February 1979 A.E. Res. 79-4 PROPERTY TAX CIRCUIT - BREAKERS IN NEW YORK STATE A Policy Analysis Bert Mason Eric Gabler Department of Agricultural Economics Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station New York State College of Agriculture and Life Sciences A Statutory College of the State University Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853 It is the policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of educational and employment opportunity. No person shall be denied admission to any educational program or activity or be denied employment on the basis of any legally prohibited dis­ crimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or handicap. The University is committed to the maintenance of affirmative action programs which will assure the continuation of such equality of opportunity. PROPERTY TAX CIRCUIT-BREAKERS IN NEW YORK STATE: A POLICY ANALYSIS1" by Bert Mason1̂ and Eric Gabler^ Rapidly rising levels of property taxation and growing concerns about the burdens these taxes place on particular groups of taxpayers have led to widespread adoption of property tax relief programs for households. At present, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have some form of property tax relief program for the elderly, and many extend coverage to the non-elderly 1/ Although specific exemptions such as the homestead exemption are the most universal form of property tax relief, circuit-breakers are the most rapidly growing type of relief program. The first circuit-breaker program was initiated by Wisconsin in 1964. By mid-1978 , thirty states and the District of Columbia had circuit-breaker laws.—2/ New York State adopted circuit-breaker legislation in March 1978. Property tax circuit-breakers t Helpful comments by Mike Lea, Edward J. Lilly, Ronald Pederson, Lois Plimpton, and Louis Tomson are gratefully acknowledged. tt Bert Mason is currently a senior economist at the Solar Energy Research Institute in Golden, Colorado, At the time this paper was written, he was an assistant professor in the Department of Agri­ cultural Economics, Cornell University. Eric Gabler is a graduate research assistant in the Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University. 1/ Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Property Tax Circuit-Breakers: Current Status and Policy Issues Washington, D.C.: February, 1975. 2/ John Shannon and Frank Tippett, "An Analysis of State Personal Income Tax and Property Tax Circuit-Breakers," unpublished paper presented at the 46th Annual Meeting of the National Association of Tax Administrators, Boston, June 1978, pp. 10-18, See Appendix A. -1- ++ - 2- are tax relief programs designed to protect household income from "exces­ sive" property tax burdens. Although design of specific circuit—breaker legislation varies among the states,,circuit-breakers generally grant partial or complete relief from "excess" property taxes when they exceed a specific percentage of household income* Property tax relief is usually given as a cash refund, direct reduction of the property tax bill, or as a tax credit against state income taxes. Proponents of circuit—breakers claim that they can rectify many of the purported ills of the real property tax, namely excess burden, regress — ivity, and interjurisdictional fiscal disparities. Opponents respond that circuit-breakers represent short-term relief rather than true reform and that benefits are distributed largely to individuals least in need of relief. Regardless of one's perspective on the desirablility of circuit- breaker programs, it is clear that widespread momentum for adoption exists. It is also true that circuit-breakers offer a politically attractive response to demands to "do something about the property tax. In an atmosphere that creates strong desires among public officials to provide immediate and visible response, it is not surprising that adoption is rarely preceded by careful analysis of potential impacts and available alternatives. The purposes of this paper are to provide a general background on circuit—breakers and discuss some important policy issues which face public officials considering property tax relief and reform, particularly in New York State. The intent is to catalyze discussion rather than pose defini­ tive answers to the complex issues involved in property taxation. -3- Objectives and Design of Property Tax Circuit-Breakers In the thirty-one states (including the District of Columbia) that have circuit-breakers, program design in terms of coverage and extent of relief varies widely.— ̂ This variation makes it difficult to provide a concise and specific definition for circuit-breakers. Generally, all circuit-breaker programs seek to alleviate "excessive" property tax burdens by linking property tax liabilities for homeowners and/or renters to current annual household income.— ̂ The usual justification for circuit- breakers is that they will alleviate purported regressivity of the property tax for low-income households and reduce interjurisdictional disparities in tax bases. Circuit-breakers are usually financed by state taxes, although a few states require local financing through direct reduction in property tax bills. It should be noted that the term "circuit-breaker" is somewhat misleading. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) poses an analogy between property tax and electrical circuit-breakers: "Property tax circuit-breakers are tax relief programs designed to protect family income from property tax 'overload' the same way that an electrical circuit-breaker protects the family from current overload. „ —5 / This analogy is not entirely accurate, since the property tax circuit-breaker does not completely shut down the "current," but instead allows a flow of property tax payments at some level legislated as acceptable. Moreover, any _3/ This section relies heavily on the Advisory Commission on Inter­ governmental Relations, op. cit. 4/ In 1974, Michigan extended circuit-breaker coverage to farms as well as owners of residential property. 