Mercy’s Motives: Asylum Granting in The UK and Jordan By Jordan Richards Introduction In January of 2011, Syrian protestors took to the streets. Like Tunisian and Egyptian citizens before them, they sought the rectification of inequalities in wealth and autonomy among different socioeconomic classes. But, their goals remained unmet. Instead, the ruling regime responded with heavy force, launching attacks on protesting neighborhoods with the aid of military equipment. Such places were also cut off from utilities and communications, effectively blockading the citizens.[i] Despite being of the minority Alawite Islamic affiliation, the royal family and security forces were merciless against those who adhered to the Sunni school of Islam.[ii] The Syrian government ignored the pleas of Sunni citizens, who’d been most impacted by droughts and lack of political and economic reform, and overlooked the promises they’d made when the current ruler, President Bashar al-Assad, first ascended to his position.[iii] Between the mounting frustrations of the majority population and the intense military action of the Syrian government, the development of this conflict into civil war escalated quickly. More than 6.3 million Syrians fled between 2011 and 2017.[iv][v] 92% of those refugees settled in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, none of which assume a large role in the global political or economic sphere, regional power notwithstanding.[vi][vii][viii] It is interesting, then, to observe how various countries have handled the resulting Syrian refugee crisis and to what extent their regime stability is threatened by such involvement. While some nations have, by necessity, taken a direct role in countering the Syrian refugee crisis, others have remained distant. Countries with a greater ability to reserve judgment against refugees and to limit the number of individuals they allow within their borders must hold some greater measure of political and economic power. What is unclear, however, is what factor has most contributed to this difference in reaction to the Syrian crisis. Could it be because of differences in geographic location which determine a nation's actual distance from the issue? The expectation of negative impact on the citizens of each respective country as a means of justifying self-gratifying decisions? Or a simple matter of variance in administrative processes? The respective responses of Jordan and the United Kingdom (UK) might be used to elucidate the issue. While Jordan is a middle income nation located on the southern border of Syria, the United Kingdom is an economic powerhouse that exists an entire continent away from the crisis at hand. Both operate under the rule of a hereditary monarchy where a parliament makes most of its policies. However, the UK is a common law country, meaning that it works on a case-by-case basis, a mode of operation that the Jordanian government does not follow.[ix] Beyond this difference in government strategy, the relative size, proximity to the crisis, and expectations regarding the influence of Syrian refugees of the United Kingdom and Jordan are sure to guide the decision-making process of each nation. Thus, it is essential to determine the extent to which each structural factor has informed the decisions of the respective countries and, furthermore, how competing interests and exercises of power of each country have influenced the other. Conflict of Interests: The Incentivization of Asylum Granting Prior to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the relationship between the citizens of Jordan and Syria was amicable. The countries enjoyed an open border agreement that allowed citizens of both countries to travel between countries without a passport.[x] Unfortunately, this policy is now a point of contention. In 2014, a number of infiltrations by militia and refugees alike were reported from the Syrian and Iraqi fronts.[xi][xii] Syrian militia members sought to target anti-regime refugees who had fled across the border. Still, Jordan did not move to restrict individuals from entering the country.[xiii] Jordanian citizens were divided between fear for their own safety and for that of their relatives from the neighboring nation as the border was swarmed. By allowing Syrian refugees access to the open border, national healthcare, and the education systems, Jordan wished to appeal to the sympathies of the global public in order to gain approval and, in turn, international aid.[xiv] Though the influx of refugees has contributed to internal political unrest and resource depletion, these policies and the show of humanitarian inclination that they represent have served as a source of leverage in international dealings. For instance, they have allowed Jordan to take an active role in the UN-HCR’s Regional Response Plan (RRP) as a show of growing faith in Jordan’s capacity for decision-making.