

HISTORY WORKERS AND LOCAL HISTORY  
IN COMMUNIST CHINA

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School  
of Cornell University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

By

Ji Hyun Han

May 2023

© 2023 Ji Hyun Han

# HISTORY WORKERS AND LOCAL HISTORY IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Ji Hyun Han, Ph. D.

Cornell University 2023

This dissertation shows how Chinese historians carved out a niche for their academic and professional lives by writing local history in the People's Republic of China. In the 1950s, historians experienced changes in the academic language they were expected to use, in the institutionally collectivized workplace, and in the relatively marginalized social status of their field in the all-out drive for industrialization. This dissertation argues that ordinary historians, re-identifying themselves as history workers in the seemingly inescapable Marxist academic regime, initiated research on local history in response to the changes that were overtaking them. History workers reactivated local gazetteer projects, organized field investigations in local villages, mines, factories, and communes, and wrote the local colonial past in congruence with the language of Marxist historiography. Local history provided historians with a legitimate and safe field for their intellectual pursuits using untapped materials. The lack of a political

imperative of the writing of local history rather allowed considerable latitude that local historians could use. They explored the space left open by this leeway within the otherwise restrictive structure to make their professional lives meaningful, adapting to the regime's exclusive academic language and collectivized academia. This dissertation advances scholarship on intellectuals and the persistence of authoritarianism in China by revealing that, as much as authoritarian power shaped intellectual life, local historians' intellectual pursuits in turn unintentionally contributed to forging the authoritarian structure in China.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Ji Hyun Han, also known as Jihyun Han, was born and raised in Seoul, Republic of Korea. She received B.A. in 2012 and M.A. in 2015 in Asian History at Seoul National University. She was awarded a Ph.D. in the Department of History at Cornell University in 2023.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It would be impossible to fully satisfy the intellectual and emotional debts I owe in a single acknowledgments page. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all the teachers in my life—academic and personal—who have guided me in person and via books and papers.

My advisors Professor TJ Hinrichs and Professor Victor Seow have been intellectually insightful to me and emotionally supportive throughout my studies at Cornell. They spared no advice or help whenever I needed it. I sincerely appreciate their perceptive and passionate support. Professor Matthew Evangelista has been my role model with his rigorous and insightful scholarship as well as the thoughtful care he extends to his students. Professor Magnus Fiskesjö's devoted attention to minorities in China has inspired my consideration of the role of intellectuals. My dissertation could never have been completed without my committee members' encouragement, support, and inspiration. I also appreciate the administrative and financial support I received from the Department of History, which was indispensable for the completion of my PhD program at Cornell.

My academic bedrock was laid by my teachers and seonbaes at Seoul National University. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Kim

Hyoung-chong and Professor Koo Bumjin, who have tended to my academic and personal growth even since I left for Ithaca.

I would like to thank my writing buddies, colleagues, friends, and family in Ithaca, Detroit, Seattle, and Seoul. Their love and trust have nurtured me throughout this journey. Students I taught in past years helped me become a better teacher semester by semester. The late Master Hye bong as well as my Dharma friends have guided me and helped me become a more generous, compassionate, and wise person to myself as well as to others. I could not have completed the dissertation without staying mindful at every possible moment.

This dissertation is about historians; that is, it has been a journey in search of myself. Completing the dissertation has not brought the search to an end but has led to new questions, which I look forward to exploring in the next stages of my life.

This is my first accomplishment since I lost my dearest Dad, Han Kyungsoo, who had proudly witnessed all my steps from the very first moment of my life. I know, in my deepest heart, that he's happy for me.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction / 1

Chapter 1 The Birth of History Workers: History as Service, Science, and Profession / 23

“To serve the people”

Antithesis to “old” historical views and methods

From history to historical science

From historian to history worker

Chapter 2 Marginalized under Industrialism: Higher Education Reform, Twelve-Year Plan, and the Humanities and Social Sciences / 64

Centripetal forces in the early PRC

Higher education reform and the fate of the humanities

1956: Noticing the margin

The twelve-year plan for philosophy and social sciences

Chapter 3 Reactivating Local Gazetteer Projects / 98

Proposals and appeals

A decentralized national project

Local academia in the making

Chapter 4 Local Field Investigations for Historical Science / 123

History and education under Great Leap Forward

Field investigations

Historical material for scientific history

Discovering localness for scientific history

Chapter 5 The Writing of the Local Colonial Past / 161

Chinese Communists in action

Who was, or is, the enemy?

Colonial life obscured

Conclusion / 193

Bibliography / 199

Appendix / 228

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Number of higher education institutions and student registration in 1949 and 1953

Table 2 Enrollment by field as percentage, 1928-1958

Table 3 Graduates by field as number and percentage, 1948-1958

## INTRODUCTION

This dissertation explores how historians carved out a niche for their professional lives in the newly established Marxist academic regime of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In the 1950s, historians faced two changes that significantly influenced their academic lives—the reconfiguration of the field in Marxist and scientific terms, and the marginalization of the field in the all-out drive for industrialization. I argue that historians, re-identifying themselves as history workers in the seemingly inescapable Marxist academic regime, initiated research on local history, enabling them to claim a role in realizing the regime's nation-building and revolutionary goals. They reactivated local gazetteer projects, organized field investigations in local villages, mines, factories, and communes, and wrote the local colonial past in congruence with the master narrative of the Chinese Revolution in the language of Marxist historiography. Historians' writing of local history not only constituted their professional lives but also signified an intellectual pursuit that contributed to the persistence of authoritarianism in China.

As used in this dissertation, and as commonly used in scholarship on Chinese history and literature, "local" refers to regional administrative units, such as provinces, prefectures, counties, cities, and villages, below the level

of the nation or dynastic realm. “Local history” refers to writing about those regional units, by people living and writing in the locale in question.

Practitioners of local history necessarily navigated rapidly evolving, ambiguous, and overlapping structures of central and regional authority; as such, their work illuminates the dynamics of center-locale power relations.

Local history has its roots in the genre of the local gazetteer (*difangzhi*; *fangzhi*), which flourished in premodern China as a record of geographical information about a particular region, published by the local government in cooperation with local intellectuals. Such a cumulative collection of local knowledge was useful to local officials, local society, and the central government. For local officials, by statute not native to the jurisdictions they were assigned to govern, local gazetteers provided guides to the local landscape, customs, crops, and native flora and fauna. For the local literati who wrote them, and for the prominent local families featured in them, local gazetteers were a means of confirming and enhancing stature and reputation. The central government, in turn, exercised its political and discursive authority over the local regions.<sup>1</sup> Local gazetteer production mediated central-local and state-society relations. Local gazetteers’ social and

---

<sup>1</sup> Joseph Dennis, “Introduction,” *Writing, Publishing, and Reading Local Gazetteers in Imperial China, 1100–1700* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), 1–13.

historiographical position in relation to dynasties continued into modern times in the form of local history, when dynastic histories yielded their central authority to the nationalist narrative of history. In exploring the social and historiographical role of local history in Communist China, I contend that local history became ordinary historians' workplace as well as an academic discipline.

My research interests revolve around three intellectual conversations. The first involves intellectuals and the sustainability of the authoritarian regime. This dissertation responds to recent studies that explore how and why intellectual pursuits, instead of undermining the PRC's authoritarian regime, contributed to its persistence. Second, my research connects the question of objectivity in historical studies to the scientism that has prevailed in modern China. Finally, this study advances scholarship on central–local relations in China by revealing the mutually constitutive relationship between central and local academic practices.

### *Intellectuals and authoritarianism*

Intellectuals, since its inception during the Dreyfus Affair, has revolved around the question of allegiance. As Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens categorize the studies of intellectuals in three approaches—class-in-themselves, class-bound, and class-less, intellectuals' ambiguous position in

the socio-political field has been the central question of research. Scholars have examined under what conditions intellectuals become radicalized or conservatized or apathetic to politics.<sup>2</sup> Intellectuals under the Chinese Communist regime has not been an exception to this century-long question of allegiance. Merle Goldman's early model of "Russian refuseniks with Chinese characteristics,"<sup>3</sup> as Timothy Cheek observes, provided convincing stories in the Cold War context with its binary framework pitting intellectual dissidents against the oppressive Communist regime.<sup>4</sup> However, China's Opening and Reform, the ensuing marketization and globalization, the end of the Cold War, and, especially, the Tiananmen Incident have changed the picture. The old model could not explain the rapidly changing intellectual landscape of the Opening and Reform era, but rather revealed the desperate hope of many for democratization that ended in breakdown in the Tiananmen Square. Since the 1990s, scholarship on Chinese intellectuals has broadened its perspectives and approaches. Intellectuals' changing relationships to the post-opening-and-reform Communist regime and to the

---

<sup>2</sup> Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens, "The Sociology of Intellectuals," *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (2002): 63-90; Gil Eyal and Larissa Buchholz, "From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions," *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (2010): 117-37.

<sup>3</sup> Timothy Cheek, *The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 21–22.

<sup>4</sup> The most influential publications are: Merle Goldman, *Literary Dissent in Communist China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); and Merle Goldman, *China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

marketizing and globalizing of academia has formed a substantial field of research for political scientists and sociologists.<sup>5</sup> Historians have turned their attention to the first half of the twentieth century, when the Chinese intellectual in Westernized and modern form was in the making.<sup>6</sup>

Despite these broadened perspectives, however, what persists is the dichotomy between intellectuals and the regime. Even though Goldman's presumed opposition between "good" intellectuals and a "bad" regime no longer prevails, the binary framework pitting individuals against the system has continued to hold sway in studies of intellectuals in China. This Enlightenment model following the long philosophical dominance of the West presupposes the existence of a class of intellectuals who think and act

---

<sup>5</sup> To name only a few: Edward Gu and Merle Goldman eds., *Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004); Zhidong Hao, *Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Changing Politics of China's Knowledge Workers* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); Xudong Zhang ed., *Whither China?: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

<sup>6</sup> Brian Moloughney and Peter Gue Zarrow eds., *Transforming history: the making of a modern academic discipline in twentieth-century China* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011); Robert Culp, Eddy U, and Wen-hsin Yeh eds. *Knowledge Acts in Modern China: Ideas, Institutions, and Identities* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2016); Fengxiang Hu, "The Rise and Operation of Modern Chinese Historical Associations," *Chinese Studies in History* 45, nos. 2–3 (2011): 70–110; Timothy B. Weston, *The Power of Position: Beijing University, Intellectuals, and Chinese Political Cultures, 1898–1929* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Tze-ki Hon and Robert J. Culp, *The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China* (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Wen-hsin Yeh, *The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, 1990); Xiaoqun Xu, *Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912–1937* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Peter Zarrow, *Educating China: Knowledge, Society, and Textbooks in a Modernizing World, 1902–1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). This also entails a historiographical change, in which the revolutionary historiography that sees modern Chinese history as a progressive process leading to the telos, the Chinese Revolution, lost its validity in late 1980s. A modernization narrative, crossing the 1949 divide, has arisen in the field to provide a comprehensive picture of modern Chinese history. See Paul H. Cohen, "Reflections on a Watershed Date: The 1949 Divide in Chinese History," in *Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches*, ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (New York: Routledge, 2003), 27–36.

as learned individuals with intellectual autonomy and therefore challenge orthodoxy and critique the system. Recent studies have sharply questioned whether such a model can explain the behavior of Chinese intellectuals, or even intellectuals in general.

Elizabeth Perry's article on universities in contemporary China refutes the conventional understanding of higher education as a source of critical intelligentsia who potentially represent a political threat to the authoritarian regime. She points out that this prevailing assumption has been founded on Enlightenment values and liberal democracy. Perry first traces how Chinese intellectuals in premodern and modern times have historically participated in a mutually supportive state–scholar nexus. She then considers the contemporary party-state's strategies for creating such a nexus inside and outside the universities, such as tight monitoring of any sign of dissent on campuses; channeling students' desire and energy for social activism into system-supportive, not system-subversive, activities; and preoccupying universities with productivity targets and compensation schemes. In this state–scholar relationship, through a pattern of “educated acquiescence,” as Perry observes, universities have contributed to the authoritarian regime's durability.<sup>7</sup> Perry's study not only identifies what sustains authoritarian

---

<sup>7</sup> Elizabeth J. Perry, “Educated Acquiescence: How Academia Sustains Authoritarianism in China,” *Theory and Society* 49, no. 1 (2020): 1–22.

regimes, a question that has inspired political scientists since the Tiananmen incident, but also proposes a transitional approach to understanding intellectuals—bringing intellectuals, who had been standing apart from the system, looking at it from outside, back into the system.

Erika E. S. Evasdottir’s study of the community of archaeologists in contemporary China takes a similar approach. Her main theoretical contribution lies in defining the individual archaeologist as a product of social interaction within a web of social rules, hierarchies, structures, stereotypes, and norms, not as a freestanding self who operates separately from the social and political structure. Any individual archaeologist is an amalgam of selves formed in various social settings, conforming to multiple “social truths,” and seeking ways to lead a happier life in the inescapable social network under the Communist regime. By participating in, not resisting, the system and by familiarizing themselves with how the system works, individual scholars have found strategies for changing the structure in ways that favor their own interests. This “obedient autonomy,” to mention Evasdottir’s provocative term, is what enables the regime to persist and what reveals how the individual and the structure mutually construct each other.<sup>8</sup> The social network and “social truth” described in Evasdottir’s study are not

---

<sup>8</sup> Erika E. S. Evasdottir, *Obedient Autonomy: Chinese Intellectuals and the Achievement of Orderly Life* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2004).

limited to the authoritarian Communist structure in China. There is a potential more broadly for a transformational shattering of the illusion of autonomous intellectuals.

Xin Fan's recent study of the establishment of a world history discipline in modern China extends this approach, but in a limited way. Fan examines how historians as a community sought ways to circumvent oppressive state control: "Halfhearted submission is one way, and appropriating the existing social structure to marginalize the external influence in the name of academic professionalism is another."<sup>9</sup> He describes in detail various cases involving historians who responded to authoritarian pressure and restrictions with belief, fear, or opportunism by using the given structure in favor of their academic pursuits, by creatively bypassing imposed duties, or by simply experiencing personal difficulties in despair. Fan, however, still rests his conceptual foundation on the bifurcation of the relationship into state control and intellectual resistance, arguing that the field of world history was an unintended product of the dynamics that played out between state control and intellectual resistance. Resistance to the oppressive regime, as had been expected of intellectuals at the time, remains the norm in his account.

---

<sup>9</sup> Xin Fan, *World History and National Identity in China: The Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 6.

Influenced by Perry and Evasdottir, my dissertation intends to deconstruct the conventional intellectual/regime dichotomy that presupposes the bifurcation of intellectual autonomy and political ideology. Once the party–state created a seemingly inescapable and exhaustive web of bureaucratic academic settings in universities and research institutes in the 1950s, historians fell under the direct control of their affiliated institutions, and historians’ teaching and research became collective work. The collectivization of historical studies, in tandem with the dominance of Marxist historiography, signified the institutional loss of intellectual autonomy, eliminating the externality of academic activity. My dissertation examines how historians, rather than challenging it, adapted to the collectivized structure and the new academic language for the sake of their academic endeavors. This approach takes seriously historians’ efforts to study historical materialism and apply it to their research, pursuing a contextualization of intellectuals’ position in relation to the regime. I see historians in the 1950s and 1960s as political and social products of the state–scholar relationship, one that was constantly in the making by the relationship itself.

Another way to move beyond the conventional dichotomy is to see in a Foucauldian way how power works between the two sides. Eddy U demonstrates that *zhishi fenzi* (intellectuals) were classified as a social category

by the Communist regime. The power exerted in the objectification and classification process for registration purposes created “the intellectual” as a category by demarcating whom to include. U argues that intellectuals were described as “intellectual” not by virtue of their inherent cognitive excellence or academic discipline but as the very product of power relations between the regime and the people, beginning with classification by the regime, followed by local identification by society and finally intellectuals’ negotiation of self-identity.

U’s perspective sheds light on “ordinary intellectuals,” such as school teachers, professors, journalists, scientists, engineers, and so on, who are disputably “intellectual” by some criteria but were classified as *zhibishi fenzi* in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>10</sup> In a similar vein, Andrew Walder’s “dual career path” framework is an attempt to analyze the relationship between ideological conformity and professional success. Chinese elites in Walder’s model consisted of two distinct groups following separate career paths: “One path requires both educational and political credentials and leads to administrative posts with high prestige, considerable authority and clear material privileges; the second path requires educational but not political credentials and leads to

---

<sup>10</sup> Eddy U, *Creating the Intellectual: Chinese Communism and the Rise of a Classification* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019).

professional positions with high occupational prestige but little authority and fewer material privileges.”<sup>11</sup>

My dissertation examines ordinary historians. Existing scholarship has focused predominantly on leading historians—both ideologues and dissenters from the regime—who were intensely debating important historical issues, building connections with political leaders, or surviving unexpected political attacks.<sup>12</sup> In the meantime, ordinary historians, such as professors, researchers, lecturers, college students, and history teachers, have become nearly invisible on the intellectual landscape. Ordinary historians constituted the majority of scholars in the field and led their professional lives as discipline-builders and practitioners. This call to see historians not through the binary framework of propagandists and protestors but in their everyday lives as discipline- and profession-builders takes seriously historians’ efforts to develop and refine historical materialism and apply it to their research. This approach not only adds a new group of individuals to the

---

<sup>11</sup> Andrew G. Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” *American Sociological Review* 60, no. 3 (1995): 309–28; Andrew G. Walder, Bobai Li and Donald J. Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into the Urban Chinese Elite, 1949 to 1996,” *American Sociological Review* 65, no. 2 (2000): 191–209. Joel Andreas applies this to his study of the rise of new intellectuals as a combination of red cadres with political credentials and older intellectuals with cultural credentials. Joel Andreas, *Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009).

<sup>12</sup> To list only a few influential studies that focus on ideological struggles over history: Merle Goldman, “The Role of History in Party Struggle, 1962–4,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 51 (1972): 500–19; Arif Dirlik, “The Problem of Class Viewpoint Versus Historicism in Chinese Historiography,” *Modern China* 3, no. 4 (1977): 465–88; Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “On Shi and Lun: Toward a Typology of Historiography in the PRC,” *History and Theory* 35, no. 4 (1996): 74–95.

intellectual landscape of the time but also allows for a better understanding of how authoritarian power worked in the creation and continuation of intellectual life in Communist China—and vice versa.

### ***Objectivity question and scientism***

This dissertation discusses objectivity and scientism in the Marxist academic regime. Historians have long questioned the objectivity of history and how historians can achieve it in the post-Enlightenment context. As Peter Novick observes, this objectivity question has critically shaped the modern profession and discipline of history in the United States and elsewhere.<sup>13</sup> As Edward Wang and Huaiyin Li point out, however, modern Chinese historiography has not, since the onset of modernization in the twentieth century, taken its lead from this question, as “few Chinese historians found it appealing or practicable to engage in purely empirical studies of the past in an ivory tower when confronted with crises of foreign encroachment and domestic turmoil.”<sup>14</sup> A sense of crisis in the struggle against imperialist

---

<sup>13</sup> Allan Megill, *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); George Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1968); Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Pim Ben Boer, *History as a Profession: The Study of History in France, 1818–1914*, trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); William R. Keylor, *Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).

<sup>14</sup> Huaiyin Li, *Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2013), 6.

intervention and a strong desire for making the Chinese nation richer and stronger dominated the modern Chinese intellectual landscape.

It was science that stood out to Chinese intellectuals in the early twentieth century as the bearer of as well as the best tool with which to achieve modernity. “Mr. Science” was given a mission to modernize the population and to make the nation richer and stronger for responding to the crisis.<sup>15</sup> D. W. Y. Kwok observed this trend and called it *scientism*, which preoccupied “intellectuals interested in using science, and the values and assumptions to which it had given rise, to discredit and eventually to replace the traditional body of values. Scientism can thus be considered . . . the tendency to use the respectability of science in areas having little bearing on science itself.”<sup>16</sup> Kwok argues that it was scientism—science as ideology—more than science itself that informed modern Chinese thinking. Grace Shen furthers this discussion by analyzing scientism not as a self-contained conceptual system but as a context-specific historical phenomenon. Shen traces how a discursive form of science came to possess the unquestionable authority of a truth-producing knowledge system, which reached its peak in

---

<sup>15</sup> Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Wang Zuoyue, “Saving China through Science: The Science Society of China, Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China,” *Osiris* 17 (2002): 291–322.

<sup>16</sup> D. W. Y. Kwok, *Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 3

Mao's China.<sup>17</sup> Science and scientism attracted modern Chinese intellectuals, in service of nation-building, modernization, and socialist construction.

The prevalence and expansion of scientism shifted the objectivity question in the field of history to the question of what makes history *scientific*. This question seemed to be easily solved when the dominance of Marxist historiography in the PRC theoretically converted history into historical science through historical materialism. In “a regime that praised science as the ultimate form of ‘seeking truth from facts,’ but rejected the findings of its most accomplished scientific practitioners,”<sup>18</sup> in Grace Shen’s words, Marxism provided a simple reference point for science. “Scholarship for the sake of scholarship” or “pure science” was criticized not only for being politically wrong but also for being unscientific. The longstanding bifurcation of scientific research and ideological engagement, or of objectivity and politics, was rejected when Marxism proclaimed itself the source of both.

When the regime imposed a predetermined answer on the question of what makes history scientific, invalidating the question itself, what purpose were historians’ academic activities serving? This dissertation examines

---

<sup>17</sup> Grace Yen Shen, “Scientism in the Twentieth Century,” in *Modern Chinese Religion II: 1850–2015*, edited by Jan Kiely, Vincent Goossaert and John Lagerwey (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 92–137.

<sup>18</sup> Shen, “Scientism in the Twentieth Century,” 132.

scientific history in the practices of history writing. First, institutional and bureaucratic collaboration in historical research—between local actors including party affiliates, government agencies, local universities, museums, libraries, historians, and residents—provided ideological legitimacy as well as logistical support. When some provincial governments initiated the local gazetteer project in the mid-1950s, they set up an academic apparatus to serve as a central node for all related governmental and academic institutions that were involved in the project. Field investigations carried out by history students in local colleges were also supported on the ground by local governments' instructions to and organizations associated with the related institutions.

Moreover, the people's engagement guaranteed the scientific quality of history in a similar way. Uradyn Bulag shows how the people's role in the making of history in the form of oral history in turn produced "the people" by "processing them from raw materials to products useful to the Party." In contrast to the conventional notion of oral history "as authentic, oppositional and revolutionary, constituting an alternative world view, representing justice," the Chinese Communists' constant mobilization of oral history practices, without "freedom not to speak," worked for, not against,

the grain of the master narrative.<sup>19</sup> My dissertation furthers Bulag's observation of the ideological function of oral history into its scientific legitimacy. The new emphasis on non-written materials for historical research—such as oral testimony, historical sites, and relics, of which the laboring masses could claim authorship and to which the masses had primary access—granted political significance as well as academic proficiency to historical research. Historical research activities came to represent the solidarity of physical workers and intellectual workers in ideological terms. Even if the party–state answered this question, local historians in practice looked for authentic ways to derive the answer, the process of which itself shaped the profession and led to historians' discovery of locally unique historical experiences.

### *Central–local relations*

This dissertation on local history contributes a valuable perspective to studies of central–local relations in China. Themes such as unification and division, centripetal and centrifugal forces, centralization and regionalism have recurred in Chinese history. Governance of local regions, peripheries, and borderlands has determined the durability of centralized states. As

---

<sup>19</sup> Uradyn Bulag, "Can the Subalterns Not Speak? On the Regime of Oral History in Socialist China," *Inner Asia* 12, no. 1 (2010): 95-111.

Prasenjit Duara notes, since the centralist conception of the new nation state won the political and discursive competition with federalist ideas following the collapse of the Qing dynasty,<sup>20</sup> centripetal forces have dominated modern China, especially under Mao's rule. As long as the country was presumed to be a protagonist and agent of a linear, teleological, Enlightenment, master narrative of Chinese history,<sup>21</sup> the local, both as a reference to a region and as a concept, came to denote division, or regionalism, which could possibly undermine the nation's survival and success.

This connotation of the local has continued throughout the twentieth century and has persisted into the present day, when the PRC, the self-proclaimed multiethnic state, is contending with difficult issues involving the borderlands and ethnic minorities. Magnus Fiskesjö argues that the new Chinese state resurrected the imperial model of a "civilized" center and a "barbarian" periphery in response to the dilemmas posed by the imperial legacy and the nation-building project. Fiskesjö examines how the state neither entirely assimilated nor entirely ignored ethnic minorities, settling

---

<sup>20</sup> Prasenjit Duara, "Provincial Narratives of the Nation: Centralism and Federalism in Republican China," in *Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity*, ed. Harumi Befu (Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993), 196.

<sup>21</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

instead for officially identifying them. This recognition by the state has formed a new imperial model that requires “primitive” and “backward” objects on the periphery that must be civilized by the center.<sup>22</sup> Here, it is the periphery that defines the center. In a similar vein, Gina Anne Tam’s study of dialects explores the question of whether there is an “authentic” Chinese language. Chinese nationalists have framed the one standard representative language, *Putonghua*, as the marker of national identity, while classifying other dialects as variants or subsidiary languages. According to Tam, however, this heterogeneous juxtaposition of dialects has shaped Chinese nationalism. Tam argues that the reality transcends the conventional distinction between standard language and dialect in the formation of Chinese nationalism.<sup>23</sup> These studies efficiently deconstruct the dualistic presumption that informs understandings of central–local relations by examining how the whole and parts define each other. My approach to local history was greatly influenced by these studies.

This dissertation discusses how localness and locality worked for, not against, centralization in Communist China. I examine how local history and

---

<sup>22</sup> Magnus Fiskesjö, “Rescuing the Empire: Chinese Nation-Building in the Twentieth Century,” *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 5, no. 1 (2006): 15–44.

<sup>23</sup> Gina Anne Tam, *Dialect and Nationalism in China, 1860-1960* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020). Another study on dialect: Jin Liu, *Signifying the Local: Media Productions Rendered in Local Languages in Mainland China in the New Millennium* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

the central narrative constituted each other. Field investigations undertaken to write local history have provided historians with historical specificity, spatiality, and locality to supplement the macroscopic Marxist search for the rules of historical development. Local historians could pursue academic proficiency at the level of specificity, spatiality, and locality as long as they did not deviate from the master narrative or from the language of historical materialism. This dissertation advances scholarship on centralization and regionalism in China by revealing the relationship between central and local academic practices as interactive and mutually constitutive.

...

The research for this dissertation was well underway when the global pandemic struck, creating an unanticipated restriction on field research in China, in particular by limiting access to local archives. Pandemic-related restrictions denying archival access, by pushing me to spend more time in used bookstores, created unexpected opportunities for discovering hitherto untapped sources: historians' journal articles, books, pamphlets, and investigative reports that were published in the 1950s and 1960s, in addition to traditional sources such as sourcebooks, newspapers, local gazetteers, and memoirs. These materials have revealed the ways in which historians, in their daily work lives, navigated and also contributed to building and modifying

institutional academic environments. They also reveal historians responding to ideological and institutional restrictions much as I did, by finding new sources and developing new approaches to historical work.

This study is structured in two separate but intertwined parts. The first two chapters discuss mainly changes at the national level, while the next three chapters examine historians' responses to changes at the local level. Both the changes and responses are investigated through the lenses of discourse and implementation. These sets of discourses and implementations at the national and local levels are intertwined across chapters. The entire story develops chronologically as well, from the first part that focuses on the early 1950s to the latter part that focuses on the mid-1950s to early 1960s.

Chapter 1, "The Birth of History Workers," traces how historians re-identified themselves as "history workers" after 1949. The establishment of the PRC signaled the advent of the Marxist academic regime, which ideologically and institutionally collectivized the field of history as well as historians. The reconfiguration of the field in Marxist terms as service to the people, as the antithesis of non-Marxist historical modes of thinking, and as science, was followed by the collectivization of historians' academic activities within an exhaustive bureaucratic structure.

Chapter 2, "Marginalized under Industrialism," locates the field of history within the broader sociopolitical context of the 1950s. The newly

established regime's emphasis on centralization and industrialization in the early Communist period shifted slightly to decentralization in the mid-1950s, through which the humanities and social sciences asserted their claim to significance. The Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences in the Chinese Academy of Sciences responded to existential devaluation and marginalization by adopting national-scale academic planning.

Chapter 3, "Reactivating Local Gazetteer Projects," examines the discussion about and partial implementation of the compilation of local gazetteers as one result of that planning. Intellectuals sought to persuade the regime to invest extensive institutional resources in the local gazetteer project, citing more effective local governance, patriotic education, and scientific research as the rationale. Their proposals seemed largely to be applicable to local practice, with local academic institutions working as centers employing or inviting local intellectuals to contribute to the project, organizing interviews, collecting written materials, discussing those materials, and writing and printing gazetteers.

Chapter 4, "Local Field Investigations for Historical Science," examines the practice of local history, particularly field investigations, which stimulated methodological and historiographical discussions of three dimensions of the new scientific history: the people's engagement, institutional collaboration, and local specificity. The chapter considers how

the democratization, institutionalization, and localization of historical knowledge production simultaneously re-constituted both scientific history and ideological correctness.

Chapter 5, “The Writing of the Local Colonial Past,” analyzes the contents of historical writings published in the 1950s and 1960s in Northeast China. In discovering repetitive narrative patterns and structures, this chapter explores local historians’ discursive strategies for obscuring the local colonial past: negotiating the relationship between locally unique colonial experiences and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s master narrative of the Chinese Revolution; appropriating the concept of the “enemy” in response to contemporaneous politics; and circumventing charges of collaboration that might involve local populations under colonial rule.

## CHAPTER 1

### THE BIRTH OF HISTORY WORKERS:

#### HISTORY AS SERVICE, SCIENCE, AND PROFESSION

They all agreed that history workers of the whole country should unite and engage in the construction of new historiography. (*People's Daily*, 1949)<sup>24</sup>

In July 1949, on the verge of the CCP's victory in the civil war, more than thirty leading historians gathered in Beijing to begin organizing the National Historical Society. This group of historians identified themselves as “history workers,” and met to discuss their roles in the new society. Doing so, they both built on and demarcated themselves from received models of historiography. Historian was one of the oldest professions in China, but was called “history worker” (*lishi gongzuozhe*; *shixue gongzuozhe*) only after 1949. This chapter analyzes the historical and institutional emergence of history workers in the PRC.

Scholars have long examined the roles of history, especially with regard to their ideological and political roles, under the Chinese Communist regime. These scholars have shown how, at significant political junctures,

---

<sup>24</sup> “Zhongguo xin shixue yanjiuhui choubeihui zuo zai ping chengli 中国新史学研究会筹备会昨在平成立.” *People's Daily* 人民日报, July 2, 1949.

historians' political legitimacy hinged on conformity to specific historical interpretations of the Chinese revolution and the CCP. For example, while the CCP was based in Yan'an in the 1930s and 1940s, it enforced Mao Zedong's interpretation of historical materialism in the construction of party history through a series of rectification campaigns. The CCP's adoption of a "Resolution on Some Historical Questions" in April 1945 was a crucial political step that legitimated Mao's rule of the party by providing an ideological foundation for it.<sup>25</sup> After the establishment of the PRC, Maoist historical philosophy, interpretation, and methodology continued to operate as ideological tools, reaching a peak during the Cultural Revolution. It is not an overstatement to say that the entire history of the PRC is a tug-of-war over history.

Focusing on these political dimensions of history, however, neglects another important aspect of history: its development as an academic discipline. As Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik has argued, "at the same time that historiography was functioning as a means of propaganda defined by the party leadership, it also functioned as an academic field of inquiry in which

---

<sup>25</sup> Tony Saich, "Writing or Rewriting History? The Construction of the Maoist Resolution on Party History," in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, eds. by Tony Saich and Hans J. van de Ven (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); Yin Da 尹达, "Gaijing lishi kexue de yanjiu gongauo: wei Mao Zedong tongzhi fabiao 'gaizao women de xuexi' shiwu zhounian er zuo 改进历史科学的研究工作—为毛泽东同志发表 '改造我们的学习' 十五周年纪念而作," *People's Daily*, May 30, 1956.

historians acted and debated according to rules which they set themselves as if they were occupying an autonomous field of cultural activity.”<sup>26</sup> Similarly, Clifford Edmunds has upheld the professionalism of Marxist historians, saying, “while they were willing to serve revolutionary goals in this general sense, they did not view their role as mere propagandists, and they were not willing to subvert academic standards or distort history to serve immediate political ends.”<sup>27</sup> In so doing, I take this non-Maoist approach to observe Mao-period historians at work.

History workers in 1950s China conducted their professional lives within the seemingly inescapable web of Communist institutions. But despite a highly institutionalized academic field, and within the dominant language of historical materialism, historians’ professional lives cannot be reduced to ideological or political choice. This chapter, by examining history and historians in Communist China from the perspective of disciplinary

---

<sup>26</sup> Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “History and Truth in Chinese Marxist Historiography,” in *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism, and Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Comparative Perspective*, eds. Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Achim Mittag and Jörn Rüsen (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 422-423; Historians not only used the past to criticize the present, but also developed a field of professionalism defining the rules of the profession and the degree of autonomy it could claim. (Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “Chinese Historical Writing since 1949,” in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 5. 1945 to the Present*, eds. Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 616.)

<sup>27</sup> Clifford Edmunds, “The Politics of Historiography Jian Bozhan’s Historicism,” in *China’s Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship*, eds. Merle Goldman, Timothy Cheek, and Carol Lee Hamrin (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University, 1987), 68.

development, illuminates average intellectuals' own constructive roles in shaping their field and in shaping their relationships to the regime.

In tracing the emergence of the concept and reality of history workers, this chapter contributes to scholarly debates over the extent of continuity and rupture across the 1949 divide. The establishment of historical continuities not only undermines the formerly dominant revolutionary historiography that highlights change in order to legitimize the Communist's rule, but also, more importantly, enables us to see historical phenomena in the PRC as a product of longer processes of experimentation with modernization over the twentieth century. In this vein, this chapter examines history workers in the PRC in relation to historical continuity and rupture, a historical product of a longer evolution of the vocation.

### ***"To serve the people"***

The first half of the twentieth century saw the gradual professionalization and institutionalization of historical studies. While history had long been a part of the classical knowledge required for generalist elites in premodern China, it was by way of educational reform under the New Policies in the late Qing period that history first took its rudimentary form as a discipline. History became a separate school subject with a designated curriculum and

textbooks, thus requiring writers and teachers with expertise.<sup>28</sup> Since then, the development of history as a modern academic discipline has had a close connection with modern pedagogical ideas and educational institutions. The demarcation from other disciplines, and from classicist models of history, became clearer in the early Republican period with the establishment of universities and departments of history. Historians became professors, developed their ideas in intellectual exchanges with other professors, and cultivated their own students in the universities. They also organized academic societies and published academic journals.<sup>29</sup> By the late 1930s, history was a distinct mode of knowledge production.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> Peter Zarrow, “The New Schools and National Identity: Chinese History Textbooks in the Late Qing,” in *The Politics of Historical Production*, 21–54.

<sup>29</sup> E-Tu Zen, “The Growth of the Academic Community, 1919–1949,” in *The Cambridge History of China Volume 13. Republican China 1912–1949*, eds. John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Hu Fengxiang 胡逢祥, “Xiandai Zhongguo shixue zhuanke xuehui de xingqi yu yunzuo 现代中国史学专业学会的兴起与运作,” *Shilin* 史林 3 (2005): 50–60; Xiaoqun Xu, *Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912–1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

<sup>30</sup> The rise of modern academic disciplines in twentieth century China has been discussed in depth and in detail by groups of scholars in the field. I am summarizing the main points for my argumentation in this chapter. For more studies on the topic, see: Hon and Culp eds., *The Politics of Historical Production*; Hou Yunhao 侯云灏, “20 Shiji Zhongguo shixue de xuekehua jincheng 20 世纪中国史学的学科化进程,” *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 2 (1999): 90–97; Liu Lung-hsin 劉龍心, *Xueshu yu zhidu: xueke tizhi yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de jianli 學術與制度: 學科體制與現代中國史學的建立* (Taipei: Yuanliu, 2002); Luo Zhitian 羅志田, “Xixue chongji xia jindai Zhongguo xueshu fenke de yanbian 西学冲击下近代中国学术分科的演变,” *Jindai Zhongguo shixue shilun* 近代中国史学十论 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2003); Moloughney and Zarrow eds., *Transforming History*; Sang Bing 桑兵, *Wanqing minguo de guoxue yanjiu* 晚清民国的国学研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2001); Wang Fansen 王汎森, *Jindai Zhongguo de shijia yu shixue* 近代中國的史家與史學 (Hong Kong: Sanlian, 2008).

Accompanying this emergence of professional historians were discussions and debates on the ideas and methodologies of historical research, which were crucial for establishing disciplinary distinctiveness. Historians returning from higher education in western countries and their translations of historiographical studies in other countries significantly affected Chinese historiography. The extent to and the ways in which historians appreciated and incorporated western ideas and methodologies into their work varied, creating what Brian Moloughney and Peter Zarrow refer to as “the plurality of modern Chinese historiography.”<sup>31</sup> This plurality encompassed a broad spectrum of ideas and methodologies that were constantly in debate. Even individual historians’ ideas and methodologies were in constant flux. Marxist historical materialism underwent several stages of development: theoretical incubation in the 1910s and 1920s, widely influential debates over the social history of China in the 1930s, and research and study of Marxism-Leninism in 1940s Yan’an.<sup>32</sup> With the coexistence and competition among ideas, fundamental questions of what history and historical methodology were never fully settled.

---

<sup>31</sup> Brian Moloughney and Peter Zarrow, “Making History Modern: The Transformation of Chinese Historiography, 1895–1937,” in *Transforming History*, 21-25, 29.

<sup>32</sup> Arif Dirlik, *Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

But under the surface of this plurality lay a general consensus on the purpose of historical education and historical studies. Historical education in late Qing and Republican period had been geared toward fostering loyalty and national identity. In learning the history of their home villages, counties, prefectures, and country, and thereby expanding their love for their hometown into love for the nation, students were expected to grow up as loyal subjects or citizens.<sup>33</sup> It is hardly radical to say that the only difference in history education between the late Qing dynasty under the New Policy and the Republic of China was the object of loyalty—to the emperor or to the Chinese nation.

Many intellectual endeavors are intended to serve the people. Timothy Cheek points out that the classical question of “how best to serve the public good” was running through Chinese intellectuals’ minds throughout the twentieth century, even though “(t)he meaning of ‘service,’ ‘the people,’ and the implied actor—who is qualified to provide this service to the people—changed significantly over the century.”<sup>34</sup> This was true of historians. The normative practice of using past events to give advice on contemporary

---

<sup>33</sup> Long-hsin Liu, “Historical Lessons and the History of Knowledge in the Late Qing Examination System,” in *Transforming History*, 75 -102; Stephen C. Averill, “The Cultural Politics of Local Education in Early Twentieth-Century China,” *Twentieth-Century China* 32, no. 2 (2006): 4-32; Tze-ki Hon, “Educating the Citizens: Visions of China in Late Qing History Textbooks,” in *The Politics of Historical Production*, 79-107.

<sup>34</sup> Cheek, *The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History*, 1.

politics, a didactic approach to the writing and reading of history, dates to the early classicists, or “Confucians.”<sup>35</sup> Modern historians’ choice of topics, use of materials, and interpretations retained this sense of political and social responsibility, whether in peace or in crisis. For example, even historian Fu Sinian, a strict advocate of textual criticism, responded furiously to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in the early 1930s by writing a book on the region and helping create a new academic journal condemning imperialist invasion of China.<sup>36</sup> In this intellectual tradition, in which scholarship and politics were intertwined, contemporaneous political circumstances strongly inflected the meanings of “service,” “the people,” and the qualifications of the service providers, scholars. Across the tumultuous years of the twentieth century, such meanings underwent many changes, and the field of history was not exempt.<sup>37</sup>

Thus, it was not a rupture in 1949 to conceive of history as having a close relation to politics. It was rather a historical product of an undercurrent in the vocation of intellectual in China. The Common Program, a quasi

---

<sup>35</sup> David Schaberg, *A Patterned Past: Form and Thought in Early Chinese Historiography* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001).

<sup>36</sup> Fan-sen Wang, *Fu Sinian: A life in Chinese History and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 149-152.