5/ ACIR, ibid., p. 2. -4- reduction in property taxes via a circuit-breaker is shifted to some other revenue source in the tax system* The property tax circuit-breaker there­ fore operates more as "relay" than a "circuit—breaker," since it shifts tax liabilities to other taxpayers. Circuit-breakers are quite flexible in application and can be designed to achieve a wide variety of legislative objectives* The impact that a particular circuit—breaker program will have on alleviating excess burden, regressivity, and revenue disparities among jurisdictions depends on specific design features of the program. Important considerations in designing a circuit—breaker include eligibility, income ceilings and extent of property tax relief. Alternative approaches to formula and program design are sketched in the following section. Relief Formulae. There are basically two types of relief formulae used in calculating "excess" property tax burdens for circuit—breaker programs. These are labelled the threshold and sliding scale approaches by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The threshold approach uses a given percentage of income as the maximum acceptable amount of property tax a household may be expected to pay. In practice, this percentage, or threshold, varies directly with income. Low incomes may have, for example, a three percent threshold, while higher incomes may climb progressively to four, five, and six percent thresholds. Any amount exceeding the threshold is called excessive, and this amount is rebated either completely or in part to the taxpayer under the relief provisions of the circuit-breaker. The sliding scale approach does not use a percentage of income criterion. Income classes are established, and for each income class a set percentage of property tax paid is rebated. For example, property taxes -5- may be reduced by ten percent for families with less than $3,000 income* Under this approach, the percentage rebated declines as higher income classes are reached. Whether property tax liability is initially high or low in relation to household income is not a factor. The differences between these two approaches, according to the ACIR are: The threshold approach (a) rests solely upon the ability-to-pay concept, and can better target relief in accordance with this principle; (b) can make the residential property tax proportional below a given income level, or even progressive over a rather broad income range; (c) grants greater benefits, everything else equal, to residents of high spending jurisdictions; and (d) grants greater benefits, everything else equal, to occupants of high value homes vis—a—vis low value homes (thus, the threshold approach tends to encour­ age overconsumption of ho using to a greater extent than the sliding-scale approach). The sliding scale approach (a) maintains interjurisdictional tax differentials, con­ sistent with the benefits-received principle of taxation (the notion that tax payments should be in proportion to benefits) where tax differentials reflect service differ­ entials; (b) maintains tax differentials among occupants of homes having different values (thereby minimizing the circuit breaker1 s stimulus to housing consumption) ; (c) maintains tax differentials that arise from inter- jurisdictional tax base differentials (property— poor jurisdictions must levy higher tax rates than property- rich jurisdictions to provide the same level of service and the sliding-scale approach maintains these differ­ entials to a greater extent than the threshold approach); and (d) assures that the taxpayer shares in tax increases so that his share of the cost of government service in­ creases does not go to zero (built-in "co- insurance ), thereby preserving the taxpayer's incentive to weigh the benefits of proposed increases and to consider whether he wishes to support them.6/ In evaluating these two approaches, ACIR. concludes that the threshold approach is the more direct and cost-effective alternative for providing 6/ Ibid, pp. 9-10. - 6- relief for excess burden. ACIR maintains that the threshold approach is preferable to the sliding-scale because it reduces the impact of inter- jurisdictional tax base disparities. Steven Gold, however, defends the sliding-scale formula on the basis that "the sliding-scale gives relatively more relief to households at each income level with lower property taxes; the threshold gives relatively more relief to households at each income level with higher property taxes.".—.7 / Gold proposes that the sliding-scale allows for greater vertical equity by guaranteeing that higher income households will not receive benefits when lower income households do not and that the sliding- scale minimizes the tendency for households of greater wealth to receive greater benefits under circuit-breaker programs. Gold argues the sliding scale is preferable if property ownership is considered: 1) to reflect a family’s preference for housing over other goods; 2) as a method of holding wealth; or 3) to reflect a desire in high-tax districts to have access to greater services that district might provide. If high property taxes are the result of a district's relatively poor property tax base, or the housing requirements of a large family, Gold suggests these equity problems are better addressed by intergovernmental fiscal transfers than by circuit-breaker relief. The sliding-scale approach has the advantage of insuring taxpayer responsibility in voting for local spending, since qualified taxpayers must share a portion of any increase in property taxes. This "responsibility" factor can be built into threshold circuit-breakers by adding a "co- insurance restriction." Coinsurance means