

WHO WEARS THE BADGE? WHY POLITICIANS MILITARIZE POLICING AND PUBLIC SAFETY

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Jessica Zarkin Notni

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WHO WEARS THE BADGE? WHY POLITICIANS MILITARIZE POLICING
AND PUBLIC SAFETY

Jessica Zarkin Notni, Ph.D.

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Elected authorities across Latin America have pursued various policing practices to solve the problems of criminal violence and police ineffectiveness that have seized the region over the last decades. Some prioritized building institutional capacity and encouraging police-community partnerships. Most, however, saw the adoption of a military model as the only viable path forward. This dissertation provides a first attempt at understanding what explains the decision to militarize public safety and its consequences for the institution—the police—elected authorities were trying to reform. To address these questions, it takes a subnational approach and turns to a silent but highly consequential type of police militarization occurring across many Latin American cities: the appointment of military members as police chiefs.

Whereas the conventional wisdom points to violence and partisanship as key drivers of police militarization, in the first chapter, I argue that the militarization of police leaders responds to political motives. Drawing on evidence from 5,580 police chief appointments in Mexico, I show that local elected authorities appoint military chiefs when they face coercive pressures and strategic incentives to align with the federal government's militarized security strategy.

In the second chapter, I further argue that military chief appointments provide elected authorities a low-cost opportunity to signal competence in security governance because character-relevant information is conveyed to citizens

when politicians militarize public safety. Responses to a mock news report survey experiment lend support to my theory. Latin Americans not only express mayors are more effective in security matters when they appoint military chiefs, but they also think that mayors are improving policing and corruption.

The third chapter examines the conditions under which the integration of military members into police departments results in bureaucratic destabilization—or disruptions in the inner workings of the police. Drawing on 300 anonymous interviews and a qualitative comparative analysis of seven police departments in Mexico, I demonstrate theoretically and empirically that destabilization is not only the product of differences in training and mode of operation between the military and police but rather a conjunction between professional differences on the one hand and rank position on the other.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jessica Zarkin Notni was born and grew up in Mexico City, where she received her BA in Political Science and International Relations from the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). She later received an MA and Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University, specializing in the politics of law and order, police militarization, and urban security governance. In July 2022, she will start as an Assistant Professor in Government at Claremont McKenna College (CMC).

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and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The military’s mission is so different from that of the police that each contaminates the other.”

–DAVID BAYLEY (2001, P. 38)

“Here the truth is that the Generals haven’t worked for us, it hasn’t worked. I’ve been here for thirty-two years and every time a General is appointed, he never finishes his six years. He leaves early. Why? Because they cause problems.”

–POLICE OFFICER (2018)

Mauricio Fernández ran for mayor of San Pedro Garza García—the wealthiest municipality in Mexico—in 2009. During his campaign, Fernández promised San Pedro’s people that, if elected, he would appoint a military member as police chief. His administration began on October 31, 2009. By November 4—and just as General Hermelindo Lara Cruz and Brigadier General Juan Arturo Esparza were taking over the leadership of police of nearby municipalities—mayor Fernández appointed Brigadier General Gonzalo Adalid Mier [Proceso, 2010].¹

A few kilometers south, the mayor of Aguascalientes city, Lorena Martínez, announced that she was firing civilian police chief José de Jesús Ortiz Jiménez. Her decision came days after Aguascalientes’ Secretary of Security (i.e., the state’s police chief), Division General Rolando Eugenio Hidalgo Eddy, complained about the difficulties communicating with Ortiz Jiménez [Notimex, 2013]. Seeking “*better coordination between security agencies*,” and with Hidalgo Eddy’s approval, mayor Martínez appointed Brigadier General Pablo José Godínez instead [Notimex, 2013]. Months after the appointment, mayor

¹Military ranks correspond to the Mexican star system.

Martínez doubled down on her decision, stating that *“Hidalgo Eddy and Godínez are both military members. They were part of the army. Therefore, there is trust. There is a relationship of collaboration and mutual respect”* [LJA.MX, 2013].

And nearly five years later, one of the first decisions that Enrique Alfaro made as the newly elected governor of Jalisco state was to appoint Division General Daniel Velasco Ramírez as Secretary of Security. As the elected governor, Alfaro was fully committed to *“help, respect, and collaborate with the military”* [Alfaro, 2018]. Therefore, beyond taking into account the General’s fifty years of experience in national security matters, Alfaro decided to invite Velasco Ramírez to run the state’s security apparatus because *“it was fundamental that state and municipal governments maintain a respectful coordination with the country’s armed forces”* [Alfaro, 2018].

Fernández, Martínez, and Alfaro were from different political parties—the conservative National Action Party (PAN), the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the more liberal Citizen Movement (MC), respectively. Moreover, they faced vastly different security contexts. Alfaro was elected amid a bloody turf war between the Jalisco Nueva Generación cartel and smaller criminal organizations financed by the Sinaloa cartel. Martínez’s Aguascalientes city, in contrast, barely had a homicide rate of 10 per 100,000 people. And these elected officials also governed substantially different electorates in contrasting regions in Mexico. However, when it came to deciding who should be the police chief, they all selected a military member. What explains Fernández, Martínez, and Alfaro’s decision to appoint a military member as police chief? More so, what were the consequences of doing so for the police itself?

This dissertation answers these questions by broadly examining elected authorities like Fernández, Martínez, and Alfaro's approach to local security governance in Latin America. Despite even the most well-intentioned promises from governments across ideological lines, security governance remains a pressing concern in the region. Not only is Latin America considered the most violent region in the world, but Latin America's cities have also seen dramatic increases in crime and violence [Muggah, 2017]. As [Davis, 2001] summarizes, "crime, insecurity, and police impunity in the major cities of Latin America remain at unprecedented levels, standing as among the most serious problems facing the continent's urban citizenry."

The consequences of this rise in violence have manifested in citizens' everyday lives [Zechmeister, 2014]. Many in Argentina, for example, recount feeling insecure in their own neighborhoods after dark [Dammert and Malone, 2002]. Brazilians and Chileans equally describe withdrawing from public spaces due to fear of crime [Dammert and Malone, 2003, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2021]. And nearly 50% of Colombians reported being afraid of being a victim of homicide [Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, 2017].

They have also manifested in citizen demands for solutions to the problems of crime and insecurity. One out of every three Colombians, for example, believe that reducing homicides requires harsher punishments [Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, 2017]. Thousands of Mexicans have taken over the streets of Mexico City to demand a more robust state response to rising insecurity [Davis, 2006]. And many others have instead opted to build order through non-state sponsored responses like organizing private armed groups or engaging in vigilante justice [Moncada, 2019].

As a result, local, state, and national elected authorities face immense political and electoral pressures to intervene in policing and security [González, 2020]. These interventions, however, have changed substantially over time. In the 1990s, the discourse centered around concepts like community, prevention, and partnership. Yet, in the absence of comprehensive structural police reforms, and with security conditions changing following transitions to democracy, so did politicians' approach to governing public safety.

1.1 Security Governance in Latin America

Following the transitions to democracy of the 1980s and 1990s, governments faced a pressing need to lessen the military's influence on policing, end the involvement of police forces in political repression, and eliminate the police's corrupt and ineffective practices [Cruz, 2006, Glebbeek, 2001]. The goal was to build police forces that were more compatible with the newly adopted principles of democracy [Bayley, 2001].

The shift towards democratic policing came in different forms. It included forming new police forces in countries that had previously experienced civil war, such as Guatemala and El Salvador. And it also included partial reforms in countries that wanted to separate themselves from their authoritarian legacies, such as Chile and Argentina. These reforms encompassed stricter recruitment standards, internal control processes, training and specialization, and the demilitarization of police forces. Demilitarization included a wide array of changes from police forces operating under new civilian ministries and bolstering civilian oversight to decentralizing operational command and transitioning from a

state-centered to a citizen-centered doctrine.

In addition to national-level changes, cities all over Latin America also took lessons from community policing in Europe and the United States to come closer to a democratic policing ideal. They implemented their own police-community models to rebuild the police's image, regain citizens' trust, address crime, and rebuild state-society linkages broken during the autocratic era [Müller, 2012]. For example, Bogotá created the *Frentes de Seguridad Local* in 1993, organized by police officers from the local police station and linked citizens to the police through informal meetings [Gonzalez, 2016]. São Paulo began the *Conselhos Comunitarios de Segurança* in 1985. The *Conselhos* provided a monthly space for government officials and police officers to provide information and updates to residents in each district and opportunities for citizens to discuss their local problems and make requests [Gonzalez, 2016].

Similarly, Buenos Aires instituted the *Foros Vecinales de Seguridad* in 1998. The *Foros* were part of a larger reform project on shared governance, and these granted citizens considerable responsibilities in police oversight [Gonzalez, 2016]. Guatemala instituted the *Juntas Locales de Seguridad Ciudadana* in 1999 to get citizens to provide information to the police [Frühling, 2003]. Chile created the *Comités Vecinales de Seguridad Ciudadana* in 1997 to increase the role of the community in preventing crime [Frühling, 2003]. And a small number of Mexican cities institutionalized participatory security mechanisms to address crime and regain citizens' trust, including Mexico City, Mérida, and Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl [Mendoza, 2019].

Unfortunately, as efforts to promote citizen security and democratize policing spread across the region, so did insecurity and violence. By the end of

the 1990s, common crime reached historical levels, and new forms of violence emerged at the hands of criminal organizations fighting to control illicit markets [Arias, 2006]. The rising levels of insecurity presented a new dilemma for national governments who recognized the need to pursue long-term police reforms yet encountered weak, incompetent, and often complicit police institutions [Yashar, 2018]. Faced with intense political and social pressure, most governments reverted to more repressive law and order strategies to tackle crime in less than one decade [Cruz, 2006, Holland, 2013, Yashar, 2018, Zaverucha, 2000].

In El Salvador, for example, comprehensive peace agreements signed in 1992 curtailed the military's role in internal security, dissolved the three security forces that operated during the civil war, and created a single National Civilian Police (PNC) [Call, 2002]. The PNC was seen as the most significant institution to emerge from the reforms. It was tasked with maintaining order and protecting citizens, was comprised of predominantly civilians with no military or combatant background, and even introduced mechanisms of professionalization and oversight [Call, 2003]. While these changes suggested a turn in police effectiveness, problems quickly emerged [Call, 2003, Cruz, 2006]. No less than five years later, elected authorities reversed many reforms, and the military began playing a supportive role in policing [Cruz, 2006]. By 2003, with Plan Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura, policing was fully militarized [Aguilar, 2016].

A similar cycle occurred in Honduras. The newly created Honduran National Police started operating in 1998 under a civilian Security Ministry and a civilian doctrine [Call, 2002]. Yet less than four years later, the military's involvement in internal security reemerged under Ricardo Maduro's administration (2002—2006) and increased considerably over the next decade. The armed

forces now participate in close to 30,000 policing operations each year [Honduras, 2016].

The cycle of re-militarization of policing functions also materialized in countries with former military regimes such as Brazil. Brazilian security policies began oscillating between community-oriented strategies and old-style crackdowns. Throughout the 1990s, for example, the federal government deployed the military for Guaranteeing Law and Order (GLO) operations to address violence in the favelas while twenty-seven of its federal states pursued community-policing strategies [Macaulay, 2012, Zaverucha, 2000]. While national authorities initially restricted GLOs to short operations, president Lula da Silva's (2003-2010) deployment of troops for the pacification program in Rio de Janeiro gave way to large-scale military operations over the next decade [Harig, 2021].

And it also emerged in Mexico, where promises of democratic security governance were short-lived. The military should have held a temporary position in public safety while Ernesto Zedillo's (1994-2000) government developed local police institutional capacity through targeted subsidies [Moloeznik, 2006]. However, the military's participation in policing increased over time. By 1999, military officers took over high-ranking positions within the Attorney General's Office (PGR in Spanish), over 5,000 soldiers joined the Federal Preventive Police, and the share of drug seizures carried out by the army rose steeply [Meyer, 2013]. Even though Vicente Fox (2000-2006) proposed several measures intended to reverse this trend and called for the army's withdrawal, the military got involved in high-value targeted operations [Pion-Berlin, 2016]. And, at the start of Felipe Calderón's (2006-2012) administration, the armed forces became the central agency in charge of executing the federal government's se-

curity strategy against crime.²

1.2 Mexico: The War Against Crime and the Adoption of a Militarized Security Strategy


In December 2006, only a month into his presidency, newly elected president Felipe Calderón’s declaration of all-out war against organized crime marked the start of Mexico’s protracted militarized federal security strategy. This strategy entailed the military’s involvement in law enforcement operations in large parts of the territory to address public safety. In 2008, over 40,000 soldiers permanently fought crime in at least twenty-four of the thirty-two Mexican states [Ángel, 2016, Ángel, 2021]. By 2021, this number rose to 80,000—see figure 1.1.

Calderón’s decision to declare “war” on the drug trade and order the army to crack down on criminal organizations in urban areas and along major routes came as Mexico experienced increased violent crime related to criminal organizations starting in the administration of Vicente Fox. From the late 1990s through Fox’s presidency, an inter-cartel turf war slowly began to emerge. Additionally, criminal organizations started to invest in military weapons and equipment and build private armies.

According to scholarly work, the increase in criminal violence in Mexico was a consequence of several factors. First, the United States’ demand for illegal drugs and supply of weapons across the border [Dube et al., 2013]. Second, state crackdowns in Colombia, which led Colombians to rely on Mexican traf-

²The military was intermittently engaged in eradication of plantations in areas of difficult access but was not frontally engaged in public safety missions.

Figure 1.1: Soldiers participating in public safety missions, 2006-2021



ficking organizations to transport shipments to the US through cities like Juárez, Laredo, and Tijuana [Shirk and Wallman, 2015]. Third, subnational party alternation, which unsettled the deals between corrupt PRI state officials and criminal organizations [Shirk and Wallman, 2015, Trejo and Ley, 2018, Trejo and Ley, 2020].

Facing increasingly powerful and violent criminal organizations and expecting a direct confrontation would break cartels into small organizations too weak to threaten the state, Calderón turned to the militarization of public safety. While his rationale was that the deployment of the military would quickly curtail criminal violence as it had in Colombia, this strategy had the opposite effect [Lessing, 2017]. Criminal violence accelerated and spread from the border states and drug-trafficking regions like Michoacán and Sinaloa to more metropolitan

Figure 1.2: Homicide rate per 100,000 people, 2000-2019



areas like Monterrey, Acapulco, and Cuernavaca. Homicides jumped 57 percent in 2008 and continued to grow dramatically through 2011—see figure 1.2. By the end of Calderón’s term, over 100,000 Mexicans were killed, and over 20,000 went missing.

Despite Calderon’s right-of-center party losing power in 2012 and growing criticism from international organizations and civil society, the federal government’s militarized security strategy continued under his successors, Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024). Peña Nieto increased the number of soldiers on the streets [Trejo and Ley, 2020]. He also relied more heavily on the Navy’s (SEMAR) special operations groups. In

2016, for example, 17,482 marines participated on a monthly basis in high-value targeted operations compared to 4,102 in 2006 [Storr and López Portillo, 2019].

López Obrador, like Vicente Fox, promised during his 2017 presidential campaign to remove soldiers from the streets and return troops to the barracks [Economist, 2021]. However, once elected, he gave the military even more power than his predecessors. López Obrador deepened the nature of public safety militarization by dismantling the Federal Police and creating the National Guard in its place. This new security force comprises soldiers and former police who de facto operate under the command of the military [Meyer, 2020]. And he went as far as asking governors to meet with the army and the navy before appointing their state's police chief to ensure that these men would be *"honest, integral, and incorruptible. And to avoid what was very common before: criminals in control of the state and municipal police"* [Flores Contreras, 2021].

1.3 What Explains the Militarization of Police and What Are Its Consequences?

The intense criminal violence in Latin America and varied government responses to deal with this pervasive problem have catalyzed a growing body of research that provides valuable insights into security policy in general and law enforcement militarization in particular. However, several gaps remain. For one, scholarly work has focused exclusively on constabularized militaries, thereby overlooking other forms of militarization taking hold across the region. We, therefore, have a good understanding of how the deployment of the military for public safety missions works, yet not enough about the use of military

weapons, training, and equipment by Latin American police forces. Nor do we have a good understanding of the subject of study of this dissertation: the appointment of military members as police chiefs.

Additionally, scholars have also directed their attention to federal governments while overlooking state and local level security governance. This oversight is unfortunate for four main reasons. First, in countries where municipal and state governments are granted limited to substantive authority over police forces, the militarization of law enforcement has also taken place. Military members have been appointed as state and municipal police chiefs. Examples include the appointment of General Richard Fernández Nunes as Rio de Janeiro's last Security Secretary in 2018 and the appointment of retired military commanders by eight of fourteen elected Mexican governors in the 2021 elections [Globo, 2018, Monroy, 2021]. In parallel, many state and local police forces have adopted military practices and equipment. Nuevo León state's Fuerza Civil, created in 2011, for example, initially deployed officers in convoys of five—just like the army—as opposed to the more traditional one-man and two-man police patrols. Similarly, Coahuila's governor, Humberto Moreira (2005-2011), created several elite SWAT teams like the GATE, GATEM, and GROM. These special security forces dressed in all black, heavily armed, and trained by military members were later accused of being involved in at least sixty cases of forced disappearance in the state [International Federation for Human Rights, 2017].

Second, while federal governments often provide an overarching approach to crime prevention and planning, most crime of immediate concern to communities is local (e.g., property crime) [US Department of Justice, 2001]. Therefore, state and local governments play a significant role in the control of crime, dis-

order, and insecurity [Homel and Fuller, 2005]. They are best positioned to assess community needs and allocate resources [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010]. Because of their responsibility in urban and rural planning, they are also strategically placed to bring together local agencies and partners in community crime prevention [US Department of Justice, 2001].

Third, public trust in local government is an essential resource for the provision of public safety. Without public trust, public safety suffers [Goldsmith, 2005]. Key within this discussion is that trust in local authorities is not a mere reflection of trust in national authorities [Fitzgerald and Wolak, 2016]. People incorporate their views about the quality of local services and community life when deciding to place their trust in local government [Fitzgerald and Wolak, 2016].

Fourth, local governments are becoming increasingly distinctive from central governments [John, 2001]. Specific to Latin America, as [Willis et al., 1999] summarize, virtually all Latin American countries have undergone some political decentralization beginning in the 1970s. This development has meant that local governments are finding new opportunities for influence and voice. Decentralization, however, has also encompassed the transfer of policy responsibility and accountability to the public. As a result, citizens now expect more from their local governments [Fitzgerald and Wolak, 2016]. They are more and more concerned about the performance and efficiency of local authorities, making the study of local security governance essential to our understanding of the politics of crime.

But, most importantly, while a lot has been written about citizens and the military, research on police militarization has yet to systematically study the

other two actors at the center of this trend: police forces and politicians. On the one hand, we know little to nothing about what happens to police forces once the dynamics of militarization take hold—and even less about police-military relations. On the other hand, scholars have also yet to engage deeply with political leaders and what motivates their behavior. Although more recent work like [Harig, 2021] and [Pion-Berlin and Carreras, 2017] has begun to move in this direction, scholars have primarily depicted politicians as merely responding to citizen demand. But, as [González, 2020] and [Holland, 2015] have demonstrated, enforcement choices are considerably strategic. They tell us something about politicians’ freedom of maneuver in security governance and the multiple factors influencing their choices. We therefore have much to learn about politicians’ decision to see crime as a problem to be deterred through *mano dura* or with the help of the communities they govern.

Because of the lack of accumulated knowledge on local security governance and the drivers of police militarization, it is essential to develop a theoretical framework that speaks to these domains. Such theorizing can help us better understand the choices of elected authorities, and the consequences of these decisions for the institutions involved in public safety and for democracy more generally.

1.3.1 Theory

Focusing on federal countries, I argue local elected authorities militarize policing when they face *coercive pressures* and *strategic incentives* to align with the federal government’s militarized security strategy. This is the case because in

federal countries, overlapping security jurisdiction in public safety makes crime prevention more challenging compared to centralized systems for two reasons. It gives rise to ambiguity regarding responsibility and authority over the enforcement of the law. And it also creates undesirable conflict between the federal, state, and local governments, who must find a way to work together. State and local governments, therefore, face significant pressures to align with the federal government's security strategy to facilitate inter-jurisdictional coordination. Yet, the federal government is not the only actor that stands to gain from alignment. Local and state governments might pursue alignment strategically to facilitate coordination, secure resources, and deflect responsibility for failed security strategies at the local level. In countries where the national government's security strategy is the deployment of the military for domestic policing, alignment will materialize in the militarization of local public safety through the appointment of military members as police chiefs. I further argue that the forces to align security institutions are not deterministic, but instead create a set of entrenched interests for local and federal governments that raise the stakes of pursuing a different security strategy to the one pursued by other elected authorities.

Taking insights from the political economy literature on pandering, I also propose that politicians militarize public safety not only to show congruence with citizen preferences but also to inform them about their governing capacities in this domain. Police militarization presents politicians with a low-cost opportunity to signal competence in security governance and boost their reputation. It does so because policy and character-relevant information is conveyed to citizens when politicians take a militarized approach to public safety. The first is an admission by elected officials that the police, in its present condition,

is incapable of fighting crime effectively, which ties nicely with the high levels of societal distrust towards the police in the region. The second is a belief that the answer to the police's incompetence is not police reform but more closely resembling the only institution capable of performing its mission effectively—the military. And the third is that they, unlike other elected authorities, are willing to get things done.

Lastly, as to the consequences of militarization for police, expanding on the work by [Llyall, 2020] on bureaucratic composition and institutional performance, I trace when and how the recruitment of military members destabilizes police departments' internal functioning. I argue that destabilization is the product of professional differences between the military and police on the one hand and rank position on the other. Departments destabilize when military members are appointed as chiefs of *civilian* police departments while remaining unaffected when military members are appointed as chiefs of *militarized* police departments or are recruited to *lower-ranking* positions by civilian chiefs.

1.3.2 Research Design and Case Selection

This dissertation applies a subnational perspective and relies primarily on the case of Mexico to test the theoretical proposals detailed above. There are numerous reasons why I take a subnational approach. First, looking at subnational variation allows me to pose new research questions related to security governance and police militarization. It also lets me shift the focus to a host of actors—mayors and governors—which are too often neglected by the dominant national-level security policy perspective. And it allows me to propose a multi-

level theory that is more attentive to causal relationships across levels of analysis to explain subnational outcomes [Giraudy et al., 2019]. The former is not to say that cross-national research is not vital to understanding how elected authorities approach local public safety. However, given the lack of accumulated knowledge about local security governance and police militarization, it makes sense to start building theory by focusing on one country before explaining a broader universe of countries.

Mexico is particularly valuable for conducting subnational research on local security governance and police militarization. First, like other federal countries that have significantly decentralized law enforcement, policing services in Mexico are shared between the federal, state, and municipal governments. Each level of government has its police force. The president, governors, and mayors have the right to appoint police chiefs (*Directores* or *Secretarios de Seguridad Pública*), who plan, organize, and oversee all police activities in the country. Mexican mayors, therefore, are the elected authorities most proximately responsible for local order and safety [Moncada, 2022].

Second, Mexican police departments significantly differ in their preparedness, equipment, training, and organizational capacity, making the country a large natural laboratory to explore variation in security governance. There are municipalities with over 2,000 police officers, such as Guadalajara, León, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, and Naucalpan. The vast majority, however, have less than nine police officers [National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 2017a]. Similarly, while some police departments like Chihuahua City have sophisticated performance management and geolocation systems, over 25% report having no computers to work with [National Institute of Statistics and Geogra-

phy (INEGI), 2017a]. And while some police are equipped with tablets to record every interaction with the citizenry, most lack funding to provide their police officers with essential equipment, training, and uniforms [National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 2017a].

Third, Mexico is one of several Latin American countries—including Brazil and El Salvador—where elected officials have appointed military members as police chiefs. Between 1999 and 2020, seventy-eight out of a sample of 284 individuals (or 27%) who served as state police chiefs were military members. Examples include Division General Ricardo Adriano Morales, who was Durango’s Secretary of Security for 140 days, and Division General Rigoberto Rivera Hernández, who served as Veracruz’s Secretary of Security for 335 days. Both men had had exceptional military careers, with Adriano Morales as commander of the Sixth Military Region and Rivera Hernández as commander of the First Military Region.³

Similarly, 841 out of a sample of 5,580 individuals (or 15.1%) appointed as municipal police chiefs between 2000-2020 were military members. Among some of the most well-known military chiefs is Lieutenant Coronel Julián Leyzaola. After retiring from the military, Leyzaola served as Tijuana’s and Ciudad Juárez’s municipal police chief—during some of the worst years of violence in both cities. In 2016, Leyzaola was attacked by gunmen while sitting in his car in Ciudad Juárez, which left him in a wheelchair. Three years after the attack, he ran for mayor of Tijuana under the banner of the *“mayor on your streets”* who *“once brought peace to the city”* [Vulliamy, 2019]. He narrowly lost the election by less than one percentage point.

³The territorial organization of the military in Mexico includes twelve military regions and forty-six military zones. Each region is commanded by a senior military member at the rank of Division General (equivalent to a three-star general in the U.S.).

For chapter 3, in addition to focusing on Mexico, I also turn to Brazil. The reason for this is threefold. First, the access to online survey panels made it possible to conduct a cross-country comparison. Second, Brazil's security governance is like Mexico's in that it is significantly decentralized. Plus, mayors and governors in both countries have appointed military chiefs.⁴ Third, despite historical and institutional differences, Mexicans and Brazilians share similar attitudes towards law enforcement institutions and security more broadly.

1.3.3 Quantitative Data

This dissertation draws on two original data sets, which I constructed. The first dataset contains information on 5,580 municipal police chief appointments for 1,059 municipalities in Mexico for the 2000-2020 democratic period. The second data set contains information on 284 state police chief appointments for thirty-two states in Mexico for the same period.

I submitted and processed over 2,000 right-to-information requests on the professional background—civilian or military—and appointment dates of the last twenty municipal and state police chiefs to construct these data sets. In these petitions, I requested twenty police chiefs to maximize the probability of getting information on all appointments for the entire democratic period (2000-2020). I did not submit requests to three types of municipalities for local police chiefs. Municipalities in Mexico City because Mexico City only has state police. Municipalities in Tamaulipas because the state police took over municipal police in 2014. And municipalities governed by traditional law (*usos y costumbres*)

⁴While municipalities in Brazil are not allowed to have their own municipal police departments like in Mexico, many have created de facto municipal police forces known as Municipal Guards as a response to citizen demand for local public safety.

because policing works differently in these mostly indigenous localities. Also, mindful that not all states and municipalities would send the data requested, I completed extensive research based on newspaper articles to supplement the information received.

