of the Seven Nations,” *The Academy* 2218, (1914), 428.

30 Kennedy, 67.

31 *Ibid.*, 69.

32 *Ibid.*, 296.

part of English-speaking nations' government structures, a further example of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority.

Kennedy was not alone in imagining that Anglo-Saxons all shared the same intrinsic political beliefs. Giddings made a case for this political homogeneity that he grounded, bizarrely, in nationalism. He argued that a "legal fiction," which readers could aptly call "nationalism," had replaced the need for tribal alliances and established American "mental homogeneity" grounded in "unity of purpose."³³ This mental and "ethical" homogeneity, Giddings claimed, facilitated American democracy. A claim of political homogeneity even among Americans would have harbored prominent and evident flaws given partisan divisions as well as ideological variance among members of the same party. The argumentative step Giddings took next, purporting shared ethics among all English-speaking people owing to a "common conviction of the...value of individual...liberty," proved even more outlandish.³⁴ He couched cultural values in the language in which political beliefs were expressed, thereby evoking the connection between race, culture, intellectualism, and governance that permeated *The Pan-Angles*. Kennedy's case for Pan-Angle political homogeneity owing to a shared reverence for self-government similarly saw it as intertwined with the language they spoke in common. The distance between this notion and reality finds a humorous parallel in the otherworldliness in which Kennedy casts Pan-Angleism. He asserts that, "If an intelligent traveller from Mars were to tour the earth to-day he would [believe]... that [the seven Pan-Angle Nations] were all inhabited by the same sort of people" given their shared language and democratic politics.³⁵ The point of shared language falters when one considers the multilingualism of the seven nations. With regards

33 Giddings, 5.

34 Ibid., 10.

35 Kennedy, 21.

to shared reverence for self-determination and individualism among English-speaking nations, issues emerge even when only comparing Britain and the US.

One issue concerns government structure: Britain was a constitutional monarchy while America was a democratic republic. *The New York Tribune* noted Kennedy's inclusion "of a monarchy in [his] federation of democracies" in its review of *The Pan-Angles* and claimed the difference as an insurmountable one.³⁶ Attempting to establish a pure democratic heritage for Anglo-Saxons, Kennedy presented the American president as a "modified eighteenth-century British king."³⁷ This British king model, he further argued, had developed from a monarchical authority that, since at least the days of "King John in 1213" had respected popular representation by consulting lords and bishops.³⁸ Kennedy used his insupportable claim that the government of Britain has always functioned based on "freedom and the democratic spirit" to state that Pan-Angle federation would uphold these American values as well. The two nations' legal structures presented a second discrepancy. To reconcile America's written constitution with its unwritten British counterpart, Kennedy made two contradictory claims. First, he claimed that the British could eventually pen a constitution.³⁹ Kennedy provided no evidence that British politicians harbored any strong desire to do so at the time and, indeed, the British government has yet to see the need to give its supreme legal code a written form.⁴⁰ Second, he claimed that both governments operated using tradition, not the written word.⁴¹ Such a claim discounted prominent schools of thought in each nation devoted to constitutional literalism and undermined the importance of

36 "Anglo-Saxon Union: The Federation of All English-Speaking Peoples, *New York Tribune*, December 5, 1914.

37 Kennedy, 114.

38 *Ibid.*, 56.

39 *Ibid.*, 105.

40 *Ibid.*, 96.

41 *Ibid.*, 96.

the English language as a means of conveying and homogenizing political beliefs, the key tenet underlying the argument of political homogeneity in the first place.

Proving the political homogeneity of the seven Pan-Angle nations would have served a greater purpose than merely suggesting an easy path to shared governance. Many of the era's political thinkers, British Constitutional theorist Alfred Dicey among them, argued that policy should reflect public opinion. In the eighth edition of his legal opus, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (1915), Dicey wrote that "democratic sentiment, further, if not democratic principle, demands that the law should, on the whole, correspond with public opinion."⁴² He criticized the expanding power of the British state as evidence of the corrosion of what he viewed as the necessary alignment between popular will and the legal code. Giddings and Kennedy also held "the spirit of individual men," in Kennedy's words, and the nature of society itself as equally fundamental to shaping the character of Pan-Angle legal codes.⁴³ Giddings noted "the conception of the social nature of the self, or individual personality, and the conception of the psychic nature of society" as key to why people readily created democratic governments.⁴⁴ He believed that democracy's social character gave individuals under its governance the moral compass they created to make sense of the world and allowed them the freedom to pursue happiness. Because these scholars held a view adjacent to Dicey's that society and social impulses informed policy, their argument as to the political homogeneity of Britain and the United States also reinforced the notion that the two populations were readily assimilable.

As a result of the immense political power Kennedy afforded knowledge expressed in the English language, Kennedy borrowed

42 Dicey, xlii.

43 Ibid., 48.

44 Giddings, 30.

from the ideas of Cecil Rhodes to envision a prominent role for knowledge-sharing among English-speaking people in a Pan-Angle federation. Kennedy saw English as the only language capable of fully expressing the nuances of democracy and “ideas peculiar to the Pan-Angle psychology” including “individual freedom” and of indoctrinating democratic values within a populace.⁴⁵ He proposed that British and American universities should exchange students and professors to ensure Pan-Angle civilization harbored substantial parallels with the Rhodes Scholar program.⁴⁶ Many of the reviews of *The Pan-Angles* noted the extensive influence of Rhodes’s thoughts on Kennedy’s. *Athenaeum* wrote that “Mr. Kennedy belongs, it is clear, to the school of Cecil Rhodes, who imagined a world kept in the ways of peace by a British, American, and German Federation.”⁴⁷ Rhodes pioneered knowledge-sharing between white nations when he established the fellowship in his public will of 1899, a document Kennedy acknowledged he had consulted when writing *The Pan-Angles*.⁴⁸ When he first established the program, Rhodes afforded two residents of each US state scholarships to Oxford. He reserved a smattering of scholarships for inhabitants of white-dominated British colonies like Australia and fifteen for selection by the German emperor to promote “good understanding” between England, Germany, and the US to establish “peace of the world” of which he believed “educational relations form the strongest tie.”⁴⁹ Rhodes hoped that the scholarships would produce a new generation of Colonists who valued “the unity of the Empire.”⁵⁰ The white racial superiority he hoped these “young Colonists” to

45 Ibid., 25.

46 Ibid., 222.

47 “Review of *The Pan-Angles: A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-Speaking Nations*,” *The Athenaeum* no. 4540, (October 1914).

48 Sinclair Kennedy, “English Plutocracy vs. Free Americanism,” *The Fatherland* 4 no. 12, (1916), 181.

49 *The Last Will*, 35.

50 Ibid., 23.

embody finds evidence in his refusal to provide scholarships to students of predominantly non-white British colonies including India, Nigeria, and Egypt.⁵¹ Thus, one should note the desire to enhance white power, unsurprisingly, as intrinsic to Kennedy's knowledge-sharing proposal as it was to his political and, as this paper will discuss momentarily, his economic thought.

Giddings mirrored Kennedy's emphasis on intellectual sharing amongst Pan-Angles, a fixation that diverged from theories of white superiority predicated on Anglo-Saxon physical prowess advanced by some of their contemporaries. He further claimed that few men had the rationality to achieve higher intellect, but that Americans possessed a particular capacity for doing so that had a British origin.⁵² "It must be claimed that this way of thinking is by no means strange to the American mind," he wrote, "and that it seems to have been a natural one to our English ancestors in earlier centuries."⁵³ He saw education as the basis of full citizenship, an idea that resonated with earlier theorizations of British-American unity, like that proposed by Dicey in 1897, fixated on establishing "common citizenship for all Englishmen and Americans."⁵⁴ The fixation of Kennedy and Giddings on the mental strength of the race contrasted theories like Mahan's emphasizing Anglo-Saxon's physical capacity. Mahan saw America's achievements as built upon the foundation of its citizens' expansionary tendencies which he attributed to their "love of freedom."⁵⁵ Kennedy noted these tendencies as well, lauding the US's domestic expansion and reducing it to the maxim, "A Pan-Angle wanders off and finds something he wishes. He takes it."⁵⁶ Lacking Mahan's verve for the military, however, Kennedy

51 Ibid., 33.

52 Ibid., 209.

53 Ibid., 222.

54 A.V. Dicey, "A Common Citizenship for the English Race," *The Contemporary Review* 71 (1897), 457.

55 Ibid., 143-144.

56 Kennedy, 48.

attributed the acquisition of new territories to Americans' political acumen instead of their physical might. By contrast, Mahan viewed militarism as the primary means of protecting American economic power and political values. He asserted that "the private property borne upon the seas, [was] sustaining the well-being and endurance of the nation [and exceeded]... all other sources of national power."⁵⁷ For Mahan, American character manifested through physical, military exertion. This fixation on physicality differed from Kennedy's and Giddings' emphasis on the mental and linguistic roots of Anglo-Saxon political power.

Kennedy devoted most of his attention to potential political ties between Anglophone powers and largely appropriated its sparse economic policy points from British protectionism. Kennedy's resistance to offering a formal economic plan for federation made his stance on the protectionism versus free trade debate of his era opaque. Kennedy's reverence for Chamberlain, however, provides a guiding light as one moves through the cloud of his muddled political theory towards his economic beliefs. Kennedy described Pan-Angleism as a continuation of Chamberlain's protectionist theory and, to imbed the voice and ideas of Chamberlain in Pan-Angleism, he included three of Chamberlain's speeches in *The Pan-Angles*, each followed by Kennedy's praiseful commentary. Given the centrality of Chamberlain to his work, one can posit that Kennedy imagined the federal ties of Pan-Angleism as an adaptation of the "colonial preferences" proposed by Chamberlain as part of his protectionist program.⁵⁸ Chamberlain saw no disjuncture between seeking colonial territories abroad while privileging British agriculture at home through tariffs which would reduce the nation's import of the colony's raw materials. A staunch proponent of increasing

57 Mahan, 132.

58 Cobden Club, 4.

imperial power, he strongly opposed Home Rule by both Ireland and South Africa during the latter part of his political career, fearing the economic losses Britain would suffer without colonial markets. Thus, Chamberlain's protectionist imperialism, and Kennedy's reverence for it, affords a basis for understanding the seemingly-outward gaze of Kennedy beyond America and towards Pan-Angle federation as a manifestation of his concern for America's economic interests.

Avoiding conversation of what tariffs would look like between the member nations, Kennedy largely embodied Chamberlain's imperialist protectionism in his characterization of a Pan-Angle economic order to focus on the necessity of favorable trade relations with the seven countries' occupied territories. "Colonizing apart," wrote Kennedy, "there is left to us trade." This phraseology connoting a marginal distinction between colonization and Kennedy's envisioned system of trade relations with non-member nations speaks to his desire that a Pan-Angle federation would impose its will on new trade partners for preferential treatment.⁵⁹ His choice to consider the relationship between America and the Philippines, under US occupation at the time he was writing, as an example of a desirable power dynamic between a Pan-Angle power and a non-member trade partner further cements one's sense of the imperial character he hoped Pan-Angleism would take on. Envisioning an expansion of Anglo-Saxon control and an increasing number of trade partnerships with occupied territories as a result of Pan-Angle federation, Kennedy expounded on the political relationship that should accompany these kinds of trade connections. He asserted that those who lived in occupied territories economically bound to Pan-Angle nations should only be seen to "belong to"

⁵⁹ Kennedy, 45.

the empire.⁶⁰ He criticized Pan-Angles for historically failing to properly distinguish between true Anglo-Saxons comprising “part of” the empire, and the colonized who merely inhabited one of its possessions.⁶¹ This definitional slippage, in his view, had dangerously compromised the coherence of Anglo-Saxon racial identity. In Kennedy’s view, economic hegemony was central to the survival of Anglophone people and the endurance of their status as the nations with, according to him, the “highest standard of living known to any comparable number of people in the world,” as well as the greatest “per capita wealth and per capita land holdings.”⁶² Kennedy designed an economic policy to enhance Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy.

Anglo-Saxon hegemony over international trade, which Kennedy presented as the basis of maintaining the American standard of living, however, could only manifest in the case of secure federation. Kennedy viewed the division of the British empire into independent nations engaged in “competitions of commerce” as the gravest threat to Anglophone whites. He wrote that detrimental economic infighting would persist “as long as the seven nations [remained] in real or hazily defined independence.”⁶³ Federating Pan-Angles and structuring trade in an imperial fashion, Kennedy hoped to avoid competition’s detrimental impact not only on national economies but on individual economic power. He described competition as “the quickest attack on a nation’s standard of living,” a fear which resonated with Chamberlain’s fixation on demonstrating that tariff reform would benefit the working man.⁶⁴ Chamberlain’s initial plans for tariff reform envisioned directing the tax revenue towards old

60 Ibid., 9; 15.

61 Ibid., 15.

62 Ibid., 40, 42.

63 Ibid., 121.

64 Ibid., 121.

age pensions for the working-class.⁶⁵ He quickly realized that the resulting revenues would not be sufficient to support a pension system and shifted his appeals to the working-class to focus on the employment his plan would protect rather than the welfare it would offer.⁶⁶ Chamberlain claimed that tariff reform surpassed all competing policies in its ability to “ensure full employment [and] continuous employment at fair wages.”⁶⁷ American Protectionists, like Roswell Benedict in *Tam, Tom, and Tim's Discussion of Free Trade* (1901), similarly claimed that tariffs were “a dam to keep American money in the country and to run American mills and employ American labor” in contrast to free trade, which they viewed as a hindrance industry and a source of job losses.⁶⁸ Like Protectionists, Kennedy described his plan as a means of reasserting the economic power of the everyman threatened by trusts and runaway capitalism.

The fixation on the working class inherent to protectionist rhetoric fit within a larger framework that emphasized the benefits prioritizing national and racial interests, instead of free trade, harbored for British and American families. Kennedy, owing to his argument's predication upon furthering the Anglo-Saxon race, also took great interest in supporting familial stability. He claimed the ultimate goal of the Pan-Angles as “to live and to have children in turn,” and saw economic and social stability of families as an American ideal and one necessary to the perpetuation of Pan-Angle superiority.⁶⁹ Protectionists paralleled their employment with one regarding the higher wages they foresaw arising once tariffs made it cost-prohibitive for British manufacturers to seek foreign labor and they instead had to employ the smaller Anglo-

65 Cobden Club, 2; Alexander Mackintosh, *Joseph Chamberlain: An Honest Biography*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1914), 197.

66 Robertson, 10.

67 Mackintosh, 288.

68 R.A. Benedict, *Tam, Tom and Tim's Discussion of Free Trade* (Cranford, N.J. M.P. Benedict, 1901), 8.

69 Kennedy, 44.

Saxon labor pool. Chamberlain argued free trade a “middle-class conspiracy” in the interest of manufacturers, who hoped that “the big loaf,” a popular euphemism for lower food costs owing to cheap imported wheat, “meant lower wages” could be paid to workers.⁷⁰ Such concerns reflect the domestic policy issues central to tariff reform arguments. Protectionists opposed income taxes and proposed that tariffs on imports would fund a British welfare state in their place. Amery drew his readers’ attention towards the gains he believed households would make under protectionism. Employing the gendered understanding of the period of women as consumers of household goods and men as wage earners, he claimed that a fixation on higher prices ignored that “there are no consumers who are not directly or indirectly dependent on the efforts of producers. Can the interests of wives and children,” he asked, “be separated from those of the breadwinners?” Amery’s holistic household view responded to accusations by free trade proponents, like the members of the Cobden Club, that protectionists concerned themselves with producers and hoped to prevent consumers from realizing the burden of the tax on their habits.⁷¹ Economic policy related to the family undergirded plans for securing Anglophone power.

The protectionist foundation of Pan-Angleism undermines the assessments by many of Kennedy’s early critics that Pan-Angleism would play into the hands of the British as they sought to cement their international supremacy. Kennedy’s adoption of Rhodes’s ideas, including his fellowship program, led Kennedy’s critics to assert that Pan-Angleism would certainly benefit Great Britain, but likely at the expense of greater, independently-amassed American power. For the editors of the *Geographic Journal Review*, *The Pan-Angles* seemed to “clearly [present] the

70 Cobden Club, 10; Mackintosh, 299; Cobden Club, 11.

71 Cobden Club, 52.

case for British imperial federation; but the case for the inclusion of the United States” seemed to them “less clear.”⁷² What these critics failed to realize was the near-impossibility that the British would ever pursue Protectionist policies, even if British politicians believed that these policies would be part of regaining control of the United States. Although protectionism held a place in British political discourse, Americans were the ideology’s firm adherents while Britain maintained its status as the world’s only free-trade economy throughout this period. Benedict claimed that “no form of Free Trade, consistent with American prosperity, [would] ever be a scientific possibility.”⁷³ He further contended that “England [was] an out and out free trade country, and about the only one on earth that [was],” owing to the advantage it secured as the first nation to adopt free-trade policies.⁷⁴ Indeed, American economists of the era frequently argued that American protectionism was necessary to counter British free trade and protect infant industry. This claim became increasingly hard to support in this period, owing to the unavoidable reality that the Northern Securities Company railroad line and other companies targeted by early 20th-century trust-busting had far surpassed “infant” status. Nonetheless, an insurmountable American fondness for protectionism remained, if tempered by the rise of monopolies. Despite Rhodes’ outlandish desires to reunify the pre-Revolution British Empire, the predominant political powers in Britain at the time of *The Pan-Angle’s* publication expressed little desire to pursue Protectionism or any far-fetched plots for economic or political recapture of the US.

British Free Traders who dominated Parliamentary politics, like J.A. Hobson, argued that Britain could never support a

72 “Reviewed Work(s): The Pan-Angles by Sinclair Kennedy,” *The Geographic Journal* 45 no. 1 (January 1915).

73 Benedict, iii.

74 Ibid., 34.

protectionist economy. “Our ownership of half of the shipping of the world and our control of commerce over the great world-routes,” he wrote in 1916, “could only have been developed and maintained by our policy of free ports and markets.”⁷⁵ To tariff reformers’ claims that England could achieve economic success through employing American-style protectionism, Robertson responded by asserting the two nations as incomparable. With twice the population of England, thirty times its landmass, greater coal and iron resources, and much greater availability of agricultural land, Robertson saw the US as an entirely different economic beast to the British Isles.⁷⁶ He further claimed that the US suffered from higher food and clothing prices as well as elevated rates of unemployment, all leading up to his point that US economic success owed to its wealth of resources rather than the effectiveness of protectionist policies.⁷⁷ Many in Britain proved reticent to adopting a protectionism-based economy and, therefore, reviewers’ identification of a Pan-Angle scheme as one which played into the hands of British politicians eagerly awaiting imperial federation proves hard to legitimate.

Kennedy’s critics’ claims of Pan-Angleism as a British-favoring plot were further compromised by the circulation of American-dominated visions of British-American alliance in this period. Political scientist and fellow Harvard Law School graduate Brooks Adams posited in *America’s Economic Supremacy* (1900) that Great Britain’s time as the world’s foremost power had come to an end. He claimed the economic crises of the 1890s as symptomatic of British decline and argued that international “wealth and power [was] migrating westward, and may..have entered America.”⁷⁸ To evidence this claim, he noted global

75 J.A. Hobson, *The New Protectionism*, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916), 112.

76 J.M. Robertson, *Chamberlain: A Study*, (London: Watts, 1905), 12

77 *Chamberlain*, 12.

78 Brooks Adams, *America’s Economic Supremacy*, (New York: Macmillan, 1900), vi.

economic shifts, including the rising flood of gold into New York banks.⁷⁹ Brooks also established a lineage of economic supremacy passing from Britain to the US by noting the interconnectedness of the two economies.⁸⁰ He claimed that the case for Anglo-Saxon alliance had become clear to members of both nations as well as to their foreign enemies,⁸¹ and stated that such an alliance would “alter profoundly the equilibrium of the world” to direct exchanges “strongly westward” and channel profits towards the US.⁸² Brooks thereby presented Anglo-Saxon federation as a natural step in redirecting British wealth towards establishing the global economic primacy of the US, a view that takes Kennedy’s nationalist view of the supremacy Pan-Angleism could afford Americans a few steps further.

Even though the fervent opposition between protectionists and free traders played a prominent role in prewar transnational politics, considering the two ideologies as entirely disparate would obscure their shared fear of warfare and how the desire to maintain international peace shaped Kennedy’s Pan-Angle argument. Hobson called protectionism “*the crime...against civilization*” that drove nations apart through tariffs “whereas the whole trend of civilization,” he argued, “[had] been to bind the peoples of the world into closer unity of interests and activities.”⁸³ While Hobson called for greater foreign exchange, including travel and language-learning, to further his free trade policy and instill peace worldwide, Kennedy expressed a more focused fear of competition among English-speaking nations. Kennedy couched his desires for federation in the need for “self-preservation” of English-speaking people through maintaining peace between

79 Ibid., 8.

80 Ibid., 11.

81 Ibid., 41.

82 Ibid., 25.

83 Ibid., 113.

them.⁸⁴ Giddings echoed him on this point, writing with alarm of the “Russian-Chinese combination” and its opposition to “English civilization.” He demanded that the United States support its British ally to not “lose commercial opportunities,” claiming that, in light of an English-speaking alliance, Americans would “need have little fear that another thousand years of medieval night [would] fall upon the Western world.” Giddings argued for a failure to ally as the precipitating factor in a return to the dark ages.⁸⁵ While free traders hoped to promote international accord, protectionists and Pan-Angles hoped that a two-headed British-American economic and political hegemon (or, in the case of Kennedy, a hegemon with two large heads and five smaller ones) could suppress future conflict to the same peaceful outcome.

Sinclair Kennedy’s theory of a Pan-Angle federation to empower the Anglo-Saxon race resonated with, and often borrowed from, arguments made in the free trade versus protectionism debate and by sociologists like Giddings. Kennedy combined Chamberlain’s proposed system of favorable tariffs between Britain and the US with Rhodes’ infatuation with knowledge-sharing between the two nations. To Chamberlain and Rhodes’s theories, he added an argument about Anglophone nations’ shared political ideals, which he attributed to the ideas intrinsic to the English language. An argument about racial homogeneity and white superiority, shaped by fears of the increasing power of Russia, China, and Japan, nonetheless formed the foundation of Kennedy’s argument. Significant tensions existed between the ideas Kennedy drew upon and the outcomes of their implementation he foresaw. Pan-Angleism rested on protectionist and imperial discourse designed for British use, and yet Kennedy framed English-speaking federation as the basis of American

84 Kennedy, viii.

85 Giddings, 289.

international supremacy. Kennedy also claimed Pan-Angleism as a means of renewing Americans' democratic values, notably that of self-government, despite the white dominance and oppression of people of color, both at home and in conquered territories, inherent to its rhetoric. *The Pan-Angles* reveals the mutability of economic discourse at the hands of political thinkers, a mutability made possible, in part, by the pervasiveness of racism and notions of white superiority in British and American political and economic theory.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Brooks. *America's Economic Supremacy*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900.
- Amery, L.M.S. *The Great Question: Free Trade or Tariff Reform?: The Case for Tariff Reform*. London: Sir I. Pitman and Sons, Ltd., 1909.
- Benedict, Roswell Alphonzo. *Tam, Tom and Tim's Discussion of Free Trade as a Remedy for Trusts, the Money Question, Imperialism, the Colonial Question, Tariff Revision, and Reciprocity*. Cranford, N.J. M.P. Benedict, 1901.
- Cobden Club. *Fact Versus Fiction: The Cobden Club's Reply to Mr. Chamberlain*. London: Cassel & Company, 1904, 4.
- Dacey, Albert Venn. "A Common Citizenship for the English Race." *The Contemporary Review* 71 (1897), 457.
- Dacey, Albert Venn. *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*. London: The Macmillan Company, 1915.
- "George Golding Kennedy Papers." HOLLIS for Archival Discovery. Harvard University. Accessed December 11, 2019. <https://hollisarchives.lib.harvard.edu/repositories/5/resources/4524>.
- Giddings, Franklin Henry. *Democracy and Empire: With Studies of Their Psychological, Economic, and Moral Foundations*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901.
- Hobson, John Atkinson. *The New Protectionism*. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916.

- Leonard, Thomas C. "Origins of the myth of social Darwinism: The ambiguous legacy of Richard Hofstadter's *Social Darwinism in American Thought*." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 71 (2009).
- Sinclair Kennedy, Sinclair. "English Plutocracy vs. Free Americanism." *The Fatherland* 4 no. 12, (1916).
- Kennedy, Sinclair. *The Pan-Angles*. New York: Longmans & Green, 1915.
- Mackintosh, Alexander. *Joseph Chamberlain: An Honest Biography*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1914.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1898.
- Palen, Marc-William. *The "Conspiracy" of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle Over Empire and Economic Globalization, 1846-1896*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- "Review of The Pan-Angles: A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-Speaking Nations." *The Athenaeum* no. 4540, (1914): 447-448.
- "Reviews: The Future of the Seven Nations." *The Academy and Literature* 2218. (November 1914), 428.
- "Reviewed Work(s): The Pan-Angles by Sinclair Kennedy." *The Geographic Journal* 45 no. 1 (January 1915), 76-77.
- Rhodes, Cecil. *The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes: With Elucidatory Notes to Which Are Added Some Chapters Describing the Political and Religious Ideals of the Testator*. Ed. W.T. Stead. London: "Review of Reviews" Office, 1902.
- Robertson, John Mackinnon. *Chamberlain: A Study*. London: Watts, 1905.
- Robertson, John Mackinnon. *The Great Question: Free Trade or Tariff Reform?: The Case for Free Trade*. London: Sir I. Pitman and Sons, Ltd., 1909.
- Schrader, Frederic Franklin. "A Reply to Mr. Sinclair Kennedy," *The Fatherland* 4 no. 12 (1916).

Schulyer, R.L. "Reviewed Work(s): The Pan-Angles by Sinclair Kennedy." *Political Science Quarterly* 30 no. 3. (September 1915), 524-525.

"Sinclair Kennedy Papers." HOLLIS for Archival Discovery. Harvard University. Accessed December 11, 2019. <https://hollisarchives.lib.harvard.edu/repositories/5/resources/4524>.<https://hollisarchives.lib.harvard.edu/repositories/22/resources/1224>.