[xv] However, these policies also force the Jordanian government to continually pander to the expectations of the donors as Jordan becomes more reliant on the financial assistance of others to bolster their exponentially growing population. The long-established nature of the UK’s reputation means that it can exert greater discretion over when and how it gets involved in current issues. Other nations and concerned citizens expect that the United Kingdom will provide some semblance of aid. But, in the event that they limit that aid, the media is more likely to justify these actions as having some humanitarian reason behind them, such as concern for its own citizens.[xvi] Furthermore, the geographic distance between the UK and Syria allows the nation another degree of separation that Jordan does not have. By contrast, because of its shared border with Syria, Jordan faces a much more imminent threat to its borders, infrastructure, and sociopolitical integrity due to the refugee crisis.[xvii] From the Jordanian perspective, they must improve their reputation to relieve the effect of such growing issues. This course has led to Jordan being consistently pressed to do more to account for other countries’ lack of action. While the UK enjoys the benefits of being regarded as a cultural and economic powerhouse, Jordan is a middle income country whose economic reach is limited. Even before the Syrian civil war, Jordan did not have enough assets to barter against the massive reserves of the United Kingdom. Now, due to mass influxes of refugees pouring from Syria and the disruption of Syrian-Jordan trade routes, Jordan has experienced increased competition for resources in tandem with rising prices of necessary goods and services. For example, rent prices have skyrocketed due to the rise of consumer demand and market competition in conjunction with declining resource availability and sound infrastructure.[xviii][xix][xx] As of 2014, 46% of the available housing units in urban Jordanian neighborhoods lacked heating and 40% were deemed unsanitary.[xxi] Because of the underwhelming state of economic affairs in Jordan, the Jordanian government would never have been able to enter an agreement to receive financial assistance from the UK or the US, the two largest donors toward alleviating the Syrian crisis, without cultivating a reputation for humanitarian action, demonstrating severe need, and offering some other, non-economic incentive. Though major donor states have disproportionate influence on the allocation of humanitarian funding, Jordan is not powerless in the negotiations of this particular circumstance. As the Syrian crisis progressed, Jordan strategically adapted its refugee policies in an attempt to attract further aid, proposing the terms for what later became the Jordan Compact of 2016. Before this agreement, only 60 percent of Jordan’s total financial need was met by humanitarian aid.[xxii] This aid was then used to alleviate the burden created by accelerated population growth on domestic infrastructure. However, Jordan and the European Union struck a deal in late 2016, which included $926 billion in macro financial assistance loans and trade concessions.[xxiii] In exchange, Jordan granted Syrian refugees work permits in sectors such as agriculture, construction, food, and manufacturing.[xxiv] The Jordanian government previously held that they were strictly opposed to allowing Syrian refugees the right to work. That they conceded on this issue which had, prior to 2016, caused the end of several meetings, hints at the core of Jordan’s rent-seeking strategy and the desires of the global market.[xxv] By doing so, Jordan was able to receive enough money to cover their necessary expenses and more. Budgeting documents following the receival of aid in 2016 reveal that a significant portion of the proceeds went into funding sectors of the economy that were not directly affected by the refugee influx, reflecting an over exaggeration of situational need in order to garner greater benefit. That is not to say that this rent-seeking strategy is without risks; the Jordanian Compact also represents the ways in which Jordan exists under the metaphorical thumb of the United Kingdom. It creates and exacerbates Jordanian reliance on international approval of domestic policies in order to garner aid and further encourages Jordan to continually allow the entrance of more refugees whilst simultaneously undoing structural decay. It places Jordan in a rapid cycle of perpetual construction and destruction. In contrast to the impacts of an influx of refugees on Jordan, larger countries like the United Kingdom might actually benefit from the increased immigration. These nations don’t have to worry about the depletion of resources and, thus, the increased market competition for goods, services, and employment would be negligible.[xxvi][xxvii] Moreover, they are more able to leverage the skills of incoming workers by fully integrating them into the workforce.