This dissertation also draws on survey data from two online surveys conducted in Brazil (n=2,003) and Mexico (n=2,017) in December 2021. These surveys were funded by a National Science Foundation Dissertation Development Research Improvement Grant (NSF DDRIG 1841128) and fielded by Netquest. The survey experiment and pre-analysis plan were pre-registered at EGAP/The Center for Open Society (<https://osf.io/4cd58>). The survey data sets include basic social and demographic information about the survey respondents. In addition, it contains information on respondents' attitudes and perceptions about security agencies, the military's participation in policing, contact with the police, and perceived insecurity. And it also includes responses to a survey experiment on police chief appointments.

1.3.4 Qualitative Data

Beyond the quantitative data, this dissertation draws on extensive qualitative information from more than 300 anonymous in-depth semi-structured interviews with academics, civil society members, civilian and former military police officers, police chiefs, state and municipal employees, and mayors. These interviews were completed in collaboration with Rodrigo Canales (Yale School of Management) for his research project titled "Building Effective, Resilient, and Trusted Police Organizations in Mexico."

Next to a team of researchers, I conducted these interviews during eighteen months of fieldwork in seven states in Mexico. In addition, I conducted supplementary interviews between August and November 2021 on Zoom to further probe my theoretical argument and proposed causal mechanisms regarding the political motives to appoint military chiefs. The interviews were completed in adherence to APSA’s “Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research.”

For each chapter, I also draw on secondary sources, newspaper articles, administrative records, and policy memos. I also triangulate across these sources to further understand how political and reputational concerns shape local security governance and how local police militarization affects the police’s internal functioning.

1.3.5 A Multi-Methods Approach

I rely on multivariate regressions, case studies, qualitative comparative analysis, three-stage content analysis, and survey experiments to evaluate my key theoretical propositions.

To evaluate how political motives influence the appointment of military members as police chiefs, I use repeated event history analysis—statistical models used to study the duration until an event. Furthermore, following the logic of nested analysis [Lieberman, 2005], I make use of a case study—Nuevo León state—to illustrate how political motives work in practice. I constructed this case study using information from twenty-three anonymous interviews with key political actors, as well as secondary sources. I selected Nuevo León because it is an extreme case of intrastate police militarization and thus could provide

insight into my theory and causal mechanisms [Gerring, 2008].

To examine if police militarization presents an opportunity for elected officials to signal competence in security governance and boost their reputation, I embedded a survey experiment in an online survey in Brazil and Mexico (n=4,020) in December 2021. The survey experiment consisted of a mock news article reporting on the appointment of a new local police chief in an unnamed municipality. I chose to use a mock news article—based on actual news reports—because it is the dominant channel through which individuals acquire information on police chiefs, including their credentials. The text of the article was relatively short. It remained constant except for the police chief’s professional background: career police officer (control), retired military member, or civilian. It also varied in terms of the context in which the appointment took place: at the start of a new mayoral administration (control)—i.e., when all mayors must appoint their police chief—or an increase in crime.

After reading the news article, I asked respondents about their perceptions of the newly appointed police chief, including how much they approved of the chief’s appointment and how much trust the new police chief inspired. I then asked respondents a series of questions on the mayor’s effectiveness and performance in public safety, policing, and corruption. Lastly, I also asked about the police’s trustworthiness and how secure respondents would feel living in the municipality they had just read about. By comparing responses between treatment conditions, I can determine the extent to which military chief appointments positively affect people’s views of politicians’ governing capabilities in policing and public safety.

Finally, to understand why some police destabilize when they recruit mili-

tary members and why others remain stable, I draw on 300 anonymous interviews and a comparative case analysis of seven police departments in Mexico. Following a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach [Ragin, 1987], I chose these seven research settings based on two criteria: 1) variation in contextual characteristics, and 2) variation in the presence of military members across ranks. Thus, these cases allowed me to link a comprehensive set of causally relevant conditions to my outcome of interest while exploring similarities and differences across comparable cases. I also rely on the Gioia methodology for qualitative analysis—or three-stage content analysis process—to explore the mechanisms behind stability and destabilization [Gioia et al., 2013].

1.4 Empirical Findings

This dissertation’s main findings center on two dimensions: what explains the appointment of military members as police chiefs and what are the consequences of integrating military members into police departments for police functioning.

1.4.1 What Explains the Appointment of Military Members as Police Chiefs?

Contrary to scholarly work that emphasizes the role of criminal violence and partisanship, I demonstrate theoretically and empirically that political motives and reputational concerns play a central role in political leaders’ decisions concerning local security governance and the militarization of local public safety.

Concerning political motives, my results provide evidence of the coerced and strategic alignment of security institutions. Mayors are more likely to appoint military chiefs when the national, state, and other local governments have militarized public safety. For example, the odds of appointing a military member increase up to 76% when the federal government deploys the military for policing operations, 131% when the state police chief is a military member, and 58% when at least one contiguous municipality had a military chief at the time of the appointment.

As for politician's reputational concerns, I find that military chief appointments provide politicians an opportunity to signal competence in security governance. Military chief appointments not only positively affect respondents' views of the mayor in policing and public safety. They also boost the mayor's credentials in the domain of corruption. For example, the appointment of a military chief causes a 2.5 percentage point increase in respondents' views of the mayor improving public safety, a 2.7-point increase in views on the mayor improving the police, and a 2.6-point increase in views on the mayor fighting corruption in his municipality in the pooled sample. However, once I disaggregate by country, I find that the reputational effects of military chief appointments are most clear among Mexican respondents. Although the effects are positive for Brazil, they fail to reach conventional statistical significance.

1.4.2 What Are the Consequences of Integrating Military Members Into Police Departments for Police Functioning?

I observe disruptions in the inner workings of the police—which I call *bureaucratic destabilization*—following military personnel recruitment in four out of the seven cases studied. Bureaucratic destabilization results from the combination of professional differences on the one hand and rank position on the other. The recruitment of military members affects the police’s functioning when military members are appointed as chiefs of civilian police departments. In contrast, their appointment as chiefs of militarized police departments or their recruitment as line officers by civilian chiefs does not impede the police’s effective functioning.

As to why this occurs, in the four destabilization cases, I observe military chiefs that sought to change the organization they joined to fit their professional background and professional identity, creating significant resentment among the civilian rank-and-file. The perceived treatment of civilian officers as second-class employees, the tension between obeying police protocol and executing the military chief’s orders, and the hopelessness of one day moving up the ranks took its toll on police officers and, in turn, destabilized the departments.

In contrast, the appointment of military chiefs to predominantly militarized police departments do not hinder a department’s ability to function effectively given the chief’s and troops’ shared ethos and mode of operation. Civilian-led departments that recruit former military as line officers, in turn, can override the police-military gap by using basic training and interactions with high-ranking civilian police officers to socialize military members into their new policing

identity.

1.5 Looking Ahead

This dissertation is divided into three stand-alone chapters. Chapter 2 turns to Mexican municipalities to theoretically and empirically explore the political motives of military chief appointments. Chapter 3 equally focuses on the drivers of local police militarization but examines an alternative motivation: politicians' desire to signal competence in security governance. Chapter 4 centers on the consequences of integrating military members into police departments by examining when and why their recruitment results in bureaucratic destabilization. Lastly, chapter 5 summarizes the dissertation's main findings and offers a reflection on future avenues of research.

CHAPTER 2

THE SILENT MILITARIZATION: EXPLAINING THE LOGIC OF MILITARY MEMBERS' APPOINTMENT AS POLICE CHIEFS

The militarization of policing is a growing international trend [De Bruin, 2021]. Images of soldiers patrolling urban neighborhoods in countries like Brazil and Honduras and of police wearing military-style gear and carrying assault rifles in countries as diverse as the United States and Nigeria are not isolated events—they have become the norm. This trend is worrisome. Scholars have overall shown that police militarization not only fails to reduce local crime and enhance officer safety but also that increases in human rights violations and the undermining of citizen security tend to follow [Blair and Weintraub, 2021, Flores-Macías, 2018, Gunderson et al., 2021, Magaloni and Rodriguez, 2020, Mummolo, 2018]. If this policy does more harm than good, what explains the militarization of public safety?

In this chapter, I address this question by examining an often neglected but highly consequential type of police militarization: the appointment of military members as police chiefs. Focusing on federal countries, I argue that politicians appoint military members as police chiefs when they face *coercive pressures* and *strategic incentives* to align with the federal government's security strategy. To test my argument, I turn to Mexico for two reasons. First, Mexico is a federally organized country where the federal, state, and municipal governments share jurisdiction over public safety. Second, this is a country where policing has been militarized, primarily since 2006.

The one drawback with Mexico is that police chief appointments have never been systematically documented, nor does the government make this informa-

tion publicly available. Therefore, I submitted and processed over 2,000 right-to-information requests to municipal governments to build a unique and novel data set on police chief appointments. I also supplemented the information received with extensive research in newspaper articles. As a result, I gathered data on 5,580 police chief appointments in 1,059 municipalities for the 2000-2020 democratic period. Out of the 5,580 police chiefs in my sample, 841 (15.1%) were military members.

Based on repeated event history analysis, I find strong evidence for security institutions' coerced and strategic alignment. The odds of appointing a military chief¹ increase up to 76% when the federal government deploys the military for policing operations, 131% when the state police chief is a military member., and 58% when at least one contiguous municipality had a military chief at the time of the appointment. Moreover, these results hold when controlling for conventional partisanship and structural violence explanations of punitive crime control.

Additionally, to illustrate how coercive pressures and strategic incentives work, I complement the statistical analysis with an in-depth discussion of Nuevo León state. Based on twenty-three anonymous interviews with key political actors and secondary sources, I trace how the federal government's decision to deploy military troops in Nuevo León in 2008 generated pressures and incentives to appoint military chiefs across the state for the next decade.

This study's primary contributions are twofold. First, by showing how political motives, more so than partisanship and violence, are the key drivers of the militarization of police leaders, this study has broad implications for our under-

¹Throughout this paper I will use the term "military chief" as shorthand for a police chief who is a military member.

standing of policing and public safety. Military chiefs' coerced and strategic appointment underscores that policing, far from being ruled by technical criteria, is a profoundly political arena. Politicians are quick to prioritize politically expedient solutions—like appointing military chiefs—to pervasive problems like crime and police corruption, without considering how these temporary solutions might come at considerable human and institutional costs.

Second, the findings have crucial policy implications for the development of peaceful democracies. On the one hand, without politicians' commitment to long-term police reform efforts, police are bound to remain weak, corrupt, and ineffective institutions. And without effective and trusted police, crime and violence are bound to persist. On the other hand, handing over the leadership of police forces to military personnel poses considerable risks for liberal democracy in Latin America. The appointment of military chiefs normalizes military dominance in public safety. It sends the message that civilians cannot solve societal problems, potentially reopening the door for military control over the provision of other public services.

2.1 The Militarization of Law Enforcement

Despite widely defining the militarization of law enforcement as the process through which government agencies tasked with providing public safety draw from and pattern themselves around the military model [Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c], scholars have narrowly studied militarization as transpiring through one of two forms. One strand of research has looked at the adoption of military weapons and equipment by police forces and the creation of specialized units in the US [Kraska, 2007]. This scholarly work has traced how,

overall, there is little evidence for the benefits of police militarization. Instead, heavy-handed police tactics have been linked to failures to reduce local crime or enhance officer safety [Gunderson et al., 2021, Mummolo, 2018].

The second strand of research has looked at the constabularization of the armed forces in Latin America—i.e., soldiers’ participation in domestic policing (e.g., [Blair and Weintraub, 2021, Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c]). Like police militarization in the US, scholars have also documented that negative consequences follow the military’s deployment for policing operations. Constabularization has been associated with undermining the rule of law, increased levels of violence, human rights abuses, and obstacles to police reform [Blair and Weintraub, 2021, Flores-Macías, 2018, Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c, Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021a, Magaloni and Rodriguez, 2020].

While this research has constituted a crucial first step in documenting the global trend in police militarization, two gaps remain. First, scholars have focused primarily on the consequences of militarization without systematically examining its drivers. Although work by [Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c] provides a valuable point of departure by discussing the role of crime, police incompetence and corruption, and the US anti-drug policy, these factors are better suited to explain why federal governments constabularize militaries. However, they are less useful to explain subnational militarization patterns where corruption and incompetence have plagued police forces for years, yet not all local authorities militarize public safety.

Second, scholars have also neglected to study a silent but highly consequential type of police militarization: the appointment of military members as police chiefs. Except for [Go, 2020]’s study on imperial feedback across police in the

US and [Zaverucha, 2000]’s account of government offices’ occupation by the Brazilian army, there is little evidence on this form of police militarization.²

One possibility for why scholars have often overlooked this type of militarization is that military chief appointments might seem unlikely at first. The prevalent belief in the literature [Bayley, 2001], and even in practice, is that “*blue [police] and green [soldiers] do not go together.*”³ However, just as military chief appointments were typical at the beginning of the 20th century in cities like Berkeley, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and Philadelphia, they have also become a feature of Latin America’s re-militarization of public safety over the last several decades.

Starting in the 1990s, Brazilian governors began appointing military members as security secretaries in various states, including Rio de Janeiro [Zaverucha, 2000]. Additionally, by 2014, 338 Brazilian mayors had appointed former military and former military police as *Guardas Municipais* chiefs [Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2014]. In El Salvador, President Mauricio Funes (2009—2014) named a military member as the National Civil Police director [Reuters, 2012]. And in Mexico, military members have been chiefs in some of the largest cities, including Tijuana and Juárez [Associated Press, 2011, *Notimex*, 2011].

The relative frequency with which politicians appoint military chiefs requires a deeper understanding of this type of police militarization. This endeavor is even more critical if we consider that police chiefs significantly impact people’s lives through the influence that their philosophy, training, and

²Some research on police reform addressed the presence of military chiefs in the 20th century (e.g., [Kalmanowiecki, 2000]). However, these scholars only do so to provide city-rich descriptions.

³Personal interview with a police officer (2018).

leadership have on police behavior [Rainguet and Dodge, 2001, Wu, 2021]. Military chief appointments raise even higher stakes in weak institutional contexts as, like other forms of police militarization, they neither guarantee better policing nor are risk-free. Military chiefs from Kenya to Brazil have been linked to grave human rights violations [Folha de Sao Paulo, 1997, Wadhams, 2009]. Violence in states like Rio de Janeiro has remained high despite having multiple military chiefs [Brooks, 1995]. And entire cities like Querétaro (in Mexico) have spent days without police presence due to strikes over civilian officers' discontent with their military commanders [Durán Peñaloza, 2016].

If the benefits are questionable and the risks potentially high, what explains the appointment of military members as local police chiefs?

2.2 A Theory on Militarized Alignment

Understanding military chief appointments require that we first recognize that law enforcement agencies are also political institutions where politics play a key role in all aspects of policing: from how communities are policed to instances of resistance to police reform [Flom, 2020, González, 2020]. Although this understanding applies to all law enforcement agencies, I will focus on federal countries where overlapping security jurisdictions exacerbate the politics in policing for the rest of this paper.

Unlike unitary countries where national police forces operate locally under central control, police power in federal countries is exercised by federal, state, and local governments with overlapping security jurisdictions.⁴ Whereas fed-

⁴My description of overlapping security jurisdictions incorporates local governments, al-

eralism enthusiasts defend this model by saying that it keeps police close to their communities, overlapping security jurisdiction makes crime prevention more challenging compared to centralized policing structures for two reasons [Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015]. First, it creates ambiguity regarding responsibility and authority over public safety and the enforcement of the law. Second, it creates undesirable conflict between the federal, state, and local governments, who must find a way to work together. As a former federal employee explained during an interview, in many instances, *“the municipality doesn’t want to follow the state, the state doesn’t want to follow the federation, and the federation doesn’t want to follow either of them. And no one trusts each other.”*⁵


As a result, federal, state, and local governments face the need to reduce conflict and facilitate inter-jurisdictional coordination by mimicking a centralized police structure. That is, getting state and local governments to align with the federal government’s security strategy. The federal government cannot force state and local governments to align with their preferred security strategy due to constitutional limitations on their authority. Nor is it likely to do so because its security efforts are severely curtailed without the cooperation from local officials who hold the monopoly over local knowledge [Sabet, 2012, p.190]. It can, however, coercively pressure state and local governments to align through, for example, persuasion and political strong-arming. It can also do so by attaching strings on the delivery of resources and withholding federal assistance.

Yet, the federal government is not the only actor that stands to gain from alignment. Overlapping security jurisdictions in combination with the mobility of crime makes a state and local government’s security performance contin-

though it is applicable to countries where police power is distributed between state and federal governments.

⁵Personal interview with a former federal employee (2021).

Figure 2.1: A theoretical model of alignment



gent on the performance and cooperation of others [Richman and Seo, 2021]. Therefore, state and local governments might strategically align with the federal government to facilitate inter-jurisdictional coordination, secure resources, and even deflect blame for failing to improve public safety at the local level.⁶

Despite there being many federal security strategies, in what follows I focus on one of the most popular and widespread strategies pursued in Latin America since democratization: the deployment of the military for domestic policing. Even though scholarly work has documented that this federal security strategy has been highly consequential in the region, we have yet to understand how it has changed policing at the local level in federal countries.

Based on my alignment theoretical model (depicted in figure 2.1), I argue that the introduction of the military into the public safety arena should lead to the militarization of local policing. An outcome which is even more likely if we also consider that the military's participation in policing 1) exacerbates

⁶This logic is like [Flom and Post, 2016]'s, who discuss blame avoidance in public security in Buenos Aires.

conflicts of overlapping security jurisdictions, 2) increases ambiguity regarding which security institution leads and which follows, and 3) makes coordination more challenging because of the professional differences in missions, mode of operation, and role conceptions between the military and police.

Concerning their missions, police forces have a protect and prevent orientation. Instead, the military's focus is to overwhelm and pacify enemies [Campbell and Campbell, 2010]. Regarding mode of operation, whereas discretion and judgment are central aspects of policing, military personnel operate within a rigid hierarchical organizational structure [Campbell and Campbell, 2010]. Lastly, the police and military also differ in the expectations of their role vis-à-vis the other. Soldiers often see their responsibility to the public as superior: *"The General, the soldier, sees the police officer as less, as second-class. The General comes and wants officers to kneel before him."*⁷ And, just as soldiers have particular ideas about their role, so do civilian officers. High-ranking police officers interviewed indeed valued the discipline of the military. They nonetheless also complained that, in the words of a civilian chief, *"they [soldiers] know nothing about policing."*⁸

Although there are multiple means that militarized alignment might take place, like acquiring military equipment or implementing military training, one of the least costly and most expedient is to appoint military members as police chiefs.⁹ Doing so is advantageous for the federal government for two reasons. First, it facilitates coordination given that, as retired military members I interviewed described, *"the truth is that soldiers are used to working with other*

⁷Personal interview with a police officer (2018).

⁸Personal interview with a police officer (2019).

⁹Compared to militarization through training and equipment, alignment through the appointment of military chiefs is quick and does not require additional monetary resources.

soldiers” and “*get frustrated with civilians.*”¹⁰ And second, by replicating the military’s chain of command sub-nationally, the recruitment of military members into police forces allows the military to operate as a central police authority.

Coercive pressures aside, local authorities might also find the appointment of military chiefs beneficial when others have adopted this strategy. Military chiefs can open communication channels with the federal government and military. They can facilitate coordination with other police agencies led by military chiefs. Plus, these appointments allow local officials to blame the federal government for future unpopular security outcomes if these materialize.

To summarize my theory on what explains the appointment of military members as local police chiefs: while I expect that some local authorities will cave to the federal government’s coercive pressures to appoint military chiefs to facilitate inter-jurisdictional coordination via alignment, others will do so strategically when they see these appointments as politically advantageous.

2.3 Case Selection and Data Collection

Testing this theory requires selecting a country where the federal, state, and local governments share jurisdiction over public safety and where elected officials have militarized policing. Mexico meets both requirements.

Like other federal countries such as the US and Brazil, law enforcement services in Mexico are shared between the federal, state, and municipal police. Its public security apparatus comprises the National Guard (previously known as

¹⁰Personal interview with a police officer (2018).

the Federal Police) and the armed forces at the national level, thirty-two state police, and over 1,800 municipal police. Security institutions have significant operational autonomy, and mayors, governors, and the president have the right to appoint and remove top officials during their term in office. Security institutions are also considerably interdependent. The federal government offers financial assistance to municipal police through targeted subsidies.¹¹ Many state police provide services to municipalities, and federal and state police presence is standard nationwide.

It has also become common to see soldiers and police conducting joint patrols in the last two decades. Since president Felipe Calderón's (2006-2012) decision to place the armed forces as heads of the federal government's crime-fighting operations, the military has played an active role in local policing. Calderón's decision to militarize policing came as Mexico experienced increased violent crime related to drug-trafficking organizations. The United States' demand for illegal drugs and supply of weapons across the border, state crackdowns in Colombia, and political alternation intensified drug-related violence [Dube et al., 2013, Trejo and Ley, 2020]. Facing increasingly powerful criminal organizations, in December 2006, Calderón declared an all-out war against crime. He first sent soldiers to his home state of Michoacán and eventually to twenty-two of the thirty-two Mexican states.

Despite Calderon's right-of-center party losing power in 2012, the federal government's militarized security strategy continued under his successors, Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-present). Peña Nieto increased the number of soldiers on the streets [Trejo and

¹¹The federal government awards two subsidies to address public safety matters: FASP and FORTASEG.

Ley, 2020]. López Obrador deepened the nature of public safety militarization by dismantling the Federal Police and creating the National Guard in its place. This new security force comprises soldiers and former police who de facto operate under the military [Meyer, 2020].

2.3.1 Data Collection

While Mexico provides an ideal laboratory to study military chief appointments, effectively answering my research question requires having fine-grained data on police chiefs. Unfortunately, police chief appointments have never been systematically documented. Nor have governments made information on police chiefs publicly available. Therefore, I submitted and processed over 2,000 right-to-information requests on the professional background—civilian or military—and appointment dates of the last twenty municipal police chiefs for almost all municipalities in Mexico. In these petitions, I requested twenty police chiefs to maximize the probability of getting information on all appointments for the entire democratic period (2000-2020).¹²

I did not submit requests to three types of municipalities. Municipalities in Mexico City because Mexico City only has state police. Municipalities in Tamaulipas because the state police took over municipal police in 2014. And municipalities governed by traditional law (*usos y costumbres*) because policing works differently in these mostly indigenous localities. Also, mindful that not all municipalities would send the data requested, I completed extensive research based on newspaper articles to supplement the information received.

¹²My prior was that police chiefs last two years in their position.

I gathered information on 5,580 appointments in 1,059 municipalities for the 2000-2020 democratic period. Of the 1,059 municipalities that provided data on their police chiefs, 17% only did so for the current administration's chief, explaining that past administrations deleted their information when leaving office, 42% of municipalities provided between two and five appointments, and 41% provided six or more.

Ideally, I would have data on police chief appointments for all municipalities for the entire period. But, unfortunately, for many municipalities, no such data exists. Nevertheless, though the data on police chief appointments is incomplete, I am confident in its usefulness for two reasons. First, the municipalities I have information on police chief appointments are home to 84% of the Mexican population and 88% of municipal police officers.¹³ Second, to my knowledge, this is the most comprehensive data set on police chiefs.

However, since the missing data may not be missing at random, I rely on a logistic regression where the dependent variable is inclusion in my subsample. I find that the municipalities in my sample are more populated and more economically developed—see the appendix. I expected this to be the case given that 1) responding to a right-to-information request requires infrastructure (i.e., a computer and internet), and 2) newspapers do not cover appointments in more rural areas. Moreover, for historical data availability reasons, my sample also has fewer observations for the 2000-2005 period than the 2005-2020 period.¹⁴

Therefore, my findings should be interpreted with the following two precautions. First, the relationships detected apply to most, but not all, cities in

¹³These statistics exclude Mexico City, Tamaulipas, and municipalities governed by traditional law.

¹⁴Further, municipalities are only required by law to store information for five years.

Mexico. Specifically, they apply to midrange to large cities, where most Mexicans live.¹⁵ Second, these explanations are less explicative for appointments during Mexico's first years as a democracy.

2.3.2 Military Chiefs

During the 2000-2020 period, 841 out of 5,580 (15.1%) individuals appointed as police chiefs in my sample were military members. Based on descriptive statistics, several patterns stand out. First, there is substantial spatial variation in military chief appointments—see figure 2.2. For example, the state of Nuevo León had the highest percentage of military chiefs in the period (49%), followed by Baja California Sur (37%). In comparison, the southern states of Campeche and Yucatán had the lowest (3% and 2% respectively). Second, as figure 2.3 shows, military chief appointments accelerated after Calderón launched his militarized security strategy in December 2006.


The spatial and temporal patterns point to the possibility of security institutions' coerced and strategic alignment. However, testing this theory requires further analysis.

2.4 Empirical Approach

A common and serious concern in policy adoption studies is that the spread of policies can be driven not by interdependencies among actors—as I expect with coercive pressures and strategic incentives—but internal determinants and

¹⁵75% of municipalities in my sample have a population above 12,284.


Figure 2.2: Percentage of local military chiefs by state



Note: Percentages calculated based on chief appointments in the sample.

common contextual factors [Franzese Jr and Hays, 2008]. Therefore, to lessen concerns of spuriousness, I adopt a mixed-methods approach. In the first step, I follow standard policy adoption models to explain military chief appointments and use different indicators to ensure that my results are not measurement or model-dependent. In the second step, I explore how coercive pressures and strategic incentives work in practice using the case of Nuevo León state.

Figure 2.3: Local military chief appointments over time



Note: Percentages calculated based on chief appointments in the sample.

2.4.1 Dependent Variable

Since my outcome of interest is whether a mayor appoints a military chief, I constructed a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for every month-year that a mayor appoints a military chief and 0 for every month-year they appoint a civilian—see table 2.1.¹⁶

The structure of my dependent variable and the nature of appointments allow me to use repeated event history analysis—statistical models used to study the duration until an event—to predict the odds that a mayor appoints a military chief given previous appointments.

¹⁶In this chapter, I understand “civilian” as non-military chiefs, including both career police officers and individuals without policing experience.

The data are set up as follows: for each municipality, there is one observation per event. The first observation covers the period from the time of entry to the study to the first appointment. The second observation covers the time from the first appointment to the second appointment, and so on until the last chief appointment for that municipality in the data set.

2.4.2 Explanatory Variables

My theory on militarized alignment holds that mayors will appoint military chiefs when they face coercive pressures and strategic incentives to align with the federal government's militarized security strategy. Considering that coercive pressures and strategic incentives to align local security institutions should be present when 1) there are clear overlapping security jurisdictions between the military and police, 2) the state government has already militarized policing, and 3) surrounding municipalities have appointed military chiefs, I proxy coercive pressures and strategic incentives by constructing three variables.