<sup>37</sup> To name only a few influential studies on the history of modern historiography in China: Edward Q. Wang, *Inventing China through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001); Li, *Reinventing Modern China*; Wang Xuedian 王学典, and Chen Feng 陈峰, *Ersbi shiji Zhongguo lishi xue* 二十世纪中国历史学 (Beijing Shi: Beijing da xue chu ban she, 2009).

constitution of the PRC, stipulated that the cultural and educational spheres of the country were expected to “serve the people,” which inherited, rather than overturned, the long pursuit of “service.” As part of the cultural and educational sphere of the new country, historical research and education also sought to serve the people in the context of the PRC.<sup>38</sup>

### *Antithesis to “old” historical views and methods*

Still, there was one radical break from previous regimes: the exclusive authority of one mode of historical thinking, displacing a plurality of historiographical approaches. The establishment of the new regime marked the dominance of Marxist historiography, in which the half-century-long development of historical materialism in China became the foundation for the reconstruction of history in Marxist terms. Even though different modes of historical thinking continued to coexist in the more moderate early 1950s, Marxist historians were in search of a more consensual answer to the question of what history should be in New China. The new National Historical Society aimed “to learn and apply the views and methods of historical materialism; to criticize various kinds of old historical views; and to

---

<sup>38</sup> Article 41 in “Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi gongtong gangling 中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领 (1949.9.29),” in *Jianguo Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian* 建国以来重要文献选编, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992), 1-13.

cultivate among history workers the style of ‘seeking truth from facts (*shishi qiushi*)’; and thereby to engage in the construction of new historiography.”<sup>39</sup> Those “various kinds of old historical views” were criticized and replaced with historical materialism to construct a new historiography.

Guo Moruo, a Marxist theorist who was the Chairman of the National Historical Society, spoke at the opening ceremony of its official establishment in July 1951. His speech coined a slogan-like set of guidelines for the field of history:

From historical idealism to historical materialism; from individual research of personal interest to collective research; from an attitude of writing individual masterpieces to an attitude of serving the people; from cherishing the past and belittling the present to valuing the study of modern history; from Han chauvinism to valuing the study of ethnic minorities; from Eurocentrism to valuing the study of Asian history.<sup>40</sup>

These six directions set up general guidelines for historical research under the Communist regime that were never completely eliminated in Mao’s China. An editorial in *Historical Education*, one of three major history journals in the 1950s, proposed similar guidelines for research and education:

---

<sup>39</sup> “Zhongguo xin shixue yanjiuhui zanxing jianzhang 中国新史学研究会暂行简章,” *People’s Daily*, July 2, 1949; “The representatives unanimously suggested that the Society should publish special history books and popular publications, compile excellent middle school history textbooks, and organize historical researchers from all over the country.” (Duan Zhemin 段泽民, “Kaizhan xin shixue yanjiu gongzuo, shoudu liang shixue tuanti zuo kaihui 开展新史学研究工作, 首都两史学团体昨开会,” *People’s Daily*, October 12, 1949.)

<sup>40</sup> Guo Moruo 郭沫若, “Zhongguo lishixue shang de xin jiyuan 中国历史学上的新纪元,” *Jinbu Daily* 进步日报, September 29, 1951.

From research behind closed doors to collective research; from cherishing the past and belittling the present to valuing the study of modern history; from blind teaching to planned teaching; from writing of emperors and princes to writing of the people; from complicated textual criticism to study of the law of social development; from personal pursuit for masterpieces to sincere service for the people.<sup>41</sup>

What stands out in these guidelines is the antitheses posed to a previous, perhaps imagined, mode of historical philosophy and methodology. In the sentence structure of “from A to B,” “A” stands for non-Marxist ways of studying history.

Less explicitly, but no less deliberately, in the 1950s, historiography and methodology articles in newspapers and leading academic journals drew similar comparisons between non-Marxist and Marxist approaches. Practically speaking, by articulating what Marxist historiography was *not*, the comparison could guide historians to better understand what it *was*. More importantly, however, constructing an antithetical identity was a crucial strategy for historical materialism to present new ideas and methodologies for history in Mao’s China.

Along the same lines, Yang Xiangkui, Director of the Department of History at Shandong University, remarked after a meeting of history

---

<sup>41</sup> “Qingzhu zuguo sinian lai de chengjiu, jiaqiang lishi kexue gongzuo 慶祝祖國四年來的成就, 加強歷史科學工作,” *Lishi jiaoxue 历史教学* 10 (1953): 1-5.

professors at the National Comprehensive University Conference in

November 1953:

I realized that the old circle of historiography had been walking on a very narrow path in pre-liberation China. Collecting historical materials and conducting textual research on them has its own significance and value, but this is by no means everything about doing history. We should not say that there is no historical science without the work on historical materials. Unfortunately, many people thought so and did so in the past, which is an error. Bigger errors are that historiography was dominated by historical idealism of historical contingency, was manifested in disordered and unsystematic teaching plans, did not have an overall concept of history nor of historical development, and emphasized ancient history over modern and contemporary history. Of course, we are not saying that ancient history is not important, but it is wrong to despise modern history, “knowing the past but not the present.” If we don’t pay attention to the development and entirety of social history, only doing fragmented research, and if we only weigh history of dynasties and imperial genealogies, it is not the right direction. In fact, the way out for the old circle of historiography was becoming increasingly narrow, and everyone was just going round and round in a small world.<sup>42</sup>

Overemphasis on historical materials and fragmented textual research was reframed by another historian as “studying insignificant and miscellaneous problems like the tip of an ox horn (*niujiao jian*) and looking for a field of research not in popular demand (*zhaolengmen*).”<sup>43</sup> Another

---

<sup>42</sup> Yang Xiangkui 杨向奎, “Canjia quanguo zonghe daxue huiyi de diandi tihui 参加全国综合大学会议的点滴体会,” *People’s Daily*, November 4, 1953.

<sup>43</sup> Ji Wenfu 嵇文甫, “Shixue gongzuo yao mianxiang qunzhong: shixue zahua zhi san 史學工作要面向群眾: 史學雜話之三,” *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史學通訊 11 (1952): 5.

historian argued that even the “history of dynasties and imperial genealogies” with a relatively broader perspective was “not the right direction,” either. “Old historians tended to replace the social activities of the Chinese nation with the activities of only a few numbers of prominent figures of certain historical period. They left the broad masses of the people out of the boundary of history.”<sup>44</sup> Historical materialism, according to Yang, was not only ideologically right, but also provided a broader perspective on history.

Previous historians’ narrow approaches and fragmented choice of topics were considered by Marxist historians to be the product of individualism: research topics were chosen based on personal interest without broader social context; historians collected historical materials for their own possession; studied historical materials by themselves, “closing the doors (*guanmen*)” of their offices; and pursued the creation of individual masterpieces or personal reputations (*mingshan shiye*). Historian Ji Wenfu wrote in 1952, “in the old circle of historiography, historians did frivolous and boring textual research under the influence of the New Textual Criticism School. It was just research for the sake of research, taking root from personal interest.... They did not consider the objective of academic

---

<sup>44</sup> Liu Yaoting 刘尧庭, “Lishi jiaoshi yao hen hao de jinxing ziwo gaizao 历史教师要很好的进行自我改造,” *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史学通讯 10 (1951): 1-2.

research nor the contribution to the people.”<sup>45</sup> New historiography claimed to be antithetical to this academic individualism, Ji continued:

There are two pathways in front of us. One is to take root in popular demand, to have a certain objective, and to resolve significant problems that relate to the masses. The other is to take root in individual interest and to do research for the sake of research with no relation to the demand of the masses. We certainly do not walk on the latter path.<sup>46</sup>

A phrase often repeated was “research for the sake of research (*wei yanjiu er yanjiu*),” or “scholarship for the sake of scholarship (*wei xueshu er xueshu*).” There were two questions: Was “research for the sake of research” right? Was “research for the sake of research” ever possible? As Ji argued, “research for the sake of research” was not the right path, as it deviated from popular demand. Huang Yuanqi, Director of the Department of History at Henan University and Chairman of the Henan Division of the National Historical Society, made a short opening speech at a symposium, “Patriotism and Historical Education,” in May of 1951, with a similar argument:

Can history simply be “scholarship for the sake of scholarship”? No. That view is wrong. Historians must closely combine their research with their current political tasks, and their current task is to defend and consolidate the people's democratic dictatorship—specifically in three major tasks: land reform,

---

<sup>45</sup> Ji Wenfu 嵇文甫, “Shixue gongzuozhe yao zhaokai yige ligong yundong 史学工作者要展开一个立功运动,” *Lishi jiaoxue* 历史教学 11 (1952): 1.

<sup>46</sup> Ji Wenfu, “Shixue gongzuo yao mianxiang qunzhong,” 5.

resisting the United States and aiding Korea, and suppressing counterrevolutionaries. These are the concrete missions of patriotism.<sup>47</sup>

At the same symposium, prominent philosopher and historian Feng Youlan similarly refuted previous historians' "purely objective attitude" in "appreciating antiques" or observing electrons and atoms. Feng rejected "an attitude of 'musing over things of the remote past (发思古之幽情),' which could not contribute to the present and the future."<sup>48</sup> In this view, the pursuit of "scholarship for the sake of scholarship" was as narrow, individualistic, and wrong as historical idealism and academic individualism.

Other historians further developed this criticism into an argument that "research for the sake of research" was not fundamentally possible and previous historians' pursuit of it was manipulative. They argued that history could not be purely nonpolitical:

In historical studies and scholarship, "seeking truth (*qiu zhen*)" and "seeking use (*qiu yong*)" are inseparable.... Pure "seeking truth" never existed in history. From the class perspective of the past, history could never be science.... "Scholarship for the sake

---

<sup>47</sup> Huang Yuanqi 黄元起, "Aiguo zhuyi yu lishi jiaoxue zuotanhui jiyao: Bei fandong tongzhi jieji yankui le guanghui de zhongguo lishi, renmin yaoqiu chongxin huifu 爱国主义与历史教学座谈会纪要: 被反动统治阶级掩盖了光辉的中国历史, 人民要求重新恢复," *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史学通讯 4 (1951): 3.

<sup>48</sup> Feng Youlan 冯友兰, "Aihen fenming fandui chun keguan de taidu 爱恨分明反对纯客观的态度," *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史学通讯 4 (1951): 2.

of scholarship” is a hoax. We must seek truth to seek usefulness.<sup>49</sup>

Another argued:

Positivists claimed pure objectivism, scholarship for the sake of scholarship, and non-class position, but in reality, the slogan of non-class and nonpolitical position was just a façade. They were being anti-revolutionary and anti-people. Were the positivists really nonpolitical? ... Claiming to be purely academic, non-class, and nonpolitical completely failed. If anyone still fantasizes about scholarship for the sake of scholarship, look at the consequences for Hu Shih!<sup>50</sup>

Textual criticism or positivism, especially under the influence of liberalism, was the most explicit target.

But there was a broader range of historical thought, methodologies, and attitudes to combat. Historians’ desire to publish a masterpiece book, for example, was not necessarily positivist. Even positivism, purportedly criticized as camouflaging pure scholarship, was responding to the political circumstances of its time, looking for ways to serve the people and save the nation. Marxist historiography was therefore largely constructed by constructing what Marxist historiography was not. For that purpose, various non-Marxist theories and practices of history did not need to be separately

---

<sup>49</sup> Zhang Shouchang 张守常, “Lun lishixue de ‘qiu zheng’ yu ‘qiu yong’: jingxian gei zhangzai xuexi de laoshimen 论历史学的‘求真’与‘求用’: 敬献给正在学习的老师们,” *Lishi jiaoxue* 历史教学 6 (1952): 185-188.

<sup>50</sup> Liu Yaoting, “Lishi jiaoshi yao hen hao de jinxing ziwo gaizao,” 1-2.

identified and criticized. The Marxist mode of historical thinking was presented in these writings as an antithesis of an agglomeration of non-Marxist historical views, methods, and attitudes, an approach which itself conformed to the dialectical antagonism of Marxism.

### *From history to historical science*

Marxist historical thinking also claimed itself to be science. Guo Moruo's opening speech at the National Social Science Worker Representative Conference in July 1949 proclaimed that dialectical materialism would uphold the hegemony of scientific truth in social sciences in the PRC:

Only after Marx and Engels advocated dialectical materialism and researchers in all fields could engage this doctrine in their research, could philosophy, history, economics, political science, law, and so on, become science. Before this, even though there had been academic research on philosophy, history, economics, political science, law, and so on, they had not reached a truly scientific stage.<sup>51</sup>

While Marxism's claim to be science was not limited to the historical domain or to China, it is noteworthy that through historical materialism, the field of history became a field of science for the first time in Chinese history.

Marxism's dominance was said by 1950s historians to "open up the new

---

<sup>51</sup> "Guo Moruo kaimuci 郭沫若开幕词," *People's Daily*, July 15, 1949. It was reflected in the Common Program as, "It shall be promoted to use a scientific historical perspective in the study and interpretation of history, economics, politics, culture and international affairs." (Article 44 in "Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi gongtong gangling 中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领 (1949.9.29)," 1-13.)

epoch of Chinese historiography by transforming historical studies into science.”<sup>52</sup> This expression, “the new epoch of Chinese historiography (*Zhongguo lishixue de xin qi Yuan*)” was widely used in labeling Marxism’s dominance in this period, not only by 1950s historians but also by historiographers in later periods. In this “new epoch,” historical studies became science, as it self-claimed.

Historian Hu Sheng’s 1956 article, titled “How social history research becomes science,” differentiated historical science (*lishi kexue*) from history (*lishixue*) in the past. According to Hu, even though historians in the past had made progress in historical studies worth inheriting, they were not able to build “a complete historical science” due to their denial of the objectivity of the study of history:

Marxism applies the perspective and method of dialectical materialism to the study of social history, finds objective laws among complex historical phenomena, and explains the development of social history based on objective laws. In this way, social history research has truly become a science.... In order to promote Marxist historical science, on the one hand, it is necessary to inherit and absorb the excellent achievements of historians in the past, and on the other hand, to criticize and delete the confusion that harms the development of historical science.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> “Qingzhu zuguo sinian lai de chengjiu,” 1-5.

<sup>53</sup> Hu Sheng 胡绳, “Shehui lishi de yanjiu zenyang chengwei kexue: lun xiandai zhongguo zichan jieji weixinzhuyi lishixue zai zhege wenti shang de hunluan guannian 社会历史的研究怎样成为科学: 论现代中国资产阶级唯心主义历史学在这个问题上的混乱观念,” *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 11 (1956): 1-25.

Hu continued, pointing out four misunderstandings which had prevented historians from establishing history as a science:

Many bourgeois historians in China have attempted to answer the question of whether history is a science, and how history can be a science. But they have not found a right answer. There are some confusions. 1) They fundamentally deny the existence of objective law in the development of social history, thus denying that historical research can also be a science. 2) Historical studies are regarded as textual studies on historical materials (*shiliao*), and thus do not explore the law of historical development. 3) They consider history a “subjective” study, not as a “science” with an objective standard. 4) They draw biology into social history research, claiming that this is a historical science, which actually undermines the true historical science.<sup>54</sup>

The major point in dispute was objectivity—whether history could be objectively studied or not. History asserted science, as long as Marxism provided a foundation of objectivity and science, and as long as historians decided to accept it.

History’s status as a science can also be understood from the perspective of its ambiguous relationship to social science. Social science research developed in China in the 1920s and 1930s by scholars returning from the United States and western Europe. Through empirical research following the disciplinary methodologies of sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, and law, social scientists tried to better

---

<sup>54</sup> Hu Sheng, “Shehui lishi de yanjiu zenyang chengwei kexue,” 1-25.

understand the present and future of Chinese society and to contribute to better governance, social engineering, and revolution.<sup>55</sup> Marxist social history took root in this broader intellectual discourse, which embodied disciplinary ambiguity—whether Marxist social history was social science or not. It was a moment when the modern Chinese intellectual world was undergoing modernization, including professionalization, institutionalization, and disciplinization, as discussed previously. The boundaries among disciplines, marked by different appearances and practices, were not yet fully established.

This ambiguity continued after 1949. When the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) was established in November 1949, there was no systematic organization of disciplines. The social science sector of CAS took shape by gradually taking over preexisting research institutes or establishing new ones. For example, the Historical Research Office at Huabei University became the Institute of Modern History in April 1950 with Fan Wenlan as director, and later reorganized as one of three institutes of history in 1954. The Institute of History and Philosophy at Academia Sinica was taken over and reorganized as the Institute of Linguistics and the Institute of Archaeology in June and August 1950 respectively. The Institute of Society at Academia Sinica was taken over and merged with the newly established Institute of

---

<sup>55</sup> Yung-chen Chiang, *Social Engineering and the Social Sciences in China, 1919-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Economics in 1953.<sup>56</sup> This unsystematic takeover of institutes, prevalent both in natural science and social science sectors, went through a reorganization in the mid-1950s, marking clearer lines among disciplines. In June 1955, the CAS established a department system, in which four departments supervised the institutes under them: the Department of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry; the Department of Biology and Earth Science; the Department of Technology and Engineering; and the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences (DPSS). Institutes of history were under the DPSS.

Chinese folklorist Xuan Bingshan has analyzed the term “philosophy and social sciences,” which, in Chinese, is “*zhexue shehui kexue* (哲学社会科学).” Xuan argues that this term and concept first appeared in the Chinese lexicon in 1955 with the establishment of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences under the CAS. The combination of the two terms in this specific order—“philosophy” first and “social sciences” next—was new. Xuan points out that the combination was not only a simple parataxis of the

---

<sup>56</sup> Li Zhenzhen 李真真, “Zhongguo kexueyuan xuebu de choubei yu jianli 中国科学院学部的筹备与建立,” *Ziran bianzhengfa tongxun* 自然辩证法通讯 4 (1992): 40-50; Xue Qian 薛倩, “Zhongguo kexueyuan zhexue shehuikexue bu de fazhan licheng yu lishi gongxian 中国科学院哲学社会科学部的发展历程与历史贡献,” *Dangdai zhongguoshi yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 9 (2017): 68-69; Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yuanshi yanjiushi 中国社会科学院院史研究室, *Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan biannian jianshi 1977-2007* 中国社会科学院编年简史 1977-2007 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010), 1-14.

two disciplines, usually understood as a juxtaposition of humanities and social sciences; “philosophy” modified “social sciences,” implying that “[Marxist] philosophy leads social sciences.” Xuan supports his argument with a remark by Hu Sheng: “Science, generally speaking, includes natural and social sciences. We speak of philosophy and social sciences together, but philosophy is not a social science. It has connection with both social sciences and natural sciences.” That, in official and informal documents, the Department was described by both the full name, “*Zhexue shehui kexue xuebu*” (Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences) and in abridged form, “*Shehui kexue xuebu*” (Department of Social Sciences), also supports Xuan’s observation.<sup>57</sup> If this is the case, the English translation of the department should be “Department of Philosophical Social Sciences.” In this way, history became a subcategory of Marxist social science, not humanities.

The term “*wenshi zhe* (文史哲),” which combines literature, history, and philosophy, was still in use in the 1950s, even in the name of a prestigious academic journal of Shandong University. However, literature, history, and philosophy were not treated as one distinct, integrated intellectual area in the institutional organization of the CAS. Literature was

---

<sup>57</sup> Xuan Bingshan 宣炳善, “‘Zhexue shehui kexue’ gainian de zhongguo yujing ‘哲学社会科学’概念的中国语境,” *Aohai feng* 粤海风 5 (2007): 29-37.

no longer categorized as an academic field, philosophy was enthroned to lead and modify both natural and social sciences, and history became historical science as an institutional subfield of social science. Historical materialism underlay history's identity within the new intellectual categorization. Under the Marxist academic regime, the field of history was a social science, itself a subcategory of science.

While historical studies were identified as a science both in theoretical and institutional senses after 1949, this identification was not limited to Marxist historians. Science had had a positive connotation since, in the 1910s and 1920s, the New Culture Movement had called for "Mr. Science" from the West to replace old traditions. Science embodied modernity and progress, keys to making the Chinese nation richer and stronger as a defense against imperialist threats. Such threats stimulated historians to pursue an exact and objective scientific understanding of the past, based on which the Chinese nation could envision a better present and future. Several different approaches to the past claimed to be the most objective and scientific.<sup>58</sup> But just as the connotations of "service to the people" shifted over time, the meanings of "science" also changed. Even after 1949, the meaning of

---

<sup>58</sup> Axel Schneider, "Reconciling History with the Nation? Historicity, National Particularity, and the Question of Universals," *Historiography East & West* 1, no. 1 (2003): 117-36; Moloughney and Zarrow, "Making History Modern," 19-24.

“scientific” history was in constant debate among historians, even resulting in personal attacks. The year 1949 marked a watershed moment in intellectual history, not in that all non-Marxist historiographies were finally rejected, but in that Marxism was crowned a “science.”

What deserves more attention is a dissolution of dichotomies between politics and science in the Marxist academic regime. As long as Marxism was said to hold the exclusive and irrefutable key to truth, the degree to which specific historical research was considered “scientific” was determined by its political correctness and “service to the people,” not its methodology or evidence. History became historical science through nothing other than historical materialism. This was a reversal of the conventional dualistic view held by moderate Marxist historians as well as non-Marxist historians, who considered political and ideological engagement the antithesis of scientific research.<sup>59</sup> In this reversal, “scholarship for the sake of scholarship” or “pure science” was not only politically wrong, but unscientific. When Marxist historiography claimed ideology and science at the same time, the conventional dichotomy dissolved. One historian put this dissolution of the dichotomy as “I do not agree with their dualist view on ‘seeking truth’ versus

---

<sup>59</sup> Huaiyin Li examines Jian Bozan’s emphasis on “objectivity” (*keguanxing*) and “scientificness” (*kexuexing*) in historical research and its freedom from the influence of current political needs. (Li, *Reinventing Modern China*, 618.)

‘seeking use.’ I believe that we should ‘seek truth’ to ‘seek use.’ Only truth can be useful.”<sup>60</sup> Thus, the pursuit of historical materialism aimed to ensure political correctness and scientific scholarship at the same time.

### *From historian to history worker*

Based on these conceptual reconfigurations of history studies—the inherited sense of social responsibility to serve the people, the rejection of all kinds of non-Marxist historical thought and methods, and the claim to the status of science—the field of history was institutionalized in the early 1950s. The structural reformation of educational and academic institutions not only established workplaces for professional historians, but also gave birth to a new label, “history workers,” whose intellectual and professional lives embodied collectivity, something that confined them to operating within the given institutional structures.

### *Institutionalization, or collectivization*

A two-tiered system of universities and the CAS was in place, taking over the previous regime’s academic system. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik has described the inheritance: “already before 1949, academic life in China had

---

<sup>60</sup> Zhang Shouchang, “Lun lishixue de ‘qiuzheng’ yu ‘qiuyong,’” 185-188.

been organized around two core institutions: the universities and their respective faculties on the one hand, and the Academia Sinica system with its specialized research institutes on the other.”<sup>61</sup> In comprehensive universities across the nation, history departments were established or restructured during the Higher Education Reform. Republican era research institutes of history were taken over by the CAS. In addition to the Institute of Modern History mentioned in the previous section, two other institutes were established in the CAS. In 1954, the three institutes were reorganized based on historical periods, as the First Institute of History (ancient history), the Second Institute of History (medieval history), and the Third Institute of History (modern history), with Guo Moruo, Chen Yuan, and Fan Wenlan as their respective directors. When the CAS constructed four departments in 1955, the three Institutes of History went under the DPSS. The First and Second Institutes merged in 1960 to become the Institute of Chinese History. A smaller group of historians worked in the national or regional archives, museums, and cultural and educational governmental apparatuses.

Academic societies such as the National Historical Society and its regional branches were another field of historians’ academic lives. Academic

---

<sup>61</sup> Weigelin-Schwiedrzik traces the origin of this system back to that of the Soviet Union, which affected the establishments of Academia Sinica and its coexistence with universities for academic activities in the Republic of China. This two-tiered system continued in Taiwan as well after 1949. (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “Chinese Historical Writing since 1949,” 616.)

journals were also published by academic societies, such as *Lishi jiaoxue* [Historical Education] (Tianjin, established January 1951), *Xinshixue tongxun* [New History Bulletin] (Henan University, established January 1951), and *Wenshibizhe* [Literature, History, and Philosophy] (Shandong University, established May 1951). These journals published research articles from historians in their respective regions, but gradually expanded their scope and influence as historians from all over the country began to submit their papers. *Lishi yanjiu* [Historical Research] (Beijing, established February 1954) was later established by the CAS to form the central and therefore the most authoritative journal for a national audience.<sup>62</sup>

“Teaching and research offices (*jiayanshi*)” became a basic unit of organization in the universities. Modeled after universities in the Soviet Union, the People’s University of China established the teaching and research office system in 1950, which provided a prototype for other universities across the country. All professors and instructors in a

---

<sup>62</sup> Albert Feuerwerker, *Chinese Communist Studies of Modern Chinese History* (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center Harvard University, 1961); Bu Xianquan 卜宪群, “Xin zhongguo shiqinian de shixue fazhan daolu 新中国七十年的史学发展道路,” *Zhongguoshi yanjiu* 中国史研究 3 (2019): 5-34; Chen Qitai 陈其泰, “Jianguo hou shiqinian shixue ‘wanquan zhengzhizhuhua’ shuo de shangquan 建国后十七年史学‘完全政治化’说的商榷,” *Xueshu yanjiu* 学术研究 12 (2001): 5-12; Luo Zhitian 罗志田, “Wenge qian shiqinian zhongguo shixue de pianduan fansi 文革前十七年中国史学的片段反思,” *Sichuan daxue xuebao zhexue shehuikexue ban* 四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版) 9 (2009): 5-15; Zhang Yue 张越, “Xin zhongguo shixue de chujian: Guo Moruo yu zhongguo makesizhuyi shixue zhudao diwei de queli 新中国史学的初建: 郭沫若与中国马克思主义史学主导地位的确立,” *Shixue lilun yanjiu* 史学理论研究 2 (2020): 61-73.

department were organized into a teaching and research office, with additional members such as translators, secretaries, administrative staff, and sometimes graduate students. The office was in charge of organizing teaching plans (lecture, seminar, exercise, experiment, make-up class, production practice, etc.); discussing teaching methods (class outline, seminar planning, experiment planning, exercise questions, etc.); editing textbooks (teaching notes, reference book, chart, etc.); planning scientific research; collaborating with enterprises and governments; improving instructors' ideological and theoretical approaches; and training graduate students. Every office had to submit a semester plan to the director of the department first, and then to the president of the university.<sup>63</sup> This direct line of control from the president to the department to the office was set up by the establishment of the department system, which constituted teaching and research offices and students.<sup>64</sup> By this system, all members of universities and their academic activities were under the leadership of the university presidents, who were themselves under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.

---

<sup>63</sup> Cheng Fangwu 成仿吾, "Zhongguo renmin daxue de jiaoyanshi gongzuo 中国人民大学的教研室工作," *Renmin jiaoyu* 人民教育 4 (1951): 11-12.

<sup>64</sup> He Wushuang 何戊雙, "Zhongguo renmin daxue 'xi' de gongzuo 中國人民大學‘系’的工作," *Renmin jiaoyu* 人民教育 6 (1951): 33-34.

History departments were no exception. Fan Xin's recent study shows that the system of teaching and research office in the universities most directly affected historical studies. In history departments, teaching and research offices were generally created by region and by period, although this varied slightly among universities. In world history, for example, there were three offices: ancient and medieval world history, modern world history, and contemporary world history; the same arrangement divided Chinese history as well. This division promoted the specialization of historical studies, in which teaching plans and historical research on certain time periods and regions were laid out by collective work by the respective office members.<sup>65</sup>

What deserves more attention in this system of teaching and research office is its strong collective initiative. Both for teaching and research, semester plans were discussed and drafted in office meetings before each semester, and approved by the director of the office, the director of the department, and the president of the university in sequential order, defining for each member what to do and how to do it over the following semester. The plans enumerated very detailed subplans, such as for the number of pages of textbook to teach for each class, or the name of the person in

---

<sup>65</sup> Fan, *World History and National Identity*, 94-96. Another study on the Soviet influence on the construction of the field of world history in Chinese universities: Dorothea A. L. Martin, *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View: Perceptions and Interpretations of World History in the People's Republic of China* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990).

charge and the start and end date of research projects. During the semester, members were required to participate in class preparation meetings, where they shared lecture plans and confirmed that they were following the designated schedule. Observing colleagues' classes and mid-semester review were also required. Members collectively edited textbooks, compiled materials, organized research projects with students, examined students' theses, and so on.<sup>66</sup> As Fan Xin elaborates, "because of the collective nature of the *jiaoyanshi* system, scholars developed more collective projects and teamwork beginning in the 1950s, and collectively edited textbooks and reference works dominated these efforts."<sup>67</sup>

A historian working in a history department as a professor would have been responsible for teaching one or more history classes on the period and region of their offices according to the semester teaching plan, and for conducting historical research on one or more topics assigned by the plan. Workers in the office worked together on a daily basis both for teaching and research. In this system, each historian's educational and academic activities and products were effectively supervised, to varying extents, by the party apparatus, the administrative structure, the reeducation program, and

---

<sup>66</sup> Cheng Fangwu, "Zhongguo renmin daxue de jiaoyanshi gongzuo," 11-12.

<sup>67</sup> Fan, *World History and National Identity*, 96.

colleagues. For example, in the Department of History at Northeastern Normal University in 1956, the faculty members of the department collectively initiated thirty-nine research projects, edited textbooks and accepted the Ministry of Education's commission to edit nine more textbooks the following year, conducted field investigations in cooperation with local governments, organized discussion seminars and office meetings to improve teaching and research capacity, invited Soviet experts for advice, published an academic journal, and organized academic conferences that history teachers from secondary schools in the region attended to improve their teaching.<sup>68</sup> Teaching and research offices took charge of their assigned projects and activities, and the department supervised the entire suite of activities.

In a report in 1951, Cheng Fangwu, the president of the People's University of China, addressed the intent to collectivize scholars and their academic activities by implementing the teaching and research office system:

In building a new country, we need to cultivate new cadres. For this, we need a new type of higher education institution and a new type of teaching organization. This organization cannot be built on the basis of individualism. It must be collective. There are diverse demands for new higher education. Only when educational workers can sufficiently cooperate with each other,

---

<sup>68</sup> Jiang Dechang 姜德昌, "Dongbei shifan daxue lishi xi jiaoshi de kexue yanjiu gongzuo 东北师范大学历史系教师的科学研究工作," *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 9 (1956): 84-85. History departments of comprehensive universities intermittently published report articles in *Lishi Yanjiu* on the activities in the departments, which show how the departmental activities were collectively organized and implemented.

and only when they can exercise their collective capacity to a high level, can these objective demands be satisfied.<sup>69</sup>

Here underlies the mentality of service to the people and the denial of individualism, discussed previously. Cheng also promoted the advantage of collective work in pursuing scientific studies. The teaching and research office system supported and ensured the conceptual reconfiguration of historical studies as a collective endeavor of service and science. More broadly, the core of institutionalizing academic fields in the 1950s was collectivization.

### *History workers, old and new*

This process of institutionalization and collectivization of the field created a new label for historians—history workers. Before 1949, historians were called *lishijia*, *lishi xuejia*, *lishi xuezhe*, and *shijia*. The term “history worker (*lishi gongzuozhe*)” does not appear in any publications from before 1949 currently available on the databases.<sup>70</sup> There are search results for “culture worker (*wenhua gongzuozhe*),” “literature and art worker (*wenyi gongzuozhe*),” “science worker (*kexue gongzuozhe*),” and “academic worker (*xueshu gongzuozhe*).”

---

<sup>69</sup> Cheng Fangwu, “Zhongguo renmin daxue de jiaoyan shi gongzuo,” 11.

<sup>70</sup> Chinese Periodicals Database: *Dagongbao*: 1902-1949; Chinese Periodicals Full-text (1911-1949); Dacheng Old Journal Full-Text Database; Dacheng Publications in the Republic of China Full-Text Database; Late Qing Periodicals Full-Text Database; National Index to Chinese Newspapers and Periodicals; *Shenbao* (1872-1949) Database.

“Academic worker (*xueshu gongzuozhe*)” and “academic work (*xueshu gongzuo*)” especially appeared in these texts with substantial frequency, including as the name of a quasi-governmental apparatus such as the National Consultation Office for Academic Work. After 1949, these terms did not disappear but had limited applications and appeared much less frequently, often referring to specific historians, for example, “historian Jian Bozan (*lishi xuejia Jian Bozan*)” or indicating historians in foreign countries, for example, “Soviet historians (*Sulian lishixuejia*)” or “Japanese imperial historians (*Riben yuyong shijia*).” Their usage in the Republican period appears to reflect the social responsibility of such scholars to serve the people, as discussed previously.

After 1949, “history worker” became more common and indeed was ubiquitously used in the PRC, along with “philosophy worker (*zhexue gongzuozhe*)” and “social science worker (*shehui kexue gongzuozhe*).” The terms “work” and “worker” in scholarship came to additionally embody collectivity, when scholars and academic activities became collectivized by institutionalization, as described above. In 1949, Zhou Enlai, explained “literature and art worker (*wenxue yishu gongzuozhe*)” as follows:

Literature and art workers are mental workers, which is also a part of proletariat. Mental workers should learn from physical workers. Generally mental work is individual... This can cause non-collectivism. In this respect, literature and art workers

should learn from the proletariat's collective mentality and study hard.<sup>71</sup>

The 1949 shift from individualist to collective norms altered the meaning of “work.” Only with collective pursuit and structural collectivization could academic activities be “work” and scholars be “workers,” part of the working class. History came within the boundaries of “work” in the PRC in this way.

As director of the History Department at Zhongshan University, Yang Rongguo said that history work consisted of research and education, and history workers could do either or both. Research work included reading Marxism-Leninism classics to have a good theoretical foundation, so that history workers could unearth the general rule of historical development while systematically organizing detailed materials. Education work emphasized collective teaching with rich materials, a clear theoretical approach, and a passionate presentation, so that students could learn more effectively. In each region, history education workers were encouraged to collect local historical materials by visiting local museums or archaeological sites, so that students could have a more material and local understanding of

---

<sup>71</sup> Zhou Enlai 周恩来, “Zhongguo quanguo wenxue yishu gongzuozhe daibiao huiyi shang de zhengzhi baogao 中华全国文学艺术工作者代表会议上的政治报告 (1949.7.1),” *Zhou Enlai Xuanji* 周恩来选集上 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), 349-350.

history.<sup>72</sup> One historian even described history education workers as “engineers of people’s souls.”<sup>73</sup>

No comprehensive data on the number of history workers in the country is currently available; only a rough estimate from different reports is possible. When Liu Danian visited the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union in 1953, he described the current state of the field of history, saying, “in higher education institutions across the country, there are about 260 history professors and about 200 research students. The Institute of Modern History and Institute of Archaeology in the CAS has about thirty researchers.”<sup>74</sup> In October 1959, *Guangming Daily* estimated the number of history teachers in higher education as 4,793, with 451 of those trained before 1949.<sup>75</sup>

As the *Guangming Daily*’s report implies, there was generational divide marked by whether historians had been trained before or after 1949. Historians who had been trained or worked in previous regimes and decided to stay in the PRC underwent a series of measures, such as reading sessions,

---

<sup>72</sup> Qi Min 齊民, “Lishi jiaoxue yinggai liyong shiwu de difang shiliao 歷史教學應該利用實物的地方史料,” *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史學通訊 7 (1956): 15-18, 23.

<sup>73</sup> Liu Yaoting, “Lishi jiaoshi yao hen hao de jinxing ziwo gaizao,” 1-2.

<sup>74</sup> Li Danian 劉大年, “Zhongguo lishi kexue xianzhuang 中國歷史科學現狀,” *Kexue tongbao* 科學通報 7 (1953): 7-9.

<sup>75</sup> “Shixue tianye chungse man 史學田野春色滿,” *Guangming Daily* 光明日報, October 15, 1959.

criticism and self-criticism, and mass movements, transforming them from historians to history workers. This happened not at once, but gradually, over the 1950s. Non-Marxist historians familiarized themselves with the new language of Marxist historical thinking either affirmatively, begrudgingly, or indifferently.<sup>76</sup> Albert Feuerwerker's early work points out that this process was relatively smooth for non-Marxist historians as well, as "even among those historians who were not committed politically, Marxist modes of historical thinking had made considerable inroads during the 1920s and 1930s."<sup>77</sup> These two modes of thinking were considered complementary rather than exclusive, especially in functional sense. While Marxism worked as a guiding theory, non-Marxist historians' critical reading skills and comprehensive knowledge of primary sources still carried substantial weight. One of the National Historical Society's early projects was the Collection of Materials of Modern Chinese History (中国近代史资料丛刊) Project. Many non-Marxist historians were mobilized due to their expertise in primary sources, while the periodization of the whole series strictly followed

---

<sup>76</sup> Jiang Haisheng 蒋海升, "Cong zhuliu dao bianyuan: 20 shiji 50 niandai chuqi de shiliao kaodingpai 从主流到边缘: 20 世纪 50 年代初期的史料考订派," *Shandong daxue xuebao zhexue shehuikexue ban* 山东大学学报 哲学社会科学版 6 (2005): 76-82; Liu Dalian, "Zhongguo lishi kexue xianzhuang," 7-9; Liu Yaoting 刘尧庭, "Lishi gongzuozhe dui xuexi dangshi yingyou de renshi 历史工作者对学习党史应有的认识," *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史学通讯 7 (1951): 7-9; Luo Zhitian, "Wenge qian shiqinian zhongguo shixue," 5-15; Zhang Yue, "Xin zhongguo shixue de chujian," 61-73.

<sup>77</sup> Feuerwerker, *Chinese Communist Studies of Modern Chinese History*, x.

the Marxist periodization of modern Chinese history.<sup>78</sup> The journal *Lishi yanjiu* had a separate section for “textual criticism (*kaozheng*)” and “introduction of historical materials,” where famous scholars of textual criticism Chen Yinke and Gu Jiegang published their work. Out of seven articles in the first issue of *Lishi yanjiu*, three were categorized by title as textual criticism. The Institute of History in the CAS addressed such this moderate pace of change in a report in the early 1950s:

We cannot hurry in practice. Historians might not be able to maturely apply Marxism-Leninism to solve important historical issues, not to solve important historical issues in one or two sentences.... We cannot force historians to “reach the sky in one step,” nor to have a high level of Marxism-Leninism right away. Let’s slowly grasp the Marxist perspective.<sup>79</sup>

As Wang Xuedian has pointed out, the Hu Shih Criticism Movement in 1955 “symbolized academic circles’ collective, public farewell to the academic traditions of the Republican era.”<sup>80</sup> Since then, Marxist historiography and methodology came to dominate the field.

---

<sup>78</sup> “Jindaishi yanjiusuo 1950 nian gongzuo gaikuang 近代史研究所 1950 年工作概况,” *Kexue tongbao* 科学通报 2 (1951): 83; “Zhongguo jindaishi he xiandaiishi ziliao congkan luxu chuban 中國近代史和現代史資料叢刊陸續出版,” *People’s Daily*, May 18, 1954; Lin Ganquan 林甘泉, “Ershi shiji de zhongguo lishixue 二十世紀的中國歷史學,” *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究 2 (1996): 5-25.

<sup>79</sup> “Zhongguo kexueyuqn jiji zhunbei yibu jiaqiang lishi yanjiu gongzuo 中國科學院積極準備進一步加強歷史研究工作,” *Kexue tongbao* 科学通报 5 (1954): 52.

<sup>80</sup> Xuedian Wang, “Fifty Years of Chinese Historiography,” *Chinese Studies in History* 45, no. 2-3 (2011): 8.

While the older generation of historians were undergoing transformation, the younger generation of history workers were trained in higher education institutions, mostly in comprehensive universities. Graduates from history departments were allocated either to regional branches of the CAS, smaller research institutes of culture and history (*wenshiguan*), regional museums, secondary education institutions as history teachers, or to stay in the affiliated department as graduate students.<sup>81</sup> The process of recruiting researchers to the Northeast Institute of Literature and History shows a glimpse of how allocation and training of history workers worked. This case, however, does not reflect the general trend of the 1950s, as the Institute was established in May of 1962, not in the 1950s.

Tong Dong was one of the founders of the institute and had ambitions to promote the humanities in the Northeast. In the summer of 1961, at the time of labor allocation for college graduates, the Institute, still under construction conceptually, administratively, and physically, notified the first group of 23 students that they had been allocated to the institute as trainee researchers. The second cohort entered the Institute in the summer of 1962, with 33 students, and the third group, 40 students, entered in the

---

<sup>81</sup> Yutaka Otsuka 大塚豊, *Gendai Chugoku Koto Kyoiku No Seiritsu* 現代中国高等教育の成立 (Tokyo: Tamagawa daigaku shuppanbu, 1996), 321.

summer of 1965. To secure talented students, Tong Dong maintained connections with major universities and followed high-ranking students' academic performances. His recruiting principle was "thesis first, dossier later." Putting more stake in students' talent and potential than their class background, he selected promising students based on their college grades and undergraduate theses. Students' political performance and family background were secondary considerations, which was unconventional at the time.<sup>82</sup> This case shows how college graduates were allocated to be trained as professional historians, and how the combination of the allocation system and a leader's priorities worked together in the process.