[xxviii] As a characteristic of the United Kingdom and other nations which have long been a destination for mass immigration, the demographic is much larger and more diverse than that of Jordan and is thus less likely to experience statistically significant political shifts as a result of the influx of refugees. The United Kingdom is not at risk of political instability in the same way that Jordan is. Given the nature of the deal, having allotted Syrian refugees with a clearer path toward a sense of permanence within the Jordanian populace, the United Kingdom had to have valued the maintenance of separation from the refugee crisis over the cost of the financial aid and any economic benefit it might have received from additional individuals within the UK workforce. According to, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” a piece by Nicole Ostrand, “this could be due to its current policy objectives. The British government, under the leadership of Prime Minister David Cameron, has vowed to reduce net migration numbers, and resettling a large number of Syrians could be perceived as contradictory to this goal.”[xxix] Power Pays and Power Plays In politics and popularity, power determines all. As a result of the influx of Syrian refugees, both the UK and Jordan have enacted novel policy shifts. However, the distinction between the two approaches lies in the nature of the protocols themselves. The UK decided to establish systems to aid in both the appeasement of UK citizens and the deterrence of border pressure. By contrast, Jordan was compelled to abstain from such conventions or was further coerced to revise its independently set standards in potentially harmful ways. There are three pertinent examples of these phenomena: the 1951 Convention on Refugees, the Jordan Compact, and the Refugee Status Determination system (RSD). The UK chose to implement the definition of a refugee as coined by the 1951 Refugee Convention, which includes any individual who cannot return to their country of origin for fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, or sociopolitical identity.[xxx][xxxi] In contrast to Jordan, which had taken in 1.3 million Syrian refugees by 2015, the UK had only granted asylum to 3,600 Syrian refugees by the end of 2014 despite recognizing 85% of asylum seekers from Syria as being refugees by Convention’s definition.[xxxii][xxxiii][xxxiv] As the Syrian crisis continued, it became more apparent that this legal definition was not an option for Jordan. Due to increasing border pressure, a rapidly shifting demographic, and international praise of its open border policy, it became a near impossibility for Jordan to distinguish between refugees, temporary protectees, and hostile individuals without causing undue burden on the already tense political atmosphere.[xxxv][xxxvi] Increasing tensions between Jordanian communities and within the Middle East meant a greater amount of migratory movement toward surrounding countries.[xxxvii] Without screening systems already in place, Jordan was left to contend with a mass influx of people seeking to enter the country. Much of the reserve of resources have been utilized to support infrastructure in which to hold newcomers already present rather than to bar those still coming in. The abrupt change in demographic also meant that the government had to contend with the influence of foreign groups on politics and policy. By 2015, roughly 20% of Jordan’s population was made up of Syrian refugees.[xxxviii] Despite not having any tangible voting power, political influence of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan would only grow with the expansion of refugee networks, integration into the workforce, and the existence of pre-existing familial ties between Syria and Jordan.[xxxix] The comparatively smaller population of Jordan compared to the UK, the nation’s already failing infrastructure, and perceived or actual oppression against Syrian refugees might serve to create an environment eerily similar to Syria just before the outbreak of the civil war. Moreover, while the 84% of Syrian refugees who have settled in urban areas have the greatest economic impact on a state, those in the two established camps have greater potential to stir political unrest. [xl] The current crisis resembles what happened in the 1960s regarding Palestinian refuge camps, which eventually fell outside Jordanian control and became micro militias that eventually clashed against the Jordanian government directly.[xli] This phenomena may be worsened by the fact that, of those who currently live in refugee camps under Jordanian control, two-thirds lived below the absolute poverty line in 2014..[xlii] Comparatively, the UK is able to operate on a case by case basis with refugees. They have access to an extensive database regarding the status of major countries from which most refugees originate.[xliii] Moreover, as enumerated by Anastasia Denisova’s work, “A Case Study of the UK and Russia’s Approaches to Syrian Refugees,” the UK has implemented a screening process called Refugee Status Determination wherein incomers must undergo security checks and a casework interview which focuses on the individuals “experience of persecution and the fear of going back to the country of origin.”[xliv] The process for obtaining refugee status in the UK is roughly six months long. As such, it conveys a degree of selectivity that Jordan cannot afford. The European approach to the Syrian crisis was predominantly concerned with containing the crisis within the Middle East; in this, the UK is no exception, having helped establish over a dozen refugee camps in Jordan since 1948.[xlv] Academics and citizens alike expressed concern that the UK, among other Westernized countries, was not doing enough to alleviate the crisis.