//2A-3/11/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE. 
Respondent. 
— ^aird^ CASE NOS. Û -6743 
and U-6744 
POLICE ASSOCIATION, CITY OF NEW 
ROCHELLE. NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION 
OF POLICE, 
Charging Party. 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (JOEL H. GOLOVENSKY. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO (REYNOLD A. MAURO, ESQ., Of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Police 
Association, City of New Rochelle, New York State Federation 
of Police (Association) to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing two charges it filed against the 
City of New Rochelle (City). 
The Association excepts to so much of the ALJ's decision 
in Case U-6743 as determined that the City did not violate 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by refusing to negotiate the 
impact of a change it made in sick leave procedures. It 
argues that the ALJ's decision "is contrary to the evidence 
adduced at the hearing." It further argues that the 
Board - U-6743 & 
U-6744 -2 
ALJ "refused to accept evidence" that would have established 
that it submitted impact demands to the City. 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision in 
Case U-6744 that the City did not violate §209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law by refusing to execute a collective bargaining 
agreement that had been reached by the parties. The crux of 
the dispute is whether a particular duty chart was part of 
the agreement that had been reached by the parties. The 
Association asserts that it was and included it in a draft 
that it presented to the City for signature. The City 
asserts that the duty chart was not part of the agreement 
reached and refused to execute the draft. The ALJ 
determined that the record evidence supports the position of 
the City. In support of its exceptions, the Association 
argues that the ALJ misinterpreted the evidence in the 
record, excluded evidence that would have supported its 
position and "showed prejudice in sustaining relevant [sic] 
and meaningless objections on the part of respondent's 
attorneys yet overruled several objections made by counsel 
for the charging party." 
Section 204.10(b) of our Rules of Procedure provides 
that exceptions shall "[i]dentify that part of the [ALJ's] 
report and recommended order to which objection is made 
[and d]esignate by page citation the portion of the record 
relied upon. . . ." The Association has not done so. This 
„ 9570 
Board - U-6743 & 
U-6744 -3 
makes it difficult for us to focus on the specific evidence and 
rulings of the ALJ to which the exceptions allude. We have 
reviewed the entire record, albeit without the benefit of the 
page citations required by our Rules, and we are not persuaded 
by the Association's arguments. 
The record shows that the City had changed sick leave 
control procedures by requiring each unit employee to submit a 
physician's note when annual sick leave accumulated to 10 days 
while in the past, doctors' notes were not required until 
annual sick leave had accumulated to 12 days. The Association 
made a single demand to relieve the impact of the change. It 
proposed that, to minimize employee expenses, the City make its 
physician available for the issuance of such notes rather than 
requiring the employees to obtain notes from their personal 
physicians. That proposal was discussed by the parties and 
rejected by the City. There is no evidence that the City made 
any counterproposal or that the Association made any 
alternative proposals; neither is there any evidence that the 
Association sought any further negotiations. 
The ALJ determined that the conduct of the City did not 
constitute a violation of its duty to negotiate in good faith. 
The Association argues that this determination is in error in 
that the City's rejection of the proposal without making a 
counterproposal constituted a violation. 
We affirm the determination of the ALJ. While a 
„• 9571 
Board - U-6743 & 
U-6744 -4 
party's outright rejection of a series of proposals without 
any counterproposals might constitute a violation, its 
rejection, after discussion, of a single proposal does not. 
We further find no evidence supporting the Association's 
contention that the ALJ refused to accept evidence which 
would have shown that it had made further impact demands. 
Turning to Case U-6744, we affirm the determination of 
the ALJ that the draft agreement submitted by the Association 
to the City for signature was not the one reached by the 
parties. The record shows that an agreement was reached on 
December 2, 1982, the stipulation of agreement being executed 
by representatives of both parties. That stipulation was 
subsequently ratified by the Association on December 6. 1982, 
and was adopted by the City on December 21, 1982. Among 
other things, it authorized the City to switch tours of duty 
to accommodate individual schedules to training programs. 