that less than 100 percent of JJ Steven Gold, "A Note on the Design of Property Tax Circuit-Breakers, National Tax Journal (December 1976), pp. 477-481. -7- property tax in excess of the threshold is refunded. Voter responsibility can therefore be maintained under either formula. Coverage. Eligibility for benefits is decided in part by the income criterion for relief incorporated into the formula. Under the sliding- scale approach, eligibility and extent of relief are usually stratified by income class until a maximum income ceiling is reached, beyond which no benefits can be claimed. Although the threshold formula requires no income classes in theory, threshold percentages usually increase and rebate percentages usually decline as income rises. Further, most states legis­ late maximum income ceilings for eligibility. In practice, states often limit coverage by criteria other than income and property tax payments. Age of the head of the household and occupancy status are often used in determining eligibility. ACIR defines three types of property tax circuit—breakers based on coverage. These are (1) 'basic circuit—breakers which cover only elderly homeowners, (2) "expanded circuit—breakers which include elderly renters (based on a percentage of rent equivalent to property tax) along with elderly homeowners, and (3) "general" circuit-breakers which provide benefits to all overburdened households To the extent that elderly homeowners have a high ratio of real property holdings to income, it may be argued that limiting coverage to the elderly will insure that only those most in need of relief receive it. But when one considers income tax and property tax exemptions already granted the elderly and costs encounterd by young households (particularly in the form of dependents), this argument is less convincing. Bendick, in a study 8/ ACIR, op. cit., p. 4. -8- of Wisconsin's expanded circuit-breaker program, found that the proportion of program benefits that go to the poor is lower for a program limited to elderly families than for a general circuit-breaker program. Relief is targeted more efficiently in a general program primarily because younger families of equal income to aged families are larger and therefore more likely to be poor.—9/ With respect to occupancy status, the justification on equity grounds for including renters is dependent upon whether renters pay property taxes. There is a current debate among economists about who pays the property tax — the owners of capital (landlords in this case) or renters. If the entire burden of property taxes is paid by owners of capital, then renters should be excluded. However, if renters pay property taxes in the form of higher rents, as is often believed in a rental market characterized by imperfect competition, then renters should also be covered. All but five states with property tax circuit-breakers include renters. It is usually assumed that 25 percent of the rent bill represents property taxes. In choosing eligibility criteria, a trade-off between equity and cost must be made. Common sense dictates that, all else being equal, a program with broader coverage will be more expensive. Among the five states currently using general and broad—based circuit—breakers, greater expense is clearly evident on a per capita cost basis. Precautionary Design Features. In designing circuit-breaker programs, it is often difficult to insure that benefits do not accrue to those not 9/ Marc Bendick, J r D e signing Circuit-Breaker Property Relief, National Tax Journal, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (March 1974). 10/ The debate about property tax shifting is covered in section 4. -9- actually in need of relief. A hypothetical case may serve as illustration. Few would argue that a wealthy family owning a high value home would merit relief under a property tax relief program. However, it is quite possible that property taxes on this large property holding, when compared to a manipulated "income," may exceed a given threshold and thus qualify the family for relief. If the circuit-breaker program uses taxable rather than unadjusted income from all sources, this family might qualify for a percen­ tage rebate of property taxes. Several methods exist for dealing with and preventing such prac— tices.”11/ Perhaps the most important method is a comprehensive definition of income• Bendickfs citation of the Wisconsin definition of income is illustrative of what might be considered. A recipient must have a husband-and-wife or single person "household income" of $7000 or less (household income includes Wisconsin-taxable income, plus net income earned out side the state, alimony and support payment s , cash public assistance, gross pension income including social security, nontaxable income from federal government securities, and workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance. Unlike most tax programs, but like welfare programs, joint filing is mandatory) Bendick suggests that further control should be made to: 1) Adjust the measurement of household income to take account of family size; 2) Include intrafamily transfers as part of household income of family members not sharing a homestead; 3) Pool incomes of all related individuals in a homestead as house­ hold income (in addition to income of husbands and wives); 11/ Some protection is basic to formula design. Adjustments in the threshold may include a variable threshold (higher for higher incomes), coinsurance restrictions, and income ceilings. 