Trentmann, Frank. "Political Culture and Political Economy: Interest, Ideology and Free Trade." *Review of International Political Economy* 5 no. 2 (1998), 217-251.

MSG, CHINESE RESTAURANT SYNDROME, AND MORAL PANIC

The Hidden Contagion

Giacomo McCarthy

Before May 1968, monosodium glutamate, the flavor enhancer casually abbreviated “MSG,” was a popular seasoning throughout America. Grocery stores advertised it as “nothing short of pure goodness” in newspapers that published recipes which called for MSG; *The New York Times* included it in its “Beginner’s Spice Shelf;” and the popular cookbook *Cook at Home in Chinese* dubbed the glutamic acid-sodium compound as “one of the five ‘Chinese staples’ one needed to start cooking Chinese [food.]”¹

Dr. Robert Ho Man Kwok’s correspondence to *The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM)* in April 1968 curtailed the seasoning’s growing popularity. *NEJM* provided the letter’s title in all-caps: CHINESE-RESTAURANT SYNDROME.² Kwok’s letter itself does not carry the term—each of the words is used but separately from one another—but a month later, each of the ten responses to Kwok’s correspondence published by *NEJM* used the term “Chinese Restaurant Syndrome” to describe its subject.³ These letters, published in the May 16th edition of the journal, were noticed by national media outlets such as *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*; these wrote about the topic in their May

1 “4 1/2-Oz. Monosodium Glutamate,” *The Los Angeles Times*, March 9, 1968; Jane Nickerson, “The Beginner’s Spice Shelf,” *The New York Times*, June 5, 1955; Jordan Sand, “A Short History of Msg: Good Science, Bad Science, and Taste Cultures,” *Gastronomica* 5 (2005), 43.

2 Robert Ho Man Kwok, “Chinese-Restaurant Syndrome,” *New England Journal of Medicine* (1968), 796.

3 H. Schaumberg et al., “Post-Sino-Cibal Syndrome”; Kwok, “Chinese Restaurant Syndrome,” 796.

19th Sunday papers with headlines such as “Chinese Restaurant Syndrome Puzzles Doctors.”⁴ These stories were reprinted in local media outlets around the country the following day, and “Chinese Restaurant Syndrome” had become a national story.⁵

Researchers, keen to ease the newest national discomfort, published two hastily-conducted and admittedly unscientific studies—again in the correspondence section of *NEJM* (ed. July 11, 1968)—identifying MSG as the cause of “Chinese Restaurant Syndrome” (CRS).⁶ By the end of the summer, *The Los Angeles Times* called MSG a “contaminant,” exposure to which, according to *The Washington Post*, had researchers “eating and weeping, eating and fainting.”⁷ As public awareness of MSG’s dangers grew, so did the scope of the allegations. By May 1969, Richard D. Lyons, a reporter for *The New York Times*, published a story claiming that MSG caused brain damage and should thus be avoided by pregnant women.⁸

The discovery of CRS and the determination that it is caused by MSG was contradictory: MSG was a widely used seasoning in consumer products as popular and universal as Campbell’s soup, chips, cereal, TV dinners, condiments, and baby food as well as many restaurants serving a wide range of global cuisines.⁹ MSG could not be the cause of a specifically Chinese syndrome because its usage was not specific to Chinese food. Despite this, the worry was not redirected to “MSG Syndrome” or any similar

4 Richard D. Lyons, “‘Chinese Restaurant Syndrome’ Puzzles Doctors,” *The New York Times*, May 19, 1968.

5 “Egg Foo Hungover,” *The Billings Gazette*, May 20, 1968.

6 Marjorie Ambos et al., “Sin Cib-Syn: Accent on Glutamate,” *New England Journal of Medicine* 279, no. 2 (1968), 105; Herbert H. Schaumburg and Robert Byck, “Sin Cyb-Syn: Accent on Glutamate,” *New England Journal of Medicine* 279, no. 2 (1968), 105.

7 Linda Mathews, “Who Put the Contaminant...?,” *The Los Angeles Times* via *The Calgary Herald*, August 12, 1968; Victor Cohn, “What’s This About Chinese Food Being Harmful?,” *The Washington Post via Florida Today*, September 12, 1968.

8 Richard D. Lyons, “Damage to Brain Linked to Chemical Used to Aid Flavor,” *The New York Times*, May 10, 1969.

9 Ian Mosby, “‘That Won-Ton Soup Headache’: The Chinese Restaurant Syndrome, MSG and the Making of American Food, 1968-1980,” *Social History of Medicine* 22, no. 1 (2009), 139.

term. Instead, the title of Kwok's letter has persisted to the modern day—in just the last year, *The Daily Mail* and *The New York Post* have published stories warning readers about CRS—inextricably linking the fear of MSG with Chinese-ness and Chinese food.¹⁰ The ensuing panic was not about MSG in isolation—had it been, the ingredient list on canned food around the country would have caused mass hysterics—but rather Chinese use of MSG. The illogicality of this permits the categorization of America's crusade against CRS as a moral panic, defined by Stanley Cohen as when “a condition, episode, person, or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests.”¹¹

This paper shows that the moral panic of MSG and CRS was empowered by a historical xenophobia directed towards Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants in the United States that otherized these Chinese communities through a discourse of cultural bizarreness. The MSG panic was driven by the fear of contamination by this otherness both on the individual level by a toxic, invisible Chinese flavoring and on the national cultural level by Chinese culture and cuisine. The panic was managed by journalists and the media, doctors and researchers, and political lobbyists, all of whose finances and reputations improved by means of the MSG moral panic.

LET'S REWIND: WHERE DID MSG COME FROM?

In the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan was in the middle of a cultural, industrial, and economic revolution. The Meiji period (1866-1912) saw Japan transform from a poor farming nation in the mid-nineteenth century to an industrial

10 Sam Blanchard, “‘Chinese Restaurant Syndrome’ Does Exist: Doctor Reveals the Best Tea to Drink If You Feel Unwell after Eating Egg-Fried Rice and Chow Mein,” *The Daily Mail*, June 29, 2018.

11 Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 23.

power by the beginning of World War II. The chemist and inventor Ikeda Kikunae was part of this wave of Japanese innovation. In 1908, Kikunae decided that “manufacturing a good, inexpensive seasoning to make bland, nutritious food tasty might be a way to [improve the poor Japanese diet.]”¹²

His product was an isolation of the ingredient in sea kelp that gives dashi, the ubiquitous Japanese stock, its unique flavor. Its chemical composition is a single sodium atom bonded with glutamate, or, simply, monosodium glutamate. By 1909 Kikunae had sold the formula for MSG to the Suzuki Chemical Company. The company marketed MSG with the brand Aji-No-Moto, which translates roughly as “the essence of taste.”¹³ Japan was the ideal initial market for Aji-No-Moto as its scientific-sounding name triggered associations with science, innovation, hygiene, and nutrition, which appealed to the Meiji ideals of civilization and enlightenment.¹⁴

Aji-No-Moto became a staple in Japanese home cooking after a series of Western endorsements and a well-designed marketing campaign that targeted the new sensibility of Japan’s reinvented domestic housewife.¹⁵ The company’s profits took off and by 1920 had entered the Chinese market by targeting the bourgeois housewife slightly differently, this time showing her dining with family as a servant prepares to bring them a plate of food made delicious by MSG.¹⁶ The flavor had entrenched itself by the end of the decade as chefs in both countries were reluctantly compelled to use MSG in their dishes as customers expected the heightened flavor it produced.

¹² Sand, “A Short History of Msg: Good Science, Bad Science, and Taste Cultures,” 38.

¹³ Betty Boxold, “The Little White Crystals That Grew,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, February 21, 1968.

¹⁴ Sand, “A Short History of Msg: Good Science, Bad Science, and Taste Cultures,” 38.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

Aji-No-Moto had attempted to cross the Pacific into the domestic American market in the mid-1920s but had been unsuccessful. Between the late 1920s and the attack on Pearl Harbor, Aji-No-Moto and MSG became popular in the United States through big deals with canned food companies, Campbell's predominant among them. In fact, between the late 1920s and 1941, Aji-No-Moto exported more MSG to the United States than it did anywhere other than Japan and Taiwan.¹⁷ The war stunted Aji-No-Moto's growth in the United States but did not slow the rising popularity of MSG, as military nutritionists used the seasoning to enhance the flavor of the necessarily cheap rations.¹⁸ As the government invested in their own manufacture of MSG, a private American labeling—Ac'cent—began to appear in American grocery stores. MSG had secured its footing in both domestic American cooking and commercialized precooked meals.

A (FOOL'S) GOLD PROMISE: THE HISTORY OF ANTI-CHINESE HATRED AND XENOPHOBIA

To explain how MSG became the cause of a specifically Chinese syndrome, it is important to understand the difficult history of the Chinese population in America. The first great wave of Chinese immigrants came in the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1848, James W. Marshall noticed something shiny beneath the surface of Sutter's Creek in Northern California. He had found gold, and with his discovery came an influx of hopeful miners. In 1849, the first year of the gold rush, three hundred and twenty-five of those miners were Chinese. That number grew to 20,026 in 1852, and, by 1870, there were approximately 63,000 Chinese immigrants in the United States, 77% of whom lived in California.¹⁹ Chinese labor brokerages

17 Ibid., 43.

18 Ibid.

19 Erika Lee, *The Making of Asian America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 142.

had encouraged them to come to America with promises of safety, wealth and prosperity. One such broker claimed that, “Americans are very rich people. They want the Chinaman to come and make him very welcome. There you will have great pay, large houses, and food and clothing of the finest description...It is a nice country, without Mandarins or soldiers. All alike, big man no larger than little man.”²⁰

This promise went unfulfilled once the immigrants reached the United States. Even as more Chinese immigrants poured into the country, those who were already established were struggling to make ends meet. By the end of 1860, seventy percent of Chinese employees in California worked as miners, but few of them had discovered any gold and began to open restaurants and laundries in mining communities to make ends meet.²¹ As the Chinese population grew and expanded beyond California, it was met with increased hostility even as the value of Chinese labor was recognized by media commenters such as the *Daily Alta California*, which called it “[a] great benefit of the State.”²² For Chinese workers, this hostility manifested itself in unfair working conditions and occupational and cultural insecurity. This insecurity is made clear by the lines designated “critical for a Chinese immigrant’s survival” in the 1875 *An English-Chinese Phrase Book*:

I cannot trust you.
 I have made an apology, but he still wants to strike me.
 He took it from me by violence...
 He tries to extort money from me...
 He cheated me out of my wages.
 He defrauded me out of my salary...
 He starved to death in prison...
 He tried to kill me by assassination...
 Have you no way to take revenge?
 The immigration will soon be stopped.²³

20 Xiao-Huang Yin, *Chinese-American Literature Since the 1850s* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 14.

21 Lee, *The Making of Asian America*, 171.

22 Ibid., 172.

23 Yin, *Chinese-American Literature Since the 1850s*, 32.

As the mines dried up during the 1860s, newly unemployed Chinese laborers found work building the Transcontinental Railroad. The first Chinese workers were hired for the project in 1865, and by 1867, 12,000 Chinese immigrants comprised 90% of the active workforce on the railroad.²⁴ In May 1869, the final track was laid to connect the Central Pacific and Union Pacific railroads at Promontory Point, completing the Transcontinental Railroad and leaving tens of thousands of former miners and railroad workers unemployed and without citizenship in San Francisco.²⁵

In the economic depression of the 1870s, these newly unemployed Chinese immigrants became a scapegoat for the hardships of struggling white American workers. As they searched for work, many Chinese laborers took jobs in factories in Northern California where they accepted low wages that effectively undercut the white workers whom they were replacing. At the same time, the newly completed Transcontinental Railroad brought a steady stream of Civil War veterans and European immigrants to seek better fortunes on the West Coast. Instead of finding economic prosperity, these settlers were faced by a cutthroat job market and economic insecurity.²⁶ These struggles coalesced into the anti-Chinese movement to which a vast majority of white Californians subscribed—in 1879, ninety-nine percent of California's voting population voted against Chinese immigration.²⁷ The movement was represented by the Workingmen's Party of California, whose campaign against Chinese immigration provided cover for the Eastern European, Irish, and Hispanic ethnic groups, which were "probationary members of the white race" on the East Coast, to intermingle and become assimilated members of the American

24 Lee, *The Making of Asian America*, 175.

25 Iris Chang, *The Chinese in America* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 120.

26 Chang, *The Chinese in America*, 121; Beth Lew-Williams, *The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the Alien in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 35.

27 *Ibid.*, 40.

citizenry. The Workingmen's party of California defined whites as the opposite of the 'bizarre' Chinese, who "looked different (especially with their hair in long-braided queues), spoke an unfamiliar language, knew little of Judeo-Christian beliefs, wore loose tunics instead of button-up shirts, and preferred pork and rice to beef and potatoes."²⁸ This 'bizarre' and otherized image of the Chinese immigrant served as the justification for legal measures taken to restrict Chinese immigration in the early 1880s.

This came in the form of a bill proposed by California Republican John Miller which would bar Chinese immigration to the United States for twenty years. His argument in favor of the bill conjured images of an Anglo-Saxon American idyll, outlining "a land resonant with the sweet voices of flaxen-haired children' and uncontaminated by 'the gangrene of oriental civilization.'"²⁹ The bill was met with support in Congress but was eventually vetoed by President Chester Arthur, who believed that he would be renegeing on an earlier agreement with China were the bill to pass. This veto was met with condemnation throughout the country and particularly in California, where the threat of mob violence forced Arthur to sign a modified version of the bill proposed by Horace Page, another California Republican, that restricted Chinese immigration for ten years rather than the previously proposed twenty.³⁰

The passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act served as an endorsement of violence for many vigilante groups across the West. Communities of Chinese immigrants were driven out of their homes by groups of angry white citizens. In September 1885, an anti-Chinese rally in Tacoma, Washington called upon its citizens to help drive out all of the Chinese from the Washington Territory and created groups of activists to go door to door in Seattle and

²⁸ Lew-Williams, *The Chinese Must Go*, 34, 36; Charles Wollenberg, "A California Precedent," <https://californiahistoricalsociety.blogspot.com/2016/02/day-of-remembrance.html>.

²⁹ Chang, *The Chinese in America*, 131.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 132.

Tacoma to pass along the message. Most laborers had left by the end of October, but those with merchandise, equipment, or possessions too valuable and bulky to move were forced to stay. On November 3rd, six hundred Chinese migrants in Tacoma's Chinatown were forced out of their homes by an angry mob that would only answer "All the Chinese, you must go!" to protestations.³¹ This happened in as many as 168 communities across the American West from 1885 to 1886.³² Much worse occurred in the same year in a mining community in Rock Springs, Wyoming, when a band of white miners, unable to cope with the low wages Chinese miners accepted, armed themselves and attacked the local Chinatown. They burned down buildings and forced their inhabitants to flee the smoke and flames, at which point they were shot and killed. At least twenty-eight Chinese workers were murdered. Similar events occurred two years later in Hells Canyon, Oregon, when thirty-one Chinese miners were robbed and murdered by "a group of white ranchers and schoolboys intent on stealing their gold and cleansing the region of their presence."³³ Similarly, the citizens of Colusa lynched sixteen-year-old Hong Di before he could stand trial for murder. The citizens' confidence in Di's guilt was so great that they took a commemorative picture of the scene after the murder had been committed.³⁴ The purported 'bizarreness' of Chinese migrants served as a justification for mass violence and blatant public racism.

The early history of America's Chinese population carried cultural weight long into the twentieth century. Although the Exclusion Act was only intended to last for ten years, a series of new laws, beginning with the 1902 Geary Act, suspended further Chinese immigration until the official repeal of Exclusion in 1943, which was passed as a conciliatory gesture towards China, which had acted as an

31 Chang, *The Chinese in America*, 133; Lew-Williams, *The Chinese Must Go*, 1.

32 Lew-Williams, *The Chinese Must Go*, 1.

33 Chang, *The Chinese in America*, 135; "The Chinese Exclusion Act," in *Re-imagining Migration UCLA* (The University of California at Los Angeles).

34 Lew-Williams, *The Chinese Must Go*, 3-4.

ally in World War II.³⁵ In the years of exclusion, Chinese immigrants were forced to fight for their rights, including those belonging to citizens. The San Francisco collector of customs in 1893 refused to accept testimonies from Caucasians to verify the citizenship of Chinese born in the United States. The 1905 *United States v. Ju Toy* Supreme Court decision mandated that all Chinese denied entry to the country, even those with citizenship, were unable to appeal their decisions and instead subject to a final decision made by the secretary of commerce and labor.³⁶ This decision slowed the legal entry of Chinese immigrants, many of whom were already given residency in the United States and were trapped outside of the country when this decision was made.

Between 1910 and 1943, Chinese immigration was controlled through Angel Island off the coast of San Francisco. Many potential migrants were detained for extended periods of time only to be sent back to where they came from. Poetry written by the detainees provides an image of their experience:

Alas, yellow souls suffer under the brute force of the white race!
Like a pig chased into a basket, we are sternly locked in.
Our souls languish in a snowy vault;
we are really not even the equal of cattle and horses.
Our tears shower the icy day; we are not even equal to bird or fowl.³⁷

After World War II and the repeal of exclusion, the Chinese community in America solidified. Many families had children, some of whom went to college and joined the ranks of the upper-middle class. This caused a cultural shift towards more rapid assimilation, and the former Chinese population centers began to disperse—in 1940, there were twenty-eight recorded ‘Chinatowns.’ By 1955, that number had decreased to sixteen.³⁸

35 Chang, *The Chinese in America*, 136.

36 Lew-Williams, *The Chinese Must Go*, 140.

37 Yin, *Chinese-American Literature Since the 1850s*, 37.

38 Chang, *The Chinese in America*, 242.

Our scene is set for the moral panic of Chinese Restaurant Syndrome and MSG by the policy changes made by Mao Zedong's government in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1957, Mao Zedong's 'anti-Rightist' movement seemed to open the floor to criticism of the Communist Party. Those who spoke out, however, were labeled "counterrevolutionaries" and detained or imprisoned. This spectacle caused many Chinese to apply for exit visas.³⁹ A year later in 1958, the Chinese government attempted to jumpstart the economy with China's 'Great Leap Forward,' forcing seven hundred million people to work in agricultural communes. The policy was unsuccessful and caused devastating famine which forced Mao Zedong to open the gates to emigration, allowing tens of thousands of Chinese into the United States. Their arrival in the United States brought an influx of Chinese culture and reestablished the Chinatowns that had begun to diminish in the 1940s and 50s.⁴⁰ As MSG became a national headline, less-assimilated Chinese populations were beginning to reemerge, poking at the long-latent embers of the racism of the late nineteenth century.

LET'S PANIC: MSG GETS SCARY

Dr. Robert Ho Man Kwok's April 1968 letter to the *NEJM* described his adverse reaction to food served at a number of Chinese restaurants in the United States:

I have experienced a strange syndrome whenever I have eaten out in a Chinese restaurant...the syndrome usually begins 15 to 20 minutes after I have eaten the first dish, lasts about two hours, without any hangover effect. The most prominent symptoms are numbness at the back of the neck, gradually radiating to both arms and the back, general weakness, and palpitation.⁴¹

As a recent Chinese immigrant, Kwok was familiar with the ingredients of Chinese food and quickly discounted ingredients

39 Ibid., 246.

40 Ibid., 247.

41 Kwok, "Chinese-Restaurant Syndrome," 796.

common to his own family's cooking such as soy sauce. He proposed a few potential causes, including the cooking wine, high sodium content, and the monosodium glutamate, finally petitioning his fellow medical researchers for their input.

Each of the ten responses published in the May 16th edition of *NEJM* suggested more serious symptoms and more outlandish causes than those proposed by Kwok. The final correspondence published in the May 16th edition likened Kwok's syndrome to a reaction to puffer fish toxicity, which causes "numbness and tingling of the lips, tongue, and inner surfaces of the mouth. Weakness follows and then there is a paralysis of the limb and chest muscles. Death may occur in 30 minutes."⁴² Another contributor was reminded of a patient who had died of cerebro-vascular thrombosis three hours after eating a Chinese dinner. Herbert Schaumburg, then an Assistant Professor of Neurology at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, pledged significant funds to "an intensive study of this problem."⁴³

Rich with sources and citations from eleven medical professionals who had been published in a top-tier medical journal, national media—in particular the aforementioned *Washington Post* and *New York Times* articles—ran with the story only days after the May 16th edition of *NEJM* was published. They relied on the contributors' conjecture as evidence of a problem and printed frightening articles. In particular, Richard D. Lyons' "'Chinese Restaurant Syndrome' Puzzles Doctors" gained significant traction after being reprinted around the country.⁴⁴ The frenzy of anti-Chinese food sentiment in the media was so great that Herbert Schaumburg, the contributor who had offered money for research on the cause of "Chinese Restaurant Syndrome," sent

42 Schaumburg et al., "Post-Sino-Cibal Syndrome," 1122.

43 Ibid.

44 Lyons, "'Chinese Restaurant Syndrome' Puzzles Doctors"; "Ill after Eating Chinese Food? You Have Company," *The Tampa Tribune*, May 20, 1968; *The Billings Gazette*, "Egg Foo Hungover."

in another letter to the *New England Journal of Medicine* in the July 11th edition. His introduction did not mince words:

To suppress the mounting hysteria and prevent the wholesale slaughter of Chinese-restaurant owners, we feel impelled to present a preliminary communication on the etiology, psychopathology, and clinical pharmacology of the variously misnamed post-sino-cybal syndrome (Chinese Restaurant Syndrome).⁴⁵

This was the opening to the first of the studies that named MSG as the cause of CRS, and despite Schaumburg's good intentions, his letter only stoked the fire against Chinese restaurateurs and their food. The letter was a brief summary of a self-study Schaumburg had conducted with his friend and colleague. Their admittedly hasty method was unscientific and inconclusive—it consisted of the two doctors methodologically eating breakfast, lunch, and dinner at their local Chinese restaurant to gather data on every item on the restaurant's menu. They identified two dishes that caused the syndrome and further identified the specific ingredient that was the culprit: monosodium glutamate.⁴⁶ Schaumburg's study was accompanied by a second, similarly hasty study conducted by a group of second year pharmacology students led by Marjorie Ambos at New York University who also concluded that monosodium glutamate was responsible for Kwok's syndrome.⁴⁷

While both studies hoped to stem the flow of anti-Chinese-restaurant sentiment, they only opened the floodgates. Two pseudo-scientific "studies" published in the *NEJM* were enough for media and academia to accept MSG's negative health effects as fact. Both the *Canadian Medical Association Journal* and the *British Medical Journal* had established MSG as the legitimate cause of "Chinese Restaurant Syndrome" before the end of 1968.

45 Schaumburg and Byck, "Sin Cyb-Syn: Accent on Glutamate," 105.

46 Ibid.

47 Marjorie Ambos et al., "Sin Cib-Syn: Accent on Glutamate," 105.

Each cited Schaumburg and Ambos' studies as evidence.⁴⁸ Popular media followed suit. Victor Cohn's *Washington Post* article (which was reprinted around the country) began: "Science proudly marched on yesterday, leaving a trail of discarded won tons [sic]."⁴⁹ Another article in *The New York Times* by Lyons asserted that a team of scientists "addicted to Chinese food" had only discovered the negative effects of MSG because of its addictive properties.⁵⁰ Lyons' evidence was a quote from Schaumburg, pulled from Cohn's article, as he implored Americans to return to Chinese restaurants by claiming "I'm going to [eat Chinese food] tonight...I'm used to the syndrome. I kind of enjoy it. When I first had it, I thought I was having a heart attack...It's not really unpleasurable, once you know you're not going to die."⁵¹

A symbiotic relationship developed between national media and the anti-MSG scientific community. Schaumburg and his colleagues published a second study in February of 1969 that extended his previous argument.⁵² It was in the spring of 1969 that Schaumburg's passionate anti-MSG campaign was joined by John W. Olney, doctor and professor of psychiatry, pathology, and immunology at Washington University. Olney published a three-page study in *Science* in May 1969 that associated MSG consumption with obesity, brain lesions, and "other disturbances."⁵³ Within a day of Olney's publication, both Cohn and Lyons published articles decrying the dangers of MSG. Cohn focused on the potential risk for pregnant women while Lyons

48 "Chinese Restaurant Syndrome," *Canadian Medical Association Journal* 99 (1968), 1206; "Kwok's Quease," *British Medical Journal* (1968), 447.

49 Cohn, "What's This About Chinese Food Being Harmful?"

50 Richard D. Lyons, "Four Scientists Find Chinese Food Fans Can Avoid Suffering," *The New York Times*, February 22, 1969.

51 Cohn; "A Chinese Dinner Got Big Head: It's Won Ton," *The Record*, August 14, 1968; Lyons, "Four Scientists Find Chinese Food Fans Can Avoid Suffering."

52 Herbert H. Schaumburg et al., "Monosodium L-Glutamate: Its Pharmacology and the Role in the Chinese Restaurant Syndrome," *Science* 163, no. 3869 (1969), 826-8.

53 John W. Olney, "Brain Lesions, Obesity, and Other Disturbances in Mice Treated with Monosodium Glutamate," *Science* 164, no. 3880, 719-21.

described Olney's brain lesions.⁵⁴ As Olney and Schaumburg continued to publish research and the media exacerbated the fear of MSG, the potential for political involvement grew.

In the spring of 1970, Olney, Schaumburg, and their colleagues worked with a young lawyer named Ralph Nader who had begun to develop a reputation for activist work. They were convinced by their research and Nader agreed; together they worked to have MSG removed from baby food and deleted from the FDA's GRAS (Generally Recognized as Safe) list.⁵⁵ Their efforts were only partially successful. Private baby food producing companies agreed to rid their products of MSG for fear of public backlash, but the FDA was unconvinced that MSG was problematic (other studies had been conducted that found no problem with MSG) and did not remove MSG from the GRAS list. Instead, they cryptically announced that MSG was "fit for human consumption but not necessarily by infants."⁵⁶

PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: MSG AND THE LEGACY OF HATRED

The panic was predicated on the xenophobia of latent historical otherization of Chinese populations in America. Jennifer LeMesurier traces the discourse of Chinese food's bizarreness and exoticness to the xenophobia and scapegoating Chinese populations experienced in the nineteenth century. As evidence for the observation, she provides the cartoon in Figure 6, drawn by George Friederick Keller, a staunch supporter of the Workingmen's Party of California, in 1877. Keller's cartoon attempted to goad anti-Chinese and anti-minority sentiment by juxtaposing the

54 Victor Cohn, "Msg Risky for Pregnant," *The Washington Post via Lansing State Journal*, May 9, 1969; Lyons, "Damage to Brain Linked to Chemical Used to Aid Flavor."