Table 2.1: Example of appointment observation

Municipality	State	Mayor	Chief appt. date	Military chief
Pesquería	Nuevo León	José Gloria López	November 2012	0
Pesquería	Nuevo León	José Gloria López	April 2013	1
Pesquería	Nuevo León	José Gloria López	February 2015	0
Pesquería	Nuevo León	José Gloria López	July 2015	0
Pesquería	Nuevo León	Miguel Ángel Lozano Munguía	November 2015	1
Pesquería	Nuevo León	Miguel Ángel Lozano Munguía	July 2016	1
Pesquería	Nuevo León	Miguel Ángel Lozano Munguía	November 2018	1
Pesquería	Nuevo León	Miguel Ángel Lozano Munguía	July 2019	0

The first variable is “military presence,” a categorical variable that takes one of four values depending on the type of military presence in the municipality being examined. This variable incorporates two pieces of information: whether the military patrolled the municipality and whether the municipality belongs to a state with a joint operation. Military patrols are measured using geo-located information on confrontations between soldiers and criminal organizations obtained through two right-to-information requests to the Ministry of Defense (SEDENA). Joint operations are state-wide police-military operations operated by the federal government with the permission of state officials. The federal government formalizes these operations by signing a bilateral agreement where security agencies agree to cooperate in public safety. These operations have been a pillar of the Mexican government’s strategy against organized crime since 2007.

Rather than including binary variables for joint operations or military patrols separately, I created the categorical variable “military presence,” which takes the value of 0 when there was no military presence in the municipality the year before (baseline), 1 if the municipality belongs to a state with a bilateral agreement but had no military patrols, 2 if the municipality belongs to a state without an agreement and had military patrols (that is, had independent patrols), and 3 if the municipality belongs to a state with an agreement and had military patrols (had centralized patrols).¹⁷ This coding responds to two reasons. First, compared to a municipality with no military presence, belonging to a state with a joint operation and military patrols should independently increase the likelihood that a mayor appoints a military chief because each raises different stakes for cooperation. Second, the possibility of appointing a military

¹⁷The results remain the same if I include military patrols and joint operations independently, see the appendix.

chief should be highest when both co-occur because of the jurisdictional overlap. Also, because together, they send the strongest signal to local politicians that security assistance is contingent on following the federal and state's directives, therefore increasing the pressures and incentives to align with the federal government's militarized security strategy.

The second variable is "state military chief," which equals 1 for every appointment that occurs while the state police chief is a military member and 0 for every appointment while the state police chief is a civilian. This variable accounts for alignment pressures from the state to the municipal level, and the incentives to align with the state government to maintain communication, procure assistance, and redirect blame on the governor.

The third variable is "at least one contiguous municipality with a military chief" designed to capture horizontal pressures and incentives to align with nearby law enforcement agencies who depend on each other for crime control. To create this variable, I identify all municipalities contiguous to the municipality being examined and see if at least one had a military chief during a new chief's appointment in the municipality being examined. As a robustness check, I also created two variables. First is the "proportion of the population in the state with a local military chief." I identify all the municipalities with a military chief when an appointment takes place, sum up the population of those municipalities, and divide by the state's overall population. The other is "nearest big municipality with a military chief." For every police chief appointment, I see if the nearest urban municipality with a population above 100,000 people had a military chief. Results using these variables are available in the appendix.

I also add municipality-level and time controls to all models to account for

alternative explanations offered by the crime-control literature and common shocks across municipalities. Although scholarly work on crime control has not put forward a theory on the drivers of military chief appointments, scholars have offered two explanations for the adoption of heavy-handed policing tactics: structural violence and partisanship.

The structural violence explanation sees enforcement as a direct and indirect response to crime. As [Karn, 2013] discusses, governments are increasingly concerned with managing risks to address criminality. This concern has triggered aggressive enforcement approaches in high-crime areas [Flores-Macías, 2018, Lessing, 2017, Osorio, 2015]. Scholars have also shown that criminal violence promotes more tough-on-crime practices through citizen demand. In contexts where crime is a widespread problem, victimization and fear of crime increase support for punitive forms of crime control [Bateson, 2012]. These attitudes and perceptions, in turn, become political incentives for elected officials, inviting them to advocate for more punitive measures to win votes [Chevigny, 2003].

The partisanship explanation sees ideology and partisan affiliation as key drivers of punitive security policies. The most basic argument is that conservative parties are more likely to implement tough-on-crime policies based on ideological principles [Holland, 2013]. In addition, scholars have also traced how co-partisanship plays a central role in local-level enforcement strategies. [Dell, 2015], for example, describes that when federal governments pursue heavy-handed policing strategies, crackdowns are more frequent in municipalities where the mayor is from the president's same party. Qualitative evidence indicates that this occurs because mayors from different parties from the pres-

ident are less motivated to implement policies dictated from above [Shirk and Wallman, 2015].

To account for structural violence, I created two variables. The first variable is the occurrence of a “turf war” in the year before the appointment takes place to get at significant and rapid changes in violence resulting from the presence of organized crime. Following [Magaloni et al., 2021], I calculate turf wars as yearly increases in homicide rates of males 15 to 44 years old of more than three standard deviations relative to their historical mean. The second variable is the municipality’s homicide rate per 100,000 people in the year before the appointment. I include this variable to get at levels of violence and proxy citizen demand for more punitive forms of crime control. To account for the partisanship explanations, I have a dummy for right-leaning mayors. Also, given the possibility that co-partisanship plays a central role in military chief appointments, I add two variables: if the mayor belongs to the same party as the president and if the mayor belongs to the same party as the governor.

The models also include additional economic, demographic, and electoral controls commonly present in policy adoption studies. These are population size and economic development since higher stakes might be involved in police chief appointments in more populated and wealthy municipalities. I also add three electoral variables to account for the possibility that military chief appointments might be a means to gain political backing for newly elected mayors. These are if the elected mayor is from a different party than the past mayor, the difference in vote share between the first and second-place candidates, and if the appointment took place in the same month the mayor took office. And I also add a dummy variable for whether the municipality being examined be-

longs to a metropolitan area to account for other sources of spatial clustering. Lastly, I also include year fixed effects to control for time shocks.

2.4.3 Results

To test my hypotheses, I use the conditional model of Prentice, Williams, and Peterson (1981) (hereafter PWP).¹⁸ PWP is one of several variance-correction models that “estimates a standard Cox model and adjust the variance-covariance matrix to account for the individual- or group-specific effects that remain” (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002). This model is ideal because police chief appointments are sequential. With PWP, a municipality is not at risk of a later appointment until all prior appointments occur—thus, the analysis stratifies estimates by appointment rank. I estimate PWP using elapsed time (time from the municipality’s entry into the observation set) because I assume that appointments have a carryover effect over the entire period under study. However, in the appendix, I include estimations using gap-time (duration since the previous appointment) to ensure that results are not dependent on how the risk set is defined.

All models estimate robust standard errors clustered by municipality to account for repeated appointments within a municipality. My initial results focus on coerced and strategic alignment without controls, and I then examine how they collectively explain the appointment of military chiefs accounting for alternative explanations and controls. I use as many municipalities and appointments as I have data for both the dependent and independent variables in all models.¹⁹

¹⁸The appendix also includes results using logit to show that results are not model-dependent.

¹⁹Since municipalities enter the observation set during a police chief appointment, the first appointment for each municipality is automatically dropped because the time between entering

Table 2.2: Determinants of military chief appointments

	<i>Dependent variable: Military chief appointment</i>			
	Model 1 Coerced and strategic alignment	Model 2 + Violence	Model 3 + Partisanship	Model 4 + All controls,
Military presence: (1) Bilateral federal-state agreement	0.36*** (0.12)	0.41*** (0.13)	0.34*** (0.12)	0.43*** (0.12)
Military presence: (2) Independent military patrols	0.74*** (0.35)	0.61** (0.28)	0.72** (0.28)	0.46* (0.25)
Military presence: (3) Centralized military patrols	0.72*** (0.20)	0.70*** (0.20)	0.71*** (0.20)	0.57*** (0.20)
State military chief At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.76*** (0.10)	0.78*** (0.10)	0.76*** (0.10)	0.84*** (0.10)
	0.49*** (0.10)	0.48*** (0.10)	0.49*** (0.10)	0.45*** (0.10)
<i>Controls</i>				
Turf war		0.54*** (0.13)		0.38*** (0.13)
Homicide rate per 100,000 people		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
Right-leaning mayor			-0.04 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)
Copartisan with the president			-0.03 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
Copartisan with the governor			-0.07 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
Population (x 10,000)				0.00 (0.00)
Economic development				0.04*** (0.01)
Belongs to a metropolitan area				0.04 (0.14)
Change party				0.17* (0.10)
Vote Margin				0.01 (0.00)
Took office				-0.95*** (0.09)
Obs.	3,575	3,573	3,575	3,573

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. All models are stratified by appointment order and include yearly dummy variables not shown here due to space considerations. *p<0.1 **p<.05***p<.01

Table 2.2 presents the coefficients of the PWP model using elapsed time. For interpretability, I compute hazard ratios by exponentiating the parameter estimates. For example, for “bilateral agreement” in model 1, $\exp(0.36) = 1.43$, which means that the odds of appointing a military chief increase by 43% when the municipality belongs to a state with a bilateral agreement to conduct joint military-police operations.

As seen in columns 1-4 of table 2.2, support for the coerced and strategic alignment of security institutions comes from the “military presence,” “state military chief,” and “at least one contiguous municipality with a military chief” variables. The coefficients on these variables are positive and significant, indicating that, as expected with alignment, a mayor is more likely to appoint a military chief when the federal, state, and other local governments have adopted a militarized security strategy.

Based on model 4,²⁰ compared to the no military presence baseline group, belonging to a state with a bilateral agreement increases the odds of appointing a military chief by 54% and 76% when, in addition to the bilateral agreement, the military participated in policing in the municipality. Independent military patrols (outside of a state-wide agreement) are also positively related to military chief appointments. However, the coefficient is significant at the 90% level suggesting that military patrols on their own are not as strongly conducive to the alignment of security institutions. The key motivator for alignment seems to be the formality of the bilateral agreement. The agreement sends the clearest signal about the federal and state governments’ priorities in public safety, likely nudging municipalities to follow. Mayors, in turn, likely see the appointment of

and appointment is zero.

²⁰Results across models are similar, thus I will focus on model 4 as it includes all controls.

a military chief as the only means to accrue state and federal police and military presence under this scenario.

Regarding state-level militarization, the odds of a mayor appointing a military chief are 131% greater when the state police chief is a military member than a civilian state chief. Substantively, the effect size is large, speaking to the degree of interdependence and need for coordination between state and municipal police. These results provide suggestive evidence that state governments are inclined to work with local police that resembles their own to facilitate a more centralized approach to policing. They also suggest that municipal governments find alignment with the state's security strategy politically advantageous.

Lastly, having at least one contiguous municipality with a military chief also increases the odds of a military chief appointment by 58%. This result suggests that mayors face horizontal pressures and incentives to align with nearby municipalities to reap the benefits and avoid the political costs of failing to militarize when others have done so. As seen in the appendix, these results replicate if I use "nearest big municipality with a military chief" or "proportion of the population in the state with a local military chief" instead.

To illustrate the weight of coercive pressures and strategic incentives for the odds of naming a military chief, I calculated the survival curves for civilian chiefs when 1) the state chief is a military member, 2) there are centralized military patrols in the municipality, and 3) at least one contiguous municipality has a military chief, and I compare these to the baseline survival curve.²¹ Curves

²¹The baseline sets all variables equal to zero except for two variables which are set to their mean: population and vote difference. I also include the mean year effect instead of using the baseline year.


are calculated for each stratum because baseline hazards are different per rank in PWP—to consider the order of appointments.

Figure 2.4 presents the results for the first four strata. The weight of coercion and strategic incentives is present across repeated appointments—irrespective of whether they are the first, second, third, or fourth chief appointed. Local civilian chiefs are consistently less likely to survive when the federal, state, and other local governments have militarized public safety.

Finally, the controls essentially behave as expected and provide some interesting insights into the dynamics of military chief appointments. As predicted by the crime-control literature, rapid and significant changes in criminal violence—captured in the turf wars variable—increase the odds that a mayor appoints a military chief by 46%. However, I find no significant effects for homicide levels, and, as included in the appendix, this pattern holds using alternative measurements of homicide. These contrasting results reveal that 1) mayors respond to changes and not levels of violence when deciding whether to appoint a military chief, and 2) turf wars likely trigger military chief appointments due to a shared belief that only military officers can confront organized crime.

Interestingly and importantly, I find no support for the partisanship explanations. Contrary to conventional wisdom, conservative mayors are not more likely to appoint military chiefs, nor are copartisan mayors. This result has important implications as it speaks to the nature of militarized policing in Latin America. In the region, both left- and right-of-center governments have militarized law enforcement. Additionally, copartisan mayors are equally likely to appoint a military chief vis-a-vis mayors from a different party.

Figure 2.4: Baseline versus coercive pressures and strategic incentives survival curves



Note: This figure plots the baseline versus coercive pressures and strategic incentives survival curves per strata. The strata reference the order of appointments. The first stratum, for example, comprises the first police chiefs appointed after a municipality enters the data set. The second stratum includes police chief appointments occurring after the first appointment in that same municipality. Time differs across strata because the first strata cover up to one electoral cycle, the second up to two electoral cycles, and so on, given that I use elapsed time.

The odds of naming a military chief also increase with economic welfare. Mayors from wealthier municipalities are at a higher risk of appointing a military chief, possibly due to the higher political stakes of bad security outcomes for their careers and the prestige of being appointed chief. Military members might see these positions on par with their military rank. Lastly, the negative and significant coefficient of “took office” is opposite to what I expected. I anticipated that the odds of appointing a military chief should be higher at the start

of a mayor's term, given that this is an issue that candidates could campaign on and then deliver on quickly. However, my results indicate the opposite. The odds of naming a military chief are 61% lower at the start of an administration, possibly speaking to mayors relying on military chief appointments as quick fixes during their time in office, perhaps after perceiving civilian chiefs failed at delivering positive crime statistics.

2.5 The Case of Nuevo León

Whereas this evidence suggests that coerced and strategic alignment is taking place, concerns might remain regarding the true interdependence of appointments. The models also say little about micro-level dynamics, which is important because my argument is ultimately about political actors and what motivates their behavior. Therefore, I turn to Nuevo León to illustrate how coerced and strategic alignment works based on twenty-three in-depth anonymous interviews with key political actors and secondary sources.²² I chose Nuevo León because it is an extreme case of intrastate police militarization (see figure 2.2) and thus provides insight into my hypotheses and mechanisms [Gerring, 2008].

The state of Nuevo León is in the northeast of Mexico and borders the states of Tamaulipas, Coahuila, and San Luis Potosí. It also shares a border with the US. Nuevo León is one of the most economically developed and industrialized Mexican states. It has the second-highest GDP per capita and is home to some of the wealthiest and most populated municipalities.

²²Further detail on the interviews is included in the appendix. All participants were guaranteed confidentiality therefore I do not specify the participant's name nor rank to safeguard their identity.

Though crime levels in Nuevo León were considerably low, the Calderón administration grew anxious that criminal violence was spiraling out of control in other states like Chihuahua. As a response, the federal government preventively sent 1,122 soldiers to the state on January 1st, 2008 under Joint Operation Tamaulipas-Nuevo León [Proceso, 2008]. SEDENA stationed soldiers in the Seventh Military Zone—part of the Fourth Military Region—commanded by Brigade General Cuauhtémoc Antúnez Pérez.²³ From the Seventh Military Zone, soldiers joined police in staffing checkpoints and patrolling neighborhoods.

By September 2010, governor Rodrigo Medina (2009—2015) became increasingly concerned that violence was not subsiding. Homicides tripled between 2009 and 2010, and confrontations between the Sinaloa and Golfo cartels and the cartels and the federal forces caused many to flee the state [Dudley, 2012]. Facing increasing pressure from the federal government and business groups, Medina “created a plan to address the state’s insecurity levels called *Alliance for Security*.”²⁴ The plan encompassed thirteen initiatives, including renewing the state’s bilateral agreement—signed on January 1st, 2011. Once more, 3,567 soldiers arrived in Nuevo León to lead the state’s crime-fighting operations under the command of Brigade General Alfredo Flores Gómez.

Contrary to Chihuahua state, where the increase in criminal violence was not followed by the widespread appointment of military chiefs,²⁵ in Nuevo León, “in that time, one could say that the army took control of the state.”²⁶ As summarized in figure 2.5, military appointments to state and municipal institutions increased


²³Military ranks used throughout the paper correspond to the Mexican star system.

²⁴Personal interview with a businessman (2018).

²⁵Out of 208 local chiefs in my sample, only twelve were military members.

²⁶Personal interview with a police officer (2018).

Figure 2.5: Nuevo León’s militarization timeline



Note: Nuevo León has fifty-one municipalities. The “missing” includes all municipalities for which I have no information on who was the police chief in that month-year. The timeline includes the start dates of Joint Operation Tamaulipas-Nuevo León and the appointment dates for all state military chiefs.

considerably after renewing the bilateral agreement. In less than a year, “most police chiefs were former military, mayoral meetings were held in the [Seventh] military [zone] base, and the General [the Ministry of Defense’s commander] directed the [security] meetings.”²⁷

Starting at the state level, Medina appointed Brigade General Jaime Castañeda Bravo as Secretary of Security in February 2011, just one month after the start of Joint Operation Tamaulipas-Nuevo León. Before Castañeda, only civilians had held this position since the Secretariat’s creation in 2003.

²⁷Personal interview with a police officer (2018).

Then came Division General Javier del Real Magallanes, named Nuevo León's Secretary of Security in March 2012. Magallanes' appointment is one of the clearest examples of blurring lines between the military and the police resulting from the military's participation in policing. Magallanes had been the Fourth Military Region commander when the federal government launched Joint Operation Tamaulipas-Nuevo León in 2008 [Granados Chapa, 2008]. As Nuevo León's Secretary of Security, he essentially fulfilled the same commanding role, though from the civilian's side. The appointment of Magallanes gave SEDENA numerous advantages. The military could operate as a de facto central police force—thus reducing conflicts of overlapping security jurisdictions—while also ensuring that Nuevo León's state police indeed followed the military's directive.

After Division General del Real Magallanes came Brigade General Alfredo Flores Gómez, appointed in December 2012. Once again, this appointment closely aligned with previous military operations in the state, allowing SEDENA to continue controlling the state's policing operations. Brigade General Flores Gómez had been the Seventh Military Zone commander from 2011 to 2012 and thus had overseen all military operations executed under Joint Operation Tamaulipas-Nuevo León [González, 2014].

Despite violence considerably subsiding by 2015, elected governor Jaime Rodríguez (2015-2021) continued his predecessor's practice of naming a military member to the state's Security Secretariat with the appointment of Brigade General Cuauhtémoc Antúnez Pérez in October 2015. Some interviewees say he appointed Antúnez because "*there was still a sense of emergency.*"²⁸ Yet, as expected with coerced and strategic alignment, others stated it was "*to avoid cre-*

²⁸Personal interview with a businessman (2018).

ating problems [with the military].”²⁹ According to people interviewed, General Antúnez “was a very important actor from the military side.”³⁰ Antúnez had been commander of the Seventh Military Zone from 2008 to December 2010 before retiring from the army.

Antúnez intensified the militarization of Nuevo León state’s security apparatus, leading some civilian leaders to label this moment as “the military invasion.”³¹ Partly due to him “not trusting them [civilians],” “there came a moment in which all the top-ranking officers were military members.”³² For example, he replaced Commissioner-General Felipe Gallo—the then three-year chief of the recently created state police, Fuerza Civil.³³ Despite Gallo’s success as Commissioner-General [Webber, 2014], an interviewee explained that the governor asked him to leave because, as expected with coerced alignment, he was “getting pressured [by military officers] to name a military member.”³⁴ Instead, the governor appointed another military member, Brigadier General Tomás Reyes.

Antúnez left the Secretariat in 2017 and was replaced by the fifth—and last—military member named Nuevo León’s Secretary of Security, Brigade General Arturo Gonzalez García. After Brigade General González came Bernardo González, appointed in April 2018, followed by Aldo Fasci, appointed in November 2018—both civilian appointees.

As the military took hold of the state’s security apparatus, the militarization of police leadership soon followed at the local level. Although there were some

²⁹Personal interview with a state employee (2018).

³⁰Personal interview with a state employee (2018).

³¹Personal interview with a police officer (2018).

³²Personal interview with a state employee (2018).

³³Nuevo León’s Fuerza Civil was created in 2011 and is part of the State’s Security Secretariat. It is a decentralized administrative agency within the Secretariat that has operational, but not administrative, autonomy.

³⁴Personal interview with a police officer (2018).

early adopters, the appointment of military chiefs increased considerably with General Bravo's appointment to the state's Security Secretariat in 2011—further speaking to the central role of the state government in local militarization. By the end of 2012, fifteen out of fifty-one municipalities had military chiefs.³⁵ These municipalities comprise 90% of the state's population.

From the state's perspective, when I asked what it was like to work with mostly military chiefs, as I expected with alignment facilitating coordination, an interviewee described that there was *"goodwill and coordination [...] It [their shared military formation] makes the work easier."*³⁶ From the municipality's perspective, when asked to reflect on why mayors appointed military chiefs, in line with the strategic alignment logic, another interviewee explained that *"mayors take for granted that the military is in charge and has the full support of the federal government. Therefore, it [appointing a military chief] secures communication channels, assistance, and coordination with them."*³⁷

Take the case of the southern municipality of Linares. In Linares, since 2012, all police chiefs have been former military. Moreover, each appointment has come with the approval of SEDENA, pointing to the strategic nature of these appointments to ensure the federal government's continuing assistance. When mayor José Roque González, for example, was asked about who he was planning on appointing as the new chief, he said that he was waiting to get the endorsement of Division General Noé Sandoval [Multimedios Digital, 2013]. Sandoval was, at the time, commander of the Fourth Military Region and, as expected with coercion playing a role in local militarization, he *"was a key player*

³⁵This list only includes municipalities in my sample for which I have information on police chiefs.

³⁶Personal interview with a state employee (2021).

³⁷Personal interview with a state employee (2021).

in ordering people, I mean Public Security Secretaries [i.e., police chiefs], to work.”³⁸

Beyond Nuevo León, the widespread appointment of military chiefs in states like Querétaro, Aguascalientes, and San Luis Potosí also supports my theory on the coerced and strategic alignment of security institutions to facilitate inter-jurisdictional coordination. Among the most illustrative cases was the sudden appointment of five local military chiefs in Coahuila in 2009 after governor Humberto Moreira announced his “Coahuila Model.” The Coahuila Model involved getting military members appointed to key state positions and as local police chiefs and have them operate under the “*moral leadership*” of the Eleventh Military Region commander [Arvide, 2012].

2.6 Conclusion

This study aimed to better understand what explains the militarization of public safety. By carefully examining military chief appointments in Mexico, it shows that the militarization of police leaders primarily responds to political motives more than structural violence and partisanship. Under certain conditions, once the federal government prioritizes the military’s role in public safety, state and local governments soon follow—leading to a cascading militarization effect. The quantitative models and qualitative evidence show that mayors are more likely to appoint military chiefs when they face coercive pressures and strategic incentives to align with the federal government’s security strategy.

The above is not to say that once a federal government constabularizes the military, police militarization sub-nationally is inevitable. On the contrary, civil-

³⁸Personal interview with a civil society member (2018).

ians' monopoly over police leadership in states like Chihuahua shows that coercive pressures nor strategic incentives to align with the federal government are always present. Even more, statements like the one from Ahome's mayor (in Sinaloa) in 2019 announcing that "*we no longer want a military member [...] we want someone who knows the city, we want someone who works well with the rank-and-file*" also point to incentives changing over time [Mariscal, 2019]. However, it does point to how the need for inter-jurisdictional coordination can significantly change the opportunity costs of how politicians approach policing locally.

In addition to advancing our understanding of the militarization of public safety, these findings have broad theoretical implications for debates on the relationship between political elites and police [Curtice and Behlendorf, 2021, Flom, 2020, Magaloni and Rodriguez, 2020, Moncada, 2009, Wilkinson, 2006]. By underscoring the role of political motives on how elected officials police the communities they govern, this study provides new insights into the tension between policing and democracy. As for the literature on civil-military relations, the findings contribute to the study of police-military relations—which is often overlooked [Brooks, 2019]. By closely examining this relation within the Mexican context, this study offers a new understanding of how the need for police-military inter-jurisdictional cooperation can change a federal country's security apparatus. Preliminary evidence from El Salvador with Funes' rationale to appoint a military member as national police chief as responding "*to the need for coordination between security agencies*" points to similar changes occurring in unitary countries with national police forces [Reuters, 2012]. Future research should evaluate these changes more closely.

As for policy implications, throughout Latin America, civilian officials have

placed a crucial political bet on military effectiveness to tackle endemic security problems like crime and police corruption. Although military chief appointments are initially politically attractive because they promise to solve these problems quickly, they can come at considerable human and institutional costs. Like other forms of police militarization, appointing military chiefs can sever police-community relations and fuel citizen distrust. Their appointment can also erode confidence in civilian authorities and legitimize military dominance over the provision of essential public services, ultimately undermining liberal democracy.

CHAPTER 3

ARE THERE REPUTATIONAL RETURNS TO MILITARIZING PUBLIC SAFETY? SURVEY EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICA

Following three days of violence that left thirty-seven people dead, in December 2008, Tijuana's mayor Jorge Ramos dismissed police chief Alberto Capella and appointed Julián Leyzaola in his place. News reports on Leyzaola's appointment stated that he was a former military officer—a Lieutenant Colonel—with ample experience in security matters. Reports also disclosed that mayor Ramos appointed Leyzaola as part of his strategy to recuperate the city with *“integral and capable men that could inspire trust among police officers and citizens.”* Furthermore, Leyzaola's appointment was a testament to his *“commitment to making the city safer and the police more effective”* [W Radio, 2008]. But, did Leyzaola's appointment inspire trust among citizens as mayor Ramos hoped? Did his appointment change people's perceptions of Ramos' commitment and handling of crime? Did it change the public's views of Tijuana's police?

Leyzaola's appointment came as governments across Latin America are remilitarizing public safety. Mayor Ramos himself held that, with Leyzaola as police chief, he had fulfilled his promise of militarizing Tijuana's police [Martínez, 2008]. According to scholarly work, citizen demand has played a central role in this process [Neto, 2019, Harig, 2021, Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c]. Like other tough-on-crime policies, police militarization has become a profitable way for leaders to present themselves as addressing the public's concerns and demonstrate congruence with their preferences [Chevigny, 2003, Flom and Post, 2016, Visconti, 2020].

In this chapter, I argue that, beyond congruence, police militarization also

provides a low-cost opportunity for elected authorities like Ramos to signal their competence in security governance. However, for this theory to hold, it requires that police militarization convey information on an elected authority's governing capabilities and improve people's perceptions of them. Although empirically both assumptions seem reasonable given the general levels of distrust towards the police in many parts of the region, to test these assumptions, I embedded a survey experiment in an online survey in Brazil and Mexico (n=4,020) in December 2021.