12/ Bendick, op. cit■, p. 19. - 10- 4) Add imputed rent for non-family members sharing a household; 5) Add a net worth ceiling for eligibility. Some families may have large asset holdings (stocks, bonds, investment property, etc.) but low current income. They may qualify for circuit- breaker relief even though they are "wealthy." Three circuit-breaker states, Maryland, New York, and Utah, currently use some form of wealth ceilings to eliminate asset-rich families from eligibility. While a wealth ceiling would prevent property-rich families or families with other large asset holdings from claiming relief, serious problems arise in estimating wealth. Furthermore, as pointed out by ACIR, a wealth ceiling should not be so low as to force people to give up their homes in order to qualify for relief. Finally, all existing circuit-breaker programs include a ceiling on maximum benefits. These ceilings represent a tradeoff between the desire to provide relief where due and the desire to prevent windfall benefits, particularly to owners of high-value property. Ceilings also limit the cost— in terms of foregone revenues— *to governments financing the circuit- breaker program. Current Status of Circuit-Breaker Programs in the U.S. Data in Table 1 give some idea of the combinations of coverage and re­ lief formulae used by the thirty-one states (including the District of Co- lumbia) with property tax circuit-breaker programs.1™3'/ Information on costs and extent of benefits for these programs is presented as Appendix A. As the data in Table 1 indicate, there is wide variation in designing circuit-breaker programs. This variation suggests the flexibility of the 13/ Shannon and Tippett (June 1978) op. cit., pp. 11-18 -11- to u0 x! «> 0 0 C0O t4--1 ClO *H 0 0 >& o 0 o> • u a0 m0 0pi to 00 *o bO 5 34-H1 '0Sc0J r—I x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x * 0 O X X —30f 0bo 06 O Z1> 0P -90 0u 0 o -4 & 4 C•L *00 r0- ’f 0 00 T1) O S-l «■ 00 6 H0 Xl X X X0 >> o " 0 0 0CO O B 0bO 0 Xo X*I0 i—•H O0 I X X X X 00 H.-I » iO--CO n TOr-H 00r-j 06 0 0 0 b 0O 0 o o u0 0 0X 0 cl 0 aCO) X X X X X X X X X 'x X X X C CLL o 00 u H•H •H t05*"!0 TH 0r0 ^ XCL § 0[>%XJ u 00 0o 0 T0O 0 0 0 X X 0# 01 X i— II (S CO o 0I •0H 0 0 TO TO O x 0 XI 0 * a» 0 0 0 X Ia) x 4-1 00 § cbu0 o § X X X X X X X X o X X X X X 0 i0~l0 00 cl 0 00 0 0 0 >0 wx B5 X l 0CL rH oo 0 O X 0J 0 0 4-1 0 0 0. I 0 > & 0 00 X X HPi o0 400 00 0(Si u U •OH 00 0 0 o 0 aXj 0O o oi rH H Q 0 4-J *0H -H CgL 00 H-H 0 > (Si CL0 bo 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 II•——HII T-0O0 i— I *rt 0 u Po0 0 X >* -0 ,0 o o U O 0 CO0 0S 40-1 U 0 *H 0 MH 0 2 o >0 t0 X X s -£H •fc ** + 00H OI— I 0 C0J UO OO Q• Table 1. Design of State Circuit-Breaker Property Tax Relief Programs, 1978 - 12- circuit-breaker concept in meeting diverse financial, social and political situations. Most state programs are limited to elderly persons, with five programs limited to elderly homeowners only, and seventeen programs covering both renters and homeowners who are elderly. Seven states have circuit-breakers that cover homeowners and renters regardless of age, although New York and Washington, D.C. accomplish this via differential programs for the elderly and non-elderly. Hawaii and Maryland have programs that cover all renters and all homeowners, respectively. All but four states have maximum income ceilings, and three states have wealth ceilings. Eighteen states use threshold formulae of some type, ten states use sliding scale formulae, and four states use special formulae more closely related to the sliding- scale.— ̂ Almost all of the circuit-breaker programs have been modified at least once since adoption. In comparing costs and extent of benefits of these programs, it is clear that general coverage programs are more expensive than those which limit coverage to the elderly. Within the categories of elderly-only and general-coverage programs, it is difficult to generalize on patterns of costs and benefits. It does appear that limits on maximum credit and income ceilings generally constrain the effects of circuit-breakers sub­ stantially. 14/ This sums to 32 states (including Washington, D.C.) due to North Dakota's separate formulae for renters and homeowners. -13- Elementals of the New York Circuit-Breaker Law In March 1978, the New York State Legislature adopted a circuit- breaker program (sections 7 and 12 of S.8819-A.11636) as amendments to the tax law. This program was an amalgamation and compromise among separate circuit-breaker proposals by the three leading gubernatorial candidates Governor Carey, Senator Anderson, and Assemblyman Duryea. It consists of both a real property tax circuit-breaker credit and a real property tax circuit—breaker deduction, which are mutually exclusive in application. Although the program is limited in terms of amount of relief granted, it covers both elderly (65 years and older) and non—elderly households. Elderly taxpayers can, however, qualify for substantially greater relief than non-elderly families. Definitions. Under the New York circuit-breaker laws, a "household" is defined broadly to include the taxpayer and all who share the residence. Tenants not related to the taxpayer are excluded as household members. "Household gross income" is defined as adjusted gross income as reported for federal income tax purposes, plus excluded capital gains, earned income that is excludable for federal tax purposes, support money not included in adjusted gross income, nontaxable strike benef its, supplemental security income payments, exempt pensions and annuities (such as railroad retire­ ment, social security and veterans' disability), unemployment insurance payments, interest from state and local bonds, workmen's compensation, and cash public assistance and relief. It does not include medical assistance for the needy or in-kind relief such as surplus foods. A residence under the circuit-breaker means a dwelling and no more than one acre of property. -14- Large landholdings, such as farms or estates, will not qualify for relief.” ^ "Qualifying real property taxes" are all real property taxes exclusive of penalties and interest levied on the residence of a qualified taxpayer. They include any property taxes that would have been levied