### ***Conclusion***

The CCP created a full-scale Marxist academic regime, first by re-identifying the field of history as an antithesis to non-Marxist historical modes of thinking and as science, and then by institutionalizing the field by collectivizing historians and their academic activities within a bureaucratic structure. This regime eliminated externality of historical studies in both terms of thoughts and institution. Within this given structure, a historian

---

<sup>82</sup> Huang Zhongye 黄中业, Sun Yuliang 孙玉良, "Gongjieguo jiaoyu shi shang de guoxue shuyuan shi xuebu: Dongbei wenshi yanjiusuo shuyao 共和国教育史上的国学书院式学府: 东北文史研究所述要," *Shehui kexue zhanxian* 社会科学战线 1(2015): 14.

could not lead an academic life without being affiliated with a bureaucratized academic institution. There was no such a thing as unaffiliated independent scholar. Once a historian was affiliated, then he or she was under the direct control of a teaching and research office, department, university, and the Ministry of Education; or the CAS, Ministry of Propaganda, and State Council. Historians in smaller research institutes, museums, and governmental apparatuses also served under their respective institutional leadership. Paul Pickowicz's observation on historians in the PRC today shows how restrictions on academic research were structurally imposed and continued throughout the regime. "There are virtually no independent historians.... How many scholars of modern Chinese history working in mainland China today and writing in Chinese are ready to express views that challenge current party/state orthodoxies? Who will employ such people? Where will they publish their research?"<sup>83</sup>

It was an institutionalized elimination of intellectual autonomy. No less than thought reforms or political struggles against intellectuals, this web of institutional settings and assigned tasks had a deep influence on the everyday lives of history workers. Taking the inescapable web seriously, however, history workers still tried to make their academic and professional

---

<sup>83</sup> Paul G. Pickowicz, "Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing by Huaiyin Li (review)," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 74, no. 1 (2014): 174.

lives meaningful in the given structure. History workers had to accept the Marxist historiography in order to speak in the only academic language permitted. History workers had to be affiliated to any institution in order to earn their living. The given workplace, work culture, and colleagues created social responsibility and pressure, making it difficult to question the system or to remain ignorant of Marxism. The pressure was not only from a distant, abstract regime but from their very own workplace. History workers' conformity in turn reinforced the structure. The birth of history worker signaled the educated acquiescence based on the historiographical reconfiguration and the rise of science in the 1950s.

## CHAPTER 2

### MARGINALIZED UNDER INDUSTRIALISM: HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM, THE TWELVE-YEAR PLAN, AND THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Now that the Chinese revolution has achieved a basic victory, a new task has emerged in front of us social scientists: to establish a new democratic China led by the proletariat and to make a smooth transition to the stage of socialism and communism. This is a tremendous and incomparable scientific undertaking. There will also be countless new problems, new obstacles, and new difficulties that we have never encountered before. (Guo Moruo, 1949)<sup>84</sup>

In January 1949, while the Civil War was still raging in other parts of the country, intellectuals from various regions flocked to Beijing, in anticipation of the impending establishment of a new state, and eager to discuss its ideological foundations. A series of meetings involving writers, artists, historians, and social scientists were held in the city. Guo Moruo, a distinguished Marxist historian in the CCP and subsequently Director of the CAS, was one of the leaders of these intellectual discussions. In his inaugural remarks at the Conference of Representatives of Chinese Social Science

---

<sup>84</sup> Guo Moruo 郭沫若, “Guo Moruo zai shehui kexue gongzuozhe daibiao huiyi faqiren hui shang de kaimuci 郭沫若在社会科学工作者代表会发起人会上的开幕词,” *People’s Daily*, July 16, 1949.

Workers' Opening Meeting in July 1949, he laid out new duties for social scientists in the new China, and outlined additional challenges that social scientists would likely face down the road. This chapter discusses these “new problems, new obstacles, and new difficulties” for social scientists.

In the first decade after the civil war, the CCP, and the country, oscillated between centralization and decentralization, or between centripetal and centrifugal forces.<sup>85</sup> *Yindi zhiyi* (in accordance with local conditions) had been a crucial revolutionary strategy when the Communists were circulating around the country in the 1940s. Lacking a firm center to supervise activity in the distant border areas, local governance mattered, providing models for expansion into other areas.<sup>86</sup> This bottom-up approach had to be changed once the Communist Party seized central power. In the early 1950s, the CCP exhibited a strong centripetal tendency for centralization of power and all-out industrialization. And, later, there was in 1956 another switch, following the party's decision to split from the Soviet development model. By 1956, the centralization that had marked the early 1950s had slowed and interest in moderate decentralization emerged among the Chinese Communist leaders.

---

<sup>85</sup> Jae Ho Chung, *Centrifugal Empire: Central-Local Relations in China* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016).

<sup>86</sup> Sebastian Heilmann, “Policy-making through experimentation: the formation of a distinctive policy process,” in *Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China*, eds. Elizabeth J. Perry and Sebastian Heilmann (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 62-101.

This chapter traces the crises that the humanities and social sciences confronted in early 1950s during centralization and industrialization, and scholars' responses to the slight decentralization of 1956. The crisis in the early 1950s was marked by a higher education reform designed to support industrialization by focusing educational resources on the natural sciences and engineering. The reform thus reduced the scope of the humanities and social sciences. Following the Communist Party's subtle shift towards decentralization in 1956 and the restructuring of the CAS, however, a small window opened that gave humanities and social science scholars an opportunity to carve out a niche for their fields. The Twelve-Year Plan for Philosophy and Social Sciences designed and proposed in 1956 by scholars in DPSS in CAS shows how scholars projected their fields in the national setting. This chapter also provides a general sociopolitical background for the following chapters.

### ***Centripetal forces in the early PRC***

In October 1949 the CCP faced an enormous task. Even at this juncture, in the founding years of the PRC, the Civil War was still raging in the southern part of the country. Cadres were busy taking over and reforming apparatuses and personnel from the previous regime at various levels of government and in various segments of society. Urban unemployment and inflation imposed

new burdens on the Communists while land reform continued at a rapid pace in the countryside. In ideological terms, the new regime needed to establish a clear and persuasive vision and direction to win the people's recognition and support.

Lacking sufficient material, human, and knowledge-related resources to achieve these objectives by itself, the CCP decided to continue its New Democracy phase. Theoretically, following Mao Zedong's thought, in the New Democracy stage that began in 1940 the CCP was pursuing a united front with democratic and nationalist bourgeoisie forces until the conditions conducive to socialism would ripen sufficiently to move on.<sup>87</sup> The First Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949 approved the Common Program, a quasi-constitutional document clarifying the new regime's stage of development as such, ensuring protection of non-Communist collaborators' rights.<sup>88</sup> New Democracy as a governing strategy provided a legitimate ground for continuity in the employment of people and resources from the previous regime. In the early years the PRC was relatively moderate and inclusive in both theory and reality.

---

<sup>87</sup> Mao Zedong 毛泽东, "Xin minzhuzhuyi lun 新民主主义论," *Mao Zedong Xuanji* 毛泽东选集, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1991).

<sup>88</sup> "Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi gongtong gangling 中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领 (1949.9.29)," 1-13.

Soon, however, the CCP shifted toward centralizing power. The Korean War that broke out in June 1950 provoked an urgent sense of crisis in and out of the party, as it was seen as threatening China with another imperialist invasion when the new state had not yet fully taken form. The so-called Resist America Aid Korea Campaign took off nationwide, mobilizing industrial production and ideological education. The campaign was followed by a series of mass movements in search of anyone who might act as an internal enemy; these movements included the Thought Reform for intellectuals, the Three-Anti Campaigns against corrupt bureaucrats, and the Five-Anti Campaign against entrepreneurs.<sup>89</sup> Once-protected non-Communist collaborators found themselves under attack, and New Democracy lost its core value.

The First Five-Year Plan was devised in these favorable circumstances and reinforced the centripetal orientation. Formulated in 1952 for the 1953–1957 period, the Plan called for rapid industrialization with a focus on heavy

---

<sup>89</sup> Jiang Yihua 姜义华, “Guodu shiqi lilun yu qudai xin minzhuzhuyi lishi beijing de yixiang kaocha 过渡时期理论与取代新民主主义历史背景的一项考察,” in *1950 niandai de zhongguo* 1950年代的中国, eds. Wu Jingping 吴景平, Xu Siyan 徐思彦 (Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chunbanshe, 2006), 1-54; Mori Kazuko 毛里和子, “Chūgoku no shakai shugi-teki sentaku to kokusai kankyō: 1953-Nen no katoki no ippan rosen' ni tsuite 中国の社会主義的選択と国際環境: 1953年の「過渡期の一般路線」について,” in *Higashi Ajia to reisen* 東アジアと冷戦, ed. Akira Yamagiwa (Tokyo: Sanrei Shobo, 1993); Yamaguchi Shinji 山口信治, “Motakuto ni yoru senryaku tenkan to shite no shinminshushugi dankai kōsō no hōki 毛沢東による戦略転換としての新民主主義段階構想の放棄,” *Ajia kenkyū* アジア研究 54 (2008): 22-39; Yang Kuisong 杨奎松, “Mao Zedong wei shenme fangqi xin minzhuzhuyi 毛泽东为什么放弃新民主主义?” *Jindaishi yanjiu* 近代史研究 4 (1997): 139-153.

industry. This model needed a strong state wielding centralized authority. Heavy industrial factories and mines were owned and run by either the central or provincial governments. Agricultural products were for the most part passed over to the state to support the urban population for industrialization. Both material and human resources were placed under state control through extensive bureaucratization and top-down employment allocation. This developmentalist drive legitimated the central authority's monopoly of power in the name of the greatest achievement for the greatest number of people. As the Plan progressed, centralization strengthened.

Okumura Satoshi has referred to 1950s China as a “wartime regime.”<sup>90</sup> Even after the series of wars that produced the regime per se ended, the wartime regime was driven by the urgent need to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible, giving precedence to virtues such as efficiency and speed, as well as the centralization of power. In these circumstances, promoting the humanities and social sciences could not be a priority. Intellectuals in these disciplines recognized this crisis to their work and tried to overcome their disadvantage.

---

<sup>90</sup> Okumura Satoshi 奥村哲, *Chūgoku no gendai-shi: Sensōtoshakai shugi* 中国の現代史: 戦争と社会主義 (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1999).

### *Higher education reform and the fate of the humanities*

This centripetal regime took concrete form in higher education reform.

Higher education reform, generally referred to in Chinese as College-Department Reorganization (*yuanxi tiaozheng*), took place gradually over the course of the 1950s<sup>91</sup>. It consisted primarily of institutional reorganization and reform. Most universities had been established in the Republican period by founders from an earlier era and were later taken over by the CCP during various phases of the Civil War. As early as 1947, the CCP was aware that universities were concentrated in a small number of large cities, departmental structures overlapped inefficiently, and the curriculum lacked important majors that would help drive industrialization. In Northeast and Northern China, which the CCP had taken over earlier in 1949 and where a large number of universities were concentrated, party cadres began discussing how to reorganize regional universities in service of the CCP's vision and needs.<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup> Douglas Stiffler examines the intellectuals' resistance in the first few years of the 1950s against the higher education reform based on their traditional perceptions of education and social standing. Stiffler shows that not until a series of thought reforms and political campaigns against intellectuals in the early 1950s undermined the idea of the university as an ivory tower of academic freedom were conditions conducive to full-fledged higher education reform in place. Douglas Stiffler, "Resistance to Sovietization of Higher Education in China," in *Universities under Dictatorship*, eds. John Connelly and Michael Grüttner (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 213-243. See also, Li Yang 李杨, "Wushi niandai de yuanxitiaozheng yu shehui bianqian: Yuanxitiaozheng yanjiu zhi yi 五十年代的院系调整与社会变迁: 院系调整研究之一," *Kaifang Shidai* 开放时代 5 (2004): 15-30.

<sup>92</sup> Li Qi 李琦, "Jianguo chuqi quanguo gaodengxuexiao yuanxitiaozheng shuping 建国初期全国高等学校院系调整述评," *Dangde Wenxian* 党的文献 6 (2002): 71-77; Stiffler, "Resistance to Sovietization of Higher Education in China," 217.

It was at the First National Conference on Higher Education in June 1950 that the principles and tasks of higher education were discussed and set up on a preliminary basis. Minister of Education Ma Yinchu gave a speech at the conference, concisely summarizing the CCP's stance:

Education must work for economic construction. The emphasis of economic construction is on industry, and the emphasis of industrial construction is on heavy industry. This clearly indicates that the primary and foremost task of our higher education should be the cultivation of advanced technicians for industries, mines, and transportation.<sup>93</sup>

Higher education reform was a highly ideological project as well as a process of institutional reorganization. In terms of institutional organization, the Ministry of Higher Education was established anew in late 1952 in line with the reform, dividing the Ministry of Education's responsibilities. All universities in the country were brought under the Ministry of Higher Education's direct or indirect jurisdiction. Once the Ministry established full control over the universities, it reorganized colleges and departments and reallocated professors and students to achieve regional balance and distribute the functions that were needed to realize the central state's objectives.<sup>94</sup> The reform was ideological in the sense that it envisioned the cultivation of elites

---

<sup>93</sup> Chung Shih, *Higher Education in Communist China* (Hong Kong: Kowloon, H. K., Union Research Institute, 1953), 76.

<sup>94</sup> Li Yang, "Wushi niandai de yuanxitiaozheng yu shehui bianqian," 15-30; Suzanne Pepper, "Education for the New Order," in *The Cambridge History of China Volume 14. The People's Republic*, eds. Rodrick MacFarquhar and J. K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 185-217.

who could contribute to the nation-building and national development that the CCP was about to launch. Education in the new China had been in the making since the CCP's takeover of universities in the late 1940s, reflecting deliberations over what kind of manpower the nation needed to achieve construction and development.

This emphasis on the duty of education to facilitate industrial development has been explained as a product Soviet influence and the CCP's Learning to One Side policy in international relations. Soviet specialists who had been sent to China to advise the party on all aspects of higher education reform attended the conference.<sup>95</sup> The Soviet Union, having already experienced long debates and changes in higher education policy in the 1920s and 1930s, appeared to have saved those debates and deliberations for the latecomer China.<sup>96</sup> As Ruth Hayhoe puts it, "A popular idea of the period was that the most advanced achievements of both capitalism and socialism were already combined in the Soviet Union, and that China could take a short-cut to development through assimilating Soviet patterns wholeheartedly and without question."<sup>97</sup> The First Five-Year Plan legitimized

---

<sup>95</sup> Ruth Hayhoe, "China's Universities and Western Academic Models," *Higher Education* 18, no. 1 (1989): 69.

<sup>96</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

<sup>97</sup> Ruth Hayhoe, "Chinese Universities and the Social Sciences," *Minerva* 31, no. 4 (1993): 478-503.

and accelerated the focus in higher education on producing technological and engineering experts.

Following the Soviet model, the higher education reform created a new landscape that sorted universities into three groups: polytechnics, comprehensive universities (*zonghe daxue*), and special colleges for agriculture, education, medicine, finance, law, art, and the like.<sup>98</sup> While the numbers involved vary from study to study, taken together this research reveals a consistent pattern of change: As the higher education reform progressed over the course of the 1950s, polytechnic colleges increased in number. In contrast, the number of comprehensive universities, reconstituted to offer instruction and research in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences, dropped.

Table 1 presents figures indicating how educational institutions and students were affected by changes that took place between 1949 and 1952. Comprehensive universities dropped in number from 49 to 14, while polytechnics increased from 28 to 38. Another study finds similar results, reporting that comprehensive universities dropped in number from 51 to 21

---

<sup>98</sup> “Jianguo chuqi quanguo gaodengjiaoyu yuanxitiaozheng wenxian xuanzhai: yijiuwuyi nian – yijiuwusan nian 建国初期全国高等学校院系调整文献选载: 一九五一年\_一九五三年,” *Dangde Wenxian* 党的文献 6 (2002): 59-71; Suzanne Pepper, *Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model* (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 175.

while polytechnics increased from 31 to 44 before and after 1952.<sup>99</sup> Yet another study reports numbers in December 1953, when there were only 14 comprehensive universities but 39 polytechnic schools.<sup>100</sup>

		Comprehensive		Engineering		Agriculture and Forestry		Health		Education		Finance and Economics	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Number of Institutions	1949	49	23.9	28	13.7	18	8.8	22	10.7	12	5.9	11	5.4
	1953	14	7.7	38	21.0	29	16.0	29	16.0	33	18.2	6	3.3
Rate of Increase		28.6		135.7		161.1		131.8		275.0		54.5	
Number of Students	1949			30,320	26.2	10,361	8.9	15,234	13.1	12,039	10.3	19,362	16.6
	1953			79,975	37.7	15,419	7.3	29,025	13.7	39,958	18.8	13,472	6.3
Rate of Increase				263.8		148.8		190.5		331.9		69.6	
		Political Science and Law		Language and Literature		Arts		Physical Education		Others		Total	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Number of Institutions	1949	7	3.4	11	5.4	18	8.8	2	1.0	27	13.2	205	100
	1953	4	2.2	8	4.4	15	8.3	4	2.2	1	0.6	181	100
Rate of Increase		57.1		72.7		83.3		200.0		3.7		88.2	
Number of Students	1949	7,338	6.3			2,755	2.4	282	0.2			116,504	100
	1953	3,908	1.8			2,700	1.3	1,096	0.2			212,181	100
Rate of Increase		53.3				98.0		388.7				182.0	

**Table 1 Number of higher education institutions and student registration in 1949 and 1953<sup>101</sup>**

<sup>99</sup> Su Weichang 苏渭昌, "Wushi niandai de yuanxi tiaozheng 五十年代的院系调整," *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Xuebao* 高等教育学报 4 (1989): 11.

<sup>100</sup> Pepper, *Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China*, 176.

<sup>101</sup> Otsuka, *Gendai Chugoku Koto Kyoiku No Seiritsu*, 131

School year	Engineering	Science	Agriculture and Forestry	Health	Education	Finance and Economics	Political Science and Law	Literature and Arts	Total
1928-1932	10.2	8.3	3.8	4.0	7.8	5.9	38.2	21.8	100.0
1933-1937	14.4	12.8	4.9	10.5	8.1	6.9	23.5	18.9	100.0
1938-1942	21.0	11.3	7.3	8.6	9.8	10.4	20.2	11.4	100.0
1943-1948	18.6	7.3	7.2	8.0	13.6	11.6	22.1	11.6	100.0
1949-1950	26.0	6.0	8.9	13.0	10.6	16.7	6.3	12.5	100.0
1950-1951	27.8	-	-	12.5	9.6	-	-	-	100.0
1951-1952	31.2	-	-	13.8	11.7	-	-	-	100.0
1952-1953	34.8	5.0	8.1	12.9	16.7	11.5	2.0	9.0	100.0
1953-1954	37.7	5.8	7.2	13.7	19.4	6.4	1.8	8.0	100.0
1954-1955	37.5	6.8	6.3	13.4	21.8	4.4	1.6	8.2	100.0
1955-1956	38.1	6.9	7.5	12.7	21.9	3.9	1.7	7.3	100.0
1956-1957	36.8	6.3	-		24.3	-	-	-	100.0
1957-1958	40.9	6.2	8.6	12.6	21.3	2.9	2.1	5.4	100.0

**Table 2 Enrollment by field as percentage, 1928-1958<sup>102</sup>**

As the number of institutions changed, the proportion of students enrolled in the corresponding fields of study followed the trend. Table 2 lists the proportion of students in academic fields from 1928 to 1958, providing a macroscopic observation of the trend. Political science and law, the most popular fields in the 1920s–1930s with 38.2% of enrolled students, decreased sharply in 1949, and the humanities decreased gradually across the entire time period. Engineering, on the other hand, which claimed only 10.2% of enrollment in 1928, had captured 40.9% of students by 1957. Table

---

<sup>102</sup> Leo A. Orleans, *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961), 71.

3 displays the numbers of graduates from 1948 to 1958, following the same trend.

Centralized personnel planning coordinated the reform efforts in order to align higher education with China's national needs. Students were enrolled not in the fields they preferred but in those to which they were assigned by the central Ministry of Higher Education. This unified planned enrollment of college students commenced in 1950 and was enforced in full measure by 1952, in line with the higher education reform process. Students sat for nationwide college entrance exams, submitted small lists of the majors they preferred, and were assigned to institutions accordingly. The centralized assignment scheme was applied again when students graduated. Enrollment was planned proactively, projecting national needs in specific fields four years into the future, so that the graduates could be recruited immediately and begin contributing to meeting the national objectives. The Bureau of Personnel in large administrative districts was in charge of matching manpower needs in various fields and industries with college graduates each year, region by region. Districts exchanged graduates with those from other districts if needed. Provincial governments later assumed

the work after the large administrative districts were abolished.<sup>103</sup> There was some student dissent against undesirable allocations, but not to the extent of seriously challenging the system. The CCP's propaganda apparatus joined the reform, framing job allocation both as a proud CCP endeavor that would eliminate the high unemployment that lingered after the previous regime, and as an honor for individual students who would now have an opportunity to serve the nation.<sup>104</sup> Institutions and propaganda offices jointly ran the entire manpower supply system from admissions to graduation and employment to support industrialization.

This was a transformative shift in higher education in China's long history. In the premodern period, higher education was closely interweaved with the civil service examination system, or was framed by the pursuit of self-cultivation, producing intellectuals with knowledge of classical texts and Confucian ethics as well as expertise in state governance. Even in the late Qing and Republican periods, when a series of educational reforms was laid out to facilitate modernization, this fundamental concept of higher

---

<sup>103</sup> “Zuohao zuzhi quanguo gaodeng xuexiao xinsheng ruxue de gongzuo 做好组织全国高等学校新生入学的工作,” *People's Daily*, September 25, 1953; Pepper, *Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China*, 179-181; Otsuka, *Gendai Chugoku Koto Kyoiku No Seiritsu*, 238-242.

<sup>104</sup> Zhao Yeqin 赵晔琴, “Cong biye fenpei dao zizhu zheyue: Jiuye guanxi zhong de geren yu guojia. 1951-1999nian renmin ribao dui gaoziao biye fenpei de baodao wei li 从毕业分配到自主择业: 就业关系中的个人与国家. 1951-1999年人民日报对高校毕业分配的报道为例,” *Shehui Kexue* 社会科学 4 (2016): 73-84.

education's purpose—to produce generalist intellectuals who could either serve as bureaucrats or play a cultural role as thinkers—did not fundamentally change. The idea of liberal arts education, borrowed mainly from the United States, did not appear to contradict the preexisting concepts or systems. Humanities disciplines such as philosophy, literature, history, music, and art, and modern fields of social sciences such as political theory, law, sociology, and economics, constituted the standard college curriculum in pursuit of a liberal arts education.<sup>105</sup> As in earlier times, in the Republican period, college graduates were expected to become bureaucrats or scholars—self-made individuals with general knowledge that would be relevant to modern life. Thus, the higher education reform of the early 1950s marked a turning point, in that “the Soviet model finally transformed the generalist Chinese intellectual into a modern specialist.”<sup>106</sup>

---

<sup>105</sup> The modern form of social sciences was in use in the Republican Government's pursuit of scientific and modernized governance as well: Chiang, *Social Engineering and the Social Sciences in China*; Tong Lam, *A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation State, 1900-1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). On social surveys as a tool for governance in the PRC, see Thomas Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

<sup>106</sup> Pepper, “Education for the New Order,” 199; Leo A. Orleans, “Soviet Influence on China's Higher Education,” in *China's Education and the Industrialized World: Studies in Cultural Transfer*, eds. Ruth Hayhoe and Marianne Bastid (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1987), 184.

School year	Engineering		Science		Agriculture and Forestry		Health			
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
1948-1949	4,752	22.6	1,584	7.5	1,718	8.2	1,314	6.3		
1949-1950	4,711	26.2	1,468	8.1	1,477	8.2	1,391	7.7		
1950-1951	4,416	23.2	1,488	7.8	1,538	8.1	2,366	12.5		
1951-1952	10,213	31.9	2,215	6.9	2,361	7.4	2,636	8.3		
1952-1953	14,565	30.3	1,753	3.7	2,633	5.5	2,948	6.1		
1953-1954	15,596	33.2	802	1.7	3,532	7.5	4,527	9.6		
1954-1955	18,614	33.8	2,015	3.7	2,614	4.8	6,840	12.4		
1955-1956	22,047	35.0	3,978	6.3	3,541	5.6	5,403	8.6		
1956-1957	17,162	30.6	3,524	6.3	3,104	5.5	6,200	11.1		
1957-1958	17,499	24.3	4,645	6.4	3,513	4.9	5,393	7.5		
Total	129,575	30.1	23,472	5.4	26,031	6.0	39,018	9.1		
	Education		Finance and Economics		Literature and Arts		Others		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1948-1949	1,890	9.0	3,137	14.9	2,521	12.0	4,084	19.5	21,000	100
1949-1950	624	3.5	3,305	18.4	2,306	12.8	2,718	15.1	18,000	100
1950-1951	1,206	6.4	3,638	19.1	2,169	11.4	2,179	11.5	19,000	100
1951-1952	3,077	9.6	7,263	22.7	1,676	5.2	2,559	8.0	32,000	100
1952-1953	9,650	20.1	10,530	21.9	3,306	6.9	2,625	5.5	48,000	100
1953-1954	10,551	22.5	6,033	12.8	2,683	5.7	3,276	7.0	47,000	100
1954-1955	12,133	22.1	4,699	8.5	4,679	8.5	3,406	6.2	55,000	100
1955-1956	17,243	27.4	4,460	7.1	4,025	6.4	2,303	3.6	63,000	100
1956-1957	15,948	28.5	3,651	6.5	4,294	7.7	2,117	3.8	56,000	100
1957-1958	31,595	43.9	2,349	3.3	4,131	5.7	2,875	4.0	72,000	100
Total	103,917	24.1	49,065	11.4	31,790	7.4	28,132	6.5	431,000	100

**Table 3 Graduates by field as number and percentage, 1948-1958<sup>107</sup>**

The new regime's emphasis on industrialization was manifested in the higher education reform, which in turn reinforced that priority. Some records indicating that engineering was not only a state priority but also the most popular major students mentioned when they were submitting their

---

<sup>107</sup> Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, "The Reorganisation of Higher Education in Communist China, 1949-61," *The China Quarterly*, no. 19 (1964): 128-160.

preferences suggests, interestingly, the consensual idea of a national priority and individuals' conformity to it.<sup>108</sup> This widespread recognition of the comparative importance of specific academic majors reproduced itself over time. The humanities and social sciences became less important fields in higher education following the reform—resulting in a smaller number of student applications and lower enrollment in a smaller number of institutions. The task and purpose of education in a comprehensive university was characterized as “cultivating researchers in the natural and social sciences who can devote themselves to scientific research and higher and secondary education.”<sup>109</sup> University graduates were assigned primarily either to graduate school to continue their studies, to the CAS for internships, or to secondary schools as teachers.<sup>110</sup>

One more thing to point out is that all the three tables above show a consistent increase in numbers of students, institutions, and graduates in teacher-training colleges, even though these tables and available sources do

---

<sup>108</sup> “Zuohao zuzhi quanguo gaodeng xuexiao xinsheng ruxue de gongzuo.”

<sup>109</sup> Zhongyang renmin zhengfu gaodeng jiaoyubu 中央人民政府高等教育部, “Guanyu zonghe daxue de fangzhen he renwu de baogao 关于综合大学的方针和任务的报告(1953.9.10),” in *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jianguo Yilai Gaodeng Jiaoyu Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian* 中华人民共和国建国以来高等教育重要文献选编, Vol. 1, ed. Huadong shida gaoxiao ganbu jinxiuban and Jiaoyu kexue yanjiusuo 华东师大高校干部进修班, 教育科学研究所, 101-113; “Quanguo zonghe daxue huiyi kaimu, taolun zonghe daxue de fangzhen, renwu he peiyang mubiao 全国综合大学会议开幕, 讨论综合大学的方针、任务和培养目标,” *People's Daily*, September 11, 1953.

<sup>110</sup> Otsuka, *Gendai Chugoku Koto Kyoiku No Seiritsu*, 321.

not provide the specific distribution of the numbers within eight main fields in teacher-training colleges—Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Education, Geography, History, and Chinese. The increase reflected the First Five Year Plan’s call for supplementing about 100,000 secondary school teachers through teacher-training colleges. The National Conference on Higher Education for Teacher Training in 1953 articulated the purpose of teacher training as cultivating future generation of human resources and emphasized the cooperation of higher and secondary education to achieve the purpose together. Teachers of history, geography, and Chinese were trained to teach students general knowledge as well as patriotic perspective of China and the Chinese nation.<sup>111</sup> The social utilities and functions of humanities and social sciences here were reduced to the means of cultivating teachers of respective training, which held only a fragment of academic and intellectual value of the fields. The marginal status of the humanities and social sciences in the early 1950s became tangible during the higher education reform, which again institutionally reproduced their status in social perceptions.

---

<sup>111</sup> “Gaodeng shifan jiaoyu huiyi bimu, quedingle gaodeng shifan xuexiao de fazhan fangzhen de renwu 高等师范教育会议闭幕, 确定了高等师范学校的发展方针和任务,” *People’s Daily*, October 14, 1953.

### ***1956: Noticing the margin***

The year 1956 marked a shift in this trend towards the sciences and engineering. While the CCP pursued centralization in administration and resource distribution in the early 1950s, in 1956 it began to take notice of the marginalized spots under the centripetal regime. The role of the region as opposed to that of the center was widely discussed. Indeed, the decentralization of the administration through the delegation of authority to provincial governments in 1956 has long been a research topic among political scientists.

Why, at this point, did the Communists begin decentralizing? Early studies cite the completion of the First Five-Year Plan in late 1955 as a domestic factor. The *People's Daily* published an editorial on New Year's Day in 1956, declaring that "The First Five-Year Plan has been accomplished earlier than planned, even exceeding the plan. Thus, the general task for the transition period has also been accomplished earlier than expected."<sup>112</sup> "In every domain, it seemed, the People's Republic was surging forward,"<sup>113</sup> as Frank Dikötter comments sarcastically on the atmosphere in 1956. The

---

<sup>112</sup> "Wei quanmian di tizao wancheng de chao'e wancheng wunian jihua er fendou 为全面地提早完成和超额完成五年计划而奋斗 (1956.1.1)," in *Jianguo Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian* 建国以来重要文献选编, Vol. 8 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992), 1-10.

<sup>113</sup> Frank Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945-57* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 404.

statistical growth of various domains in Chinese society concealed the increasingly dire condition of the people, as Dikötter argues. This early *success* in planned industrialization, at least in statistical terms, seemed, however to give confidence to the Communist Party. China was still an underdeveloped country but had made enormous progress.

In addition, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February 1956 profoundly affected China's path. As early success relied on China's full implementation of the Soviet model, especially regarding the centralization of authority and top-down planning, this criticism of its moral legitimacy left the Chinese Communists in a difficult position. On the other hand, it appeared to offer Mao Zedong, who was concerned with the increasingly bureaucratized ways of the Chinese revolution, an opportunity. His concern turned into the endeavor to expand and complete collectivization in the countryside in mid-1955. The Hundred Flowers Campaign was another of his attempts to criticize the exceedingly bureaucratized trend within the party and to revive revolutionary zeal in society.

Mao elaborated this idea in a speech, "On the Ten Major Relationships," he delivered at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo in April 1956. In revisiting and denouncing the Soviet model, Mao raised questions about the centralized and lopsided approach, and stressed the

need to establish more evenly balanced relationships in ten domains. The fifth domain of the ten involved the relationship between central and local authorities. In the speech Mao admitted that administrative centralization in the early years was necessary but created rigidities and inefficiency. “We should not, like the Soviet Union, concentrate everything at the center, tightening up the regions without discretion.” To construct a powerful socialist country, strong central leadership was still required but with full use of regional initiatives, he argued.<sup>114</sup>

This speech pointed to a loosening up in local administrations, a view that was further advanced at the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956. At this first Party Congress in the PRC, while Mao Zedong Thought was removed from the party charter in cognizance of the cult of Stalin, Mao’s proposal regarding the ten relationships was discussed and informed several resolutions. While decision-making authority lay at the center, units that were responsible for production and construction were located physically in certain regions under regional governments’ jurisdictions. Thus, moderate decentralization was needed to make communication and production in such

---

<sup>114</sup> Wen Yanshi argues that Mao’s argumentation embodies a consensual understanding among the leaders, especially Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, receiving reports and examining nationwide economic development. Wen Yanshi 闻言实, “1956nian zhongyang lingdao tongzhi de diaocha yanjiu yu ‘Lun shi da guanxi’ de fabiao 1956 年中央领导同志的调查研究与‘论十大关系’的发表,” *Dangde Wenxian* 党的文献 1 (2006): 21-27.

units more efficient. At the Congress, cadres of provincial parties and governmental institutions weighed in on decentralization and asked for more effective distribution of resources to support regional industrialization, which would in the end contribute to national industrialization. This regionally oriented initiative expanded over the next few years, especially after the Third Plenum of the Central Committee in September 1957, leading eventually to the Great Leap Forward. Provincial industries, commerce, and finances were handed over to provincial governments.

Another marginalized area that attracted belated attention that is worth investigating is the fate of the humanities and social sciences. As mentioned earlier regarding the higher education reform of the early 1950s, attention was lavished on science and engineering, essentially marginalizing the humanities and social sciences. Academic centralization worked not only between disciplines but also within disciplines. Within the humanities and social sciences, it was Marxism that became the leading ideology and foundation of a unified academia. The Chinese scholar Yang Fengcheng conceptualizes this development as “unification”: “The core purpose of cultural policy in the early 1950s was to consolidate Marxism’s leading position as a major ideology and to actualize the unification of culture. Unification means merging various kinds of rich cultures and mutually

competing academic thoughts into one mode of thinking.”<sup>115</sup> This tendency also underwent a shift in 1956, when Mao first proposed the Hundred Flowers Campaign at the same meeting at which he delivered “On Ten Major Relationships.” This extending of attention to the marginal disciplines in academia was fixed in the Twelve-Year Plan on Science in 1956.

### *The twelve-year plan for philosophy and social sciences*

While science and engineering still received disproportionate attention and resources from the party, intellectuals, thrusting their foot through the slightly open door, slipped humanities and social sciences into the party’s awareness. When the CCP decided to set up a twelve-year national plan for scientific development in early 1956, the DPSS at the CAS took the initiative for its own long-term plan and gained party approval.

The Conference on Intellectuals in January 1956 marked the party’s most advanced and institutionalized mobilization of intellectuals for industrialization. With confidence and optimism, the party was envisioning “achieving a Socialist Society within the span of three five-year plans.”<sup>116</sup> To

---

<sup>115</sup> Yang Fengcheng 杨凤城, “Xin shiqi zhongguo wenhua fazhan de jige congguan wenti yanjiu 新时期中国文化发展的几个宏观问题研究,” *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 12, no.3 (2005): 49-54.

<sup>116</sup> Guo Moruo 郭沫若, “Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di san ci huiyi shang de fayan, quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui fu weiyuanzhang Guo Moruo de fayan 在第一届全国人民代

support this effort, intellectuals were expected to take responsibility for pushing their respective fields to a world-class academic level within twelve years under the party's guidance. "The participants in the conference shared the perspective that the importance of intellectuals has grown during the rapid socialist construction, but they are not capable enough to meet the current needs. The party must extend its leadership over intellectuals, fully mobilize their capability, help them reform themselves, expand the number of intellectuals, and raise the level of their work performance."<sup>117</sup>

The party was aware that a series of mass campaigns in the early 1950s had planted doubt and insecurity among intellectuals. Thus, another purpose of this conference was to show the party's willingness to trust and support intellectuals to encourage them in turn to support the national drives. Conference participants discussed not only a far-sighted vision that would inform cultural and academic policy but also concrete plans such as schemes to improve intellectuals' working conditions and a reorganization of academic apparatuses.

---

表大会第三次会议上的发言; 全国人民代表大会常务委员副委员长郭沫若的发言," *People's Daily*, June 19, 1956.

<sup>117</sup> "Zhonggong zhongyang zhaokai guanyu zhishi fenzi wenti huiyi, Mao Zedong tongzhi haozhao wei xunsu ganshang shijie kexue xianjin shuiping er fendou 中共中央召开关于知识分子问题会议, 毛泽东同志号召为迅速赶上世界科学先进水平而奋斗," *People's Daily*, January 30, 1956.

Premier Zhou Enlai's concluding speech at the conference, "Report on the Problem of Intellectuals," was published in the *People's Daily* at the end of January 1956, officially presenting the party's intellectual policy for onward development.<sup>118</sup> In this speech, Zhou Enlai mentioned that the "State Council has already entrusted the State Planning Commission to come up with a 1956~1967 Long-term Plan on Science Development within three months."<sup>119</sup> This timeframe came from Mao Zedong's submission of a draft of the "1956~1967 National Agriculture Development Outline" in July 1955, implicating the timeline of three five-year plans to be completed by 1967.<sup>120</sup> The State Council expanded this long-term planning into science development to mobilize intellectuals from various fields in a more institutionalized way. After organizing the Science Planning Small Group in Science Planning Mobilization Meeting and establishing the Science Planning Commission, a draft of the "1956~1967 Long-term Plan Outline on Development of Science and Technology" was issued in August 1956. The Science Planning Commission consisted of and was operated by members of

---

<sup>118</sup> Zhou Enlai 周恩来, "Guanyu zhshi fenzi wenti de baogao 关于知识分子问题的报告 (1956.01.14)," in *Zhou Enlai Xuanji*, 158-191.

<sup>119</sup> Zhou Enlai, "Guanyu zhshi fenzi wenti de baogao," 184.

<sup>120</sup> Mao Zedong 毛泽东, "Lun shi da guanxi 论十大关系 (1956.4.25)," in *Jianguo Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian Vol. 8*, 191; Chu Zhuwu 储著武, "Xiang xiandai kexue jinjun: Zhou Enlai yu 1956-1967 kexue guihua gongzuo zai renshi 向现代科学进军: 周恩来与 1956-1967 年科学规划工作再认识," *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 27, no.1 (2020): 83-93.

the CAS from four affiliated departments: the Department of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry, the Department of Biology and Earth Science, the Department of Technology and Engineering, and the DPSS.

It was the first of the three abovementioned departments that initiated and worked on the plan for the development of science and technology. To produce the draft, some 200 scientists and technicians around the country and experts from the Soviet Union gathered in Beijing for discussions. They collected and chose projects that needed to be carried out based on academic importance, international standards, current national standards, and research progress.<sup>121</sup> The draft was reviewed and modified multiple times by the Planning Commission and officially distributed to the related sectors to be implemented in December 1956.<sup>122</sup> It was the first academic development plan produced by the PRC and was later reported as having been essentially accomplished in 1963.

---

<sup>121</sup> Guo Moruo, “Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di san ci huiyi shang de fayan.”

<sup>122</sup> On the timeline and contents of the “1956~1967 Long-term Plan Outline for Scientific and Technological Development”: Chu Zhuwu 储著武, “Guowuyuan kexue guihua weiyuanhui yanjiu 国务院科学规划委员会研究,” *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 28, no.3 (2021): 47-62; Sun Hongqing 孙洪庆, and Hu Huakai 胡化凯, “‘Shiernian gui Hua’ yu jianguo chuqi de cixue fazhan ‘十二年规划’与建国初期的磁学发展,” *Ziran Bianzhengfa Tongxun* 自然辩证法通讯 33 (2011): 31-37; Yang Wenli 杨文利, and Zhang Meng 张蒙, “Xin zhongguo di yi ge keji fazhan gui Hua de zhiding, shishi ji lishi jingyan 新中国第一个科技发展规划的制定、实施及历史经验,” *Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 6 (2007): 42-49; Zhang Jiuchun 张久春, and Zhang Bachun 张柏春, “Guihua kexue jishu: ‘1956-1967 nian kexue jishu fazhan yuanjing gui Hua’ de zhiding yu shishi 规划科学技术: ‘1956-1967 年科学技术发展远景规划’的制定与实施,” *Zhongguo Kexueyuan Yuankan* 中国科学院院刊 34, no.9 (2019): 982-991.

This plan for developing science and technology had a forgotten twin sibling—the Plan on Philosophy and Social Sciences. The two planning processes shared a similar timeline and procedures. The DPSS in the CAS was in charge of planning in the form of small groups and a planning office. Gathering plans from fifteen academic fields, including economics, history, archaeology, linguistics, and philosophy, the Planning Office produced a draft in October 1956. It was never fully implemented or followed up on, however, and has not received scholarly attention for that reason.

At first, the planning for philosophy and social sciences occupied a small portion of the broader Science Plan. A nine-member Science Plan Small Group included scholars from the DPSS, and the early planning meetings in 1955 with Soviet experts mentioned planning for social sciences, although only briefly.<sup>123</sup> Later, the plan was divided into two branches—one on science and technology and the other on philosophy and the social sciences.<sup>124</sup> The Director of the Science Bureau of the Ministry of Propaganda, Yu Guangyuan, recalls that he persuaded Zhou Enlai to make a separate plan simultaneously for philosophy and the social sciences, and

---

<sup>123</sup> Li Jie 李洁, “Xin zhongguo zhexue shehui kexue ‘guihua kexue’ moshi de chuangli 新中国哲学社会科学‘规划科学’模式的创立,” *Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu* 中共党史研究 5 (2019): 75-85; Zhang Jiuchun and Zhang Bachun, “Guihua kexue jishu,” 982-991.