The survey experiment consisted of a mock news article reporting on the appointment of a new local police chief in an unnamed municipality. I chose to use a mock news article—based on actual news reports—because it is the dominant channel through which individuals acquire information on police chiefs, including their credentials. The text of the article was relatively short. It remained constant except for the police chief's professional background: career police officer (control), retired military member, or civilian.¹ It also varied in terms of the context in which the appointment took place: at the start of a new mayoral administration (control)—i.e., when all mayors must appoint their police chief—or an increase in crime.

Overall, I find strong approval for the appointment of military members as police chiefs. Compared to a career police officer, the appointment of a military member increased support for the police chief's appointment by 3.0 percentage points in the pooled sample. Furthermore, respondents also reported higher trust levels towards military chiefs than career police chiefs.

¹By career police chief I mean a chief who had to pass through the ranks of the police force. By civilian I mean an unsworn individual who has not had to pass through the ranks and has experience in non-policing professions.

Lending support to my theory on competence, I also find that military chief appointments positively affect respondents' views of the mayor in policing and public safety. They also boost the mayor's credentials in the domain of corruption. For example, the appointment of a military chief caused a 2.5 percentage point increase in respondents' views of the mayor improving public safety, a 2.7-point increase in views on the mayor improving the police, and a 2.6-point increase in views on the mayor fighting corruption in his municipality. However, once I disaggregate by country, I find that the reputational effects of military chief appointments are most clear among Mexican respondents. Although the effects are positive for Brazil, they fail to reach conventional statistical significance.

The findings of this study have important theoretical contributions. First, by focusing on politicians' reputational concerns, they highlight another path through which citizens shape security policy in the region. Latin Americans not only favor a militarized approach to public safety, as others have documented. They also hold elected officials who take this approach in higher regard. Second, by focusing on the politics of local police militarization, the results have broad implications for our understanding of urban security governance. They show how citizen demand in tandem with elected authorities' reputational concerns make it seem rational for local governments to militarize public safety, even though this strategy is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.

The findings also raise alarms regarding the construction of peaceful cities. Popular support for the militarization of public safety coupled with politicians' short-term reputational and political interests decreases city governments' likelihood of investing in sustainable and democratic police reform efforts. Without

these reforms, police are bound to remain distrusted. And, without adequate and trusted local police, the militarization of public safety will continue being a popular and politically profitable security policy.

3.1 Empirical Setting

At the beginning of the 1990s, Latin-American governments turned to tough-on-crime strategies to tackle historical levels of crime and new forms of violence emerging at the hands of criminal organizations fighting to control illicit markets [Yashar, 2018]. Along with constricting due process rights and introducing discretionary crimes, political leaders remilitarized public safety [Holland, 2013, Macaulay, 2012]. As a result, less than two decades later, most countries had deployed military troops to urban settings to curb criminal violence and quell protests [Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c]. Some countries also created military police forces, including Mexico and Honduras. And others, like El Salvador and Venezuela, also assigned high-ranking military officials to fill security positions normally reserved for civilians or the police.

Existing scholarship has shown that law enforcement militarization has been highly consequential. The deployment of the military for domestic policing, for example, has been associated with increased levels of violence and human rights abuses [Blair and Weintraub, 2021, Flores-Macías, 2018, Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c, Magaloni and Rodriguez, 2020]. It has also been linked with undermining citizen security, the rule of law, and police reform [Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c, Pérez, 2015, Yashar, 2018].

In parallel, recent work has begun to focus more closely on its drivers.

Scholars have proposed multiple factors influencing the militarization of public safety in the region. These include police ineffectiveness, the US' anti-drug policy abroad, criminal organizations' equipment and sophistication, and citizen demand [Amaya Cobar, 2012, Dammert, 2019, Dammert and Bailey, 2005, Deare, 2008, Diamint, 2015, Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c, Harig, 2021, Kurtenbach and Scharpf, 2018, Pascual, 2017, Pion-Berlin and Acácio, 2020, Pion-Berlin and Carreras, 2017]. On citizen demand specifically, scholars contend that politicians militarize policing in part to pander to public opinion [Flores-Macías, 2018, Harig, 2021]. As Latin America became the most violent region globally, concerns about crime gave way to a popular outcry for harsher anti-crime measures and demands for the police to act boldly [Caldeira, 2002, Cruz and Kloppe-Santamaría, 2019]. Consequently, the introduction of more tough-on-crime policies became a “cheap” and electorally profitable way for political leaders to demonstrate congruence with their voters [Chevigny, 2003, Flom and Post, 2016, Visconti, 2020].²

3.2 Theory

While there is substantial evidence that party elites across Latin America have marched in step with the mass public on issues of policing, scholarly work on police militarization has primarily depicted politicians as merely responding to citizen demand. Yet, as [González, 2020] and [Holland, 2015] have demonstrated, enforcement choices are considerably strategic. They tell us something about politicians' freedom of maneuver in security governance and the multiple factors influencing their choices.

²For a similar discussion on the US case, see [Enns, 2014].

Taking insights from the political economy literature on pandering (for a summary see [Schnakenberg and Turner, 2019]), I propose that politicians militarize public safety not only to align with citizen preferences but also to inform them about their governing capacities in this domain. Police militarization presents politicians with a low-cost opportunity to signal competence in security governance and boost their reputation. It does so because policy and character-relevant information is conveyed to citizens when politicians take a militarized approach to public safety. The first is an admission by elected officials that the police, in its present condition, is incapable of fighting crime effectively, which ties nicely with the high levels of societal distrust towards the police in the region. The second is a belief that the answer to the police's incompetence is not police reform but more closely resembling the only institution capable of performing its mission effectively—the military. And the third is that they, unlike other elected authorities, are willing to get things done.

Why would the public care about their elected leader's competence in security governance? I argue that they care because crime, violence, and insecurity have grown to become one of the biggest challenges for Latin America's democratic and economic development, impacting people's everyday lives [Cruz, 2009]. Latin Americans overwhelmingly cite insecurity among the top social challenges facing their country [Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019]. Nearly 70% believe the state does not protect them against crime [Latinobarómetro, 2020]. And close to 50% report avoiding walking alone at night for fear of being a victim of crime [Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019]. Yet despite the grim outlook, Latin Americans still believe in the government's ability to tackle insecurity and expect their elected officials to do so. A substantial majority—61 percent—think their governments

can solve a large part of the crime problem, and nearly 50% believe that the state should continue giving resources to the police to fight crime instead of to the general public [Latinobarómetro, 2011, Latinobarómetro, 2020]. Therefore, competence in security governance is not only something that citizens likely desire but something that can give politicians a political advantage over other elected officials.

To examine this theory, I turn to a silent but highly consequential type of police militarization: the appointment of military members as local police chiefs. The reason for doing so is threefold. First, it allows me to shift focus on a host of actors—cities, mayors, and police chiefs—which, despite their centrality in security governance, are too often neglected in scholarly and policy debates on crime and insecurity [Post, 2018]. Second, it lets me bring into the conversation on police militarization its more subtle and less well-known types. Military chief appointments were widespread at the beginning of the 20th century. However, as Leyzaola's story exemplifies, they have also become a feature of Latin America's remilitarization of public safety [Dammert and Bailey, 2005, Go, 2020, Moloeznik and Suárez de Garay, 2012, Zarkin, 2022, Zaverucha, 2000]. Military members have been appointed security secretaries or police chiefs in countries like Brazil, Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico. And third, despite popular belief, preliminary evidence suggests that military chiefs are neither more effective nor less corrupt than their non-military counterparts. We need to look no further than the states of Guerrero or Tabasco in Mexico, where criminal violence, police ineffectiveness, and police corruption have persisted despite having multiple military chiefs.

3.2.1 Hypotheses

The proposition that military chief appointments provide a low-cost opportunity for mayors to signal competence in security governance rests on three crucial assumptions: 1) people support the appointment of military chiefs, 2) these appointments convey information about the mayor's handling of security matters, and 3) they improve people's perceptions of the mayor. I test these assumptions in this study by offering the following two hypotheses:

H1 – Police chief: Respondents will be more supportive of the appointment of military members as police chiefs compared to non-military chiefs.

H2 – Mayor: Respondents will consider mayors who appoint military chiefs as more competent in security governance than mayors who appoint non-military chiefs.

Additionally, insofar as police chief appointments might convey information beyond the mayor's governing credentials, I also propose the following:

H3 – Police: The appointment of a military member as police chief is more likely to elicit favorable views towards the police than a non-military chief.

H4 – Municipality: Respondents will be more likely to report feeling secure in the municipality where the appointment takes place when the mayor appoints a military chief compared to a non-military chief.

There are a few reasons why I expect this to be the case. First, because police are highly vertical institutions, perceptions of its leader likely impact the institution's reputation. Second, feelings of insecurity are affected by perceptions of the police's role in crime [Cruz, 2009]. Thus, if military chief appointments change people's perceptions of the police, as mayor Ramos hoped, they should also change their perceptions of insecurity.

Finally, I also explore the possibility that the information conveyed by military chief appointments on the mayor's governing capabilities will be most persuasive in situations where military chiefs have a perceived comparative advantage over non-military chiefs.

H5 – Crime: Respondents' positive perceptions of the police chief, police, and mayor will be highest when the mayor appoints a military chief due to rising crime instead of at the start of his administration.

I expect crime to exacerbate the positive effects of military chief appointments on people's perceptions because, as [Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021b] and [Pion-Berlin and Carreras, 2017] have documented, Latin Americans have very low confidence in the police's capacity to fight crime. In contrast, they see the military as an institution capable of completing this task effectively.

3.3 Case Selection and Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I designed and embedded a mock news article survey experiment in an online survey (n=4,020) in Brazil and Mexico in December

2021. The survey was funded by the National Science Foundation and fielded by Netquest.³ Netquest invited respondents to participate from their proprietary panels based on a national sample from each country. A total of 2,003 surveys were completed in Brazil and 2,017 in Mexico. For the Brazilian sample, respondents came from all twenty-seven states, and for the Mexican sample, respondents came from all thirty-two states.

Like other web surveys relying on opt-in panels, people living in urban areas are overrepresented in my sample. Although this bias poses certain limitations for drawing inferences regarding the general population, having a predominantly urban sample is ideal for my study for a few reasons. First, on average, residents of urban areas pay more frequent attention to the news than residents of rural areas [Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2016]. Second, newspapers cover police chief appointments of suburban and urban municipalities at a higher frequency compared to chief appointments of more rural municipalities [Zarkin, 2022]. And third, military members are predominantly appointed as chiefs in big cities [Zarkin, 2022].

3.3.1 Case Selection

I conducted the survey experiment in Brazil and Mexico because these countries share similar contextual and institutional characteristics that are crucial for the design and external validity of the survey experiment.

First, elected officials in both countries face similar security challenges. Thus, issues of crime and policing are equally salient among both publics. Brazil and

³The survey experiment and pre-analysis plan were pre-registered at EGAP/The Center for Open Society (<https://osf.io/4cd58>).

Mexico possess some of the highest rates of violent and non-violent crime in the region. For example, in 2020, Mexico had a homicide rate of 27 per 100,000 people, while Brazil had a rate of 19.3 [Asmann and Jones, 2021]. Furthermore, 33% of Mexicans reported being a victim of a crime in 2018, so did 19% of Brazilians [Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019].

Second, Brazil and Mexico are both federal countries and countries that have significantly decentralized law enforcement, which is essential for studying local security governance. Mexico's preventive policing apparatus comprises the National Guard (previously known as the Federal Police) at the national level. It also has thirty-two state police under the direction of the state's governor. And it has over 1,800 municipal police responsible for crime prevention, administrative infractions, and traffic.⁴ Local governments pay municipal police, commanded by a police chief (*Director* or *Secretario de Seguridad Pública*) who plans, organizes, and oversees all police activities. Like the president and governor, mayors have the right to appoint the local chief beginning their administration and remove him during their term in office.

In the case of Brazil, the constitution establishes several police forces. The Federal Administration controls three police forces: the Federal Police, the Federal Highway Police, and the Federal Railroad Police. In addition, each state has a Civilian and Military Police, which the state governor controls. And while municipalities are not allowed to have their own municipal police forces, they are allowed to create Municipal Guards. By 2019, 1,184 out of 5,570 municipalities reported having a Municipal Guard—many of which were created in the last decade to respond to citizen concerns concerning insecurity conditions.

⁴Although the constitution states that public security is the responsibility of the federation, the states and the municipal councils, approximately 600 municipalities do not have a local police force.

Most Municipal Guards operate in mid to large cities, are present in twenty-four state capitals, and employ over 120,000 police officers [Sestrem, 2021].⁵ Municipal Guards were initially tasked with guarding the municipality's parks and buildings [Caldeira, 2002]. However, with the creation of the National Public Security Plan and the National Program for Public Security with Citizenship in 2007, Municipal Guards have gained prominence in maintaining public order at the local level—making them comparable to Mexican municipal police [FADIS-IMA, 2021]. In Brazil's larger cities, today Municipal Guards have considerable police power, are well-armed, organized, and equipped, and share with Mexican municipal police forces daily functions—see figure 3.1 for visual comparison [Vergueiro, 2008]. These include crime prevention, responding to calls from the population, making arrests in flagrante, patrolling neighborhoods, combating intrafamily violence, and assisting in the security of major events. Like Mexican municipal police, many also have special militarized groups, collaborate with the State Military Police, and participate in joint operations [Vergueiro, 2008].

Furthermore, due to their increasing importance in Brazil's security landscape, political interest in Municipal Guards has soared locally and nationally. Brazilian mayors are now campaigning on Municipal Guard promises and reallocating resources for local public safety. Take the case elected mayor of São Bernardo, Orlando Morando, who promised to duplicate the number of Municipal Guard officers if elected in 2016 [Leoratti and Laranjeira, 2016]. Or the case of the mayor of Curitiba, Rafael Greca, who celebrated fulfilling one of his campaign promises of protecting Curitiba's families with the acquisition of

⁵The average population of municipalities without a Municipal Guard is 18,044 and with a Municipal Guard is 112,916.

1,316 nine-mm pistols for Guard officers [Leoratti and Laranjeira, 2022].⁶ At the national level, deputies known as the “Bullet Bench” or *Bancada da Bala*, all former law enforcement officers, introduced an amendment to article 144 of the constitution in 2021 to recognize Municipal Guards as de jure local police forces [Spechoto, 2021, Sestrem, 2021].

Third, federal governments in both countries have deployed military troops for domestic security for decades; thus, respondents in both countries are familiar with the survey’s theme. Starting in the 1990s, the Brazilian government began deploying the military for Guaranteeing Law and Order (GLO) operations to address violence in the favelas [Macaulay, 2012]. While the federal government initially restricted GLO’s temporarily and geographically, president Lula da Silva’s (2003—2010) deployment of the military for the pacification program in Rio de Janeiro gave way to large-scale military operations over the next decade [Harig, 2021].

In Mexico, the military’s participation in domestic missions increased considerably beginning the 1990s. By 1999, over 5,000 soldiers joined the Federal Preventive Police, and the share of drug seizures carried out by the army rose steeply [Lessing, 2017, Moloeznik, 2006]. Under Vicente Fox’s presidency (2000-2006), the military got involved in capturing kingpins [Mendoza Cortés, 2016]. And, by the start of Felipe Calderón’s (2006-2012) administration, the armed forces became the central agency in charge of executing the federal government’s strategy against crime. Over 80,000 soldiers now work permanently fighting crime in at least twenty-four of the thirty-two Mexican states [Ángel, 2016, Ángel, 2021].

⁶The experience of Morando and Greca is just one among many Brazilian mayors seeking to undertake greater involvement in local security governance through their Municipal Guard.

Figure 3.1: Examples of Mexican municipal police forces and Brazilian Municipal Guards.



Sources: [Comunicação, 2020, Mora, 2021, Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, 2021, de Rio Preto, 2019, de León, 2021, Villegas, 2018]

Fourth, mayors have appointed military members as police chiefs in both countries, which is essential for ecological validity. As depicted in table 3.1, of a sample of 5,580 police chief appointments in Mexico between 2000 and 2020, nearly two in ten are military members, four in ten are career police officers, and the remaining four are civilians [Zarkin, 2022].⁷ Moreover, most military members in Mexico are appointed as chiefs of mid to large cities. For example, of the eight most populated municipalities in the country, only Puebla and Zapopan have not had a military chief in the last two decades.⁸

As for Brazil, according to the 2019 Municipal Basic Information Survey, of 1,184 Municipal Guard commanders, 77% were career police (Military Police, Federal Police, Civilian Police, or Municipal Guard police), 2% were former military, 7% were civilians, and the remaining 14% had another professional background [Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2014].⁹ Former military members have served as Municipal Guard chiefs in mostly suburban and urban settings, including municipalities like Salvador (Bahía), Manaus (Amazonas), São José de Ribamar (Maranhão), and Campinas (São Paulo) [Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2014].

Fifth, the Mexican and Brazilian media frequently reports on police chief appointments, especially in the more populated cities with local newspapers and

⁷The category “civilians” is comprised of individuals who did not pass through the ranks of a police organization, including lawyers, engineers, doctors, and teachers.

⁸The eight most populated municipalities in 2020 are Tijuana, León, Puebla, Ecatepec de Morelos, Ciudad Juárez, Zapopan, Guadalajara, and Monterrey [National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 2020b]. I do not include Iztapalapa and Gustavo A. Madero in this list because, contrary to the rest of Mexican municipalities, Mexico City boroughs do not have municipal police forces.

⁹According to the Federal Law 13.022—2014 the position of Municipal Guard chief can only be occupied by Municipal Guard career officer. However, Brazilian mayors continue appointing civilian, military police, and former military members as Municipal Guard chiefs stating that the Federal Law establishes general norms but cannot interfere with municipal autonomy. See [Mossoró Hoje, 2017] for an example.

Table 3.1: Local police chiefs by professional background

	Mexico	Brazil
Military	15%	2%
Career police officer	46%	77
Civilian	39%	7%
Other	-	14%

Note: In Mexico, the category "career police officer" includes State Police, Municipal Police, Federal Police, Judicial Police, and other smaller forces like the Auxiliary Police and the Rurales. It includes Military Police, Federal Police, Civilian Police, and Municipal Guards in Brazil.
Sources: [Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2014, Zarkin, 2022]

where public safety concerns are salient, which is also essential for ecological validity. Figure 3.2 includes several examples of appointment articles in both countries. In these articles, it is common to find a sentence or two on the police chief's professional background, the chief's vision for the police force, and the mayor's goals for the municipality. Although there are other ways that people might find out about the police chief's professional background, including through public statements by the mayor, media reports are the primary means this information reaches the public.

Just as there are similarities between both countries, there are also significant historical and political differences that could influence societal preferences in security governance. Brazil, for example, had a military dictatorship, while Mexico was ruled for more than seventy years by a single autocratic party [Geddes et al., 2014, Greene, 2010]. Mexican politics is extensively centralized, while Brazil's is less so [Harbers, 2010]. And Mexico's party system is remarkably institutionalized compared to Brazil's party system, which is widely considered to be weakly institutionalized [Greene and Sánchez-Talanquer, 2018, Klašnja and Titiunik, 2017].

However, a careful exploration of public opinion data from the Americas

Figure 3.2: Examples of news articles on police chief appointments

MEXICO

CORONEL JORGE SOLÍS TOMA PROTESTA COMO DIRECTOR OPERATIVO DE SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA EN CAJEME

0 agosto 15, 2019

ESPECIAL, Ago. 15- Para reforzar el trabajo que realiza la Secretaría de Seguridad Pública Municipal de Cajeme, el alcalde Sergio Pablo Mariscal Alvarado tomó protesta a Jorge Manuel Solís Casanova como director operativo de la corporación.

Al tomar posesión de manera oficial, el presidente municipal le instruyó a trabajar en la prevención del delito reforzando con acciones de proximidad social y fomentando una cultura de la legalidad en la sociedad, cumpliendo con el Bando de Policía y Gobierno.

"Hay una coyuntura histórica que tenemos que aprovechar, es necesaria la coordinación de los tres niveles de gobierno, es por ello que sumamos a nuestro equipo de trabajo al Coronel de Infantería, porque con su trayectoria vamos a trabajar reforzando las leyes y reglamentos actuales cumpliendo con una cultura de la legalidad", expresó.

Designan a Mario Alberto Andrade como nuevo titular de seguridad pública en Cajeme

Alejandro de la Torre Dossier Político en Cajeme
 Día de publicación: 2011-05-05

Cd. Obregón.- En sustitución de Víctor Landeros Arvizu, el cabildo en pleno de esta ciudad designó al Capitán Segundo de Infantería Mario Alberto Andrade Ramos en la jefatura de policía preventiva y tránsito municipal.

"Se valoraron varios perfiles para la elección, el Capitán Segundo de Infantería en situación de retiro cuenta con la experiencia y disciplina necesaria para garantizar un estratégico trabajo de coordinación con los tres niveles de Gobierno", declaró el alcalde Manuel Barro Borganio.

El nuevo titular es originario del Estado de Chiapas, formó parte de las fuerzas armadas durante 22 años (1988-2010), cuenta con conocimientos en conducción personal, manejo y funcionamiento de armamento de diversos calibres exclusivos de las fuerzas armadas, seguridad a instalaciones vitales, entre otros.

Designan nuevo titular de SSP en Tamaulipas

El gobernador Eugenio Hernández Flores designó al comisario jefe, Antonio Garza García como nuevo secretario de Seguridad Pública, en sustitución de José Ives Soberón.



Ciudad Victoria.- Tras la renuncia de José Ives Soberón Tjerina como secretario de Seguridad Pública en Tamaulipas, el gobernador Eugenio Hernández Flores **designó esta tarde como nuevo titular al comisario jefe, Antonio Garza García.**

Mediante un comunicado oficial, el mandatario estatal anunció este nombramiento, en un evento que se realizó en Casa de Gobierno, donde conminó al nuevo funcionario a trabajar con responsabilidad y eficiencia, a fin de dar respuesta a las demandas de la ciudadanía.

BRAZIL

07/11/2012 20:41 - Atualizado em 07/11/2012 20:41

Novo comandante da Guarda Municipal toma posse no Rio

Capitão Leandro Matelli substitui o coronel Henrique Lima Castro. Cerimônia de posse foi nesta quarta-feira, com presença do prefeito.

Do G1 Rio



O capitão Leandro Matelli tomou posse nesta quarta-feira (7) como inspetor geral da Guarda Municipal do Rio. A cerimônia foi realizada no auditório da Academia de Ensino da instituição, em São Cristóvão, na Zona Norte.

Matelli tem dez anos de experiência no quadro de oficiais da Polícia Militar em funções de comando e planejamento e substitui o coronel Henrique Lima Castro, que estava à frente da GM-Rio desde abril de 2011.

A solenidade contou com a presença do prefeito Eduardo Paes, do secretário municipal da Ordem Pública, Alex Costa, dos comandantes das unidades operacionais da Guarda e de diversas autoridades da Prefeitura do Rio e da área de segurança pública.

Guarda Municipal tem novo comando em Uberaba

Nomeações de novos comandante e subcomandante foram publicadas nesta quarta-feira (22).

Por M62

23/01/2020 20:07 - Atualizado há um ano



A Prefeitura de Uberaba divulgou, nesta quarta-feira (22), a exoneração de Marco Túlio Garveschio do cargo de comandante da Guarda Municipal. **A decisão foi publicada no Portal Voz**, jornal oficial do Município.



14/08/2016 09:05 - Atualizado em 14/08/2016 09:05

Guarda Municipal de São Vicente, SP, tem novo comando

Marcelo de Paula assumiu o cargo na última semana. Sub-comando fica com Andréa Carla Bermudes Duran.

Do G1 Santos



A Guarda Municipal de **São Vicente**, no litoral de São Paulo, está com um novo comandante. Marcelo de Paula, que atuava como GCM 1ª classe, assumiu o cargo na última semana.

Sources: [El Economista, 2010, G1, 2012, G1, 2016, G1, 2020, González Correa, 2009, No Pasa Nada, 2019]

Barometer reveals that, on average, Mexicans and Brazilians share similar attitudes towards law enforcement institutions and security more broadly. For example, 77% of Mexicans and 76% of Brazilians believe that the armed forces should combat crime and violence. Similarly, 47% of Mexicans and 42% of Brazilians think a coup is justified when crime is high. And 57% of Mexicans and 56% of Brazilians express dissatisfaction with local police performance [Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2014]. These similarities, plus those detailed above, make the case selection ideal for this study, as well as the comparison between Mexico and Brazil important for understanding how local elected officials strategically approach public safety.

3.3.2 Research Design and Sample

The first part of the survey questionnaire included basic social and demographic questions and several pre-treatment covariates on trust in security institutions, the military's participation in policing, and perceived insecurity. Similar to face-to-face surveys like the Americas Barometer (see the appendix for greater detail), 46% of respondents in the pooled sample were male. The median age of participants was 38 years old, and one in two had attained at least upper secondary education. Additionally, 20% of respondents identified with a political party, 27% identified crime as one of the country's most important problems, and 63% had little to no trust in the police compared to 38% in the military. Lastly, 79% favored the military's participation in policing operations, and 80% believed its participation would improve public safety.

Following the pre-treatment questions, respondents read an introductory

statement that specified that they were required to read a news report and answer questions based on what they had just read. The mock article was adapted from actual news articles. It provided information on the appointment of a local police chief in an unnamed municipality.¹⁰ The text of the mock news report was relatively short. It remained constant except for two elements.

The first element was the police chief's professional background: career police officer (control), retired military member, and civilian. Although this study concerns military chiefs, I included civilians as a third category because they comprise a large proportion of police chiefs in the region.¹¹ Moreover, they are the antithesis of military chiefs. Civilian chiefs are often appointed when elected officials are concerned with achieving better police management or police-community relations.¹² As a former state employee explained during an interview, *"a military chief knows about discipline and weapons, but has little experience in management, in project development, in investments, everything that a businessman does."*¹³ Finally, and most importantly, attitudes towards civilian chiefs could provide crucial information on the effectiveness of appointments as competence signals.

The second element was the context in which the appointment took place: at the start of a new mayoral administration (control) or an increase in criminal violence. The reason for doing so was twofold. First, a review of over fifty news

¹⁰I did not include the name of the municipality to avoid contaminating the treatment and making the experiment about one particular city.

¹¹I used the more general category of "civilian" instead of referring to the chief's profession—e.g., businessman, lawyer, engineer, teacher, etc.—because doing so would have introduced a source of bias into the study.

¹²A good example is the appointment of Jorge Amador—a sociology Ph.D.—as police chief of Nezahualcóyotl in 2003. Mayor Luis Sánchez believed that reverting soaring crime rates and recuperating citizen's trust in Nezahualcóyotl required a new policing model and appointing a *"different kind"* of police chief (Personal interview with a police chief 2018).

¹³Personal interview with a former state employee (2018).

reports on police chief appointments in Mexico and Brazil showed that newspapers primarily publish these articles during the start of a new administration when all elected officials must appoint a police chief. However, appointment reports also surface when something has gone wrong in the municipality, including increases in crime or corruption scandals. Thus, I could ensure that the experiment closely approximated natural news cycles by including both. Second, adding contextual variation allowed me to tease out whether reputational effects are contingent on military chiefs having a perceived comparative advantage over non-military chiefs—dealing with crime—or when no such advantage is obvious—at the start of the mayor’s administration.