in the absence of other partial exemptions. This means that taxpayers with partial exemptions such as the veterans* and elderly exemptions can use exempt taxes in computing total real property taxes; circuit-breaker relief will supplement, rather than replace, benefits received from current partial exemptions. Qualified renters, as well as homeowners, are eligible for circuit- breaker relief. Under the law, 25 percent of rent is considered as the real property tax equivalent. The amount of rent paid is reduced to reflect utilities, furnishing or board that might be included in the rental figure. Real Property Tax Circuit—Breaker Credit. By the provisions of subsection (e) of §606 of the Tax Law, a tax credit is available to all qualified taxpayers for the tax years 1978, 1979 , and 1980. Taxpayers qualifying for relief are elderly and non-elderly resident individuals who have occupied the same residence for at least six months and whose house­ hold gross incomes do not exceed $12,000. Taxpayers who would otherwise qualify are not eligible for circuit-breaker relief if the full value of the residence exceeds $65,000 or if the adjusted rent for the residence exceeds $300 per month. Relief is equal to 50 percent of property taxes 15/ §305 of the Agriculture and Markets Law provides for the agricultural value assessment of farmland within agricultural districts. - 15- exceeding a variable percentage of household income, thus making this a threshold-type circuit-breaker with a coinsurance requirement. An important feature of the real property tax circuit-breaker credit is that it uses different relief schedules for elderly and non-elderly households. Reflecting the general preference given to the elderly under circuit-breaker provisions in other states, the relief provided to the elderly is substantially greater than to the non-elderly by way of lower income percentages and higher maximum benefit ceilings. For the non-elderly, excess real property taxes qualifying for a tax credit are calculated as follows: Excess real property taxes are the excess of real If household gross property tax equivalent or i n c om e for the the excess of qualifying taxable year is: real property taxes over: Not over $5,400 5% of household gross income $5,401 - $7,200 6% of household gross income $7,201 - $10,000 6% of household gross income $10,001 - $12,000 7% of household gross income The amount of credit granted is drastically reduced by provisions which limit maximum levels of reduction. The maximum credit cannot exceed $20 if household gross income is $5,400 or less, $15 if income is between $5,400 and $7,200, $12.50 if income is between $7,200 and $10,000, and $10 if income is more than $10,000 but does not exceed $12,000. For the elderly (65 years and older), excess real property taxes qualifying for a tax credit are calculated as follows 16/ This schedule (stated in section 7 of S . 8819-A. 11636) was initially set to become effective in the tax year beginning in 1980. However, the implementation date was advanced by S.9095—A.12108 to the taxable years 1978, 1979, and 1980. -16- Excess real property taxes are the excess of the real property tax equivalent or Xf household gross 50% of the excess of quali­ i n c ome for the fying real property taxes taxable year is: over: Not over $3,600 4% of household gross income $3,601 - $5,400 5% of household gross income $5,401 - $7,200 6% of household gross income $7,201 - $12,000 7% of household gross income The maximum circuit-breaker credit for elderly households is $200 if income does not exceed $7,200, $40 if income is between $7,200 and $10,000, and $15 if income is greater than $10,000 and does not exceed $12,000. The following tables (Table 2 and 3) provide illustrations of the magnitude of property tax relief granted under the New York real property tax circuit-breaker credit for non-elderly and elderly households. It is clear from these examples that the elderly will receive substantially greater relief than non-elderly taxpayers. This is primarily the result of the relatively liberal maximum credit ceiling of $200 for the elderly, as contrasted to $20 for the non-elderly. Real Property Tax Circuit-Breaker Deduction. As an alternative to the circuit-breaker credit, 1978 legislation allows a property tax circuit- breaker deduction for state resident individual income tax computation^1̂ Under this legislation, a qualified taxpayer can deduct a specified amount of property taxes from federal adjusted gross income (for state income tax purposes) for taxable years 1978, 1979, and 1980. Taxpayers qualifying for relief are non-elderly resident individuals whose household gross incomes exceed $5,400 but do not exceed $12,000 and who have occupied the same residence for at least six months. Relief is not available under the real 17/ Tax Law §612, Subsection (m) as authorized under subsection (c), para. (18). This legislation may be changed from a modification to an adjustment status to facilitate its administration in conjunction with New York City tax. - 17- ion no oin cs oCM oCM oCM OCM oCM oCM ii-nH ii-nH iC-MH Cf-M H 1 C-M4 Io-H orH 4J cs CO 0) (Uo u o Ov mo O Om in mo •fH ■ • * • ts ■ > **H r- 0) o '-*' m CM r-. n r—|n CM 00 sOD i-H Ht o CO CM X u o co \CDM CO COM -00 in r- o H i-H Ht CO PicMot- ■vt- CO CO CO CO CM 3 1 -— s *3 CM CD O o o u ain in m o 1 '“N tn CM CoM oCM oCM OCM oCM CoM n CM C i-H 'w' i-H i-H i- MH CM Ho o ooo ou — o in o00 Om O O m * • n• in« •co­ 4-1•rH i-H s-̂ rr--. n CM O i-» in i—1 r-in CO 0O X rH ■0H0t n Co CO CCMM o ts a CO CM i-H i-H i-HO orH CD ■H i-H CO CO CO CM CM X4-1 # bOtH S a) •|HX i-H CO o ■M in o • in m o • CD •rH• a) 0) o o o o O O rmH ii-nH iC-HM iC-M O *13 CN CM CM CM CM CM CM H M tC-MH O o bO QJ m• in■ in• X•H cD cd i-H r- in CM r- in i—l r» o CO o o z a rH CMCO CoO 0CM0 oX i-H Mf •CM CCMO CM 1—f Ci-HO io-H 00 m t3 a) a) bo t-H • > CS S •H •H XH o W to CO r-H XCD oin mo ^ i 0) P.4J o PiX • • CD rs o u Xin m o tH U M <0 0 4) o a iMPt o o O Q)o iO in in iOn t-H o X n CD 4-)PH - in CM O r» m i*H Ml- irn-. o CO o o a) 14H i-"- n CM CM CCMO iC-HM 0 rH u T ) ' CM CM CM CM CM ■H I -H i-H CS a) cd o > u cd •o o mO O O 1— 1 V }H CM d•H d o 0 tH cO to s H • rH -̂s O O o i—1 o iH {g o ts . bO CM CM CM CM o o o o o COM CoM oCM i-H o its CO MH P CO- 4-1 •H O •H 4J i-H o CS X to • H o 4-1 4J •H ** CinD o O T> a P QJU • in• in• 0) <0 d M tH > 0i—H nr-- m CM O i-". in rH . rH o o o o o o O —t i C—Ol <—11 00 X X X)H CD u -CO- 0 o CO MH o CO 4J QJ O MH-n <0 • H CDC a s •H a) rH4-1O *4rH-1 in ocr\ in O m CM 'dCM ro- 0r-0 m O Os miC H to 4J ---V r-H 0 i-H 4)M U 4-1 >1 tH pH 0) 0 4-1 oo oO oo oo oO oO oo oo oo oo oo oo oo to ts u CaS t-HCD <0CT\ CD§ 00 n- in in CO CM H o Os 00 n- a ca a a da) o f-H X 0o \____ iH CM CO .....m..