<sup>124</sup> Guo Moruo, “Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di san ci huiyi shang de fayan.”

moved into the planning phase after Zhou's immediate approval.<sup>125</sup> The Science Bureau under the Ministry of Propaganda was in charge of working-level communications with the DPSS. Yu Guangyuan took responsibility for coming up with the plan, along with the historian Liu Danian, the Director of Planning Small Group.

This development was not simply Yu Guangyuan's personal venture but also a response to a longstanding demand within academic circles that had emerged in the late 1940s. As discussed in the previous chapter, the humanities and social sciences had worked in a two-tiered system involving research institutes and higher education institutions in Republican China, both of which systems were taken over by the CCP but not in the same way. While colleges and universities were subjected to nationwide reorganization in early the 1950s as discussed above, research institutes waited until the CAS had created four departments to improve organizational aspects of the process. Before the formation of the DPSS, the CAS included six institutes for social sciences, each of which was taken over separately by various kinds of academic institutions at various points in time. The highest academic authority in the country should not have been organized in such a haphazard

---

<sup>125</sup> Yu Guangyuan 于光远, "Zhou Yang he wo 周扬和我," in *Hui Zhou Yang 忆周扬*, eds. Meng Wang 王蒙, Ying Yuan 袁鹰 (Huhehaote: Neimenggu Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), 160-162. To validate Yu's memoir, the Chinese historian Chu Zhuwu traces Zhou Enlai's engagement with the planning and supports Yu's account Chu Zhuwu, "Xiang xiandai kexue jinjun," 83-93.

way, according to Pan Zinian, Director of the DPSS, pointing out the problem at the Inaugural Meeting of the department in June 1955:

Philosophy and social sciences are too weak among broader national projects... Although there are some people in various parts of society who can conduct scientific research, we should admit that we do not have sufficient human resources or competence. Even the limited number of researchers we have are not organized well. Under this circumstance, it is impossible for scientific workers to fulfil their full potential. We have not cultivated a sufficient number of young cadres, either. Thus, it is an imperative mission to organize and expand the research force.<sup>126</sup>

Pan Zinian's speech also discussed the need for planning. "Each academic field lacks a planned and systematic approach TO research, which has caused fragmented work and incomplete materials... We must carry out scientific research on philosophy and social sciences in a planned way."

Soon, the State Council mobilized the Science Plan, which met these inter-circle planning needs. The DPSS established the Planning Office under the Ministry of Propaganda and commenced the project.<sup>127</sup>

The Planning Office tasked each field with submitting its respective plan by February 1956. For example, in the field of history, the three

---

<sup>126</sup> Pan Zinian 潘梓年, "Zhongguo kexueyuan zhexue shehui kexuebu baogao 中国科学院哲学社会科学部报告 (1955.6.2)," *Kexue Tongbao* 科学通报 7 (1955): 39-43.

<sup>127</sup> Xiang Ming 向明, "Zhexue shehui kexue xuebu yu zhongguo kexueyuan de guanxi bianqian: Jiantan Guo Moruo de juese 哲学社会科学学部与中国科学院的关系变迁: 兼谈郭沫若的角色," *Jiangsu Daxue Xuebao* 江苏大学学报 19, no.3 (2017): 74-79.

Institutes of History established their own small groups with ten members each, held multiple meetings, and in January 1956 drafted the “Twelve-Year Plan for the Development of Historical Science and Cultivation of Historical Science Workers.”<sup>128</sup> Since February the Planning Office, led by the Secretary of the DPSS and the Director of the Planning Office Liu Danian, had held a series of discussions of the drafts from the various fields with the goal of finalizing the Plan by October 1956.<sup>129</sup> The plan stipulated key research topics to be studied, key books that should be completed, and other projects such as translations of Marxist classics, the organization of important scholarship from around the country, translations of international scholarship, construction of a scholarship information system, the compilation of local gazetteers, and the compilation of an encyclopedia. Moreover, the plan also suggested increasing the pool of academic personnel by adding 16,100 senior researchers, 24,800 intermediate researchers, and 24,600 junior researchers to the CAS and higher education institutions across the country.<sup>130</sup> Criticized later, in 1958, as “too practical, lacking

---

<sup>128</sup> Chu Zhuwu 储著武, “Lishi kexue yanjiu gongzuo shiernian yuanjing guihua cao’an chugao yanjiug 历史科学研究工作十二年远景规划草案初稿研究,” *Anhui shixue* 安徽史学, no. 3 (2019): 152-159.

<sup>129</sup> Huang Renguo 黄仁国, *Liu Danian Nianpu* 刘大年年谱 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2017), 132, 133, 148-49.

<sup>130</sup>Xue Qian, “Zhongguo kexueyuan zhexue shehui kexue bu,” 75.

ideological guidance,”<sup>131</sup> the planning process appeared to focus on the physical and human resources needed in the humanities and social sciences, not on the principles and underlying rationale.

### ***Conclusion***

This chapter has examined how, in China, the humanities and social sciences struggled to break from their marginalized position during the 1950s. In the very early years of the PRC, such research did not receive substantial attention from the regime, which was driven mainly by the industrialization imperative. The new regime expressed its priorities through higher education reform, in which the natural sciences and engineering outstripped the humanities and social sciences in terms of the number of institutions and student enrollment. This engineering-centered education required a radical transition from longstanding education traditions in Chinese history, in which the purpose of scholarship was to produce a class of literati officials. The reform not only revealed the new regime’s priorities but also changed widespread perceptions of the two groups of fields, resulting overall in a

---

<sup>131</sup> Li Zhenzhen 李真真, “Zhongxuanbu kexuechu yu zhongguo kexueyuan: Yu Guangyuan, Li Peishan fangtanlu 中宣部科学处与中国科学院: 于光远、李佩珊访谈录,” *Bainianhu* 百年潮 6 (1999): 23-30; Yu Guangyuan, “Zhou Yang he wo,” 160-162.

diminishing number of graduates who could potentially function as scholars in the humanities and social sciences.

Not until Mao Zedong's "On the ten major relationships" speech promoted a moderate centrifugation or dispersal of power away from the center in 1956 did the humanities and social sciences encounter a chance to respond to this circumstance. The DPSS in the CAS and the Ministry of Propaganda took the initiative of devising a long-term plan for these disciplines, when the party center was still focused on planning for agriculture and technology. In response to internal demand for scientific research, the Department drafted the Twelve-Year Plan on Philosophy and the Social Sciences in 1956, including plans for producing more researchers and conducting research projects in a wide range of fields.

Yu Guangyuan stated in an interview that, "in a planning report meeting, Pan Zinian proposed the problem of 'emphasizing *li* (natural sciences) and downplaying *wen* (liberal arts) (*zhongli qingwen*).'<sup>132</sup> Mao Zedong said, '*Li* is important, but we should not downplay *wen*. We should emphasize *li* but *not* downplay *wen*.'" This reveals the contemporaneous prospects of the humanities and social sciences at that point in 1956—

---

<sup>132</sup> Li Zhenzhen, "Zhongxuanbu kexuechu yu zhongguo kexueyuan," 23-30; Yu Guangyuan 于光远, "Zhiding he shishi zhexue shehui kexue guiha de lishi he jinhou de shexiang 制定和实施哲学社会科学规划的历史和今后的设想," in *Yu Guangyuan Jingji Lunzhu Quanji* 于光远经济论著全集, Vol.10 (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2015), 3.

downplayed thus far, but not to be downplayed any longer even though it would not be emphasized as strongly as *li*.

Intellectuals' efforts to make sense of the value of the humanities and social sciences in the context of industrialism continued over time in China. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution reshaped the humanities and social sciences in a radical way, raising the question of what was truly scientific research that could serve the nation and the revolution. China after the Opening and Reform brought the bureaucratized academic domain into the context of marketization, again downplaying humanities and social sciences following the logic of the market economy. In the PRC, red engineers and technocrats replaced the traditional Chinese model of literati officials. Since Chinese intellectuals debated the "Science and the Outlook on Life" and "Science and Metaphysics" in the early twentieth century,<sup>133</sup> science has long been considered the appropriate tool for generating national wealth and power in modern China, a status it enjoys even now.

Understanding how Chinese intellectuals argued for the social meaning and responsibility of their work in the humanities and social sciences in the 1950s

---

<sup>133</sup> Fa-ti Fan, "The Controversy over Spontaneous Generation in Republican China Science, Authority, and the Public," in *Science and Technology in Modern China, 1880s-1940s*, eds. Jing Tsu and Benjamin Elman (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2015), 209-244.

could open a broader discussion of the valorization of knowledge and its effects.

## CHAPTER 3

### REACTIVATING LOCAL GAZETTEER PROJECTS

On the list of options under the Twelve-Year Plan in 1956, the compilation of local gazetteers stood out to some intellectuals. A local gazetteer appeared to be a legitimate vehicle for demonstrating the utility and significance of the humanities and social sciences. This chapter examines intellectual discussions related to and partial implementation of the project promoting the compilation of local gazetteers in the context of decentralization in mid-1950s China.

A local gazetteer is a record of geographical information about a particular region, published by the local government in cooperation with local intellectuals. Gazetteers developed a general common format around the thirteenth century, covering topics such as topography, geography, population, industry, history, literature, and biographies. Although specific gazetteer-compilation practices changed over time, the genre remains in existence in contemporary China. The long survival of the genre shows its persistent significance and advantages. In the Ming and Qing periods, when the publication of gazetteers surged across the country, gazetteers included information about a region that dynastic histories did not. Gazetteers in the

Ming and Qing periods have been appreciated greatly by later historians for their value as historical sources.<sup>134</sup>

Local gazetteers in the premodern period have attracted scholarly attention both as a rich source in historical research and as a subject of historiographical works.<sup>135</sup> Local Gazetteer Studies (*fangzhibixue*), studies of the history, format, and system of gazetteers, has formed a substantial and separate field of research, especially in China.<sup>136</sup> Gazetteers have flourished across the PRC since the 1980s. Local governments at various levels have produced countless gazetteers on a wide range of sectors in their regions, providing researchers of contemporary China with useful information at the regional level.<sup>137</sup>

---

<sup>134</sup> Seunghyun Han's analysis of the compilation of local gazetteers in the Qianlong reign in the eighteenth century examines how the Qing court tried to concentrate cultural power in the center away from local literati by exerting control over the entire compilation process across the regions. Zhang Xuecheng's theory of local history supported such a centralized and state-centered approach to local regions, differing from James Hargett and Peter Bol's understanding of local gazetteers in the Song period as reinforcing localism and local identity. (Han Seunghyun 한승현, "18 segi cheongjoui jibangji, jibangmunheon tongjechaeggwa Jang Hagseong-ui bangjilon 18 세기 清朝의 地方志, 地方文獻 統制策과 章學誠의 方志論," *Yeogsa Hagbo* 역사학보 192 (2006): 255-303.)

<sup>135</sup> James M. Hargett, "Song Dynasty Local Gazetteers and Their Place in the History of Difangzhi Writing," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 56, no. 2 (1996): 405-42; Peter K. Bol, "The Rise of Local History: History, Geography, and Culture in Southern Song and Yuan Wuzhou," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 61, no.1(2001): 37-76.

<sup>136</sup> To name only a few: Liu Weiyi 刘纬毅 ed., *Zhongguo fangzhi shi* 中国方志史 (Taiyuan: Sanjin chubanshe, 2010); Lu Zhengyue 陆振岳, *Fangzhibixue yanjiu* 方志学研究 (Jinan: Jilu shushe 2013).

<sup>137</sup> Dong Yibo 董一博, "Yao zhongshi bianxiu difangzhi 要重视编修新地方志," *People's Daily*, August 23, 1982.

What is missing from this history of local gazetteers in China is an accounting of the first half of the twentieth century. Gazetteers continued to be compiled under the Republican and Manchukuo governments, but not on a national scale and, experiencing frequent interruptions by war, the practice eventually ceased at some point in the 1940s. The idea of compiling local gazetteers emerged again in the 1950s when the CCP began turning its attention back to local governance. The local gazetteer project of the 1950s and 1960s, however, was not as active as in the premodern period or in the 1980s, and it did not survive the Cultural Revolution.

This short-lived and regionally fragmented compilation of gazetteers lacks a full-scale study that would connect it with the trend toward decentralization in the regime at the time. Thus, it is important to understand how this local academic task was discussed intellectually and administratively, how it was implemented on the ground, and what the compilation of local gazetteers meant to local party organizations and governments. This chapter explores local gazetteers as a manifestation of decentralization occurring around 1956 both in local regions and in the humanities, and also as an intellectual field in which marginalized humanities and social science scholars discovered their social role and utility in the new industrialist state.

### *Proposals and appeals*

At the First Session of the First National People's Congress in September 1954, Shandong provincial representative Wang Zhuchen suggested the idea of writing local gazetteers, but the proposal was not adopted.<sup>138</sup> When Wang again proposed the same agenda at the Third Session of the First National People's Congress in June 1956, however, it was accepted and promoted in the *People's Daily*.<sup>139</sup> During the two intervening years, the government's agenda was undergoing intraparty examination and was recalled when the Twelve-Year Plan was being drafted in late 1955. Several regions had set out to establish Provincial Gazetteer Compilation Committees as early as March 1956. The initiative to write local gazetteers officially surfaced with its inclusion in the Twelve-Year Plan in 1956 following Wang's second proposal.

Intellectuals, especially those with academic training in history, stepped forward in response to this rare opportunity, in which the party-state was willing to devote attention and resources to a nationwide humanities-related project. They argued for the significance and utility of

---

<sup>138</sup> This is another circumstantial clue that the CCP was turning its attention to local governance in 1956 but had not yet begun doing so in 1954.

<sup>139</sup> Wang Zhuchen 王祝晨, "Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di san ci huiyi shang de fayan, zaozao dongshou bianji difangzhi, Wang Zhuchen daibiao de fayan 在第一届全国人民代表大会第三次会议上的发言, 早早动手编辑地方志, 王祝晨代表的发言," *People's Daily*, June 29, 1956.

local gazetteers when the project was being contemplated and proposed ambitious operational measures when the project was launched.

Wang Zhuchen's first proposal, in 1954, resonated among intellectuals. In response, a prominent historian, Jin Yufu, published an article in March 1956 in which he argued for collecting old gazetteers and rewriting them to produce new gazetteers. The historian Fu Zhenlun and the archivist Ju Shu'an supported Jin's argument in the following issues of the same academic journal, *Xin Jianshe*.

To these historians, gazetteers represented the "precious historical and cultural heritage of the country, second only to dynastic histories," and deserve preservation and continuation. But this endorsement by itself did not persuade the industrialist regime. Jin emphasized how rich and useful the information that traditional gazetteers provided was, for example by conveying facts about local populations, peasants' movements, and natural phenomena. Fu Zhenlun also promoted the comprehensiveness of local gazetteers' information about certain localities and their people-oriented aspects. These historians also pointed out flaws in traditional gazetteers, such as their lopsided focus on and praise of bourgeois literati and their scant

attention to peasants' lives.<sup>140</sup> By emphasizing the inherent advantages that would be enjoyed while reforming the flaws of traditional gazetteers, historians argued that compiling new local gazetteers could be significant in both nation-building and scientific research. Jin further argued that modern gazetteers could be made more scientific through cooperation with discipline-specific experts—unlike traditional gazetteers, which were written mostly by generalist literati.

Wang Zhuchen, as an educator, added another advantage of gazetteers: their effect on the people's education. He argued that teaching local history and geography in primary and secondary schools would not only enhance intuition and specificity in education but also develop a patriotic spirit among students. Compiling local gazetteers could contribute to the accumulation and circulation of local knowledge as well as the creation of high-quality local history textbooks: "Patriotic education begins with a deep understanding of one's hometown."<sup>141</sup> This idea resonated with how the educational utility of local history appealed to the regime, perhaps as a carry-over from the early twentieth century.

---

<sup>140</sup> Jin Yufu 金毓黻, "Pu xiu xin fangzhi de nieyi 普修新地方志的拟议," *Xin Jianshe* 92 (1956): 64-65; Ju Shu'an 居漱庵, "Dui bianji xin fangzhi ji zhengli jiu fangzhi de jidian yijian 对编辑新方志及整理旧方志的几点意见," *Xin Jianshe* 新建设 98 (1956): 64-65.

<sup>141</sup> Wang Zhuchen, "Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di san ci huiyi shang de fayan."

At the Third Session of the Second Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPCC) in March 1957, when the gazetteer project was being organized, the historian Gu Jiegang, along with another historian, Ye Gongchuo, and a CPCC member, Li Peiji, jointly proposed an implementation outline, succinctly summing up the legitimacy of local gazetteers:

Local gazetteers in our nation are unique. Since *Yuejue Shu* opened up the genre, for two thousand years there have been provincial gazetteers, prefecture gazetteers, county gazetteers, and even village gazetteers. Thousands of gazetteers have survived until the most recent twenty years. They include information on geography, institutions, the climate, produce, the population, customs, history, anecdotes, and everything about a certain region, all compiled into books arranged by topic. Although gazetteer compilation had advantages and disadvantages, both the Ming and Qing dynasties paid attention to them for their wide range of practical uses. . . . Gazetteer compilation continued even after the Xinhai Revolution. It was a great pity that compilation efforts went silent once Chiang Kai-shek seized power. I believe this high-quality traditional method of documentation should not cease. Centering on certain regions, gazetteers preserve rich local materials and various kinds of documents; record ethnic, historical, economic, and cultural aspects of a certain region; provide references for state-building and scientific research; and stimulate a patriotic spirit for hometowns and the nation among the people.<sup>142</sup>

---

<sup>142</sup> Gu Jiegang 顾颉刚, Li Peiji 李培基, and Ye Gongchuo 叶恭绰, "Zai zhengxie di er jie quanguo weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi shang de fayan, jixu bianzuan difangzhi, Gu Jiegang, Li Peiji, Ye Gongchuo lianhe tichu batiao shixing gangyao 在政协第二届全国委员会第三次全体会议上的发言, 继续编纂地方志, 顾颉刚、李培基、叶恭绰联合提出八条实行纲要," *People's Daily*, March 18, 1957.

With this line of argument, these intellectuals showed that they were shrewdly conscious of their readership, making sure to emphasize how the CCP could make use of gazetteers for its own purposes: to acquire knowledge about local populations and land for local governance as well as for patriotic education. In line with this recipient-conscious argumentation were historians' appreciation of historiographically meaningful compilation practices and the academic pursuit of scientific research. The Local Gazetteers Small Group's compilation agenda almost perfectly reiterated Gu Jiegang's rationale.<sup>143</sup>

To maximize the twofold utility of gazetteers, intellectuals suggested making full use of the bureaucracy for implementation. Ju Shu'an, in full support of Wang, Jin, and Fu's addresses and articles, developed a proposal that included specific measures to ensure that the plan would be realized. Ju suggested establishing a Local Gazetteer Small Group under the Scientific Planning Commission of the State Council, which would invite experts with rich experience in archival research to devise an overall plan and format. The CAS and the Research Institute of Literature and History would then jointly

---

<sup>143</sup> “Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu zhuanfa zhongguo kexueyuan zhaxue shehui kexuebu, guojia dang'anju, ‘Guanyu bianxie difangzhi gongzuo de jidian yijian’ 中共中央宣传部转发中国科学院哲学社会科学部、国家档案局‘关于编写地方志工作的几点意见’(1963.7.23),” in *Zhongguo Difangzhi Zonglan, 1949-1987* 中国地方志综览, 1949-1987, ed. Lai Xinhua 来新夏(Hefei: Huangshan Shushe, 1988), 259-260.

organize a Planning Commission under a National Local Gazetteer Compilation Commission, which would work on implementation plans and supervise local compilation commissions at various levels. The National Local Gazetteer Compilation Commission would include under it an Investigation Commission and an Editorial Commission. Compilers would be recruited from departments of history at universities, short-term training courses, institutes under the CAS, secondary schools, local Research Institutes of Literature and History, local Cultural Relics Administration Commissions, and retired cadres and intellectuals from diverse areas of society.<sup>144</sup> In Ju's design, the National Local Gazetteer Compilation Commission would be the key locus of history- and humanities-related bureaucratic resources across the country and would operate under the leadership of the State Council, the very embodiment of institutional significance.

Gu Jiegang also suggested establishing a Compilation Supervision Commission under the State Council and granting it authority to determine formats and approve drafts. Gu, like Ju, devised a focal institute, with a Compilation Institute in every region. Administrative, cultural, and educational cadres and workers at various levels in the regions would

---

<sup>144</sup> Ju Shu'an, "Dui bianji xin fangzhi ji zhengli jiu fangzhi de jidian yijian," 64-65.

cooperate by sending related documents, tax records, demographic information, statistics, and so on to the Compilation Institutes. Also, the Institutes would collect and preserve related books, archives, and unpublished manuscripts for their records. If a given region lacked sufficient expertise regarding certain topics, the Institutes would also consult with the central Compilation Supervision Commission for compilation with respect to those topics.<sup>145</sup>

Wang Zhuchen as well, in his third proposal at the Fourth Session of the First National People's Congress, suggested establishing a nationwide institution that would oversee the compilation project. He believed the CAS should take on this role in virtue of its extant research resources and its potential for connecting local regions to the center.<sup>146</sup> After Wang's relatively less transformative suggestion was accepted, the Local Gazetteer Small Group was in the end established under the CAS and the State Archives Bureau.

Intellectuals shared the idea of having a key institution within the bureaucratic system of the party plan and implement the nationwide project.

---

<sup>145</sup> Gu Jiegang, Li Peiji, and Ye Gongchuo, "Zai zhengxie di er jie quanguo weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi shang de fayan."

<sup>146</sup> Wang Zhuchen 王祝晨, "Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di si ci huiyi shang de fa yan, jinyibu kaizhan difangzhi gongzuo, Wang Zhuchen de shumian fayan 在第一届全国人民代表大会第四次会议上的发言, 进一步开展地方志工作, 王祝晨的书面发言," *People's Daily*, July 8, 1957.

Moreover, they believed this key institution should be a gathering place for all related resources for one purpose—compiling gazetteers. Governmental, cultural, educational, academic, and research institutions at various levels, such as local governments, local parties, local people’s committees, museums, libraries, archives, cultural relics commissions, universities, and so on, should actively cooperate by providing materials, allowing photographs and photocopies to be made, and participating in interviews.<sup>147</sup> Some even envisioned that these activities should be strongly supported by the key institution’s position under the State Council.

Intellectuals believed that this project was important enough to deserve robust structural support. And, with this support, the project could produce gazetteers of academically high quality. At this point, intellectuals’ somewhat CCP-focused approach to persuading the party to acknowledge the practicality and usefulness of gazetteers for local governance and patriotic education revealed their scholarly desire. When the party-state seemed willing to grant some institutional space for the compilation project, some scholars wanted to add several new components. They argued that compiling new gazetteers should be preceded by collecting and studying

---

<sup>147</sup> Fu Zhenlun 傅振伦, “Zhengli jiu fangzhi yu bianji xin fangzhi wenti 整理旧方志与编辑新方志问题,” *Xin Jianshe* 93 (1956): 60-62.

traditional gazetteers. Traditional gazetteers were no longer directly useful for local governance or patriotic education under the CCP—scholars did not make this connection, either. Their rationale was that traditional gazetteers could provide a format to be followed in new gazetteers.<sup>148</sup> In addition to this suggestion regarding traditional gazetteers, in 1957 Wang Zhuchen further promoted his proposal by arguing that local geography and local history textbooks should also be compiled together with gazetteers.<sup>149</sup> To the scholars, bureaucratic and academic values were not incompatible but could be mutually supportive.

### *A decentralized national project*

The intellectuals' proposals appear to have been given a fair hearing, and were applied to the project. In accordance with the Twelve-Year Plan, the DPSS under the CAS and the State Archives Bureau jointly established a Local Gazetteer Small Group under the guidance of the Ministry of Propaganda with Zeng San, the Director of the State Archives Bureau, in

---

<sup>148</sup> Fu Zhenlun, “Zhengli jiu fangzhi yu bianji xin fangzhi wenti,” 60-62; Jin Yufu, “Pu xiu xin fangzhi de nieyi,” 64-65; Ju Shu’an, “Dui bianji xin fangzhi ji zhengli jiu fangzhi de jidian yijian,” 64-65; Liu Xiwen 刘希文, “Bianxiu difangzhi de wo jian 编修地方志的我见,” *Dang’an Gongzuo* 档案工作 4 (1962): 11-12; Zhang Haipeng 張海鵬, “Tan bianzuan xin difangzhi de jige wenti 談編纂新地方志的幾個問題,” *Anhui Shixue Tongxun* 安徽史学通讯 1 (1959): 42-44, 50.

<sup>149</sup> Wang Zhuchen, “Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di si ci huiyi shang de fa yan.”

charge.<sup>150</sup> The Small Group's October 1958 draft of "Forms and Systems for New Compilation of Local Gazetteers" provided guidelines for the project, accommodating the intellectuals' discussions of the utility of gazetteers: "By systematically organizing and preserving materials on the region, we can serve the socialist construction and education of cadres and the people." In terms of the idea of designating a central agency for the project as well, while the Small Group played the role at the center, the guidelines suggested that each region establish an organization for compiling gazetteers under their respective party committees and people's committees, working as a central receptacle for collecting, preserving, and utilizing the materials from various sources in the region. The guidelines did not however define a specific format or mode of operation for such organizations.<sup>151</sup>

While the Small Group served as the central academic authority for this countrywide project, it depended on local implementers—provincial-level party committees—to ensure that the project would actually be initiated and, if so, how much in the way of resources and effort were put into the project. Provincial-level party committees were encouraged, but not

---

<sup>150</sup> Lai Xinhua, *Zhongguo Difangzhi Zonglan, 1949-1987*, 19–21.

<sup>151</sup> Difangzhi Xiaozu 地方志小组, "Guanyu xin xiu difangzhi de jidian yijian 关于新修方志的几点意见 (1958.10.20)," in *Zhongguo Difangzhi Zonglan, 1949-1987*, 255; Subsequently, in March 1961, "Compendium of New Compilation of Local Gazetteers" was promulgated, but the original text is currently unavailable.

required, to organize sets of institutions exclusively for compilation purposes, to collect related documents and artifacts across provinces, to supervise municipal- and county-level party committees' compilations, and to draft provincial gazetteers.<sup>152</sup>

Currently no small number of provinces, cities, and counties have initiated this project. For this project in each region to better meet the needs of national construction, this draft of forms and systems for new compilation of local gazetteers is sent to each local government for reference.<sup>153</sup>

The central authority offered only a rough blueprint “to better meet the needs of national construction.” Gazetteer compilation and the guidelines for the project were not obligatory for local implementers, which also reflected the decentralizing context of the time.

The Small Group further articulated the principle that compilation needed to be aligned with specific conditions on the ground, such as organizational capabilities, the financial situation, and the academic resources available in each region. The conditions included history departments and geography departments in higher education institutions, cadres in governmental agencies, middle school teachers, cultural centers, museums, archives, scientific research institutes, and local branches for promoting

---

<sup>152</sup> Difangzhi Xiaozu, “Guanyu xin xiu difangzhi de jidian yijian,” 255.

<sup>153</sup> Difangzhi Xiaozu, “Guanyu xin xiu difangzhi de jidian yijian,” 255.

popular science in the region.<sup>154</sup> Thus, the project depended on every local party's willingness and capacity to organize and devote local resources—predictably, producing varying results across the several provinces.

This project, however, does not appear to have gained national attention, even after top party leaders promoted it around 1958. Mao Zedong, well known for his keen interest in history, remarked at the Chengdu Conference in March 1958 that “all the regions of the nation should compile local gazetteers.” Premier Zhou Enlai mentioned in multiple meetings in 1958 and 1959 the significance of gazetteers and encouraged support for the initiative to write them.<sup>155</sup> When the State Archives Bureau investigated in 1960, however, it was reported that, since 1956, around 20 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions and more than 530 counties had commenced compilation of local gazetteers, with more than 250 counties already having submitted drafts.<sup>156</sup> This number was relatively small as a

---

<sup>154</sup> Qiu Xinli 邱新立, Wang Fang 王芳, “Zhongguo wu, liushi niandai difangzhi de bianxiu shimo ji chengguo gaishu (xu) 中国五、六十年代地方志的编修始末及成果概述 (续),” *Zhongguo Difangzhi* 中国地方志 1-2 (2001): 127-135.

<sup>155</sup> This Mao quotation cannot be identified in any published document coming out of the Chengdu conference, but it was quoted continuously during the 1980s and 1990s whenever the significance of local gazetteers needed support from the most important figure to assert their legitimacy. Zhou Enlai's comments are traceable in his chronology, but the same remarks are repeatedly quoted only in the context of promoting local gazetteers. It is likely that the compilers of local gazetteers in the 1980s excavated the party leaders' past comments to promote their current work, but the comments did not seem to have wide influence at the time of the speech in the absence of media coverage or separate entry in anthologies.

<sup>156</sup> Lai Xinhua, *Zhongguo Difangzhi Zonglan, 1949-1987*, 18-22; Liu Weiyi, *Zhongguo Fangzhi Shi*, 334-340.

share of the 2,014 county-level administrative regions in China in 1960.<sup>157</sup>

Only 25% of counties had initiated efforts to participate in the national project and only about 12% had completed most of it. By 1965, only around 20 county-level gazetteers had been published.<sup>158</sup>

Hubei Province was the first region to embrace the project and published the most gazetteers among the provinces. In March 1956, Hubei Province established a Provincial Gazetteer Compilation Committee with the Research Institute of Literature and History as a central agency. The institute's director, Shen Zhaonian, was in charge of the project. He gave a speech at the Third Session of the Second CPCC in March 1957, at the same event where Gu Jiegang promoted the project in his own terms. He explained how Hubei had been working on the project:

Since receiving a telegraph from the State Council and instructions from Sir Dong Biwu last year, we have been compiling local gazetteers. The purpose is to serve the socialist construction. We should start with each county, compiling brief gazetteers, and then compile complete gazetteers. The entries of brief gazetteers should focus on the history of county formation, natural conditions, economic conditions, the number of students, folk customs, scenic spots and historic sites, and so on. Once compiled, gazetteers should be distributed to the governmental agencies responsible for construction, education and civil affairs for reference. The Hubei Provincial People's Committee has

---

<sup>157</sup> “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng quhua (1960 nian) 中华人民共和国行政区划 (1960年),” *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng quhua shouce* 中华人民共和国行政区划手册 (Beijing: Minzhengbu xingzheng quhuachu, 1986).

<sup>158</sup> Liu Weiyi, *Zhongguo Fangzhi Shi*, 151.

appointed the person in charge to set up the Hubei Provincial Local Gazetteers Compilation Committee, to assign personnel for interviews, and to appoint the staffs of the Research Institute of Literature and History and the Advisory Office for compilation work. If necessary, college professors and relevant public figures can be invited to help. Xianning County has already started the project. The experience we will get from Xianning can be extended to other counties and cities. It is envisioned that brief gazetteers for all the counties and cities in the province will be completed in about three years.<sup>159</sup>

This speech clearly shows the rationale, the overall process, and plans for compiling county-level gazetteers in Hubei. Compilation was meant both to serve “socialist construction” and to provide governing references for construction, education, and civil affairs. The Research Institute of Literature and History worked as a central node for the project, managing human resources, interviews, and compilation. Shen Zhaonian also noted that elderly professionals and experts, those over sixty years old, comprised the majority of the hundred-fifty-six members working at the Institute, and worked as compilers based on their knowledge of historical materials and their past experiences. Shen filed a report at the First Session of the Second Hubei Provincial People’s Congress in December 1958, which spells out the organization of the compiling team:

---

<sup>159</sup> This telegraph from the State Council seems to have served as the official command for the project, but it is no longer available. Shen’s speech included the only mention of it. “Zai zhengxie di er jie quanguo weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi shang de fayan, gaoling guanyuan jiji xiuzuan fangzhi, Shen Zhaonian jieshao Hubei wenshiguan de gongzuo 在政协第二届全国委员会第三次全体会议上的发言, 高龄馆员积极修纂方志, 沈肇年介绍湖北文史馆的工作,” *People’s Daily*, March 15, 1957.

The project has just started. So we only had a simple organization at first—one compiling team with twelve members, and two interview teams with nine members each. Thus, the working speed was quite low. This July, however, we set up a plan for the Great Leap, reorganized the compiling team into two teams with six members each and the interview teams into three teams with six members each. These teams were required to complete brief gazetteers of one county every month. By this November, over five months, they had completed the task.<sup>160</sup>

The Committee decided to focus on county-level gazetteers that were relatively brief—ranging from around seventy thousand to one hundred thousand words. In December 1958, the Xishui County Brief Gazetteer, the Xianning County Brief Gazetteer, the Xiaogan County Brief Gazetteer, and the Hanchuan County Brief Gazetteer were published through the Hubei People’s Publisher, and a draft of the Huangmai County Brief Gazetteer was printed for internal circulation. The Yingcheng County Brief Gazetteer was published in March 1959. All these County Brief Gazetteers focused less on the premodern period than on how people’s lives changed and improved after 1949.

Two factors appeared to facilitate the rapid compilation that took place in Hubei—the attentiveness of the then-Vice Chairman of the PRC Dong Biwu, whose birthplace and political bedrock lay in Hubei, and his

---

<sup>160</sup> “Shen Zhaonian daibiao de fayan: Hubei Province fangzhi zuanxiu weiyuanhui gongzuo gaikuang 沈肇年代表的发言: 湖北省方志纂修委员会工作概况 (1958.12),” *Hubei sheng di er jie renmin daibiao dahui ydi yi ci huiyi huikan* 湖北省第二届人民代表大会第一次会议汇刊 (Wuhan: Hubei sheng di er jie renmin daibiao da hui di yi ci huiyi mishuchu), 1958.

close relationship to the Director of the Research Institute of Literature and History, Shen Zhaonian. Shen recollected that Dong Biwu wrote to him after the province experienced a major flood in 1954: “Following in the footsteps of Hunan province, we need to compile materials on the history of natural disasters in Hubei for future governing reference.” Shen immediately organized a team at the Institute for this purpose, which became something like a prototype gazetteer compilation team for the near future. Later, in 1956, when the idea of the local gazetteer project was being discussed in the central government, Dong again instructed Shen to initiate the gazetteer project in the province: “Compiling gazetteers is to serve the socialist construction. Start by compiling brief gazetteers for each county and city and then revise them into complete gazetteers.”<sup>161</sup> Dong’s instruction to compile brief county gazetteers first was implemented as such. Dong Biwu was one of the top party leaders who seemed interested in the local gazetteer project; his remarks on the importance of the project in summer 1959 were quoted repeatedly by gazetteer compilers:

Local gazetteers should be encyclopedias of each region—an organic constituent of Chinese history and a “slice,” or a factor, or an element of Chinese national culture.<sup>162</sup>

---

<sup>161</sup> “Shen Zhaonian 沈肇年,” in *Hubei renwu chuanji* 湖北人物传记, ed. Hubei sheng zhi renwu zhi bianjishi 湖北省志人物志编辑室 (Wuhan: Hubei sheng zhi renwu zhi bianjishi, 1982), 42.

<sup>162</sup> Hubei sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 湖北省地方志编纂委员会 ed., *Dangdai zhongguo difangzhi zhongyao huibian* 当代中国地方志重要文献汇编 (Wuhan: Hubei sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui), 2.

Political and academic authorities in the region worked for the rapid initiation of the project.

While Hubei province compiled brief county gazetteers first, taking a bottom-up approach, Hunan province reversed the order—compiling a provincial-level gazetteer first. In November 1957, the Hunan Provincial Party Committee decided to compile the Hunan Provincial Gazetteer, and in June 1958 the Hunan Provincial People’s Committee passed the agenda for establishing the Hunan Provincial Gazetteer Compilation Committee. Cheng Qian, Governor of Hunan province, was appointed Chairman, Tang Lin became Hunan Provincial Minister of Propaganda, and Xie Hua, Director of the Institute of History and Archaeology and Director of the Research Institute of Literature and History, became Vice Chairman of the Compilation Committee. The Committee consisted of sixty-three members, including local provincial cadres as well as prefecture, city, and county cadres, along with renowned scholars and experts from the province. Fifteen volumes of the Hunan Provincial Gazetteer were planned, and the first three volumes, consisting of a chronology of the province as well an account of its geography (in two volumes), were published in 1959, 1961, and 1962.<sup>163</sup>

---

<sup>163</sup> “Difangzhi bianzuan 地方志编纂,” *Hunan nianjian 1985* 湖南年鉴 1985 (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1985); “Hunan sheng zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 湖南省志编纂委员会,” *Hunan sheng zhi: juanmo zhanxiu shilu* 湖南省志: 卷末纂修实录 (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2005); “Hunan sheng zhi

The leadership organization reflects a scrupulous distribution of the various arenas involved in the project. The governor's appointment to be chairman of the Committee gave political leverage to the project across the province, and the Minister of Propaganda's appointment to one of the two Vice Chairmanships hinted at the ideological significance of the project. It was the historian Xie Hua who assumed actual responsibility for the entire project as the other vice chairman. Xie was an authoritative academic figure in the province, directing two provincial research institutes. He set up a Compilation Office within the Institute of History and Archaeology under his direct leadership and appointed Liu Ruoyun, Vice Director of the Research Institute of Literature and History, as director. Xie recruited recent graduates from the History Department at Zhongshan University to work as a full-time cadre. The Compilation Office took full charge of compilation with close daily collaboration with the two institutes Xie Hua was directing.<sup>164</sup> In Hunan province, Xie Hua's organizational capability and his academic resources enabled him to serve in effect as a central clearinghouse for the project.

---

bianzuan weiyuanhui chengli 湖南省志编纂委员会成立,” *Hunan nianjian* 2007 湖南年鉴 2007 (Changsha: Hunan nianjianshe, 2007).

<sup>164</sup> “Hunan sheng zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui.”

Jilin Province also engaged extensively in compiling gazetteers. What stands out when considering the province's compiling organization and process is close collaboration with local universities, mostly with Jilin Normal University. For example, Shuangyang County organized a Gazetteer Compilation Committee in September 1958, inviting teachers and students from departments of history at both Jilin University and Jilin Normal University in the city of Changchun to participate. "Under the direct leadership and care of the Shuangyang County Party Committee and with the effort of all the compilers, the Committee completed drafting the gazetteer in only three months." The compilers browsed existing county gazetteers that had been produced in previous regimes, collected related historical materials from local institutions, read post-1949 documents provided by local governments, and interviewed a large number of local people. The draft was reviewed by an older generation of cadres and teachers from the region as well as the local party committee. After many discussions, revisions, and reviews, the draft was finally published in December 1959.<sup>165</sup>

---

<sup>165</sup> "Shuangyang xian zhi (chugao) 双阳县志 (初稿) (1959)," in *Jilin Fangzhi Daquan* 吉林方志大全 (Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 1989), 257-267.

Teachers and students from either or both of the two provincial universities, not only in Shuangyang, were the actual compilers of all the remaining thirteen drafts of the municipal and county gazetteers for Jilin province in the late 1950s. Between 1958 and 1960 the party committees of Jiaohe County, Linjiang County, Tonghua County, Liuhe County, Fusong County, Hailong County, Ji'an County, Huinan County, the village of Kuaidamaozi, and the city of Liaoyuan all invited teachers and students from Jilin Normal University for interviews and documentary research.<sup>166</sup> Editorial notes on these county-level gazetteers illustrated how the governmental-academic collaboration worked:

The Liuhe County Gazetteer was compiled by the Liuhe County Cultural Revolution Task Force of the History Department at Jilin Normal University, with forty-two-second year students (eleven students wrote it and thirty-one students participated in the historical field investigations and discussions), four teachers, and three county cadres. The process was based on the instructions given by the provincial and prefectural party committees and was carried out under the direct leadership of the Liuhe County Party Committee, the County Gazetteer Compilation Committee, and the Cultural Revolution Task Force of the History Department at Jilin Normal University.<sup>167</sup>

---

<sup>166</sup> “Jiaohe xian zhi 蛟河县志,” 359-376; “Linjiang xian zhi dagang (cao'an) 临江县志大纲 (草案),” 604-607; “Tonghua xian zhi (caogao) 通化县志 (草稿),” 643-659; “Kuaidamaozi xiang zhi (chugao) 快大茂子乡志 (初稿),” 659-661; “Liuhexian xian zhi (chugao) 柳河县县志 (初稿),” 690-698; “Fusongxian xianzhi bianxie dagang (gao) 抚松县县志编写大纲 (稿),” 721-722; “Hailong xian zhi bianxie gangmu 海龙县志编写纲目,” 764-766; “Ji'an xian zhi bianxie gangmu 辑安县志编写纲目,” 802-803; “Huinanxian xianzhi bianxie gangmu 辉南县县志编写纲目,” 854-855; “Liaoyuan shi difangzhi bianxie tigang chugao 辽源市地方志编写提纲初稿,” 501-503 in *Jilin Fangzhi Daquan*.