55 Alan Levinovitz, *The Gluten Lie* (New York, NY: Schwartz Publishing, 2015), 10; "Mr. Ralph Nader and Pure Food," *Nature* 226 (1970), 205-206.

56 A. N. Williams and K. M. Woessner, "Monosodium Glutamate 'Allergy': Menace or Myth?," *Clinical & Experimental Allergy* 39 (2009); Alan Levinovitz, *The Gluten Lie* (New York, NY: Schwartz Publishing, 2015), 10.

cultural 'eccentricities' of American minorities with the proud and stately Uncle Sam who sits at the head of the table. In the image, the Chinese diner is preparing to take a bite of an uncleaned rat that he has skewered.⁵⁷ Keller's depiction suggests that the differences between the well-dressed American statesman at the head of the table are irreconcilable with the minorities seated before him, including the Chinese man whose culinary habits are depicted as unclean and absurd. Similarly, LeMesurier notes Mark Twain's description of his encounter with a Chinese grocer in the Chinatown of Virginia City, Nevada in Twain's 1872 travel literature *Roughing It*:

He had various kinds of colored and colorless wines and brandies, with unpronounceable names, imported from China in little crockery jugs, and which he offered to us in dainty little miniature wash-basins of porcelain. He offered us a mess of birds'-nests; also, small, neat sausages, of which we could have swallowed several yards if we had chosen to try, but we suspected that each link contained the corpse of a mouse, and therefore refrained.⁵⁸

Twain's language is telling: the wines, though dainty and attractive, are unnamed and unmarked and therefore untrustworthy. Similarly, the sausages are appealing but inedible due to his suspicion that they are made from unhygienic and unacceptable ingredients like mouse, which he describes not as meat but instead as "corpse" to convey their repulsiveness effectively. These sentiments were largely unchanged by the time MSG became a national cause for concern. A *New York Times* article published in November 1969 entitled "In Hong Kong It's Dog or Snake at Lunch Now" describes the inaccessibility of Hong Kong's cuisine to American and European tourists due to its 'exoticness' and unethicity—dog-nappers purportedly

⁵⁷ Jennifer L. LeMesurier, "Uptaking Race: Genre, Msg, and Chinese Dinner," *Poioi: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Rhetorical Analysis and Invention* 12, no. 2 (2017), 5.

⁵⁸ LeMesurier, "Uptaking Race," 5.

stole dogs from unwitting owners to provide meat for the city's restaurants.⁵⁹

This association of Chinese food with bizarre and repulsive ingredients and untrustworthy practices was exacerbated by a perceived lack of hygiene in Chinese restaurants. In my interview with Stanley Liu, the Vice President of Operations at Panda Express, America's largest Chinese chain restaurant, he connected this association with poor hygiene to the difficult necessities of Chinese Exclusion, saying "I may be speculating, but if you think back to the Chinese Exclusion of 150 years ago, Chinese couldn't get jobs, so they opened restaurants, and the restaurants were oftentimes the front of where they live...so if [a customer] sees their home stuff with the restaurant's stuff, they might ask some questions."⁶⁰ As Chinese restaurant operators, Liu claims, Panda and others bear a particular burden of proof of hygiene and cleanliness that other restaurants do not. Compelled to conform to American restaurant aesthetics, tastes, ingredients, and demonstrations of cleanliness, Chinese American cooking moved away from more traditional techniques and ingredients. At the same time, this burden of proof cemented Chinese food as unapproachable, questionable, and outside the mainstream of American cuisine.⁶¹

The xenophobic discourse of the MSG panic is underscored by the fact that in 1958, just eleven years before Kwok wrote his letter to *NEJM*, 58 million pounds of MSG were produced in the United States—the seasoning was a cheap way to improve the appearance, flavor, and texture of low-quality, mass-produced food. The seasoning was useful as a flavor enhancer across cuisines, and thus by 1980 the United States was producing ten percent of the

59 Ian Stewart, "In Hong Kong It's Dog or Snake at Lunch Now," *The New York Times*, November 22, 1969.

60 Stanley Liu, interview by author, 2018.

61 LeMesurier, "Uptaking Race," 5-6.

world's MSG.⁶² Despite such widespread use, the panic surrounding MSG continued to be associated specifically with Chinese food, prompting headlines like “Chinese food make you crazy? MSG is No. 1 Suspect,” the writing of books such as *Excitotoxins: The Taste that Kills* and *In Bad Taste: The MSG Symptom Complex*, and the production of *60 Minutes* specials on MSG in Chinese cuisine.⁶³

In 1970, Olney's initial study published in *Science* described his findings after injecting a number of young mice with a significant dose of MSG. Many of the mice experienced serious negative side-effects, including massive obesity, skeletal deformation, brain lesions, and female sterility.⁶⁴ After two separate double-blind studies could not substantiate Olney's findings, the topic became controversial among researchers. Throughout the 1970s, dozens of studies were conducted, both affirming and contradicting Olney's initial findings.⁶⁵ The controversy grew as Olney himself published 25 papers in the decade in an effort to prove MSG's long-term harmfulness. Along with Nader and other consumer rights activists, Olney was critical of his scientific opponents as “colluding with the food industry.”⁶⁶ Despite his efforts, the opposition maintained that Olney's results were improperly measured and were intended to achieve little more than cause fear.

The studies published by Olney, his supporters, and his opponents make frequent reference to ‘Chinese Restaurant

62 Mosby, “That Won-Ton Soup Headache,” 139.

63 Anna Maria Barry-Jester, “How Msg Got a Bad Rap: Flawed Science and Xenophobia,” *Fivethirtyeight.com*, <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-msg-got-a-bad-rap-flawed-science-and-xenophobia/>.

64 Olney, “Brain Lesions, Obesity, and Other Disturbances in Mice Treated with Monosodium Glutamate,” 719-721.

65 Mosby, “That Won-Ton Soup Headache”; R.M. Burde, B. Schainker, and J. Kayes, “Acute Effect of Oral and Subcutaneous Administration of Monosodium Glutamate on the Arcuate Nucleus of the Hypothalamus in Mice and Rats,” *Nature* 233 (1971); N.J. Adamo and A. Ratner, “Monosodium Glutamate: Lack of Effects on Brain and Reproductive Function in Rats,” *Science* 169, no. 3946 (1970). For an example of the pro-Olney opinion, see Burde et. al. (1971); for an example of Olney's opposition, see Adamo and Ratner (1970).

66 Mosby, “That Won-Ton Soup Headache,” 141.

Syndrome' but do not describe the short-term syndrome detailed either in Kwok's letter or any of his ten responses. As Olney's debate raged regarding the long-term effects of the seasoning, Schaumburg's research into the short-term side effects of MSG had created a separate controversy. In fact, the majority of the research published on MSG and CRS during the 1970s was in response to Schaumburg rather than Olney.⁶⁷ This research proved similarly inconclusive: multiple double-blind studies conducted in the early 1970s found that even extremely large amounts of daily MSG consumption had little impact on healthy adult males.⁶⁸ These were quickly refuted and contradicted by other studies conducted separately until there was little consensus.

Notably, the studies that were conducted after Schaumburg's initial research did not examine the effects of MSG in foods or consumer products that did not have Chinese origins. One example provided by Ian Mosby in his paper "That Won-Ton Soup Headache': The Chinese Restaurant Syndrome, MSG and the Making of American Food, 1968-1980" comes from the 1969 response to Olney's first study by Frank Blood, Bernard Oser, and Philip White. Despite questioning Olney's methods and results, they did not question the basic premise that MSG caused CRS. Instead, they suggested that the symptoms described in Kwok's initial letter could have been caused by an allergic reaction or that it "appears to have resulted from the addition of as much as 5 gm per portion of soup."⁶⁹ The idea that Chinese restaurateurs overused MSG quickly became the primary justification as to why CRS was not experienced outside of Chinese restaurants. In R.A. Kenney and C.S. Tidball's 1972 study "Human susceptibility to monosodium l-glutamate," the authors suggest that, despite

67 Ibid.

68 Gaetano Bazzano, John A. D'Elia, and Robert E. Olson, "Monosodium Glutamate: Feeding of Large Amounts in Man and Gerbils," *Science* 169, no. 3951 (1970), 1208-1209; Mosby, "That Won-Ton Soup Headache," 141.

69 Mosby, "That Won-Ton Soup Headache," 143.

results that failed to demonstrate the symptoms of CRS upon consumption of MSG, it was the “exhibition of quantities [of MSG] that might be regarded as bizarre in the culinary setting” that could cause CRS.⁷⁰

The ‘bizarre Chinese overuse’ of MSG manifested in politics. On November 12, 1969, the New York City Health Department ordered Chinese restaurants and manufacturers of commercially available Chinese food to use MSG in their food only sparingly.⁷¹ An internal investigation had determined that in seventeen cases of the malady, fifteen of the victims had consumed MSG at a Chinese restaurant and that two pounds of MSG had been added to 1,500 pounds of egg rolls.⁷² These statistics, intended to reveal excessive MSG use on the part of Chinese establishments, instead reveal a double standard. Recipes calling for MSG were often published in newspapers around the country and the proportions of MSG used were consistent with or greater than the “excessive” amount criticized by the New York Health Department. One Fourth of July recipe in *The Cincinnati Enquirer*, for example, called for 2 teaspoons (approximately 6 grams) of MSG to season 2 pounds (approximately 900 grams) of ground beef, or 1/150th the mass of MSG to beef as compared to 1/750th the mass of MSG to egg rolls decried in the Health Department’s investigation.⁷³ Tracing the discursive legacy of Chinese otherness through food, the xenophobic element of the moral panic becomes apparent. Even as MSG was a staple in popular American foods, the panic coalesced around its use in Chinese cooking. This reveals a hypocritical dialectic of fear that

70 R.A. Kenney and C.S. Tidball, “Human Susceptibility to Oral Monosodium L-Glutamate,” *The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition* 25, no. 2 (1972), 140-6; Mosby, “That Won-Ton Soup Headache,” 143.

71 Richard D. Lyons, “Health Aides Tell Chinese Eateries to Curb Msg Use,” *The New York Times*, November 13, 1969.

72 Lyons, “Health Aides Tell Chinese Eateries to Curb Msg Use.”

73 Pat Williams, “Fourth of July Picnic, Cookouts,” *The Cincinnati Enquirer*, 1968.

is not explained by the physical properties of MSG but rather the associative properties of those preparing it.

MSG AS CONTAGION: CHINESE BODIES AND THE NATIONAL MEMBRANE

Laura Otis' *Membranes: Metaphors of Invasion in Nineteenth-Century Literature, Science, and Politics* provides a theoretical framework for understanding why the moral panic of MSG had momentum and cultural currency as soon as it identified the Chinese immigrant community as its 'folk devil' or the human object whose subalternity is exploited by a moral panic to generate exaggerated fear.⁷⁴ The latent xenophobia and anti-Chinese sentiment that gave credibility to the perception of Chinese culture and cuisine as bizarre and exotic also allowed heightened concern among white Americans of the cleanliness and hygiene of Chinese food. Her work addresses this question of hygiene, health, and contagion within the context of the scientific theory and the culture of imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As biologists in the nineteenth century began to understand health as individual—one body can be cured by healing its individual tissues, organs, and cells—the rapid advance of European colonialism transformed the way European nations and citizens understood themselves. As European countries annexed territories as extensions of their sovereign nations, the people within those annexed territories were not designated as part of the nation's citizenry. Channels were open for European nations and their newly invented 'membranes' to be pierced by unwanted cultures and their peoples.⁷⁵ As Otis recognizes, "while they were happy to expand outward, Westerners became horrified when the cultures, peoples, and diseases they had engulfed began diffusing, through their now

⁷⁴ Goode and Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics*, 74.

⁷⁵ Laura Otis, *Membranes: Metaphors of Invasion in Nineteenth-Century Literature, Science, and Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 5.

permeable membranes, back toward their imperial cell bodies.⁷⁶

This is the fear that the CRS panic capitalized on. Not only was MSG a potentially dangerous substance to individuals' health, but it was as invisible as any bacteria or microscopic germ and carried by a Chinese host that threatened a white American ideal. The fear of Chinese restaurateurs poisoning the American population with an invisible and unknowable powder did not only confirm imperialistic suspicions of their strangeness and otherness, but also proved that the Chinese were not benign and, in the face of scientific evidence, damaging to American society. The panic triggers both versions of Otis' fear: the individual's bodily sanctity is penetrated by a microscopic carrier of illness just as the national entity is attacked by a foreign and insidious folk devil population.⁷⁷ Through Otis' understanding of individual and cultural disease, the illogicality of the term 'Chinese Restaurant Syndrome' and the misplaced fear of Chinese restaurateurs fits into the larger discourse of anti-Chinese sentiment since the mid-nineteenth century.

MASTERMINDS: WHO COMES OUT ON TOP?

The protagonists of the moral panic of CRS who propagated that fear have experienced prosperity since. In the media, two of the loudest voices whose articles turned Kwok's brief and unexciting letter into a national controversy were Richard D. Lyons at *The New York Times* and Victor Cohn at *The Washington Post*. When Kwok's letter was published, both Lyons and Cohn were young veterans just beginning their careers in journalism. The story of MSG, CRS, and the great controversy that ensued gave each writer substantial subject matter for decades to come and helped bolster their reputations as journalists. Each lived into his eighties and was celebrated by his respective newspaper after

⁷⁶ Otis, *Membranes: Metaphors of Invasion*, 5.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.

his death.⁷⁸ Cohn in particular found good fortune in life as he won a number of prizes throughout his career and became the editor of *The Washington Post's* science section. After his death, the Council for the Advancement of Science Writing named the Victor Cohn Prize for Excellence in Medical Science Writing after him.⁷⁹

Medically, both John Olney and Herbert Schaumburg found themselves in the national spotlight for their role in the legal crusade against MSG. In 1968, Olney was in his first year out of medical residency in the faculty at Washington University. His early campaigning against MSG gave him a national platform which he used to further study the brain and neurotransmitters. He coined the now common term 'excitotoxin' in his early work and has had Olney lesions, a type of brain damage caused by drug abuse, named after himself.⁸⁰ Schaumburg remains a doctor and an instructor at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York. He was in his first few years at the college when he helped lead the charge against MSG and has now become one of the foremost neurotoxicologists in New York, serving as the neurology consultant for the New York City Poison Control Center.⁸¹

Politically, the consumer activist Ralph Nader was celebrated for his defense of consumer rights. *The New Yorker* described him as "responsible for the existence of automobiles that have seat belts, padded dashboards, air bags, non-impaling steering columns, and gas tanks that don't readily explode when the car gets rear-ended."⁸² Later in the article, the author credits

78 J.Y. Smith, "Post Science Writer, Editor, and Author Victor Cohn Dies at 80," *The Washington Post*, 2000; Daniel E. Slotnik, "Richard D. Lyons, Versatile Times Reporter, Dies at 84," *The New York Times*, 2013.

79 "Victor Cohn Prize for Excellence in Medical Science Reporting," Council for the Advancement of Science Writing, <http://casw.org/casw/victor-cohn-prize-excellence-medical-science-reporting-0>.

80 Jim Dryden, "Obituary: John W. Olney, 83, Professor of Psychiatry and Neuropathology," <https://source.wustl.edu/2015/04/obituary-john-w-olney-83-professor-of-psychiatry-and-neuropathology/>.

81 "Faculty Profile: Herbert H. Schaumburg, M.D.," Albert Einstein College of Medicine, <http://www.einstein.yu.edu/faculty/7752/herbert-schaumburg/>.

82 Hendrik Hertzberg, "Reckless Driver," *The New Yorker* 2004, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/03/08/reckless-driver>.

Nader as the reason why “baby food isn’t spiked with MSG.” The future presidential candidate built his career off of successful activist campaigns against the state to ensure citizens were safe from the products they had been sold. His fight to have MSG removed from the GRAS list in the 1960s and 70s alongside Olney and Schaumburg was one of his first nationally covered stories and had a significant impact on his career, providing him a platform and a voice to carry out further political action.

Each of these men enjoyed a career of wealth, prosperity, and respect. They were also all involved in the propagation of the national panic of the Chinese Restaurant Syndrome. Regardless of whether or not these men believed that they were providing a public good or if they were pursuing their own successes, it is clear that their role in creating the largely disproven and discredited anti-MSG fright provided them with upward mobility and success even as Chinese immigrants and restaurateurs were forced to struggle to defend their cuisine and their livelihoods.

CONCLUSION: LEGACY OF PANIC AND THE FUTURE OF MSG

The scientific controversy over MSG has dwindled since a flurry of surveys and methodological critique began to be published in the early 1980s.⁸³ Adam Williams’ comprehensive 2009 review of all medical literature published regarding MSG found that “While there is some evidence to suggest that large doses of MSG (43 g) ingested on an empty stomach without concomitant food ingestion may elicit some of the symptoms of the ‘Monosodium glutamate symptom complex’, it would be inappropriate to conclude that MSG consumed as part of a typical western diet would be likely to induce such symptoms,” and that “the current evidence does not suggest that MSG is a significant

83 Mosby, “That Won-Ton Soup Headache,” 143.

contributor to asthma, urticaria, angio-oedema, or rhinitis.”⁸⁴ As the evidence builds in favor of MSG, a number of cultural icons, including celebrity chefs David Chang and Anthony Bourdain and the ESPN statistics guru Nate Silver, have spoken out against the racism of ‘Chinese Restaurant Syndrome.’⁸⁵ As the panic dies down, its legacy comes to symbolize the difficult history of the Chinese immigrant community in America and the racism and violence that it has faced while providing a translucent view of the still-present and deeply-held xenophobia of the white American majority. By seeing the racialized dynamic of the MSG panic through the lens of Laura Otis’ *Membranes*, the loose ends of anti-Chinese xenophobia before and during Exclusion and the affected bizarreness of Chinese food can be seen as the underlying fear of cultural ‘contamination’ and the fuel for the moral panic of CRS. These fears were capitalized on by the media, the medical institution, and political lobbyists—represented by Cohn, Lyons, Olney, Schaumburg, and Nader—to achieve maximum cultural currency and create individual prosperity. As these voices fall silent and are replaced by fresh advocates for the reestablishment of MSG in the American spice cabinet, after 50 years of “No Added MSG” stickers, perhaps restaurateurs should start reprinting signs to read “MSG added in moderation.”

84 A. N. Williams and K. M. Woessner, “Monosodium Glutamate ‘Allergy’: Menace or Myth?,” *Clinical & Experimental Allergy* 39 (2009), 640.

85 Dave Chang, “Msg, Korean Food, and Cultural Appropriation,” <https://www.theringer.com/2018/5/29/17403344/msg-korean-food-and-cultural-appropriation>; Barry-Jester; Wil Fulton, “Anthony Bourdain Thinks Fear of Msg Is Bullshit (and He’s Probably Right),” *Thrillist*, <https://www.thrillist.com/eat/nation/anthony-bourdain-msg-in-food-is-not-bad-for-you>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "4 1/2-Oz. Monosodium Glutamate." *The Los Angeles Times*, March 9, 1968.
- Adamo, N.J., and A. Ratner. "Monosodium Glutamate: Lack of Effects on Brain and Reproductive Function in Rats." *Science* 169, no. 3946 (1970): 673-74.
- Ambos, Marjorie, Nancy R. Leavitt, Lynne Marmorek, and Susan B. Wolschina. "Sin Cib-Syn: Accent on Glutamate." *New England Journal of Medicine* 279, no. 2 (July 11, 1968).
- Barry-Jester, Anna Maria. "How Msg Got a Bad Rap: Flawed Science and Xenophobia." Fivethirtyeight.com, <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-msg-got-a-bad-rap-flawed-science-and-xenophobia/>.
- Bazzano, Gaetano, John A. D'Elia, and Robert E. Olson. "Monosodium Glutamate: Feeding of Large Amounts in Man and Gerbils." *Science* 169, no. 3951 (1970).
- Blanchard, Sam. "'Chinese Restaurant Syndrome' Does Exist: Doctor Reveals the Best Tea to Drink If You Feel Unwell after Eating Egg-Fried Rice and Chow Mein." *The Daily Mail*, June 29, 2018 .
- Boxold, Betty. "The Little White Crystals That Grew." *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, February 21, 1968.
- Burde, R.M., B. Schainker, and J. Kayes. "Acute Effect of Oral and Subcutaneous Administration of Monosodium Glutamate on the Arcuate Nucleus of the Hypothalamus in Mice and Rats." *Nature* 233, no. September 3, 1971 (1971).
- Chang, Dave. "Msg, Korean Food, and Cultural Appropriation." <https://www.theringer.com/2018/5/29/17403344/msg-korean-food-and-cultural-appropriation>.
- Chang, Iris. *The Chinese in America*. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.
- "The Chinese Exclusion Act." In *Re-imagining Migration UCLA: The University of California at Los Angeles*.
- "Chinese Restaurant Syndrome." *Canadian Medical Association Journal* 99 (December 21, 1968): 1206-7.

- Cohn, Victor. "What's This About Chinese Food Being Harmful?" *The Washington Post* via *Florida Today*, September 12, 1968.
- . "Msg Risky for Pregnant." *The Washington Post* via *Lansing State Journal*, May 9, 1969.
- . "What's This About Chinese Food Being Harmful?" *The Washington Post* via *Florida Today*, September 12, 1968.
- Dryden, Jim. "Obituary: John W. Olney, 83, Professor of Psychiatry and Neuropathology." <https://source.wustl.edu/2015/04/obituary-john-w-olney-83-professor-of-psychiatry-and-neuropathology/>.
- "Egg Foo Hungover." *The Billings Gazette*, May 20, 1968.
- "Faculty Profile: Herbert H. Schaumburg, M.D." Albert Einstein College of Medicine, <http://www.einstein.yu.edu/faculty/7752/herbert-schaumburg/>.
- Fulton, Wil. "Anthony Bourdain Thinks Fear of Msg Is Bullshit (and He's Probably Right)." Thrillist, <https://www.thrillist.com/eat/nation/anthony-bourdain-msg-in-food-is-not-bad-for-you>.
- Goode, Erich, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda. *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*. 2nd ed. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
- Hertzberg, Hendrik. "Reckless Driver." *The New Yorker*, 2004.
- "Ill after Eating Chinese Food? You Have Company." *The Tampa Tribune*, May 20, 1968.
- Kenney, R.A., and C.S. Tidball. "Human Susceptibility to Oral Monosodium L-Glutamate." *The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition* 25, no. 2 (1972).
- Kwok, Robert Ho Man. "Chinese-Restaurant Syndrome." *New England Journal of Medicine* (April 4, 1968).
- "Kwok's Quease." *British Medical Journal* (August 24, 1968).
- Lee, Erika. *The Making of Asian America*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015.
- LeMesurier, Jennifer L. "Uptaking Race: Genre, Msg, and Chinese Dinner." *Poroi: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Rhetorical Analysis and Invention* 12, no. 2 (2017).

- Levinovitz, Alan. *The Gluten Lie*. New York, NY: Schwartz Publishing, 2015.
- Lew-Williams, Beth. *The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the Alien in America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018.
- Liu, Stanley. "Interview with Stanley Liu." By Giacomo McCarthy (2018).
- Lyons, Richard D. "'Chinese Restaurant Syndrome' Puzzles Doctors." *The New York Times*, May 19, 1968.
- . "Damage to Brain Linked to Chemical Used to Aid Flavor." *The New York Times*, May 10, 1969.
- . "Four Scientists Find Chinese Food Fans Can Avoid Suffering." *The New York Times*, February 22, 1969.
- . "Health Aides Tell Chinese Eateries to Curb Msg Use." *The New York Times*, November 13, 1969.
- Mathews, Linda. "Who Put the Contaminant...?" *The Los Angeles Times* via *The Calgary Herald*, August 12, 1968.
- Mosby, Ian. "'That Won-Ton Soup Headache': The Chinese Restaurant Syndrome, Msg and the Making of American Food, 1968-1980." *Social History of Medicine* 22, no. 1 (2009): 133-51.
- "Mr. Ralph Nader and Pure Food." *Nature* 226 (April 18, 1970).
- Nickerson, Jane. "The Beginner's Spice Shelf" *The New York Times*, June 5, 1955.
- Olney, John W. "Brain Lesions, Obesity, and Other Disturbances in Mice Treated with Monosodium Glutamate." *Science* 164, no. 3880 (May 9, 1969).
- Otis, Laura. *Membranes: Metaphors of Invasion in Nineteenth-Century Literature, Science, and Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
- Sand, Jordan. "A Short History of Msg: Good Science, Bad Science, and Taste Cultures." *Gastronomica* 5 (2005): 38-49.
- Schaumberg, H., Nicholas E. Davies, Thomas J. McCaghren, Matthew Menken, William Migden, Elizabeth Kirk Rose, Jogeswar Rath, et al. "Post-Sino-Cibal Syndrome." *New England Journal of Medicine* (May 16, 1968).