- j X r- 00 a s a s o X CD o u 0 o I-H V H T3 CH u CDCO- B-8 lO r- * + ** Table 2. Non-Elderly Property Tax Circuit-Breaker Credit -18- CM oo oO O oCM oCM oCM Co O Oo OO O oM CM CM oCM -d- - od- sot (N o o Oin o o OOs » m m* LPl cu C •< O ou ✓1—-s1 cCoM s•—t1 caOv r0-0' ee'­ 1—1 sr • m vD in CO CM o tu0 •H st st CO CO COn C i—O1 CCDM CCMO vi—Dt CO »o—t rs st X !>c/> a 0Is 4gJ P 4 a CM Oo oo o o o o O To 0) a o o o 300 Oin0 n* m« 4-1 r—1•CO-y"™\ C0M0 St cO 00 t0s f ti O0 vD st CM 0 CmD rSH s0t0 vD CmO CiOn CCM 01 C 1—4 rS M l-iCOO- co CO CO CM CM CM Td . CU •4-H>4-1 CO 0 Om •ICdO H■H CM oo oo oO oO Oo oo S t so in « Tct \D cO t CO d 00CO td Td CM CM CM CM CM CM i— 1 *—s uo •HrH 0J < J>•COU o*Huon. Oin mo o o •H U0)0 TO * • in* oo 1 OMJ a i-H CCMO sT—̂t Mo0r r0-0 r-. •m—f st VvDD n cO * 0 -cX u cO \D cO CO cO CM cM CM CM rS CO in 3vD 0 d V . *XrldU) Ta)cd •o cdP1O H o 0 in nO a) ) £ 0* H 0 aj 00•H 'CwM' oo oo oO oo r-» a m f»H . X > (d JD 00 vD t-H s0t0 Vi—Oi o o OJ •H •rlCO to X CMn)o CM CM CM rH *—H f-H 4O-> (0 rCU aH 4Jo o a 0 Cu in OtoID /"N * in X cd -CO- Ĥ « CO :a) aj U C0M0 s t-H St vD o o o a) Is u Cv t V MD st D 00 r- n CM 00 ID i—l 00 •—i •o 0J 0 0P}H CM CM CM i—i p*S i—l id Di <4H o -CO- CU O aj V u § oin o Td 4S 0J to CU •rHo u i—1 o oO vD 00 r- m st u a) I0s) ai—s» rr"-S. ci-oH Ĥ CM & CO M o O a •H 0 •rl pC rH rH 4-1 4-1 •H rH Pi OJ a (U 3 0 CM St ■D 00 vmD ii——l1 o o o o o o 1*-I t> o 0 i OJ 0r0S vi—Dl d- IC—Ml 00 H-l &cd ts J3!-S •rl 4J C0 +J CO aj Is i•dH OJ +j OJ■cUO ■rH cd 4-1CU > 0 MS in l-s o J-l * 0J •rH cdv st CM CO VD Os 0 ^3 rH •o 4VJ 'r0H C DO rC-Ms 0o0 st CM lO-s. 0r-0 as i—l Pi MS ChU *rf i—l CM CM CO s sCtO ivnD vCOO vD rms 00 U 0 X •pH •OrHJ &O rH •to- o o cd4H 6 4-1 /TS H '•—1 0J---' Is PUH a) Is ts*rHD 0C)U 4-1O O •H Is d rHo O O 0J 2is . i— t 00 O0 * ■H O a 3 3 0 rH 4J a e ^ 0 p e O p X 1 03 d VM p o > > MH 03 p 43 P P p X I P p P P i X I 0 i n d 0) d « d o 03 p P 0 d g d d 03 03 d O o 03 ■H d d p j o •H p O p * p 0) -H o 03 H > P d d 0 0 43 CO 1— 1 p P d P P d o OJ , d p & 03 (0 N u U d O P d P p P •H P COp m 43 d m Cu 03- CO m .5 P > d 43 d d p d P c r « o vo d CM •H 01 P 03 p -d

03 > B *H 8 d A o p rH (U d d u tn o ON o P h o ■H ♦H a d *0- H|H Np*' X I 2 p P p p I p m P M *> Q)d d M-j o P p d .d p a O 0 * d CM iH 03 cr\ d 0J 43 4 d rH d Vi CO o

o d rH cx aO CO p o CO P d P d o p P < r o p to p 03 CM o d o d CO 03 CO 03 CO u d p O p O CO* at p p fX o i n o 0 p d CO CO CO X 60 p d op 4J d i n OJ Pd O k p P o n d 03 03 d d ■H' ♦rl 03 pd CO >> p X I o c d •a i n CO 01 CO ■H 60 1— f d d p d B p 43 CO p d o 03P a o 03 O 03 .5 TD O u o s d 43 P 43 o CO p > 0 p ■o>O . do , c * 03 d 03 p x 0 03 oo rH d a) X J CO Php . 0 P p CO PCO p 60 d hrH p 03 a) d *H < fy a) 41 CO i— 1 d 03 d o «H p O 01 & P d 0 d d d CO 0) ♦H tH p B d < T o rd -H p ■H d O d a p u d p o > 01 d y 03 cn d o pd P p 03 03 dO 0 d p p ’d P -c/> 03 p d o 03 CO O 03 P h CO P c • fl P p P d CO 60 T? X 03 iH 0J 03 a p CO *H P Pd o H p 0J o U o pd CD CO d o 03

CO CO i n 03 p i n ■H 03 CO ♦H 03 03 p M o 'r l p o CO u o fcn & P iH CM o CO p oo P CO d CM i— 1 X od X oB &o p i— 1 CO CM 43 d p o rH OJ Hm CM 4) 03 d d m CO 0) CM 03 d CO p P cn 0} 43 CM *c o 03 d rH X 43 tS P< p s 03 4l-f 52 o P co­ Tdl X J X I X J x • h d CO dd da i n c d o43 d d d o £ P ao in d VO 1 CMO P CO CO CM 01 P <44 d P P CM o> P NO 0 fn 43 0) P CO o P 'w ' coP OJ P o 0 o 0) P0cn ,a0 sOJ CL* P 01 P P 031 0 Td x l 0) £o d 03 d0 d P p> OJ > S3 d S 0 53 P o o5 03 pH P n >H Pflj TOJ >0J on >0) r S-*. > P̂. fP d Vi Hp£| oHn Hcn pui Ma> P 0 d vo P ON d p r-> O n i— l ON P rH d rH y y w ■ri 3 ° s * OOlW u c 2 a, u u co co B y (3 0 0 uO ab r~. o) j j o ae) y o« O C tn • Oh a® 0) •S^O *pH (3 •p Lp . «, yO -h -d 4-* t y d ' o w o. o rx 3 5 im « 0 c o -ay iI oLAs (C-1 o* Pn ^ y§ ̂ «■ ^ H |4 1) - -13 S y Op« 2 § rH h i B y cn O O0J3 - 03 xO .5 c« o > O d rC a; s H d ,u * o ’d d 0* -H 1> [ O uf * &l) 2c ° M *T3 o d p > (0° o y » w iqm) w<0 «ot; M MH a) xi d ,a e o o Mc xy y 60 * ^ B d »co Md *H S-J _| " y n( (A o >0 -d «y d • £ d d .—( M X - M T 3v j d d (A O C H SS -H « P. d CM 4J H d « r O H -P d O > T3 ^a) 4d-1 CU U |r! M ‘H M U 4-4 Uoj **oH OOJ -0UJ ao ̂T>3 ti yw axi do d S B o ea U CO t0o3 T01 *TJ H 3 N o d 0) £QC IT) 1-t H« DCS ̂ •-! xj Or̂ H r-’ ^ od *o->i ^ ̂ pod; o1-\4 4̂Cj *dH d W H <31 > ON d O' ♦H O ^ -d ̂ p a ^ Appendix B - KEY FEATURES OF STATE CIRCUIT-BREAKER PROPERTY TAX RELIEF PROGRAMS, April 1978 children 51-

u ■oaP 3 3td§mo pfQ p* o C*H uC M O 00 r-* y o y | 41 <4-4o\ 1 OJH ^ fj I 1 I P to 60 XH y cl , . o « B E * sp B ’ Oo oCl tyo 3 je JC 41 34) O $ as a) fi haj ■C ffl h <5u cs a . ,> 1B 4 J M s— 4P ‘•jHj P v> 41 4y1 £1, "Oo 4O-1 r>H7 P3 B O O b y P 41 P-y 4pi M«B u M ,na B Cl CL .fi lt4 S oU O £ > Oo 0-o c o o a ® , ® B *0 S a EJ p y ■o P.e - fi y P r-f V**r(b ^ p y o 0) *w<■PH » 0) o a* a M *4-H1iWHeft 3 p ® 0 O PCU^> 4 pa4 sy § c - 4J ̂ (3 « *BH Ct y B60 M g o y y C w t» in to 41 P* tp a) a) a) iH p*cd op 3™ Mfdop p o• 3 M B 0 o CL >Ipo o O B M O O O y y ip p M B d CO o o 9 > O n feid B 0 E O B <5 ^-o B P « - 5 o o •H 4J *4r-(1 iH . - y -f_i t3r Mo 4-1 a 5) 60 ® *r4 t0 _3. -*nJ u o s ̂B ^ O y . f i - ' B O 4> „ b y 3 B y ■H W 3 •p to y y B B y& CtoO B60 - X p O (U to y y b By UfiM 3 to 60 4-1 £ B 4J y o p x 4-1 B o i j4) CL to *d 75 u 60 » 14 O rH 3 U) O a M-Oi o « 6B0 -pB . . y ̂“ HP By mt - 4. f i Cl OS ’Si J «