Based on the possible combinations of context and professional background, respondents were randomly assigned to read one of six possible mock news reports—see figure 3.3 for an example.¹⁴ The control article reported on the appointment of a career police officer—because this is the norm—at the start of the mayor’s administration—when all mayors must appoint a police chief. For the Mexico mock article, I selected the name of the police chief based on the most frequent names appearing in a sample of over 5,000 police chief appointments [Zarkin, 2022]. For the Brazil mock article, I selected the name of the police chief based on the most frequent names appearing in newspaper articles on Municipal Guard commanders.

After reading the news article, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the newly appointed police chief, including how much they approved of the chief’s appointment and how much trust the new police chief inspired. I then asked respondents a series of questions on the mayor’s effectiveness and performance in public safety, policing, and corruption. Lastly, I also asked about

¹⁴See the appendix for balance tests.

Figure 3.3: Mock news article in Spanish

José Antonio García Olvera es nombrado nuevo titular de seguridad

Por: redacción



[Tras dar inicio a su gobierno/Tras el incremento en los índices delictivos], el presidente municipal Sergio Alvarado nombró a José Antonio García Olvera como nuevo jefe de la policía preventiva y tránsito municipal. En entrevista, el presidente municipal señaló que García Olvera es un [militar en situación de retiro/civil/policía de carrera] que cuenta con amplia experiencia en seguridad.

Al tomar posesión de manera oficial, García Olvera se comprometió a atender las instrucciones del presidente municipal y mostrarle resultados positivos a la sociedad.

the police's trustworthiness and how secure respondents would feel living in the municipality they had just read about.¹⁵ The mock article appeared at the beginning of each question to ease the cognitive burden of having to memorize the report's text.¹⁶

3.4 Results

To estimate the effects of appointing a military chief on perceptions of the police chief, the police, the mayor, and the municipality, I fitted nine OLS models, one for each dependent variable. I first estimate the effects of the police chief's

¹⁵See the appendix for the questions in Spanish, English, and Portuguese.

¹⁶During the pilot, most respondents asked to see the news article at the top of each question because, by the fourth question, they had already forgotten what the article said.

professional background irrespective of the context of the appointment. I then calculate the effects considering the combination of professional background and context—rising criminal violence or the start of the mayoral administration. The professional background models use career police chief as the baseline group. The professional background plus context models use the appointment of a career police chief at the start of a mayoral administration. Although the outcome variables were initially measured on a scale from one to four, following [Mummolo, 2018], these were rescaled to range from 0 to 100, so effects can be interpreted as percentage-point increases.


3.4.1 Effects by Professional Background

Figure 3.4 shows average differences in responses between respondents who read about the appointment of a military (treatment 1) or civilian chief (treatment 2) compared to respondents who read about the appointment of a career police chief (control), pooled and by country.

Lending support to hypothesis 1, the appointment of a military member as police chief caused a statistically significant 2.9-point increase in approval for the chief's appointment and a 3.0-point increase in trust in the police chief in the pooled sample. This same pattern is observed in each country separately. Military chief appointments caused a 3.0-point increase in support for the chief's appointment and a 3.7-point increase in trust in the police chief in Mexico. In Brazil, it caused a 2.9-point and a 2.4-point increase, respectively.

As for hypothesis 2, as seen in figure 3.4, I find that military chief appointments improve people's perceptions of the mayor's governing capabilities in

Figure 3.4: Survey experimental results: the appointment of a military or civilian chief versus a career police chief



Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer black bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter gray bars represent 90 percent. The baseline category is a career police officer.

security, policing, and corruption. In the pooled sample, the appointment of a military chief caused a statistically significant 2.5 percentage point increase in respondents' views of the mayor improving public safety and a 2.7-point increase in views on the mayor improving the police. It also led to a 2.7-point increase in the mayor's perceived effectiveness in fighting crime and, notably, a 2.6-point increase in views on the mayor fighting corruption in the municipality. Moreover, the positive effects of appointing a military chief on the mayor's capabilities hold when, instead of looking at each outcome independently, I look at them jointly in a competence index.¹⁷ As seen in the appendix, the appointment of a military chief caused a 3.6-point increase in the mayor's competence score.

Again, this pattern holds when looking at Mexican respondents only. Overall, the appointment of a military chief caused a 5.2-point increase in the mayor's competence score and each of the outcome variables independently. For example, the appointment of a military chief caused a statistically significant 3.6 percentage point increase in respondents' views of the mayor improving public safety, a 4.2-point increase in views on the mayor improving the police, and a 3.8-point increase in the mayor's perceived effectiveness in fighting crime. Plus, the appointment of a military chief also caused a 4.0-point increase in views on the mayor fighting corruption in the municipality. Evidence that Brazilian mayors benefit reputationally from appointing a military chief is weaker. Compared to a career police chief, the effect of appointing a military chief on views towards the mayor is in the expected direction. However, it fails

¹⁷I constructed the competence index using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based on the responses to the following questions: is the mayor improving public safety, is the mayor improving the police, is the mayor fighting corruption, and the mayor's effectiveness in public safety. The results are nearly identical if I construct the index by averaging scores instead of using PCA.

to reach conventional statistical significance levels looking at each outcome independently or the mayor's competence score.

In line with hypotheses 3 and 4, like mayors, the police and municipality also benefit from military chief appointments in the eyes of the public. The appointment of a military chief caused a 1.7-point increase in trust in the police. However, this positive effect is less clear when disaggregated by country. Trust in the police increased by 1.9 percentage points ($p < 0.1$) in Mexico, and, in Brazil, it remains unchanged. As for the municipality, the appointment of a military chief made respondents feel safer by 2.8 percentage points, and the same pattern holds looking at Mexican and Brazilian respondents independently. The appointment of a military chief caused a 3.5-point increase in how secure Mexican respondents would feel if they lived in the municipality where the appointment took place and a 2.0-point ($p < 0.1$) increase among Brazilian respondents.

Civilian Chiefs

Although this study is about police militarization, some notable results regarding civilian chief appointments deserve highlighting. Strikingly, compared to the appointment of a career police chief, the appointment of a civilian as police chief caused a 2.5, 2.1, and 1.6 percentage point drop in respondent's approval of the appointment, trust in the police chief, and trust in the police respectively.

Respondents are also rather critical of mayors who appoint civilian chiefs. In the pooled sample, the appointment of a civilian chief caused a statistically significant 1.9-point decrease in respondents' views of the mayor improving public safety and a 2.4-point reduction in views of the mayor improving the


police. It also caused a 1.6 percentage point decrease in opinions on the mayor's effectiveness in fighting crime and a 2.4-point reduction in his competence score. As for the municipality, the appointment of a civilian chief caused a 2.4-point decrease in perceptions of safety compared to a career police chief in the pooled sample.

3.4.2 Effects by Professional Background and Context

In addition to examining how the selection of a police chief can change people's perceptions of the mayor, the police, the police chief, and the municipality, I also estimate whether respondents' perceptions depend on the context in which the appointment takes place—hypothesis 5. Figure 3.5 shows average differences in responses between respondents by each treatment condition and the control condition—the appointment of a career police chief at the start of the mayoral administration—pooled and by country.

Contrary to my expectations, the effect of appointing a military chief on perceptions of the police chief, the mayor, the police, and the municipality among respondents is similar when the appointment takes place at the start of the mayor's administration or due to increasing crime. For example, the appointment of a military chief boosted the mayor's competence score by 2.9 percentage points when the military chief is appointed at the start of the mayor's administration and 2.8 points when the chief is appointed when crime is rising. However, respondents' views of the mayor are, on average, more unfavorable when he appoints a civilian chief at the start of his administration. For example, a civilian chief's appointment in the context of rising crime leads to a 2.4-point

Figure 3.5: Survey experimental results including variation in the context



Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) and appointment context (rising crime or the start of a new mayoral administration) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality. Estimates are based on OLS model with robust standard errors. Longer black bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter gray bars represent 90 percent. The baseline category is the appointment of a career police officer at the start of a new mayoral administration.

reduction in the mayors' competence score versus 3.8 percentage points when the appointment takes place at the start of the mayor's term in office. It also leads to a decrease of 2.3-points in perceptions of the mayor's effectiveness in public safety at the beginning of his administration, while the negative effect is indistinguishable from zero when crime is rising.

A similar pattern emerges when looking at Mexican respondents only. Overall, there is little difference in the signal sent by military chief appointments when the appointment takes place at the start of the mayoral administration or when crime is rising. For example, there is a 3.7 percentage point increase in respondents' views that the mayor is fighting corruption when a military member is appointed at the start of the mayor's term in office and a 3.6 percentage point increase when the appointment is because of an increase in crime. Among Brazilian respondents, the effect of appointing a military chief at the start of the mayor's administration or in the context of rising crime on favorable views of the mayor are indistinguishable from zero.

3.4.3 Effects by Subgroups

Finally, I also estimate whether effects differ by respondent's traits, attitudes, and violent contexts—see the appendix for graphical summaries. The clearest differences concern institutional trust and beliefs about the military's internal roles. In the pooled sample, the positive effect of appointing a military chief on the mayor's reputation is higher among respondents who have high levels of trust towards the military and approve the military's participation in domestic policing. For example, among those with high levels of trust in the military,

military chief appointments cause a 4.5 percentage point increase in perceptions of the mayor improving public safety. At the same time, its effect is negative and indistinguishable from zero among those with low levels of trust.

However, the results generally reveal little evidence of heterogeneous responses by victimization, perceived insecurity, views on the country, and demographics. For example, older respondents have very similar views concerning military chief appointments vis-à-vis younger respondents. The same goes for more educated and less educated respondents. Nor are there substantial differences based on the respondents' state homicide rate. This general pattern is noteworthy as it speaks to the robust societal support for the military's internal missions in Latin America documented by both policing and civil-military relations scholars (e.g., [Bailey and Dammert, 2006, Pion-Berlin and Carreras, 2017]).

3.5 Discussion

Together, the findings suggest that societal preferences in tandem with political leaders' reputational concerns are a crucial driver of the militarization of local public safety in the region and particularly in Mexico. Given Latin Americans' low confidence in the ability of the police to deal with crime effectively, it is not surprising that there is strong approval for military chief appointments compared to both career professionals and civilians. More important, though, is that respondents also reported having greater trust in the police chief—and Mexicans express greater trust in the police—when the mayor appoints a military member, which is crucial if we consider two things. First, Latin America

has one of the lowest levels of trust in the police [Corbacho et al., 2015]. Second, criminology and policing scholarly work has shown that trust in the police is fundamental for effective policing. It likewise encourages civic participation and more active engagement in the area of security and community life [Jackson and Bradford, 2010].

Lending support to my theory on competence, the findings of this study suggest that for mayors, military chief appointments serve to signal their governing capabilities and boost their reputation among the public. However, the results are more nuanced if we look at these effects by country. Mexican respondents not only expressed mayors were more effective in security matters when they appointed a military chief, but they also thought that the mayor was improving policing and public safety. The appointment of a military chief also affected Mexican respondents' beliefs about the mayor in the domain of corruption, which echoes widespread beliefs about the Mexican military's incorruptibility. Less than 25% of Mexicans consider the military corrupt compared to 70% when asked about the police [National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 2020a]. What is notable about this finding is that the military's reputation concerning corruption can change a mayor's reputation in good governance.

In the case of Brazil, as seen in figure 3.4, although the effects of military chief appointments were in the expected direction, the estimates fell short of significance at conventional levels. There are at least three possible reasons why I observe these results. The first, and most likely, is that despite the increasing importance of Municipal Guards, Brazilians still know little about their role in local public safety and therefore overlook the importance of their police chief.

It could also be the case that they perceive Municipal Guards as inconsequential for security governance compared to the state's military police. Thus, they perceive no advantages to appointing a military chief. Or, perhaps, Brazilians are more skeptical of local elected officials than Mexican respondents. Unfortunately, the questions in the survey do not allow me to rule out one or more of these explanations. Knowing which of these best explains the results found for Brazil will require further research. One promising approach to assess if this is a story about the novelty of Municipal Guards and the more salient role of governors in policing would be to repeat the survey experiment but look at the appointment of a state's Security Secretary instead.

The findings also point to police chiefs affecting how secure or insecure Latin Americans feel about their surroundings. This is a significant result, given that policymakers and scholars have traditionally linked insecurity concerns to police behavior [Cruz, 2009]. This study suggests that insecurity concerns are also shaped by police leadership. As heads of a highly vertical institution, police chiefs—like CEOs—play a fundamental role in how the police force is perceived. Moreover, their reputations can affect overall safety sentiments.

The final notable effect relates to how Mexican and Brazilian respondents view the appointment of civilian chiefs. Not only did respondents disapprove of these appointments, but the findings indicate that civilian chief appointments harm the mayor's and police's standing among the public despite the news report stating that they had ample experience in security matters. On average, mayors were thought to be less effective at fighting crime, the police was perceived as less trustworthy, and municipalities as more unsafe.

Although understanding why respondents distrust civilian police chiefs is

beyond the scope of this study, I offer at least two reasons why this might be the case. First, respondents might perceive civilian chief appointments as mayors engaging in favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism. Or second, they might believe that civilians have no business doing police work. Considering that respondents were more critical of civilian chief appointments at the start of the mayor's administration lends partial support to the political patronage explanation. However, because the term "civilian" can be interpreted in different ways, further research should explore whether the effect found is in line with a particular type of understanding. It should also explore if the effect varies if respondents are given more information on civilian chiefs, such as their profession—e.g., businessman, lawyer, doctor, or teacher, among others.

3.6 Conclusion

This study's main contribution is showing how approaches to security governance can change how citizens perceive the political leaders making these decisions. The appointment of military chiefs offers politicians an opportunity to signal competence in public safety and boost their reputation, especially in the case of Mexico. Quite the contrary, the appointment of a civilian chief produces negative political returns for mayors and the police.

Together, these findings add to our understanding of societal preferences regarding the militarization of law enforcement. Latin Americans are not only supportive of the military's involvement in policing missions, as other scholarly work has shown, but they are also supportive of individual military members taking over the leadership of police forces. The findings also shed light on local

police militarization. This study shows that this is an important and understudied phenomenon in federal countries and suggests that reputational concerns are a crucial motivation for the militarization of local public safety.

In addition, the findings speak to work on cities and the rule of law. Scholars have long been concerned with the state's control of its territory. However, as [Post, 2018] writes, the politics of law and order has received little attention, especially at the local level. This study builds on emerging research on the politics of policing by showing how people's assessments of local executives changes depending on their approach to security governance. Favorable views toward politicians who militarize public safety make it unattractive for local governments to pursue the demilitarization of policing despite the evident need or desire to do so.

This study also has crucial policy implications. It underscores that we cannot understand local security governance without first examining the strategic and reputational incentives confronting elected authorities. Faced with the desire to boost their credibility on the one hand and presidents relying on the military for internal security missions on the other, the militarization of policing becomes an easy way out for local elected authorities. The consequences of embracing a militarized approach to public safety for police-community partnerships, criminal violence, police functioning, and citizen security, however, remain to be explored.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY OR CIVILIAN? THE CHANGING FORCES OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS AND BUREAUCRATIC DESTABILIZATION IN MEXICO

In April 2016, police officers of the Querétaro municipal police department (PD) went on strike over police chief Division General Hidalgo Eddy's treatment of civilian police officers [Durán Peñaloza, 2016]. Fifteen days later, the mayor of Querétaro dismissed Division General Hidalgo as police chief, barely 202 days after his appointment. Some kilometers up north (and just a few years earlier), mayor Raymundo Flores publicized that the Apodaca PD recruited an additional fifty military officers to join the police force. That same day, Mayor Flores also announced Captain Eulalio López's ratification for a second term as police chief [Notimex, 2012]. Captain López stayed on as chief of Apodaca for an additional three years.

These are but two examples of opposing outcomes that result from the recruitment of military members into PDs. The question is, why do some PDs destabilize when they recruit military members, and why do others remain stable? Drawing on 300 anonymous interviews—with line officers, supervisors, police chiefs, ex-military police officers, city employees, and unsworn staff—and a comparative case analysis of seven PDs in Mexico,¹ I build a theory of when and how recruitment of military members into PDs results in *bureaucratic destabilization*. By bureaucratic destabilization, I mean disruptions in the inner workings of the police as an organizational actor. Though destabilization in PDs can materialize in many forms—including ineffectiveness, low-quality

¹As is explained in the institutional setting section, to safeguard the identity of participants and uphold our anonymity agreement, I do not reveal the PD's nor the participant's name throughout this chapter.

services, inability to pursue mandates, and substandard performance—in this study I focus on chief tenure and employee unrest.

My theory argues that bureaucratic destabilization is not the product of differences in training, duty, and mode of operation between military members and civilian police officers but rather a conjunction between professional differences on the one hand and rank position on the other. As I show in my comparative and within-case analyses, bureaucratic destabilization results when military members are appointed as chiefs of *civilian* PDs.² In contrast, their appointment as chiefs of *militarized* PDs³ or their recruitment as *line officers*—i.e., officers who do not have senior positions—by civilian chiefs does not impede the police’s effective functioning.

From these interviews, this chapter also proposes three mechanisms that translate rank position and professional differences into bureaucratic destabilization: 1) *treatment* of police officers as second-class employees, 2) *unfamiliarity* with policing and police protocols, and 3) *perceived* injustices related to professional growth and career-track. In the four destabilization cases, I observe military chiefs that sought to change the organization they joined to fit their professional background and professional identity,⁴ creating significant resentment among the civilian rank-and-file. The perceived treatment as second-class employees, the tension between obeying police protocol and executing the military chief’s orders, and the hopelessness of one day moving up the ranks took its toll on police officers and, in turn, destabilized the departments.

²Throughout the chapter, the term “civilian police department” means that the majority of police officers in the department are civilians.

³In political science, the term “militarized” takes multiple definitions. In this chapter, I use “militarized police department” as shorthand for PDs where the majority of police officers in the department are military members.

⁴By professional identity I mean how individuals self-define in relation to their profession (i.e., what they do). For an in-depth discussion see [Pratt et al., 2006].

Lastly, this chapter also proposes two mechanisms through which civilian-led departments that recruit former military personnel as line officers can override the gap between policing and military identities: basic training and interactions with supervisors. Civilian chiefs use basic training and interactions with high-ranking officers to socialize military members, resulting in the incremental construction of their new policing identity over time.

This chapter makes several contributions. It builds on and extends research on the militarization of law enforcement by documenting a widespread yet understudied type and discusses its consequences for PDs. It also extends research on bureaucracies by focusing on the inner workings of bureaucratic agencies and providing evidence for how bureaucratic composition not only affects performance—as other scholars have shown—but also a bureaucracy’s internal functioning. Additionally, it also adds to civil-military relations scholarly work that documents how military experience and military presence in government is consequential.

These insights also have clear implications for practitioners and policymakers. The findings of this study suggest that orchestrating opportunities for lower-ranking ex-military personnel to reimagine and re-construct their professional identity is beneficial for civilian PDs. It also points to the importance of carefully assessing a new chief’s fit in the department before their appointment and the need for congruence between the department’s philosophy and the chief’s professional identity.

In what follows, I first provide a brief review of the literature on the militarization of law enforcement, noting the gaps in contemporary scholarship. Next, I discuss why Mexican PDs are a particularly useful setting to study mil-

itary members' recruitment. I then present my comparative case study analysis and theoretical argument, followed by three short case studies to provide empirical illustrations of my argument. In the following section, I discuss the mechanisms that explain why PDs destabilize and the means through which they can overcome professional differences between the military and police. Lastly, I summarize the theoretical argument and draw out implications for theory and practice.

4.1 The Standard View on the Militarization of Law Enforcement

Studies on the militarization of law enforcement and its consequences for democracy, public safety, and the rule of law saw an impressive surge in the last decade as a response to crime control becoming increasingly militarized worldwide [De Bruin, 2020]. This research has mostly focused on militarization as occurring through one of two forms: the adoption of military weapons and equipment by police forces (see [Kraska, 2007]) or the military taking on police functions (see [Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c]). Based on these two approaches, scholars have shown that negative consequences tend to follow law enforcement militarization [Blair and Weintraub, 2021, Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c, Magaloni and Rodriguez, 2020, Mummolo, 2018, Yashar, 2018].

Despite the many advances in the literature, one considerable gap remains. The police acquiring military equipment or the military taking on police functions are not the only ways militarization takes place. As [Go, 2020] has documented, militarization also occurs with the integration of military members

into PDs. Unfortunately, except for [Go, 2020, Moloeznik and Suárez de Garay, 2012, Zaverucha, 2000], academic scholarship has said little on this more subtle form.

One likely reason for this omission is that this pathway to police militarization was most common in the early 20th century. In Buenos Aires, for example, from 1880 to 1955, thirty of forty-seven of its police chiefs were military members [Kalmanowiecki, 2000]. Similarly, from 1916 to 1929, all Mexico City police chiefs were military officers [Davis, 2001]. And in the US, between 1905 and 1915, military veterans became chiefs of the Berkeley, Philadelphia, and Savannah PDs [Go, 2020]. However, this path is not long-gone. Just the opposite. Military members' recruitment into PDs has become characteristic of the re-militarization of public safety in Latin America.

Starting in the 1990s, Latin-American presidents, governors, and mayors turned to the military to command police forces. In Brazil, for example, generals were named Ministers of Public Safety in Rio de Janeiro, Pará, and Pernambuco [Zaverucha, 2000]. And in El Salvador, President Mauricio Funes (2009—2014) named Division General Francisco Ramón Salinas as director of the National Civil Police [Arauz and Labrador, 2011]. Democratically elected politicians also turned to the military to build new police forces. This was the case in Mexico, where President Ernesto Zedillo (1994—2000) created the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) with close to 5,000 police officers and 5,000 soldiers [Meyer, 2014]. Likewise, Honduras created the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP) in 2013 to tackle rising criminal violence. This police force is comprised entirely of military members.

Understanding more about this type is critical not only to offer an important

addition to our dominant views of police militarization but also because wide-ranging research on leaders, bureaucrats, and bureaucracies suggests that the integration of military members into PDs should be consequential.

Concerning leaders and elites, researchers across sub-fields have documented how a leader's socializing experiences and ascriptive traits shape their behavior and affect important political outcomes (see [Krcmaric et al., 2020] for an extensive summary). Military service, for example, has been shown to affect the decision-making of presidents and cabinet members by changing their policy preferences (e.g., [Horowitz and Starn, 2014]). To the extent that police chiefs impact the departments they command through the policies they introduce and the influence that their experiences and leadership have on the police force, we can hypothesize that recruiting military chiefs likely affects how a PD functions.

Political scientists have also documented how bureaucrats' experiences, backgrounds, and traits influence both the effective delivery of services and their behavior (see [Tsai, 2007] for an example). Specific to policing, scholarship has found that a police officer's gender, ethnicity, and race play a key role in understanding variation in police conduct [Ba et al., 2021]. Based on this literature, we can anticipate that differences between civilian police officers and military members—linked to their professional background and professional identity—likely matter for policing.

Beyond individual traits, scholars have also pointed to the centrality of a bureaucracy's composition to explain variation in performance. [Lyll, 2020], for example, finds that the ethnic composition of armed forces explains battlefield performance in modern war. [White, 2021] traces how the presence of military officers and civilians in state cabinets affects the likelihood of international con-

flict. And [Miller and Segal, 2019] show that the integration of women in US policing improved police quality significantly. By these accounts, we can imagine that the mix of military and civilian police officers in PDs probably affects police functioning. A scenario which is even more likely if we consider two things. On the one hand, policing theorists' firm belief that "*the military's mission is so different from that of the police that each contaminates the other*" (see [Bayley, 2001]).⁵ On the other hand, evidence that military forces do not effectively take constabulary roles despite participating in peacekeeping and policing-type operations [Harig, 2020].

While all these sources offer useful and vital insights on broader leadership patterns, bureaucracies, institutional performance, and individual behavior, whether military recruitment ultimately affects PDs remains to be explored.


4.2 Institutional Setting

Mexican PDs are a particularly useful setting to study the recruitment of military members into police forces. Like other federally-organized countries such as the US, Mexico has over 1,800 PDs—municipal, state, and federal. These departments significantly differ in their preparedness, equipment, training, and organizational capacity, making the country a large natural laboratory to explore variation in policing experiences.

Moreover, Mexico is one of several Latin American countries where both mayors and governors have turned to military members to run local police de-

⁵These differences extend to police officers' and soldiers' education, discipline, training, tactical techniques, handling of citizens, mode of operation, security concerns, and organizational mission.

Figure 4.1: Percentage of state police chiefs who are military members by state.



Note: These percentages are for a subsample of state police chiefs for whom I obtained information on their professional background and appointment dates either through right-to-information requests or newspaper articles.

partments. Between 1999 and 2020, seventy-eight out of a sample of 284 individuals who served as police chiefs of state police departments were former or current military members.⁶ In some states, such as Aguascalientes, Colima, Guerrero, and Tabasco, military members comprise over 50% of state police chiefs. In contrast, in other states like Sonora and Yucatán, only civilians have held this position—see figure 4.1.

⁶This statistic only includes individuals for whom I obtained information on their professional background and appointment dates. State police chiefs commonly receive the titles of Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Commissioners or Directors, and their title varies over time and across states.

The same patterns hold at the municipality level. In Sinaloa, for example, fifty-seven out of a sample of 208 municipal police chiefs were military members, and all municipalities in the state had at least one military member commanding its police department in the last two decades.⁷ In sharp contrast, twelve out of a sample of 212 municipal police chiefs in Chihuahua were military members, and most municipalities have only had civilian chiefs.⁸

Finally, a considerable number of Mexican police officers are ex-military. According to the 2017 National Survey on Police Standards, Training and Professionalization (ENECAP), 9% of Mexican police officers are former military [National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 2017b]. This statistic is at par with other countries', including the US, where 19% of police officers are military veterans [Weichselbaum and Schwartzapfel, 2012].

Given the difficulty in gaining access to PDs and the need to dive deep into the department's micro-level dynamics and its staff's experiences, I selected seven local PDs as my research settings. Following a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach [Ragin, 1987], I chose these seven research settings based on two criteria: 1) variation in contextual characteristics, including location, size, partisan politics, and criminal environment; and 2) variation in the presence of military members across ranks.⁹ Thus, these cases would allow me to link a comprehensive set of causally relevant conditions to my outcome of interest—i.e., prioritize multiple conjunctural causation—while exploring similarities and differences across comparable cases. Moreover, by bringing them

⁷This statistic only includes individuals for whom I obtained information on their professional background and appointment dates.

⁸This statistic only includes individuals for whom I obtained information on their professional background and appointment dates.

⁹QCA combines the best features of the case-oriented and variable-oriented approach by seeing cases as configurations of variables [Marx et al., 2014, Ragin, 1987]).