<sup>167</sup> “Liuhexian xian zhi (chugao) 柳河县县志 (初稿),” in *Jilin Fangzhi Daquan*, 690.

In Jilin's case, local universities functioned as major providers of human resources for the project and subcontracted implementors for the provincial party committee. As discussed in Chapter 5, this project worked in tandem with the Great Leap Forward in education and historical studies, redefining the historical field investigation as an ideologically significant and academically scientific method for history students.

***Conclusion: Local academia in the making***

Intellectuals tried to persuade the CCP to invest extensive institutional resources in the gazetteer project, citing better local governance, patriotic education, and scientific research as the rationales. Moreover, intellectuals sought bureaucratic support for the project, which, they argued, could generate academic and scientific accomplishments. Considering how the humanities and social sciences were marginalized in allocating national attention and resources in the first few years of the PRC's history, this new project that involved compiling local gazetteers, which emerged in the context of decentralization in the mid-1950s, seemed like a precious opportunity to the intellectuals involved. Now that the CCP could afford to turn its eyes to something other than industrialization, intellectuals wanted to seize the chance.

Their rationales and proposals appeared largely to have been applied to local practice and were well received by a range of local intellectuals, who took charge of the project or were hired as compilers. In the cases of Hubei, Hunan, and Jilin provinces, where the provincial party leadership's appreciation of the significance of the project created favorable conditions, local research institutes and local universities took the initiative in either administrative or unofficial ways. As Jin Yufu and Gu Jiegang suggested, these local academic institutions served as centers through which local intellectuals were invited to participate or were employed for the project, and these intellectuals organized interviews, collected written materials, discussed those materials, and wrote and printed gazetteers, albeit not as robustly as suggested by their initial proposals for restructuring the bureaucratic support system. The mobilization of governmental, cultural, educational, academic, and research-related resources in counties and provinces in the name of the local gazetteer project created an academic community that spanned the regions. The local gazetteer project gave impetus to the making of local academic communities in pursuit of social functioning and responsibility.

## CHAPTER 4

### LOCAL FIELD INVESTIGATIONS FOR HISTORICAL SCIENCE

What makes history scientific? Over the course of the twentieth century, the question often came down to an issue of “objectivity.” For the Chinese Communists historical materialism, since its importation to China in the 1910s, appeared to provide an objectively scientific framework, as well as exact predictions for the national revolutionary path.<sup>168</sup> Elaborated and complemented by Mao Zedong’s theory of the Chinese trajectory of historical development,<sup>169</sup> Marxist historiography dominated historiographical ideology in China, especially after 1949. Even though historical materialism claimed to be intrinsically scientific, it did not guarantee the development of a united and consensual notion of scientific history in the PRC. Historians representing a broad range of intellectual traditions, from positivists to radical Marxists and from established historians to college students, ceaselessly questioned scientific history during the 1950s in academic debates and mass movements. This chapter examines the changing discourse in mid-1950s China through which historians,

---

<sup>168</sup> Dirlik, *Revolution and History*; Maurice J. Meisner, *Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

<sup>169</sup> Mao Zedong, “Xin minzhuzhuyi lun 新民主主义论,” 662-711.

students, and the Communist Party questioned what constituted scientific history, and what constituted objectivity.

With respect to the conceptualization and practice of science in the PRC, a dichotomy between politically autonomous science and ideology has long prevailed. Conventional understanding holds that anti-intellectual mass movements in Mao's China undermined academic disciplines and prevented scientific development. The full dominance of ideology and class struggle over science reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution and was replaced by pragmatism following the Reform and Opening in the late 1970s.<sup>170</sup> This standard narrative, however, not only dismissively fails to acknowledge Maoist standards of science and scientific progress, but also overlooks the dynamics that played out between science and ideology during that time.

Recent studies in the history of science and technology have challenged conventional wisdom by exploring the construction of dichotomies between science and technology, and observing interactions. Scholars have discovered the continuous pursuit of scientism and technocracy for state-building from the early twentieth century, a process

---

<sup>170</sup> Hong Yung Lee, *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Leo A. Orleans and Caroline Davidson eds., *Science in Contemporary China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980).

that was intensified considerably by rapid industrialization and socialist construction in the 1950s.<sup>171</sup> Moreover, popularized science, with the laboring population functioning as a new agent of knowledge production, was itself considered a form of knowledge that not only scientists but also the Chinese people produced, circulated, received, and utilized. This democratization of knowledge production and popularization of science blurred the purportedly sharp line between science and ideology.<sup>172</sup>

In the field of history as well, this opposition of academic expertise to political ideology has long served as a major framework. The early 1950s was marked by a lopsided rivalry between positivism and Marxism. Positivist historians' expertise and capability in analyzing historical materials were useful in the national projects of compiling historical materials and cooperating with Marxist historians' chronicling of the Chinese revolution. After a series of thought reforms and mass movements gradually but exhaustively suppressed positivist historians, though, debate within the

---

<sup>171</sup> Arunabh Ghosh, *Making It Count: Statistics and Statecraft in the Early People's Republic of China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020); Li Hou, *Building for Oil: Daqing and the Formation of the Chinese Socialist State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018); Victor Seow, *Carbon Technocracy: Energy Regimes in Modern East Asia* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2021).

<sup>172</sup> Sigrid Schmalzer, *The People's Peking Man: Popular Science and Human Identity in Twentieth-Century China* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008); Sigrid Schmalzer, *Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). More studies on the popularized science: Fa-ti Fan, "Science, state, and citizens: Notes from another shore," *Osiris* 27, no. 1 (2012): 227-249; Joshua Eisenman, *Red China's Green Revolution: Technological Innovation, Institutional Change, and Economic Development under the Commune* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Marc André Matten and Rui Kunze, *Knowledge Production in Mao-Era China: Learning from the Masses* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2021).

Marxist front flourished.<sup>173</sup> Arif Dirlik calls this the debate over historicism (*lishi zhuyi* 历史主义) and the class viewpoint (*jieji guandian* 阶级观点).<sup>174</sup> In an overview of PRC historiography, Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik discusses the relationship between historical materials and historical theory, and argues that this was the only methodological debate undertaken to establish historical truth in the PRC.<sup>175</sup> The radicalization of history during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution has regrettably been regarded as ideology's victory over scientific history.

Historicizing the notion and practice of scientific history *per se*, however, unsettles this framework. In taking up the perspective of recent studies in the history of science—taking seriously the historians' pursuit of scientific history and the new active agents of historical knowledge production, this chapter asks the question: What was the role of field research in the re-constitution of scientific history in mid-1950s China?

Field investigation came into being in the Chinese Communist context in 1927, when Mao Zedong published *Report on an Investigation of the*

---

<sup>173</sup> Wang, "Fifty Years of Chinese Historiography," 7-69.

<sup>174</sup> Dirlik defines the class viewpoint as "the position that took class division as the most important datum in the interpretation of the past and regarded the struggle of the oppressed against their oppressors as the motive force of history." On the other hand, historicism focused on revealing "the complexity of class structures in history, and the attenuations of relations between classes, by placing historical events in their temporal social context." (Dirlik, "The Problem of Class Viewpoint Versus," 467.)

<sup>175</sup> Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "History and Truth in Chinese Marxist Historiography," 423.

*Peasant Movement in Hunan*. To fully grasp the situation on the ground and the inner dynamics of individual villages, Mao valued investigations in the field and information gathered from it. He supported this practice on a theoretical level with “On Practice” (1937), which provided a foundation for investigation in the PRC.<sup>176</sup> This chapter traces how field investigation was applied to historical research in the mid- and late 1950s in the context of the Great Leap Forward.

Historical field investigations stimulated three methodological and historiographical discussions about scientific history—the people’s engagement, institutional cooperation, and local specificity. In examining field investigations organized by local colleges in Jilin Province after 1958, this chapter discusses how the democratization, institutionalization, and localization of historical knowledge production simultaneously constituted scientific history as well as ideological correctness in Mao’s China.

### ***History and education under Great Leap Forward***

#### *Great Leap Forward in History*

In March 1958, Chen Boda, Vice Minister of Propaganda, made a speech, titled “Emphasize the present and deemphasize the past. Learn while

---

<sup>176</sup> Ghosh, *Making It Count*, 47-53.

working.” As the title suggests, Chen argued that humanities and social sciences should place greater emphasis on modern phenomena than ancient ones and that scholars should abandon divisive elitist attitudes toward the working masses.<sup>177</sup> After a week, on March 18, the *People’s Daily* printed a full page of leading scholars’ responses to the speech. Under a large banner, “Emphasize the Present, Deemphasize the Past. Learn while Working. Materialize the Great Leap Forward in Philosophy and Social Sciences!” scholars in the fields of philosophy, literature, law, education, economics, and history elaborated on the implications of Chen’s guidelines for their respective fields. This Great Leap Forward in academia was ideological preparation for the nationwide drive of the Great Leap Forward as well as a trigger for transformation within academic fields later.

For its part, the discipline of history experienced a remarkable transformation, but with unintended consequences. A leading historian, Jian Bozan, proposed ten specific plans to accomplish a Great Leap Forward in History (*lishixue dayuejin* 历史学大跃进). The plans included organization (of conferences, academic societies, and international exchanges), institutional reform (of history departments in colleges, and exchanges of workers

---

<sup>177</sup> “Chen Boda tan zhexue shehui kexue ruhe yuejin? Houjin Bogu Biangan Bianxue 陈伯达谈哲学社会科学如何跃进? 厚今薄古, 边干边学,” *People’s Daily*, March 11, 1958.

between research institutions and colleges), writing (of textbooks, the history of the Republic of China, the history of the People's Republic of China, and translations), and archival arrangements.<sup>178</sup> The Great Leap Forward in History, which was intended to take form in an institutionalized reformation and reorientation of the discipline of history in practice, encountered an unexpected mass movement led by young historians and college students in response to Chen's speech.

The movement began soon after Chen's speech at major universities in Beijing and quickly spread nationwide. Students' wallposters at major colleges criticized *bourgeois historians*—mostly established college professors. From the students' point of view, it was these professors who emphasized the past and occupied elitist positions. Historians' expertise in ancient history and primary sources and their methodology of textual criticism came under attack. The students driving this political movement became more and more radicalized. Accusations were extended to young, relatively less established Marxist historians for not being Marxist enough. Personal complaints like “too much homework to do,” “teachers' cursory preparation for class,” “teachers' unkindness outside classroom,” were justified as accusations of

---

<sup>178</sup> Jian Bozhan 翦伯赞, “Xing wu mie zi, fazhan lishi kexue 兴无灭资, 发展历史科学,” *People's Daily*, March 18, 1958.

elitist and bourgeois attitudes among the teachers. Hardworking historians were accused of conducting their well-written studies in pursuit of individual, not communal, prosperity.<sup>179</sup> In Spring 1959, leading historians in the party deemed the justifications for such accusations to have crossed a line, undermining the academic discipline itself. They tried to rationalize the entire movement and to defend the discipline by promoting academic debates.<sup>180</sup> While this short-lived mass movement undermined academic discipline through personal accusations, it also touched on several historiographical issues of the time, especially concerning the proper politically and academically meaningful subjects and methods of historical research. In the spirit of emphasizing the present and deemphasizing the past, classes on ancient history were subject to criticism. One criticism, for example, was the weight given to the pre-Qin period over the late Qing or

---

<sup>179</sup> On wall posters: *Houjin bogu ziliao suoyin* 厚今薄古资料索引 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue tushuguan, 1958); *Houjin bogu* 厚今薄古 (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1958); *Houjin bogu bianlun ji* 厚今薄古辩论集 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1958); *Lishi kexue zhong liangtiao daolu de douzheng* 历史科学中两条道路的斗争 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1958). Two volumes of *Lishi kexue zhong liangtiao daolu de douzheng* [Struggles Between Two Roads in Historical Science] were published by the People's Publishing House in 1958 and 1959 respectively. While the first volume includes earlier movements at Beijing University, Beijing Normal University, and Nankai University, NENU's posters were printed in the second volume in line with Shandong University, Zhongshan University, Xibe University, Sichuan University, and East China Normal University. On recent studies of the mass movement: Chen Peng 陈闯, "Cong bianyuan dao zhongxin: 1958nian de shixue qingnian qunti 从边缘到中心: 1958年的史学青年群体," *Shehui kexue luntan* 社会科学论坛 2 (2019), 225-234; Chu Zhuwu 储著武, "'Houjin bogu': 1958nian lizhixue dayuejin '厚今薄古': 1958年历史学大跃进," *Anhui shixue* 安徽史学 1 (2017), 159-168; Gu Xuefeng 谷学峰, "1958nian 'Shixue geming' yanjiu 1958年'史学革命'研究," (PhD Diss., Shandong University, 2011).

<sup>180</sup> Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "On Shi and Lun," 74-95.

later in the selection of teaching materials and the distribution of teaching time.<sup>181</sup> Also, an overemphasis on the histories of kings and princes over peasants and worker history was criticized for overlooking the role that common people played in historical development. While teachers described kings and princes as vividly and dramatically as possible, lectures on peasant uprisings were usually short and simplistic, giving students a sense that the driving force in historical development was kings and princes, not common people.<sup>182</sup> Radical students called for a focus on Mass Line history and a deemphasis on the history of dynasties and heroes. Instead, historians should explore the history of factories and communes.

Historical research methods were criticized as well— “Overplaying historical material, downplaying theory.” Students criticized teachers who emphasized the importance of historical materials only, in what they argued as the absence of analysis or guiding theory. This was problematic to them, as historical materials must have been produced and slandered by the bourgeois class in the past. “Pseudo-historical materials (*wei shiliao* 伪史料)” had to be analyzed and criticized with the assistance of proper guiding

---

<sup>181</sup> *Lishi kexue zhong liangtiao daolu de donzheng*, 228, 235.

<sup>182</sup> *Lishi kexue zhong liangtiao daolu de donzheng*, 254-256.

theory—Marxism-Leninism.<sup>183</sup> Many teachers, however, “did not study Marxism-Leninism hard, but cherished only a little rare historical material hoarded in their own hands like a treasure.” Some people did not delve into the study of Marxism-Leninism, but just looked up the appropriate books when they needed to quote some theory. Teaching also lacked class analysis of historical events, figures, and materials<sup>184</sup>:

Teacher Sun requires us to study at least 40 hours a week. In reading historical materials, he emphasizes, “Seize as much time as possible and read. The more you read the better” . . . One hundred twenty hours in five weeks is the most we can make for study, and the 1,600 pages he assigned as requirement is already a big problem. . . Teacher Sun asks us, whenever he sees us, “How many documents did you read? Any questions?” This increases the burden of our thoughts. To complete the task he assigns, we can’t get out of the piles of historical materials all day. It makes us feel “burdensome” to participate in the movement, which affects the reform.<sup>185</sup>

From the students’ perspective, teachers not only adopted an uncritical approach but also required students to spend too much time and energy reading huge piles of documents. The “burden” kept them from becoming politically reformed citizens, they argued.

---

<sup>183</sup> *Lishi kexue zhong liangtiao daolu de douzheng*, 220, 224, 228, 236.

<sup>184</sup> Wang Miao 汪淼, “Zichan jieji xueshu sixiang zai lishi xi jiaoxue kexue yanjiu gongzuo zhong de jidian biao xian 资产阶级学术思想在历史系教学科学研究工作中的几点表现,” *Dongbei renmin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 东北人民大学人文科学学报 2 (1958): 65-69; Wang Zao 王藻, “Pipan lishi jiaoxue he yanjiu gongzuo zhong de zichan jieji fangxiang 批判历史教学和研究工作中的资产阶级方向,” *Jilin Daily* 吉林日报, May 30, 1958.

<sup>185</sup> *Lishi kexue zhong liangtiao daolu de douzheng*, 230.

This accusatory intensity indeed affected historians as they engaged in rethinking their roles and responsibilities as history workers (*lishi gongzuozhe* 历史工作者) in the *new* China. “History workers’ activities must serve the present” in two ways—as researchers and as educators. The purpose of historical research was to discover the laws of social and historical development and to prove the inevitability of the current social transformation. Thus, having piles of historical materials should not be the ultimate purpose but only the means by which history workers did their work. As educators, historians should be “both red and expert” (*youhong youzhuan* 又红又专), cultivating future workers “with a high degree of socialist consciousness and modern science and culture.” “Some teachers,” however, “have the ambition to become scientists, but have no ambition to be educators. . . The essence is the idea of emphasizing the profession and neglecting politics. . . Comrades who are keen on writing articles and pamphlets but ignore teaching do not prioritize socialist interests but struggle for personal fame and wealth. What kind of redness can those comrades have?” Students involved in the movement concluded that history workers should be “not only scientists of Marxism-Leninism but also socialist educators.”<sup>186</sup>

---

<sup>186</sup> Wang Miao, “Zichan jieji xueshu sixiang zai lishi xi jiaoxue kexue yanjiu gongzuo zhong,” 69.

### *Great Leap Forward in Education*

The gust of the Great Leap Forward blew into colleges not only in the form of the mass movement but also in education policy. Historians in colleges worked on transforming history education in accordance with the central educational directive and pondered the social roles and functions of history, history education, and historians in the Great Leap society.

The Great Leap Forward in Education established a new direction in education policy through the “Directive on Education Work” issued in September 1958. This document summarized and criticized education policies and ideas that had prevailed since 1949, including “education being isolated from reality,” “education for education’s sake,” “the separation of mental and manual labor,” and “education can be led only by experts.” The directive also stipulated principles such as “education serving politics,” “the combination of education and productive labor,” and “the Mass Line in education.”<sup>187</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup> “Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu jiaoyu gongzuo de zhishi 中共中央、国务院关于教育工作的指示,” in *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* 建国以来重要文献选编, Vol. 11 (Beijing: Zhong yang wen xian chu ban she, 1992), 489-498; Suzanne Pepper, “New Directions in Education,” in *The Cambridge History of China Volume 14. The People’s Republic*, 400. This directive was issued by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council immediately after Lu Dingyi, the Minister of Education, published an article in *Red Flag* in August, titled “Education must be combined with productive labor.” The editorial board of *Red Flag* noted that the Lu’s document elaborated on the conclusion of the National Education Work Conference held in April and June 1958, and would be distributed to party committees at all levels including colleges along with the directive. (“Editorial,” *Hongqi* 红旗 7, (1958): 1; “Jiaoyu bixu yu shengchan

What stands out with regard to the Great Leap Forward in History is the idea of “the combination of education and productive labor.” The idea itself was not at all new. The CCP’s adoption of this idea can be traced back to the Half-work Half-study (*bangong bandu* 半工半读) movement in Yan’an in the early 1940s. One of the most recent previous cases occurred in the Northeast Liberated Area Education Work Conference that convened in May 1949. To promote industrial recovery and rapid development to support the ongoing Civil War, the Conference resolved that education should combine study with productive labor and help the working masses cultivate cultural knowledge and revolutionary thoughts.<sup>188</sup> The adoption of the Soviet developmental model in the early 1950s, however, pushed back against this idea. The new education model focused on producing experts in science and engineering. It was contrary to a resolution passed by the Northeast Educational Conference in 1949, but with the same goal—to achieve industrial development as quickly as possible. Engineering colleges proliferated, flourishing with increasingly many institutions and students. Graduates were assigned to production sites immediately. This emphasis on science and engineering in education accompanied an emphasis on expertise

---

laodong xiang jiehe 教育必须与生产劳动相结合,” in *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian Vol. 11*, 405-425.)

<sup>188</sup> “Dongbei kai shengshi jiaoyu huiyi, taolun jiaoyu yu shengchan jiehe 东北开省市教育会议, 讨论教育与生产结合,” *People’s Daily*, May 30, 1949.

(*zhuan* 专) over “redness” (*hong* 红). Becoming useful engineers for the nation required expertise after years of being immersed in education. When in the mid 1950s the CCP decided to break away from the Soviet model and pursue Chinese-style socialism, this emphasis on expertise over “redness” was criticized for dissociating education from the working masses and inducing elitist attitudes among the educated.

The combination of education and productive labor experienced a revival in the same vein. Kang Sheng, the Deputy Director of the Central Culture and Education Group and the head promoter of “Part-work Part-study (*qingong jianxue* 勤工俭学),”<sup>189</sup> endorsed several specific measures that were to be implemented in various regions. Part-work Part-study could be achieved with contributions from two sides—the working masses and the schools. Workers and farmers were encouraged to build their own schools adjacent to factories and communes to learn basic knowledge and revolutionary thought. Students were encouraged to go to factories and farms to participate in production and learn from the working masses. Intellectuals, including technicians, engineers, lecturers, teachers, and students, were encouraged to go to villages, factories, and communes to

---

<sup>189</sup> The original meaning of “Part-work Part-study (*qingong jianxue* 勤工俭学)” was “Work diligently work and study frugally.”

improve the production process, wipe out illiteracy, and help in establishing schools. Kang Sheng praised the factory construction in schools and colleges in Beijing:

The combination of education and productive labor has found specific forms and a bright road. Colleges, secondary professional schools, and middle schools can adopt this form of constructing and running factories to solve the problem of combining education with productive labor. It seems that all schools must go this way.<sup>190</sup>

The northeastern city of Changchun was also witnessing the Part-work Part-study movement in schools and colleges. The CCP Jilin Provincial Committee held a Provincial Conference on Culture and Education in June 1958, in which the new central educational policy was discussed.<sup>191</sup> Less than a month after this conference, Changchun saw more than 1,500 factory units constructed by students from colleges, secondary technical schools, and middle schools.<sup>192</sup> The Education Bureau of the Changchun Municipal Government reported that the 32 middle schools and 162 primary schools in the city constructed 357 factories, farmed 390.64 *shang* (equal in units to

---

<sup>190</sup> “Qingong jianxue ruxin jieduan, Kang Sheng tongzhi zai yici zuotanhui shang zhichu, xuexiao ban gongchang, shi jiaoyu yu shengchan xiang jiehe zhaodao le juti xingshi 勤工俭学进入新阶段, 康生同志在一次座谈会上指出, 学校办工厂, 使教育与生产劳动相结合找到了具体形式,” *People’s Daily*, July 12, 1958.

<sup>191</sup> Yuan Shaoying 袁韶莹, *Jilin sheng gaodeng jiaoyu shi* 吉林省高等教育史 (Jilin: Shidai wenyi chubanshe), 330.

<sup>192</sup> “Da gaige da yuejin: ben bao jizhe pingshu changchun shi xuexiao ban gongchang de xingshi 大改革 大跃进: 本报记者评述长春市学校办工厂的形势,” *Jilin Daily*, July 25, 1958.

hectares in Northeast China), and affiliated with 242 production units for student labor activities outside schools.<sup>193</sup>

In students' factory construction and production ventures, departments of history were no exception. *Jilin Daily* published a student report on July 25, 1958, on a factory operation involving students from the Department of History at Northeastern Normal University (NENU) under the title "Students of Social Sciences Can Also Run Factories Well":

Under the light of the general line of socialist construction, especially after the recent vigorous implementation of Chairman Mao's educational policy, our Department of History has set off an upsurge in part-work part-study to construct and run factories. Our department has constructed more than 20 factories. Someone can ask: "Can a department of history, or humanities, construct and run factories? Even if so, probably just an antique factory!" If we were to answer to this question with facts, it's not like that. . . . Including carpentry, paper and cotton milling, tiling, ironworks, a film factory, a bone meal factory, a fertilizer plant, a chalk factory, a urea plant, a sulfuric acid plant, and a cement and cement tile factory. . . . One hundred percent of the students in the department participated in the factory construction activities.<sup>194</sup>

These students in the Department of History were trying to refute skepticism regarding whether history students could combine education and

---

<sup>193</sup> Changchun shi jiaoyu ju shi zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 长春市教育局史志编纂委员会, *Changchun shi jiaoyu wenxian ziliao xuanbian (1948-1985)* 长春市教育文献资料选编 (1948-1985) (Changchun: Changchun shi jiaoyu ju shi zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1988), 234-238.

<sup>194</sup> Xiao Mengran 肖孟然, Dong Guoku 董国库, "Xue shehui kexue de tongyang hui ban hao gongchang xue shehui kexue de tongyang hui ban hao gongchang" 学社会科学的同样会办好工厂," *Jilin Daily*, July 25, 1958.

productive labor effectively. They constructed factories that produced a wide range of materials, regardless of their academic expertise, as much as other departments did. In only two weeks or so, first-, second-, and third-year students constructed 18 factories, while fourth-year students constructed 17 factories. They studied in the morning, participated in labor activities in the afternoon, and enjoyed extracurricular/extra-labor activities at night. Even though some wondered whether the routine would affect the quality of study negatively, the students who wrote the report denied this. History students at NENU were busy with the Emphasize the Present and Deemphasize the Past mass movement in March and April of 1958, with factory construction taking place in June and July.

### ***Field investigations***

Factory construction was not the only way in which history students combined education with productive labor. Field investigations undertaken for historical research were organized at local colleges. Field investigation as a research method had been regarded as important for understanding the actual situation in which peasants and workers existed since Mao Zedong's *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* in 1927 redirected the strategies of the Chinese Communist movement. The new education policy brought back field investigation as a way of combining education and labor.

After the new direction in education policy was delivered through the Provincial Conference on Culture and Education in June 1958, the Department of History at Northeast People's University (NPU) studied the policy and discussed how to apply it to historical research and education:

During the Great Leap Forward for socialism in our country, the Party Central Committee presented a clear education policy of "Education serves the proletariat politics; Combine education and productive labor." After this policy was promulgated, the entire membership of the Department of History raised awareness through a series of learning and discussing activities under the leadership of the party. We all unitedly supported this policy. However, there were still some unresolved problems, such as *how historical science serves the proletariat politics and how it is combined with productive labor*. These problems were not resolved quickly. To carry out the party's education policy and fully experience it by doing, the General Party Branch of the department decided to organize field investigation by sending history students into the countryside to be with the working masses to participate in productive labor and conduct research at the same time.<sup>195</sup>

With these considerations in mind, in the late 1950s the history departments at NENU and NPU organized a series of field investigations and published research articles. These field investigations were bureaucratically supported by the party-state apparatus in Jilin Province. The CCP Jilin Provincial Committee issued a directive in September 1958 to local party committees, factories and mines, party committees in enterprises, and

---

<sup>195</sup> Shao Pengwen 邵鹏文, "Lishi xie xuesheng qu meikuang xie chu yibu: *Jiaobe meikuang bashi nian* 历史系学生去煤矿写出一部: 蛟河煤矿八十年," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 86.

party organizations in academic and research institutions. It instructed all of these actors to study and follow the central “Directive on Education Work” and provide more support in arranging for relevant university activities, including factory production and field investigations.<sup>196</sup> Accordingly, college students’ field investigations were supported and managed by local party committees or local propaganda departments.

The field investigations in Jilin Province shared a similar structure and pedagogical pursuit. Appendix 1 presents the details of the field investigations conducted by the two universities. Below is a summary.

1. Dates: All fieldwork was conducted either during summer or winter breaks.
2. Cooperation: a) academic collaboration with the Jilin Provincial Museum, the Jilin Province Cultural Relics Management Committee, and the CAS Jilin Provincial Branch Institute of Economics; b) administrative cooperation was provided by CCP local party committees, CCP factory party committees, local propaganda departments, and local people’s committees.

---

<sup>196</sup> Yuan Shaoying, *Jilin sheng gaodeng jiaoyu shi*, 99.

3. Research topics: The Anti-Japanese Struggle by the Red Army and the working masses. Some archaeological studies were also led by archaeologists from the departments.
4. Research activities: Students visited local residents to conduct interviews, discovered and excavated historical sites, and collected written sources from local institutions.
5. Relationship with the working masses: Post-field reports emphasized that students “ate, lived, and worked together with peasants (or workers).” Students participated in construction work in some villages, or production work in factories—explicit ways of combining education and productive labor. “In the Jiaohe Coal Mine, we went down to excavate coal, while visiting miners, holding meetings, and trying to collect oral and written materials.”<sup>197</sup> Also, villagers and workers not only provided oral testimonies and written documents but also led students to previously unknown sites in the region and told stories about the sites. In some cases, students organized exhibitions for the masses to introduce the local history they studied during the investigation.

---

<sup>197</sup> Shen Xiaomei 申笑梅, “Wo zou guo de lu 我走过的路,” in *Beifang shijie renwu* 北方史界人物, eds. Li Junwu 李俊武, Zhou Guangbu 周光陪 (Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1991), 318.

6. Products: Some investigations eventually produced books, either issued by publishers or for intra-college circulation. Researchers carrying out field investigations in Jiaohe County ended up writing a County Gazetteer with local cadres. Collaborations with the CAS Jilin Branch produced professional research articles.

For example, in July 1958 the history department at NENU organized a field investigation trip to the Xi'an Coal Mine in Liaoyuan. Under the new educational banner of “going to the mines, going to the countryside (*xiakuang xiaxiang* 下矿下乡),” students collected historical documents and miners’ testimonies while living and working together with the miners and their families. Li Guang, a lecturer in the department and the organizer of the fieldwork, published an article that examined “the miserable life and intense anti-Japanese resistance struggle” of miners in Xi’an under Japanese colonial rule. The main source of Li’s article was *Liaoyuan Visiting Research Source Book*, which was compiled by the Department of History Cultural Revolution Work Team Liaoyuan Squadron. The source book included a manuscript of a village symposium with students, interview records of miners, and reports of local cadres.<sup>198</sup>

---

<sup>198</sup> Li Guang 黎光, “Rikou zhimin tongzhi xia Xi’an kuanggong de feican shenghuo he fankang douzheng 日寇殖民统治下西安矿工的悲惨生活和反抗斗争,” *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林师大学报 3 (1959): 5-11.

Field investigation was a product of the Great Leap Forward in both history and education. The Emphasize the Present Deemphasize the Past Movement of Spring 1958 raised many questions about the contents and methods of history. The political movement highlighted the importance of studying modern history with a focus on peasants and workers. This Mass Line history—the writing of the history of common people, people’s communes, factories, and villages— had the potential to serve both historical research and education. History workers proposed historical field investigations in which labor activities did not necessarily prevent students from learning about the past of the region or learning proper disciplinary practices. Especially in the Northeast, the Anti-Japanese Struggle was an appropriate topic for achieving the two goals—Emphasize the Present and combining education with productive labor. One NENU lecturer wrote that, “Historical field research is a vibrant learning process, *an integration of theory and reality, and an important method to improve the quality of learning.*”<sup>199</sup> A lecturer in NPU wrote in a report to the most prestigious history journal in the country, *Historical Research*, that “we all felt that we harvested *both discipline and*

---

<sup>199</sup> Wan Jiuhe 万九河, “Lishi diaocha zai lishi jiaoxue zhong de zhongyao yiyi 历史调查在历史教学中的重要意义,” *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林师大学报 3 (1959): 1-4.

*ideology* through this field investigation.”<sup>200</sup> No matter how much actual integration was achieved, history workers found a way to coordinate academic activities with contemporary political demands.

### ***Historical material for scientific history***

Following the field investigations, methodological discussions, especially regarding historical material, occurred frequently. Students’ early criticism of historians’ overemphasis on historical material over Marxist theory or contemporary politics continued and developed throughout the field investigations. As seen above, students complained about their homework and course requirements, which required them to cover overwhelming numbers of documents and books. This seemingly childish grumbling could have reflected generational conflict over academic authority, as James Harrison and Huaiyin Li argue. Younger historians and students, who lacked the opportunities and resources they needed to learn and develop disciplinary skills because of political turmoil and wars, were marginalized and disoriented in a field that imposed strict academic standards and rigid interpretive schemas. Established historians’ expertise with primary sources

---

<sup>200</sup> Liu Chunfan 柳春藩, “Jilin daxue lishi xi xuesheng zai ben sheng jinxing wenwu pucha 吉林大学历史系学生在本省进行文物普查,” *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 11 (1958): 36.

and interpretive skills had long been respected but gradually lost political favor after 1949 when Marxist historiography came to dominate the field.<sup>201</sup>

The devaluation of traditional historical research peaked in 1958. The Great Leap Forward in History promoted the Emphasize the Present Deemphasize the Past approach, using a slogan that was deliberately designed to underrate senior historians' academic capital as the antithesis of Marxism. During the mass movement, *historical material*, connotating bourgeois history, was the antithesis of theory, which was now to be informed by Marxism. As Wang Miao wrote, "overplaying historical material and downplaying theory is the most obvious manifestation of bourgeois historical thoughts in our department."<sup>202</sup> After *theory* provisionally won over *historical material* during the mass movement,<sup>203</sup> young historians and students went to the field to collect historical materials. The question was no longer about the dichotomy of theory and historical material—*What kind of historical material is politically correct and academically proper?*

---

<sup>201</sup> James P. Harrison, *The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions: A Study in the Rewriting of Chinese History*, (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 238; Li, *Reinventing Modern China*, 142.

<sup>202</sup> Wang Miao, "Zichan jieji xueshu sixiang zai lishi xi jiaoxue kexue yanjiu gongzuo zhong," 66.

<sup>203</sup> This was another round of historiographical discussion of what Arif Dirlik puts as "the debate (which) involved basic problems of the Marxist interpretation of history that had divided Chinese historians since the 1930s . . . the relationship between revolutionary consciousness and history in Marxist interpretations of the past . . ." Dirlik keenly observes that this historiographical division enrooted in Marxist historical thought surfaced once political circumstance needed it. Whether the debate (re)commenced and attacked someone on either side of the divide was subject to the political trends of the time. Thus, the nature of historiographical debate was political, not academic. (Dirlik, "The Problem of Class Viewpoint Versus Historicism," 470.)

Students' field experience opened up possibilities for using other kinds of historical materials than written documents. Non-written sources such as oral testimonies, historical sites, and relics were flourishing in field studies. Especially under the banner of combining education and productive labor, students "ate, lived, and worked with the peasants (or workers)," which created favorable conditions for close interaction with local residents. It was working people who could claim authorship of or primary access to these materials. The history workers therefore needed the support and guidance of the people to make use of these materials and produce historical research. The collection process per se embodied abandoning elitist attitudes and learning from the masses. Thus, all the field investigations organized by NENU and NPU in the late 1950s involved interviews with local residents. The people's engagement granted political significance to the historical research—making it Marxist enough and *red* enough.

Not only political significance but also academic progress was achieved through engagement with the people, or so the historians in the investigations argued. First, local people introduced locally known but bureaucratically unknown sites and shared locally circulated stories of the past. For example, in Nong'an County, even the county's Cultural and Education Bureau did not know that there was a historical site in Xiaochengzi Village. "With the great support of the Village cadres and

people,” while the NPU research team visited the site but could spend only two hours there and wrote only a short report, this event opened archaeological research across the entire region.<sup>204</sup> Knowledge that local residents possessed exclusively and shared with historians recalls James Scott’s concept of *metis*. *Metis* is usually illegible or unrecognizable by the modern state but common knowledge among local people. Scott points out that *metis* is unofficial but indispensable for maintaining official sectors.<sup>205</sup> In these historical field investigations as well, local knowledge seemed to contribute to new academic discoveries.

Local historical knowledge abounded, especially regarding the recent past, in testimonies and relics of living people. The emphasis on modern history in the mass movement laid the groundwork for the contribution to historical studies of non-written sources. Fieldwork in Panshi County explored the history of Anti-Japanese activities in the region with relics and stories the local people provided. The late 1950s was barely two decades after Japanese colonial rule:

Many comrades think that it is very difficult to find contemporary revolutionary relics. However, it is not always true.

---

<sup>204</sup> Wang Yazhou 王亞洲, Zhang Xuanru 张旋如, Yuan Fuwei 袁傅伟, Yu Zhidong 于治栋, “Jilin Nong’an Tianjiatuozi yizhi e faxian yu chubu diaocha 吉林农安田家坨子遗址的发现与初步调查,” *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 63-76.

<sup>205</sup> James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 309-341.

Most of the revolutionary relics are in the hands of the broad masses. We discovered all twenty-nine revolutionary sites and more than two hundred relics we collected at the sites with the help of local residents. They told us precious stories about those relics.<sup>206</sup>

To these historians, Japanese colonial rule in the region undermined the accuracy and legitimacy of the remaining written documents. A huge number of documents, newspapers, journals, and archives that Japan and its puppet state left behind in local libraries and government offices included rich stores of information. Some field investigation reports pointed out how poorly the Japan-produced documents conveyed historical truth. This stimulated another ongoing discussion in the Emphasize the Present Deemphasize the Past Movement—criticism of pseudo-historical materials written from the bourgeois perspective and uncritical readings of those documents:

It is heartbreaking to listen to the old workers of the coal mine in Liaoyuan testifying what they suffered under the Japanese rule. But the book *The Ten-year History of the Xi'an Coal Mine*, written by a bourgeois, quasi-mercenary Japanese scholar, describes the life of miners under Japanese control in Manchukuo as, “It’s like heaven.” They shamelessly manipulated history. It shows how dangerous it can be to blindly trust historical materials without proper identification.<sup>207</sup>

---

<sup>206</sup> Shao Pengwen 邵鹏文, Chen Tiejian 陈铁健, Duan Jingxuan 段景轩, Liu Yumeng 刘于孟, Tian Jujian 田居俭, “Jilin sheng Panshi xian dahong shila shan hongjun juzhu yizhi diaocha ji 吉林省磐石县大紅石礮山紅軍居住遗址調查記,” *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 43-52.

<sup>207</sup> Li Guang, “Rikou zhimin tongzhi xia Xi’an kuanggong de feican shenghuo he fankang douzheng,” 5-11; Wan Jiuhe, “Lishi diaocha zai lishi jiaoxue zhong de zhongyao yiyi,” 1-4.

Furthermore, this emphasis on non-written material reflected the generational conflict that the mass movement had revealed. Established historians' broad knowledge and expertise with primary sources was intimidating to new generations who lacked training in academic disciplines. Students' complaints about teachers' reading lists containing too many materials found legitimate ground when field investigations obtained new materials. Their teachers did not necessarily have greater access to or more knowledge about non-written materials than younger historians and students. Rather, those who went to the field and who were willing to talk to the local people knew better:

When it comes to the study of the past, some people take the methods of “to close the door and read books” and “to study classics until one’s hair turns grey.” Some people rely only on documents and replace their own thoughts with other people’s main arguments. This research method buries oneself in a book, only hovering around it, and repeats other people’s opinions. We don’t have to do this kind of study, because this method rarely leads to creative breakthroughs but rather possibly causes big mistakes.<sup>208</sup>

Historians in these field investigations did not however dismiss written documents entirely but tried to properly manage both written and non-written materials. Most research articles written by NENU and NPU

---

<sup>208</sup> Wan Jiuhe, “Lishi diaocha zai lishi jiaoxue zhong de zhongyao yiyi,” 1-4

researchers in fact cited Japanese governmental and factory-management documents. While structural understanding of the period relied on the documentary sources, oral testimonies added texture. By crosschecking historical documents produced under Japanese rule with oral testimonies of the people, historians believed they could narrate the history in a way that enabled their accounts to come closer to revealing what had really happened. Non-written materials could supplement and even correct that to which written documents attested.

The new historiographical emphasis on modern history and the history of the common people, brewed over by the mass movement, could be materialized with bureaucratic support, as directed by the new educational policy. The entire process of field investigation—planning and organizing field activities, allocating accommodations to students, collecting written and non-written materials, and writing research articles or local gazetteers—was a product of institutional cooperation between local actors including party affiliates, government agencies, universities, museums, historians, and residents. Those involved were local party apparatuses (CCP County Committees), local party propaganda departments (CCP Municipal Committee Propaganda Department, CCP Plant Committee Propaganda Department), local government apparatuses (Cultural Relics Management Committee of Jilin Province), local mine and factory committees, local

academic institutions (NENU, NPU, the CAS Jilin Provincial Branch Institute of Economics, the Jilin Provincial Museum), and local people's committees. These institutions contributed to field investigations by organizing field trips, providing historical documents, mobilizing local resources and people, conducting research, writing reports and books, and discussing publications. Research articles, local history books, and local gazetteers that were published following field investigations were collaborative products of these academic and bureaucratic institutions, not of individual historians' "closing the door and reading books."

The sets of dichotomies discussed here—expertise versus *redness*, established historians versus young historians, historical material versus theory, written documents versus non-written materials, individual historical study versus communal cooperation, and academic prowess versus political correctness—existed but not necessarily in a mutually exclusive way. Rather, for young historians and students in the fields, being *red* by engaging closely with the masses and making use of bureaucratic resources to identify topics and methods of historical research together led to academic progress. Knowledge here was produced, circulated, received, and utilized not only by experts but also by the people. The democratization and popularization of historical knowledge production was not only politically proper but also

academically meaningful to them. It was this popularized institutional cooperation that granted academic authority to their historical research.