, B O f ■H j j *tJ (H 60- a>i—( 4> iH D B >1 4J & y ̂ w B1 <(-i P X 4-1 B B (1 B a W y j O O 9 ^ 5 «H ■ « <4-1 4BJ B p r-4 « y *4o-1 to y to 5 hy y I ] < p b 44 g M > | 3 B U o y ^ m y y 3 0*P iH S O g S fi y _ y & o O 4-1 41 0 b M y !>•H l>7X P 0 3 0 O -o Cd .JO O *> o p y -h o oO . f 4BJ O4) a 4(1)14 14 r--i B Qy - My t(1r tUs yCL (pXB C 0l) P3 •H 0 O -F- H*H M 4) CL Cl B O 4-t ■ M o o o o o n o o i n os 00 < /> -B i y bC» a -a fi 'O 5 3 c d i n d f l M O d d i ned td sO P 1 O d 9 l m to so O tft 00 eft O ' to m •H eft m > ■H eft o *H * P so *d t » P so P m p T J t n P sO ♦tJ CN a) o Q) eo p iH T3 o 0Jqj P p 0) a) u p 3 a) d d> a> p p at 0 d at 1-f n d Q) o >o P W B d a> iH o a> > -O o at > d - r P ’ O O 0) 33 P o 33 p O eft O p Ed 33 p o cd ^ 3 c CdD m m-io o o r̂ o*PH CO t3 a> p0JOPu■H ĈJ *H 'H r̂o cr̂r.. <>u CT> t0-"»\ > r-f pCf ^ Heft fetfJt u01 O cd a « y"\ ed C 0> cd r-^ r-i*H felfjt 1̂* 4J *h r - td r^to as S as C asd »-♦ O I- 1 M ^ H ^ -52- *

  • 13 d i0-i r-i tfd x1* u 0 a . 4i-d1 O-h Mo rt-jt iaj) ■mU 4-a1 <1) t f i wO nd s 4-J i<—UI -doffl I TS 6I 0-O0 GI d h (!) >1 <6D 0O0 dI a>h R to -jdj 2 i s C^ ag is? w O co H CO w * 8 a K So ggtj f t CO M X W 4{> ti P °* d , g« *^ 0 y) tjfo ̂ c 0) m &a. v* d X& 0 O 0 -oP u X OP Of U o o +-1 \0 10 tH 0 P ei w u $ V Q.0 o a 0a Od P O > P p o d P X « _ o tf p U d 0 •4 03 Ip ^ P *H d in B 3 0 j 3 H 4f ^o 0 0 CM «H 'G 2 s 0 td «H flj o P 0 ^ . •H p 01 4J 0 tp H o d sH P X d X 0 O ► O J " O D 0 £ £ m a O o O u 4J 0 cr 0 0 p ^ p p - rH e u a -5 pfl a X J3 0 P 0 0 o ^ p • 0 01 P O o fl} 0 0 0 01 ^ 03 d p <4H ^ 0 t 0j *rH o tf in X O ^ tG ^ ^ ^^ 5f t"W" tp H p rH O 03 o a 0 j-i ■H 0 iH O u ^ _,d Mh P P P • i •H -G P4 0 O tf X 0 o ° - 5 P 4-1 Ifl ’S X * > o> >> X «H o "2 ja i-i 0 x) 0 e o > 0 o- T o .Hp d3 ,c “ S dO -H H 0 ,c i-i d 0 0 o O CM H O 0 X *H p 0 P p O p tH u ^3 C>0 S f t Ml tf CM 0 w o CJ « P S«f 0 0 tf O d o a a <4-4 Mh cr1 0) p a d »+4 o f t -r-4 0 p d d ^ &* tf d P rH 0 § *i-t *H a) 0 0 £h tp ■o> Xd Xa X 0 X ^ tf tf h tdf co pC pCO ©CM Ct0) co s dom o ‘rl d tTj N 0 fO D U 00 d) w NW T3 *r| 0 ■H 1j *H P0) ^ -tH> 0) O VJD dO C0 * 0 d r - U0 a0 40H p p > p p pfi 00 m ro p od p0) > <>D rC-T* ON i n *h n -H % Os ^ Q>J ̂ !■-- >of a> > - -H ^ ^ tti ̂ Pi h d H H PH X S ifc tfp d tf 0 a ^ ClO ^ s- tf /-N 0 0 iH CO h r - 0 ptf d r - >■> h- ttC, c r--P 0 \ 0 p cr> p tf X tf X CO id ^ ' £ ^ Appendix B - KEY FEATURES OF STATE CIRCUIT-BREAKER PROPERTY TAX RELIEF PROGRAMS, April 1978 $800 maximum. Rent equivalent is 22%*§/ -53- ■M (9 0) Xp d > p 41 p O X) B y n p p p S ip CO 0 p 41 p o P 0 d d P •H *H o 41 in O r^ CO a) 01 0 )d 01 *H CO d Cl 60 P p P O p ♦r! P P 41 vO p i—fu n» 41 hQ 0 .5 a y 41 CO H rP d d ■H X d O 41 O p CO d > CO rC P P o 41 d P O to p a p o P 0) p CO

    o P o *H d d CO U o p CL 41 p Pp 41 CL d o m GO P rH 0 o S P j— 1 ■l—f P Cl d CL CL O' H p p CO o pp O o p p d p o 0 to Pu O > o d ip , d t P o X O d X I iO > o P rH p P d p & p Hlr> O Cl 1—1 a p 'H p o p •rl •rl d P p q ■rl n p . p 3 d 0 CO a m d d O ■H pCI p d d P S“n P 41o 41 41 *H X 4) > 01 c r 4H 41 O T3 B P p o U P & d §* s d ■l—1 60 »p 41 41 P o o P 41 XI d 0 P C0 o 41 p CL 41 § 41 41 ip p P (X ;3 tO <0 41 si p O p d p 41CO P o GO p o o O a a O 60 > 41 41 'H p p x P 0 cO X

    Cl p o y o d p i—f d 41 CL O ■H CO rH o o CM d d CL u p VO o d o 0 d d CO O 0 ) 41 s p 60 P ip > *! 0 CO o p a s p d p X i-H - CO 41 d C0 rH P p sd ,o c3 Q 0) P p CM 0 ) o 4) 4) H S3P d P P CL d o p rH 41 P 41 d d 'H p P 0a d a Jd td a P CO >> o d r-^ d d X d p O p d to p o 60 rd X l X o diH 0) H o d P p ■— H 01 d 0> p OJ P o o otp o o d d d Pc 41 0 41u d rH a CO p u cr1 P o rH rH P 4) X? T d p *H o to O rHd d d i i d d 41 o\ o d P CO C0 41 41 dP 41 d p & CO o P CO O d 'H 01 4)> o aj 5 01 o > § 41 CO CO 41ch a> i P 41 4J 41 p o O 41 © E>*rA U »p o *H p Cl o *p d CL ■H XJ 01 0) & *i-f P *rf & ci gj P .41 01 X p p p x p p d iH O o o d 41 p O TJ Cl o Cl P a a P P P a 41 > . o a p CM P o CO t r cO 0) 0k o CO 0) 41 P en XT* P 0 p Xp 41 p 41 41 Cl 41 o > d d p Xp CL tp £ p P* o> ai H d CL a 0 41 o 41 rH P Cl u O PL a CL O & o 41 > 3o5 w t-H fi cn d X P o Ed P o f-i < (9 v - , d r^ co Ip do od X o 'H Cl P CO 0J 41 Cl P cn n rc~̂o -i>-l ir-̂n P O Xf >41 d 1 cn —i D9 (—31I 03 '[d9 rr~-. Htfl cht-\ S 50=) . - i Appendix B - KEY FEATURES OF STATE CIRCUIT"BREAKER PROPERTY TAX RELIEF PROGRAMS, April 1978 F ro m b a s e d t a x e s f o r t r s 6 5 u n d e r b u t -54- u s M V £ g Pe oO d (D CO 0 4>0) ■H iH d CO y i n u i-4 d y O y d ̂ m <5 y P a) 3 CO O o o'd o - yct3 V£i vd-f 41 tyH Uo-i X3 41 M c r 4) yCu «D X o p CM e d X ■Cfl- p 5 > K o o O 4) yO X V p C0 f-r o*H n) to g P m CO M P§ 0) 5g S ■nH Vol -t 01 CO S 44 a) 44 g p P icb O Ue r«d -CO yCO oo kl o W u P u s p i O o S o y 4-1 u p P O X>W 4c-t TcJ O 0e) T3 d p J d ft cds •H pg a) QJ 0 CO> o fP cd Vr d a) O a>JJ o 3 y *P 44 B o o CO d 4-1 ♦H CO n j CT* 44 X P O O CO ♦3 o cn T3 o £ > > ■r-f d O 4J 'H i d . P (U y d d ■H- d JJ y CO o CO 3 OJ J-i o o M OJ 44 CO O y y a CO •a o a V> y y «H o CD e CD CO P d rH OJ 4) o 0) 0) S 3 J-l o a o i n H ° O *H 01 o *3 p (0 O a) CO 0 P *3 O o y T— f y P d 0 d 0 CO 3 -d" 3 CO v a) 4) 3 CO Vt d a) X O H a 0 ph cd Td <0- j j cd m j s Vi -3 C4 •H P i 41 d *H -d y o o o o e o o o o o o o o 0 o d oo CO M -crt- ■CO- T3 d y p T3 y p 41 P cd CO bQ o 3> d 00 0 60 o y d CO p p 0 P CO y t n ’H n CO y CO y *H 44 cd p > T j n p > P > P o *H y o T J o> y 0 no CM y o nd p y d y CO P ^ y vO y r-N ■H P •H ? ’•d iH P o H < t T3 r 4 a> p y 44 o d i d 4) T J o d id o d pd i n y ^ y y cd cd p p y y cd cd Cr\ y d Cd -4 CO & d d CO d y . h B co CM d (0 » CD 3 y o m *i4 y > i d 0 m ♦rl CO o i n p d 4=1 cd pc5 O cd id Td K vfi - a ^ in cn *■3 * ay t- \f *•3« r~l co .* VCO -a (LI f t >1-1 id ->rt mh- s 4-1 O > i—I >*r f Cr̂M. in r̂ ' Qcd -tdd Py ^ CyrS a> 0> ̂ pfcl3i Md CH\ t(T-\f C0| cd o P cBd Q) id r̂* o ̂r̂ P P cd P a ; i‘ 0Hd O cd r̂ P O w-h i ^i-f a-\ CO O ̂ Appendix B - KEY FEATURES OF STATE CIRCUIT-BREAKER PROPERTY TAX RELIEF PROGRAMS, April 1978 d u e -55- p P (0 1 01 I P * s P 1 j d 1 OJ I GO 4H GO O p a 1 CO iH p P