Thereafter, the Association proposed an alternative duty 
schedule which would have accommodated training programs 
automatically without the necessity of tour switches. The 
City indicated that it would not object to the proposed 
change in the tour of duty schedule if that change were 
acceptable to the Superior Officers Association, which was 
then negotiating a contract on behalf of a separate unit of 
the City's employees. The City indicated that it wanted a 
single tour of duty schedule for both its rank and file and 
Board - U-6743 & 
U-6744 -5 
superior police officers. 
The Superior Officers Association rejected the proposed 
new duty schedule. Nevertheless, the Association included a 
duty chart embodying its proposed schedule in the draft 
agreement that it submitted to the City. The City's refusal 
to execute that draft was not a violation of §209-a.l(d) of 
the Taylor Law because the draft did not accurately reflect 
the parties' agreement. 
We also find nothing in the record to support the 
Association's contention that the ALJ refused to permit the 
introduction of relevant evidence regarding this matter, that 
he demonstrated any prejudice in his handling of the case or 
made any prejudicial rulings. We therefore reject the 
Association's remaining arguments. 
NOW THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and 
WE ORDER that the charges herein be. and 
they hereby are. dismissed. 
DATED: March 11. 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
#2B-3/ll/85 
~^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF MOUNT VERNON. 
Respondent, 
-— -and -CASE—NO—U^6888 
CITY OF MOUNT VERNON POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
RAINS & POGREBIN. P.C. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO (REYNOLD A. MAURO, ESQ. of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the City of Mount Vernon 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA). It alleges that the 
City of Mount Vernon (City) violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law by unilaterally imposing a term and condition of 
employment upon new appointees to police positions within the 
negotiating unit represented by PBA. The innovation is that 
new appointees must reimburse the City for a training course, 
which may reach $4,500., if they resign within three years of 
their permanent appointment. 
The City acknowledges its innovation of this 
reimbursement program, but it contends that its action was 
'> Board - U-6888 -2 
not a violation of the Taylor Law. Its first argument in 
support of this contention is that the reimbursement program 
is not a mandatory subject of negotiation because, like a 
residency requirement, it is a qualification for both initial 
and continuing employment. It also argues that the 
reimbursement of training cost is similar to reimbursement of 
a moving expense allowance which, in a dictum in County of 
Tompkins, 10 PERB 1P066 (1977). this Board said might be 
imposed unilaterally upon an employee who voluntarily resigns. 
Finally, the City makes a public policy argument in 
defense of its conduct. It asserts that several policemen 
^ who have accepted employment with it have resigned shortly 
after completing the expensive training course which it had 
furnished. These individuals had then accepted similar 
employment from other municipalities which, by reason of 
being spared the costs of training, could afford to provide 
greater salaries and benefits than the City was providing. 
The matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding merit 
in the charge and rejecting the City's defenses. 
Decisions of this Board holding that residency 
requirements are a qualification for both initial and 
continuing employment are not a precedent for the proposition 
that a public employer may unilaterally require reimbursement 
- for training costs. The issues raised by such 
) Board - U-6888 -3 
reimbursement do not involve qualifications for employment. 
To the extent that the training itself is a qualification for 
the performance of police work, the City has unilaterally 
chosen to hire employees who do not meet this qualification. 
It has then chosen to train these already hired employees in 
order to qualify them to perform the work that they had been 
hired to do. The sole issue is whether the City or the 
employee will pay for the training if the employee resigns 
within three years of receiving a permanent appointment. 
This is a compensation issue and a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
Moreover, as we noted in Salamanca Police Unit. CSEA. 12 
PERB ir3079 (1979), residency requirements are explicitly 
provided for by Public Officers Law §30, which states: 
Every office shall be vacant upon . . . the 
incumbent . . . ceasing to be an inhabitant of 
the state, or if he be a local officer, of the 
political subdivision, or municipal 
corporation of which he is required to be a 
resident when chosen . . . . 