Table 4.1: Research setting

Case	Interviews and fieldwork
M1	38 interviews and 11 focus groups
M2	42 interviews and 6 focus groups
M3	32 interviews and 6 focus groups
M4	51 interviews and 5 focus groups
M5	43 interviews and 3 focus groups
S1	43 interviews and 16 focus groups
S2	22 interviews and 7 focus groups

together in a truth table, I would be able to assess which combination of conditions ultimately produced the same outcome [Marx et al., 2014].

Over eighteen months of research, between 2018 and 2019, together with a team of researchers,¹⁰ I conducted over 300 in-depth semi-structured interviews with line officers, supervisors, police chiefs, ex-military police officers, city employees, and unsworn staff—see table 4.1.¹¹ Subject selection was purposeful. We choose individuals based on their professional background (former military, police officers), post (sworn and unsworn), rank (line officers and high-ranking officers), years-in-service (short- and long-tenured), and perspective (insiders and outsiders) who could talk about different facets of the PD’s history and functioning.

We conducted these interviews in Spanish and face-to-face. Before the interview, we asked participants for their consent to participate in the study anonymously. Therefore, I do not specify the name of the PD, the location, nor the participant’s personal identifiers throughout the chapter to safeguard their identity.

¹⁰The data collection was completed within a larger research project led by Rodrigo Canales, Yale School of Management, titled “Building Effective, Resilient, and Trusted Police Organizations in Mexico”.

¹¹Unsworn staff refers to individuals who work in police departments, do not carry a firearm and a badge, and carry out administrative tasks.

Table 4.2: Participant’s referring to the integration of military members by profile

Profile	Number
Civilian police officer	50
Former military police officer	18
Police chief (former military, civilian, and career police chiefs)	9
Civilians (e.g., consultants, civil society, and academics)	9
Other municipal employees	6
Unsworn staff	5
Police academy trainer	2
Deputy police chief	1
Other state employees	1
Mayor	1

The interviews lasted an average of ninety minutes and consisted of three broad categories: the PD’s recent history, police operations, and police officers as employees—i.e., training, career opportunities, talent management, and recruitment. Asking about all these issues allowed me to systematically examine the functioning of the PDs over time, understand the context in which military members were recruited, and explore the experiences of staff more naturally and within the department’s everyday operations. The core interview questions did not include explicit references to the integration of military members into the department. We only asked follow-up questions if the participants brought this issue to our attention. Out of the 300 participants we interviewed, 100 did. I present descriptive information on these 100 participants in table 4.2. I also complemented the interviews with extensive research in newspaper articles, police documents, and other second-hand sources to recreate a timeline of each case’s events.

4.3 Military Officers and Bureaucratic Functioning

This study yields insights into one of many potential outcomes of interest: *bureaucratic functioning*. By bureaucratic functioning, I simply mean the inner workings of police. Despite its importance, I do not focus on police performance because my research design is uniquely positioned to zoom-in on the internal micro-level dynamics that are partly responsible for variation in performance.¹²

One of the difficulties with focusing on bureaucratic functioning is that it is not easy to operationalize. Even more if we consider that a useful measurement needs to capture instances of destabilization and instances of effective functioning meaningfully. As such, I focus on chief tenure. Though I recognize it is a rough indicator of bureaucratic functioning, I believe that chief tenure is a good measurement for two reasons. First, drawing on insights from the management field, there is ample evidence that chief executives are more likely to be dismissed during organizational and performance downturns [Boeker, 1992, Fredrickson et al., 1988]. Second, unlike other potential indicators of bureaucratic functioning—such as organizational coherence, quality, and competence—that are subject to interpretation, chief tenure is a straightforward measurement that can be replicated and validly applied across contexts. However, to ensure that my results are not dependent on a single indicator, I use employee unrest as a complementary measurement. Employee unrest is operationalized as occurrences of everyday forms of resistance up to collective outright defiance by police officers.

¹²This argument is similar to [Centeno et al., 2017] who contend that organizational structures are analytically prior to performance.

4.3.1 When do Police Departments Destabilize?

As summarized in table 4.3, I observe bureaucratic destabilization following military personnel recruitment in four out of the seven cases studied. First, police chiefs in M4, M5, S1, and S2 left the PDs between a year and a year and a half after their appointments. Their short tenure stands in sharp contrast to M1, M2, M3's chiefs, who remained in their position a minimum of four years. Second, these PDs also experienced significant employee unrest. In M5, "*officers were sleeping in the patrol cars, underneath trees, smoking, talking on their phones. Complete chaos.*" In S2, "*there was considerable anguish, and (...) a lot of people (...) left the department and went to work for [other] departments.*" In S1, "*this [appointing a military chief] provoked resentment and even labor strikes.*" And in M4, civilian police officers "*openly rebelled against the chief*" by turning "*their back at him. They literally turned their back. When he came out to talk.*"

Table 4.3: Comparing PDs on key variables

PD	Characteristics		Alternative explanations			Military members		Outcomes		
	Location	PD type	Force size (\approx)	Criminal violence	Party turnover	Chief turnover	Line officers	Police chief	Chief tenure	Employee unrest
M1	North	Municipal	500	High		Low	X	X	4,060	
M2	South	Municipal	500	Low	/	Low	X		1,732 ¹	
M3	Center	Municipal	2,000	Medium		Low	X		2,198	
M4	North	Municipal	2,000	High	/	Low		X	471 ²	X
M5	West	Municipal	3,000	Low	/	High		X	384 ³	X
S1	South	State	5,000	Medium	/	High		X	585 ⁴	X
S2	North	State	5,000	High	X	Low		X	362	X

Note: For party turnover, I take into account whether chief appointments coincided with a change in party at the mayoral level for municipal police departments and at the gubernatorial level for state police departments. A “/” means that party turnover coincides with only one of two or more chief appointments. Police chief tenure (measured in days) takes into account all police chiefs who commanded the department during the recruitment and presence of military members.

¹ Averages over two civilian chiefs.

² Averages over two military chiefs.

³ Averages over two military chiefs.

⁴ Averages over six military chiefs.

At first glance, it might seem from the four destabilization cases—M4, M5, S1, and S2—that having a military member as police chief is always disadvantageous for a PD. However, the appointment of a former military member to M1's PD did not hinder its ability to function effectively. On the contrary, as of 2020, the police chief continued as head of the department and is proud of *"overseeing the successful consolidation of the [police] force."* The difference in tenure between M1 versus M4, M5, S1, and S2 suggests that a third variable moderates the relationship between a military member's appointment as police chief and destabilization.

One such variable could be a violent criminal environment. Operational stressors place significant emotional and physical demands on police officers and can lead to increased turnover, psychological distress, and emotional exhaustion among the ranks [Adams and Buck, 2010, Chapin et al., 2008]. Yet, nothing in the data suggests that levels of violence are associated with the length of tenure for two reasons. First, as presented in table 4.3, there are high, medium, and low levels of violence in cases with both long and short police chief tenure. Second, M1 had similar violence levels as M4 and S2 and still did not see its police force temporarily destabilize.

Another potential explanation is that destabilization resulted from the high rates of chief turnover more than from a military member's appointment as chief. Scholars have linked rapid turnover in PDs to organizational disruption, increases in financial costs, and decreases in productivity and service delivery [Rainguet and Dodge, 2001]. However, S2 and M4 experienced destabilization despite having only one and two military chiefs. And a close examination of the sequence of events in M5 and S1 reveals that a military members' initial ap-

pointment as chief preceded both M5 and S1's high chief turnover.¹³ In M5, the appointment of a Major General and subsequent removal 272 days after taking over the PD set in motion the department's high turnover rates for the following five years. Similarly, in S1, facing a colossal corruption scandal linked to the then six-year civilian police chief, the governor turned to the military for support. The first military chief barely lasted 151 days as head of the department, and for the next eight years, five different Generals took over S1's police.

A third alternative explanation is that electoral competition and party alternation, by undermining the informal networks of protections that facilitate criminal operations in Mexico [Trejo and Ley, 2018, Trejo and Ley, 2020], also impaired the PDs' functioning. Nevertheless, the appointment of a military member as chief only coincided with party alternation in S2. In M4, M5, and S1, military officers were appointed both during party reelection periods and party alternation periods. Likewise, agency heads are also more likely to leave their posts following partisan turnover [Dahlström and Holmgren, 2019]. However, military chiefs in M4, M5, and S1 left the PDs during the term of the local executive who appointed them to the position.

A last potential explanation is that this is not a story about police chiefs but inherently unstable and unmanageable PDs. Yet, multiple within-case comparisons allow me to rule out this competing hypothesis. The average tenure of civilian chiefs exceeded that of military chiefs in all destabilization cases. In M4, for example, civilian chiefs lasted, on average, 1,094 days in the department, while the military chiefs lasted 471 days. Similarly, the average tenure of civilian chiefs in S1 was three times that of the military chief.

¹³The case-comparison thus suggests that the selection of a military chief sets in motion the dynamic of institutional fluidity or "serial-replacement" as discussed by [Levitsky and Murillo, 2014].

What then explains instances of bureaucratic destabilization? My argument—summarized in figure 4.2—is that the recruitment of military members affects the functioning of PDs when they are appointed as chiefs of *civilian* PDs. In contrast, their recruitment does not affect PDs when military officers are appointed as chiefs of *militarized* PDs or join lower-ranking positions in departments commanded by civilian chiefs.

Figure 4.2: Conceptualizing the effect of incorporating military members into PDs

		Police chief	
		Military	Civilian
Line officers	Military	Stability	Stability
	Civilian	Destabilization	Stability

The one common feature that M4, M5, S1, and S2 share and that was absent in M1 is that the military chiefs joined a predominantly civilian police force. In M1, the military chief commanded a force comprised almost entirely of former military members. As to why this difference should matter, having a shared ethos, training, and mode of operation greatly facilitated the General’s command of M1’s force and engendered organizational commitment. As will be seen in the case discussion, the General generated a sense of trustworthiness within the police, and his subordinates trusted him. His leadership was perceived as legitimate, and his military formation was key in convincing ex-military to join the department. As a former military officer succinctly summarized, “soldiers and police officers are not the same. I would be working with a group of

people that knew each other, well not exactly, but we had worked for the same institution, which makes you more confident."

The military chief "*created a small army*" which meant that neither the military chief nor former military police officers had to change their professional identity to fit the new job. Quite the contrary, maintaining their military identity was vital for the department's successful functioning because they "*knew each other*" and had "*this way, discipline, an ideology.*" In M4, M5, S1, and S2, the opposite occurred. Military chiefs did not share a common vision with their rank-and-file and sought to change the force to fit their professional identity. Each perceived the other as untrustworthy and as an incompetent decision-maker. This produced significant unrest among civilian police officers who were considerably "*hurt, angry, and that created a serious [institutional] crisis.*"

The above analysis points to the centrality of the differences in mode of operation and training between military and police officers in explaining bureaucratic destabilization. Still, it does not allow us to account that M2 and M3's civilian-led PDs were unaffected by the recruitment of ex-military—and where the same professional differences surface. M2 and M3's experiences show that the recruitment of military personnel to command PDs or to patrol must also be taken into account. It is for this reason that my theory posits that destabilization is not only the product of differences in training and mode of operation but rather a conjunction between professional differences on the one hand and rank position on the other. Contrary to military chiefs who can impose their philosophy and leadership style upon the PD they join, military members recruited as line officers necessarily have to change themselves to fit the job if they want to remain in the force.

Given the difficulties of doing justice to seven diverse cases in a single chapter, I focus my attention on three cases to demonstrate my theoretical argument. These are three especially informative cases given that, as described above, multiple plausible explanations are correlated with employee unrest and chief tenures. Still, a thorough process analysis reveals that destabilization results from rank position and professional differences. These cases also capture the three types of civilian-military personnel combinations I consider consequential for bureaucratic functioning and shed light on the interactions between police officers and police chiefs.

4.3.2 M4: Recruitment of a Military Member as Police Chief of a Civilian Police Department

M4 is a paradigmatic case of bureaucratic destabilization resulting from a military chief commanding a civilian police force. Criminal violence levels soared by 2008 in M4 due to outbreaks of gang violence and bloody battles between criminal organizations. Homicide rates reached over 100 per 100,000 people in the municipality. Having received numerous death threats, the civilian police chief turned in his resignation after five years as the department head. Like many other elected authorities across the country, the city's mayor turned to the military for help:

The city was no exception, and both at the state level and the municipality level, they appointed military chiefs. I insist, [they did this] with good intentions. But they were bad ideas — *M4: Police chief*

The mayor appointed a retired General to run the department while leaving the rest of the force untouched:

The transition for me was quite simple because the entire team stayed. I gave him [the General] what was mine, and upper management continued running their units. The administrative process was quite simple, but the model changed radically. It changed to a military-model, to a military-style, and that's when things started crumbling — *M4: Police chief*

The incoming General lasted a little over a year in the force. The election of a different party to the mayoral office brought the appointment of a second military member, a retired Lieutenant Colonel, who ran the department for a year before being asked to leave.

Though news articles claimed that the Lieutenant Colonel left due to escalating violence, interviewees provided an alternative story. Officers described that the force grew resentful and frustrated with the military command, to the point of openly subverting against the military chief in a public celebration:

In 2009 the chief left early, and a General was appointed as department chief. [He was here] for a few months, and then a new mayor was elected, and another Lieutenant Colonel came whose time here ended badly. The officers turned their back at him. They literally turned their back. When he came out to talk, they all turned around.
— *M4: Police officer*

High-ranking officers met with the mayor soon after and asked for the chief's

resignation. One week later, six police officers were murdered by members of criminal organizations, providing the final nudge the mayor needed to ask for the Lieutenant Colonel's resignation and appoint a new civilian chief:

Here in M4, the military period was far from fortunate. The department was very hurt, angry, and that created a serious crisis [...] I was appointed police chief in 2011 during a crisis within the institution and in the municipality more generally. They didn't even let me take office. Instead, I decided that my first act as chief was to honor fellow officers that had fallen, that were killed in the past eight days.
— *M4: Police chief*

The department proved its resilience, and, under the direction of the new civilian chief, it regained its stability:

We received police chiefs from here or that had worked in other police departments, that understood the policing function, and that's when things started getting better. — *M4: Administrative staff*

The chief stayed in the department for over two years, during which he turned it into a model police institution. He introduced new professionalization and performance monitoring systems, increased the force's size and salary, allocated significant resources to police dignification, and formed closed ties to the private sector.

4.3.3 M1: Recruitment of a Military Member as Chief of a Militarized Police Department

The case of M1 provides a useful counterpoint to M4 as it illustrates that, under certain conditions, PDs can function effectively under military command. M1's mayor came into office amid a security crisis linked to criminal organizations fighting to control drug trafficking routes to the US. While police warned the mayor to stay far from police business, the mayor did the opposite after an assassination attempt. Due to the increasing levels of violence, the mayor of a neighboring municipality recommended naming a General as police chief. Though initially hesitant, M1's mayor accepted due to a shared belief that soldiers were not afraid of criminals. The mayor's thinking was that the armed forces would help the General, and the General could, in turn, command and control the police force and therefore guarantee public safety.

The General received a police force in deplorable conditions. To turn the department around, he fired most police officers and then built a highly militarized, reactive force. Out of the approximately 300 police officers that comprised M1's PD, a little over 200 left when he took over as police chief.

By sending recruitment fliers to the nearest military battalion, the General replaced police officers with former military members, whom he initially separated from the remaining civilian officers and sent to patrol the streets:

My first experience was that on the third day I got here, I was given a uniform, they explained what policing was, had a 15-day training on policing functions, and then I was given a patrol car and assigned

to a beat. We were separated from the police officers and assigned to the most conflictive areas. — *M1: Ex-military*

Less than six months after his appointment as chief, over 50% of M1's PD was ex-military:

When my General got here and brought ex-military, he created a small paramilitary force because, for example, one came from the special force, another from the seventh [military] zone, and like that. People who were retired, pilots from the air force, they all came here. So, what did he create? A small army. — *M1: Ex-military*

When asked about the recruitment strategy, staff explain that the General recruited ex-military officers, namely because he had already worked with them, knew how they operated, considered them to be more disciplined, and trusted them:

He trusts ex-military because he has worked with them — *M1: Ex-military*

Similarly, when asked why they joined the M1 PD, ex-military emphasized trust, familiarity, and admiration for the General:

Well, I come from the military, and the General was already here, so I knew they would have discipline, there would be order under a military chief. And you already have the discipline, you already know how to work, so when you get there you are like "How is it going my General?" — *M1: Ex-military*

By 2020, the General was still the head of the department, and most of his high-ranking officers are ex-military who joined the force in his early days as chief:

Well, the work environment here under the General is that there is a lot of ex-military in the department. This makes us different from other police forces because most of the high-ranking officers are ex-military, either retired or left the army. And they have a particular way. Not because they are soldiers per se, but the civilian's and military's mode of operation is very different. We, ex-military, still believe that orders are given, and orders are followed. — *M1: Ex-military*

4.3.4 M2: Recruitment of Military Members as Line Officers

Under a Civilian Police Chief

M2 provides a critical example of why professional differences are necessary but not sufficient for bureaucratic destabilization. M2's PD was created in the early 2000s after almost thirty years of state police presence in the municipality. The newly elected mayor wanted to give the institution a more citizen-centered spirit and hired a friend and former businessman to run the department. Despite the chief's inexperience, the chief successfully established the organizational structures and processes necessary for the department to operate. Everyday management notwithstanding, his biggest challenge was to find recruits to grow his force of only eighty officers. Recruitment proved challenging because the chief only wanted to work with newcomers:

The original idea was to recruit new officers from the communities, and we could forge them from zero. — *M2: Mayor*

In the following mayor's term, a new civilian police chief continued this recruitment strategy and oversaw the department's consolidation. However, recruitment changed significantly with the election of a new party to the mayor's office and a career police chief's appointment. Though the department's philosophy and operations remained the same, and the new chief doubled-down on preventive and community-oriented strategies, he also had a different idea of the type of people he wanted to recruit. Contrary to M2's first police chief, he believed that the best strategy was to recruit state police officers or ex-military:

He was the chief that came from the state police. He had another vision. I even say that during that period, the HR area had very little work because he would say, "I only accept this [state police officers or ex-military] and that's it." — *M2: HR supervisor*

By the end of his term, ex-military comprised close to 10% of the police force.

Despite the influx of non-civilian recruits, the department continued operating as it had for the last eight years and maintained their community policing model. Moreover, the current police chief—in 2021 in his eighth year in office—continued the pursuit of proactive partnerships with the public, despite re-prioritizing recruiting only civilian trainees:

Now there's a new profile and, when we recruit new officers, we prefer civilians who have never worked in another police department or are ex-military. — *M2: HR supervisor*

4.4 Why Does Bureaucratic Destabilization Occur?


While the comparative and within-case analysis reveal the combination of factors that together produce bureaucratic destabilization, they come up short in explaining why destabilization occurs. Answering this question requires diving deep into the interview data.

To analyze the data, I followed an iterative, three-stage content-analysis process. This method is ideal to capture the participants' experience in theoretical terms. That is, to move from raw data to terms and themes for analysis. This process is also widely used in sociology to "capture concepts relevant to the human experience in terms that are adequate at the level of meaning of the people living that experience and adequate at the level of scientific theorizing about that experience" [Gioia et al., 2013].

First, each sentence of the interviews was analyzed by the research team that participated in the field-visits following an open-ended coding approach [Corbin and Strauss, 2014]. The purpose of the open-ended coding was to identify general themes including "police department history," "military," "operations," "leadership," "philosophy," "police-citizen interactions," "politics," and "training," among others. Specific to this study, to minimize coding bias, I checked all the transcripts a second time to identify whether all sentences related to the "military" theme were coded correctly. In the second stage, I organized the initial military codes that shared similar qualities into a series of first-order categories [Corbin and Strauss, 2014]. Lastly, I grouped the first-order categories into similar second-order categories based on the frequency of mentions and mapped these to each of my cases [Gioia et al., 2013]. I refined

and revised the second-order categories until I settled on a limited number of overarching themes exemplified in figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: Examples of first- and second-order coding



Based on this analysis, I propose three mechanisms that translate rank position and professional differences into bureaucratic destabilization. These mechanisms are 1) *treatment* of police officers as second-class employees, 2) *unfamiliarity* with policing and police protocol, and 3) *perceived* injustices related to professional growth and career-track. I also propose two mechanisms through which civilian-led departments recruiting military personnel as line officers can override the gap between policing and the military professional identity.

In the following sections, I first present the generally accepted differences between the military and the police professions as narrated by different participants. I then discuss the mechanisms that translate professional differences and rank position into destabilization. Lastly, I examine two socialization mechanisms used by civilian chiefs to bypass the military-police gap.

4.4.1 Differences in Training and Mode of Operation

Beliefs about the intrinsic differences between the military and the police were so widespread that participants used the same language and provided similar examples across all seven cases to describe them:

Blue and green do not go together. The way soldiers are educated, their discipline and tactical techniques, their handling of citizens. It is very different from the way a police department should operate (...) That's why it's not a good combination. — *M4: Police officer*

Both civilian and ex-military officers voiced such narratives. Former military officers often contrasted their current duties to those they performed while in the army:

The differences are two: the soldier has a different training than the police, which is naturally geared differently because the army is focused on actions like handling a weapon or how to complete an order. They aren't taught about investigating, following an arrest protocol, an inspection, how to detain someone, which protocols to apply, and we are taught all of this in the police. — *M1: Ex-military*

Employees also stressed the key tensions between each profession's approach to public safety and mode of operation. While most valued the discipline and conviction entrenched in the military ethos, they nonetheless also recognized that those qualities could sometimes be harmful to the police's mode of operation:

Instead, police officers work with citizens, with the local business owner, with the worker; there is more closeness. Maybe that is one of the things that has been hardest for ex-military because it is not the same thing to prevent as to pursue a target. — *S2: Police officer*

As [Lipsky, 2010] identified, police officers, like other street-level bureaucrats, enjoy a great deal of autonomy and discretionary decision-making because judgment is part of the nature of their service to the public. Features like autonomy and discretion came up when officers contrasted the responsibilities of a police officer to those of a soldier and linked the differences to the military's structure:

What was hard for me was coming from military life to civilian life because it is different. The difference is that we must act at the moment, with intelligence, to solve a situation. Because in the army, we go all together and go, and a commander leads you, and you go back, and the soldier just goes. How can I say this, the group doesn't act [independently] as the police officer does directly with the public. — *M1: Ex-military*

Overall, across cases, civilian officers, ex-military, and unsworn staff described that both professions diverged in their duties, decision-making power, identity, structure, and mission at an initial, fundamental level. However, as my theory suggests, professional differences are not sufficient to produce bureaucratic destabilization. Instead, I argue that there are three mechanisms that translate professional differences and rank position into bureaucratic destabilization. These mechanisms include treatment of civilian officers as second-class

employees, lack of legal and policing procedural knowledge, and perceived injustices related to the police career-track.

4.4.2 Second-Class Employees

A particularly salient feature of incorporating military chiefs for police officers was their treatment of staff. Officers believed that military chiefs did not take them seriously simply because of their uniform and even expressed feeling treated like second-class employees:

When they come to the police, the general or the soldier sees the police officer as less, as second-class. The general comes and wants officers to kneel before him. Discipline is okay, but not at that level.

— *S1: Police officer*

The perception of second-class employees was a recurrent feature in their narratives and appeared even in the smallest of things. Moreover, officers believed that mistreatment was directly tied to the chief's military background and training:

The General started making fun, if that is the phrase, of obese cops, "You are very fat, go exercise, eat less," and he was careless in how he did it because that is how they are trained. Obviously, the police officer feels attacked, and "No, wait. You are my boss, and you do not respect me, and you are asking me to respect citizens. Start in your own house." I think it is a lot of anger towards the military

chiefs, the lack of respect, and not being aware that they are working with civilians, police officers, but still civilians. — *M4: Police officer*

Another point of conflict was the military chief's preconceived ideas about the abilities and competence of his subordinates, and how these ideas were incompatible with how the department was used to running:

I had friends that worked there, and how he treated women was beyond deplorable, he spoke to the officers in the worst way possible that you can imagine, like idiots, and like that. — *S2: Civil society member*

Most of all, interviewees were irritated at losing autonomy and being seen as unqualified without merit:

I1: This guy [the General] came in trying to change everything here, change us like we were his sons like we were his property.

I2: His property, and no sir [we are not].

I3: He was rude to some, to some police officers, and he was so fussy that when a document was not stapled as he liked, he would destroy the document and make you print it again. — *M4: Police officers*

To summarize, officers found it increasingly difficult to work under the military chief's command given their acquired lesser status. They openly rejected the changes executed by the chief to make the organization more akin to the military.

4.4.3 Unfamiliarity with Policing and Police Protocol

The officers in the four destabilization cases also believed that the chief's unfamiliarity with the law and policing protocols directly undermined police work. Officers often contrasted the benefit of having a career police officer or civilian chief, implicitly or explicitly, to having a military chief in terms of effective leadership. Possessing the administrative abilities required to keep the department running, experience in the field, and periodic socializing with lower-ranking officers. Neither of these qualities was associated with military chiefs. Officers and staff reproached them for the opposite:

First, they brought a General from the army. The General was old. He thought that this city was about sitting at a desk and giving orders "do this and this," and he never met with the rank-and-file, he never came to talk to the patrol officers, and he never understood that the city's dynamic was different. — *M5: Undersecretary*

Officers also criticized military chiefs for their inexperience with the policing profession and dismissal of what police officers are required and permitted to do by law. Their inexperience created significant tensions in the force as military chiefs gave orders that they could not execute. Not only did they express concerns in terms of legal mandates, but officers were also aware of the risks inherent in the military chief's dismissal of the department's codes of conduct and regulations:

This Major comes, and to a police officer that committed a violation, the Major comes and tells me, "Arrest him for fifteen days." And I

say, "My Major, I cannot arrest him fifteen days" "Why not? In the army—" "The army is the army, my Major, here in the police we have state laws and municipal regulations that we must abide by, and the regulations only allow me to arrest him thirty-six hours for any violation." This is the advice I gave. [The Major responds] "Well, I don't care; I want you to arrest him for fifteen days." I cannot work like this. The regulations do not allow this. Ignorant. Horrible. —
M5: Police chief

And they were even resentful of small changes to police protocols, such as disregarding the department's dress code policy which have clear police grooming standards:

He allowed you to have long hair, you could have long hair and a beard. Another thing that was not permitted [by protocol] here. —
M4: Police officer

Inexperience on the part of the newly recruited military chief created a dilemma for officers, either obey orders or follow the department's rules:

I have a specific example. I am part of the Honor and Justice Commission. There was a General here, a Major. He would say. He would come to the hearing during which we are supposed to present evidence and testimony specified by the code of conduct, with rights and obligations. The General would come and say, "You know what? Just fire him, quickly," without being heard. After that, another military officer came, another General, who sort of understood what was

happening. Right now, we have another chief that was a police officer. He knows this world. He is a lawyer. Things have changed. I am not against the military. If they adapted to police work, then things would work out. — *S1: Police officer*

For officers, it became evident that the military chief's unfamiliarity with the policing profession undermined morale. As narrated by this mid-ranking officer, frustration became the norm:

I was there as head of the special forces, and I remember that the General walked in. "Let's see, who is in charge?" "At your orders, sir," "Let's see, go find a monkey and start mixing [cement] and go find another, if he knows about plumbing, get him to fix those tubes," That's the way it is in the army. They do everything. He wanted us to do that. "Yes, sir." We follow orders. I don't know how, but we have to follow them. I said, "He is wrong." He had just joined the department, and we had just met him, so we couldn't talk. He left, and I went to the maintenance area and told them, "Hey, could you help us out" [To the interviewer] Do you understand what I am saying? We already had protocols and processes for how things should be done in the department. So, I executed his order, but I didn't do it myself, neither did my crew because that is not our job. — *M4: Police officer*

In sum, interviewees described a situation where it was practically impossible to fulfill what the chief demanded and what their profession stipulated.