### *Discovering localness for scientific history*

Field investigations in villages, mines, and factories also prompted discussions of local history and its relationship to the grand narrative of the Chinese Revolution. In the early 1950s, when the CCP had just established the country and Marxist historical thinking dominated the field, the centripetal forces driving the construction of one grand narrative pulled historians into the pursuit of universality—the discovery of general laws of the historical development of China and the Chinese Revolution. Before the Great Leap Forward in History and Education, established historians such as Ding Zeliang and Chen Guizong had published a few articles on revolutionary movements in the Northeast. They had been assigned to NPU during the College-Department Reorganization in the early 1950s and took advantage of local primary sources and deepened their historical research. Using locally available documents in provincial archives and libraries, they examined the Northeastern experience of important historical events like the

Boxer Rebellion and the Xinhai Revolution.<sup>209</sup> They provided locally contextualized illustrations of these events within a master narrative of the historical development of China. Local contexts and particularities enabled historians to elaborate on historical details while still differentiating themselves from the non-Marxist Textual Criticism School. In their writings, local history was not provincialized but rather enriched the centrally constructed and distributed narrative of the Chinese revolution.

Field investigation in individual villages, factories, and mines brought recognition to specificity, spatiality, and locality in historical research. Field investigations featured historians' spatial experience in specific geographic areas and auditory collection of the people's personalized experience of the past. This new recognition of the need for local specificity required reconciliation with the grand narrative of the nation. What was at stake was an understanding of how best to achieve universality and uniqueness at the same time.

For some, local history's subordination to and dependence on the central narrative did not fundamentally change, but rather provided new and

---

<sup>209</sup> Chen Guizong 陳貴宗, "Dongbei Yihetuan Yundong cuantan 東北義和團運動初探," *Shixue jikan* 史学集刊 1 (1956): 81-92; Chen Guizong 陳貴宗, "Xinhai Geming shiqi Dongsansheng de geming yundong 辛亥革命時期東三省的革命運動," *Shixue jikan* 史学集刊 2 (1956): 49-79; Ding Zeliang 丁則良, "Youguan Xinhai Geming shiqi Dongbei ruogan shishi de yixie ziliao (shang): Liaoningsheng tushuguan dang'an jilu zhi yi 有關辛亥革命時期東北若干史事的一些資料(上): 遼寧省圖書館檔案輯錄之一," *Shixue jikan* 史学集刊 1 (1956): 157-165.

more specific details. A historian at NENU made a bold argument connecting the colonial experience of one village in Tonghua to the colonial experience of the entire Northeast and then to all of the colonies that suffered under Japanese imperialism and finally to all colonized people in the world:

For example, we have investigated the history of the cruel rule of Japanese imperialism in recent decades in several counties and cities in the Tonghua area. In so doing, we can understand the general picture of the cruel rule of Japanese imperialism in the whole Northeast. Because each county in the Tonghua area was an integral part of colonial rule in the Northeast at that time, it was a concrete embodiment of the barbaric colonial policy of Japanese imperialism. Moreover, from the colonial rule of Japanese imperialism in the Northeast, we can also infer other imperialists' ruling of colonized people. Although there are differences in the imperialist powers and in the manifestations of colonialism, their vicious nature and the aims are the same. . . . Therefore, fieldwork is an important method for understanding the general law of historical development. Although the scope of historical fieldwork is limited to a few regions, from the investigation of several regions, we can get the basic and necessary understanding of more regions and even the overall historical situation. . . . Because the historical development of one or several regions affects that of other regions and the whole, historical developments are generally consistent across regions while each region retains unique characteristics.<sup>210</sup>

While this argument is theoretically preliminary and rough, it connects the most specific context of a specific region to the general law of historical development for the entire country and even the entire world. Locally

---

<sup>210</sup> Wan Jiuhé, "Lishi diaocha zai lishi jiaoxue zhong de zhongyao yiyi," 1-4

discovered narratives served and conformed to universality by providing puzzle pieces of varying size.

For others, local uniqueness stood out. A lecturer in the Department of Economics at NPU, Kong Jingwei, focused more intently on the uniqueness of the Northeastern economy. In examining the socioeconomic structure of the modern Northeast, Kong implicitly acknowledged differences between the colonial Northeastern economy from the quasi-colonial economy of the rest of China.<sup>211</sup> Other historians identified local differences from the rest of the country and used them to promote the region's revolutionary contributions with universal passion and effort:

In terms of economic development, the geographical environment, ethnic distribution, imperialist invasion, and the Qing's governance, Northeast China was not identical to the rest of China. Accordingly, the development and size of the people's revolutionary movements were not identical to those in the rest of China, either. However, the revolutionary movements in other regions ignited the Northeastern people's revolutionary zeal, and the revolutionary movements in the Northeast also contributed to the expansion of the national revolution as a whole.<sup>212</sup>

---

<sup>211</sup> Kong's study of the Northeastern economy did not refute the master narrative until the 1960s, but became bolder after the 1980s, arguing for unique features of the Northeast in Chinese history.

<sup>212</sup> Zhongguo kexueyuan Jilinsheng fenyuan lishi yanjiusuo 中国科学院吉林省分院历史研究所, Jilin shifan daxue lishixi 吉林师范大学历史系 eds., *Jindai Dongbei renmin geming yundong shi: jiu minzhu zhuyi shiqi* 近代东北人民革命运动史:旧民主主义革命时期 (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1960), 2.

Local history was a co-product of academic institutions, local party–state apparatuses, and the masses. This cooperation in turn created local academic communities. *History of Modern Northeastern People’s Revolutionary Movement (Old Democratic Revolution Period)*, published in July 1960 by Jilin People’s Publisher, was a marker of the sprouting of local history and a local historical community in Northeast China. The main writers came from the Teaching and Research Section of Modern Chinese History in the Department of History at NENU, and the Research Office of Northeast Local History in the Institute of History in the CAS Jilin Provincial Branch. Related party–state institutions, libraries, higher education institutions, and scientific research institutions at all levels in the three provinces in the Northeast supported the project. Along with written documents including archives, books, and newspapers, interviews with people who participated or observed important historical events provided the major sources of research.<sup>213</sup>

After the draft of the history study was complete, the project group held a conference in October 1959 to which they invited historians from the region. Professors from Liaoning University, Harbin Normal College, Jilin

---

<sup>213</sup> Zhongguo kexueyuan Jilinsheng fenyuan lishi yanjiusuo, *Jilin shifan daxue lishixi, Jindai Dongbei renmin geming yundong shi: jiu minzhuzhuyi shiqi*, 5-7; Li Guang 黎光, “Jiu minzhuzhuyi geming shiqi Dongbei renmin geming douzheng gaishu 舊民主主義革命時期東北人民革命鬥爭概述,” *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林師大學報 2 (1960): 52-80.

University, Changchun Normal College, and officers of the Jilin Provincial Museum and Jilin People's Publisher attended the conference. Participants pointed out errors in the book, but overall complimented it as the first book to systematically delineate the history of revolutionary movements in the three Northeastern provinces. Also, the ability of the project to complete the draft in only seven months was "the result of the party's General Line for Socialist Construction and the result of the broad cooperation involving a communal effort and the Mass Line approach under the leadership of the party."<sup>214</sup> As a result of the many sources it embraced as authoritative sources, the book functioned as a textbook for future research on local history in the Northeast. In this case, the popularization and politicization of historical research created an academic community, which again implies the consilience of academic and political pursuits in knowledge production.

---

<sup>214</sup> "Guanyu *Jindai Dongbei geming yundong shi* (chugao) de xueshu taolunhui 關於近代東北人民革命運動史(初稿)的學術討論會," *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林師大學報 2 (1960): 100; Li Guang, "Jiu minzhuzhuyi geming shiqi Dongbei renmin geming douzheng gaishu," 52-80. The next volume was to have been published under the title of either *Jindai Dongbei renmin geming yundong shi: xin minzhuzhuyi shiqi* 近代東北人民革命運動史: 新民主主義革命時期 [History of People's Revolutionary Movement in the Modern Northeast: New Democratic Revolution Period] or *Xiandai Dongbei renmin geming yundongshi* 現代東北人民革命運動史 [History of People's Revolutionary Movement in the Contemporary Northeast], but the plan seemed to have been cancelled during the Cultural Revolution. (Chang Cheng 常城, Sun Jiwu 孫繼武, "Wusi shiqi Dongbei renmin de geming douzheng 五四時期東北人民的革命鬥爭," *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林師大學報 2 (1960): 97.)

## *Conclusion*

Two historiographical events chronologically but jointly contributed to the rise of field investigation as a historical research method in mid-1950s China. The Emphasize the Present Deemphasize the Past Movement sparked discussions on the ontology and methodology of history among historians of the younger generation. Contemporary history prevailed over ancient history. The history of the masses gained approval and priority over the history of kings and dynasties. The new educational policy that called for combining education and labor then further pushed historians to prove the usefulness of fieldwork in the context of the national Great Leap Forward. Historians at colleges identified field investigation as a fitting method not only for continuing the conversation within the mass movement but also for following the educational directive on their own terms. Field investigation enabled historians to work with the masses and study the past at the same time. Young historians and students went to specific villages, towns, factories, and mines to see and listen to evidence of the local past.

Three features of field investigations informed the authorization of scientific history. Written materials no longer guaranteed that scientific standards of historical study would be met, but rather became devalued as inaccurate and improper sources. Non-written materials, such as oral testimonies, historical sites, and relics, of which the laboring masses could

claim authorship and to which the masses had primary access, received major attention in the field. The people's engagement granted political significance as well as academic proficiency to historical research. Moreover, the entire process of field investigation—planning and organizing field activities, allocating accommodations to students, collecting written and non-written materials, and writing research articles or local gazetteers—was a product of institutional cooperation between local actors including party affiliates, government agencies, universities, museums, historians, and residents. This institutional and bureaucratic collaboration provided a functional foundation for scientific history. Furthermore, field investigation in individual villages, factories, and mines brought recognition to specificity, spatiality, and locality, which led to the sprouting of local history and local communities of historians. In this way, attributes of science were entangled with ideology and the institutions of the Communist regime, which in turn reinforced the Marxist academic regime in China.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE WRITING OF THE LOCAL COLONIAL PAST

Northeast China has had many labels in modern China. From the Qing dynastic rulers' sacred homeland to a borderland territory of the Chinese nation, to a Japanese colony, to the Chinese Communists' industrial base, and to a "Rust Belt"-like region of industrial and social decline after the Opening and Reform, Northeast China has been governed by many different people, labeled with ever-changing names, and continuously reidentified over a century of tumultuous change. The historical transformation of the region has been framed differently at different junctures in history, as layers of the past have been retrospectively re-narrated and reconstructed. This chapter examines two such layers: the colonial experience in the 1930s and 1940s and local historians' writing of it in the 1950s and 1960s.

What stands out most in those historical writings is the scant attention given to Japan. This absence is worth examination, considering that the Northeast was under direct colonial control for thirteen years by the Japanese puppet state, Manchukuo. In the 1950s and 1960s, once-colonized people were still alive, remembering their everyday life under colonial rule at a distance of only a few years. This absence contradicts the widely held belief that the colonized people subscribed to a nationalist anti-imperialism. But it

was only after the 1980s that anti-Japanese nationalism gained a strong popular appeal in China.<sup>215</sup> Scholars such as Parks M. Coble and Peter Hays Gries have also pointed out that the history of Japanese rule of the Northeast “was often ignored”<sup>216</sup> and that “there was little research on [it]”<sup>217</sup> during the Mao period. Why? Examining the sociopolitical and historiographical context of the Northeast in the 1950s and 1960s provides an answer.

This chapter argues that local historians developed a discursive strategy of obscuring the past by obfuscating the enemy and blurring colonial life. “Obscuring the past” obviously resonates with Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s classic study, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Trouillot argues that power operates in the writing of history from sources, archives, and writing processes, and deliberately, unconsciously, or inadvertently decides what happened in the past and what is written about the past. While this chapter builds on Trouillot’s work, “obscuring the past”

---

<sup>215</sup> Arif Dirlik, “‘Past Experience, If Not Forgotten, Is a Guide to the Future’; Or, What Is in a Text? The Politics of History in Chinese-Japanese Relations,” *boundary 2* 18, no. 3 (1991): 29–58; Leo T. S. Ching, *Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019); Rana Mitter, “‘Old ghosts, new memories’: China’s changing war history in the era of post-Mao politics,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 1 (2003).

<sup>216</sup> Parks M. Coble, “China’s New Remembering of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937–1945,” *The China Quarterly* 190 (2007), 403.

<sup>217</sup> Peter Hays Gries, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 73.

does not mean the same thing here. To better disclose power relationships, Trouillot's account presumes a clear dichotomy between silencing power and silenced voices: rulers and subjects, the colonizers and the colonized, us and them. Using this dichotomy remains a political imperative in the post colonial era given the persistence of the colonial structure of power; questioning the dichotomy itself needs to be done carefully. However, this framework does little to illuminate the agency of the colonized in historical writing. This chapter shows how the past was obscured not by the colonizers but by the once-colonized people in Northeast China.

The history of the Northeast complicates the dichotomy in several ways, enabling a new approach to postcolonial power in production of history. Rana Mitter's *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* reveals how the story of Japanese occupation of the Northeast was fabricated by the nationalist Northeastern activists in exile who were in pursuit of the government's attention and support. Mitter points out that their narrative of resistance, specifically the simple language and the simple dichotomy of invader versus victim concealed shades of gray, namely collaborators. This Manchurian myth, constructed in the 1930s, formed the prototype of how people saw the colonial Northeast, even to the

present day.<sup>218</sup> Mitter's work not only informs the gray zone within the dichotomy, but also serves as a reminder that the Manchurian myth was constructed by the colonized, not the colonizer.

In the same vein, Jini Kim Watson has identified a lack of postcolonial theory in scholarship examining the East Asian colonial experience. As she observes, "the dominant tropes of postcolonial theory, including hybridity, the critique of Eurocentrism, and deconstructive analyses of power, have neither emerged from, nor taken root within, the context of East Asia."<sup>219</sup> The history of the colonial experience of East Asia has largely been constructed by studying Japanese imperialism or by promoting Chinese nationalism, as Mitter argues. Power is rarely deconstructed in either approach.

Bruce Cumings has argued that modernization theory overwhelmingly dominates scholarly understandings of postcolonial East Asia, which has not given room for postcolonialism to maneuver.<sup>220</sup> This was the case in postcolonial China as well, in which the CCP pursued modernization

---

<sup>218</sup> Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

<sup>219</sup> Jini Kim Watson, "Imperial Mimicry, Modernisation Theory and the Contradictions of Postcolonial South Korea," *Postcolonial Studies* 10, no. 2 (2007): 172.

<sup>220</sup> Bruce Cumings, "Boundary Displacement: The State, the Foundations and Area Studies During and After the Cold War," in *Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies*, eds. Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

through state-led rapid industrialization. In that instance, colonial power was not deconstructed but simply changed hands to a new regime. The Communist Party went from victim to winner: “the newly established People’s Republic did not wish to dwell on Chinese suffering.”<sup>221</sup>

When the Northeast reidentified itself as “the eldest son of socialism” to lead the efforts for national industrialization, given its heavy industrial base in the 1950s, the imperative was not understanding the structure and operation of the colonial power in the past but “moving forward.” Whereas, in other countries, the colonial past is most often silenced by former and current colonizers, in the socialist Northeast, it was the people, purportedly the proud winner of the anti-imperialist wars and the new power in the new regime, who deliberately, unconsciously, or inadvertently obscured their own colonial past. In exploring how historians in socialist Northeast China wrote their local colonial past, this chapter seeks to enrich the discussion of historians’ discursive strategies in the postcolonial era.

This chapter analyzes the historical texts which were mostly produced by local field investigations examined in Chapter 4. As discussed in the previous chapter, the organizations of field investigations by local universities produced historical writings as collective products of

---

<sup>221</sup> Gries, *China’s New Nationalism*, 73.

institutional cooperation by various local actors, embodying a communal understanding of the local past.

### ***Chinese Communists in action***

How did local historians write the region's past? This general question may lead to an interesting historiographical discussion when it is about Northeast China. Its colonial experience under Japanese imperialism was locally unique and signifies a phase of historical development different from other parts of the PRC. Under the Marxist academic regime, in which the unchallengeable master narrative of the Chinese Revolution dominated the historical discourse in various levels of the society,<sup>222</sup> this local historical trajectory embodied the potential of divergence from a commonality-building national narrative. The rhetorical question above could be restated: How did local historians negotiate the relationship between the central and local narratives, or between universality and local specificity?

The role of the Northeast in the master narrative of the Chinese Revolution is crystalized in the title of Steven Levine's book, *Anvil of*

---

<sup>222</sup> Susanne Schwiedrzik, "In Search of a Master Narrative for 20th-Century Chinese History," *The China Quarterly*, no. 188 (2006): 1070–1091.

*Victory*.<sup>223</sup> The CCP organized a united front against Japanese imperialists and the Nationalist Party in the 1930–40s Northeast, which led to their victory in the Second World War and the Chinese Civil War. The CCP's endeavors in the urban underground and countryside in the Northeast is considered to have laid the anvil for the establishment of the PRC. This narrative guided the writing of history in the region, in selecting topics and making arguments. Anti-Japanese struggle and labor protest were popular topics for the historical research projects organized by Northeast People's University (NPU) and Northeast Normal University (NENU).

The CCP's activity in the region was often described in terms of leadership and loyalty. Protests by workers and miners were described as spontaneous and noble, but intrinsically limited, blossoming only after the CCP's intervention and organization. One collective research article, for example, examines labor protests in Dalian, spanning a period from the opening of Manchurian Railway Company in 1906 to the organization of the Dalian Chinese Society of Engineering in 1923 and the eventual arrest of the Society's leaders and its abolishment in 1927:

Chinese workers in Lüda region, who were enduring one-seventh of the wage of Japanese workers as well as dangerous labor conditions, called strikes twelve times from 1916 to 1919. In 1918, in the Manchurian Railway Shahekou factory, more than

---

<sup>223</sup> Steven I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

two thousand workers went on strike, and in 1919, in the Fuchang factory, more than four thousand workers went on strike. However, such struggles had neither a clear political goal nor a doctrine of struggle. They were simply economic struggles, only in pursuit of the improvement of living conditions. Without a unified organization or leadership, the fragmented and spontaneous struggles ended in failure.<sup>224</sup>

While acknowledging the proletariat's power in challenging the harsh working conditions and its early attempts at protest in the 1910s, the writers attribute its failure to effect widespread change to a lack of political consciousness and leadership. Even intellectuals who were relatively sympathetic to the laboring masses were framed as incapable of genuinely understanding the people and leading a revolution, even if they were not as exploitative as capitalists:

Capitalist democrats also abhorred colonial rule by the imperialists. However, because of the intrinsic limitations of their class and the attitude of compromise, they could not fundamentally attack colonial rule, could not discover the laboring masses' revolutionary potential, and excluded the most revolutionary class, the proletariat, from their anti-Japanese activities.<sup>225</sup>

The article moves on to 1923, when two workers in the Shahekou factory, Fu Jingyang and Yu Jinglong, organized a labor union, the Dalian

---

<sup>224</sup> Lü Xichen 吕曦晨, Yang Cailan 杨彩兰, Cong Yongri 丛永日, Liu Yumeng 刘于孟, Ai Fuwei 哀傅伟, Tian Jujian 田居俭, "Dalian Zhonghua gongxuehui ji qi lingdao de gongre yundong 大连中华工学会及其领导的工人运动," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1959): 100.

<sup>225</sup> Lü Xichen, Yang Cailan, Cong Yongri, Liu Yumeng, Ai Fuwei, Tian Jujian, "Dalian Zhonghua gongxuehui ji qi lingdao de gongre yundong," 101.

Chinese Society of Engineering (a name designed to sound like something other than a union to avoid surveillance). It was the first labor union in Lüda region. The CCP immediately joined them by contacting the leaders, dispatching cadres to the union, constructing party organizations within the union, organizing political and cultural education, and cultivating worker cadres who later participated in underground labor movements in the Northeast. The ninety-five-day strike at the Fudao textile mill in 1926 was described in the article as the successful realization of the CCP's organizing leadership and the Society's effort:

Labor struggles by the Dalian Chinese Society of Engineering gave a serious blow to Japanese imperialism and effectively shattered the enemy's illusion of "Stable Kwantung." Even the Japanese rulers could not deny that "the Dalian Chinese Society of Engineering was in full swing, making the strike a groundbreaking event in the labor movement in Manchuria."<sup>226</sup>

This narrative is repeated in another article on labor protest in the Fushun coal mine. Miners called strikes twenty-five times between 1916 and 1925 in response to an increase in production speeds, a sharp rise in prices, and worsening labor conditions during the First World War. According to the article, however, these strikes only came to fruition after the CCP's intervention:

---

<sup>226</sup> Lü Xichen, Yang Cailan, Cong Yongri, Liu Yumeng, Ai Fuwei, Tian Jujian, "Dalian Zhonghua gongxuehui ji qi lingdao de gongre yundong," 108.

Without the leadership of the party, those strikes could not last more than three days and failed in the end.... Only after 1929, when the party dispatched Yang Jingyu as a Fushun Special Branch Secretary to lead underground protests, the Fushun people's anti-Japanese patriotic labor struggle became genuinely led by the party. Consequently, labor movements developed from economic struggles into political struggles.<sup>227</sup>

The CCP's leadership and capability were framed as indispensable in efficient and meaningful labor struggle in the region, even though it was not clear how exactly the dispatched cadres changed the situation. That those protests were crushed in the end by the Gwantung army in the late 1920s did not undermine the CCP's competence or political significance in this narrative.

The CCP's loyalty and devotion was also emphasized. Writing about anti-Japanese guerilla activities in the region, historians described the highlighted Communist cadres and people as having a strong will and devotion in the face of desperate crises and other difficulties. Even though various anti-Japanese groups arose in response to the Japanese invasion, especially after the Mukden Incident in 1931, it is argued that only the CCP-led struggles held out until the end without surrendering to the carrots or sticks of the imperialists. The authors wrote:

---

<sup>227</sup> Xue Zhu 雪竹, "Jiu yi ba shibian qian Fushun meikuang gongren douzheng 九一八事变前抚顺煤矿工人斗争," *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 2 (1960): 86.

Northeastern compatriots, who ardently loved the homeland and did not want to become homeless slaves, resentfully resisted the Japanese invasion and organized activities everywhere under the protection and leadership of the Communist Party. In the spring of 1932, all kinds of anti-Japanese save-the-nation mass organizations were established in every corner of the Northeast, like bamboo shoots after rain.... However, led by reactionary landowners or warlords, most organizations collapsed shortly in the face of military attacks and enticing offers by the imperialists. It was the people organized and led by the Communist Party who genuinely raised the anti-Japanese banner. Thus, the guerilla activities in Panshi county were the core of anti-Japanese activities in the southern Northeast.<sup>228</sup>

What was irrefutably revealed during the excavation and evaluation of the remains and relics in the Panshi guerilla base is that the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army led by the party maintained their anti-Japanese struggle throughout the entire period under colonial rule. It is just as Comrade Mao Zedong said: “People in the three northeastern provinces and patriotic military groups in the region, against the Nationalist Government’s non-resistance policy, organized anti-Japanese armies and devoted themselves to heroic guerilla activities under the leadership or with the cooperation of the Communist Party. Guerilla activities developed on a large scale and were not extinguished by the enemy despite a series of hardships and frustrations.”<sup>229</sup>

Even if the CCP’s leadership and devotion was unmatched in these instances, using such specific cases to paint a broader picture of the region is another thing. But single spatial or temporal examples of success were

---

<sup>228</sup> Tan Xian 譚銑, Li Heqing 李鶴慶, Wu Zeyi 吳澤義, “1931–1934nian Panshi xian kangri aiguo renmin tuanti jianjie 1931–1934 年磐石县抗日爱国人民团体簡介,” *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 53–57.

<sup>229</sup> Shao Pengwen, Chen Tiejian, Duan Jingxuan, Liu Yumeng, Tian Jujian, “Jilin sheng Panshi xian dahong shila shan hongjun juzhu yizhi diaochaji,” 50.

routinely appropriated in service of generalization. Panshi county, a core guerilla base of the CCP in the early 1930s, attracted historians' attention and field investigations in the mid-1950s. The research articles on guerilla forces, patriotic mass organizations, and labor protests in Panshi county unanimously emphasize the CCP's leadership and devotion, but not how the anti-Japanese struggles in the county collapsed in the mid- to late 1930s after fierce attacks by the Kwantung Army.<sup>230</sup> Labor movements in Dalian and Fushun could not regain power after the 1930s either. The CCP cannot be said to have “withstood the anti-Japanese struggle *throughout the entire period under colonial rule* [emphasis added],” contrary to the claims of many of these articles. Many such articles invoke an ambiguous “heritage” of resistance in lieu of more evidence-based arguments that the CCP was always successful.<sup>231</sup>

Such generalizations were likely motivated by the Northeast's significance and contribution to the development of the Chinese Revolution.

---

<sup>230</sup> Li Yibin 李义彬, Liu Yumeng 刘于孟, Dong Weiquan 董维权, “1931–1935nian Jihai tielu gongren de kangri douzheng 1931–1935 年吉海铁路工人的抗日斗争,” *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 59–62; Shao Pengwen, Chen Tiejian, Duan Jingxuan, Liu Yumeng, Tian Jujian, “Jilin sheng Panshi xian dahong shila shan hongjun juzhu yizhi diaochaji,” 43–52; Tan Xian 谭銑, Li Heqing 李鹤庆, Wu Zeyi 吴泽义, “1931–1934nian Panshi xian kangri aiguo renmin tuanti jianjie 1931–1934 年磐石县抗日爱国人民团体简介,” *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 53–57.

<sup>231</sup> Chen Yujing 陈雨静, “Shenshan li jian gongchang jianchi kangzhan: Jieshao ‘Dongbei kangri lianjun di shi yi jun bingongchang geming wenwu zhanlanhui 深山里建工厂坚持抗战: 介绍“东北抗日联军第十一军兵工厂革命文物展览会,” *Wenwu cankao ziliao* 文物参考资料 8 (1958).

Elizabeth Perry has examined how a mining town in Anyuan retrospectively became a source of revolutionary tradition.<sup>232</sup> The ways in which spontaneous insurrections by Anyuan miners from 1900 to the 1920s were later mythologized as a root of the Chinese Revolution resemble how labor protests in Dalian and Fushun came to be narrated. The ways in which the CCP's intervention, training, experiments, and struggles transformed the working masses' zeal into actual revolution in Anyuan resonate with the historical trajectory of labor movements in the Northeast. In this narrative, Northeast China was presented not as an anomaly, but rather as a space of anti-imperialist revolution due to its colonial experience and the CCP's devotion to the region.

***Who was, or is, the enemy?***

In identifying Japanese imperialism as the enemy of the CCP and the people, historians in the 1950s and 1960s put more of an accent on “imperialism” than on “Japanese.” The labor protests and guerilla activities were described less as Chinese nationalist resistance against Japanese invaders than as proletariat resistance against the whole imperialist operation, including collaborators, labor brokers and contractors, reactionary forces, the GMT,

---

<sup>232</sup> Elizabeth J. Perry, *Anyuan: Mining China's Revolutionary Tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

and bourgeois intellectuals, on top of Japanese imperialism. In this framework of class struggle that informed the field of history in the 1950s and 1960s, the concept of enemy was expanded further and obfuscated as a result.

The collaborative imperialist suppression of the laboring masses was instantiated as the brutal treatment of workers in factories and mines:

They often openly said, “There are too many Chinese people. It does not matter if hundreds or thousands die. Mining as much coal as possible is important.” They did not care about miners’ lives or safety; nor did they install safety equipment... One former worker testified, “People died almost every day. It was normal that seventeen or eighteen people died a day.” They established fascist organizations in the mines such as police units, police stands, and a labor department. In cooperation with the army and police, the labor department controlled miners’ registrations and commutes, surveilled miners’ words and actions, and tortured miners on charges of being “anti-Manchukuo anti-Japanese reactionaries,” “thought criminals,” or “economic criminals.”<sup>233</sup>

This brutality was repeatedly presented in nationalist discourse through descriptions of Death Pits (*wanrenkeng*) across the Northeast, in which thousands of Chinese miners and other workers were buried dead or alive in the 1930s. The cruelty, however, was not only perpetuated by the Japanese. Chinese collaborators and labor contractors serving for such brutal

---

<sup>233</sup> Li Guang, “Rikou zhimin tongzhi xia Xi’an kuanggong de feican shenghuo he fankang douzheng,” 6.

operations of factories and mines also contributed to this violence, and it was these actors that historians in the 1950 and 1960s delved more into:

The miners in the Fushun coal mine were all Chinese. As the Japanese invasion expanded, the number of miners increased every year. There were 1,100 miners in 1917, 30,600 in 1926, and 33,400 in 1930. There were two sources of miners: nearby residents who were looking for jobs and were recruited by contractors, and people who were deceived... The recruiting method: The mine organized recruiting teams with labor contractors (*batou*) and their miners. They went to their hometowns, “explaining” how good Fushun and its mining facilities were, and how high miners’ standards of living were, to deceive job seekers.... Japanese thieves (*rikou*) provided travel expenses and rewarded teams based on their recruiting outcomes. The mine paid travel expenses for the newly recruited miners. In this way, a huge number of bankrupt peasants were deceived and came to Fushun.<sup>234</sup>

Not only in the recruiting process but also in supporting themselves in the mining towns of Fushun and Xi’an did the miners fall victim to Chinese contractors, who opened retail stores, brothels, and gambling houses to take away their wages. The Xi’an mine paid wages not in money but in exchange tickets that could be circulated only within the mining town. Miners could not escape as they depended on the intra-town resources through which “Japanese thieves and Chinese contractors” monopolized the town economy and exploited the miners. As one article put it:

Japanese thieves cultivated a group of contractors (*batou*) and field agents (*waiqin*) from Chinese collaborators, landowners,

---

<sup>234</sup> Xue Zhu, “Jiu yi ba shibian qian Fushun meikuang gongren douzheng,” 83.

comprador capitalists, scoundrels (*liumang*), and rogues (*wulai*), and made them become their agents in oppressing people.... Countless miners were killed under the control of Japanese thieves, contractors, and field agents. Even alive, miners were stripped of even the bare minimum of the right to live. Miners were starved, frozen, injured, disabled, or became ill. Miners were always under threat, and there was no freedom of residence, speech, or action. It was like being in jail.<sup>235</sup>

Research on the Harbin Tram factory also describes how the Japanese made use of Chinese collaborators (*hanjin zougou*) in order to avoid direct resistance from the Chinese people: “those loyal collaborators, obeying their Japanese owner, cruelly oppressed, extorted, abused, and beat Chinese people. Thus, tram workers had deep hatred for those scum of the nation (*minzu bailei*) and continued resisting them.”<sup>236</sup>

In this framework of class struggle, blame and hatred were aimed at the class enemy, not the national enemy. The research article on the Xi’an mine described above quotes from the book *A ten-year History of the Xi’an Coal Mine*, written by Sadao Yoshida in 1942. It describes the moment when the Kwantung Army took over the mine in December 1931: “the attitude of the Chinese toward the Japanese was very intimidating. Chinese people cursed the Japanese as bastards (*Wangbadan*) or Asian devils (*Dongyang gui*)

---

<sup>235</sup> Li Guang, “Rikou zhimin tongzhi xia Xi’an kuangong de feican shenghuo he fankang douzheng,” 6–7.

<sup>236</sup> Li Yibin 李义彬, “Ha’erbin dianche gongren de kangri douzheng 哈尔滨电车工人的抗日斗争,” *Jilin daxue shehui kexue xuebao* 吉林大学社会科学学报 1 (1961): 110.

and shouted that they should beat the Japanese devils to death.”<sup>237</sup> Such racist or nationalist emotional outbursts from Chinese people were not described in historical writings in the 1950 and 1960s. Moreover, some historians even suggested that there was international solidarity between the Chinese and Japanese proletariat in resisting the development of capitalism.<sup>238</sup> The CCP appeared again as a loyal leader and winner of class struggle: “the Communist Party avenged the miners. The miners, clapping their hands and yelling in delight, thanked the party and Chairman Mao.”<sup>239</sup> The colonial experience was redefined in terms of class struggle and, as a result, was reduced to class struggle.

This reduction led to the obfuscation of the enemy in contrast to the specific descriptions of the CCP’s interventions. The effect of obfuscation is to transform the enemy—people—into a discourse. At some point, the discourse begins to stand on its own, losing its specific historical context. Then, it can be appropriated for other purposes in response to contemporaneous politics: whoever the enemy is or was, the CCP and the people must be the winner.

---

<sup>237</sup> Li Guang, “Rikou zhimin tongzhi xia Xi’an kuanggong de feican shenghuo he fankang douzheng,” 8.

<sup>238</sup> Lü Xichen, Yang Cailan, Cong Yongri, Liu Yumeng, Ai Fuwei, Tian Jujian, “Dalian Zhonghua gongxuehui ji qi lingdao de gongre yundong,” 103–104; Zhu Shouren 朱守仁, “Jiu yi ba shibian hou riben renmin de fanzhan douzheng 九一八事变后日本人民的反战斗争,” *Lishi jianxue* 历史研究 2 (1961).

<sup>239</sup> Li Guang, “Rikou zhimin tongzhi xia Xi’an kuanggong de feican shenghuo he fankang douzheng,” 7.

The most immediate appropriation worked by conflating Japanese imperialism with American imperialism. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the newborn state had a sense of crisis and mobilized a nationwide movement of Resisting U.S. Aggression and Aiding Korea. Anti-American imperialism had a huge appeal across the country. Northeastern provinces were at the very front line of the war just across a river and were inhabited by Koreans who had recently moved from the Korean Peninsula. On top of this geographic and demographic proximity to the war, the historical experience of the imperialist invasion along the Korean Peninsula only a couple of decades ago furthered the local sense of crisis. The author of a report on cultural relics concluded with this sense of crisis: “American imperialism has inherited Japanese imperialism and right now is militarizing Japan to become our enemy. Under the leadership of the Party and Chairman Mao, we should firmly unite and shatter the invasion of all imperialists.”<sup>240</sup> The number of research articles and books on American imperialism in China increased in number.<sup>241</sup> The experience of the

---

<sup>240</sup> Li Wenxin 李文信, “Rikou zai Dongbei wenhua qinlüe de zuixing 日寇在東北文化侵略的罪行,” *Wenwu cankao ziliao* 文物参考资料 9 (1951): 209.

<sup>241</sup> To list only a few: Jia bai 贾白, “Jiu yi ba shibian zhong meiguo bangzhu riben qinlüe woguo de zuixing 九一八事变中美国帮助日本侵略我国的罪行,” *Jianghai xuekan* 江海学刊 9 (1961); Li Tuiou 李退愚, “Mei diguozhuyi zai jiu yi ba shibian shiqi dui zhongguo de qinlüe 美帝国主义在九一八事变时期对中国的侵略,” *Wenxue yuekan* 文学月刊 4 (1959); Sun Kefu 孙克复, “Meiguo zai zhong ri zhanzheng zhong wannong de heping pianju 美国在中日战争中玩弄的和平骗局,” *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 9 (1965); Yi Wenchenc 伊文成, “Shi er nian lai mei ri fangdongpai fuhuo riben junguozhuyi de zui’e huodong 十二年

Northeast led to the reexamination of the Mukden Incident informed by the American imperialist invasion.<sup>242</sup>

The Northeast Patriotic Martyr Memorial Hall was established in 1955 in Harbin on a street named after the female anti-Japanese fighter Zhao Yiman. One area of exhibition was entitled “Violence of Japan, the U.S., and Chiang (*Ri Mei Zhang*).” The exhibition showed events from 1931 to 1949, with a curated collection of photographs, relics, records, and memoirs showing the Japanese reign of terror and violence alongside the American and GMT’s rule of the region after 1945, in which “Chiang’s thief group (*Zhang zei jituan*) brutally killed innocent Chinese people, Communist Party members, progressive figures, students, workers, peasants, reporters, women, and children.”<sup>243</sup> This curating method reflects Denise Ho’s study on the curation of the revolutionary past during the Mao period. Ho has examined how emotional appeal was critical in curating for effective

---

来美日反动派复活日本军国主义的罪恶活动 (1948–1959 年),” *Dongbei shida xuebao* 东北师大学报 2 (1960). More in *Jianguo yilai zhongguo xiandai shi lunwen mulu suoyin* 建国以来中国现代史论文目录索引 1949–1982, edited and published by Nankaidaxue lishixi 南开大学历史系, 1982, 102.

<sup>242</sup> Chen Fangzhi 陈芳芝, “Jiu yi ba shibian shiqi mei ri diguozhuyi de goujie 九一八事变时期美日帝国主义的勾结,” *Beijing daxue xuebao* 北京大学学报 3 (1962); Chen Fangzhi 陈芳芝, “(Xu) Jiu yi ba shibian shiqi mei ri diguozhuyi de goujie” (续)九一八事变时期美日帝国主义的勾结,” *Beijing daxue xuebao* 北京大学学报 4 (1962).

<sup>243</sup> Sun Qingge 孙庆阁, “Dongbei lieshi jinianguan 东北烈士纪念馆,” *Wenwu cankao ziliao* 文物参考资料 7 (1955): 127–128.

propaganda.<sup>244</sup> The juxtaposition of three enemies, based on their similarity—violence—is an example of the discursive strategy of obfuscating the enemy.

A similar strategy worked in domestic politics when the Anti-Rightist Campaign sought to silence divergent opinions of the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Historical writings in the late 1950s, which were not necessarily stimulated by the Anti-Rightist Campaign, added their rebuttal of the so-called rightist interpretations of the past with historical evidence and narratives collected from local areas. Ge Peiji, who had purportedly participated in anti-Japanese guerilla activities in the Northeast, made a comment at a symposium at the People's University, which was published in the *People's Daily* on May 31, 1957.<sup>245</sup> His comment, “without the Communist Party, people did not have to sell the country in the Northeast,” which implied that it was the Communist Party who cornered collaborators to work with the Japanese, attracted discussion and dispute, and was attacked as a rightist view. The history lecturers and students in the Jilin People's

---

<sup>244</sup> Denise Y. Ho, *Curating Revolution: Politics on Display in Mao's China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

<sup>245</sup> “Zhongguo renmin daxue jixu juxing zuotanhui, jiaoshimen cong butong guandian tichu wenti 中国人民大学继续举行座谈会, 教师们从不同观点提出问题,” *People's Daily*, May 31, 1957.

University aggressively disproved Ge's claim with materials collected from the Panshi guerilla base:

Without the Communist Party, people did not have to sell the country." This stale expression reveals how the rightists attack the party, how fundamentally anti-socialist the rightists are, and how totally ignorant the rightists are of history.<sup>246</sup>

Research on the Xi'an coal mine also concluded with their rebuttal against the dispute frequently raised during the Hundred Flowers Campaign:

In 1957, petty bourgeoisie in the Xi'an coal mine, together with other bourgeoisie rightists in the country, madly attacked the party and socialism, saying that "workers' living conditions are not as good as those in the Manchukuo period" and "the party cannot lead industrial construction." How can they shout out such ultra-reactionary voices, mistaking right for wrong, confusing black and white, if they are not crazy, an echo of imperialism, the remnants of dark and corrupt forces?<sup>247</sup>

The rightists were either "crazy" or "an echo of imperialism" or "the remnants of all dark and corrupt forces." Whoever was against the CCP and the people was associated with imperialism and its shadow.

### *Colonial life obscured*

The choice of research topics and historians' black-and-white approach to them led to a simplified historical reconstruction of the period. Were there

---

<sup>246</sup> Shao Pengwen, Chen Tiejian, Duan Jingxuan, Liu Yumeng, Tian Jujian, "Jilin sheng Panshi xian dahong shila shan hongjun juzhu yizhi diaochaji," 50

<sup>247</sup> Li Guang, "Rikou zhimin tongzhi xia Xi'an kuanggong de feican shenghuo he fankang douzheng," 10.

only the people and the enemy of the people living in the 1930–40s Northeast? Were there only resistance and imperialism/collaboration? Such a simplistic binary for political purposes concealed the shades of gray, as Rana Mitter argues, and the texture of colonial life.

The CCP exercised its power to discursively objectify and categorize individuals. As described previously, colonial life was reduced to formatted and attributed sets of categories of resistance or collaboration, and Northeastern people were designated as loyal fighters, poor victims, or vicious collaborators. Classification is and was a powerful tool of the CCP and other communist regimes’ “frameworks for social engineering.”<sup>248</sup> In particular, the labeling of “the enemy of the people” has been repeated at critical junctures of the PRC—even now, toward nonconforming individuals during the COVID-19 pandemic. As long as the CCP was putting historical writing in terms of Marxist class struggle in the 1950 and 1960s, the local colonial past was blurred in an inflexible frame. The overly rigid dichotomy obscured the past.

Another method of obscuration was the quantitative construction of the past through economic history. The Department of Economics in the NPU launched a project in 1958 to compile *Historical Materials on the*

---

<sup>248</sup> U, *Creating the Intellectual*, 3.