It was this statutory language that persuaded us to say 
(at p. 3149): "[T]hus,'by statute, a residency requirement 
that applies when an employee is first chosen is a 
qualification for his continuing employment." We further 
noted that in states such as Michigan, Wisconsin and 
Massachusetts which do not have legislation comparable to 
Public Officers Law §30. "while a public employer may impose 
a residency requirement for the hiring of new employees, 
residency, as a continuing condition to remain employed, is a 
Board - U-6888 -4 
mandatory subject of negotiation. .. . ." Where Public Officers 
Law §30 is inapplicable, we reach the same conclusion.— 
There is no state statute specifically authorizing 
public employers to demand reimbursement for training or 
providing that an employee's pre-hire agreement to make such 
reimbursement would preempt collective negotiations on the 
subject. We therefore find no merit in the City's first 
argument. 
We also reject the City's second argument. The basis of 
our dictum in County of Tompkins was State Finance Law §6-d. 
since replaced by State Finance Law §204. That statute 
authorizes the State to compensate employees for moving 
expenses incurred in the course of taking a new position. It 
further provides for the 
return to the State [by an employee receiving 
such compensation, of] monies received for such 
expenses in the event that he resigns or 
voluntarily separates from the position to 
which he is initially appointed within one year 
of the effective date of such appointment. 
i/our dictum in Auburn City Unit. Cayuga County 
Chapter. CSEA. 9 PERB ir3085. (1976), is not to the 
contrary. There, we said (at p. 3152): 
It may, however, be a continuing gualification for 
employment. An employee who is hired subject to a 
residency reguirement continues to be subject to it as 
a qualification set at the time of his hire. 
We now clarify the position of this Board to indicate that 
the circumstance under which a residency reguirement is a 
continuing qualification for employment is that the initial 
employment was covered by Public Officers Law §30. 
i Board - U-6888 -5 
i 
County of Tompkins merely held open the question of the 
relationship of the statute to what would otherwise be a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. There being no comparable 
statute regarding reimbursement for training costs incurred 
by a municipality, the dictum is not relevant here. 
The City's policy argument also does not persuade us to 
reverse the decision of the ALJ. The City is rightly 
concerned about maintaining the employment of staff in which 
it has invested time and money. Efforts to retain staff. 
however, whether by positive inducements such as increased 
compensation or negative inducements such as reimbursements 
i 
to the employer, cannot be imposed unilaterally when, as 
here, they involve terms and conditions of employment. 
Pre-hire agreements between a public employer and a 
prospective employee do not negate a public employer's Taylor 
Law duty to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment 
of that prospective employee once he has attained employee 
status. Otherwise, a public employer could evade that duty 
if it could persuade prospective employees to waive their 
rights under §§202 and 203 of the Taylor Law. It is 
therefore improper for a public employer to condition an 
offer to hire a prospective public employee upon that 
prospective employee's waiver of the Taylor Law right to be 
,) represented in negotiations covering the allocation of 
training costs. 
Board - U-6888 
NOW THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and 
WE ORDER the City to: 
1. Immediately rescind and cease enforcement of all 
training agreements in issue executed by any unit 
^-mpJLQy_ejej_^ — " ~ ' ' " -
2. Immediately cease and desist from requiring 
execution of the training agreement as a condition 
to an individual's appointment to any unit position; 
3. Refund to any individual any monies paid by that 
individual to the City pursuant to the terms of the 
training agreement, with interest on that sum at the 
currently prevailing legal rate of interest, 
calculated from the date of each individual's 
payment to the City; 
4. Negotiate in good faith with the PBA the terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees 
represented by the PBA; and 
5. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations at which unit employees work in places 
ordinarily used to post notices of information to 
unit employees. 
DATED: March 11, 1985 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
lLl.*t-%x, 
David C. Randies 
•'<U> 3 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
.PUBUC^EMSXBflMEfeCUBELATJQfelSLB 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the City of Mount 
Vernon Police Benevolent Association (PBA) that the City of Mount Vernon (City) 
1. Will rescind and not enforce all training agreements in issue 
executed by any unit employee; 
2.- Will not require execution of the training agreement as a 
condition to any individual's appointment to any unit position; 
3. Will refund to any individual any monies paid by that individual 
to the City pursuant to the terms of the training agreement, 
with interest on that sum at the currently prevailing legal 
rate of interest, calculated from the date of each individual's 
payment to the City; 
4. Will negotiate in good faith with the PBA the terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees represented by the PBA. 