- Schaumburg, Herbert H., and Robert Byck. «Sin Cyb-Syn: Accent on Glutamate.» *New England Journal of Medicine* 279, no. 2 (July 11, 1968): 105.
- Schaumburg, Herbert H., Robert Byck, Robert Gerstl, and Jan H. Mashman. "Monosodium L-Glutamate: Its Pharmacology and the Role in the Chinese Restaurant Syndrome." *Science* 163, no. 3869 (February 21, 1969).
- Slotnik, Daniel E. "Richard D. Lyons, Versatile Times Reporter, Dies at 84." *The New York Times*, 2013.
- Smith, J.Y. "Post Science Writer, Editor, and Author Victor Cohn Dies at 80." *The Washington Post*, 2000.
- Stewart, Ian. "In Hong Kong It's Dog or Snake at Lunch Now." *The New York Times*, November 22, 1969.
- "Victor Cohn Prize for Excellence in Medical Science Reporting." Council for the Advancement of Science Writing, <http://casw.org/casw/victor-cohn-prize-excellence-medical-science-reporting-0>.
- Williams, A. N., and K. M. Woessner. "Monosodium Glutamate 'Allergy': Menace or Myth?" *Clinical & Experimental Allergy* 39 (2009): 640-46.
- Williams, Pat. "Fourth of July Picnic, Cookouts." *The Cincinnati Enquirer*, 1968.
- Wollenberg, Charles. "A California Precedent." <https://californiahistoricalalsociety.blogspot.com/2016/02/day-of-remembrance.html>.
- Yin, Xiao-Huang. *Chinese-American Literature Since the 1850s*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000.

ALBERT GALLATIN AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON

Microcosms of National Political Change

Bishoy N. Megalla

In 1794, Alexander Hamilton, acting Secretary of the Treasury, found himself in rural Pennsylvania, attempting to stymie the brewing Whiskey Rebellion.¹ To him, the best course of action was a forceful demonstration of federal power, especially towards leaders who inspired revolt among the rank-and-file rebels.² One of these leaders was Albert Gallatin. Recently and overwhelmingly elected to the lower house of the Pennsylvania legislature, Gallatin played a huge role in legitimizing not only the protests against the excise tax on whiskey, but also the “contempt” that tax collectors in the state received.³ Gallatin would assume Hamilton’s job fewer than six years later, but, at the time, Hamilton attempted to inveigle John Powers, a local Pennsylvania moderate, into fabricating evidence against Gallatin.⁴ Although Hamilton ultimately failed to arrest Gallatin, he never forgot Gallatin’s participation in the Whiskey Rebellion.⁵ Nor did Gallatin forget Hamilton’s attempt to fabricate evidence against him; years later, upon Hamilton’s death, Gallatin confided that he

1 The Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania was an armed protest against an excise tax on domestic distilled spirits (commonly called the “whiskey tax”). For a further discussion of the responses to the tax see William Hogeland, *The Whiskey Rebellion: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and the Frontier Rebels Who Challenged America’s Newfound Sovereignty* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); Ron Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 468-482.

2 Ron Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 476.

3 *Ibid.*

4 For full story, see Hogeland, *The Whiskey Rebellion*, 225-227.

5 Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, 469.

did not understand why Americans chose to “deify Hamilton and treat Burr as a murderer. The duel, for a duel, was certainly fair.”⁶

This story typifies how historians depict the relationship between Alexander Hamilton and Albert Gallatin—that of two men whose differing visions for the fledgling republic elicited strong personal animosity towards each other. But their value to historians goes beyond merely a private intellectual feud. Indeed, by comparing the political views of these two men, historians may contextualize their differences in the larger framework of the rising partisanship of the 1790s. To those who view these differences through a political lens, Alexander Hamilton becomes the archetypal Federalist—their “intellectual fountainhead.”⁷ Favoring a loose construction of the Constitution, Federalists called for a strong national government that promoted economic growth and fostered cordial relationships with Great Britain. Gallatin, on the other hand, becomes a torchbearer for the “[Democratic]-Republican cadre” and part of an eventual triumvirate with Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.⁸ Favoring a strict construction of the Constitution, Democratic-Republicans distrusted the Federalists and their policies; instead, they placed a stronger emphasis on states’ rights, preferred an economy grounded in free enterprise, and were empathetic towards Revolutionary France.⁹ Put simply, historians generally see in Hamilton and Gallatin the growing partisanship of the nation. For example, internationally-renowned tax expert Gregory May argues that although Jefferson and Madison despised Hamilton’s vision

6 Albert Gallatin to J.W. Nicholson, July 19, 1804, in *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Henry Adams, ed., 3 vols. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879), 1: 282.

7 Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, 5.

8 Gregory May, *Jefferson’s Treasure: How Albert Gallatin Saved the New Nation from Debt* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2018), xxiv.; when doing my research, I was surprised to find references to the Democratic-Republican triumvirate of Gallatin, Jefferson, and Madison mainly due to Gallatin’s obscurity today.

9 In many of the sources I encountered, the “Democratic-Republicans” are referred to as “Democratic-Republicans,” or “Republicans.” For ease of usage and clarity, I have referred to the party as “Democratic-Republicans” throughout my essay.

for America, “only Gallatin was capable of undoing the fiscal system” that Hamilton had created.¹⁰ Historian Raymond Walters Jr. contends that Gallatin’s notions of “fiscal practices and human values” caused him to “modify Federalist policies.”¹¹

Yet the two men, although so often depicted as polar opposites, also had substantial ideological similarities, and some recognize this. Historian Max Edling posits that Gallatin was “much more of a Hamiltonian than he [Gallatin] would let on.”¹² Thomas McCraw echoes this viewpoint, arguing that many allow the ideological differences between Hamilton and Gallatin to “overshadow their areas of agreement,” which were much more substantial.¹³

In truth, it goes both ways—the relationship between these two financial founding fathers was much more complex than it is typically portrayed. This paper—through analysis of their published reports and private correspondence—aims to make a meaningful contribution to the study of the relationship between Albert Gallatin and Alexander Hamilton by arguing that it evolved over time. The traditional interpretations of the relationship between the two men are not therefore mutually exclusive. During the 1790s, the two men were diametrically opposed in their visions for the fledgling republic. However, once Gallatin assumed the role of Secretary of the Treasury, he began to share many of the same principles as Hamilton, particularly regarding constitutional interpretation, internal improvements, and central banking. Moreover, this paper proposes that the progression in the relationship between the two men allows us to analyze

10 May, *Jefferson's Treasure*, xxxi.

11 Raymond Walters Jr., *Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), 262-263.

12 Max M. Edling, *A Hercules in the Cradle: War, Money, and the American State* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), 109.

13 Thomas K. McCraw, *The Founders and Finance: How Hamilton, Gallatin, and Other Immigrants Forged a New Economy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 358.

the parallels between Gallatin's change in perspective and the changing nature of the Democratic-Republican Party.

GALLATIN AND HAMILTON: THE CONSTITUTION

More than any other issue, the interpretation of the Constitution and its implications for the power of the federal government created a divide between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans. Federalists championed a loose interpretation, supporting an expansion of federal power through the doctrine of implied powers: powers granted to the United States government not explicitly stated in the Constitution but assumed through precedence. Democratic-Republicans, on the other hand, demanded a stricter interpretation, based on an insistence to adhere "to the original terms of the Constitution."¹⁴ While in opposition to the Federalists, this interpretation allowed Democratic-Republicans to prevent what they defined as "federal encroachment on the remaining bastions of liberty in the states."¹⁵ Based on the molds created by their respective parties, one might assume that Gallatin and Hamilton had divergent interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. Although the two men were on opposite sides of the initial constitutional ratification debates, their years of public service demonstrated that they both possessed loose interpretations of the document.

Alexander Hamilton, arguably more than any other founder, worked arduously to "infuse life" into the Constitution and make it the "working mandate of the American government."¹⁶ In trying to convince New York to ratify the document, Hamilton contended that the only alternative to the Constitution was the

14 Lance Banning, "Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793," *William and Mary Quarterly* 31 (April 1974): 178.

15 *Ibid.*, 179.

16 Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, 242.

“dismemberment of the Union.”¹⁷ Once the Constitution was ratified, Hamilton espoused, and worked to refine, a broad interpretation of the document. To him, the Constitution was meant to be a flexible document, and not one that imposed “shackles” on the power of the federal government.¹⁸ Instead, Hamilton believed that the Constitution should endow the federal government with the “capacity to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen.”¹⁹ Ultimately, this interpretation of the Constitution legitimized Hamilton’s belief that the national government could operate with few limits in areas of foreign policy, armed forces, and commerce.²⁰

While Hamilton spent months mobilizing support for the Constitution, Gallatin, like many of his contemporaries living in the backcountry, stood staunchly opposed to the document. A key contributor to the Harrisburg Convention of 1788, which met “for the purpose of recommending revision of the new Constitution,” Gallatin believed that the Constitution consigned an inordinate amount of power to the central government, and he worried that the executive and legislative branches of the proposed government were not properly restrained by the Constitution.²¹ Disenchanted with the proposed document, he submitted resolutions which deemed it “necessary that a revision of the federal Constitution be obtained in the most speedy manner.”²² To him, although the Articles of Confederation engendered the need for a “more efficient government,” the new Constitution contained measures that were “so exceptionable” as to require amendment.²³ Although Gallatin’s

17 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison, ed., *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1961), 27-31.

18 *Ibid.*, 148-153.

19 *Ibid.*

20 Gerald Stourzh, *Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1970), 161-163.

21 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 10, 1788.

22 *A Draft of Report of the Harrisburg Conference*, September 3, 1788, in *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Henry Adams, ed., 3 vols. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879), 1:2.

23 *Ibid.*, 1.

resolutions proved too radical for many of the Harrisburg delegates, four of the twelve amendments passed by the convention “embodied suggestions Gallatin had made,” one of which limited the powers of Congress “to those specified in the Constitution.”²⁴ This opposition to unchecked power, coupled with a similar literalist view of the Constitution, made the Democratic-Republicans attractive to Gallatin when he joined the House of Representatives in December 1795. For Democratic-Republicans, Gallatin brought the much-needed financial expertise needed to both understand and to expose the Hamiltonian program as divergent from the tenets of the Constitution. In less than a year, James Madison would describe Gallatin as the “real Treasure” of the Democratic-Republican Party, and, in 1797, when Madison left the House, Gallatin assumed his role as “the leader of the Jeffersonians.”²⁵

As different as Hamilton and Gallatin’s views of the Constitution seem to have been during the ratification debate, Gallatin’s actions as Secretary of the Treasury, specifically during the Louisiana Purchase, suggest that the two men interpreted the Constitution, particularly the powers of the executive, very similarly.²⁶ In 1803, the prospect of purchasing the Louisiana Territory from France created a clash in Jefferson’s cabinet. On one side was Attorney General Levi Lincoln. According to him, if the purchase was to conform to Jefferson’s strict states-rights construction of the Constitution, which granted only enumerated powers to the federal government, then the terms of the purchase should be worded so that the United States was only modifying

24 Walters, *Albert Gallatin*, 30.

25 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, January 31, 1796, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia; Nicholas Dunagan, *Gallatin: America’s Swiss Founding Father* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 61, 63.

26 Although discussed later in the paper, it is arguable that Gallatin’s actions towards internal improvements also prove that he had grown a much looser interpretation of the Constitution during his years as Secretary of the Treasury. Most people treat this as something that Gallatin had been harboring or hiding, but that viewpoint ignores the dynamic characters of historical figures.

its borders to include the purchased land.²⁷ Lincoln and Jefferson both hoped that by framing the acquisition in this manner, they could circumvent the need for a constitutional amendment giving the federal government express power to acquire new territory. On the other side was Gallatin, who disparaged the idea that the federal government required a constitutional amendment to acquire territory. According to Gallatin, the general power that the Constitution gave the President and Senate to make treaties endowed Jefferson with the institutional framework that made the purchase of the territory permissible.²⁸ Gallatin also posited that the very existence of the United States as a nation gave it the power to extend its borders by treaty in the same way that nations had operated for millennia. When Jefferson sent copies of a proposed amendment to his cabinet, Gallatin only acknowledged his receipt of the letter and noted that he hoped the draft was merely for deliberation and reflection, since he had already made it clear that he found a constitutional amendment unnecessary.²⁹ Even though Gallatin acknowledged that a “possible objection” could be drawn from the Tenth Amendment, which reserved to the states “the powers not yielded by them to the Union,” he warned that this would set a dangerous precedent for the addition of any state to the Union.³⁰ It is evident that much of Gallatin’s argument was based on a broad construction of the Constitution that endowed the federal government with implied power, an argument almost wholly removed from his proposed amendments to the Constitution approximately fifteen years earlier.

Although Hamilton did not directly participate in the debates over the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase, his

27 Levi Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson, January 08, 1803, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

28 Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, January 13, 1803, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

29 Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, July 9, 1803, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

30 Ibid.

prior sentiments coupled with an editorial he wrote surrounding the purchase suggest that he agreed with Gallatin. During his tenure as Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton articulated and refined the doctrine of implied powers; according to him, the federal government had implied powers that could be utilized to efficiently carry out its enumerated ones.³¹ Hamilton's belief of the purchase's constitutionality is reinforced by his writings surrounding the Louisiana Purchase. Writing in *The New York Evening Post*, Hamilton posited that nothing had been more pertinent than potentially acquiring the territory since the "question of Independence."³² To Hamilton, two courses of action existed: first to attempt to purchase the land from France, or second, to seize the land and negotiate after the fact.³³ As a whole, Hamilton's editorial seems to be a strong vindication of the Louisiana Purchase, never once bringing any constitutional objections to the foreground. Although the Democratic-Republicans fought resolutely against these ideals, Jefferson ultimately utilized Hamilton's doctrine of implied powers to justify the purchase as constitutional.

Clearly, between the ratification debate of the late 1780s and the debate over the Louisiana Purchase in 1802, Gallatin's comfort with the broad construction of the Constitution moved closer to Hamilton's long-standing view—possibly as a result of his own party's position in power.³⁴ While in opposition to the Federalist majority, Gallatin and the Democratic-Republicans had resisted a broad interpretation of the Constitution that expanded executive power beyond its enumerated powers, but once the Democratic-

31 Forrest McDonald, *Alexander Hamilton* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1979), 110.; Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, 671.

32 "Coriolanus" [Alexander Hamilton], *New York Evening Post*, February 8, 1803.

33 Ibid.

34 Further bolstering this argument is the discussion of infrastructure that follows. There again, Gallatin does not find an amendment to the Constitution necessary in order for federal aid to be given for internal improvement projects.

Republicans were in office their opposition subsided. Wilson Cary Nicholas, a close confidant of Jefferson, posited that the Constitution gave the government “power as broad as it could well be made” with regards to acquiring territory.³⁵ Although Jefferson initially had scruples with the constitutionality of the acquisition, he was virtually alone in the matter amongst his confidants.

In fact, Jefferson’s continued calls questioning the constitutionality of the purchase were “coldly received” by his party.³⁶ This was due, in large part, to the fact that the acquisition would be a political feat for the Democratic-Republicans. As the territory to the West became states, it would surely “undermine the position and power” of New England Federalists, thereby solidifying Democratic-Republican rule.³⁷ In addition, the Louisiana Purchase coincided perfectly with Gallatin’s belief that Western settlement would drive the growth of the United States.³⁸ Once in the position to make this dream a reality, Gallatin continually urged quick action rather than the “deferrals based on potential unconstitutionality” that he had previously supported.³⁹ In power, Gallatin and a wide swath of the Democratic-Republican party found the idea of granting the national government more centralized power to effectively shape the nation more appealing.

GALLATIN AND HAMILTON: CONNECTING THE NATION

When the First Federal Congress convened in March of 1789, it seemed that internal improvements would be impervious to the impending political partisanship. Early efforts by legislators

³⁵ W.C. Nicholas to Thomas Jefferson, September 03, 1803, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

³⁶ Henry Adams, *The Life of Albert Gallatin* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879), 87.

³⁷ Dungan, *Gallatin*, 78.

³⁸ Although the rest of this paper will not cover this extensively in the way that it deserves, much of Gallatin’s policy can be attributed in some way to Western expansion. Many historians agree that his time in Pennsylvania dramatically affected the way Gallatin thought America should develop. The best discussion of this I saw was in McCraw, *The Founders and Finance*, 246-271.

³⁹ McCraw, *The Founders and Finance*, 261.

to pass bills that built lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and piers at the federal government's expense passed through both houses of Congress with little recorded debate.⁴⁰ But as the 1790s progressed, irreconcilable differences between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans spilled over into the debate surrounding domestic improvements.

Federalist representatives tended to support widespread implementations of internal improvement projects, citing them as a means for the national government to provide for the "general welfare" of the American people.⁴¹ But Democratic-Republicans had misgivings about Federalist support for internal improvements. The Federalist agenda of utilizing the "monied gentry" to fund plans corroborated the elitist critique levied by the Democratic-Republicans.⁴² To them, internal improvement companies that emerged in the late eighteenth century were merely mercantilist structures that Federalists used to propel hidden motives and "enlist the passions of party on the side of hydraulic expansion."⁴³ These hidden motives were not difficult to uncover; several Federalist proponents of internal improvement projects also owned large swaths of land whose value would rise after development. This made it easy for Democratic-Republicans to characterize Federalist internal improvements as corrupt dealings serving merely as a "source of boundless patronage to

40 John Lauritz Larson, *Internal Improvements: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 45.

41 While doing research, it was interesting to me how the early debates around internal improvements revolved around constitutional interpretations. For more information on Federalist inclinations towards public works, see Larson, *Internal Improvements 14-37*; Stephen Minicucci, "Internal Improvements and the Union, 1790-1860," 18 (October 2004): 163-164. Although Larson fixates on George Washington's ideology concerning internal improvements, he transposes ideals onto key Federalists (Philip Scuyler, Hamilton, Harry Lee, and Robert Morris).

42 Larson, *Internal Improvements*, 16.

43 *Ibid.*, 31. This is a quote by Dewitt Clinton that Larson cites. It is interesting to see Dewitt Clinton, the man eventually responsible for the Erie Canal, one of the most ambitious internal improvement projects of its time, lambast Federalist policy on internal improvements.

the executive, jobbing to members of Congress.”⁴⁴ Democratic-Republicans also took issue with federal encroachment upon what they believed to be state affairs. Writing to James Madison, Jefferson postulated that the “safest construction” of the Constitution meant that the national government could only “refer it [internal improvement] to the states for amendment.”⁴⁵

Hamilton’s views were diametrically opposed to those of Jefferson, and the Democratic-Republicans generally. He believed it was the responsibility of the national government to implement federally directed internal improvement projects. In his *Report on Manufactures*, Hamilton devoted an entire section to the “facilitating of the transportation of commodities.”⁴⁶ Often seeking inspiration from England, he contributed the success of British manufacturing to the “melioration of the public roads... and the great progress...in opening canals.”⁴⁷ Hamilton also saw internal improvements as a way of weaning the nation off of its dependence on European manufacturers. If the United States continued to “diversify, develop, and extend” internal improvements, it would be able to provide for itself if Europe would not take “the product of [its] soil.”⁴⁸ His belief in the importance of federally-directed internal improvements was based on his broad interpretation of the Constitution, which gave Congress the “authority to provide for the common defense and general welfare.”⁴⁹ Because internal improvements increased the general welfare, Hamilton had “little doubt” that it was in the power of the federal government to become directly involved in a comprehensive plan for American infrastructure.⁵⁰

44 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 6, 1796, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

45 Ibid.

46 Alexander Hamilton’s Final Version of the Report of Manufactures, December 5, 1791, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Founders Online, National Archives.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

Initially, Gallatin's strict interpretation of the Constitution caused him to disagree with Hamilton—although he agreed that internal improvements were vital, he did not look towards the federal government to direct them. As a land speculator, Gallatin was acutely aware of the benefits of internal improvement. He believed that new canals and roads would “naturally draw and increase population,” thereby increasing land values.⁵¹ But his motives were not all venal, as transportation was a perennial issue for those settling the Western frontier whom Gallatin empathized with throughout his political career. However, like Jefferson, the Tenth Amendment—which asserted that all powers not specifically given to the federal government were in the purview of the States—motivated Gallatin's plans for internal improvements during his time in the Pennsylvania legislature.⁵² Refusing to look towards the federal government for funds, Gallatin instead proposed legislation that funded internal improvement projects through chartered private stock companies, one of which built the nation's first turnpike between Philadelphia and Lancaster.⁵³ This use of private stock companies would serve as a model for the next half century, as those with strict interpretations of the Constitution attempted to build internal improvements within their states.

Despite his initial concerns over the constitutionality of federally mandated internal improvements, during his time in the Jefferson Administration, Gallatin became an enthusiastic proponent of internal improvements on the federal level. Although he had left Pennsylvania, Gallatin's desire to develop the West remained with him; due to these strong inclinations, Gallatin saw internal improvements as integral to “cementing

51 Walters, *Albert Gallatin*, 46.

52 Larson, *Internal Improvements*, 51.

53 Walters, *Albert Gallatin*, 47.

the bonds of the Union between those parts of the United States whose local interests have been considered as most dissimilar.”⁵⁴ He memorialized these views in his *Report on Roads, Canals, Harbors, and Rivers* in 1808. Far ahead of its time, Gallatin’s *Report* posited that “no other single operation...can more effectually tend to strengthen and perpetuate that union” than a group of internal improvement projects that would connect virtually every part of the country.⁵⁵ Although the report was ultimately rejected by Congress as being too costly—Gallatin estimated the project would cost \$20 million, an astronomical sum at the time—it epitomizes his eventual strong support for internal improvements.

Although Gallatin had become more comfortable with federally directed internal improvements, Jefferson remained uncomfortable with this broad interpretation of federal power; for much of his presidency, Jefferson called for a constitutional amendment giving the federal government express power over such improvements. He also envisioned that this amendment would allocate federal aid proportionally to each state’s population.⁵⁶ Gallatin staunchly disagreed with Jefferson’s views on constitutionality and apportionment. He did not believe that an amendment was necessary to allow for federally funded infrastructure. Although Jefferson voiced his concerns over the constitutionality of federally directed projects, Gallatin worked arduously to convince him that these projects were “of primary importance.”⁵⁷ According to Gallatin, all the federal government truly required was assent by the

54 *Albert Gallatin to William Giles*, February 13, 1802, in *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Henry Adams, ed., 3 vols. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879), 1:76.

55 Albert Gallatin, *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury; on the Subject of Public Roads and Canals; made in pursuance of a Resolution of the Senate, of March 2, 1807* (Washington: R.C. Weightman, 1808), 8.

56 Walters, *Albert Gallatin*, 181.

57 Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, April 13, 1807, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

states that projects passed through. Since these projects tended to benefit such states, Gallatin found it unlikely that the federal government would have difficulty in acquiring state assent—thereby questioning the necessity of pushing an amendment through Congress.⁵⁸ Furthermore, Gallatin proposed that the federal government appropriate money to the states for internal improvement projects, circumventing misgivings that could arise from strict interpretations of the Tenth Amendment. Additionally, even if the amendment were to be written, Gallatin disagreed with Jefferson’s idea of apportionment. To Gallatin, a system that apportioned the funds proportional to population would be unworkable, since improvements could not be “exactly portioned in that matter.”⁵⁹ He also thought that apportionment would undoubtedly benefit larger states, potentially “very embarrassing” for the posterity of the Democratic-Republican Party.⁶⁰ In less than a decade, Gallatin’s stance on internal improvements was indistinguishable from the ones posited by Alexander Hamilton in his *Report on Manufactures*.

Gallatin’s response to Jefferson’s constitutional scruples regarding internal improvements are inextricably linked to the way that Democratic-Republicans operated once in power. Although initially opposed to widespread internal improvement projects, Democratic-Republicans became increasingly comfortable with implementing these projects to stay in power. Thomas Jefferson had emphasized the Republican governing principles as “throwing himself on the justice of

58 Albert Gallatin, *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury; on the Subject of Public Roads and Canal*, 73.

59 Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, November 16, 1806, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

60 Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, October 29, 1808, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

his country” by adhering to the majority.⁶¹ For a long time, this allowed him to portray himself as being a “spokesman for a latent majority of Americans.”⁶² However, the turn of the nineteenth century brought new meaning to the relationship between political parties and American voters. The voters’ final authority had been reaffirmed by the contentious election of 1800, and Democratic-Republicans, in their undertaking to remain in power, “hoped not to leave any means of arousing voter support neglected.”⁶³ As a result, practical politicians like Gallatin attempted to offer platforms which the voter could both identify with and that a majority of voters could approve of.⁶⁴ Furthermore, there is little doubt that Gallatin’s approval expressed concerns over how the Democratic-Republicans would be viewed by Western frontier voters, who would be hurt by minimal apportionments to internal improvements

This concern that policy could aggrieve voters can also be seen in Gallatin’s correspondence to Jefferson surrounding the proposed Cumberland Road in 1808. Jefferson staunchly opposed the proposal, supported by local politicians, that the road pass through Uniontown, Pennsylvania. Gallatin cautioned him about the implications of this decision, reminding him of the “uniform majority of 2000 voters” that Uniontown provided to the Democratic-Republicans. If angered by the road placement, Gallatin conjectured that these votes would cause the Democratic-Republicans to “infallibly lose the State of Pennsylvania at the next election.”⁶⁵ The fact

61 Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, April 13, 1807, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

62 Todd Estes, ed., *A Companion to Thomas Jefferson: Jefferson as Party Leader* (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2012), 141.

63 Noble E. Cunningham Jr., *The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party Operations, 1801, 1809* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963), 298

64 Ibid.

65 Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, August 6, 1808, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

that Gallatin expressed concerns about voter approval reflects the notion that the turn of the nineteenth century ushered in an era where the voter began to truly shape policy decisions.⁶⁶

The Democratic-Republicans initially stood diametrically opposed to Hamilton's ideas of a federally mandated internal improvements project. While a representative, Gallatin reflected these views, supporting internal improvements but opposing federal action on the matter. However, as Treasury Secretary, Gallatin became more comfortable with the notion that the Constitution granted the federal government power to direct internal improvements. In fact, at points, Gallatin's views became indistinguishable from Hamilton's. This change in opinion reflects a wider shift that occurred at the party level. Once in power, this aversion to federally mandated internal improvement projects slowly eroded, especially as Democratic-Republicans sought to maintain the support they received across the nation.

GALLATIN AND HAMILTON: CENTRAL BANKING

During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress chose to rely on fiat money, The Continental, as a method of currency finance.⁶⁷ In less than a year, rapid inflation had devalued the currency by more than ninety-eight percent, creating the phrase, "not worth a Continental."⁶⁸ As the Revolutionary War ended, this experience with the Continental made the founders acutely aware of the urgency surrounding the financial framework they would create for the new nation. Although the topic enjoyed unanimity for some time, two divergent ideologies

⁶⁶ Doing further research, I found out that the road ultimately passed through Uniontown after passage of a bill in 1811 specified that it should (Walters, *Albert Gallatin*, 182). Although the president was now Madison, this only strengthened my conviction that Gallatin was thinking of voter support for the Democratic-Republicans when he pushed Jefferson to listen to the Uniontown voters.