4.4.4 Career Opportunities

The third feature that contributed to bureaucratic disruption was the perceived injustices between the department's professionalization standards and career track versus high-ranking military personnel's arrival.

One common criticism that police officers made about the military-to-police pipeline was how high-ranking military members did not take policing seriously:

Ex-military within the police have not worked because their training is different from the police. Often, the veterans, the retired generals, come here as if they were taking a vacation. — *S1: Police officer*

Or they saw their appointment as an opportunity to employ other military members in high-ranking positions:

Many generals came here and treated the department as their employment agency, and I tried not to let this happen because this creates a huge problem: you break the police career-track, which is very serious. — *S2: Police chief*

Interviewees believed that the appointment of military members to high-ranking positions stalled career progression:

The soldiers get here, and they take all the high-ranking positions, from sergeant and up. They [are supposed] to be here two years [but]

they did not go to the academy; they get here like “I am from the military, and I am great, and I am getting in.” Okay. So, what happened? They create a ceiling for the rest of the officers. Why? Because they had all the positions that were already budgeted occupied, and the rest [of police officers] are not going to move up, which means that they would be here two years, more than two years, four years without moving upwards, and going to have to leave. This created disappointment and resentment. They broke the police career-track. They broke with people’s aspirations to move up, and you take that from an organization, any organization, people’s aspirations to grow, and ruin it. — *S2: Police chief*

Their appointment sidelined the shared narrative that hard work and professionalization equaled moving up the ranks:

Line officers hated the military chiefs because of professional envy. In the police career track, it is offensive that they appointed a military chief because all police officers aspire to be chief one day. — *S1: Police officer*

Police officers became disheartened by the department’s unfulfilled promises of moving up the police career-track if they put in the work and saw the dismissal of high-ranking civilian officers as an insult to the entire group’s capacity and preparation:

The police officers took this very badly. They saw this as an affront to their career, people that have been here for three years, training, took

leadership courses and everything. [They would say] “Why didn’t you choose someone from us? Why did you bring someone from outside?” — *S2: Civil society member*

In summary, what I observe in the four destabilization cases are military chiefs that sought to change the organizations they joined to fit their professional background and professional identity, creating significant resentment among the civilian rank-and-file. The perceived treatment as second-class employees, the tension between obeying police protocol and executing the chief’s orders, and the hopelessness of one day moving up the ranks took its toll on police officers and, in turn, weakened the departments. Military chiefs lasted less than a year and a half in their post, many police officers resigned, and as presented in the case discussion of M4, their anger on one occasion culminated into open rebellion.

4.4.5 Overcoming Incompatibility by Changing Mindsets

As noted at the beginning of this section, my findings show that reflections on the mismatches between policing and military work are equally present in cases with no observed instability despite military presence. For example, former military officers in M2 and M3’s police departments also talked about key differences in duties and training, and emphasized the differences between flexible versus rigid modes of operation:

I was in the army, and definitely, the military ideology, the military way, or the military mystique is not about prevention, not even about

dissuasion. It is about elimination. If there is a risk, eliminate it. If there is an enemy, eliminate him. Police study situations, they engage with communities; they approach neighbors and sometimes mediate between them. The soldier doesn't, the soldier wasn't prepared to engage with the community, but was prepared to eliminate risks — *M3: Ex-military*

However, in contrast to the destabilization cases, officers in both cases of integration also acknowledged that the department overcame the professional differences over time. As an interviewee succinctly puts it:

As we say, you have to swim with the tide. You have to adjust to how everyone else normally works, and, those that cannot, leave [...] [The ones that stay] get used to it. They might not abandon their disciplinary regime, but they start getting closer to neighbors, they start talking to people, they stop being little soldiers that just stand around. — *M3: Police officer*

The question, then, is how these departments got former military line officers to start "*swimming with the tide.*" I propose two socialization mechanisms that civilian chiefs can use to successfully change mindsets: requiring ex-military to complete basic training and promoting frequent interactions with supervisors.

Regarding basic training, it is interesting that both police departments at first did not require basic training for military members:

[Were you required to complete initial training?] No, that was after [...] What happened is that I wasn't sent to the police academy be-

cause of my military training because I already knew basic training. I knew how to use a weapon; I knew about self-defense; I knew how to follow orders, all the basics. — *M3: Ex-military*

However, higher-ranking staff in both departments recognized that, except for recruits that join more reactive specialized law enforcement units,¹⁴ the lack of training was negatively impacting the department vis-à-vis the community:

Yes, they arrive all Rambo-like and want to arrest everyone, speak disrespectfully, not cordially. — *M2: Police officer*

In consequence, both departments changed their recruitment policies and conditioned the entry of ex-military personnel on various prerequisites, including the successful completion of basic training:

Sometimes the soldier is already trained, so it's easier to join the police, but they've restricted all of that [...] because now, "Yes you are a soldier, but if you do not have initial training then you cannot join the department." — *M2: Police officer, paramedic*

When reflecting on the utility of basic training to bridge the gap between policing and the military service, several supervisors and academy trainers mentioned that training provided the necessary material for effective policing:

¹⁴The gap is smaller to nonexistent because the types of duties and activities that personnel in special operation units perform is quite similar to those performed by the military. As an ex-military specified "Because we are used to confrontations, and we get here and it is also part of our everyday."

It does change because the soldier comes here with that intention. Soldiers think, “you stay here and watch,” just watch; no community engagement, no assisting, no helping, just watching. However, during initial training in policing, you learn about human rights, mediation, conflict resolution, and all the materials you need to be a police officer. — *M3: Ex-military*

Likewise, police chiefs recognized the advantages of recruiting former military personnel. However, they also understood its limits:

Yes, I feel that because of the military discipline in the Army and the Navy, they are well prepared, and it helps compared to non-military recruits because you don’t need to teach them to march, teach them to salute, and other things. Military recruits know all of this. That part is no longer an issue. With them, what you need to know is how to adapt them, teach them about others’ safety, that the public supports us, and that our job is to help the communities in everything. — *M2: Police chief*

And therefore, stressed the importance of shifting these recruit’s reactive viewpoint to a preventive one on public safety:

There are people, young people, that do their military service, and they have them there for three to four months, and they are trained, at least trained in the military field. It is then up to us to finish shaping them in prevention, policing, and all of that. — *M2: HR staff*

Officers also linked professional identity change to the every-day work of supervisors or middle managers. Without knowing it, supervisors practiced the principles of procedural justice with their recruits—listening, being fair, treating others with respect, and demonstrating trustworthiness [Tyler, 2003]. For example, supervisors stressed the importance of constant communication:

If you see that he is getting angry or losing control during the interaction, you automatically take charge. You move him and handle the situation. Afterward, you explain to him, “you need to be more flexible; you need to be this and this. [...] You start working with them and talk, talk, talk. — *M2: Police officer*

They also reflected on the importance of treating former military recruits with respect to set an example:

We did have some issues related to that because they are very rigid [...] Changing their mindset from strict to a little more flexible has been difficult, but it depends on how you treat them. The way that you tell them, “It’s okay, you were in the military, but you are no longer there, you are a police officer, and discipline is different here. This does not mean that you need to be relaxed, but it means more flexibility and more contact with the community.” — *M2: Police officer*

While both departments succeeded in changing how former military line officers approached policing, interactions with the public, and the provision of public safety, it is notable that most officers recognized that changing mindsets is not automatic:

You talk to them, and they start changing that mental chip. Their transformation happens a little slowly. It doesn't happen in a day, but little by little as you explain to them. — *M2: Police officer*

Most ex-military reported up to a year to fully adjust to their new duties:

It must have taken about six months to adjust; I am still adjusting because it is different. Here interactions with citizens are kinder, more enjoyable, while in the military, they are a little harder, drier. The military way. Here you want to be their friend. — *M2: Ex-military*

And academy staff and supervisors agree:

You start seeing changes by the third, fourth, and fifth months, depending on the individual's attitude because there are stubborn people. So, you start by sending them to a unit with little contact with citizens while he starts to want to change. — *M2: Academy trainer*

To conclude, what I observe in both integration without destabilization cases are military members that changed to fit their jobs. Police departments socialized ex-military personnel to address their initial work-identity violations,¹⁵ resulting in the incremental construction of a new policing identity over time.

¹⁵Work-identity violations means that there is a mismatch between who individuals are and what they do at work [Pratt et al., 2006].

4.5 Discussion

This study aimed to better understand an understudied and largely ignored type of police militarization and how it affects PDs. By carefully examining the trajectories of seven PDs and analyzing over 300 in-depth interviews with police officers, police chiefs, ex-military police officers, and unsworn staff, I proposed a theory on how recruitment of military members into police affects their functioning. I argued that recruitment destabilizes PDs when military members are appointed as police chiefs of civilian PDs while remaining unaffected when military members are appointed as chiefs of militarized police forces or are recruited to lower-ranking positions by civilian chiefs.

As to why this occurs, this study proposed three mechanisms that translate professional differences and rank position into bureaucratic destabilization. These mechanisms are (1) treatment of police officers as second-class employees, (2) unfamiliarity with policing and police protocol, and (3) perceived injustices related to professional growth and career-track. I also proposed two mechanisms used by civilian chiefs whom recruit ex-military to bypass the misalignment in military and police professional identities: compulsory basic training and interactions with supervisors.

This study makes important theoretical contributions. It brings attention to an alternative type of militarization—the recruitment of military members into PDs—and moves beyond [Go, 2020] and [Zaverucha, 2000] by understanding the experiences and processes that unfold when military command police or military members become police officers. This study also uncovers a hidden cost of the militarization of public safety for police. Scholars like [Yashar, 2018]

and [Flores-Macías and Zarkin, 2021c] identified that the militarization of public safety negatively affects police by stalling police reform and reallocating resources from the police towards the armed forces. This chapter proposes a third potential adverse effect: destabilizing their internal functioning.

The proposed theory also builds on previous work on role conception and the role evolution of militaries worldwide. Crucial theoretical work has pointed out that for military units to take on policing roles, they need first to acquire the practical skills relevant to their new role [Campbell and Campbell, 2010]. The move from warfighting to policing requires that soldiers use more judgment, mediation, and communication during their missions, which can be achieved through training programs that socialize the less aggressive and more mediating policing mindset [Campbell and Campbell, 2010]. In practice, there is some evidence of role evolution in the context of temporary assignments involving peacekeeping or crime-fighting operations [Harig, 2020]. This study extends research in this area by documenting under what conditions role evolution follows when military members join PDs and the mechanisms through which PDs can achieve professional identity transformation.

This study also extends research on bureaucracies in three ways. First, it builds on and complements research by scholars like [Lyall, 2020] on bureaucratic composition by providing additional evidence for how composition matters for bureaucratic functioning in the case of PDs. Second, the mechanisms proposed also point to the centrality of professional identities to understand how bureaucrats enact and make sense of their environment as well as under what conditions professional identities shift in relation to work changes. Third, by focusing on bureaucratic functioning and bureaucratic destabilization,

it moves beyond the literature's dominant focus on performance and invites further research on the inner workings of bureaucracies.

As for the literature on civil-military relations, the theory and findings contribute to emerging work on the causes and consequences of the presence of military members in governmental agencies (see [Brooks, 2008, Pion-Berlin, 2020, White, 2021]). Though work on this subject has focused primarily on cabinets and state councils, this study points to the police as an equally interesting site for study. In line with [Brooks, 2008] and [White, 2021], the cases in this study also underline the importance of focusing on spaces of shared power between military members and civilians.

The findings also have important practical implications for politicians, policymakers, and PDs. Since the turn of the century, democratically elected civilians across Latin America have increasingly appointed military members as police chiefs as a strategy to (1) tackle rising criminal violence, (2) align security institutions, (3) or present themselves as competent decision-makers. Though a military members' appointment as police chief might be reputationally rewarding, this chapter points to its inherent risks. This study suggests that the appointment of a military chief can, under certain conditions, be counterproductive to the provision of public safety or the transformation of the police into an effective and trusted force. Consequently, political leaders need to assess how a potential chief's appointment might affect their PD's functioning. M1's experience under the leadership of a military member points to the importance of fit between a police department's philosophy and a chief's professional identity.

Lastly, this study also has practical implications for the professional train-

ing of police officers. While former military members bring positive skills to the policing profession [Daxe Jr et al., 2009], the results suggest that basic training for military members that join PDs should be compulsory. Socializing ex-military to address their initial work-identity violations—as in M2 and M3—is desirable and consequential for the decisions and actions they take on-duty.

Though this study made several contributions to our understanding of police militarization in general and the recruitment of military members to police forces in particular, it has several limitations. While the methods were ideal for the type of exploration pursued in this chapter, as in all qualitative studies, one needs to be careful about generalizing these findings to other PDs. Still, this study allows for a better understanding of one type of police militarization. Scholars should treat the theoretical proposition on military members' recruitment to PDs as a hypothesis to test using other types of methods, cases, and data. In future work, researchers should more explicitly compare police chiefs across a set of organizational and performance outcomes and propose innovative ways to operationalize police leadership and fit.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Amid mounting crime and citizen demand for security and safety, Latin American governments have enacted a wide range of policies to create effective policing practices in the last ten years. Some governments prioritized police-community partnerships, procedurally just interactions, and building citizen trust. Most, however, embraced a militarized paradigm. Believing that discipline and hierarchy could solve the problems of police criminality and incompetence, civilian authorities gave public safety to the military, created paramilitary units, and handed over the leadership of police forces to military personnel. The chapters in this dissertation represent a first attempt to understand what explains this decision and its consequences for the very institutions political leaders were trying to reform.

5.1 Summary and Main Findings

In this dissertation, I have argued that local politicians militarize policing when they face coercive pressures and strategic incentives to align with the federal government's militarized security strategy. I also proposed that elected officials militarize public safety not only to signal congruence with citizen preferences but also to inform them about their governing capacities in this domain. As to the consequences of militarization for police, I theorized that the recruitment of military members affects the functioning of police when they are appointed as chiefs of civilian police departments. In contrast, their recruitment does not affect police when military officers are appointed as chiefs of militarized police departments or join lower-ranking positions in departments commanded

by civilian chiefs.

Taking a subnational perspective and relying on a mixed-methods approach, I demonstrate empirically that political and reputational concerns play a central role in political leaders' decisions concerning local security governance. Regarding political motives, based on 5,580 police chief appointments and in-depth interviews with political actors from Nuevo León state, I find evidence for the coerced and strategic alignment of security institutions to facilitate interjurisdictional coordination in crime control. As to politicians' reputational concerns, I find that military chief appointments can offer politicians a cheap opportunity to signal competence in security governance. Using a mock news report survey experiment in Brazil and Mexico, I find that mayors who appoint military chiefs are seen as more effective in public safety. They are also thought to be doing something about policing and corruption in their municipality.

I also demonstrate that police militarization is, under certain conditions, highly consequential for police forces themselves. Based on a qualitative comparative analysis of seven Mexican police departments, I find that bureaucratic destabilization results from the interaction of professional differences between the military and police and rank position. The appointment of military members as chiefs of civilian police departments interferes with the police's effective functioning. Furthermore, based on interviews with civilian and former military police officers, I propose three mechanisms that explain why police destabilize: the perceived treatment of civilian officers as second-class employees, the chief's lack of policing and procedural knowledge, and the interference with the police's career track.

5.2 Avenues of Future Research

Many questions went unexplored due to the need for additional interviews, data, and research across different cities in Mexico and in the region. In my view, the biggest and most important questions that are left unanswered relate to the consequences of appointing a military chief for vital outcomes such as police performance, criminal violence, and police abuse. For example, are military chiefs more effective at fighting crime? What happens to crime levels when military chiefs are appointed? Do military chiefs spend more on military training and equipment? Do police forces become less corrupt under the leadership of a military chief?

Future research should also engage more deeply in the processes of demilitarization. Building effective and trusted police requires understanding how contemporary governments successfully overcome the militarization paradigm of policing. It requires knowing what roadblocks they face and how demilitarization impacts police and communities alike. Scholars might ask when do elected authorities demilitarize public safety? What role do political and reputational concerns play in this process? What is the role of citizens and police chiefs? Do police officers invite demilitarization, or do they perceive their work as less consequential?

Additionally, this dissertation spawns more questions on mayors than it answers. There is much left to learn on the strategic nature of enforcement and the factors constraining security governance choices. For example, when do elected officials prioritize congruence with their voters, and when do they build police institutional capacity despite short-term costs? What motivates political leaders

to take on a greater role in security governance? What motivates them to disengage from this domain? We also need to pay greater attention to the interaction between police chiefs and elected authorities. How and when do politicians and police chiefs communicate? Is their relationship confrontational or cooperative? Who is ultimately responsible for policing and public safety?

5.3 Final Thoughts

Even though democratic rule has taken hold throughout Latin America, policing bears little semblance to democratic ideals. As [González, 2020] rightly describes, “police bureaucracies continue to serve as authoritarian enclaves.” Once praised for their professionalized police forces, Colombia and Chile are now facing significant pressures for radical reform after the egregious police abuses committed against protesters in 2019 and 2021 [Amnesty International, 2021, Bartlett, 2020]. The Buenos Aires Provincial Police has maintained distinctly authoritarian coercive practices [González, 2020]. Police killings tripled between 2013 and 2020 in Brazil [The Economist, 2021]. And despite Mexico’s justice reform, police forces continue to be viewed as part of the problem instead of part of the solution of the current security crisis [Sabet, 2010]. Against this backdrop, the military’s participation in public safety emerged as a desirable alternative. Yet far from moving Latin America towards democratic policing, the military’s takeover has sent the message that civilians cannot solve societal problems and undermined citizen security. This dissertation has invited us to think about what pushes elected politicians to continue going down this path. It also invites us to reflect on what types of police forces we would like to see in Latin America and, more specifically, who we would like to wear the badge.

APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2


A.1 Data Sources

Data on homicides comes from the National Health Information System (SINAIS). Data on elections and parties come from [Magar, 2018] and the National Electoral Institute (INE). Data on city and state military chiefs come from right-to-information requests and open-source information published in newspaper articles. Data on federal joint operations come from [Flores-Macías, 2018]. Data on military patrols uses the Ministry of Defense (SEDENA) information on military confrontations with criminal organizations via two public-information requests (0000700018420 and 0000700233818). Population comes from the National Population Council (CONAPO). Economic development comes from the UNDP's Human Development Index for Mexican municipalities database (rescaled from 0 to 100) available in the Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal (SNIM). Metropolitan area status comes from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) 2005, 2010, and 2015 yearly reports on "Delimitación de las Zonas Metropolitanas de México."

A.2 Example of a Response to a Right-to-Information Request

Figure A.1 is an example of a response to a right-to-information request soliciting information on police chief appointments and their professional background.

Figure A.1: Tijuana’s response to the right-to-information request.



Dependencia: Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana Municipal
 Sección: Oficina del Titular
 Número de Oficio: 2197-SPPCM-2020
 Asunto: El que se indica

Tijuana, Baja California, a 18 de noviembre de 2020.

ARIADNA SANDOVAL ROCHA
 DIRECTORA DE LA UNIDAD DE TRANSPARENCIA
 DEL H. XXIII AYUNTAMIENTO DE TIJUANA, B.C.
P R E S E N T E:


Por medio de este conducto, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 1, 2, 7, 8, 23 de la Ley General de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública; 1, 2, 3, 4, 15 fracción IV, 55, 115, 117, 122, 123, 129 de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública para el Estado de Baja California y en seguimiento a su oficio número UT-XXIII-2346/2020, derivado de la solicitud de información con número de Folio 01050920 y mediante el cual canaliza a esta Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana, la siguiente petición:

<<A quien corresponda. Solicito un listado que contenga

- Los nombres y apellidos completos de los últimos 20 Secretarios de Seguridad Pública, incluyendo el actual.
- Para cada uno de ellos(a)s la fecha de su ingreso
- Para cada uno de ellos(a)s la fecha en que dejó el cargo
- Para cada uno de ellos(a)s si es Encargado de Despacho o Secretario
- Para cada uno de ellos(a)s el tipo de perfil, ya sea policía de carrera (es decir, ascenso en el servicio policial) civil, militar o marino
- Para cada uno de ellos(a)s indicar su nivel de educación y en el caso de tener licenciatura, maestría o doctorado cual fue la carrera que cursó
- Si es policía de carrera, indicar si pertenece a la policía federal, la policía estatal, la policía municipal o la policía ministerial
- Si es policía de carrera, indicar su rango.
- Si es militar o marino, indicar su cargo

De antemano, se indica que los sujetos están obligados a proporcionar esta información con fundamento en la Ley General de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, Capítulo II de las Obligaciones de Transparencia Comunes, en el artículo 70 y el artículo 71 >> (sic)

A efecto de dar respuesta a la solicitud formulada por el ciudadano, esta Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana Municipal de Tijuana, Baja California, hace de su conocimiento que se realizó una búsqueda en nuestros archivos, dándonos como resultado que no se cuenta con toda la información como la requiere el ciudadano, toda vez que la base de datos electrónica inició su funcionamiento a partir del 2015 y los documentos enviados al archivo muerto solo cuentan con un periodo de preservación, en ese tenor le aclaro que solo estamos obligados a conservar información correspondiente a los últimos 5 años anteriores al periodo actual, esto con fundamento en lo dispuesto en los lineamientos dispuestos en la Norma Técnica número 44, denominada "Archivo Muerto en las dependencias del Ayuntamiento y Entidades Para Municipales", de la Sindicatura Procuradora del H. Ayuntamiento de Tijuana, Baja California, en términos del precepto 115, fracción II, de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, así como específicamente en el artículo Vigésimoprimer del Acuerdo 20/02/2004 del Diario Oficial de la Federación,



denominado "Lineamientos Generales para la organización y conservación de los archivos de las dependencias y entidades de la Administración Pública Federal".

Aunado a lo anterior le informo que estos son los datos con los que cuenta esta Secretaría:

No.	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
1	Juan Valdes Moreno	14 oct 2020	actual	Encargado Despacho	Civil	Maestría en Administración Pública	x	Civil	x
2	Jorge Alberto Ayón Monsalve	01 oct 2016	16-nov-2020	Secretario	Militar	Lic. En Administración	x	Civil	Diplomado de Estado Mayor
3	Marco Antonio Sotomayor Amezcua	01-dic-2016	30-sept-2015	secretario	Militar	Maestro en Administración Pública	x	x	x
4	José Luis López Medina	01-mar2016	30-nov-2016	Encargado Despacho	Civil	Medio Superior	Municipal	Sub jefe	x
5	Alejandro Lores Valladares	01-dic-2013	30-nov-2016	Secretario	Civil	Lic. En Derecho	Municipal	Sub inspector	x
6	Jesús Alberto Capella Ibarra	06-oct-2011	30-nov-2013	Secretario	Civil	Lic. En Derecho	x	x	x
7	Gustavo Huerta Martínez	01-dic-2010	05-oct-2011	Secretario	Militar	No aplica	x	x	Cap. 1er. De Infantería
8	Julián Leyzaola Pérez	01-dic-2008	01-dic-2010	Secretario	Militar	No aplica	x	x	Teniente Coronel
9	Jesús Alberto Capella Ibarra	01-dic-2007	30-nov-2008	Secretario	Civil	Lic. En Derecho	x	x	x
10	Luis Javier Aljorri Franco	04-mar-2006	30-nov-2007	Secretario	Civil	Lic. En Derecho	x	x	x
11	Ernesto Santillán Santillán	06-dic-2004	03-marzo-20	Secretario	Civil	Lic. En Derecho	x	x	x
12	Martín Deminguez Rocha	01-dic-2001	01-dic-2004	Secretario	Civil	Lic. En Derecho	x	x	x
13	Perla del Socorro Leyva	01-dic-1998	30-nov-2001	Secretario	Civil	Lic. En Derecho	x	x	x

A.3 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1 presents summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables included in main regression models.

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Min	Max	Median	Std.Dev
Military chief	0.15	0	1	0	0.36
Military presence	0.39	0	3	0	0.73
State military chief	0.22	0	1	0	0.41
At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.34	0	1	0	0.47
Turf war	0.13	0	1	0	0.33
Homicide rate X 100,000 (previous 12 months)	21.45	0	421.73	11.57	31.46
Right-wing mayor	0.28	0	1	0	0.45
Copartisan with president	0.36	0	1	0	0.48
Copartisan with governor	0.51	0	1	1	0.50
Population (10,000)	12.88	0.05	183.91	3.99	25.66
Change party	0.56	0	1	1	0.56
Margin win	12.53	0	100	9.75	10.80
Took office	0.55	0	1	1	0.59
Belongs to a metropolitan area	0.29	0	1	0	0.45
Economic development	71.65	44.4	100	72.1	6.76

A.4 Sample Versus Population Comparison

To evaluate the characteristics of the limited sample of municipalities with information on police chief appointments (n=1,091), I compare it to the original universe municipalities with police departments (n=1,942) using a logistic regression where the dependent variable is inclusion into my sample.¹ As explanatory variables, I include log population, log police department size, log GDP per capita, log population density, mean educational attainment, log average monthly wage, and underdevelopment score.

As seen in table A.2, the municipalities in my sample have significantly larger populations, larger police departments, and more economically developed. I expected to observe these differences given that a modicum of infrastructure (i.e., a computer, internet access, and personnel) is required to reply to a right-to-information request. Moreover, newspapers likely overreport police chief appointments in larger municipalities compared to smaller, more rural municipalities.

¹As specified in the manuscript, the original universe of municipalities excludes municipalities in Mexico City, in Tamaulipas, and those with a traditional form of government (*usos y costumbres*).

Table A.2: Sample versus population

DV: Municipality belongs to limited sample

Log population	0.38** (0.06)
Log police department size	0.22** (0.03)
Log population density	-0.03 (0.04)
Average educational attainment	-0.12 (0.08)
Log average monthly wage	0.21 (0.23)
Log GDP per capita	0.37 (0.29)
Underdevelopment Score	-0.36** (0.12)

N=1,942
Pseudo R2=0.16

Note: Stars denote statistical significance at the * 0.05 and ** 0.01 level.