City of Mount Vernon 
Dated. By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2C-3/ll/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO. 
Respondent, 
^and ~CASE~NOT U-76 57 
LOUIS C. ST. GEORGE, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
Louis St. George, the charging party herein, has filed a 
motion for the reconsideration of this Board's decision of 
January 18, 1985, dismissing his charge against the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF).— The charge 
alleged that PEF violated its duty of fair representation to 
St. George by refusing to appeal an adverse grievance 
dertermination to court. The grievance had complained that 
by reason of his job assignments, St. George, an Unemployment 
Insurance Claims Examiner (salary grade 14) was entitled to 
the position of Senior Unemployment Insurance Claims Examiner 
(salary grade 18). 
i/l8 PERB 1P005. 
Board - U-7657 _2 
We dismissed the charge on the ground that it failed to 
allege facts sufficient to constitute a violation of the 
Taylor Law. In doing so we assumed all the facts alleged in 
the charge were true. St. George makes four arguments in 
support of his motion. ^ ^ 
1. He reasserts the proposition that he was entitled to 
oral argument in order to present evidence in support of his 
allegations of fact. 
Oral argument is granted to afford an opportunity to 
present positions regarding questions of law. It is an 
inappropriate forum for the presentation of evidence. In any 
event, no evidence was required as St. George's allegations 
were deemed true.—2 / 
2. He reasserts the allegation that he was performing 
the work of a Senior Unemployment Insurance Claims Examiner. 
As we noted in our prior decision this was not 
sufficient to establish gross negligence or irresponsible 
conduct on the part of PEF. On the face of the documents 
submitted by St. George it appeared that PEF determined that. 
2/st. George has submitted a letter, dated March 5, 
1985, in response to PEF's affidavit in opposition to 
reconsideration. That letter contains allegations of fact 
which supplement the allegations contained in his earlier 
papers. They do not, however, affect the legal analysis 
herein. 
£1 
Board - U-7657 -3 
notwithstanding his out-of-title work, St. George could not 
be promoted at his unemployment insurance office because, by 
reason of its small size, that office was not entitled to 
have a Senior Unemployment Insurance Claims Examiner on its 
staff. Without such__grp̂ ss_:nejgldjĝ jice-jax- irresponsible——~— 
conduct there is no violation of the duty of fair 
3/ 
representation.— 
3. He reasserts his allegation that other unemployment 
insurance offices of similar size had the position of Senior 
Unemployment Insurance Claims Examiner on their staff. He 
adds, however, that he communicated this information to PEF 
and that it did not investigate the matter. 
The original allegation raised no question of gross 
negligence or irresponsible conduct. Whether or not the 
additional allegation does may not now be considered by us 
because it was not part of the original charge. 
4. He reasserts the allegation that PEF did not give 
him sufficient reason for its rejection of the appeal early 
enough for him to have retained an attorney to appeal on a 
private basis. 
There is no indication in St. George's motion of newly 
3/The third possible basis of such a violation is 
discrimination. No such allegation is present in this case. 
Board - U-7657 -4 
discovered evidence that would justify a reconsideration of 
the arguments based upon these allegations.— 
For the reasons stated herein. WE ORDER that the motion 
herein be. and it hereby is, denied. 
DATED: March 11. 1985 
Albany. New York 
^^£ v&*?-&^%^_ 
arold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies. Member 
^/in its response PEF complains that our decision 
implies that it had not provided appropriate information to 
St. George in a timely fashion. It has submitted 
affidavits in support of the proposition that it did 
furnish St. George with timely and relevant information. 
As St. George's charge was dismissed for failure to allege 
facts sufficient to constitute a violation of the Taylor 
Law. his allegations were deemed true without any actual 
determination having been made on whether they were, in 
fact. true. It is still unnecessary for us to resolve the 
issue of fact. 
O9 584 
#2D-3/ l l /85 
") STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BROOME COUNTY 
CASE NO. E - 1 0 4 1 
Upon—the—App-l-tc action—for-Designation—of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
JAMES J. PENDERGAST. for Broome County 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Broome Community College Guild, 
NYSUT. AFT 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The application herein was filed by Broome County 
(County). It sought the designation of five employees of its 
Community College (College) as managerial or confidential. 