*Manchurian Railway Company (1906–1945)* and *Historical Materials on Land Reclamation in the Northeast (1840–1945)*. These projects scrutinized how Japanese imperialism gradually infiltrated the Northeastern economy through the Manchurian Railway Company and how Japanese imperialism exploited Northeastern land, causing disasters. Professors, lecturers, and students of the project went to several local libraries, including the Dalian Library, the Liaoning Library, the Harbin Library, the Changchun Municipal Library, the Jilin People’s University Library, and the Jilin Normal University Library to collect investigation reports, letters, and archives of the Manchurian Railway Company, the Ministry of the Railway, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, in both Chinese and Japanese.<sup>249</sup> Unlike research projects in the departments of history in the same period in the region, which pursued mass line field investigations for academic research, this economic history project prioritized the compilation of documents. The activities of Japanese imperialists were brought to light through the examination of these documents and quantification rather than on relics from the field or firsthand testimony.

---

<sup>249</sup> “Dongbei renmin daxue bianji ‘Dongbei kenzhi shi ziliao’ ji ‘Mantie shi ziliao’ de chubu jihua 东北人民大学編輯“东北垦殖史資料”及“滿铁史資料”的初步計劃,” *Jingji Yanjiu* 经济研究 7 (1958): 15.

One economic historian in this project in particular, lecturer Kong Jingwei, is worth further analysis. Kong graduated from the Department of History at NPU in 1951, majoring in Marxist theory; he later changed to economic history, following the advice of Lü Zhenyu, a prominent Marxist historian, President of NPU, and Kong's supervisor.<sup>250</sup> His early work focuses on the debate over the seeds of capitalism in China, based on his background in Marxist theory. After the mid-1950s, however, Kong's focus moved to the economic history of modern Northeast China. Working as a lecturer in the Department of Economics, he published *Lecture Notes on the History of China's National Economy* (1955), *A Brief History of China's Economy: From the Ming and Qing Dynasties to the War of Resistance Against Japan* (1958), and *A Brief History of China's Economy: From the War of Resistance against Japan to the Pre-Liberation Period* (1959).<sup>251</sup>

---

<sup>250</sup> "Jilin daxue jingji yanjiusuo jiaoshou Kong Jingwei 吉林大学经济研究所教授孔经纬," Kong shi zongqin wang, Accessed March 1, <http://www.kong.org.cn/bbs2/a/a.asp?b=223&id=5548>; "Jilin daxue jingji xueyuan dangwei zoufang weiwen lituixiu jiaoshi 吉林大学经济学院党委走访慰问离退休教师 (2019.1.23)," Jilin University Department of Economics, Accessed March 1, <http://jjxy.jlu.edu.cn/info/1051/10090.htm>; Kong Jingwei 孔经纬, "Lü Zhenyu zai zhongguo jingjishi fangmian de zhongyao gongxian 吕振羽在中国经济史方面的重要贡献," in *Lü Zhenyu he Zhongguo Lixixue: Xueshu Yantao Jinian Wenji* 吕振羽和中国历史学: 学术研讨纪念文集, ed. Jilin daxue shehui kexue yanjiuchu 吉林大学社会科学研究所 (Changchun: Jilin University Publisher, 1996), 166–170.

<sup>251</sup> Kong Jingwei 孔经纬, *Zhongguo guomin jingji jianggao* 中国国民经济史讲稿 (Changchun: Northeast People's University, 1955); Kong Jingwei 孔经纬, *Zhongguo jingji shilüe: Ming Qing zhi kangzhan qian* 中国经济史略—明清至抗战前 (Changchun: Jilin People's Publisher, 1958); Kong Jingwei 孔经纬, *Xu Zhongguo jingji shilüe: Kangzhan zhi jiefang qian* 续中国经济史略—抗战至解放前 (Changchun: Jilin People's Publisher, 1959).

As a Marxist economic historian, Kong used theory on the Marxist stages of historical development. He considered the Northeast before 1931 to be at the same stage of development as the rest of China at the time, the semicolonial and semifeudal stage. Based on the documents from the Research Department of the Manchurian Railway Company, he argued that Japanese capital had entered the Northeast not independently but in the form of joint enterprise of Chinese and Japanese.<sup>252</sup> After the Mukden Incident in 1931, however, the Northeast diverged from the rest of China, becoming a colony, Kong argued.<sup>253</sup> Kong coined his own periodization accordingly. Not completely diverging from the centrally imposed periodization for historical education (Ming–Early Ching–Qing after the Opium War–1919–1937–1945), Kong subdivided the period from 1919 to 1937, adding 1931 and naming the Mukden Incident as a crucial inflection point.<sup>254</sup> With his analysis of its economic structure, Kong delved into the unique economic features of the Northeast for the rest of his scholarly life.

---

<sup>252</sup> Kong Jingwei 孔经纬, “Jiu yi ba qian dongbei de waishang shili 九一八前东北的外商势力,” *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 12 (1959).

<sup>253</sup> Kong Jingwei 孔经纬, *Ri e zhanzheng zhi kangzhan shengli qijian dongbei de gongye wenti* 日俄战争至抗战胜利期间东北的工业问题 (Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publisher, 1958), 20–26; Kong Jingwei 孔经纬, “Qing chu zhi jiaowuzhan qian dongbei guantian qidi de jingying de mintian yiji mindi de fazhan 清初至甲午战前东北官田旗地的经营和民佃以及民地的发展,” *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 4 (1963).

<sup>254</sup> Kong Jingwei 孔经纬, *Zhongguo jingji shilüe: Ming Qing zhi kangzhan qian* 中国经济史略: 明清至抗战前 (Changchun: Jilin People’s Publisher, 1958).

The last chapter of his book, *Industrial Problems in Northeast China from the Russo-Japanese War to the Victory of Anti-Japanese War (1958)*, examined how the regional economy has developed and how it was exploited during the Japanese colonial period. The book uses primary sources such as investigation reports and statistical data from the Manchurian Railway Company, the Manchukuo government, the GMT's National Resources Commission, the Northeast Materials Adjustment Commission, and the CCP's Northeast Finance and Economics Commission. He showed negative aspects of Manchukuo's controlled economy such as low wage for Chinese workers, inadequate labor conditions, decreases in agricultural production, and inflation. While criticizing Japanese imperialism for creating a dysfunctional industrial structure to serve the imperialist expansion and torturing the people in the Northeast, Kong Jingwei also noted that economic indicators after 1937, such as heavy industrial production, mineral extraction, and imports/exports, were far higher than the rest of China and almost comparable to other leading countries.<sup>255</sup> Kong Jingwei took a let-the-numbers-speak-for-themselves approach, presenting large quantities of numbers and tables with only one or two sentences added for concise

---

<sup>255</sup> Kong Jingwei, *Ri e zhanzheng zhi kanzhan shengli qijian dongbei de gongye wenti*, 63–88.

explanation. The omission of qualitative description reduced the texture of colonial life to numbers and statistical changes.

This so-called positivist, quantitative approach was limited for evaluating the Japanese colonial inheritance after 1945. On the one hand, Kong acknowledged the historical continuity of the industrial base from the Manchukuo period to the PRC,<sup>256</sup> but, on the other hand, argued that “the GMT’s reactionary destruction did not leave any industrial foundation from the Manchukuo period.”<sup>257</sup> It was not clear whether he was arguing for continuity or rupture. He also derogated but at the same time acknowledged Japanese industrial development, writing “for the Japanese, the purpose of industrial development was not charity but just depredation. The industrial base under the Manchukuo was just an exchange of Chinese people’s suffering.”<sup>258</sup> Along the same lines, he wrote, “the industrial base constructed under the Manchukuo has now taken the role of a major industrial base of China, just as the capitalist construction of large enterprises provides the material and technical foundation for socialism.”<sup>259</sup>

---

<sup>256</sup> Kong Jingwei, *Ri e zhanzheng zhi kanzhan shengli qijian dongbei de gongye wenti*, 70.

<sup>257</sup> Kong Jingwei, *Ri e zhanzheng zhi kanzhan shengli qijian dongbei de gongye wenti*, 75.

<sup>258</sup> Kong Jingwei, *Ri e zhanzheng zhi kanzhan shengli qijian dongbei de gongye wenti*, 75.

<sup>259</sup> Kong Jingwei, *Ri e zhanzheng zhi kanzhan shengli qijian dongbei de gongye wenti*, 73.

Kong Jingwei's economic history of modern Northeast China is a good example of how a historian in the 1950–60s absorbed orthodox Marxist historiography, analyzed the locally unique history with it, and deferred critical judgement of the local past by couching his work in quantitative terms. Kong neither conformed to nor resisted the contemporaneous ideological ebb and flow. In 1962, when Kong's former supervisor Lü Zhenyu asked how he had been doing, Kong answered, "I've been under criticism as a black model for taking the road of white (*bai*) and expertise (*zhuān*)." Kong could not be hired as a professor, because, as Kong said to Lü, he was not only not a party member but rather the target of a political movement.<sup>260</sup> His positivist approach and lack of ideological rhetoric faced criticism, although his research was not suspended. Kong's economic history was shaped by the accessibility of sources, his reservation of historical judgement, and his efforts to avoid ideological backlash.

The way in which numbers obscure texture resonates with a historiographical debate in South Korea on colonial modernity theory. The theory argues that Japanese colonial rule contributed to the political and economic modernization of Korea, denigrating the predominating colonial exploitation theory as nationalist. In the name of positivism and science,

---

<sup>260</sup> Kong Jingwei, "Lü Zhenyu zai zhongguo jingjishi fangmian de zhongyao gongxian," 166–170.

historians of colonial modernity presented numbers and statistics to show how political and economic indicators had improved thanks to the colonial rule.<sup>261</sup> Even though the motivations were different, the approach obscured the colonial past with a discursive strategy similar to that of historians in the 1950-1960s Northeast China. Historians blurred the colonial past of the region by their choice of topic and methodology, presenting a stark dichotomy of the people and the enemy of the people to obscure the shades of gray; numbers, together the myth of facts and science, similarly obscured the reality of colonial life.

### *Conclusion*

Japanese colonial rule gave the region a unique past that was unlike that of any other region in China. As a result of that legacy the region's history seemed to diverge from the master narrative of the Chinese Revolution, a counternarrative that local historians tried to negotiate through writing regional history. It was through this regional particularity that centralization and standardization in Communist Chinese historiography was challenged but persisted.

---

<sup>261</sup> Heo Suyeol 허수열, "Sigminji geundachwalon-ui jaengjeom 식민지근대화론의 쟁점," *Dongyanghak 동양학* 41 (2007): 227-250.

A historiographical approach to recent scholarly work on the colonial Northeast reveals what was or what was not available to local historians in the 1950s and 1960s. Studies after 2010s tend to take more nuanced approaches in examining various forms and agencies of colonial life. For example, Chong Eun Ahn has examined Korean migrant peasants' survival tactics, especially in response to the shortage of resources during the wars. In deconstructing the rigid framework of resistance, victimhood, or collaboration, Ahn reveals how ambiguously Korean peasants identified themselves in relationship with Japanese and other people in the Northeast to survive.<sup>262</sup> Qiunan Li has also investigated ordinary people's economic struggles in Manchukuo and how they "bec[ame] adept in navigating through systematic hardships and shortages in order to make ends meet under a suppressive regime that emphasized violence and the willingness to punish anyone who failed to comply with its agenda." Li conceptualizes it as "superficial compliance."<sup>263</sup> Norman Smith and Annika Culver's edited volume proposes a "Manchukuo perspective" to identify certain literary and artistic trends among writers and artists in Manchukuo. They argue that

---

<sup>262</sup> Chong Eun Ahn, "Surviving the Second World War in Manchukuo: Memories of Korean Experiences of the War in Manchurian Farming Villages," *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 11, no. 2 (2017).

<sup>263</sup> Qiunan Li, "Surviving Manchukuo: The Economic Struggles of Ordinary People in Urban Manchukuo from 1937–1945," *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 14, no. 2 (2020): 281.

“resistance versus collaboration paradigms do not fit neatly in this case, where Manchukuo literature is intriguing because it arguably contains both elements and shades in between.”<sup>264</sup> Collaborators in the traditional binary are now understood as active agents of their own lives.

This is a very recent trend, however. Even a 2005 state-of-the-field article on how Chinese scholars in the 1980s and 1990s approached the colonial Northeast pointed out that historians have overwhelmingly focused on the notorious collaborators at the top who contributed to the establishment of the puppet state.<sup>265</sup> Only after the turn of the century did the new focus appear in the field, probably due to the greater accessibility of multifaceted and multilanguage sources and the decrease in political sensitivity. These were not available for historians in the 1950–60s.

Local historians in the 1950–60s were the survivors of colonial rule only at a distance of a few years. Their everyday life under colonial rule, if described in detail, could have been easily framed as collaboration in the sociopolitical context of the 1950–60s, in which class struggle dominated the

---

<sup>264</sup> Annika A. Culver and Norman Smith eds., *Manchukuo Perspectives: Transnational Approaches to Literary Production* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2020), 3.

<sup>265</sup> Yoon Hwy-tak 윤휘탁, “Sigminji, Jeomlyeongji-ui “hyeob lyeog”(Collaboration) yeongu: “manjugug”-ui sigmin cheje guchuggwa junggugin-ui hyeoblyeog chegye-e gwanhan yeongu donghyang; junggug haggye-ui yeongu seonggwa-leul jungsim-eulo 식민지, 점령지의 “협력”(Collaboration) 연구: “만주국”의 식민체제 구축과 중국인의 협력체계에 관한 연구 동향: 중국학계의 연구 성과를 중심으로,” *Sa Chong: The Historical Journal* 사총 61 (2005).

intellectual discourse. By writing the colonial history of the region to conform to the grand narrative of the Chinese revolution, by identifying the Northeast as a source of anti-imperialist revolutionary tradition, by setting up a clear dichotomy of the people and the enemy of the people, and by blurring the texture of colonial life with numbers and statistics, local historians were able to defer historical judgement and avoid ideological backlash. Obscuring the past was their discursive strategy to talk about the past by not talking about the past.

## CONCLUSION

This dissertation shows how Chinese historians responded to changes in their academic and professional lives in the 1950s and 1960s. While they still shared a sense of vocation whereby historical studies were conducted in service of the people, the meanings of the components of the vocation, such as “historical studies,” “service,” and “the people,” required redefinition under the new regime. The Chinese Communists’ seizure of political power signified the establishment of a Marxist academic regime, in which the half-century-long advancement of Marxism in China finally ascended to the discursive throne. Historical materialism dominated the field of historical studies after a short grace period granted to other modes of historical thinking. The field of history was re-formed in Marxist terms, as service to the laboring people, as a legitimate antithesis to all kinds of non-Marxist historiographies, and as science. In tandem with this epistemological transformation of history, historians experienced the institutionalization of the field and the collectivization of their workplaces.

It was in this exhaustive structural setting that historians conducted historical research, taught history classes, and followed bureaucratic procedures. As much as collectivization systematically eliminated any authorized way to live outside the collectives, historians’ academic activities

saw no alternative in either discursive or affiliative terms. Within the strong industrialist and developmentalist scheme of the PRC, the humanities and social sciences were marginalized as less important tools for industrialization. The new regime expressed its priorities through higher education reform, in which the natural sciences and engineering outstripped the humanities and social sciences in terms of the number of institutions and student enrollment. This engineering-centered education not only revealed the new regime's priorities but also changed social perceptions of the two groups of fields. All in all, historians experienced changes in the academic language they were expected to use, in the institutional mode of the workplace, and in the relatively marginalized social status of their field.

It was in the mid-1950s that historians and intellectuals saw a slightly open door through which to thrust their feet. The completion of the First Five Year Plan, the denunciation of Stalin, and Mao Zedong's concern for bureaucratization within the party conjointly shifted the party's attention to hitherto marginalized areas. The Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences under the Chinese Academy of Sciences took this chance to devise a nationwide twelve-year plan for the humanities and social sciences. Even though this plan was not fully implemented, the planning process initiated conversations about rearranging the fields in a more organized way and making practical plans to develop those fields.

What stimulated intellectual discussion most vigorously in this planning process and what was partially implemented in several regions was the local gazetteer project. To reactivate the compilation of local gazetteers, intellectuals made their case that gazetteers would promote more effective local governance, patriotic education, and scientific research. Moreover, they argued for bureaucratic support from the party, for example by setting up compilation-exclusive institutions where all the related resources could be gathered and where historians and other scholars could work together to produce academic accomplishments. Their rationale and proposals seemed largely to have been applied to local practice and were well received by a range of local intellectuals. Governmental, cultural, educational, academic, and research-related resources in counties and provinces were mobilized in the name of the local gazetteer project, which in turn created sinews of local academic community in these regions.

The localization of historical studies continued under the banner of the Great Leap Forward. The new educational emphasis on combining academic studies with productive labor was applied to historical education, which was undergoing a historiographical transition toward the emphasis on contemporary mass history. The two separate but interconnected demands made field investigation a useful way to achieve the two objectives. By spending summer or winter breaks in villages, factories, or mines, history

students could talk to local residents, listen to their recent historical experiences, and write local history in various forms while participating in ongoing agricultural or mining production in a given area. Field investigation provided ideological legitimacy to historical research, supported by institutional arrangements of local party–state apparatuses and through the people’s engagement. Moreover, the locality, spatiality, and specificity of local history provided the localized accounts of the Chinese revolution, which did not deviate from, but rather constituted, the official narrative with their rich details.

Local history provided historians with a legitimate and safe field for their intellectual pursuits. While top-level historians were engaging with ideology-related historiographical debates that would create general guidelines for the field and in which losers could be purged, local historians were doing their jobs in their workplaces. The writing of local history did not appear to respond to an urgent political imperative at the time, but found untapped materials and methods for academic research. The lack of a political imperative caused the lack of attention and resource distribution, but also allowed considerable latitude that local historians could use. Local historians explored this leeway in the restrictive structure to make their professional lives meaningful. The spatial sense and the localized details that

local history provided enriched the field of history as well as historical education.

It is worthwhile noting that local historians' academic activities were not subversive of the system, but rather contributed to the persistence of authoritarianism in China. As much as authoritarian power shaped intellectual life, local historians' intellectual pursuits in turn helped to forge the authoritarian structure. Were they naively or cunningly conforming to the regime or acting as sycophants? Over my own years of academic pursuit in graduate school, involving coursework, qualifying exams, professionalization training, and dissertation submission, a stream of questions has always resonated inside me: Am I truly intellectually autonomous? Do I choose my own research topics, methods, and even my academic identity? To what extent does the institutional structure of the graduate school, the design of the degree course, the academic trends in the field, the ubiquitous references to Foucauldian concepts, high-tech society, global capitalism, the pandemic, and my racial, gender, and cultural identity in this field and in this country define my intellectual autonomy? To what extent am I able to challenge these restrictions to claim sacred intellectual autonomy when my living and self-efficacy depend on it? Bourdieu's call for a sociology of intellectuals, of us, can be applied to Chinese historians under the Communist regime as well. The deconstruction of a power structure is

followed by sympathy when the bifurcation of intellectual autonomy and political suppression does not establish a norm for individual intellectuals.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “Chen Boda tan zhexue shehui kexue ruhe yuejin? Houjin Bogu Biangan Bianxue 陈伯达谈哲学社会科学如何跃进? 厚今薄古, 边干边学.” *People’s Daily* 人民日报, March 11, 1958.
- “Da gaige da yuejin: ben bao jizhe pingshu changchun shi xuexiao ban gongchang de xingshi 大改革 大跃进: 本报记者评述长春市学校办工厂的形势.” *Jilin Daily* 吉林日报, July 25, 1958.
- “Difangzhi bianzuan 地方志编纂.” *Hunan nianjian 1985* 湖南年鉴 1985. Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1985.
- “Dongbei kai shengshi jiaoyu huiyi, taolun jiaoyu yu shengchan jiehe 东北开省市教育会议, 讨论教育与生产结合.” *People’s Daily* 人民日报, May 30, 1949.
- “Dongbei renmin daxue bianji ‘Dongbei kenzhi shi ziliao’ ji ‘Mantie shi ziliao’ de chubu jihua 东北人民大学編輯“东北垦殖史資料”及“滿铁史資料”的初步計劃.” *Jingji Yanjiu* 经济研究 7 (1958): 15.
- “Editorial.” *Hongqi* 红旗 7, (1958): 1.
- “Gaodeng shifan jiaoyu huiyi bimu, quedingle gaodeng shifan xuexiao de fazhan fangzhen de renwu 高等师范教育会议闭幕, 确定了高等师范学校的发展方针和任务.” *People’s Daily* 人民日报, October 14, 1953.
- “Guanyu Jindai Dongbei geming yundong shi (chugao) de xueshu taolunhui 關於近代東北人民革命運動史(初稿)的學術討論會.” *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林师大学报 2 (1960): 100.
- “Guo Moruo kaimuci 郭沫若开幕词.” *People’s Daily* 人民日报, July 15, 1949.
- “Hunan sheng zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui chengli 湖南省志编纂委员会成立.” *Hunan nianjian 2007* 湖南年鉴 2007. Changsha: Hunan nianjianshe, 2007.

- “Hunan sheng zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 湖南省志编纂委员会.” *Hunan sheng zhi: juanmo zuanxiu shilu* 湖南省志: 卷末纂修实录. Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2005.
- “Jianguo chuqi quanguo gaodengjiaoyu yuanxitiaozheng wenxian xuanzhai: yijiuwuyi nian – yijiuwusan nian 建国初期全国高等学校院系调整文献选载: 一九五一年\_一九五三年.” *Dangde Wenxian* 党的文献 6 (2002): 59-71.
- “Jiaoyu bixu yu shengchan laodong xiang jiehe 教育必须与生产劳动相结合.” in *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* 建国以来重要文献选编, Vol.11, 405-425. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992.
- “Jindaishi yanjiusuo 1950 nian gongzuo gaikuang 近代史研究所 1950 年工作概况.” *Kexue tongbao* 科学通报 2 (1951): 83.
- “Qingong jianxue ruxin jieduan, Kang Sheng tongzhi zai yici zuotanhui shang zhichu, xuexiao ban gongchang, shi jiaoyu yu shengchan xiang jiehe zhaodao le juti xingshi 勤工俭学进入新阶段, 康生同志在一次座谈会上指出, 学校办工厂, 使教育与生产劳动相结合找到了具体形式.” *People’s Daily* 人民日报, July 12, 1958.
- “Qingzhu zuguo sinian lai de chengjiu, jiaqiang lishi kexue gongzuo 慶祝祖國四年來的成就, 加強歷史科學工作.” *Lishi jiaoxue* 历史教学 10 (1953): 1-5.
- “Quanguo zonghe daxue huiyi kaimu, taolun zonghe daxue de fangzhen, renwu he peiyang mubiao 全国综合大学会议开幕, 讨论综合大学的方针、任务和培养目标.” *People’s Daily* 人民日报, September 11, 1953.
- “Shen Zhaonian daibiao de fayan: Hubei Province fangzhi zuanxiu weiyuanhui gongzuo gaikuang 沈肇年代表的发言: 湖北省方志纂修委员会工作概况 (1958.12).” *Hubei sheng di er jie renmin daibiao dahui ydi yi ci huiyi huikan* 湖北省第二届人民代表大会第一次会议汇刊. Wuhan: Hubei sheng di er jie renmin daibiao da hui di yi ci huiyi mishuchu, 1958.

- “Shen Zhaonian 沈肇年.” in *Hubei renwu chuanji* 湖北人物传记, edited by Hubei sheng zhi renwu zhi bianjishi 湖北省志人物志编辑室, 42. Wuhan: Hubei sheng zhi renwu zhi bianjishi, 1982.
- “Shixue tianye chungse man 史学田野春色满.” *Guangming Daily* 光明日报, October 15, 1959.
- “Wei quanmian di tizao wancheng de chao’e wancheng wunian jihua er fendou 为全面地提早完成和超额完成五年计划而奋斗 (1956.1.1).” in *Jianguo Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian* 建国以来重要文献选编, Vol. 8, 1-10. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992.
- “Zai zhengxie di er jie quanguo weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi shang de fayan, gaoling guanyuan jiji xiuzuan fangzhi, Shen Zhaonian jieshao Hubei wenshiguan de gongzuo 在政协第二届全国委员会第三次全体会议上的发言, 高龄馆员积极修纂方志, 沈肇年介绍湖北文史馆的工作.” *People’s Daily* 人民日报, March 15, 1957.
- “Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu zhuanfa zhongguo kexueyuan zhexue shehui kexuebu, guojia dang’anju, ‘Guanyu bianxie difangzhi gongzuo de jidian yijian’ 中共中央宣传部转发中国科学院哲学社会科学部、国家档案局‘关于编写地方志工作的几点意见’ (1963.7.23).” in *Zhongguo Difangzhi Zonglan, 1949-1987* 中国地方志综览, 1949-1987, edited by Lai Xinhua 来新夏, 259-260. Hefei: Huangshan Shushe, 1988.
- “Zhonggong zhongyang zhaokai guanyu zhishi fenzi wenti huiyi, Mao Zedong tongzhi haozhao wei xunsu ganshang shijie kexue xianjin shuiping er fendou 中共中央召开关于知识分子问题会议, 毛泽东同志号召为迅速赶上世界科学先进水平而奋斗.” *People’s Daily* 人民日报, January 30, 1956.
- “Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu jiaoyu gongzuo de zhishi 中共中央、国务院关于教育工作的指示.” in *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* 建国以来重要文献选编, Vol.11, 489-498. Beijing: Zhong yang wen xian chu ban she, 1992.

- “Zhongguo jindaishi he xiandaishi ziliao congkan luxu chuban 中國近代史和現代史資料叢刊陸續出版。” *People's Daily* 人民日報, May 18, 1954.
- “Zhongguo kexueyuqn jiji zhunbei yibu jiaqiang lishi yanjiu gongzuo 中國科學院積極準備進一步加強歷史研究工作。” *Kexue tongbao* 科学通报 5 (1954): 52.
- “Zhongguo renmin daxue jixu juxing zuotanhui, jiaoshimen cong butong guandian tichu wenti 中国人民大学继续举行座谈会, 教师们从不同观点提出问题。” *People's Daily* 人民日报, May 31, 1957.
- “Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi gongtong gangling 中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领 (1949.9.29).” in *Jianguo Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian* 建国以来重要文献选编, Vol. 1, 1-13. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992.
- “Zhongguo xin shixue yanjiuhui choubenhui zuo zai ping chengli 中国新史学研究会筹备会昨在平成立。” *People's Daily* 人民日报, July 2, 1949.
- “Zhongguo xin shixue yanjiuhui zanxing jianzhang 中国新史学研究会暂行简章。” *People's Daily* 人民日报, July 2, 1949.
- “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng quhua (1960nian) 中华人民共和国行政区划 (1960年).” *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng quhua shouce* 中华人民共和国行政区划手册. Beijing: Minzhengbu xingzheng quhuachu, 1986.
- “Zuohao zuzhi quanguo gaodeng xuexiao xinsheng ruxue de gongzuo 做好组织全国高等学校新生入学的工作。” *People's Daily* 人民日报, September 25, 1953.
- “Zuohao zuzhi quanguo gaodeng xuexiao xinsheng ruxue de gongzuo 做好组织全国高等学校新生入学的工作。” *People's Daily* 人民日报, September 25, 1953.
- Ahn, Chong Eun. “Surviving the Second World War in Manchukuo: Memories of Korean Experiences of the War in Manchurian Farming Villages.” *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 11, no. 2 (2017).

- Andreas, Joel. *Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Averill, Stephen C. "The Cultural Politics of Local Education in Early Twentieth-Century China." *Twentieth-Century China* 32, no. 2 (2006): 4-32.
- Boer, Pim Ben. *History as a Profession: The Study of History in France, 1818–1914*, translated by Arnold J. Pomerans. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Bol, Peter K. "The Rise of Local History: History, Geography, and Culture in Southern Song and Yuan Wuzhou." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 61, no.1 (2001): 37-76.
- Bu, Xianquan 卜宪群. "Xin zhongguo shiqinian de shixue fazhan daolu 新中国七十年的史学发展道路." *Zhongguoshi yanjiu* 中国史研究 3 (2019): 5-34.
- Bulag, Uradyn. "Can the Subalterns Not Speak? On the Regime of Oral History in Socialist China." *Inner Asia* 12, no. 1 (2010): 95-111.
- Chang, Cheng 常城 and Sun Jiwu 孫繼武. "Wusi shiqi Dongbei renmin de geming douzheng 五四时期东北人民的革命斗争." *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林师大学报 2 (1960): 97.
- Changchun shi jiaoyu ju shi zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 长春市教育局史志编纂委员会. *Changchun shi jiaoyu wenxian ziliao xuanbian (1948-1985)* 长春市教育文献资料选编 (1948-1985). Changchun: Changchun shi jiaoyu ju shi zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1988.
- Cheek, Timothy. *The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Chen, Fangzhi 陈芳芝. "Jiu yi ba shibian shiqi mei ri diguozhuyi de goujie 九一八事变时期美日帝国主义的勾结." *Beijing daxue xuebao* 北京大学学报 3 (1962): 45-57.
- Chen, Fangzhi 陈芳芝. "(Xu) Jiu yi ba shibian shiqi mei ri diguozhuyi de goujie (续)九一八事变时期美日帝国主义的勾结." *Beijing daxue xuebao* 北京大学学报 4 (1962): 77-89.

- Chen, Guizong 陳貴宗, “Dongbei Yihetuan Yundong cuhtan 東北義和團運動初探.” *Shixue jikan* 史学集刊 1 (1956): 81-92.
- Chen, Guizong 陳貴宗. “Xinhai Geming shiqi Dongsansheng de geming yundong 辛亥革命時期東三省的革命運動.” *Shixue jikan* 史学集刊 2 (1956): 49-79.
- Chen, Peng 陈闯. “Cong bianyuan dao zhongxin: 1958nian de shixue qingnian qunti 从边缘到中心: 1958年的史学青年群体.” *Shehui kexue luntan* 社会科学论坛 2 (2019), 225-234.
- Chen, Qitai 陈其泰. “Jianguo hou shiqinian shixue ‘wanquan zhengzhihua’ shuo de shangquan 建国后十七年史学‘完全政治化’说的商榷.” *Xueshu yanjiu* 学术研究 12 (2001): 5-12.
- Chen, Yujing 陈雨静. “Shenshan li jian gongchang jianchi kangzhan: Jieshao ‘Dongbei kangri lianjun di shi yi jun bingongchang geming wenwu zhanlanhui 深山里建工厂坚持抗战: 介绍“东北抗日联军第十一军兵工厂革命文物展览会.” *Wenwu cankao ziliao* 文物参考资料 8 (1958).
- Cheng, Fangwu 成仿吾, “Zhongguo renmin daxue de jiaoyanshi gongzuo 中国人民大学的教研室工作.” *Renmin jiaoyu* 人民教育 4 (1951): 11-12.
- Chiang, Yung-chen. *Social Engineering and the Social Sciences in China, 1919-1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Ching, Leo T. S. *Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2019.
- Chu, Zhuwu 储著武. “‘Houjin bogu’: 1958nian lizhixue dayuejin ‘厚今薄古’: 1958年历史学大跃进.” *Anhui shixue* 安徽史学 1 (2017), 159-168.
- Chu, Zhuwu 储著武. “Guowuyuan kexue guihua weiyuanhui yanjiu 国务院科学规划委员会研究.” *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 28, no.3 (2021): 47-62.

- Chu, Zhuwu 储著武. “Lishi kexue yanjiu gongzuo shiernian yuanjing guihua cao’an chugao yanjiug 历史科学研究工作十二年远景规划草案初稿研究.” *Anhui shixue* 安徽史学, no. 3 (2019): 152-159.
- Chu, Zhuwu 储著武. “Xiang xiandai kexue jinjun: Zhoug Enlai yu 1956-1967 kexue guihua gongzuo zai renshi 向现代科学进军: 周恩来与1956-1967年科学规划工作再认识.” *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 27, no.1 (2020): 83-93.
- Chung, Jae Ho. *Centrifugal Empire: Central-Local Relations in China*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016.
- Coble, Parks M. “China’s New Remembering of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937–1945.” *The China Quarterly* 190 (2007): 394-410.
- Cohen, Paul H. “Reflections on a Watershed Date: The 1949 Divide in Chinese History.” in *Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches*, edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, 22-36. New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Culp, Robert, Eddy U, and Wen-hsin Yeh eds. *Knowledge Acts in Modern China: Ideas, Institutions, and Identities*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2016.
- Culver, Annika A. and Norman Smith eds. *Manchukuo Perspectives: Transnational Approaches to Literary Production*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2020.
- Cumings, Bruce. “Boundary Displacement: The State, the Foundations and Area Studies During and After the Cold War.” in *Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies*, edited by Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.
- Dennis, Joseph. *Writing, Publishing, and Reading Local Gazetteers in Imperial China, 1100-1700*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015.
- Difangzhi Xiaozu 地方志小组. “Guanyu xin xiu difangzhi de jidian yijian 关于新修方志的几点意见 (1958.10.20).” in *Zhongguo Difangzhi Zonglan, 1949-1987* 中国地方志综览, 1949-1987, edited by Lai Xinhua 来新夏. Hefei: Huangshan Shushe, 1988.

- Dikötter, Frank. *The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945-57*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013.
- Ding, Zeliang 丁則良. "Youguan Xinhai Geming shiqi Dongbei ruogan shishi de yixie ziliao (shang): Liaoningsheng tushuguan dang'an jilu zhi yi 有關辛亥革命時期東北若干史事的一些資料(上): 遼寧省圖書館檔案輯錄之一." *Shixue jikan* 史学集刊 1 (1956): 157-165.
- Dirlik, Arif. "'Past Experience, If Not Forgotten, Is a Guide to the Future'; Or, What Is in a Text? The Politics of History in Chinese-Japanese Relations." *boundary 2* 18, no. 3 (1991): 29–58.
- Dirlik, Arif. "The Problem of Class Viewpoint Versus Historicism in Chinese Historiography." *Modern China* 3, no. 4 (1977): 465-88.
- Dirlik, Arif. *Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Dong, Yibo 董一博. "Yao zhongshi bianxiu difangzhi 要重视编修新地方志." *People's Daily* 人民日报, August 23, 1982.
- Duan, Zhemin 段泽民. "Kaizhan xin shixue yanjiu gongzuo, shoudu liang shixue tuanti zuo kaihui 开展新史学研究工作, 首都两史学团体昨开会." *People's Daily* 人民日报, October 12, 1949.
- Duara, Prasenjit. "Provincial Narratives of the Nation: Centralism and Federalism in Republican China." in *Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity*, edited by Harumi Befu. Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993.
- Duara, Prasenjit. *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Edmunds, Clifford. "The Politics of Historiography Jian Bozhan's Historicism." in *China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship*, edited by Merle Goldman, Timothy Cheek, and Carol Lee Hamrin. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University, 1987.
- Eisenman, Joshua. *Red China's Green Revolution: Technological Innovation, Institutional Change, and Economic Development under the Commune*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.

- Evasdottir, Erika E. S. *Obedient Autonomy: Chinese Intellectuals and the Achievement of Orderly Life*. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2004.
- Eyal, Gil, and Larissa Buchholz. "From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (2010): 117-37.
- Fan, Fa-ti. "Science, state, and citizens: Notes from another shore." *Osiris* 27, no. 1 (2012): 227-249.
- Fan, Fa-ti. "The Controversy over Spontaneous Generation in Republican China Science, Authority, and the Public." in *Science and Technology in Modern China, 1880s-1940s*, edited by Jing Tsu and Benjamin Elman, 209-244. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2015.
- Fan, Xin. *World History and National Identity in China: The Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- Feng, Youlan 冯友兰. "Aihen fenming fandui chun keguan de taidu 爱恨分明反对纯客观的态度." *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史学通讯 4 (1951): 2.
- Feuerwerker, Albert. *Chinese Communist Studies of Modern Chinese History*. Cambridge: East Asian Research Center Harvard University, 1961.
- Fiskesjö, Magnus "Rescuing the Empire: Chinese Nation-Building in the Twentieth Century." *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 5, no. 1 (2006): 15-44.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Fu, Zhenlun 傅振伦. "Zhengli jiu fangzhi yu bianji xin fangzhi wenti 整理旧方志与编辑新方志问题." *Xin Jianshe* 93 (1956): 60-62.
- Ghosh, Arunabh. *Making It Count: Statistics and Statecraft in the Early People's Republic of China*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.
- Goldman, Merle. "The Role of History in Party Struggle, 1962-4." *The China Quarterly*, no. 51 (1972): 500-519.
- Goldman, Merle. *China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981.

- Goldman, Merle. *Literary Dissent in Communist China*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Gries, Peter Hays. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
- Gu, Edward and Merle Goldman eds. *Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market*. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004.
- Gu, Jiegang 顾颉刚, Li Peiji 李培基, and Ye Gongchuo 叶恭绰. "Zai zhengxie di er jie quanguo weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi shang de fayan, jixu bianzuan difangzhi, Gu Jiegang, Li Peiji, Ye Gongchuo lianhe tichu batiao shixing gangyao 在政协第二届全国委员会第三次全体会议上的发言, 继续编纂地方志, 顾颉刚、李培基、叶恭绰联合提出八条实行纲要." *People's Daily* 人民日报, March 18, 1957.
- Gu, Xuefeng 谷学峰. "1958nian 'Shixue geming' yanjiu 1958年“史学革命”研究." PhD Diss., Shandong University, 2011.
- Guan, Shanfu 关山复. "Preface." in *Zhongguo Dongbeishi* 中国东北史, edited by Tong Dong 佟冬, 1-4. Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1986.
- Guo, Moruo 郭沫若. "Guo Moruo zai shehui kexue gongzuozhe daibiao huiyi faqiren hui shang de kaimuci 郭沫若在社会科学工作者代表会发起人会上的开幕词," *People's Daily* 人民日报, July 16, 1949.
- Guo, Moruo 郭沫若. "Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di san ci huiyi shang de fayan, quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui fu weiyuanzhang Guo Moruo de fayan 在第一届全国人民代表大会第三次会议上的发言; 全国人民代表大会常务委员会副委员长郭沫若的发言." *People's Daily* 人民日报, June 19, 1956.
- Guo, Moruo 郭沫若. "Zhongguo lishixue shang de xin jiyuan 中国历史学上的新纪元." *Jinbu Daily* 进步日报, September 29, 1951.
- Han, Seunghyun 한승현. "18 segi cheongjoui jibangji, jibangmunheon tongjechaeggwa Jang Hageong-ui bangjilon 18世纪 清朝의 地方志, 地方文献 統制策과 章學誠의 方志論." *Yeogsa Hagbo* 역사학보 192 (2006): 255-303.

- Hao, Zhidong. *Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Changing Politics of China's Knowledge Workers*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
- Hargett, James M. "Song Dynasty Local Gazetteers and Their Place in the History of Difangzhi Writing." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 56, no. 2 (1996): 405-442.
- Harrison, James P. *The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions: A Study in the Rewriting of Chinese History*. New York: Atheneum, 1969.
- Hayhoe, Ruth. "China's Universities and Western Academic Models." *Higher Education* 18, no. 1 (1989): 49-85.
- Hayhoe, Ruth. "Chinese Universities and the Social Sciences." *Minerva* 31, no. 4 (1993): 478-503.
- He, Wushuang 何戊雙. "Zhongguo renmin daxue 'xi' de gongzuo 中國人民大學'系'的工作." *Renmin jiaoyu* 人民教育 6 (1951): 33-34.
- Heilmann, Sebastian. "Policy-making through experimentation: the formation of a distinctive policy process." in *Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China*, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry and Sebastian Heilmann, 62-101. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011.
- Heo, Suyeol 허수열. "Sigminji geundaehwalon-ui jaengjeom 식민지근대화론의 쟁점." *Dongyanghak* 동양학 41 (2007): 227-250.
- Ho, Denise Y. *Curating Revolution: Politics on Display in Mao's China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Hon, Tze-ki and Robert J. Culp eds. *The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Hon, Tze-ki. "Educating the Citizens: Visions of China in Late Qing History Textbooks." in *The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China*, edited by Tze-ki Hon and Robert J. Culp, 79-107. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Hou, Yunhao 侯云灏. "20 Shiji Zhongguo shixue de xuekehua jincheng 20世纪中国史学的学科化进程." *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 2 (1999): 90-97.