⁶⁷ Fiat money is generally defined as currency without intrinsic value that is established as money through government regulation. The U.S. dollar has been fiat money since Nixon took the U.S. off the gold standard in 1971.

⁶⁸ Edling, *A Hercules in the Cradle*, 24.

emerged. Federalists supported Hamilton's notions of assuming the state debt after the Revolution, imposing an excise tax, and creating a central bank. In response to the Hamiltonian program, Democratic-Republicans opposed the imposition of excise taxes on a national level, and the power of the federal government to create a central bank. To the leading Democratic-Republicans, the system created by the Federalists was replete with "stock-jobbers and king-jobbers," who personally profited from the Hamiltonian program. This was a system that the Democratic-Republicans planned on reforming, if given the chance.⁶⁹ Although the Democratic-Republicans contested much of the Hamiltonian program, the creation of a central bank by the federal government became a focal point of the Democratic-Republican opposition.

To Hamilton, the creation of a central bank was integral to the success of his financial framework for the fledgling republic. Writing to Robert Morris well before he was the Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton contended that no other institution could give the new government "that extensive and systematic credit" that he believed to be indispensable to a country with a dearth in revenues.⁷⁰ Once in office, Hamilton immediately endeavored to turn his dream into a reality—less than a year after joining the Washington administration, he published his *Report on a National Bank*, which outlined his plans for a U.S. central bank. Despite being "poetic in its beauty and symmetry," Hamilton's report, and the Bank Bill it engendered in Congress, garnered intense criticism from Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who opposed the bank on constitutional grounds. Citing the Tenth Amendment, Jefferson believed that, "the incorporation of a bank, and other powers assumed by this bill [The Bank

⁶⁹ Gordon S. Wood, *Empire of Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 172.

⁷⁰ Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris, April 30, 1781, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.]

Bill],” had not been delegated to the federal government by the Constitution.⁷¹ Unsettled by Jefferson’s opposition to the bill, Washington requested that Hamilton defend the constitutionality of the Bank Bill. What resulted was a 15,000-word manifesto in which Hamilton argued that the incorporation of a central bank should be considered a “*quality, capacity, or mean to an end,*” and therefore, a measure that was permissible under the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution.⁷² Assiduously argued, Hamilton’s opinion on the constitutionality of the bank convinced Washington, who would ultimately sign the Bank Bill of 1791, and create the Bank of the United States.

The fight against the Bank of the United States, and Hamilton’s general financial plan, did not end with the passage of the Bank Bill.⁷³ Throughout the 1790s, Democratic-Republicans would show widespread disapproval of the Hamiltonian program—Albert Gallatin figured prominently in this opposition. In 1796, Gallatin made perhaps his most consequential contribution to this opposition by writing his *Sketch of the Finances of the United States*, a document replete with “relentless assaults on Hamilton,” and his financial program.⁷⁴ Gallatin dedicates part of the *Sketch* to critique the Bank of the United States. In it, Gallatin concedes that the creation of the Bank proved convenient due to the fact that the United States struggled with a geographical solitude that made it difficult to deal with any “drain in species” that might occur.⁷⁵ However, Gallatin presents several objections to the Bank ultimately created by

71 Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, February 23, 1791, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Founders Online, National Archives.

72 Hamilton’s Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States: 1791, February 16, 1791, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School.

73 For the rest of this section, the Bank of the United States is referenced by “the Bank.”

74 McCraw, *The Founders and Finance*, 205.

75 *A Sketch of the Finances of the United States*, in *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Henry Adams, ed., 3 vols. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879), 3:135.

Hamilton. First, Gallatin reiterates Jefferson's original critique that "Congress had not, by the Constitution, a power to incorporate any public bodies."⁷⁶ Gallatin then argues that Hamilton had utilized private capitalization of the Bank as a means of benefiting "private speculators, excited by the rapidity of appreciation."⁷⁷ This mode of capitalization coupled with immense borrowing by the Washington administration not only "increased the corruption inherent in public borrowing," but also raised the price of the national debt by approximately six percent, a detriment to the quotidian American whom Gallatin felt to be representing.⁷⁸ As a result, even if the Bank proved convenient, Gallatin concluded that the Bank ultimately created by Hamilton "justified the fears of abuses" lobbied by its opponents.⁷⁹ This encompassing critique of the Bank of the United States demonstrated a vast financial acumen previously unseen in the Democratic-Republican opposition to Hamiltonian finance.

Despite his views in his *Sketches of the Finances of the United States*, Albert Gallatin was one of the few Democratic-Republicans who would defend the Bank against the resolute opposition that Jefferson demonstrated as president. Once in power, Jefferson proposed that all of the Bank's assets be redistributed among state banks, "making all the banks republican by sharing deposits."⁸⁰ But Gallatin disagreed with the President; in fact, when Jefferson suggested placing safeguards to stymie a monopoly by the Bank, Gallatin replied that it was "not proper to displease" the directors of the Bank because they made federal money accessible across the country without the need to apply for a loan in each state, a requirement that Gallatin believed

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid., 136.

79 Ibid.

80 Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, July 12, 1803, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

state banks would assuredly put in place.⁸¹ Gallatin not only attempted to maintain the bank that Hamilton created but also managed to expand its operations. After the Louisiana Purchase, Gallatin argued for a branch of the Bank of the United States to open in New Orleans, so that, as the U.S. acquired land west of the Mississippi, money could be transmitted quickly and safely.⁸² Despite his initial opposition to the bank, Gallatin saw it as essential during his term as Secretary of the Treasury, and continually deplored Jefferson's objections to them as purely political.⁸³ Although initially a strong opponent of the bank, Gallatin eventually saw the bank as important to building the nation's credit and as one of the few avenues through which his ambitious internal improvement projects could be funded. As a result, he would become its chief defender throughout much of the Jefferson administration.

Jefferson continued to oppose the Bank of the United States, but Gallatin's changing views on the matter are indicative of a larger trend occurring in the Democratic-Republican party. During the 1790s, the consolidation of power created by the Bank, and several other aspects of Hamilton's financial plan, perturbed the Democratic-Republicans. Despite the Democratic-Republicans' initial opposition, by 1800 the bank had created an efficient apparatus to transport funds across the country. As a result, in his correspondence with Jefferson,

Gallatin characterizes any measure to weaken the bank as purely a "political objection."⁸⁴ This critique was not an isolated one; instead, it emulated a view shared by Gallatin's colleagues. During Jefferson's presidency, a number of Democratic-

81 Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, June 18, 1802, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Rotunda Digital Database, University of Virginia.

82 *Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson*, December 18, 1803, in *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Henry Adams, ed., 3 vols. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879), 1:173.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

Republicans became wary of adopting the “political intolerance of their Federalist predecessors.”⁸⁵ Although outnumbered by those who urged for a more partisan administration, this minority pushed Jefferson to adopt more “middle of the road policies” that recognized some of the efficiency created by the Federalists.⁸⁶ Gallatin’s moderation in the face of Jefferson’s unwavering criticism is a paragon of this faction of moderates who opposed partisan notions that had dominated Democratic-Republican politics in the early years of the republic. This moderation undoubtedly changed the ultimate fate of the Bank during the Jefferson administration.

CONCLUSION: GALLATIN, HAMILTON, AND THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY

It is tempting to contextualize the ideological relationship between Albert Gallatin and Alexander Hamilton in the larger framework of the rising partisanship that underpinned American politics during the early national period. However, by analyzing constitutional interpretation, internal improvements, and central banking, it becomes apparent that the relationship between these two founding fathers was much more complex than it is typically portrayed. During his early years, Gallatin proved to be an intractable opponent to Alexander Hamilton. But, once in office, Gallatin would defend many of the ideas and institutions initially proposed by Hamilton.

Albert Gallatin’s evolving mindset is not an isolated incident, but it is instead a proxy to examine some of the changes that were occurring in the Democratic-Republican Party. In opposition, the Democratic-Republicans found Federalist principles abhorrent betrayals of republican principles. However, once in power, the political advantages of certain policies, the

85 Cunningham., *The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power*, 70.

86 Ibid.

changing relationship with the voter, and the desire by a few to remain politically tolerant to advantageous Federalist policy drove the Democratic-Republicans closer to the Federalists that they once despised. Gallatin's opinions about issues rapidly evolved during his time as a leading Democratic-Republican. In many ways, this shift was indicative of the changes occurring in the Democratic-Republican party as a whole. Albert Gallatin himself possibly put it best when, in his retirement, he quipped that no matter "which party was in power, the same spirit" drove the United States forward.⁸⁷ At first, being in opposition to a Federalist majority gave Gallatin, and the Democratic-Republicans more generally, the incentive to oppose Hamilton's programs for the new nation. However, once in power, their views came to coincide with many of those shared by Hamilton and the Federalists. Ultimately, the ideas posited by Albert Gallatin and Alexander Hamilton, and the conversations these ideas elicited, had a tremendous effect on the formation of the early national period.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Gallatin Albert, *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury; on the Subject of Public Roads and Canals; made in pursuance of a Resolution of the Senate, of March 2, 1807* (Washington: R.C. Weightman, 1808).

Gallatin, Albert, *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, ed. Henry Adams (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879). 3 vols.

The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Rotunda Database, 2011-2019.

The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

⁸⁷ Albert Gallatin to Madame de Staël, October 4, 1814, in *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Henry Adams, ed., 3 vols. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879), 1: 636.

The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. Barbara B. Oberg, ed. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Rotunda Database, 2009-2019.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Banning, Lance. "Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793." *The William and Mary Quarterly*, vol. 31, no. 2, 1974.
- Chernow, Ron. *Alexander Hamilton*. Penguin Books, 2005.
- Cogliano, Frank. *A Companion to Thomas Jefferson*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.
- Cunningham, Noble E. *The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party Operations 1801-1809*. University of North Carolina, 1974.
- Dungan, Nicholas. *Gallatin: America's Swiss Founding Father*. New York University Press, 2010.
- Edling, Max M. *A Hercules in the Cradle: War, Money, and the American State, 1783-1867*. The University of Chicago Press, 2014.
- Hogeland, William. *The Whiskey Rebellion: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and the Frontier Rebels Who Challenged America's Newfound Sovereignty*. Simon & Schuster, 2006.
- Larson, John Lauritz. *Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States*. University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
- May, Gregory. *Jefferson's Treasure: How Albert Gallatin Saved the New Nation from Debt*. Regnery History, 2018.
- McCraw, Thomas K. *The Founders and Finance: How Hamilton, Gallatin, and Other Immigrants Forged a New Economy*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014.
- McDonald, Forrest. *Alexander Hamilton a Biography*. Norton, 1982.
- Minicucci, Stephen. "Internal Improvements and the Union, 1790-1860." *Studies in American Political Development*, vol. 18, no. 02, 2004, doi:10.1017/s0898588x04000094.
- Stourzh, Gerald. *Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government*. UMI Books on Demand, 1995.

Walters, Raymond. *Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat*. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969.

Wood, Gordon S. *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815*. The Legal Classics Library, 2014.

“WHAT YOU WANT IS REVOLUTION. HOW? GO LOOK IT UP IN THE LIBRARY”

Democratizing Information and Space Through the Bay Area’s Informal Libraries

Camryn Bell

In its May 5-11, 1967 issue, the Bay Area-based alt-weekly *Berkeley Barb* offered an intriguing literary proposition to its readers. An advertisement, squeezed between a report of a local councilmember’s distaste for “hippies” and a feature on Mexican-American students suing the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, read: “Some people in Berkeley want to organize a mobile ‘movement library,’ of radical literature.”¹ This somewhat vague call for materials was accompanied by a telephone number that interested parties could contact to donate or assist in the establishment of the library. Beyond this brief appearance in the weekly’s pages, mention of this “movement library” disappeared into the summer months. However, word ultimately spread about the library, and words led to action. By September, it had materialized from its humble beginnings as an optimistic proposal to a concrete, if ramshackle, operation. Housed in a 1942 army ambulance and outfitted with colorful, abstract artwork that called attention to the vehicle as it made its way through the East Bay, the Movement Library manifested itself as a repository of radical literature. Its mission was perhaps best summed up in its slogan: “Loaned Here Free, Easy to Borrow, Easy to Retur [sic].” By filling out a card with an address and the name of a requested title, patrons could check out texts from the library’s rapidly growing collection without late fees or firm return dates. Though

1 Advertisement, *Berkeley Barb*, May 5-11, 1967.

the library was mobile, it served as a crucial resource for obtaining literature not typically offered in the local public or university libraries at the time, such as books on civil rights, the anti-war movement, and student free speech movement groups. As the self-described “Librarian” Arnie Egel outlined in an article profiling the Movement Library and its goals, “Marches, draft refusal and libraries are all necessary to build political consciousness and to make people aware.”² By February 1968, the library’s truck was marooned on UC Berkeley’s Sproul Plaza due to a lack of funds, and eventually, was moved to a stationary location at Moe’s Bookstore on Telegraph Avenue in Berkeley.³

Though the Movement Library was seemingly short-lived, its mission and legacy were not. The Library played a crucial role as a free repository of information and represents a microcosm of the larger flow of ideas sweeping across the Bay Area during the 1960s and 1970s. As an accessible resource, it was critical to the organization of social consciousness, the distribution of radical thought and logistical organizing in the region of influence it reached on its driving route. As Arnie Egel pointed out, libraries themselves were intrinsically tied to the idea of cultivating and advancing radical political thought. The informal library — which I will define from here on out as libraries independent of institutional systems, such as universities, public library systems, or privately housed collections — provided an alternative to regulated forms of information sharing, serving as a parallel to the ideological alternatives being offered in the tumultuous times characterized by the countercultural, New Left, and various other social, political, and civil rights movements. As one columnist wrote in another Bay Area-based underground publication, the *San Francisco Good Times*, the very idea of the library was

2 “Movement Library moving up fast,” *Berkeley Barb*, September 15-21, 1967.

3 “Movement Library Stuck,” *Berkeley Barb*, February 16-22, 1968.

fundamentally tied to the propagation of radical thought. The author then posed a rhetorical back-and-forth to their readers that engaged with this idea: “What you want is revolution. How? Go look it up in the library.”⁴ This quote gestures toward some of the key conceptual ties between the library and revolutionary thought, and how a library could serve as a site for advancing radically progressive ideas.

As new media scholar Abigail De Kosnik outlines, formal libraries serve as “memory institutions,” defined as repositories of cultural memory and information designated, established and run by formal mechanisms of power. De Kosnik writes: “From the late nineteenth through the late twentieth century, memory — not private, individual memory, but public, collective memory — was the domain of the state.”⁵ It is this context that separates an institutionalized library or archive from their more informal, radical counterparts. The definition of library in general can be difficult to pin down, but for the purposes of this paper it is a repository of organized information designed to be accessed by many people. It also has a spatial element in that the library is somewhere one can go to in order to gain access to the desired materials, leading to the role many libraries take on as gathering spaces. It is the intersection of the goal to provide for accessible information in an organized space, and the role of its patrons, to access said information, that define the library from other social spaces.

It is notable that libraries are arguably relatively democratic institutions compared to other state bodies. However, while they often provide the general public with free, readily accessible information, they are still limited in the scope of services and information they can provide, whether that be in a physical sense or in terms of ideological content. This is a legacy well-hewn

4 Sandy Darlington, “River,” *San Francisco Good Times*, September 11, 1970.

5 Abigail De Kosnik, *Rogue Archives* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016), p. 1.

into the institutional structure of libraries, which, even in their most progressive forms, have been “dominated by predominantly white, male and bourgeois cultures and histories.”⁶ Groups pushed to the peripheries of society have historically negotiated with and created alternative spaces for information exchange in light of the shortcomings presented by institutionalized libraries, resulting in the realization of the informal library. I argue that these informal libraries served both as archives of memory and places where groups could gather and express their ideas freely, serving simultaneously symbolic and practical purposes. As Joan M. Schwartz and Terry Cook point out in their work, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory,” archival sources have immense potential to symbolize power, meaning that “some can afford to create and maintain records, and some cannot; that certain voices thus will be heard loudly and some not all; that certain views and ideas about society will in turn be privileged and others marginalized.” With informal libraries, this idea aligned with the goal to reclaim power over information by groups on the margins that were advocating for radical ideals, in some cases through the creation of an archive.⁷

Regarding sources, I primarily use newspapers and periodicals that were published throughout the Bay Area, centering in and around San Francisco, Berkeley and Oakland. These pieces provide a range of details about where information was being produced, and also served as a primary source of advertising for the various libraries and information centers that popped up throughout the pivotal decade of the 1960s and diffused into the 1970s, and to a lesser degree, into the 1980s. The

6 Tim Huzar, “Neoliberalism, Democracy and the Library as a Radically Inclusive Space” (paper presented at IFLA WLIC 2014 - Lyon - Libraries, Citizens, Societies: Confluence for Knowledge in Session 200 - Library Theory and Research, Lyon, France, 16-22 August 2014), p. 6.

7 Terry Cook and Joan M. Schwartz, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory,” *Archival Science*, vol. 2 (2002), p. 14.

publications I draw from can all be classified as “underground publications,” that is, periodicals published outside of the mainstream press.⁸ I further delve into the archival records of the San Francisco Gay Library Project, which constitutes the source material of the case study in the third section of this paper. Building on the information provided by the robust print culture of the Bay Area, as well as two specific library case studies, I aim to address why these places were established, how people used them, and the ways in which they served as a means of preserving historical memory. Another layer of my analysis engages with the ways in which institutional libraries proved to be hostile to radical or revolutionary thought, directly leading to the establishment of informal library sites.

These sources are not only methodologically necessary to point out the types of places readers were utilizing to find and exchange information, but the underground press also serves as a critical point for contextualizing information exchange within radical movements. In this moment of social and political upheaval, the development of the radical press was a physical means of distributing and developing radical literature outside of the mainstream, and a way to provide concrete logistical information to readers, such as meeting times or how to contact organizers.⁹ The underground press movement — which had especially strong roots in the Bay Area — has been relatively well-documented, making it a critical starting point in understanding informal libraries as sites for preserving and propagating information in the region.¹⁰ The reality of a flourishing underground press began taking shape in the early 1900s, as

⁸ John McMillian, *Smoking Typewriters: The Sixties Underground Press and the Rise of Alternative Media in America*, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 32.

⁹ John McMillian, *Smoking Typewriters: The Sixties Underground Press and the Rise of Alternative Media in America*, (NY: Oxford University Press), p. 32.

¹⁰ Katie Anastas, “Underground Newspapers: The Social Media Networks of the 1960s and 1970s,” Mapping American Social Movements Through the 20th Century, University of Washington.

anarchist, labor, and other social movements rose to prominence. In light of persecution by government officials and the mainstream press, underground publications flourished as groups sought to distribute information outside of the watchful gaze of those opposed to their ideals, while still remaining accessible to advertise logistical and ideological information about their respective causes.¹¹ These were matters of autonomy, information, and communication, and these presses continued to increase their production into the 1950s and 1960s as other social and political movements took hold in the postwar era.¹² The countercultural movement further advanced the tradition of a robust print culture, with presses continuing to crop up around the country as well as in the Bay Area. On this trend, Christopher Tinson offers a critical perspective on the role of the press in the Black Power movement, asserting that “these publishing spaces offered a form of direct community engagement and movement-inspired political literacy. These periodicals went beyond merely presenting the news.”¹³ Underground publications were crucial on many fronts, but they largely served to establish an intellectual framework that has been pinpointed as having “socialized people into the Movement, fostered a spirit of mutuality among them, and raised their democratic expectations.”¹⁴ In this sense, the underground press can be understood as a foundation for the information distribution that was advanced by informal libraries, in that they provided spaces for utilizing these resources and for communal gathering.

Another important contextual point to address is the Bay Area itself as a nexus of social and political movements.

11 Katie Anastas, “Underground Newspapers: The Social Media Networks of the 1960s and 1970s,” Mapping American Social Movements Through the 20th Century, University of Washington, https://depts.washington.edu/moves/altnews_geography.shtml.

12 Ibid.

13 Christopher Tinson, “Remembering the Black Radical Press,” *Black Perspectives*, January 25, 2018.

14 John McMillian, *Smoking Typewriters: The Sixties Underground Press and the Rise of Alternative Media in America*, (NY: Oxford University Press), p. 4.

Cultural historian Anthony Ashbolt pinpoints the Bay Area as a primary site of radical thought in both a symbolic sense and building on a historical ideological tradition. He argues that San Francisco's beginnings as a "union town," with strong roots in labor organizing, paired with movements such as the rise of the Beat Generation, made for a two-punch combination that lent the Bay Area its still-existing (though debatable) notoriety as an epicenter of countercultural, social, and political movements.¹⁵ Another important frame of reference was the development of the anarchist movement in the Bay Area, which laid the groundwork for the socio-political trends of eschewing the mainstream, as well as important concepts relating to the use of "free space" and the exchange of radical information. Important to the anarchist movement in the Bay Area were institutions such as the "bohemian free spaces" of KPFA-Pacific Radio, anarchist infoshops, and The Communication Company, the public information arm of the anarchist group The Diggers, which was significantly influential in terms of shaping countercultural aesthetics and practices.¹⁶ At the confluence of these movements and ideologies lies what Ashbolt designates as the crucial importance of symbolic space for radical groups during the 1960s, in that autonomous institutional sites, vibrant local communities, and other types of public gathering places held significant roles in the struggle for democracy.¹⁷

The convergence of the underground press and the general revolutionary fervor of the Bay Area offers a starting point for considering the establishment and significance of informal libraries alongside other radical movements. As these movements developed, they took with them a robust print culture, advancing ideas through the production of literature and written works, and

¹⁵ Anthony Ashbolt, *A Cultural History of the Radical Sixties in the San Francisco Bay Area* (London, UK: Pickering & Chatto, 2013), p. 29, 41.

¹⁶ Andrew Cornell, *Unruly Equality: U.S. Anarchism in the 20th Century* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016), p. 251-252.

¹⁷ Ashbolt, p. 3.

would eventually provide radical free spaces and information sources for their patrons. Through analysis of how people used and understood informal libraries, this paper demonstrates that the construction of these spaces was dual-purpose, serving as both repositories of information and promoting radical ideas. Looking at these sites, there is much to learn about both the movements themselves and about the symbolic significance of the library as an archive of memory for groups and ideas outside of the mainstream.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

The connections between space, information exchange, and radical ideas have been approached from many angles, ranging from the ideologically abstract to case-based analyses. However, libraries, and informal libraries in particular, are often left out of the conversations connecting social movements to organizing spaces and repositories of information. This is a critical oversight, and one that this paper addresses, as libraries are often one of the most central and accessible resources for the people who make up the social movements that are frequently the subject of historical study. Looking at the use of libraries within the context of these ideological groups helps to show how real people were creating, organizing and using information to their specific needs. In “The Symbolic Significance of Archives,” historian James O’Toole makes a prescient argument that archives are imbued with symbolic meaning in addition to their role as physical repositories, which has manifold implications for understanding how and why libraries have been created and utilized.¹⁸ O’Toole’s focus is broad, spanning from the medieval period to the present, but his argument provides insights into the interpretation of physical records. Absent from his argument, however, is the library itself as a proper archive,

¹⁸ James O’Toole, “The Symbolic Significance of Archives,” *American Archivist*, vol. 56 (Spring 1993), p. 234-255.

forgoing the important implications of the library as serving a similar, symbolic function as both a public communal space and a holding space for information and ideas. Their communal and public aspects may be why libraries are often left out of this conversation, though they generally match the criterion of being both a physical repository and a symbolic space — a necessary site of analysis within the larger context of the value of “the archive.”

In “American Moderns: Bohemian New York and the Creation of a New Century,” Christine Stansell focuses her argument on Greenwich Village as a case study, claiming that the urban space produced a specific social culture that in turn facilitated intellectual exchange through communal spaces such as coffee houses. Stansell argues that these spaces were dynamic, allowing for the facilitation of radical ideas in places that came to be designated as safe and separate from institutional regulation.¹⁹ David Parsons takes another approach to the concept of space and ideological development, analyzing coffeehouses as centers of intellectual and radical exchange in the framework of “countercultural coffeehouses.” In his work, “Dangerous Grounds: Antiwar Coffeehouses and Military Dissent in the Vietnam War,” Parsons illustrates that these independently established coffeehouses “served as resource centers and organizational bases for the growing movement of active-duty soldiers organizing against the war.”²⁰ In both of these authors’ works, designated free space was an essential part of producing a certain radical social milieu and political culture. However, analysis of these spaces has focused more heavily on the idea of communal gathering than around overt information exchange or on the libraries themselves. Sometimes a library was housed within the coffeehouses in these

¹⁹ Christine Stansell, *American Moderns: Bohemian New York and the Creation of a New Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

²⁰ David L. Parsons, *Dangerous Grounds: Antiwar Coffeehouses and Military Dissent in the Vietnam Era*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017), p. 2.

authors' studies, but their points of concentration rest specifically on communal spaces producing a particular intellectual culture and lending themselves to the development of political thought. One of the locations Parsons explores, the Oleo Strut in Killeen, Texas, also had significant connections to the Bay Area. The Oleo Strut appeared frequently in the *Berkeley Barb* and *Movement* newspapers, often in calls for readers to contribute to the Oleo Strut's growing radical library, which included texts and works on racism, imperialism, history, and “the things the rulers of America DON'T want GIs to read.”²¹ This indicates that the coffeehouse and library cultures were not isolated, but rather critically intertwined in the larger scope of radical information exchange.

“Gay by the Bay,” by Susan Stryker and Jim Van Buskirk, offers another view into the connection between space, information, and the role of institutions, focusing on the ways the Prohibition era created a network of secret, private bars in which “queer people could gather and their friends could socialize.”²² Stryker and Van Buskirk argue that these spaces served as starting points for later LGBTQ political organizing, and they contend that this was directly tied to the use of communal social space. Their work mirrors “American Moderns” in the connections between social gathering and the exchange of radical ideas, concepts that parallel the ways informal libraries would ultimately be used. These three examples highlight the ways that space have been strategically used for the purpose of information exchange, and provide a framework for analyzing libraries that has been absent from the narratives accompanying the history of social movements. The way ideologically radical groups used library spaces gives insight into the priorities of these groups and the development of organizing strategies.