[xlvi][xlvii] Beyond the necessity of easing the burden of smaller countries like Jordan, the abundance of resources within the nation and the existing infrastructure allows the UK to easily support a greater influx of refugees and may even benefit from doing so. For larger countries with stable pre-existing systems of screening and integration, and which are positioned away from the epicenter of the immediate crisis, benefits to taking in refugees may include the diversification of skilled labor, increases in wages of born citizens, and private industry booms.[xlviii] Conclusion Though positive reputation and the supplementation of resources are important factors in both the United Kingdom’s and Jordan’s decision-making process, only the UK experiences the full benefit and control over the allocation of such holdings and is able to make decisions that directly align with its goals, namely maintaining separation from the refugee crisis. Conversely, the Jordanian government has only been able to achieve its goals by adhering to the desires of wealthier nations. They have managed to subsist off of the allocated aid of other nations and barter for more resources by appealing to the severity of their situation, but are still expending its resources faster than they can rebuild them. The current situation is not conducive to real growth for the Jordanian nation. In the short-term, despite the fact that the United Kingdom has spent more money on refugee settlement, it has incurred fewer costs and seen greater benefits from taking in Syrian refugees than Jordan. Moreover, it has been able to act in a manner that is more closely aligned with its self-determined goals. Geographic location plays a role in the nations’ capacity to distance themselves from the crisis. However, differences in this ability are more aptly attributed to disparities in the stability and economic influence of the UK and Jordan, which are further highlighted by indirectly competing interests. Overall, these differences have resulted in a discrepancy in the extent to which each nation can redirect threats of political and economic instability that have occurred as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis. Illustration by Nicolas Hernandez-Torre [i] “Syrian Civil War: Syrian History,” Britannica, last modified July 17, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War/additional-info#history [ii] “Syrian Civil War: Syrian History,” Britannica, last modified July 17, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War/additional-info#history [iii] “Syrian Civil War: Syrian History,” Britannica, last modified July 17, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War/additional-info#history [iv] Belal Fellah, Caroline Krafft, Jackline Wahba, “The Impact of Employment and Wages in Jordan.” Journal of Development Economics, 139. (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387818310344?via%3Dihub [v] Nicole Ostrand, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” Journal on Migration & Human Society 3, no. 3 2015, https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=110364815&db=sxi [vi] Belal Fellah, Caroline Krafft, Jackline Wahba, “The Impact of Employment and Wages in Jordan.” Journal of Development Economics, 139. (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387818310344?via%3Dihub [vii] Nicole Ostrand, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” Journal on Migration & Human Society 3, no. 3 2015, https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=110364815&db=sxi [viii] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [ix] Anastasia Denisova, “A Case Study of the UK and Russia’s Approaches to Syrian Refugees,” International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 3 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2017.1396666 [x] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xi] Luigi Achilli, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Reality Check,” Migration Policy Centre (2015), https://doi.org/10.2870/821248 [xii] Wa’ed Alshoubaki, Michael Harris, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of International Studies 1, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2018/11-2/11 [xiii] Wa’ed Alshoubaki, Michael Harris, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of International Studies 1, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2018/11-2/11 [xiv] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xv] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xvi] Muhammad Najam-ud-din Farani, Iram Khalid, Muhammad Rizwan Abbassi, “United Kingdom’s Foreign Policy Towards Syrian Refugees,” Journal of Political Studies 24, no. 1 (2017), https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=6&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=124589848&db=25h [xvii] Wa’ed Alshoubaki, Michael Harris, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of International Studies 1, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2018/11-2/11 [xviii] Luigi Achilli, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Reality Check,” Migration Policy Centre (2015), https://doi.org/10.2870/821248 [xix] Nicole Ostrand, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” Journal on Migration & Human Society 3, no. 3 2015, https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=110364815&db=sxi [xx] Wa’ed Alshoubaki, Michael Harris, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of International Studies 1, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2018/11-2/11 [xxi] Nicole Ostrand, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” Journal on Migration & Human Society 3, no. 3 2015, https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=110364815&db=sxi [xxii] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xxiii] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xxiv] Belal Fellah, Caroline Krafft, Jackline Wahba, “The Impact of Employment and Wages in Jordan.” Journal of Development Economics, 139. (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387818310344?via%3Dihub [xxv] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xxvi] Wa’ed Alshoubaki, Michael Harris, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of International Studies 1, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2018/11-2/11 [xxvii] Jean-Francois Maystadt, Philip Verwimp, “Winners and Losers Among a Refugee-Hosting Population,” Economic Development & Cultural Change 62, no. 4, https://doi.org/10.1086/676458 [xxviii] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xxix] Nicole Ostrand, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” Journal on Migration & Human Society 3, no. 3 2015, https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=110364815&db=sxi [xxx] Muhammad Najam-ud-din Farani, Iram Khalid, Muhammad Rizwan Abbassi, “United Kingdom’s Foreign Policy Towards Syrian Refugees,” Journal of Political Studies 24, no. 1 (2017), https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=6&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=124589848&db=25h [xxxi] Anastasia Denisova, “A Case Study of the UK and Russia’s Approaches to Syrian Refugees,” International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 3 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2017.1396666 [xxxii] The Impact of Employment and Wages in Jordan.” Journal of Development Economics, 139. (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387818310344?via%3Dihub [xxxiii] Anastasia Denisova, “A Case Study of the UK and Russia’s Approaches to Syrian Refugees,” International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 3 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2017.1396666 [xxxiv] Nicole Ostrand, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” Journal on Migration & Human Society 3, no. 3 2015, https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=110364815&db=sxi [xxxv] Luigi Achilli, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Reality Check,” Migration Policy Centre (2015), https://doi.org/10.2870/821248 [xxxvi] Wa’ed Alshoubaki, Michael Harris, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of International Studies 1, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2018/11-2/11 [xxxvii] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xxxviii] The Impact of Employment and Wages in Jordan.” Journal of Development Economics, 139. (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387818310344?via%3Dihub [xxxix] Wa’ed Alshoubaki, Michael Harris, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of International Studies 1, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2018/11-2/11 [xl] Nicole Ostrand, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” Journal on Migration & Human Society 3, no. 3 2015, https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=110364815&db=sxi [xli] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xlii] Nicole Ostrand, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” Journal on Migration & Human Society 3, no. 3 2015, https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=110364815&db=sxi [xliii] Anastasia Denisova, “A Case Study of the UK and Russia’s Approaches to Syrian Refugees,” International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 3 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2017.1396666 [xliv] Anastasia Denisova, “A Case Study of the UK and Russia’s Approaches to Syrian Refugees,” International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 3 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2017.1396666 [xlv] Luigi Achilli, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Reality Check,” Migration Policy Centre (2015), https://doi.org/10.2870/821248 [xlvi] Nicole Ostrand, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” Journal on Migration & Human Society 3, no. 3 2015, https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=69bd7768-a159-4a78-a053-2e8f71247d0c%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=110364815&db=sxi [xlvii] Victoria Kelberer, “Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12313 [xlviii] Jean-Francois Maystadt, Philip Verwimp, “Winners and Losers Among a Refugee-Hosting Population,” Economic Development & Cultural Change 62, no. 4, https://doi.org/10.1086/676458 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.