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D di i—1 a CO o 0) d f-H i—i d CM o d ^ <33 ea w S3 V d ^ < d w cn H**IMo 3 1—1 *» cr\ a) a; C0 CO »A QJ *H H CM *h ^ r-* v \0 > r-> h ' vo r-- r-* CCS o> a) CT'i ov ̂ f0ti) H0*1 o>Q ^ i— i H d co d 0) o j-j cuor>-d ■u w Appendix B - KEY FEATURES OF STATE CIRCUIT-SHEAKER PROPERTY TAX RELIEF PROGRAMS, April 1978 -57- Footnotes for Appendix B - Key Features of State Circuit-Breaker Property Tax Relief Programs, April 1978. 1/ The number of beneficiaries and cost data are for the fiscal years shown in parenthesis. 2/ Relief currently takes the form of cash refunds as those having an ~ income tax liability fail to qualify for property tax rebate. 3/ Homeowners in Connecticut now have the option of circuit~breaker relief or a property tax freeze. Both programs reduce tax bill* 4/ The program was expanded by 1977 legislation to include all home­ owners. The fiscal year 1979 cost has been estimated at approximately $60 million. 5/ In 1974 Michigan extended circuit-breaker coverage to farmers as well as owners of residential property. Farmers must agree to restrict land use to obtain relief, however. 6/ The maximum credits are increased by $200 for the elderly and “ disabled. All credits shall be reduced by any state paid homestead credits provided under Section 273.13(6) and (7). (Maximum credit $675 less the homestead credit). 7/ Claimants may not own Nevada realty, other than their own home, assessed at over 30,000. 8/ North Dakota has a separate program which lowers the assessed value of low-income elderly homeowners by as much as $3,000. 9/ In determining a person's income for eligibility, the amount of medical expenses incurred and not compensated for shall be deducted. 10/ Low-income senior citizens (age 58 and over with income under $5,000) are provided optional rental assistance. 11/ The number of beneficiaries, average benefits, and cost data are for property or sales tax refunds to the elderly or disabled. Age and income requirements are the same for both programs. Applicants can receive either a property or a sales tax refund. The Department of Revenue processes the claims for both programs and refunds whichever is to the applicants advantage. Separate data by program is not available. 12/ For purposes of calculating the credits, household income is reduced by $600 if the claimant, spouse or any dependent of the claimant is 65 years of age or older. Source: Shannon and Tippett, (1978), op. cit., p. 10. -58- References Aaron, Henry J. Who Pays the Property Tax? A New View. Washington, D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1975. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Financing Schools and Property Tax Relief— A State Responsibility. Washington, D.C. : January 1973. . Property Tax Circuit-Breakers: Current Status and Policy Issues. Washington, D.C.: February 1975. Bendick, Marc, Jr. "Designing Circuit-Breaker Property Relief," National Tax Journal, Vol, XXVII, No. 1 (March 1974). Black, David E. "Property Tax Incidence: The Excise-Tax Effect and Assessment Practices," National Tax Journal, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (December 1977). Carey, Hugh L. Educational Finance and the New York State Real Property Tax— The Inescapable Relationship, Education Study Unit, New York State Division of the Budget. Albany: May 1976. Gaffney, Mason. "The Property Tax is a Progressive Tax," Proceedings of the 64th Annual Conference on Taxation, National Tax Association, 1971. . "An Agenda for Strengthening the Property Tax," in Property Tax Reform, George E. Peterson (ed,). Washington, D.C.: The John C. Lincoln Institute and the Urban Institute, 1973. Gold, Steven. "A Note on the Design of Property Tax Circuit-Breakers," National Tax Journal, Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (December 1976). Mason, Bert and Edward Lutz. Real Property Tax Assessments in New York: A Primer. New York State College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Information Bulletin 130 (October 1977). Mieszkowski, Peter. "The Property Tax: An Excise Tax or a Profits Tax?, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 80, No. 1 (April 1972). Netzer, Dick. Economics of the Property Tax. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966. "The Incidence of the Property Tax Revisited," National Tax Journal, Vol. XXXI, No. 4 (December 1976). New York State. Agriculture and Markets Law § 305. _____. Tax Law § 612. New York State, Temporary State Commission on State and Local Finances. The Real Property Tax (vol. 2), Albany: 1975, -59- The New York Times. June 28, 1978. Palmer, John L. and Joseph J. Minerik. "Income Security Policy," in Setting National Budget Priorities: The Next Ten Years, Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze (ed~s~.Tr Washington, D~cTf~ The Brookings Institution, 1976. Peterson, George. "The Regressivity of the Residential Property Tax," Urban Institute Working Paper 1207-10, November 1972. Shannon, John. "The Property Tax: Reform or Relief?" in Property Tax Reform, George E. Peterson (ed.), Washington, D.C.: The John C. Lincoln Institue and the Urban Institute, 1973. and Frank Tippett. "An Analysis of State Personal Income Tax and Property Tax Circuit-Breakers," unpublished paper presented at the 46th Annual Meeting of the National Association of Tax Adminis­ trators. (Boston: June 1978).