21 “Letters: Oleo Strut,” *Movement*, October 1969.

22 Susan Stryker and Jim Van Buskirk, *Gay by the Bay: A History of Queer Culture in the San Francisco Bay Area* (San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books, 1996), p. 22.

THERE WERE POLICE “EVEN [IN] THE LIBRARY”:
INSTITUTIONAL LIBRARIES AS HOSTILE SPACES

Though this essay focuses on the construction of libraries outside of the mainstream institutions, the Bay Area has historically had a robust and progressive public library system, as well as a complementary network of university libraries dotting the Berkeley-San Francisco-Oakland area. In this section, I briefly address the history of the area’s public institutions as well as outline some of the factors that led to these institutions becoming hostile, or at least inhospitable, to the countercultural causes and marginalized groups attempting to utilize their services. These conflicts were spatial — as the library as a space for demonstrators — and ideological — challenging what sort of information a library could and should have amongst its collections.

The San Francisco Public Library system was established on the cusp of the twentieth century as a part of the “Free Library” legislation that also led to the establishment of its sister institution, the Oakland Public Library system.²³ The aim of this 1878 act was to create free and accessible centers of information throughout the state, instilling the libraries with outwardly democratic values: these were to be places that everyone could use, in theory. Yet no matter how utopian these values were, they were challenged at the outset with institutional policies of racial segregation and other limitations on who could, in reality, use these spaces. The dual public library systems of San Francisco and Oakland provided branches across the Bay Area, and a Richmond library system was established in 1907, making for a robust network of publicly accessible information that grew and developed into the twentieth century. However, several factors led marginalized and radical organizers to seek out their

²³ An Act to establish and maintain free public libraries and reading-rooms, California State Assembly, 22nd sess. (March 18, 1878), p. 329.

own institutions rather than relying on the public, private, or university libraries that may have initially been common places to access information and gather.

In the wake of the rising countercultural movements of the 1960s, the San Francisco Public Library saw increased institutional violence in places that billed themselves as spaces for learning, exchanging literature, and a “vital force in the communities.”²⁴ In one case, a June 26, 1967, talk by General Maxwell Taylor at San Francisco’s Hilton Hotel was met with backlash from the Berkeley Campus Mobilization Group for the general’s role in promoting the Vietnam War. The event was hosted by the American Library Association, and though the “SFPL [was] not endorsing Taylor,” the clash represented a fundamental discrepancy in institutional versus radical thought and practice in the local library scene. Librarians with the San Francisco Public Library protested the war general’s speaking appointment, but the continuation of the event represents a fundamental rift between the library’s employees, patrons, and ideological goals.²⁵ In this sense, the library represented a conduit for controversial figures, who opposed the anti-war ideals held by protestors. Three years later, librarians also spoke out about the presence of police at an August 19, 1970, demonstration at the San Francisco Public Library’s Civic Center Branch, as these forces were using library spaces as a means of surveilling demonstrators. The signatory librarians wrote, “It seems to us that this is an inappropriate use of the library for purposes for which it was not designed, as inappropriate as would be a similar use of a school, a hospital or a church...the library is supposed to be an educational and cultural facility and it should remain that.”²⁶ They also went

24 Richard Coenberg, “Synergizing Reference Service in the San Francisco Bay Region,” *ALA Bulletin*, vol. 62, no. 11 (December 1968), p. 1,381.

25 “SF Library Opposed to Taylor Talk,” *Berkeley Barb*, June 23-29, 1967.

26 “Petition Sez Lib for Libraries,” *Berkeley Barb*, September 11-17, 1970.

on to emphasize the connection between police presence and the violation of the trust of “blac [sic], third-world and poor white people” in the library space.²⁷ As social and political movements progressed into the 1970s, this relationship between institutional violence and use of free space would only increase. As one writer also pointed out in the *Berkeley Barb*, the “ubiquitous” presence of the police and private guards extended not only to local shopping centers and markets, but “even the library.”²⁸ These examples illustrate how the library became a site in direct opposition to new lines of ideological thought and acted as a mechanism of the state. This led various groups to seek out and establish their own library spaces in line with their ideological goals.

Public libraries also often became hostile to revolutionary causes in an ideological sense with censorship of or outright bans on certain materials. The *Berkeley Barb* and *AVANT GARDE*, another alternative, radical publication, underwent a lengthy period of back-and-forth over censorship issues in the Richmond Public Library system. In response to limited outcry about the *Berkeley Barb*'s outwardly racy content, which ranged from advertising sex shops to graphic photography, the Richmond Public Library decided to pull the two magazines from its shelves.²⁹ This produced extensive community backlash, resulting in the reinstatement of the *Berkeley Barb* on library shelves in a matter of months.³⁰ The incident, however, contributed to a sense of threat, in that an alternative paper such as the *Berkeley Barb*, which aimed to publish material considered subversive and that also reported extensively on radical movements, could be removed from the shelves. Though the case of the Richmond

27 Ibid.

28 S.B. Glick, “Pork Price,” *Berkeley Barb*, November 6, 1970.

29 “Barb-Burners off Base,” *Berkeley Barb*, September 13-19, 1968.

30 “Barb Alive in Richmond,” *Berkeley Barb*, January 17-23, 1969.

Public Library resulted in a victory for the underground publication, the controversy that ensued encapsulates a moment of transparency, showing the library as an institution willing to ban certain categories of material.

Another important aspect concerning the symbolic role of the library was in its connection to the student movements that emerged in the 1960s. As social and political uprisings emerged at universities around the country in response to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, in defense of civil rights, and following the first rumblings of the feminist movement, the library became a symbolic space as a vestigial arm of the university system and a physical location of violence. At San Francisco State University, during the Third World Liberation Front strikes, the university library was a site of direct institutional violence and a place that produced innovative rebellion. In terms of direct action, the library's systems of information management also became a means of subverting the system. As Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin detail in their history of the Black Panther Party, during the Third World Liberation Front strikes, “students continued to use occasional disruptive tactics such as ‘book-ins’ at the library, during which a group of students would check out as many books as they could, then return them all, backing up the system and shutting down library circulation.”³¹ These tactics were a means of dismantling a space that was hostile to their cause, and representative of the ways in which traditional library spaces became hostile to their patrons. Police in the library was a common occurrence during these types of protests, with onlookers noting the “Gestapo patrolling the library.”³² Similar actions also took place across the country in

31 Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, *Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), p. 281.

32 ““We escalate,”” *Berkeley Barb*, January 24-30, 1969.

line with the nationwide sweeps of social organizing. Among them were “guerilla [sic] demonstrations” at Cornell University, where students checked out thousands of books in protest of the collection’s lack of material relevant to Black students.³³ There were also numerous sit-ins held at Columbia University’s Low Library, both of which were reported on in Bay Area underground publications.³⁴ These national movements added to the growing image of institutional libraries as hostile, which in turn led political organizers and activists to seek out spaces more suited to their needs. Similarly, these libraries testify to the ways in which these sites of knowledge were inherently politicized. While they functioned outwardly as neutral spaces of learning, they were often in actuality sites of oppression.

In the wake of institutional libraries showing themselves to be in opposition to many of the radical ideas emerging from all loci of the social and political spectrum, informal libraries emerged as a solution to the problems posed by these mainstream sites. They offered access to radical ideological content and served as free, accessible spaces. The ways in which the Bay Area’s social and political movements organized informal libraries was multifaceted, and the following sections of this paper address two case studies that illustrate how organizers within the feminist movement and advocates for LGBTQ rights carved out niches to exchange information and literature, and to gather in the face of institutional hostility. Two groups by no means paint a comprehensive portrait of every social movement or informal informational space that would appear in this period, but the following two sections illustrate a portion of the robust network of informal library spaces that emerged within the larger scope of social and political organizing.

33 “Cornell - Ashes or Blaze,” *The Movement*, vol. 5, no. 6, July 1969.

34 “Notes on Columbia,” *The Movement*, vol. 5, no. 2, March 1969.

FREE SPACE AND FEMINISM: ORGANIZING
LIBRARIES FOR AND BY WOMEN

The feminist movement was one of the groups that ardently addressed the need for free spaces to exchange information in the Bay Area. Part of a national movement swelling at the time, the Bay Area provided a base network for feminist organizers and a prime location for emerging feminist thought. Among the many groups that would surface in the Bay Area was Sudsoflopen, an organization of women's liberation activists that frequently met in the Old Wives' Tale Bookstore in the Mission District.³⁵ The group was known for its innovative introduction of “consciousness raising” in group development through the principles of “opening up, sharing, analyzing and abstracting,” as well as advancing the idea of “free space,” which was outlined in an essay by Sudsoflopen member Pam Allen.³⁶ In her treatise, “Free space: A perspective on the small group in women's liberation,” Allen laid out the concept that free space was critical to the advancement of the women's movement, in providing a site for the clear and unabated communication of radical ideas.³⁷ At the core of these tenants was the idea that “Unless women are given a non-judgmental space in which to express themselves, we will never have the strength or the perception to deal with the ambivalences which are a part of us all.”³⁸ In this sense, spatial freedom was a crucial part of advancing the movement and the ideas produced by feminist groups.

One of the ways that spaces for free information exchange and gathering crystallized was in the form of feminist bookstores.

35 Deborah A. Gerson, “Making Sexism Visible: Private Troubles Made Public,” in *Ten Years that Shook the City: San Francisco 1968-1978*, ed. by Chris Carlsson (San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 2011), p. 172.

36 Pamela Allen, *Free Space: A Perspective on the Small Group in Women's Liberation* (New York, NY: Times Change Press, 1970), p. 23-31.

37 Ibid.

38 Allen, p. 25.

In his analysis of feminist bookstores in the larger context of activist entrepreneurs, Joshua Davis locates the creation of autonomous free spaces within the women's movement as a means for women to navigate capitalism in order to achieve independence. Davis points to the creation of the Women's Print Collective in Oakland as well as the Oakland-based Diana Press as two such groups that utilized a capitalist structure to sell, exchange, and carve out a space for feminist work in the publishing market. Well into the 1970s, these groups expanded in the Bay Area and excelled in employing women and putting out feminist works.³⁹ In a similar vein, Kristen Hogan also identifies women's bookstores as a site for advancing the women's movement, providing "safe spaces for information circulation and discussion as well as training grounds for agitational activities."⁴⁰ By providing information not available in university libraries or other public institutions, these bookstores became foundational in advancing feminist thought and building what would become the backbone of women's studies programs. Bookstores functioned as public entities, not unlike a reference site in a public library, with an emphasis on exchange and learning. Some even developed their own rental libraries, expanding the scope of what bookstores could provide.

Because Black feminist groups often had to carve out their own space from broader feminist and civil rights activist groups, facilitating the exchange of information was central to their mission. Publications distributed nationwide were a central part of this movement, serving as a critical means of disseminating information and mobilizing organizational action. One of the preeminent Black feminist groups, Black Women

39 Joshua Davis, *From Head Shops to Whole Foods* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017), p. 147-149.

40 Kristen Hogan, "Women's Studies in Feminist Bookstores: 'All the women's studies women would come in,'" *Signs*, vol. 33, no. 3 (Spring 2018), p. 596-597.

Organized for Action, was established and based out of San Francisco. They, along with the Third World Women’s Alliance, published *Triple Jeopardy*, an underground newspaper, and *What it Is!*, an organizational newsletter. Both publications served as “informational conduits” for members and those interested in the cause and also provided an important function in the larger scope of organizing. In her text “Living for the Revolution,” Kimberly Springer outlines that “With limited resources, black feminists relied on their own abilities to disseminate information... publishing newsletters, newspapers, and other publications about black women and feminism allowed black women to share leadership responsibilities and affirm their common identity as activists.”⁴¹

In addition to the establishment of free space for women to freely gather and share feminist ideas, there was also a strong and persistent demand for these feminist works outside of the typical avenues for obtaining information. This attitude was emphasized in a listing in alternative newspaper the *Berkeley Tribe*, headlined “Steal this centerfold.” The article in question included resources for women, such as bookstores and publications under the designation “survival is a collective problem.”⁴² The article gestures toward the need for these feminist resources and discusses the ways in which people sought out spaces outside of the mainstream in order to exchange information. In an interview from the San Francisco-based feminist-lesbian publication *Amazon Quarterly*, an anonymous interviewee described the process of finding information on feminist thought as such: “I didn’t seek out information specifically. For one thing I was sort of trapped — the only information I had was the high school and public library, and

41 Kimberly Springer, *Living for the Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), p. 93.

42 “Steal this Centerfold,” *Berkeley Tribe*, October 22-28, 1971.

in those places there was nothing.”⁴³ In this sense, feminist bookstores and their informal libraries provided an answer to a dearth of information in institutional resources, continuing the mission of radical feminist publications and carving out the intellectual and physical “free space” that was so central to the movement.

In this turbulence of feminist action, three things emerge as important to the feminist cause: a robust flow of information in the form of underground and feminist-led publications, a significant bookstore culture as a site for feminist gathering and exchanging materials, and an emphasis on “free space” and the establishment of autonomous spaces. In light of these materials not being made available at public institutions, women found ways of making their information available and accessible, contributing to a vigorous picture of the feminist organizing landscape. This drive for accessible information is evidenced in the *Amazon Quarterly's* “Resources” section, which in a 1973 edition pointed to dozens of publications, centers, and other resources for women in both the Bay Area and across the country.⁴⁴

Much like the Movement Library, another important radical resource emerged in the Bay Area: an informal women’s library, with a focus on preserving feminist works and advancing the cause. Located at 2325 Oak Street in the north hills of Berkeley, the Women’s History Research Center was run by local women’s activist Laura X, and offered materials such as books, periodicals, pamphlets, and other research implements for women patrons to utilize.⁴⁵ Its motto, which would eventually be signposted on the organization’s door read: “Our history has been stolen from us.”⁴⁶ This message was a preminent reminder of the Center’s mission,

43 “Marie,” *Amazon Quarterly*, December 1973.

44 “Resources, collective efforts,” *Amazon Quarterly*, October 1973.

45 Laura X, “The Women’s History Library: Notes on a Decade,” *Journal of Library History*, vol. 15, no. 4 (Fall 1980), p. 465.

46 ““History Stolen,”” *Berkeley Barb*, September 1-7, 1972.

which was to reclaim a history for women that had not been preserved or prioritized in mainstream informational institutions. The center’s ultimate goal was to create a space to develop and maintain what became the International Women’s History Archive and serve as an accessible research center for “women in all walks of life, past to present.”⁴⁷

In a similarly frank fashion to its declaratory motto, a 1970 ad for the center declared, “Work on the center is done by women who use it.”⁴⁸ The center was envisioned as a place for women, by women. In an early document outlining the site’s goals and vision, its creators emphasized both the physical aspects and the material it would contain as significant. The space was to be convenient, near the freeway and various bus lines, and also had space in its front yard “which could make a nice play area for children.”⁴⁹ This initial manifesto for the library’s location is a testament to whom and what the space was intended for: women and information pertaining to feminist ideology. Women, who may have been working or taking care of children, were centered in its conception.⁵⁰

Topics addressed by the center included women in history, action projects, and ways women had been portrayed by men in public contexts. The library also laid out specific goals in terms of what the space could offer: a place to research, lend, correspond, and sell women’s literature.⁵¹ Various outreach projects were conducted by the Center in an effort to obtain microfilm and other material relating specifically to the women’s movement, both in an effort to add to the “Herstory Library” archive (as it was sometimes referred to) as well as to sell to other libraries

47 ““History Stolen,”” *Berkeley Barb*, September 1-7, 1972.

48 Advertisement, *Berkeley Tribe*, July 3-10, 1970.

49 “Berkeley Women’s Center,” *It Ain’t Me Babe*, July 2-23, 1970.

50 “Berkeley Women’s Center,” *It Ain’t Me Babe*, July 2-23, 1970.

51 Advertisement, *Berkeley Tribe*, October 16-23, 1970

throughout the country.⁵² In this two-pronged effort, the library made strides in establishing its own archive independent from mainstream libraries and also communicated intentional efforts to expand their material memory into mainstream institutions. By encouraging the production and collecting copies of these women-helmed works, the library established itself as a physical repository for the historical memory of the women's movement, captured in its collections.

This preservation effort was not without challenges, however, particularly in relation to mainstream libraries. In one study, staff members at the Center revealed several major issues regarding the establishment of the space and in their efforts to integrate feminist and women-focused material to larger libraries. These issues were described as “reflections of policy or lack of it, patriarchal attitudes and traditions of the institution, or of the librarian.”⁵³ There was also the problem of the persistent categorization of “women's materials,” which were a critical part of library budget spending, most often including magazines, “cookbooks, Harlequin Romances, titillating soap-operas,” and the like of stereotypically feminine literature.⁵⁴ This policy-based tension reflects the continued significance of the Center as a space for preserving historical memory, as they were the only ones who would accept some works. The struggle only persisted as they faced material and budgetary struggles in their attempts to push feminist-focused information into the public library system, and, by proxy, the mainstream. The Center would face a tenuous future in the 1970s, closing intermittently starting in 1972, but remains an important symbolic space and still holds significance in how it

52 “Herstory Microfilm Project,” *Berkeley Barb*, August 13-19, 1971.

53 Helen Rippier Wheeler, “We can't put women on the budget,” *Library Acquisitions: Practice & Theory*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1978), p. 133.

54 Helen Rippier Wheeler, “We can't put women on the budget,” *Library Acquisitions: Practice & Theory*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1978), p. 134.

maintains its accrued archive of women-related literature.⁵⁵

For women, this sort of space represented a place to engage in feminist discourse and to establish a space away from institutional regulation. Though the library as concept was not overtly patriarchal, there was a persistent element of oppression that made some women uncomfortable in mainstream gathering spaces. This was shown in a 1972 case in which a group of two dozen women, calling themselves Women in Solidarity, stormed the Berkeley Public Library with picket signs in protest of a guard who had been accused of harassing women. This protest occurred amidst a larger trend of women being harassed in the library space. There was an overt sentiment expressed by this group that “women [were] not safe at the library.”⁵⁶ The Center then took on a role as an alternative to this sort of place in that it gave women the space to control and navigate their own space and served as an ideological hub for material relating to women’s issues.

Spaces for information designed and made specifically for women arose around the Bay Area throughout the 1960s and 1970s — some centered around Valencia Street in the Mission District in San Francisco, where there were outposts such as the Old Wives’ Tales Bookstore, Women’s Building, and the Women’s Press Project — all serving as places for gathering and creating feminist material. As Susan Stryker and Jim Van Buskirk detail in “Gay by the Bay,” the Bay Area saw a “distinctive women’s culture that blossomed in the early 1970s, a culture with its own music, literature, social theories, gathering places, community publications, fair, and festivals.”⁵⁷ Coming forth from the second wave feminism of the 1960s, the 1970s saw a continuation of women claiming space for themselves in order to exchange information and facilitate ideas. These two aspects

55 “How local groups will celebrate,” *Berkeley Barb*, Aug. 25-31, 1972.

56 “Women Gain Guard Change At Library,” *Berkeley Barb*, March 17-23, 1972.

57 Susan Stryker and Jim Van Buskirk, *Gay by the Bay: A History of Queer Culture in the San Francisco Bay Area* (San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books, 1996), p. 57.

are evident in the case study of the Women's History Research Center and the archive it created. In preserving the memory of women's work and feminist theory, the Center and its like-minded Bay Area counterparts served a role that mainstream institutions would not. Their collections stand as representation of what was important to actual participants in the women's movement and reflect what was missing from its representation in the mainstream. In these locations, women could gather in peace in a space that was safe and could engage with material that was curated with a specific goal in mind, independent of the patriarchal hand of the state.

“NO EXISTING INSTITUTION PROVIDES OR IS WILLING TO
PROVIDE THE LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SERVICES THE
GAY/LESBIAN COMMUNITY NEEDS”

San Francisco is often designated as the nexus of the gay rights movement, with the city serving as a starting point for organizational frameworks that diffused themselves across the nation, making for a comprehensive movement.⁵⁸ With foundational organizations such as the Vanguard, the Mattachine Society, the Daughters of Bilitis, and numerous other collective bodies, the Bay Area was a center for advocating for and defending gay rights, and it served as a major organizational center and as a hub for producing publications focused on gay rights and issues pertinent to members of the community.⁵⁹ With this in mind, the Bay Area is a prime site from which to analyze the development of informal libraries for facilitating information in the context of the gay rights movement.

An initial space of significance in the gay rights movement would be the gay bar scene, particularly in San Francisco. Out of

⁵⁸ Nan Alamilla Boyd, *Wide-open Town: A History of Queer San Francisco to 1965* (Berkeley, CA: UC Press, 2003), p. 201.

⁵⁹ Elizabeth A. Armstrong, *Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950-1994*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 4, 62.

this public social sphere emerged community gathering spaces, sites for publishing informational literature, and general places to meet. One gap faced by the community was the absence of formal spaces for accessing gay literature — whether that meant obtaining practical information, well-known gay publications, or fictional works focusing on gay characters. Mainstream library institutions often held limited or no LGBTQ information or were overtly hostile to gay patrons. Mirroring the other examples of police hostility within the library, gay library patrons and students seeking to use libraries often experienced violence in library settings. In one 1970 *Berkeley Tribe* report, it was noted that “For many years, the University police have harassed Homosexuals who are brave enough to be themselves...in 1965 they removed every other door from a library john to prevent people from sitting next to each other and talking through or passing notes under stall walls to meet each other.”⁶⁰ This observation testifies to the ways in which the library in some cases presented a hostile space for gay patrons.

One way the issues with institutional resources were addressed was through direct action. In one case, San Francisco residents Cliff Wilson and Melvin Bento ran a 24-hour phone line located at the Hotel Oregon off of Valencia Street in the Mission District that was dedicated to providing “a complete information center for the gay community center.”⁶¹ Handling more than 7,000 calls from members of the gay community, the line provided information on subjects ranging from housing, baths, bars, health care, and food. The pair also maintained a library, largely made up of publications on gay life, which callers could access via their call service.⁶² As outlined in a *Berkeley Barb*

60 Konstantin Berlandt, “Cheek to Cheek,” *Berkeley Tribe*, March 27-April 3, 1970.
61 Jennifer L. Thompson, “The Boys Who Run the Gay Grapevine,” *Berkeley Barb*, November 16-22, 1973.

62 Ibid.

profile, the library and information line were intended to “go one step beyond the information offered in gay publications.”⁶³ Their setup represents one way that individuals worked to provide and facilitate information when it may have been lacking in mainstream systems. Where institutions were not providing resources needed by the community, individuals stepped up to provide this information in an informal, but still publicly accessible way.

Other resources for information emerged amongst the gay community in similarly innovative forms. In line with the tradition of utilizing the gay bar as a space to facilitate information exchange, San Francisco’s Gangway bar developed a lending library that was run from inside the bar hall and was advertised in underground publications that called for patrons to utilize their services.⁶⁴ The library was sustained by donations, which it solicited through publications like the *Bay Area Reporter*.⁶⁵ Other groups, such as the Mattachine Society — a national organization with local branches that provided organizing and leisure spaces for gay men — operated libraries from their group location. San Francisco’s branch, located on Ellis Street, had a library that was accessible through the next-door Adonis Bookstore and included a collection of periodicals and a screening room.⁶⁶ The library was described as “very pleasant,” with “a library of books regarding homosexuality on both walls and comfortable chairs with free coffee served.”⁶⁷ These places provided sites for informal, non-institutional libraries, and, as they often branched out of known and accessible resources such as bars or the Mattachine Society, they

63 Ibid.

64 Advertisement, *Bay Area Reporter*, vol. 4, no. 19, September 18, 1974.

65 “General Happenings: Tidbits by the Bay,” *Bay Area Reporter*, vol. 4, no. 7, April 3, 1974.

66 “Cinemattachine,” *Bay Area Reporter*, vol. 4, no. 4, February 20, 1974.

67 “Mattachine Films,” *Bay Area Reporter*, vol. 3, no. 6, March 21, 1973.

were a crucial means of obtaining and facilitating information.

Though these groups addressed some of the gaps in the community regarding information, there still lacked a central resource that bridged these various interests and resources. In response, a broader and more concentrated effort began to establish a library by and for the gay community. In order to address the gap left by institutional resources and the lack of a centralized resource for information, a major project was organized by members of the LGBTQ community. The San Francisco Gay Library Project was the first major effort of its kind to unify and organize specifically gay literature and resources for the Bay Area community and beyond. In its statement of purpose, the team behind the library outlined that “Our experience during the last four years has led us to conclude that no existing public institution currently provides or is seemingly willing to provide the services that the multifaceted gay community needs.”⁶⁸ The group sought to establish a place that would both house information relating to the gay community in an accessible space and would be a safe place for community members to gather and work. It also aimed to have an established archive of gay collections, as a similar resource was absent from the public domain. In this way this space, like the Women’s History Research Center, would also become a source of historical memory, capturing the needs of the moment in its contemporary collections, library loan records, and preservation of archival materials. As the group later outlined, “the group sees as its goal the creation of a comfortable, supportive environment sensitive to the library and information needs and interests of our diverse community.”⁶⁹

The library project initially began as a proposed branch of an already existing public branch of the San Francisco

⁶⁸ Description of the SFGLP, page 3, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

⁶⁹ Fundraising and Publicity, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

Public Library system, but eventually removed itself from the auspices of the institution in order to form a library in its own vision. Under the guidance of then-San Francisco Supervisor Harvey Milk, the library was open to “anyone interested” in the project.⁷⁰ Though the public library system made some efforts to purchase some materials relating to the gay community, organizers felt that their needs were unmet by their response and began the establishment of their own repository of information. The needs the library addressed were outlined in a six-point manifesto included in the group’s foundational documents: it would provide gay fiction “that identifies and validates the gay experience”; make available studies of gay life “to assist one in understanding one’s own identity and sexuality”; provide materials to assist in the coming out process; “help gay people develop a sense of community”; provide a repository for private collections that individuals might like to leave “as a part of the gay cultural heritage”; and provide “the community-at-large with accurate information about homosexuals and their world which would help alleviate the misunderstandings between the gay community and the community-at-large.”⁷¹ The fifth point, focused on a resource that aimed to encompass a representation of the “gay cultural heritage” affirms that the preservation of historical memory was a key tenet in the foundation and role of the library. Where past records of gay life had been censored, lost, or were simply not encouraged to be created in the first place, the library sought to start to remedy this loss for future generations to come.