The Broome Community College Guild, NYSUT. AFT (NYSUT) 
objected to the designation of two of those employees as 
either managerial or confidential and a hearing was held to 
elicit the relevant facts.— The two positions in question 
are Director of the College's Computer Center, a position 
held by Eugene Krause, and Budget Officer, a position held by 
Carl Miller. The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
i/one of the positions covered by the application is in a 
negotiating unit represented by another employee organization. 
The issues raised by that part of the application are being 
considered in another proceeding. The employer withdrew the 
aspect of the application seeking the designation of the other 
two positions, both of which were vacant. 
••*•-• Ur<JO<u> 
) Board - E-1041 -2 
Representation (Director) determined that Krause is a 
managerial employee and Miller a confidential employee.— 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of NYSUT to both 
parts of the decision of the Director. 
_ The primary basis of the Director' s__de_t_exiaijia-,tl-0-n--t-h-a-t 
Krause is a managerial employee is that the record shows that 
he served as a member of a group of administrators identified 
as the College's "management team". As such, he participated 
in its deliberations, which involved the formulation of 
policy. Furthermore, the record showed that Krause reported 
to the president of the College. 
NYSUT's exceptions do not contest the record support of 
the Director's findings of fact. Neither do they challenge 
his conclusions of law. Instead, NYSUT argues that on 
January 3. 1985. which was after the close of the record 
herein and five days before the issuance of the Director's 
decision, the County changed Krause's assignment materially. 
It asserts that Krause no longer reports to the College's 
president and that he is no longer a member of the management 
team or a participant in its deliberations. In support of 
its assertion it has attached to its exceptions a 
-̂'Having determined that Krause was managerial he 
found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether he 
was also confidential. He did indicate, however, that the 
functions of his job which made him managerial might also 
justify his designation as confidential. 
951 
) Board - E-1041 -3 
copy of a memorandum on the letterhead of the College which 
appears to corroborate that assertion. The County, in its 
response, does not refute the assertion but merely points out 
the obvious — there is no evidence in the record to support 
it. _ . — : 
The alleged new facts raise a question as to whether 
Krause still performs managerial functions. If not. it would 
be wrong for us to deprive him of his Taylor Law rights based 
upon assignments that no longer exist. We therefore remand 
the matter to the Director for further investigation and a 
new determination. 
In finding Miller to be confidential the Director 
determined that he drafts and redrafts proposed College 
budgets during the course of collective negotiations based 
upon projections that are made by the management team in 
negotiations. NYSUT's exceptions argue that this is not 
sufficient to constitute Miller's status as confidential 
because the work that he does is mechanical in nature. 
Moreover, he submits so many redrafts of the budget that he 
never knows whether any particular draft will be the final 
one. Thus, according to NYSUT, he is not in a position to 
evaluate with confidence the position of management in 
negotiations. 
Having reviewed the record we affirm the decision of the 
Director. In preparing the various budgets. Miller 
*• 9587 
Board - E-1041 -4 
is required to consider salary estimates. These estimates 
come from the County's negotiators and reflect their 
assessment of the progress of negotiations. Furthermore, 
the budget that Miller prepares is based upon his 
predictions of expenditures which he makes based upon his 
analysis of the College's past experience. This, too, is a 
indication of the confidential nature of his job. Town of 
Stony Point. 18 PERB 1[3011 (1985). 
NOW THEREFORE, WE ORDER that 
1. Carl Miller be and he hereby is designated a 
confidential employee of the County, and 
2. That the application of the County to designate 
Eugene Krause managerial or confidential is 
remanded to the Director for further 
proceedings. 