- Houjin bogu bianlun ji* 厚今薄古辩论集. Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1958.
- Houjin bogu ziliao suoyin* 厚今薄古资料索引. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue tushuguan, 1958.
- Houjin bogu* 厚今薄古. Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1958.
- Hsu, Immanuel C. Y. "The Reorganisation of Higher Education in Communist China, 1949-61." *The China Quarterly*, no. 19 (1964): 128-160.
- Hu, Fengxiang 胡逢祥. "Xiandai Zhongguo shixue zhuan ye xuehui de xingqi yu yunzuo 现代中国史学专业学会的兴起与运作." *Shilin* 史林 3 (2005): 50-60.
- Hu, Fengxiang. "The Rise and Operation of Modern Chinese Historical Associations." *Chinese Studies in History* 45, no.2-3 (2011): 70-110.
- Hu, Sheng 胡绳. "Shehui lishi de yanjiu zenyang chengwei kexue: lun xiandai zhongguo zichan jieji weixinzhuyi lishixue zai zhege wenti shang de hunluan guannian 社会历史的研究怎样成为科学: 论现代中国资产阶级唯心主义历史学在这个问题上的混乱观念." *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 11 (1956): 1-25.
- Huang, Renguo 黄仁国. *Liu Danian Niao pu* 刘大年年谱. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2017.
- Huang, Yuanqi 黄元起. "Aiguo zhuyi yu lishi jiaoxue zuotanhui jiyao: Bei fandong tongzhi jieji yankui le guanghui de zhongguo lishi, renmin yaoqiu chongxin huifu 爱国主义与历史教学座谈会纪要: 被反动统治阶级掩盖了光辉的中国历史, 人民要求重新恢复." *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史学通讯 4 (1951): 3.
- Huang, Zhongye 黄中业, and Sun Yuliang 孙玉良. "Gongjieguo jiaoyu shi shang de guoxue shuyuanshi xuebu: Dongbei wenshi yanjiusuo shuyao 共和国教育史上的国学书院式学府: 东北文史研究所述要." *Shehui kexue zhanxian* 社会科学战线 1(2015): 70-83.

- Hubei sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 湖南省地方志编纂委员会 ed. *Dangdai zhongguo difangzhi zhongyao huibian* 当代中国地方志重要文献汇编. Wuhan: Hubei sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1991.
- Iggers, George. *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1968.
- Ji, Wenfu 嵇文甫. "Shixue gongzuo yao mianxiang qunzhong: shixue zahua zhi san 史學工作要面向群眾: 史學雜話之三." *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史学通讯 11 (1952): 5.
- Ji, Wenfu 嵇文甫. "Shixue gongzuozhe yao zhaokai yige ligong yundong 史学工作者要展开一个立功运动." *Lishi jiaoxue* 历史教学 11 (1952): 1.
- Jia, Bai 贾白. "Jiu yi ba shibian zhong meiguo bangzhu riben qinlüe woguo de zuixing 九一八事变中美国帮助日本侵略我国的罪行." *Jianghai xuekan* 江海学刊 9 (1961).
- Jian, Bozhan 翦伯赞. "Xing wu mie zi, fazhan lishi kexue 兴无灭资, 发展历史科学." *People's Daily* 人民日报, March 18, 1958.
- Jiang, Dechang 姜德昌. "Dongbei shifan daxue lishi xi jiaoshi de kexue yanjiu gongzuo 东北师范大学历史系教师的科学研究工作." *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 9 (1956): 84-85.
- Jiang, Haisheng 蒋海升. "Cong zhuliu dao bianyuan: 20 shiji 50 niandai chuqi de shiliao kaodingpai 从主流到边缘: 20 世纪 50 年代初期的史料考订派." *Shandong daxue xuebao zhexue shehuikexue ban* 山东大学学报 哲学社会科学版 6 (2005): 76-82.
- Jiang, Yihua 姜义华. "Guodu shiqi lilun yu qudai xin minzhuzhuyi lishi beijing de yixiang kaocha 过渡时期理论与取代新民主主义历史背景的一项考察." in *1950 niandai de zhongguo* 1950 年代的中国, edited by Wu Jingping 吴景平, Xu Siyan 徐思彦, 1-54. Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chunbanshe, 2006.

- Jilin Fangzhi Daquan* 吉林方志大全. Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 1989.
- Jilin University Department of Economics. “Jilin daxue jingji xueyuan dangwei zoufang weiwen lituixiu jiaoshi 吉林大学经济学院党委走访慰问离退休教师 (2019.1.23).” Accessed March 1. <http://jjxy.jlu.edu.cn/info/1051/10090.htm>.
- Jin, Yufu 金毓黻. “Pu xiu xin fangzhi de nieyi 普修新地方志的拟议.” *Xin Jianshe* 92 (1956): 64-65.
- Ju, Shu'an 居漱庵. “Dui bianji xin fangzhi ji zhengli jiu fangzhi de jidian yijian 对编辑新方志及整理旧方志的几点意见.” *Xin Jianshe* 新建 98 (1956): 64-65.
- Keylor, William R. *Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.
- Kong shi zongqin wang. “Jilin daxue jingji yanjiusuo jiaoshou Kong Jingwei 吉林大学经济研究所教授孔经纬.” Accessed March 1. <http://www.kong.org.cn/bbs2/a/a.asp?b=223&id=5548>.
- Kong, Jingwei 孔经纬. “Lü Zhenyu zai zhongguo jingjishi fangmian de zhongyao gongxian 吕振羽在中国经济史方面的重要贡献.” in *Lü Zhenyu he Zhongguo Lishixue: Xueshu Yantao Jinian Wenji* 吕振羽和中国历史学: 学术研讨纪念文集, edited by Jilin daxue shehui kexue yanjiuchu 吉林大学社会科学研究所, 166–170. Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe, 1996.
- Kong, Jingwei 孔经纬. *Zhongguo jingji shilüe: Ming Qing zhi kangzhan qian* 中国经济史略: 明清至抗战前. Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1958.
- Kong, Jingwei 孔经纬. “Jiu yi ba qian dongbei de waishang shili 九一八前东北的外商势力.” *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 12 (1959): 19-23.
- Kong, Jingwei 孔经纬. “Qing chu zhi jiaowuzhan qian dongbei guantian qidi de jingying de mintian yiji mindi de fazhan 清初至甲午战前东北官田旗地的经营和民佃以及民地的发展.” *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 4 (1963): 67-90.

- Kong, Jingwei 孔经纬. *Ri e zhanzheng zhi kangzhan shengli qijian dongbei de gongye wenti* 日俄战争至抗战胜利期间东北的工业问题. Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1958.
- Kong, Jingwei 孔经纬. *Xu Zhongguo jingji shilie: Kangzhan zhi jiefang qian* 续中国经济史略—抗战至解放前. Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1959.
- Kong, Jingwei 孔经纬. *Zhongguo guomin jingji jianggao* 中国国民经济史讲稿. Changchun: Dongbei renmin daxue, 1955.
- Kurzman, Charles, and Lynn Owens. “The Sociology of Intellectuals.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (2002): 63-90.
- Kwok, D. W. Y. *Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.
- Lai, Xinhua 来新夏 ed. *Zhongguo Difangzhi Zonglan, 1949-1987* 中国地方志综览, 1949-1987. Hefei: Huangshan Shushe, 1988.
- Lam, Tong. *A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation State, 1900-1949*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.
- Lee, Hong Yung. *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
- Levine, Steven I. *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
- Li, Guang 黎光. “Jiu minzhuzhuyi geming shiqi Dongbei renmin geming douzheng gaishu 舊民主主義革命時期東北人民革命鬥爭概述.” *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林师大学报 2 (1960): 52-80.
- Li, Guang 黎光. “Rikou zhimin tongzhi xia Xi’an kuanggong de feican shenghuo he fankang douzheng 日寇殖民统治下西安矿工的悲惨生活和反抗斗争.” *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林师大学报 3 (1959): 5-11.
- Li, Hou. *Building for Oil: Daqing and the Formation of the Chinese Socialist State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018.
- Li, Huaiyin. *Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013.

- Li, Jie 李洁. "Xin zhongguo zhexue shehui kexue 'guihua kexue' moshi de chuangli 新中国哲学社会科学‘规划科学’模式的创立." *Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu* 中共党史研究 5 (2019): 75-85.
- Li, Qi 李琦. "Jianguo chuqi quanguo gaodengxuexiao yuanxitiaozheng shuping 建国初期全国高等学校院系调整述评." *Dangde Wenxian* 党的文献 6 (2002): 71-77.
- Li, Qiunan. "Surviving Manchukuo: The Economic Struggles of Ordinary People in Urban Manchukuo from 1937–1945." *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 14, no. 2 (2020): 280-299.
- Li, Tuiou 李退愚. "Mei diguozhuyi zai jiu yi ba shibian shiqi dui zhongguo de qinlüe 美帝国主义在九一八事变时期对中国的侵略." *Wenxue yuekan* 文学月刊 4 (1959).
- Li, Wenxin 李文信. "Rikou zai Dongbei wenhua qinlüe de zuixing 日寇在東北文化侵略的罪行." *Wenwu cankao ziliao* 文物参考资料 9 (1951): 209.
- Li, Yang 李杨. "Wushi niandai de yuanxitiaozheng yu shehui bianqian: Yuanxitiaozheng yanjiu zhi yi 五十年代的院系调整与社会变迁: 院系调整研究之一." *Kaifang Shidai* 开放时代 5 (2004): 15-30.
- Li, Yibin 李义彬, Liu Yumeng 刘于孟, and Dong Weiquan 董维权. "1931–1935nian Jihai tielu gongren de kangri douzheng 1931–1935 年吉海铁路工人的抗日斗争." *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 59–62.
- Li, Yibin 李义彬. "Ha'erbin dianche gongren de kangri douzheng 哈尔滨电车工人的抗日斗争." *Jilin daxue shehui kexue xuebao* 吉林大学社会科学学报 1 (1961): 107-117.
- Li, Zhenzhen 李真真. "Zhongguo kexueyuan xuebu de choubei yu jianli 中国科学院学部的筹备与建立." *Ziran bianzhengfa tongxun* 自然辩证法通讯 4 (1992): 40-50 .

- Li, Zhenzhen 李真真. “Zhongxuanbu kexuechu yu zhongguo kexueyuan: Yu Guangyuan, Li Peishan fangtanlu 中宣部科学处与中国科学院: 于光远、李佩珊访谈录.” *Bainianhu* 百年湖 6 (1999): 23-30.
- Lin, Ganquan 林甘泉. “Ershi shiji de zhongguo lishixue 二十世纪的中国历史学.” *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 2 (1996): 5-25.
- Lishi kexue zhong liangtiao daolu de douzheng* 历史科学中两条道路的斗争. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1958.
- Liu, Chunfan 柳春藩. “Jilin daxue lishi xi xuesheng zai ben sheng jinxing wenwu pucha 吉林大学历史系学生在本省进行文物普查.” *Lishi yanjiu* 历史研究 11 (1958): 36.
- Liu, Danian 劉大年. “Zhongguo lishi kexue xianzhuang 中國歷史科學現狀.” *Kexue tongbao* 科学通报 7 (1953): 7-9.
- Liu, Jin. *Signifying the Local: Media Productions Rendered in Local Languages in Mainland China in the New Millennium*. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
- Liu, Long-hsin. “Historical Lessons and the History of Knowledge in the Late Qing Examination System.” In *Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China*, edited by Brian Moloughney and Peter Zarrow, 75 -102. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011.
- Liu, Lung-hsin 劉龍心. *Xueshu yu zhidu: xueke tizhi yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de jianli* 學術與制度: 學科體制與現代中國史學的建立. Taipei: Yuanliu, 2002.
- Liu, Weiyi 刘纬毅 ed. *Zhongguo Fangzhi Shi* 中国方志史. Taiyuan: Sanjin Chubanshe, 2010.
- Liu, Xiwen 刘希文. “Bianxiu difagnzhi de wo jian 编修地方志的我见.” *Dang'an Gongzuo* 档案工作 4 (1962): 11-12.
- Liu, Yaoting 刘尧庭 “Lishi gongzuozhe dui xuexi dangshi yingyou de renshi 历史工作者对学习党史应有的认识.” *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史学通讯 7 (1951): 7-9.

- Liu, Yaoting 刘尧庭. "Lishi jiaoshi yao hen hao de jinxing ziwo gaizao 历史教师要很好的进行自我改造." *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史学通讯 10 (1951): 1-2.
- Lü, Xichen 吕曦晨, Yang Cailan 楊彩蘭, Cong Yongri 叢永日, Liu Yumeng 刘于孟, Ai Fuwei 哀傅偉, and Tian Jujian 田居儉. "Dalian Zhonghua gongxuehui ji qi lingdao de gongre yundong 大連中华工学会及其领导的工人运动." *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1959): 99-109.
- Lu, Zhengyue 陆振岳. *Fangzhixue yanjiu* 方志学研究. Jinan: Jilu shushe 2013.
- Luo, Zhitian 罗志田. "Wenge qian shiqinian zhongguo shixue de pianduan fansi 文革前十七年中国史学的片段反思." *Sichuan daxue xuebao zhexue shehuikexue ban* 四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版) 9 (2009): 5-15.
- Luo, Zhitian 罗志田. "Xixue chongji xia jindai Zhongguo xueshu fenke de yanbian 西学冲击下近代中国学术分科的演变." *Jindai Zongguo shixue shilun* 近代中国史学十论. Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2003.
- Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. "Lun shi da guanxi 论十大关系 (1956.4.25)." in *Jianguo Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian* 建国以来重要文献选编, Vol. 8. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992.
- Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. "Xin minzhuzhuyi lun 新民主主义论." *Mao Zedong Xuanji* 毛泽东选集, Vol. 2. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1991.
- Martin, Dorothea A. L. *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View: Perceptions and Interpretations of World History in the People's Republic of China*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990.
- Matten, Marc André and Rui Kunze. *Knowledge Production in Mao-Era China: Learning from the Masses*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2021.
- Megill, Allan. *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

- Meisner, Maurice J. *Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Mitter, Rana. “‘Old ghosts, new memories’: China’s changing war history in the era of post-Mao politics.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 1 (2003): 117-131.
- Mitter, Rana. *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
- Moloughney, Brian and Peter Zarrow eds. *Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011.
- Moloughney, Brian and Peter Zarrow. “Making History Modern: The Transformation of Chinese Historiography, 1895–1937.” in *Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China*, edited by Brian Moloughney and Peter Zarrow, 1-46. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011.
- Mori, Kazuko 毛里和子. “Chūgoku no shakai shugi-teki sentaku to kokusai kankyō: 1953-Nen no katoki no ippan rosen' ni tsuite 中国の社会主義的選択と国際環境：1953年の「過渡期の一般路線」について。” in *Higashi Ajia to reisen 東アジアと冷戦*, edited by Akira Yamagiwa. Tokyo: Sanrei Shobo, 1993.
- Mullaney, Thomas. *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2011.
- Nankaidaxue lishixi 南开大学历史系 ed. *Jianguo yilai zhongguo xiandai shi lunwen mulu suoyin 建国以来中国现代史论文目录索引 1949–1982*. Tianjin: Nankaidaxue lishixi, 1982.
- Novick, Peter. *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Okumura, Satoshi 奥村哲. *Chūgoku no gendai-shi: Sensōtoshakai shugi 中国の現代史：戦争と社会主義*. Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1999.
- Orleans, Leo A. “Soviet Influence on China's Higher Education.” in *China's Education and the Industrialized World: Studies in Cultural Transfer*, edited

- by Ruth Hayhoe and Marianne Bastid. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1987.
- Orleans, Leo A. and Caroline Davidson eds. *Science in Contemporary China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980.
- Orleans, Leo A. *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961.
- Otsuka, Yutaka 大塚豊. *Gendai Chugoku Koto Kyoiku No Seiritsu* 現代中国高等教育の成立. Tokyo: Tamagawa daigaku shuppanbu, 1996.
- Pan, Zinian 潘梓年. “Zhongguo kexueyuan zhexue shehui kexuebu baogao 中国科学院哲学社会科学部报告 (1955.6.2).” *Kexue Tongbao* 科学通报 7 (1955): 39-43.
- Pepper, Suzanne. “Education for the New Order.” in *The Cambridge History of China Volume 14. The People's Republic*, edited by Roderick MacFarquhar and J. K. Fairbank, 185-217. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Pepper, Suzanne. “New Directions in Education.” in *The Cambridge History of China Volume 14. The People's Republic*, edited by Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Pepper, Suzanne. *Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Perry, Elizabeth J. “Educated Acquiescence: How Academia Sustains Authoritarianism in China.” *Theory and Society* 49, no. 1 (2020): 1-22.
- Perry, Elizabeth J. *Anyuan: Mining China's Revolutionary Tradition*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
- Pickowicz, Paul G. “Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing by Huaiyin Li (review).” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 74, no. 1 (2014): 167-176.
- Qi, Min 齊民. “Lishi jiaoxue yinggai liyong shiwu de difang shiliao 歷史教學應該利用實物的地方史料.” *Xin shixue tongxun* 新史學通訊 7 (1956): 15-18, 23.

- Qiu, Xinli 邱新立 and Wang Fang 王芳. “Zhongguo wu, liushi niandai difangzhi de bianxiu shimo ji chengguo gaishu (xu) 中国五、六十年代地方志的编修始末及成果概述 (续).” *Zhongguo Difangzhi* 中国地方志 1-2 (2001): 127-135.
- Saich, Tony. “Writing or Rewriting History? The Construction of the Maoist Revolution on Party History.” in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, edited by Tony Saich and Hans J. van de Ven. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.
- Sang, Bing 桑兵. *Wanqing minguo de guoxue yanjiu* 晚清民国的国学研究. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2001.
- Schaberg, David. *A Patterned Past: Form and Thought in Early Chinese Historiography*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001.
- Schmalzer, Sigrid. *Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016.
- Schmalzer, Sigrid. *The People's Peking Man: Popular Science and Human Identity in Twentieth-Century China*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008.
- Schneider, Axel. “Reconciling History with the Nation? Historicity, National Particularity, and the Question of Universals.” *Historiography East & West* 1, no. 1 (2003): 117-136.
- Schwarcz, Vera. *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Scott, James C. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Seow, Victor. *Carbon Technocracy: Energy Regimes in Modern East Asia*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2021.
- Shao, Pengwen 邵鹏文, Chen Tiejian 陈铁健, Duan Jingxuan 段景轩, Liu Yumeng 刘于孟, and Tian Jujian 田居俭. “Jilin sheng Panshi xian dahong shila shan hongjun juzhu yizhi diaochaji 吉林省磐石县大红

- 石礮山紅軍居住遗址調查記。” *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 43-52.
- Shao, Pengwen 邵鹏文. “Lishi xie xuesheng qu meikuang xie chu yibu: *Jiaohemeikuang bashi nian* 历史系学生去煤矿写出一部: 蛟河煤矿八十年.” *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 86.
- Shen, Grace Yen. “Scientism in the Twentieth Century,” in *Modern Chinese Religion II: 1850 - 2015*, edited by Jan Kiely, Vincent Goossaert and John Lagerwey, 92-137. Leiden: Brill, 2016.
- Shen, Xiaomei 申笑梅. “Wo zou guo de lu 我走过的路.” in *Beifang shijie renwu* 北方史界人物, edited by Li Junwu 李俊武 and Zhou Guangbu 周光陪. Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1991.
- Shih, Chung. *Higher Education in Communist China*. Hong Kong: Kowloon, H. K., Union Research Institute, 1953.
- Stiffler, Douglas “Resistance to Sovietization of Higher Education in China,” in *Universities under Dictatorship*, edited by John Connelly and Michael Grüttner, 213-243. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005.
- Su, Weichang 苏渭昌. “Wushi niandai de yuanxi tiaozheng 五十年代的院系调整.” *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Xuebao* 高等教育学报 4 (1989): 9-19.
- Sun, Hongqing 孙洪庆 and Hu Huakai 胡化凯. “‘Shiernian gui Hua’ yu jianguo chuqi de cixue fazhan ‘十二年规划’与建国初期的磁学发展.” *Ziran Bianzhengfa Tongxun* 自然辩证法通讯 33 (2011): 31-37.
- Sun, Kefu 孙克复. “Meiguo zai zhong ri zhanzheng zhong wannong de heping pianju 美国在中日战争中玩弄的和平骗局.” *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 9 (1965).
- Sun, Qingge 孙庆阁. “Dongbei lieshi jinianguan 东北烈士纪念馆.” *Wenwu cankao ziliao* 文物参考资料 7 (1955): 127-128.

- Tam, Gina Anne *Dialect and Nationalism in China, 1860-1960*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- Tan, Xian 譚銑, Li Heqing 李鶴慶, and Wu Zeyi 吳澤義. “1931–1934nian Panshi xian kangri aiguo renmin tuanti jianjie 1931–1934 年磐石县抗日爱国人民团体簡介.” *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 53–57.
- U, Eddy. *Creating the Intellectual: Chinese Communism and the Rise of a Classification*. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019.
- Walder, Andrew G. “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order.” *American Sociological Review* 60, no. 3 (1995): 309-28.
- Walder, Andrew G., Bobai Li and Donald J. Treiman. “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into the Urban Chinese Elite, 1949 to 1996.” *American Sociological Review* 65, no. 2 (2000): 191-209.
- Wan, Jiuhé 万九河. “Lishi diaocha zai lishi jiaoxue zhong de zhongyao yiyi 历史调查在历史教学中的重要意义.” *Jilin shida xuebao* 吉林师大学报 3 (1959): 1-4.
- Wang, Edward Q. *Inventing China through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001.
- Wang, Fan-sen. *Fu Ssu-nien: A life in Chinese History and Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Wang, Fansen 王汎森. *Jindai Zhongguo de shijia yu shixue* 近代中國的史家與史學. Hong Kong: Sanlian, 2008.
- Wang, Miao 汪淼. “Zichan jieji xueshu sixiang zai lishi xi jiaoxue kexue yanjiu gongzuo zhong de jidian biao xian 資產階級學術思想在历史系教学科学研究工作中的几点表現.” *Dongbei renmin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 东北人民大学人文科学学报 2 (1958): 65-69;
- Wang, Xuedian 王学典 and Chen Feng 陈峰. *Ersbi shiji Zhongguo lishixue* 二十世纪中国历史学. Beijing Shi: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009.

- Wang, Xuedian. "Fifty Years of Chinese Historiography." *Chinese Studies in History* 45, no. 2-3 (2011): 7-69.
- Wang, Yazhou 王亞洲, Zhang Xuanru 张旋如, Yuan Fuwei 袁傅伟, and Yu Zhidong 于治栋. "Jilin Nong'an Tianjiatuozi yizhi e faxian yu chubu diaocha 吉林农安田家坨子遗址的发现与初步调查." *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 63-76.
- Wang, Zao 王藻. "Pipan lishi jiaoxue he yanjiu gongzuo zhong de zichan jieji fangxiang 批判历史教学和研究工作中的资产阶级方向." *Jilin Daily* 吉林日报, May 30, 1958.
- Wang, Zhuchen 王祝晨. "Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di san ci huiyi shang de fayan, zaozao dongshou bianji difangzhi, Wang Zhuchen daibiao de fayan 在第一届全国人民代表大会第三次会议上的发言, 早早动手编辑地方志, 王祝晨代表的发言." *People's Daily* 人民日报, June 29, 1956.
- Wang, Zhuchen 王祝晨. "Zai di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di si ci huiyi shang de fa yan, jinyibu kaizhan difangzhi gongzuo, Wang Zhuchen de shumian fayan 在第一届全国人民代表大会第四次会议上的发言, 进一步开展地方志工作, 王祝晨的书面发言." *People's Daily* 人民日报, July 8, 1957.
- Wang, Zuoyue. "Saving China through Science: The Science Society of China, Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China." *Osiris* 17 (2002): 291-322.
- Watson, Jini Kim. "Imperial Mimicry, Modernisation Theory and the Contradictions of Postcolonial South Korea." *Postcolonial Studies* 10, no. 2 (2007): 171-190.
- Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne. "Chinese Historical Writing since 1949." in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing. Volume 5. 1945 to the Present*, edited by Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne. "History and Truth in Chinese Marxist Historiography." in *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism, and Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Comparative*

- Perspective*, edited by Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Achim Mittag and Jörn Rüsen. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
- Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne. "In Search of a Master Narrative for 20th-Century Chinese History." *The China Quarterly*, no. 188 (2006): 1070–1091.
- Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne. "On Shi and Lun: Toward a Typology of Historiography in the PRC." *History and Theory* 35, no. 4 (1996): 74-95.
- Wen, Yanshi 闻言实. "1956 nian zhongyang lingdao tongzhi de diaocha yanjiu yu 'Lun shi da guanxi' de fabiao 1956年中央领导同志的调查研究与‘论十大关系’的发表." *Dangde Wenxian* 党的文献 1 (2006): 21-27.
- Weston, Timothy B. *The Power of Position: Beijing University, Intellectuals, and Chinese Political Cultures, 1898-1929*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
- Xiang, Ming 向明. "Zhexue shehui kexue xuebu yu zhongguo kexueyuan de guanxi bianqian: Jiantan Guo Moruo de juece 哲学社会科学学部与中国科学院的关系变迁: 兼谈郭沫若的角色." *Jiangsu Daxue Xuebao* 江苏大学学报 19, no.3 (2017): 74-79.
- Xiao, Mengran 肖孟然, Dong Guoku 董国库, "Xue shehui kexue de tongyang hui ban hao gongchang 学社会科学的同样会办好工厂." *Jilin Daily* 吉林日报, July 25, 1958.
- Xu, Xiaoqun. *Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912–1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Xuan, Bingshan 宣炳善. "'Zhexue shehui kexue' gainian de zhongguo yujing '哲学社会科学'概念的中国语境." *Aohai Feng* 粤海风 5 (2007): 29-37.
- Xue, Qian 薛倩. "Zhongguo kexueyuan zhexue shehui kexue bu de fazhan licheng yu lishi gongxian 中国科学院哲学社会科学部的发展历程与历史贡献." *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 24, no.5 (2017): 67-79.

- Xue, Zhu 雪竹. "Jiu yi ba shibian qian Fushun meikuang gongren douzheng 九一八事变前抚顺煤矿工人斗争." *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 2 (1960): 83-86.
- Yamaguchi, Shinji 山口信治. "Motakuto ni yoru senryaku tenkan to shite no shinminshushugi dankai kōsō no hōki 毛沢東による戦略転換としての新民主主義段階構想の放棄." *Ajia kenkyū* アジア研究 54 (2008): 22-39.
- Yang, Fengcheng 杨凤城. "Xin shiqi zhongguo wenhua fazhan de jige congguan wenti yanjiu 新时期中国文化发展的几个宏观问题研究." *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 12, no.3 (2005): 49-54.
- Yang, Kuisong 杨奎松, "Mao Zedong wei shenme fangqi xin minzhuzhuyi 毛泽东为什么放弃新民主主义?" *Jindaishi yanjiu* 近代史研究 4 (1997): 139-153.
- Yang, Wenli 杨文利, and Zhang Meng 张蒙. "Xin zhongguo di yi ge keji fazhan guihua de zhiding, shishi ji lishi jingyan 新中国第一个科技发展规划的制定、实施及历史经验." *Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu* 当代中国史研究 6 (2007): 42-49.
- Yang, Xiangkui 杨向奎. "Canjia quanguo zonghe daxue huiyi de diandi tihui 参加全国综合大学会议的点滴体会." *People's Daily* 人民日报, November 4, 1953.
- Yeh, Wen-hsin. *The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919-1937*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, 1990.
- Yi, Wencheng 伊文成. "Shi er nian lai mei ri fangdongpai fuhuo riben junguozhuyi de zui'e huodong 十二年来美日反动派复活日本军国主义的罪恶活动 (1948-1959年)." *Dongbei shida xuebao* 东北师大学报 2 (1960).
- Yin, Da 尹达. "Gaijing lishi kexue de yanjiu gongauo: wei Mao Zedong tongzhi fabiao 'gaizao women de xuexi' shiwu zhounian er zuo 改进

历史科学的研究工作——为毛泽东同志发表‘改造我们的学习’十五周年纪念而作。” *People's Daily* 人民日报, May 30, 1956.

Yoon, Hwytak 윤휘탁. “Sigminji, Jeomlyeongji-ui “hyeoblyeog”(Collaboration) yeongu: “manjugug”-ui sigmin cheje guchuggwa junggugin-ui hyeoblyeog chegye-e gwanhan yeongu donghyang: junggug haggye-ui yeongu seonggwa-leul jungsim-eulo 식민지, 점령지의 “협력”(Collaboration) 연구: “만주국”의 식민체제 구축과 중국인의 협력체계에 관한 연구 동향: 중국학계의 연구 성과를 중심으로.” *Sa Chong: The Historical Journal* 사총 61 (2005): 323-336.

Yu, Guangyuan 于光远. “Zhiding he shishi zhexue shehui kexue guihua de lishi he jinhou de shexiang 制定和实施哲学社会科学规划的历史和今后的设想.” in *Yu Guangyuan Jingji Lunzhu Quanji* 于光远经济论著全集, Vol.10. Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2015.

Yu, Guangyuan 于光远. “Zhou Yang he wo 周扬和我.” in *Hui Zhou Yang* 忆周扬, edited by Meng Wang 王蒙 and Ying Yuan 袁鹰. Huhehaote: Neimenggu Renmin Chubanshe, 1994.

Yuan, Shaoying 袁韶莹. *Jilin sheng gaodeng jiaoyu shi* 吉林省高等教育史. Jilin: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1999.

Zarrow, Peter. “The New Schools and National Identity: Chinese History Textbooks in the Late Qing.” in *The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China*, edited by Tze-ki Hon and Robert J. Culp, 21–54. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

Zarrow, Peter. *Educating China: Knowledge, Society, and Textbooks in a Modernizing World, 1902–1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Zen, E-Tu. “The Growth of the Academic Community, 1919–1949.” in *The Cambridge History of China Volume 13. Republican China 1912–1949*, edited by John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Zhang, Haipeng 張海鵬. “Tan bianzuan xin difangzhi de jige wenti 談編纂新地方志的幾個問題.” *Anhui Shixue Tongxun* 安徽史学通讯 1 (1959): 42-44, 50.

- Zhang, Jiuchun 张久春 and Zhang Bachun 张柏春. "Guihua kexue jishu: '1956-1967 nian kexue jishu fazhan yuanjing guihua' de zhiding yu shishi 规划科学技术: '1956-1967年科学技术发展远景规划'的制定与实施." *Zhongguo Kexueyuan Yuankan* 中国科学院院刊 34, no.9 (2019): 982-991.
- Zhang, Shouchang 张守常. "Lun lishixue de 'qiuzheng' yu 'qiuyong': jingxian gei zhangzai xuexi de laoshimen 论历史学的'求真'与'求用': 敬献给正在学习的老师们." *Lishi jiaoxue* 历史教学 6 (1952): 185-188.
- Zhang, Xudong ed. *Whither China?: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.
- Zhang, Yue 张越. "Xin zhongguo shixue de chujian: Guo Moruo yu zhongguo makesizhuyi shixue zhudao diwei de queli 新中国史学的初建: 郭沫若与中国马克思主义史学主导地位的确立." *Shixue lilun yanjiu* 史学理论研究 2 (2020): 61-73.
- Zhao, Yeqin 赵晔琴. "Cong biye fenpei dao zizhu zheyue: Jiuye guanxi zhong de geren yu guojia. 1951-1999nian renmin ribao dui gaoziao biye fenpei de baodao wei li 从毕业分配到自主择业: 就业关系中的个人与国家. 1951-1999年人民日报对高校毕业分配的报道为例." *Shehui Kexue* 社会科学 4 (2016): 73-84.
- Zhongguo kexueyuan Jilinsheng fenyuan lishi yanjiusuo 中国科学院吉林省分院历史研究所, Jilin shifan daxue lishixi 吉林师范大学历史系 eds. *Jindai Dongbei renmin geming yundong shi: jiu minzhuzhuyi shiqi* 近代东北人民革命运动史: 旧民主主义革命时期. Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1960.
- Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yuanshi yanjiushi 中国社会科学院院史研究室. *Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan biannian jianshi 1977-2007* 中国社会科学院编年简史 1977-2007. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010.
- Zhongyang renmin zhengfu gaodeng jiaoyubu 中央人民政府高等教育部. "Guanyu zonghe daxue de fangzhen he renwu de baogao 关于综合

大学的方针和任务的报告(1953.9.10).” in *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jianguo Yilai Gaodeng Jiaoyu Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian* 中华人民共和国建国以来高等教育重要文献选编, Vol. 1, edited by Huadong shida gaoxiao ganbu jinxiuban and Jiaoyu kexue yanjiusuo 华东师大高校干部进修班, 教育科学研究所, 1979.

Zhou, Enlai 周恩来. “Zhongguo quanguo wenxue yishu gongzuozhe daibiao huiyi shang de zhengzhi baogao 中华全国文学艺术工作者代表会议上的政治报告 (1949.7.1).” *Zhou Enlai Xuanji* 周恩来选集, Vol. 2. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980.

Zhou, Enlai 周恩来. “Guanyu zhshi fenzi wenti de baogao 关于知识分子问题的报告 (1956.01.14).” *Zhou Enlai Xuanji* 周恩来选集, Vol. 2. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1980.

Zhu, Shouren 朱守仁. “Jiu yi ba shibian hou riben renmin de fanzhan douzheng 九一八事变后日本人民的反战斗争.” *Lishi jiaoxue* 历史研究 2 (1961): 62-65.

APPENDIX

Field investigations

Date	Location	Number of Students	Cooperating Institutions	Research Topic	Research Activities	Relationship with Working Masses	Product
1958. 7.23~ 1958. 8.17	40 Villages in Panshi, Dunhua, and Nong'an County <sup>1</sup>	About 60 third- and fourth-year students	Jilin Provincial Museum, Cultural Relics Management Committee of Jilin Province		Collected about 600 historical relics and revolutionary relics	- "We ate, lived, and worked together with peasants" - participated in reservoir construction in Xinli town	
	Panshi County <sup>2</sup>		3 people from the Panshi County People's Committee	Anti-Japanese Struggle in Banshi County	- Visited and interviewed about 190 people, 30 of whom were Red Army soldiers - Discovered 15 revolutionary sites - Discovered 29 historical sites - Collected about 200 relics of about 80 kinds	"Discovered the relics with the help and guidance of the masses"	

<sup>1</sup> Liu Chunfan 柳春藩, "Jilin daxue lishi xi xuesheng zai ben sheng jinxing wenwu pucha 吉林大学历史系学生在本省进行文物普查," *Lishi Yanjiu* 历史研究 11 (1958): 36.

<sup>2</sup> Shao Pengwen 邵鹏文, Chen Tiejian 陈铁健, Duan Jingxuan 段景轩, Liu Yumeng 刘于孟, Tian Jujian 田居俭, "Jilin sheng Panshi xian dahong shila shan hongjun juzhu yizhi diaochaji 吉林省磐石县大红石砬山红军居住遗址调查记," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 43-52; Tan Xian 谭琮, Li Heqing 李鹤庆, Wu Zeyi 吴泽义, "1931-1934nian Panshi xian kangri aiguo renmin tuanti jianjie 1931-1934年磐石县抗日爱国人民团体简介," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 53-57; Li Yibin 李义彬, Liu Yumeng 刘于孟, Dong Weiquan 董维权, "1931-1935nian Jihai tielu gongren de kangri douzheng 1931-1935年吉海铁路工人的抗日斗争," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 59-62.

Dunhua County <sup>3</sup>	Group 1: unclear Group 2: 6 students		Group 2: Archaeological sites in 4 villages	- Discovered 4 Twenty-Four-Stone sites			
Nong'an County <sup>4</sup>	Group 1: 10 people including lecturers and students Group 2: 6 people	Local party cadres and local government cadres	- Group 1: 4 ancient cities of Liao period near Itong River - Group 2: 7 villages near Songhua River	- Group 1: Excavated ancient city sites, tombs, relics - Group 2: Excavated Tianjiatuozi site	- Group 1: participated in bank revetment work for 5 days in Xiaochengzi - Group 1: held exhibitions of historical relics in 2 villages - Group 2: The Tianjiatuozi site had been unknown even by the county, but local residents introduced the site to the research team.		

<sup>3</sup> "Dunhua xian er shisi kuai shi yizhi diaocha ji: Jilin daxue lishi xi Dunhua wenwu puchadui di er xiaozu 敦化县二十四块石遗址调查记: 吉林大学历史系敦化文物普查队第二小组," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 87-92.

<sup>4</sup> Luo Jizu 罗繼祖, "Nong'an Yitongke xi'an wensu pucha jianji 农安伊通河西岸文物普查简报," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 77-85; Wang Yazhou 王亞洲, Zhang Xuanru 张旋如, Yuan Fuwei 袁傅伟, Yu Zhidong 于治栋, "Jilin Nong'an Tianjiatuozi yizhi e faxian yu chubu diaocha 吉林农安田家坨子遗址的发现与初步调查," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 63-76; Li Yubin 李义彬, "Lishi xi si nianji tongxue zai nongcun jinxing laodong duanlian he diaocha yanjiu 历史系四年级同学在农村进行劳动锻炼和调查研究," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 36.

1958. 11~ 1959. 1	Jiaohe County Bao'an Village <sup>5</sup>	29 fourth-year students	CCP Jiaohe County Committee, Jiaohe County People's Committee	"Historical change in Bao'an Village after liberation, the development of the mutual aid and cooperation movement, struggles between socialist and capitalist roads, the superiority of cooperation, the Great Leap Forward in agricultural production and the establishment of a people's commune"	- Interviews - historical documents of the region	- "We ate, lived, and worked together with peasants" - participated in socialist education movement in the village - <i>The Road to Happiness (History of People's Commune)</i> was written in "the language of the masses, in popular and vivid language."	- Drafted a book, <i>The Road to Happiness (History of People's Commune)</i> in only 20 days. Jilin People's Publisher published the revised book in October 1959. - 10 students drafted <i>Jiaohe County Gazetteer</i> with 9 cadres of Jiaohe County
1958. 11~ 1959. 1	Jiaohe Coal Mine <sup>6</sup>	23 fourth-year students	CCP Jiaohe Coal Mine Committee	History of Jiaohe Coal Mine		- "We ate, lived, and worked together with workers" - participated in production labor and grassroot work - "In the mine, we went down to mine to excavate coal, while visiting miners, holding meetings, and trying to collect oral and written materials."	- Drafted a book, <i>80 years of Jiaohe Coal Mine</i> , including 120 paintings describing the history

<sup>5</sup> Shao Pengwen 邵鹏文, "Lishi xie xuesheng qu meikuang xie chu yibou: Jiaohe meikuang bashi nian 历史系学生去煤矿写出一部: 蛟河煤矿八十年," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1958): 86.

<sup>6</sup> Shen Xiaomei 申笑梅, "Wo zou guo de lu" 我走过的路, in *Beifang shijie renwu* 北方史界人物, eds. Li Junwu 李俊武, Zhou Guangbu 周光培 (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1991), 318.

1959. 5~6	Dalian <sup>7</sup>		- Cooperative research with Chinese Academy of Science Jilin Provincial Branch Institute of Economics - In support of CCP Lüda Municipal Committee Propaganda Department, CCP Dalian Locomotive and Rolling Stock Plant Committee Propaganda Department	Dalian Chinese Society of Engineering and its organization of labor protests against Japanese rule	- Interviewed former workers - Read Japanese archives, newspapers, magazines, and monographs	- Research article
1959. 5~6	Fushun Coal Mine <sup>8</sup>		- Cooperative research with Chinese Academy of Science Jilin Provincial Branch Institute of Economics	Labor protests in Fushun Coal Mine under management by the Manchurian Railway Company		- Research article

<sup>7</sup> Lü Xichen 吕曦晨, Yang Caolan 杨彩兰, Cong Yongri 丛永日, Liu Yumeng 刘于孟, Ai Fuwei 艾傅偉, Tian Jujian 田居儉, "Dalian Zhonghua gongxuehui ji qi lingdao de gongre yundong 大連中华工学会及其领导的工人运动," *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 3 (1959): 99-109.

<sup>8</sup> Xue Zhu 雪竹, "Jiu yi ba shibian qian Fushun meikuang gongren douzheng 九一八事变前撫順煤矿工人斗争," *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 2 (1960): 83-86.

1959. 5~7	Shangzhi County, Harbin Tram Factory <sup>9</sup>	About 70 third- and fourth-year students	“Under the co- leadership of Harbin Tram Factory, Local Party Committee, and general Party Branch of the Department”	Anti-Japanese struggles	- visited workers for interview - collected archives and documents in the related departments, and newspapers	- “We ate, lived, and worked together with peasants and workers” - organized an exhibition tour of cartoons drawn for the publication of <i>Brief History of Shangzhi People’s Anti-Japanese Struggle</i>	- <i>Book, History of Harbin Tram Factory</i> - <i>Book, Brief History of Shangzhi People’s Anti-Japanese Struggle</i> - Research article
--------------	---	---	--	----------------------------	---	---	---

<sup>9</sup> Li Yibin 李义彬, “Wo xiao lishixi bianxie chu ‘Shangzhi renmin kangri douzhengshi’ he ‘Ha’erbin dianche gongsi shi’ he ‘Ha’erbin dianche gongsi shi’ 我校历史系编写出‘尚志人民抗日斗争史’和‘哈尔滨电车公司史’”, *Jilin daxue renwen kexue xuebao* 吉林大学人文科学学报 1 (1960): 68; Li Yibin 李义彬, “Ha’erbin dianche gongren de kangri douzheng 哈尔滨电车工人的抗日斗争”, *Jilin daxue shehui kexue xuebao* 吉林大学社会科学学报 1 (1961): 107-117.