The library’s organizing team also contended with the general perception of gay literature, which the group sought to

⁷⁰ “Gay Library to Form,” *Bay Area Reporter*, vol. 8, no. 23, November 8, 1978.

⁷¹ Description of the SFGLP, pages 2-3, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

address with the existence of the library itself. Particularly, this was the association of gay literature with pornography, which the board contradicted at a fundamental level. They outlined that “much of this writing has been expurgated or bowdlerized to remove any suggestion of it. Not only has homosexuality been suppressed in literary works, but it has also been ignored or misrepresented,” and they argued that these works “be restored to their legitimate place in world literature.”⁷² This stance provides the basis for what the San Francisco Gay Library meant in both literal and symbolic terms — it was to be a place to restore and amplify gay works which had previously been suppressed, particularly in the context of institutional libraries.

In light of these unmet needs, members of the community came together in order to establish a place to meet these needs. Often convening in San Francisco’s Walt Whitman Bookshop, the group built their mission from the ground up. Absent of any sort of institutional funding or insurance, donations were made and events such as garage sales were hosted to raise money for the project. The Project’s organizing body sent letters to local colleges and gay student organizations soliciting donations and advertising the creation of the library, representing one of the groups the library was seeking to provide resources for and reach: students whose local or university libraries may not have held information they needed.⁷³ The effort on a whole was a mobilization of the LGBTQ community and its infrastructure — aiming to provide a resource to benefit the entire community, the entire community needed to be involved. As the library gained steam, local gay businesses became central in helping to print literature

⁷² Description of the SFGLP, pages 1, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

⁷³ Minutes of the Board of Governors for the San Francisco Gay/Lesbian Library, May 19, 1982, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

to distribute information about the library.⁷⁴ Additionally, they reached out to local gay publications to advertise for donations and fundraising, among them the *Sentinel* and *Castro Times*.⁷⁵ In this sense, this informal library would not only be a centralized resource of gay information, but a centralized resource established and supported by the entire gay community, broadening its range of influence.

In its planning stages, the San Francisco Gay Library was to include amenities such as a phone-line reference and referral service for patrons to utilize before the site obtained a permanent location, testifying to the urgency for these resources.⁷⁶ As the project members outlined, “we felt that this experience would provide us with a better idea of what the information needs of the gay community actually are.”⁷⁷ Though, by July 28, 1981, the organizing group had only \$240 in their treasury, the efforts of the library continued on.⁷⁸ By the end of the year, the group came under the financial auspices of the Castro Street Fair Foundation, and also joined in with the Harvey Milk Archives and the Lesbian and Gay History Project, both of which also aimed to create LGBTQ-focused archives. The teaming up of these groups indicates the multifaceted nature of the project, which united the community in a common goal of creating this space. Under this alliance, the collections continued to grow to include private

⁷⁴ Minutes of the Board of Governors for the San Francisco Gay/Lesbian Library, May 18, 1981, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

⁷⁵ Fundraising and Publicity, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

⁷⁶ Minutes of the Board of Governors and Library Advisory Committee for the San Francisco Gay/Lesbian Library, September 25, 1981, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

⁷⁷ Minutes of Meeting #10 of the San Francisco Gay Library Project Library Advisory Committee, August 26, 1981, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

⁷⁸ Minutes of the Board of Governors for the San Francisco Gay/Lesbian Library, July 28, 1981, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

donations, reprinted files, clipping files, and archival materials.⁷⁹ The staff also eventually took on three special librarians, three academic librarians, and two public librarians.⁸⁰

Additionally, the project became an important source for establishing a reference system for LGBTQ-related materials. This was another gap in the institutionalized library system that the library sought to address by incorporating materials into a broader system of accessibility and organization. This became important in the nationwide project of establishing repositories of LGBTQ-focused literature in a codified way. The library project was at the forefront of these efforts, as other archivists and librarians reached out, such as Paul Thurston, a member of the Stonewall Library Committee in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. As he wrote to the Library Advisory Committee, “to the best of my knowledge, no classification schedule or subject heading list for gay/lesbian literature has been published.”⁸¹ As it began to materialize, the San Francisco Gay Library broadened its ability to provide an innovative and essential role in organizing information for the gay community.

Building a technical reference schematic — as Thurston mentioned in his letter — was an important task for the library project: this would be the basis for how patrons could access materials and would be a means of institutionalizing their collections on their own terms. The project addressed the “need for a simple, flexible classification scheme” as well as the need to emphasize topics and headings “tailored to the needs of our users.”⁸² Another aspect the library was interested in addressing

79 Newsletter, 1981, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

80 Library Advisory Committee, Minutes of Meeting #5, April 10, 1981, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

81 Letter from Paul Thurston to the San Francisco Gay Library Project, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

82 Library Advisory Committee, Minutes of Meeting #1, February 25, 1981, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

was beyond technical reference in a bibliographic sense; the reference service also included “referrals to supportive individuals or groups,” making it more than just a means of locating literature.⁸³ Outside of the traditional library system, these were action items the organizing group had to address to create a center of information with longevity for the community. In the context of the broader gay rights movement, the library serves as a case study for how members of the community sought to address an institutional gap and to facilitate informational exchange.

CONCLUSION: SUBVERTING INSTITUTIONAL SPACES, CREATING INFORMAL LIBRARIES

In the wake of institutional libraries revealing themselves to be in opposition to the radical ideas emerging from all corners of the social and political spectrum, informal libraries emerged as a solution to the problems posed by these mainstream sites. These sites transcended ideological content and served as free, accessible spaces. The ways in which the Bay Area’s social and political movements organized informal libraries were multifaceted, as were the ways groups carved out niches to exchange information and literature and to gather in the face of institutional hostility. These case studies are a mere slice of the numerous social movements and informal informational spaces that appeared in the Bay Area, part of a robust network of informal library spaces that emerged as part of the larger trend of radical social and political organizing.

In this essay, I aimed to address the significance and role of informal libraries in the social movements that created them. These were places that developed in response to informational needs that weren’t being met, and that were critical in dispersing and preserving radical ideas. The latter purpose is one that is one

83 Library Advisory Committee, Minutes of Meeting #7, May 15, 1981, Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12), GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA.

of the most valuable, in that these libraries were not only conduits for information but vessels for historical memory. The Women’s History Research Center and the San Francisco Gay Library stand as bastions of historical memory that could have been lost due to their revolutionary content had they not existed, but that were able to be preserved through these organizational efforts. Though they may not serve the same publicly facing function they once did, those checked-out texts, meeting spaces, and the mark left on the bibliographic world by their very formation stand as a reminder of the importance of establishing accessible resources of information. The influence of informal libraries such as these has also permeated into the present state of library sciences. Today, most mainstream libraries have LGBT and women-focused sections, as well as other specific subject categories that are increasing representation in these spaces.

Libraries remain understudied subjects of historical analysis, both in their institutional and informal forms. Today, the conception of libraries is also complicated by their roles in providing access to digital information, use of the internet, and an ever-widening range of services that reach far beyond the borrowing of physical materials. An understanding of how these sites have historically served and not served marginalized groups can provide a blueprint for how modern libraries work with their communities and lead to the availability of broader and more inclusive services and information. There is much more to be found in the study of informal libraries in particular, expanding into topics such as prison libraries, grassroots book sharing systems, and online libraries created by groups not seeing their needs met in the mainstream systems. These types of groups are a testament to the continuing need for ideologically diverse, accessible and representative literature to be available, and are a way to better understand the social movements and issues that define our lives.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

ARCHIVAL AND MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS

GLBT Historical Society, San Francisco, CA
Gay Library Project Records (#1998-12)

NEWSPAPERS

Amazon Quarterly (Oakland, CA)
Bay Area Reporter
Berkeley Barb
Berkeley Tribe
It Ain't Me Babe (Berkeley, CA)
Movement Newspaper (San Francisco, CA)
San Francisco Good Times

PUBLISHED MATERIAL

Allen, Pamela. *Free Space: A perspective on the small group in women's liberation*. New York: Times Change Press, 1970.

Coenenberg, Richard. "Synergizing Reference Service in the San Francisco Bay Region." *ALA Bulletin* 62, no. 11 (December 1968): 1379-1384.

Wheeler, Helen Rippier. "We can't put women on the budget." *Library Acquisitions: Practice & Theory* 2, no. 2 (1978): 133-139.

X, Laura. "The Women's History Library: Notes on a Decade." *Journal of Library History* 15, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 465.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Anastas, Katie. "Underground Newspapers: The Social Media Networks of the 1960s and 1970s." Mapping American Social Movements Through the 20th Century, University of Washington, <https://depts.washington.edu/moves/altnewsgeography.shtml>.

Armstrong, Elizabeth A. *Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950-1994*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

- Ashbolt, Anthony. *A Cultural History of the Radical Sixties in the San Francisco Bay Area*. (London, UK: Pickering & Chatto, 2013).
- Bloom, Joshua and Martin, Waldo E. *Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013.
- Boyd, Nan Alamilla. *Wide-open Town: A History of Queer San Francisco to 1965*. Berkeley, CA: UC Press, 2003.
- Cornell, Andrew. *Unruly Equality: U.S. Anarchism in the 20th Century*. Oakland, CA: UC Press, 2016.
- Davis, Joshua Clark. *From Head Shops to Whole Foods: The Rise and Fall of Activist Entrepreneurs*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.
- De Kosnik, Abigail. *Rogue Archives: Digital Cultural Memory and Media Fandom*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016.
- Hogan, Kristen. “Women’s Studies in Feminist Bookstores: ‘All the Women’s Studies women would come in.’” *Signs* 33, no. 3 (Spring 2008): 595-621.
- Huzar, Tim. “Neoliberalism, Democracy and the Library as a Radically Inclusive Space.” Paper presented at IFLA WLIC 2014 - Lyon - Libraries, Citizens, Societies: Confluence for Knowledge in Session 200 - Library Theory and Research, Lyon, France, 16-22 August 2014.
- McMillian, John Campbell. *Smoking Typewriters: The Sixties Underground Press and the Rise of Alternative Media in America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- O’Toole, James. “The Symbolic Significance of Archives.” *American Archivist*, vol. 56 (Spring 1993): 234-255.
- Parsons, David L. *Dangerous Grounds: Antiwar Coffeehouses and Military Dissent in the Vietnam Era*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017.
- Springer, Kimberly. *Living for the Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations, 1968-1980*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.
- Stansell, Christine. *American Moderns: Bohemian New York and the Creation of a New Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Stryker, Susan and Van Buskirk, Jim. *Gay by the Bay: A History of Queer Culture in the San Francisco Bay Area*. San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books, 1996.

Tinson, Christopher. "Remembering the Black Radical Press." *Black Perspectives*. January 25, 2018, <https://www.aaihs.org/remembering-the-black-radical-press>.

A PASTIME FOR WARTIME

World War I, Major League Baseball, and the New Obligations of Cultural Citizenship

Kevin Diestelow

On June 1st, 1917, star catcher Hank Gowdy departed the Boston Braves clubhouse and left his teammates behind. Although the season was only halfway finished and Gowdy was one of the anchors of the team, a deeper obligation to his country pulled him away. Gowdy became the first player to leave a Major League Baseball team for the Armed Services after the outbreak of World War I. Morally sound, courageous, and, above all, patriotic, he did not wait for his draft number to be called. Instead, he enlisted directly into the army, stating that while he did not feel forced to enlist, “[he] wouldn’t feel content to stay on this side of the Atlantic in comparative security and know that others were bearing the brunt across the ocean.”¹ An elite player at the top of his game, Gowdy exemplified the qualities that earned baseball the moniker “America’s National Pastime.” As with every male citizen of draft age, the advent of WWI introduced new obligations to Gowdy that tested his devotion to his country. In his case, he met those new obligations with humility, drive, and unflinching national pride.²

Gowdy’s story and the choices he made are emblematic of wider changes that reshaped American society as a result of WWI. Before the war, societal obligations were local, and the

1 Hank Gowdy, “Why I Enlisted,” *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 4 (August 1917): 507, 530.

2 For a full narration of Gowdy’s story see Jim Leeke, *From the Dugouts to the Trenches: Baseball during the Great War*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2017, 25-27.

state capacity of the United States government was limited.³ Throughout 1917 and 1918, state capacity increased dramatically, and new developments like the draft heightened the demands the government placed on its citizens and changed the underlying cultural components of citizenship. The boundaries of citizenship evolved, taking on a decidedly martial and coercive tone. Truly gaining acceptance as a citizen required patriotic shows of devotion to the nation and, particularly for male citizens, direct wartime service. During the war, American cultural institutions like Major League Baseball reflected these changes in the cultural foundations of citizenship, and various groups, including the state, industry insiders, and ordinary citizens, utilized baseball to shape and process their understandings of an evolving citizenship. Although using Major League Baseball as a paradigm to understand citizenship necessarily constrains the scope of analysis to the demographically limited world of professional baseball, changes in citizenship broadly impacted society at all levels and across all demographic categories.⁴ Even those who were not eligible for the draft—including, most notably, the entire female population of the United States—and minority groups who were often excluded from effectively exercising their civil rights were still expected to act in a patriotic fashion and contribute to the war effort in other vital ways on the home front. This updated cultural definition of citizenship created a new hurdle for aspiring citizens

3 State capacity refers to the ability of states to collect taxes, maintain law-and-order, and provide public goods to citizens. As state capacity increases, the presence of the state in everyday life and the ties between state and citizen increase as well.

4 Within this paper, baseball is utilized both to refer to the broad usage of baseball as a symbol and the narrow world of the baseball industry. Regarding the baseball industry, I include players, coaches, managers, owners, and sportswriters involved with Major League Baseball (MLB). Although the same trends that I conceptualize here were evident in the minor leagues and the nascent Negro League (which would officially form in 1920), I focus on the MLB both to maintain a concise narrative and to develop the concepts at their broadest level. For the majority of citizens, baseball meant the MLB. This is reflected in both period sources and secondary works on the history of baseball. Future work should expand the paradigm developed here to all levels of organized baseball, as well as consider how those excluded from the world of Major League Baseball still utilized the sport to understand evolutions in citizenship.

and a new dimensional requirement for existing citizens which the baseball industry ultimately reflected.

Scholars studying baseball have long argued that the sport can explain important aspects of American history. Over the past several decades, historians have produced many scholarly works which analyze some aspect of history—race, democracy, class conflict, nationalism—within the confines of the baseball diamond. These works treat baseball as “a powerful vehicle for exploring America” and show that baseball can reveal fundamental assumptions regarding American life.⁵ During World War I, baseball’s interaction with the war mirrored wider debates within American society. Throughout the period, baseball struggled to reconcile its status and reputation as the national pastime with the needs of its business side.⁶ People both within the industry and outside it used baseball to sell a particular national identity based on rabid patriotism. At the same time, baseball looked to protect its interests as a business in order to survive the war economically. Steps taken to do so often undercut the images of baseball presented in patriotic propaganda. Understanding the dichotomy between baseball’s patriotic reputation and the economic decisions the industry made to survive World War I provides insight into how ordinary

⁵ See for example: Jules Tygiel, *Past Time: Baseball as History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Other works that treat baseball in this manner include: Martin C. Babicz and Thomas W. Zeiler, *National Pastime: U.S. History through Baseball*, Lanham: Roman & Littlefield, 2017.; John Bowman, and Joel Zoss, *Diamond in the Rough: The Untold History of Baseball*, New York: Macmillan, 1989.; Mitchell Nathanson, *A People’s History of Baseball*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012.; David Q. Voigt, “Reflections On Diamonds: American Baseball and American Culture.” *Journal of Sport History* 1, no. 1 (1974): 3-25.; Martin C. Babicz and Thomas W. Zeiler, *National Pastime: U.S. History through Baseball*, American Ways Series. 2017.; and Robert Elias, *The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S. Foreign Policy and Promoted the American Way Abroad*, New York: New Press, 2010.

⁶ Paul Hensler, “‘Patriotic Industry’: Baseball’s Reluctant Sacrifice in World War I,” *Nine: A Journal of Baseball History and Culture* 21, no. 2 (2013): 98-106. Hensler addresses this struggle in-depth in his article. He reaches the conclusion that the baseball industry prioritized their own self-interest as much as possible before reluctantly yielding to the national interest. Within this paper, I utilize Hensler’s conclusions to gain new insight into the evolution of citizenship during the period.

citizens both willingly and unwillingly navigated a murky new citizenship of obligation. Major League Baseball, like many citizens, warily accepted these changes to citizenship culture; while seemingly embracing new martial obligations, baseball often acted with considerable ambivalence towards the ideals of new citizenship, mirroring the ambivalence held by many citizens at the time. Although the baseball industry always cloaked its behavior in a veneer of patriotism, the efforts the industry put into avoiding the draft mirrored that of many citizens who, faced with the prospect of death in Europe, balked at their obligations. Ultimately, the power of the government to reshape citizenship overcame this resistance, and baseball, like most citizens, acquiesced to the new definition of citizenship, providing an example of the reshaped relationship between citizen and state.

CONCEPTUALIZING CITIZENSHIP

To understand how baseball reflects changing citizenship during World War I, it is important to discuss citizenship itself and how it evolved during that period. At its most basic level, citizenship refers to one's legal rights and obligations as recognized by a certain polity. One qualifies as a citizen if one is able to freely exercise those rights and fulfill those obligations.⁷ Traditional citizenship histories generally focus on how laws, statutes, and other aspects of officialdom were crafted to either include or exclude people from holding or exercising citizenship. As such, they emphasize legalistic attitudes towards the boundaries of citizenship.⁸ These studies limit citizenship to its legal basics

⁷ Barbara Young Welke, *Law and the Borders of Belonging in the Long Nineteenth Century United States*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 3.

⁸ For example, see Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. While Smith provides many valuable insights into the development of citizenship in America, he bases his analysis very heavily on legal definitions of citizenship, typifying a more traditional approach to the issue.

and are built on the premise that by studying the laws regarding citizenship throughout history, it is easy to recognize who could and could not attain citizenship.

Recent works add new dimensions that complicate the simple legal narrative by placing cultural “belonging” at the heart of citizenship.⁹ While still recognizing the importance of legal standing in creating citizens, cultural studies of citizenship identify the important role cultural performance plays in gaining acceptance as a citizen. For example, Barbara Young Welke defends a theory of citizenship in which legal recognition must be combined with recognition of personhood (meaning cultural acceptance) for citizenship to have any meaning.¹⁰ Gaining that recognition involves subscribing to a certain set of cultural practices and values. This dichotomy between legal recognition and cultural acceptance has typified contested citizenship in America since the earliest periods of colonization.¹¹ Such a theory helps to explain how and why citizenship is almost always more restrictive than a strict legal reading might suggest. If one considers citizenship in this fashion, citizenship is never automatic. Instead, citizenship has to be shaped, earned, and proven in order to be truly gained. Legalistic citizenship is not enough; it must be augmented by cultural acceptance and assimilation. Acting according to cultural norms is essential to obtaining this acceptance. Considering citizenship in this fashion is a crucial part of understanding American experiences during World War I because the war dramatically changed the cultural makeup of United States citizenship. This had significant implications for citizens at the time.

9 Barbara Young Welke, *Law and the Borders of Belonging*, 3-4.

10 Barbara Young Welke, *Law and the Borders of Belonging*, 1-18.

11 David Reynolds, *America, Empire of Liberty a New History of the United States*, New York: Basic Books, 2009.; and Barbara Young Welke, *Law and the Borders of Belonging in the Long Nineteenth Century United States*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Scholars of U.S. citizenship have identified World War I as a crucial moment in the creation of modern citizenship identities. According to Christopher Capozzola, the war generated “a fundamental transformation in the political structures and cultural meanings of U.S. citizenship.”¹² Specifically, he and other authors emphasize that during the war, martial obligations and 100% Americanism, which refers to the push for a unified national culture centered on patriotism and national loyalty during wartime, became the keys to gaining meaningful citizenship. Before the war, the cultural underpinnings of citizenship were felt locally and often tied to ethnic identities retained from the intense immigration which transformed the population of the United States at the end of the 19th century. As a result of wartime changes, cultural citizenship became nationalized and tied specifically to wartime service to the state. This process was not smooth, and experiences varied; however, by the end of the war, relationships between the state and her citizens had expanded in a way that limited opportunities for meaningful citizenship.¹³ It left only two conjoined paths—fulfilling one’s military obligations through the draft and displaying rabid patriotism—as the only viable ways to gain acceptance in the eyes of fellow citizens. Not following these paths led to being labeled a “slacker,” which could exclude one from meaningful participation in the polity and in society.¹⁴ The baseball industry, as well as individuals within it, faced the same path to true acceptance as ordinary citizens during WWI.

12 Christopher Capozzola, “Legacies for Citizenship: Pinpointing Americans during and after World War I,” *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 4 (September 2014): 713.

13 Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.; and Christopher Capozzola, “Legacies for Citizenship.”

14 Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*; Christopher Capozzola, “Legacies for Citizenship”; and Kathryn L. Wegner, “Progressive Reformers and the Democratic Origins of Citizenship Education in the United States during the First World War,” *History of Education* 42, no. 6 (November 2013): 713–28.

BASEBALL AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP

At the onset of war, organized baseball, buoyed by its patriotic reputation, was seemingly well prepared to weather the changes to national identity and citizenship that were to occur in the next two years. Following U.S. entry into the war, this is exactly what happened. Baseball became a vehicle for remolding the American citizenry, and at least initially, baseball truly embodied 100% Americanism and national service. Through direct contributions to the national war effort and indirect use as a symbol of America, the actions of organized baseball during the war years illustrated changes to citizenship.

The use of baseball imagery in a symbolic manner during World War I reflected how cultural institutions, including baseball, became intertwined with citizenship and how the cultural backing of citizenship evolved to favor the state. One of the main hurdles the United States Government sought to overcome in the run up to war was creating a uniform American culture, identity, and support for war. President Wilson and members of his administration knew that winning the war would require, as the President stated in a proclamation announcing the Draft, that “the whole nation must be a team, in which each man shall play [his] part.”¹⁵ Wilson’s deliberate use of the word “team” within his proclamation highlights how government officials used elements of culture (in this case, competitive sports) to convey their decisions to citizens. However, Wilson, and other government officials were also aware that in an era immediately following an intense period of migration, a uniform American culture did not truly exist. New citizenship mores were thus carefully crafted to foster 100% Americanism.¹⁶ Cultural institutions which embraced

15 Woodrow Wilson, “Presidential Proclamation regarding the Selective Service Act,” 18 May 1917, UVA Miller Center.

16 Kathryn L. Wegner, “Progressive Reformers and the Democratic Origins of Citizenship Education in the United States during the First World War.”

that spirit, including organized baseball, were a vital part of the effort to sell “proper” American values to a diverse public.

The government’s direct usage of baseball as a symbol for new citizenship ideals is vividly evident in recruitment and war bond drive posters. These posters were produced by the U.S. government and were specifically designed to convey citizens’ new relationship with the government and to reveal how the state wanted citizens to view the new obligations of citizenship.¹⁷ By using baseball on these posters, the government sought to convey that new relationship in familiar and understandable terms. One, depicting Uncle Sam holding a bat, urged citizens to “get in the game with Uncle Sam.”¹⁸ Through this poster, the war was directly equated with baseball, which in turn was equated with strong patriotic values in order to urge participation in the national war effort. Another poster depicts a doughboy shown in full uniform throwing a grenade as if it were a baseball. The message “that arm—your country needs it” accompanies the image.¹⁹ This poster encouraged citizens to take the skills they learned playing baseball and use them to aid in the country’s war effort. The government also utilized baseball in their own efforts to sell bonds. One war bond poster declared that “Strike Two!” had been called on Germany. To “strike out autocracy,” citizens needed only to patriotically support the nation by buying war bonds.²⁰ Together then, these posters clearly show what new expectations the governments placed on citizens: patriotism, wartime service for men, and contributions on the home front from all citizens. Through them, the government utilized baseball to convey these new theories of citizenship to a reluctant citizenry.

17 Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*, 5.

18 J.C. Leyendecker, *Get in the Game with Uncle Sam*, 1917.

19 Vojtěch Preissig, *That arm- your country needs it*, Library of Congress, 1918.

20 *Strike two! Help strike out military autocracy! Every Liberty Bond you buy helps win the war*. United States, Library of Congress, 1917.

Baseball also played an important role in patriotic celebrations and rhetoric. One such example is a patriotic event put on for departing drafted soldiers in New York on September 4, 1917 at the Polo Grounds, home to the New York Giants. The soldiers were treated to free admission to a game and watched the players conduct military drill before the game. Such a display modeled good, patriotic conduct to the newly recruited soldiers and reinforced to them how they ought to act. It is notable that officials decided that a baseball game would be the most suitable entertainment for newly drafted soldiers because it shows that officials saw a great value in using the sport to shape impressions among citizens. Baseball was viewed as a unique entertainment which embodied and reinforced the preparation needed for soldiers to be effective on the battlefield. As such, it had value for a government demanding new levels of service from its citizens.

In addition to watching the game, soldiers also listened to a message from President Wilson and a patriotic speech by the mayor of New York. The tone of that speech, delivered in the shadow of the ballfield, where the mayor urged soldiers to “Fight! Fight clean! Fight Fair! Fight hard! and Win!” encapsulates how baseball was directly used as an appeal to prepare citizens for war.²¹ If the word “play” was substituted for the word “fight,” one could easily imagine that same speech being delivered by a manager to players before the start of a game. Instead, it was used to explain to soldiers, in the familiar language of sports, what their new duty to and role in the nation was. The clear rhetorical and symbolic link between baseball and soldiering explored in events and speeches like these shows how baseball became a tool in the construction of new citizenship.

21 “Fight Hard and Win! Is Mayor’s Appeal,” *The Evening World*, September 4, 1917, *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers*.