DATED: March 11. 1985 
Albany, New York 
#3A-3/ll/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (UNIFIED COURT 
SYSTEM). 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NOS. 0^2814 
& C-2820 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY FEDERATION OF COURT 
EMPLOYEES, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
1 . 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Ninth Judicial District 
Court Employees Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named public employer, in 
\ the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
APPENDIX A 
Titles or Positions Included In the 
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT j 
NEGOTIATING UNIT!/ ] 
I 
Administrative Assistant J 
Administrative Services Clerk 
Assistant Court Clerk* JG-16 
Assistant Court Clerk* JG-18 
Associate Court Clerk 
Associate Law Assistant 
Associal:l^L^w~As^i^t^ir~f —~""""'"" " 7 '.'" ~™ 
Associate Law Clerk to Judge 
Associate Surrogate's Court Clerk 
Court Assistant 
Court Attendant | 
Court Clerk 
Court Officer 
Court Reporter 
Data Entry Control Clerk j 
Data Entry Control Clerk HSAP 
Law Assistant-Trial Part j 
Law Assistant (Trial Part) to Acting Justice 
Law Assistant (Trial Part) to Acting Justice PT 
Law Clerk to Judge 
Law Librarian . . . . • • • 
Law Library Clerk 
Law Stenographer 
Office Assistant 
Office Stenographer -
Office Typist 
Office Typist PT 
Office Typist HSAP 
Principal Court Clerk 
Principal Law Assistant 
Principal Law Assistant (Trial Part) to Acting Justice 
Principal Law Clerk to Judge 
Principal Law Librarian 
Principal Office Assistant 
Principal Office Stenographer 
Principal Office Typist 
Security Supervisor 
Security Supervisor* COMP 
Secretary 
Secretary to Judge 
Senior Court Clerk 
1/ Except any employee whose position has been or is determined 
to be managerial or confidential by the New York State Public 
Employment Relations Board, employees whose exclulsion has 
been stipulated to. in writing, by the parties, and part-time 
employees who work less than 50% and temporary employees who 
are expected to be on the payroll for a period of less than 
nine months. 
,. 9590 
Senior Court Officer 
Senior Court Officer* JG-18 
Senior Court Reporter 
Senior Law Assistant 
Senior Law Assistant (Trial Part) to Acting Justice 
Senior Law Clerk to Judge 
Senior Law Librarian 
Senior Law Library Clerk 
Senior Office Assistant 
Senior Office Assistant HSAP 
Senior Office Stenographer 
Senior Office Typist 
-S'e^ar^0^^ce^Ma^Ha-ne-Opex"a^or*-
Senior Secretary to Judge 
Senior Surrogate's Court Clerk 
Uniformed Court Officer* 
Certification - C-2814 & C-2820 page 2 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time employees 
occupying nonjudicial positions within 
the County of Westchester and the 
County of Rockland who were paid by 
either the County of Westchester or the 
County of Rockland prior to April 1, 
1977. or, if created after such date. 
— wou-td--ha-ve~been™so^ 
enactment of Chapter 966 of the Laws of 
1976. whose job titles are set forth in 
Appendix A attached hereto. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Ninth Judicial District 
Court Employees Association and enter into a written agreement 
with such employee organization with regard to terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees in the above unit, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of. and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: March 11. 1985 
Albany, New York 
 *-**«-
Harpld R. Newman, Chairman 
'/cJl^f-rL 
David C. RandlesV Member 
//3B-3/11/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF LACKAWANNA. 
Employer, 
— and- — GASE-NO,—G-28^8 
LACKAWANNA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
) accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Lackawanna Police Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Patrolmen. Detectives. Lieutenants. 
Chiefs of Detectives and Captains. 
J Excluded: Chief of Police. Police Matrons, and 
Complaint Writers. 
ar ^JiJiji 
Certification - C-2898 page 2 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Lackawanna Police 
Benevolent Association and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of. and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: March 11. 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
%JX1<^ 
David C. Randies. Membsfr 
#30-3/11/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK. 
Employer. 
— — — -and^ . CASE-NO-—eUZ825 
THE UNION OF FEDERATED CORRECTION 
OFFICERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Council 82. AFSCME. AFL-CIO has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
) for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
) Certification - C-2825 page 2 
Unit: Included: Employees of the State of New York in 
the Security Services Unit. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and 
enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment of the 
employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
) 
DATED: March 11, 1985 
Albany. New York 
~ Q*>Qf