The government was not the only entity that used baseball to enforce new ideals of citizenship. The baseball industry itself also leaned into its power to enforce citizenship through culture because they greatly feared being labeled as frivolous entertainment during the war. The changing pressures of service-based citizenship led to degrees of intolerance for “slacking” among citizens. Vigilante-esque hunts for draft dodgers, as well as mass demonstrations against those that shirked obligations, were common and sparked fear within organized baseball that they might fall prey to the same forces.²² It was their hope then that leveraging the sport to sell 100% Americanism and the government’s new ideals of citizenship would ensure a continued level of robust public support for the sport through the duration of the conflict. This reality was reflected in numerous articles and columns about baseball written during the war in periodicals like *Baseball Magazine* and *Spalding’s Official Baseball Guide*. Although these articles represent only the specific view of baseball insiders, they provide insight into how baseball conceptualized itself internally and externally presented itself to the world outside of the industry. With titles like “A Plea for Sport” and “Baseball for Our Soldiers and Sailors,” the articles justified baseball’s existence during the war through its alignment with and enforcement of vital American values.²³ On the one hand, each of the articles portrays baseball as being an “important factor in the daily life of a

22 For discussion of how citizens reacted against those who protested the new obligations of citizenship, see: Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen*.

23 The pages of *Baseball Magazine* were filled with articles extolling baseball’s patriotism during the war. See for example: “A Plea for Sport,” *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 4 (August 1917): 465, 468.; “Baseball for Our Soldiers and Sailors,” *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 3 (July 1917): 372.; William A. Sunday, “A Defense of the Grand Old Game,” *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 3 (July 1917): 360-361.; and Charles Weeghman, “Playing Ball for Uncle Sam,” *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 5 (September 1917): 431, 456. Even though the articles were written by insiders, they were intended to be consumed by the general public. Thus, they illustrate both how baseball positioned itself relative to new standards of citizenship and how it demonstrated that alignment to citizens.

majority of our citizens.”²⁴ By providing wholesome recreation for citizens, baseball helped keep morale high and citizens engaged. However, writers moved beyond this readily evident defense of baseball’s value by emphasizing the sport as a patriotic pastime. In this sense, attending a baseball game was not only meant to be a recreational pursuit but also a place where one could learn what it meant to be a “proper” American.

Just as politicians used baseball both in spectacle and in rhetoric to directly model new obligations to soldiers, the industry also sought to directly aid in preparing soldiers for war. Following the declaration of war, “preparedness” was the buzzword of the moment. Training and equipping soldiers, as well as mobilizing the general population, would determine the effectiveness of America’s military prowess. In the earliest days of 1917, baseball fully embraced a preparedness-driven ethos to show its devotion to the war effort. The exertions of the sport covered a myriad of activities from training players in military drill, to selling war bonds, to providing baseball materiel to soldiers and sailors. Military drill became an important fixture of 1917’s spring training. By opening day, every team in the American League and the Dodgers in the National League had hired drill instructors and trained their team in military maneuvers. Once the season began, they exhibited their skill to the fans before games. According to one drill sergeant attached to the Chicago White Sox, the drill increased “the martial bearing of the men.” The drill instructor felt that such practice markedly improved the players’ military comportsment, noting that they “do carry themselves different from what they did at the start.”²⁵ Although the sight must have been somewhat comical—the players used bats instead of rifles

24 John Tener in *Spalding’s Base Ball Guide, and Official League Book for 1918-1919*. A.G. Spalding & Bros, 1918.

25 W.S. Smiley, “White Sox Drill Sergeant Speaks for Military Training,” *Sporting News*, April 12, 1917.

when conducting drill—column writers often commented on the practice and used it as evidence that baseball bred good soldiers and aided the war effort.

One article in *Baseball Magazine*, “A Defense of the Grand Old Game,” written by former ballplayer and preacher Billy Sunday, even went as far as categorizing baseball as a “war game” whose skills directly translated to battlefield success. Sunday rationalized that baseball enforced clean living and gave soldiers the skill and courage they would need in battle. After all, Sunday argued, “what is a battle anyway but a showdown of athletic skill of a terrible intensity but athletic skill just the same?”²⁶ Although this argument certainly minimizes the horror that soldiers would experience in the trenches, it perfectly conveys how proponents of baseball shaped their view of both the sport and the conflict itself in ways which drew the two closer together within the new confines of martial citizenship. In Sunday’s eyes, baseball not only theoretically prepared citizens for the symbolic fulfillment of their citizenship obligations but also literally gave young men the skills needed to be successful soldiers in France. The foregrounding of martial contribution and emphasis on how baseball built citizens for war in Sunday’s article adeptly convey how baseball reflected and captured the emphasis on military service within the changing nature of citizenship.

Major League Baseball’s monetary contributions to the war effort were a direct way in which the industry fulfilled its obligation to the nation and projected patriotic sacrifice. In a piece written for *Baseball Magazine* early in 1918, editor F.C. Lane detailed what baseball had given to the war effort. Lane found much to celebrate in baseball’s contributions. He estimated that major league team owners alone had contributed over \$100,000

²⁶ William A. Sunday, “A Defense of the Grand Old Game,” *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 3 (July 1917): 360-361.

to war-related charities like the American Red Cross. In addition, most teams donated portions of ticket proceeds to war charities.²⁷ They also donated tickets directly to servicemen—in many stadiums, “[army uniforms] were all the tickets necessary” to secure admission.²⁸ Baseball also became integral in selling war bonds. Liberty loans, as they were called, were one of the primary ways that the U.S. government raised the massive amounts of money needed to finance the war. The American League alone bought \$110,000 worth of loans.²⁹ Games often doubled as war bond drives in order to funnel the direct contributions of citizens towards the state. Players contributed as well—many of the winners of the 1917 World Series used their bonus checks to purchase war bonds, a fact organized baseball intentionally publicized.³⁰ Baseball’s well-publicized direct contributions to the war effort physically represented the new obligations one owed to the nation and mirrored the numerous contributions which individual citizens were now expected to make. The baseball industry used such contributions to directly emphasize that the American national pastime diligently served the national interest.

Baseball’s connection to the war and its ties to evolving ideas of citizenship and service could be seen in popular culture as well, as evidenced by a variety of different pieces of sheet music which made use of baseball as a symbol. The titles of these songs, as well as their lyrics, directly connected baseball to the war effort and often contained the same themes as government posters and speakers. In “Playing Baseball on the Western Front,” fighting the war is directly equated with playing a baseball game, and baseball acts as a metaphor through which the fighting is understood. This directly parallels the kind of rhetoric surrounding baseball players

27 F.C. Lane, “Baseball’s Bit in the World War,” *Baseball Magazine* 20, no. 2 (March 1918): 386-391, 436-437.

28 “Drill and Ball Game at the Polo Grounds,” *The Evening World*, September 4, 1917.

29 F.C. Lane, “Baseball’s Bit in the World War,” 390.

30 Jim Leeke, *From the Dugouts to the Trenches*, 54.

drilling before games and supports the notion that baseball could be used to teach soldiers their role. Other examples focus on a more jingoistic brand of patriotism. Songs like “Uncle Sam Will Strike the Kaiser Out” and “Batter Up, Uncle Sam is at the Plate,” combine common patriotic tropes with baseball metaphors to help craft a culturally cohesive vision of Americanness centered around wartime mobilization and participation.³¹ Together these songs show that utilizing baseball as a symbol for changing citizenship mores was not the exclusive purview of government actors and that changing conceptions of citizenship did receive some buy-in from popular culture writ-large.

According to proponents of the sport at the time, baseball, as America’s national pastime, reflected the bedrock “American” values which supported new ideals of citizenship. This focus on baseball as “America’s game” teaching “American values” is heavily tinged by a nostalgic viewing of baseball history and the patriotic feelings such a view engenders. Considering baseball in this way often distorts critical ways in which the sport perpetuated unequal structures of power and influence throughout history.³² Even so, for most fans of the sport, at all points in its history, that nostalgically patriotic view of “America’s pastime” is a deeply held reality and should be taken seriously. For fans during World War I, baseball became a way to understand a new citizenship culture based on 100% Americanism. “America’s game” taught them something essential about American life. By foregrounding this element of the game, those who organized, promoted, wrote about, and experienced Major League Baseball helped to sell new standards of citizenship to the general population while also maintaining popular appetite for baseball.

31 Dorothy Deane and Ernest Bradley, *The Baseball Smile: an American Marching Song*, The May Walter Publishing Co., London: 1918, Library of Congress.; A.A. Westman, and Jean Walz, *Playing Baseball on the Western Front*, Chicago: 1918, Library of Congress.; Harry Tighe, and Harry Von Tilzer, *Batter Up, Uncle Sam is at the Plate*, 1918, Library of Congress.; Robert Dixon, *Uncle Sam will Strike the Kaiser Out*, 1918, Library of Congress.

32 Mitchell Nathanson, *A People’s History of Baseball*, xi-xii.

ACCEPTING A CITIZENSHIP OF OBLIGATION

Although baseball seemed to perfectly model evolving citizenship during WWI, economic concerns weighed heavily on the sport and limited the degree to which it willingly acquiesced to new obligations. The heart of the dilemma was the draft. While maintaining an attitude of patriotic sacrifice was key to baseball's nation-building image, the draft heavily impacted baseball's profitability. Most of baseball's working population, including players, coaches, and support staff, were draft eligible.³³ Without exemptions from these new obligations, baseball would need to suspend operations until the close of the war due to lack of manpower. As war intensified, organized baseball compromised its patriotic message by trying to avoid the draft.

President Wilson signed the Selective Service Act of 1917 (SSA) into law on May 18, 1917. The draft covered male citizens and persons "who have declared their intention to become citizens" between the ages of twenty-one and thirty.³⁴ In effect, this codified obligation to the nation as a legal requirement for citizenship. If one intended to enjoy citizenship, they must register for the draft and serve in the war if called upon to do so. Prior to passage of the act, baseball had unequivocally supported the war effort. However, cracks began to appear once owners and players faced the very real possibility of financial ruin. Complicating matters even more was the fact that, initially, no one was certain whether the draft would apply to baseball. The SSA gave the President the ability to exempt from the draft any industries deemed essential to the nation, but whether that exemption applied to baseball was an open question.³⁵ For the remainder of

33 Robert Elias, *The Empire Strikes Out*, Chapter 5.

34 Selective Service Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 78. The SSA presents the official boundaries of new citizenship. It does not capture the debates or cultural factors that influenced the turn of citizenship during WWI. However, it is within the framework set by the SSA that that debate and turn occurred.

35 Selective Service Act, 40 Stat. 78-80.

1917 and into 1918, organized baseball set out to prove its own essentialness to society in order to gain a reprieve from the more burdensome obligations of new citizenship.

It was for this purpose that F.C. Lane, Billy Sunday, and other sportswriters laid out defenses of baseball across the pages of *Baseball Magazine* during the war. While their articles show baseball seemingly meeting the obligations of citizenship and certainly convey how those new obligations had reshaped the boundaries of citizenship and effective participation in the nation, they were ultimately designed to build the support necessary to exempt baseball from fully completing the obligations of citizenship. When Lane declared quite seriously to his readers that baseball had suffered “greater losses on account of the war than any other industry,” he implicitly suggested that baseball should not be required to contribute any more to the effort than it already had.³⁶ When he highlighted how much money and material baseball generated, he did so to show that baseball cleared the vague bar for “national service” outlined in Section Four of the SSA, which gave broad directions that “persons employed in the service of the United States as the President may designate” could be exempted from the draft.³⁷ Baseball insiders pounced on such vague legislative language to try to exempt the sport from the draft. This argument, of course, over-exaggerates the place of baseball within wartime society. In considering these claims, however, one can gain appreciation for the ways in which new citizenship mores began to shape the ways citizens and industries presented themselves. To maintain relevance, industries, as well as individual citizens, needed to provide value to the nation. It is this feeling which drove writers like Lane to take such overstated rhetorical positions in order to defend baseball.

36 F.C. Lane, “Baseball’s Bit in the World War.”

37 Selective Service Act, 40 Stat. 79.

The same dichotomy between maintaining a patriotic visage while still protecting baseball from the most onerous aspects of wartime service and citizenship can be seen in the writings of those that highlighted baseball's ability to teach the qualities of citizenship and patriotism to the public. In the same article where he declared baseball to be the perfect way to prepare soldiers for the trenches, Billy Sunday also characterized the sport as "a mental and physical tonic" necessary for the continued wellbeing of the American people and of American soldiers, which Sunday believed made baseball even more essential during wartime than peacetime.³⁸ Other authors from inside the game advanced similar arguments. Charles Weeghman, owner of the Chicago Cubs, shared a description of the massive baseball tournament played by servicemen in a Great Lakes training camp to highlight how valuable baseball was for maintaining the morale of soldiers. The tragedy of this scene, in Weeghman's mind, was that the soldiers, who had demonstrated a clear enthusiasm for baseball, would be unable to enjoy the game if the draft included professional players.³⁹ If that happened, soldiers would be deprived of wholesome entertainment, that prepared them to meet their obligations as soldiers. The men tasked with defending organized baseball felt that avoiding such an outcome would surely be enough incentive to mark baseball as essential and thus exempt those within organized baseball from the draft.

Perhaps most importantly, many players-turned-soldiers expressed ambivalence to serving in the war. Such ambivalence betrayed a skepticism of new citizenship and undermined the outwardly patriotic claims baseball writers made. While baseball writers lionized players like Gowdy, who served nobly overseas as the perfect exemplars of the patriotic ballplayer, most players fell

³⁸ William A. Sunday, "A Defense of the Grand Old Game."

³⁹ Charles H. Weeghman, "Playing Ball for Uncle Sam," *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 5 (September 1917): 431, 456.

well short of his example. The chief culprits for pulling players away from their duties were the industrial leagues. Players could sign with a shipyard or ironworks and be technically employed in necessary work that was draft-exempt while still being able to play a significant amount of baseball. They often made more money playing in the industrial leagues than they did in the major leagues while also gaining the benefit of learning a skilled trade. Many notable players, including Joe Jackson and later Babe Ruth, navigated the new ideals of citizenship in this manner, which increased the quality of play and popularity of the leagues.⁴⁰ Interestingly enough, many industrial league players (including Ruth) met other exemptions from the draft beyond working in a war industry, so it was not solely their job that kept them on this side of the Atlantic. Although they were still playing baseball, their industrial work contributed to a vital aspect of the war effort. Even so, they were pilloried by many in the press and held up as an example of baseball “celebrity slackers,” looking to avoid serving like the rest of the country.⁴¹ The existence of players who seemingly shirked their duties provides a counterweight to the Gowdy anecdote introduced at the beginning of this paper. These two contesting visions, the industrial players and Gowdy, remind us that neither the slacker nor the dutiful patriot were ever wholly definitive and that in the face of new obligations, citizens made complex choices and adopted complex identities.

Citizens who saw these actions were understandably skeptical of baseball’s commitment to the nation. Many questioned why ballplayers and baseball should be exempted while the rest of the nation served. This criticism came from many directions. From the stands of games, players in the industrial leagues could

40 For more information on industrial teams, see Jim Leeke, *From the Dug-outs to the Trenches*, 90-98.

41 See for example: “Griffs Get Shipyard Jobs,” *Washington Star*, August 21, 1918; and Louis A. Dougher, “Yankees Proud of Those Who Joined Colors; Don’t Mention Rest,” *Washington Times*, July 2, 1918.

count on fans to hurl insults like “slacker” or “trench dodger” at them from the stands.⁴² In newspapers, especially ones outside of organized baseball, treatment of the sport and of ballplayers was similar. Perhaps the most prolific critic of baseball and organized sports in general was *Stars and Stripes*, the official newspaper of the Armed Forces, which argued incessantly with sportswriters over the boundary of patriotic service. The newspaper even went as far as to discontinue its sports section to protest the intransigence of those who argued sport was essential.⁴³ Even within the world of sport, opinion was not unified. “It is a joke,” the Cincinnati Reds’ business manager wrote, that ballplayers were able to avoid serving through “contract jumping and slacking.”⁴⁴ Such feelings point to the vitriol that engulfed discussions touching on the boundaries of citizenship during the war years. Citizen anger towards baseball players would have been entirely reasonable at the time. As citizenship and acceptance in society became tied to service, even the appearance of shirked obligation could draw condemnation. For many citizens, the fact that ballplayers were still at home and not in France was enough evidence to warrant the label “slacker,” regardless of any patriotic benefits their continued play might have generated. That accusations of slacking entered into the discussion suggests that questions of citizenship were clearly at the forefront of public debate in many aspects of wartime life.

Discussions of slacking were a serious matter during the war. Those citizens who did not fulfill their obligation were often branded as slackers by their fellow citizens and faced extralegal mobs and vigilante justice.⁴⁵ Interestingly enough, however, in the case of baseball, this argument was also reversible as evidenced

42 “Caught on the Fly,” *Sporting News*, October 3, 1918.

43 “The Sporting Page Goes Out,” *Stars and Stripes*, July 26, 1918.

44 Frank Bancroft quoted in Jim Leeke, *From the Dugouts to the Trenches*, 93.

45 Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*, esp. Chapter 1.

by the rhetoric of baseball's defenders. Sportswriters labeled those that argued against the continuance of baseball as slackers because of the importance that they placed in the continuation of the game.⁴⁶ They argued that baseball was as beneficial as working in a factory, and in one extreme case, that star baseball players remaining on the diamond was as beneficial as countless nameless soldiers being sent to the trenches.⁴⁷ That both sides could claim the mantle of patriotism and smear the opposition as slackers points to the contested and ambivalent attitudes towards new citizenship during the war.

Despite efforts to protect the economic interests of the game, the hammer fell for baseball on May 23rd, 1918, when General Enoch Crowder ordered new regulations which ended any hope that baseball would be exempt from the draft. Nicknamed the "Work or Fight" order, Crowder's guidelines reinterpreted the SSA and took a hard stance on the boundaries of essential work. Under "Work or Fight," any person not employed in a select group of "useful" industries would be eligible for immediate draft, regardless of their initial classification.⁴⁸ Faced with the uncompromising nature of Crowder's order and the definitive weight of government power, baseball had little choice but to suspend operation indefinitely.⁴⁹ Although the order was due to take effect on July 1st, 1918, the owners of major league teams were able to negotiate an extension until the beginning of September so that they could finish the season with some modicum of grace. After the final pitch was thrown in the 1918 World Series, players and managers packed their bags and headed out on the path that Gowdy blazed more than a year before. The power of the

46 "A Plea for Sport," *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 4 (August 1917): 465, 468.

47 "Johnson Shocks Fans with His Plan for Exempting Games' Stars," *New York World*, November 22, 1917.

48 "'Work or Fight,' Choice Given to Men within Draft Age," *Washington Star*, May 23, 1918.

49 Louis Lee Arms, "Big League Baseball to Halt if General Crowder's Order Becomes Effective," *New York Tribune*, May 21, 1918.

government to redefine citizenship and require citizens to meet their obligations could not be denied, even by a popular and powerful institution like Major League Baseball.

CONCLUSION

The experiences of baseball during wartime actively demonstrates the increased interactions between government and citizens during WWI. The clear intertwining of baseball's experiences and the rhetoric of citizenship closely tracks changes in the cultural dimensions of citizenship. For those who navigated the treacherous waters of obligation, what mattered most was patterns of behavior--whether one acted in the right way and with the right characteristics. Legislation detailing the obligations of citizenship (namely the SSA and Crowder's Work or Fight order) definitively laid out the boundaries of citizenship, but within that bounded space, both the government and the baseball industry itself used the sport to define abstract concepts like patriotism, sacrifice, and national duty. This process was always reactive in nature. Baseball helped contribute to the formation of this new definition of citizenship and, in the process of formation, dealt with the fundamental changes to the game brought by the draft.

The industry ambivalently supported and to an extent outright resisted full cooperation with the increased obligations of citizenship. This mirrors the ambivalence and contradiction felt by the wider population. Changes in citizenship at the advent of WWI dramatically increased interactions between the Federal Government and everyday citizens. This process did not occur smoothly, and citizens did not meekly submit to government control. Instead, a series of debates ensued as citizens negotiated their places in the new citizenship order. The ultimate resolution of this debate, as revealed in the history of baseball, shows the extent to which citizenship was remade. Although the process

did not unfold without contention, the sweeping power of the government over citizenship limited opportunities for effective resistance. Citizenship, even when defined culturally, is a tool of governments, and in the end, the state wielded much power over the boundaries of citizenship.

The patterns of behavior which typify the modern state emerged as a result of the First World War. It was the first “total” war which necessitated the total mobilization of citizens to win. Although the subsection of citizens physically fighting the war was a relatively narrow demographic, the remainder of the nation was expected to join the fight in other ways. Cultural institutions like Major League Baseball reflected this dramatic rise in the expectations placed on citizens by the state. The baseball industry navigated the same types of problems that individuals faced within this new environment. By exploring citizenship through the lens of baseball, the connection between culture and citizenship becomes far clearer. Ultimately, citizenship and culture cannot be separated—both government official and ordinary citizen alike used cultural touchstones like baseball as a nexus through which to understand and shape the way in which citizenship was defined.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

- “A Plea for Sport.” *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 4 (August 1917): 465, 468.
- Arms, Louis Lee. “Big League Baseball to Halt if General Crowder’s Order Becomes Effective.” *New York Tribune*, May 21, 1918.
- “Baseball for Our Soldiers and Sailors.” *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 3 (July 1917): 372.
- “Big League Baseball to Halt if General Crowder’s Order Becomes Effective.” *New York Tribune*, May 24, 1918.
- “Caught on the Fly.” *Sporting News*, October 3, 1918.
- Deane, Dorothy, and Ernest Bradley. *The Baseball Smile: an American Marching Song*. The May Walter Publishing Co., London: 1918, Library of Congress.
- Dixon, Robert. *Uncle Sam will Strike the Kaiser Out*. 1918, Library of Congress.
- Dougher, Louis A. “Yankees Proud of Those Who Joined Colors; Don’t Mention Rest.” *Washington Times*, July 2, 1918.
- Gowdy, Hank. “Why I Enlisted.” *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 4 (August 1917): 507, 530.
- “Griffs Get Shipyard Jobs.” *Washington Star*, August 21, 1918.
- “Johnson Shocks Fans with His Plan for Exempting Games’ Stars.” *New York World*, November 22, 1917.
- Lane, F.C. “Baseball’s Bit in the World War.” *Baseball Magazine* 20, no. 2 (March 1918): 386-391, 436-437.
- Preissig, Vojtěch. *That arm- your country needs it*. 1918, Library of Congress.
- Selective Service Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76-83.
- Smiley, W.S. “White Sox Drill Sergeant Speaks for Military Training.” *Sporting News*, April 12, 1917.

- Spalding's Base Ball Guide, and Official League Book* for 1917-1918. A.G. Spalding & Bros, 1917.
- Spalding's Base Ball Guide, and Official League Book* for 1918-1919. A.G. Spalding & Bros, 1918.
- Strike two! Help strike out military autocracy! Every Liberty Bond you buy helps win the war.* United States, 1917, Library of Congress.
- Sunday, William A. "A Defense of the Grand Old Game." *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 3 (July 1917): 360-361.
- The Evening World*, September 4, 1917, *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers*.
- "The Sporting Page Goes Out." *Stars and Stripes*, July 26, 1918.
- Tighe, Harry, and Harry Von Tilzer. *Batter Up, Uncle Sam is at the Plate*. 1918, Library of Congress
- Weeghman, Charles. "Playing Ball for Uncle Sam." *Baseball Magazine* 19, no. 5 (September 1917): 431, 456.
- Westman A.A., and Jean Walz. *Playing Baseball on the Western Front*. Chicago: 1918, Library of Congress.
- Wilson, Woodrow. "Presidential Proclamation regarding the Selective Service Act," 18 May 1917, UVA Miller Center.
- "'Work or Fight,' Choice Given to Men within Draft Age." *Washington Star*, May 23, 1918.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Babicz, Martin C., and Thomas W. Zeiler. *National Pastime: U.S. History through Baseball*. Lanham: Roman & Littlefield, 2017.
- Bachin, Robin F. "At the Nexus of Labor and Leisure: Baseball, Nativism, and the 1919 Black Sox Scandal." *Journal Of Social History* 36, no. 4 (2003): 941.
- Bowman, John, and Joel Zoss. *Diamond in the Rough: The Untold History of Baseball*. New York: Macmillan, 1989.

- Capozzola, Christopher. "Legacies for Citizenship: Pinpointing Americans during and after World War I." *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 4 (September 2014): 713–26.
- . *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Elias, Robert. *The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S. Foreign Policy and Promoted the American Way Abroad*. New York: New Press, 2010.
- Hensler, Paul. "'Patriotic Industry': Baseball's Reluctant Sacrifice in World War I." *Nine: A Journal of Baseball History and Culture* 21, no. 2 (2013): 98-106.
- Leeke, Jim. *From the Dugouts to the Trenches: Baseball during the Great War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2017.
- Nathanson, Mitchell. *A People's History of Baseball*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012.
- Reynolds, David. *America, Empire of Liberty a New History of the United States*. New York: Basic Books, 2009.
- Smith, Rogers M. *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Tygiel, Jules. *Past Time: Baseball as History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Voigt, David Q. "Reflections On Diamonds: American Baseball and American Culture." *Journal of Sport History* 1, no. 1 (1974): 3-25.
- Wegner, Kathryn L. "Progressive Reformers and the Democratic Origins of Citizenship Education in the United States during the First World War." *History of Education* 42, no. 6 (November 2013): 713–28.
- Welke, Barbara Young. *Law and the Borders of Belonging in the Long Nineteenth Century United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

ABOUT THE CORNELL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

The Cornell Historical Society (CHS) is an undergraduate organization at Cornell University founded in the fall of 2010. Our mission is to foster an appreciation and understanding of historical topics and methodology within the undergraduate student body and general community at Cornell University. Our largest endeavor is the annual publication of Ezra's Archives, which showcases undergraduate research in the field of History. In addition, we support the History Advising Program for students, host speaker events, and encourage community among undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty in the Cornell History Department. If you wish to learn more, please contact us at cornellhistoricalsociety@gmail.com.

If you are an undergraduate or recent graduate and would like to submit a work of original research for a future edition of Ezra's Archives, please reach out to the editors directly at ezrasarchives@gmail.com.