A.5 Description of Interviews Conducted for the Nuevo León Case

For the Nuevo León case, I draw on twenty-three anonymous interviews from participants linked to the state in the last two decades (see table A.3). Part of these interviews were completed by the author in 2021 and part were completed in collaboration with a team of researchers participating in a larger research project titled “Building Effective, Resilient, and Trusted Police Organizations in Mexico” led by Rodrigo Canales (Yale School of Management) and funded by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) between 2018 and 2020.

All the interviews were conducted in Spanish, either face-to-face or on Zoom. Participants were debriefed on the purpose of the research project before the interview and asked for their consent. Participants were also guaranteed confidentiality, therefore, I do not specify their location, rank, and name,

as well as limit information on their professional background throughout the dissertation to safeguard their identity.

The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. The initial interviews completed in collaboration with Rodrigo Canales' team consisted of three broad categories: the police department's history, police operations, and police officers as employees. Asking about these issues allowed me to systematically examine the context in which military members were appointed as police chiefs. The interviews completed on Zoom went into greater detail on the drivers of military chief appointments.

Table A.3: Description of interviewees for the Nuevo León case

Profile	Number of participants
Police officer	7
State employee	5
Businessperson	3
Civil society representative	3
Municipal employee	2
Academic	1
Federal employee	1

A.6 Robustness Checks

In this section, I present results for different model specifications to ensure that the results are not model or variable dependent. I first present the repeated event history analysis using other risk-set specifications. Next, I present results using different measurements of homicides. Then, I show results using different measurements horizontal pressures and incentives. Next, I present results using other measurements of copartisanship and military presence. Finally, I present results using logit.

A.6.1 Results using Different Risk-Set Specifications for Repeated Events

Table A.4 presents the repeated event history analysis results using different risk-set specifications. Column 1 displays the Prentice, Williams, and Peterson (PWP) model results using elapsed time as presented in the manuscript. Column 2 shows the outcomes for the PWP model using gap time—i.e., time from the last event. Column 3 includes the results for the Wei, Lin, and Weissfeld (WLW) model, otherwise known as the marginal-risk set model. WLW ignores the order of events and treats each failure as belonging to an independent stratum. As seen in table A.4, results are similar across the different risk-set specifications.

Table A.4: Comparison of results using different risk-set specifications

	<i>Dependent variable: Military chief appointment</i>		
	Model 1 Prentice Williams Peterson using elapsed time	Model 2 Prentice Williams Peterson using gap time	Model 3 Wei, Lin, and Weissfeld
Military presence: (1) Bilateral federal-state agreement	0.43 (0.12)	0.48 (0.13)	0.53 (0.14)
Military presence: (2) Independent military patrols	0.46 (0.25)	0.62 (0.27)	0.65 (0.29)
Military presence: (3) Centralized military patrols	0.57 (0.20)	0.69 (0.20)	0.76 (0.23)
State military chief	0.84 (0.10)	0.85 (0.10)	0.88 (0.11)
At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.45 (0.10)	0.52 (0.10)	0.47 (0.11)
<i>Controls</i>			
Turf war	0.37 (0.13)	0.41 (0.14)	0.36 (0.13)
Homicide rate per 100,000 people	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Right-leaning mayor	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.10)	0.09 (0.12)
Copartisan with the president	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)
Copartisan with the governor	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)
Population (x 10,000)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Economic development	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Belongs to a metropolitan area	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)	0.17 (0.17)
Change party	0.17 (0.10)	0.18 (0.10)	0.22 (0.11)
Vote Margin	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Took office	-0.95 (0.09)	-1.19 (0.10)	-0.79 (0.10)
Obs.	3,573	3,573	3,595

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. All models are stratified by appointment order and include yearly dummy variables not shown here due to space considerations.

A.6.2 Results using Different Homicide Rates Measurements

I estimated the PWP elapsed time model using different specifications for homicide rates. I calculated the 12-month homicide rate for the twelve months previous to the police chief's appointment (as included in the manuscript) and repeat this exercise for the 6-month homicide rate and the 3-month homicide rate. I then replicate the results using homicides with a firearm and male homicides to proxy for criminal violence levels associated with organized crime.

As seen in table A.5, table A.6, and table A.7 there is no significant relationship between homicide levels—total, with a firearm, and male—and military chief appointments. These results stand in sharp contrast to the “turf war” results, suggesting that mayors respond to changes in violence levels and not violence levels per se.

Table A.5: Results for the PWP-elapsed time model using different measurements of total homicide rates

	<i>Dependent variable: Military chief appointment</i>		
	1	2	3
Military presence: (1) Bilateral federal-state agreement	0.43 (0.12)	0.43 (0.12)	0.42 (0.12)
Military presence: (2) Independent military patrols	0.46 (0.25)	0.46 (0.25)	0.45 (0.26)
Military presence: (3) Centralized military patrols	0.57 (0.20)	0.55 (0.20)	0.55 (0.20)
State military chief	0.82 (0.10)	0.83 (0.10)	0.83 (0.10)
At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.45 (0.10)	0.46 (0.10)	0.46 (0.10)
<i>Controls</i>			
Turf war	0.38 (0.13)	0.37 (0.14)	0.36 (0.12)
12-month total homicide rate	-0.00 (0.00)		
6-month total homicide rate		-0.00 (0.00)	
3-month total homicide rate			-0.00 (0.00)
Right-leaning mayor	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)
Copartisan with the president	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
Copartisan with the governor	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
Population (x 10,000)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Economic development	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Belongs to a metropolitan area	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)
Change party	0.17 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)
Vote Margin	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Took office	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)
Obs.	3,573	3,573	3,573

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. All models are stratified by appointment order and include yearly dummy variables not shown here due to space considerations.

Table A.6: Results for the PWP-elapsd time model using different measurements of firearm homicide rates

	<i>Dependent variable: Military chief appointment</i>		
	1	2	3
Military presence: (1) Bilateral federal-state agreement	0.42 (0.12)	0.42 (0.12)	0.42 (0.12)
Military presence: (2) Independent military patrols	0.46 (0.25)	0.46 (0.26)	0.46 (0.26)
Military presence: (3) Centralized military patrols	0.55 (0.20)	0.54 (0.20)	0.54 (0.20)
State military chief	0.83 (0.10)	0.83 (0.10)	0.83 (0.10)
At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.46 (0.10)	0.48 (0.10)	0.46 (0.10)
<i>Controls</i>			
Turf war	0.37 (0.13)	0.35 (0.14)	0.35 (0.12)
12-month firearm homicide rate	-0.00 (0.00)		
6-month firearm homicide rate		-0.00 (0.00)	
3-month firearm homicide rate			-0.00 (0.00)
Right-leaning mayor	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)
Copartisan with the president	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
Copartisan with the governor	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
Population (x 10,000)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Economic development	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Belongs to a metropolitan area	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)
Change party	0.17 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)
Vote Margin	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Took office	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)
Obs.	3,573	3,573	3,573

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. All models are stratified by appointment order and include yearly dummy variables not shown here due to space considerations.

Table A.7: Results for the PWP-elapsed time model using different measurements of male homicide rates

	<i>Dependent variable: Military chief appointment</i>		
	1	2	3
Military presence: (1) Bilateral federal-state agreement	0.43 (0.12)	0.43 (0.12)	0.42 (0.12)
Military presence: (2) Independent military patrols	0.46 (0.25)	0.46 (0.25)	0.45 (0.26)
Military presence: (3) Centralized military patrols	0.57 (0.20)	0.56 (0.20)	0.55 (0.20)
State military chief	0.84 (0.10)	0.84 (0.10)	0.83 (0.10)
At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.45 (0.10)	0.45 (0.10)	0.46 (0.10)
<i>Controls</i>			
Turf war	0.38 (0.13)	0.37 (0.13)	0.36 (0.12)
12-month male homicide rate	-0.00 (0.00)		
6-month male homicide rate		-0.00 (0.00)	
3-month male homicide rate			-0.00 (0.00)
Right-leaning mayor	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)
Copartisan with the president	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
Copartisan with the governor	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
Population (x 10,000)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Economic development	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Belongs to a metropolitan area	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)
Change party	0.17 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)
Vote Margin	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Took office	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)
Obs.	3,573	3,573	3,573

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. All models are stratified by appointment order and include yearly dummy variables not shown here due to space considerations.

A.6.3 Results using Different Horizontal Incentives and Pressures Specifications

I estimated the PWP elapsed time model using different specifications for horizontal strategic incentives and pressures. As seen in table A.8, results are similar across models. All variables are positive and significantly related to the odds of appointing a military chief. The odds of appointing a military chief increase 16% when an additional 10% of the state's population lives in a municipality where a military member is police chief. Similarly, the odds increase by 58% when the largest urban municipality has a military chief.

There are some differences in coefficient sizes and significance levels for other explanatory variables primarily due to changes in the sample size. Due to my limited sample, I do not always have information on who is the police chief of the nearest largest municipality, especially during the 2000-2005 period. However, as table A.8 shows, my results are robust to these sample changes.

Table A.8: Results for the PWP-elapsed time model using different specifications of horizontal strategic incentives and pressures.

	<i>Dependent variable: Military chief appointment</i>		
	1	2	3
Military presence: (1) Bilateral federal-state agreement	0.43 (0.12)	0.51 (0.13)	0.39 (0.13)
Military presence: (2) Independent military patrols	0.46 (0.25)	0.44 (0.24)	0.30 (0.22)
Military presence: (3) Centralized military patrols	0.57 (0.20)	0.73 (0.20)	0.48 (0.18)
State military chief	0.82 (0.10)	0.69 (0.10)	0.66 (0.09)
At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.45 (0.10)		
Nearest biggest municipality with a military chief		0.46 (0.12)	
Proportion of the population in the state with a military chief			0.02 (0.00)
<i>Controls</i>			
Turf war	0.38 (0.13)	0.30 (0.14)	0.36 (0.12)
Homicide rate per 100,000 people	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Right-leaning mayor	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.10)
Copartisan with the president	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.01 (0.09)
Copartisan with the governor	-0.06 (0.10)	0.00 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)
Population (x 10,000)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Economic development	0.04 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Belongs to a metropolitan area	0.04 (0.14)	0.17 (0.16)	0.19 (0.15)
Change party	0.17 (0.10)	0.23 (0.11)	0.17 (0.09)
Vote Margin	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Took office	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.79 (0.10)	-0.89 (0.09)
Obs.	3,573	3,101	3,994

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. All models are stratified by appointment order and include yearly dummy variables not shown here due to space considerations.

A.6.4 Results using Different “Copartisanship” Specifications

I estimated the PWP elapsed time model using a different specification for “copartisanship.” As seen in table A.9, results are similar across models. All copartisan variables fail to reach statistical significance.

Table A.9: Results for the PWP-elapsed time model using different specifications of “co-partisanship.”

	<i>Dependent variable: Military chief appointment</i>		
	1	2	3
Military presence: (1) Bilateral federal-state agreement	0.43 (0.12)	0.42 (0.12)	0.41 (0.12)
Military presence: (2) Independent military patrols	0.46 (0.25)	0.45 (0.25)	0.47 (0.25)
Military presence: (3) Centralized military patrols	0.57 (0.20)	0.55 (0.20)	0.53 (0.21)
State military chief	0.84 (0.10)	0.85 (0.10)	0.85 (0.10)
At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.45 (0.10)	0.46 (0.10)	0.46 (0.10)
<i>Controls</i>			
Turf war	0.38 (0.13)	0.37 (0.14)	0.36 (0.13)
Homicide rate per 100,000 people	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Right-leaning mayor	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)
Copartisan with the president	-0.05 (0.09)		0.08 (0.14)
Copartisan with the governor	-0.06 (0.10)		0.04 (0.12)
Copartisan with the president and governor		-0.18 (0.13)	-0.28 (0.22)
Population (x 10,000)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Economic development	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Belongs to a metropolitan area	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)	0.03 (0.14)
Change party	0.17 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)
Vote Margin	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Took office	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.94 (0.09)
Obs.	3,573	3,573	3,573

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. All models are stratified by appointment order and include yearly dummy variables not shown here due to space considerations.

A.6.5 Results using Different Specifications for “Military Presence”

I estimated the PWP elapsed time model using a different specification for “military presence” to ensure that my results are not dependent on how I specified this categorical variable. As seen in table A.10, results do not change if I introduce military patrols and bilateral agreements independently.

Table A.10: Results for the PWP-elapsd time model using different specifications of “military presence.”

	<i>Dependent variable: Military chief appointment</i>			
	1	2	3	4
Military presence: (1) Bilateral federal-state agreement	0.43 (0.12)			
Military presence: (2) Independent military patrols	0.46 (0.25)			
Military presence: (3) Centralized military patrols	0.57 (0.20)			
Military patrols		0.39 (0.17)		0.26 (0.17)
Bilateral agreement			0.43 (0.11)	0.39 (0.12)
State military chief	0.84 (0.10)	0.87 (0.10)	0.84 (0.10)	0.84 (0.10)
At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.45 (0.10)	0.50 (0.10)	0.45 (0.10)	0.45 (0.10)
<i>Controls</i>				
Turf war	0.38 (0.13)	0.31 (0.13)	0.43 (0.13)	0.39 (0.13)
Homicide rate per 100,000 people	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Right-leaning mayor	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)
Copartisan with the president	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
Copartisan with the governor	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)
Population (x 10,000)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Economic development	0.04 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Belongs to a metropolitan area	0.04 (0.14)	0.01 (0.14)	0.05 (0.14)	0.05 (0.14)
Change party	0.17 (0.10)	0.15 (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)	0.18 (0.10)
Vote Margin	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Took office	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)	-0.95 (0.09)
Obs.	3,573	3,573	3,573	3,573

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. All models are stratified by appointment order and include yearly dummy variables not shown here due to space considerations.

A.6.6 Results using Logit

To ensure that my results are not model-dependent, I replicated the results using logit—and include year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level as well. I also observe strong patterns of coerced and strategic adoption of militarized policing using logit (see table A.11). For example, the probability that a mayor appoints a military chief increases from 12% to 25% when the state police chief is a military member compared to a civilian state chief. The probability increases from 13% to 23% when, in addition to the bilateral agreement to conduct state-wide joint operations, the military participated in policing activities in the municipality. Also, the probability that a mayor appoints a military chief increases from 13% to 19% when at least one contiguous municipality has a military chief.

Table A.11: Results using logit

Military presence:	
(1) Bilateral federal-state agreement	0.53 (0.13)
Military presence:	
(2) Independent military patrols	0.59 (0.30)
Military presence:	
(3) Centralized military patrols	0.72 (0.22)
State military chief	0.91 (0.11)
At least one contiguous municipality with a military chief	0.50 (0.10)
<i>Controls</i>	
Turf war	0.32 (0.14)
Homicide rate per 100,000 people	-0.00 (0.00)
Right-leaning mayor	-0.12 (0.10)
Copartisan with the president	-0.07 (0.10)
Copartisan with the governor	-0.08 (0.10)
Population (x 10,000)	0.00 (0.00)
Economic development	0.03 (0.01)
Belongs to a metropolitan area	0.05 (0.14)
Change party	0.02 (0.10)
Vote Margin	0.01 (0.00)
Took office	0.05 (0.09)
Obs.	4,382

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses.

APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3

B.1 Survey Administration and Sample

The mock news article survey experiment was embedded in a national online survey conducted in Brazil and Mexico between December 2 and December 23, 2021. The online surveys were funded by a National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant and fielded by Netquest. Netquest is a U.S. survey firm dedicated to online survey research through opt-in online respondent panels. All their panels are proprietary panels, and individuals invited to complete the survey are given one-time personal invitations.

A total of 2,003 surveys were completed in Brazil and 2,017 in Mexico. For the Brazilian sample, respondents came from all 27 states, and for the Mexican sample, respondents came from all 32 states. Additionally, the samples are similar in characteristics like sex, age, education to face-to-face surveys like LAPOP—see Table B.1 and Table B.2.

Table B.1: Comparison sample, Mexico

Characteristic	Description	Survey sample	LAPOP Sample 18/19
Age	Mean age	38	42
Gender	% male	44	49
Education	Mean education level	High school	High school
Skin color	Skin color (different scales)	Medium (7.5)	Medium (4.5)
Ideology	Left/Right (1-10)	5.2	5.3
Party ID	% identifies with a political party	19	18

Table B.2: Comparison sample, Brazil

Characteristic	Description	Survey sample	LAPOP Sample 18/19
Age	Mean age	42	39
Gender	% male	48	49
Education	Mean education level	High school	High school
Skin color	Skin color (different scales)	Medium (7.6)	Medium (4.2)
Ideology	Left/Right (1-10)	5.5	5.9
Party ID	% identifies with a political party	23	19

B.2 Data Description

Table B.3 and Table B.4 present respondents' socioeconomic and demographic information.

Table B.3: Respondent characteristics, Mexico

Characteristic	Description	Mean	Min	Median	Max	SD
Age	Age	38	18	36	82	13.7
Gender	Gender (1=male)	0.44	0	0	1	0.5
Education	Education level Mexico (categorical)	3.7	0	4	6	1.2
Income	Household monthly income (categorical)	4.2	1	5	7	1.7
Skin color	Skin color (categorical)	7.5	1	8	11	1.4
Party ID	Identifies with a political party (1=Yes)	0.2	0	0	1	0.4
Victim	You or household member has been a victim of a crime (1=Yes)	0.37	0	0	1	0.5

Table B.4: Respondent characteristics, Brazil

Characteristic	Description	Mean	Min	Median	Max	SD
Age	Age	41.6	18	40	79	15.4
Gender	Gender (1=male)	0.48	0	0	1	0.5
Education	Education level Brazil (categorical)	2.5	0	2	5	1.2
Income	Household monthly income (categorical)	4.4	1	5	6	1.8
Skin color	Skin color (categorical)	7.6	1	8	11	2.2
Party ID	Identifies with a political party (1=Yes)	0.23	0	0	1	0.4
Victim	You or household member has been a victim of a crime (1=Yes)	0.26	0	0	1	0.4

B.3 Balance Tests

OLS models in Table B.5 and Table B.6 predict treatment assignment as a function of respondent characteristics. The F statistic and p-value at the bottom of each model correspond to the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly

zero—which should be true if balance was achieved through random assignment.

As Table B.5 and Table B.6 show, no p-value on any F-statistic allows us to reject this null (i.e., $p > .05$), indicating that the randomization was successful.

Table B.5: OLS Models Predicting Treatment Assignment in Mexico sample

	Start police	Crime police	Start civilian	Crime civilian	Start military	Crime military
Education	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Sex	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Income	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Skin color	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Party id	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Country's direction	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Victim	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Trust police	-0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Trust military	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Military participate policing	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Military improves public safety	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Interact police	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Call police	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Police protects against crime	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)
N	1,992	1,992	1,992	1,992	1,992	1,992
F-stat	0.89	0.79	0.96	1.45	1.20	0.62
p-value on F-stat	0.58	0.69	0.50	0.12	0.26	0.86

Table B.6: OLS Models Predicting Treatment Assignment in Brazil sample

	Start police	Crime police	Start civilian	Crime civilian	Start military	Crime military
Education	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Sex	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Income	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
Skin color	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Party id	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Country's direction	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Victim	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Trust police	0.03** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Trust military	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Military participate policing	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Military improves public safety	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Interact police	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Call police	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Police protects against crime	-0.03 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
N	1,975	1,975	1,975	1,975	1,975	1,975
F-stat	0.77	1.35	1.01	0.71	0.36	1.30
p-value on F-stat	0.71	0.17	0.44	0.78	0.99	0.19

B.4 Mock News Articles

Figure B.1 shows the mock news article in Spanish (for Mexico), Figure B.2 in English (for Mexico), Figure B.3 in Portuguese (for Brazil), and Figure B.4 in English (for Brazil).

Figure B.1: Mock article (Spanish, Mexico)

José Antonio García Olvera es nombrado nuevo titular de seguridad

Por: redacción



[Tras dar inicio a su gobierno/Tras el incremento en los índices delictivos], el presidente municipal Sergio Alvarado nombró a José Antonio García Olvera como nuevo jefe de la policía preventiva y tránsito municipal. En entrevista, el presidente municipal señaló que García Olvera es un **[militar en situación de retiro/civil/policía de carrera]** que cuenta con amplia experiencia en seguridad.

Al tomar posesión de manera oficial, García Olvera se comprometió a atender las instrucciones del presidente municipal y mostrarle resultados positivos a la sociedad.

Figure B.2: Mock article (English, Mexico)

José Antonio García Olvera is appointed as new police chief

By: news desk



[After taking office/After the increase in crime indicators], mayor Sergio Alvarado appointed José Antonio García Olvera as the new municipal police chief. In an interview, the mayor explained that García Olvera is a **[career police officer/retired military member/civilian]** with significant experience in public safety.

During his appointment ceremony, García Olvera promised to follow the mayor's directives and deliver positive results.

Figure B.3: Mock article (Portuguese, Brazil)

Vítor Silva Oliveira assume comando da Guarda Municipal

Da redação



[Após do aumento da criminalidade/Após tomar posse], o prefeito Cláudio Osvaldo Pereira empossou ao novo comandante da Guarda Municipal, Vítor Silva Oliveira. Em uma entrevista, o prefeito disse que o comandante Silva Oliveira é um **[policial de carreira/ex-membro do Exército/civil]** com muita experiência na área de segurança pública.

Durante o discurso dele, Oliveira se comprometeu a seguir as instruções do prefeito e melhorar a segurança pública da cidade.

Figure B.4: Mock article (English, Brazil)

Vítor Silva Oliveira is appointed as new Municipal Guard commander

By: news desk



[After taking office/After the increase in crime indicators], mayor Cláudio Osvaldo Pereira appointed Vítor Silva Oliveira as the new Municipal Guard police chief. In an interview, the mayor explained that Silva Oliveira is a **[career police officer/retired military member/civilian]** with significant experience in public safety.

During his appointment ceremony, García Olvera promised to follow the mayor's directives and deliver positive results.

B.5 Question-Wording

Table B.7 presents the English, Spanish, and Portuguese survey questions for the outcome variables.

Table B.7: Question-wording for outcome variables

Question	English	Spanish	Portuguese
Police chief: appointment	How much do you approve or disapprove of the appointment of the new police chief you just read about?	¿Qué tanto aprueba o desaprueba el nombramiento del nuevo jefe de la policía sobre el cual acaba de leer?	O quanto você aprova ou desaprova a nomeação do novo comando sobre o qual acabou de ler?
Police chief: trust	How much trust would you say the new police chief you just read about inspires?	¿Cuánta confianza le inspira el nuevo jefe de la policía sobre el cual acaba de leer?	Até que ponto tem confiança no novo comando sobre o qual acabou de ler?
Police: trust	How much trust would you say the police department you just read about inspires?	¿Cuánta confianza le inspira la policía sobre la cual acaba de leer?	Até que ponto tem confiança na Guarda Municipal sobre o qual acabou de ler?
Mayor: improving public safety	On a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 is not at all and 4 is a great deal, to what extent do you think the mayor you just read about is improving public safety in his municipality?	En una escala del 1 al 4 donde 1 es nada y 4 es mucho ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el presidente municipal sobre el que acaba de leer está mejorando la seguridad en su municipio?	Numa escala de 1 a 4 onde 1 é nada e 4 é muito, em que medida você diria que o prefeito sobre o qual você acabou de ler está melhorando a segurança na sua prefeitura?
Mayor: improving police	On a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 is not at all and 4 is a great deal, to what extent do you think the mayor you just read about is improving policing in his municipality?	En una escala del 1 al 4 donde 1 es nada y 4 es mucho ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el presidente municipal sobre el que acaba de leer está mejorando la policía en su municipio?	Numa escala de 1 a 4 onde 1 é nada e 4 é muito, em que medida você diria que o prefeito sobre o qual você acabou de ler está melhorando a Guarda Municipal da sua prefeitura?
Mayor: effectiveness in public safety	How would you rate the mayor's effectiveness in public safety?	¿Qué tan efectivo considera el desempeño del presidente municipal sobre el que acaba de leer en el ámbito de seguridad?	Quão eficaz você considera a atuação do prefeito sobre o qual você acabou de ler na área de segurança?
Mayor: tough-on-crime	How much do you agree or disagree that the mayor you just read about is tough on crime?	¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo que el presidente municipal sobre el que acaba de leer combate la delincuencia con mano dura?	Com que intensidade você concorda que o prefeito sobre o qual você acabou de ler combate o crime com "mão dura"?
Mayor: fighting corruption	On a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 is not at all and 4 is a great deal, to what extent do you think the mayor you just read about is fighting corruption in his municipality?	En una escala del 1 al 4 donde 1 es nada y 4 es mucho ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el presidente municipal sobre el que acaba de leer está luchando contra la corrupción en su municipio?	Numa escala de 1 a 4 onde 1 é nada e 4 é muito, em que medida você diria que o prefeito sobre o qual você acabou de ler está lutando contra a corrupção na sua prefeitura?
Municipality: feel secure	How secure or insecure would you feel living in the municipality you just read about?	¿Qué tan seguro o inseguro se sentiría de vivir en el municipio sobre el cual acaba de leer?	Quão seguro ou inseguro você se sentiria morando na prefeitura sobre o qual acabou de ler?

B.6 Benchmark Regressions

In this section I report the regression results for the benchmark models that compute the average differences in responses by treatment and control conditions.

All the dependent variables were originally on a four-point scale:

- *Police chief, approve appointment*: from strongly disapprove (1) to strongly approve (4).
- *Police chief, trust*: from none (1) to a lot (4).
- *Police, trust*: from none (1) to a lot (4).
- *Mayor, improving public safety*: from not at all (1) to a great deal (4).
- *Mayor, improving the police*: from not at all (1) to a great deal (4).
- *Mayor, effectiveness in public safety*: from not at all effective (1) to very effective (4).
- *Mayor, tough-on-crime*: from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).
- *Mayor, fighting corruption*: from not at all (1) to a great deal (4).
- *Municipality, feel secure*: from very insecure (1) to very secure (4).

However, following [Mummolo, 2018], I rescaled the variables to range from 0 to 100 so effects can be interpreted as percentage-point increases.

B.6.1 Regression Results for Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3

The independent variables are dummy variables that measure the police chief's professional background. "Military" takes the value of one when the police

chief is a former military member and “Civilian” takes the value of one when the police chief is a civilian. The control group (baseline) is a career police chief.

Table B.8: Regression results by professional background condition, Pooled

	Police chief		Police		Mayor					Municipality	
	Approve ap- pointment	Trust	Trust		Improving public safety	Improving police	Effectiveness in public safety	Tough-on- crime	Fighting cor- ruption	Feel secure	
Military	2.97*** (0.69)	3.04*** (0.72)	1.67** (0.74)		2.54*** (0.80)	2.73*** (0.80)	2.78*** (0.76)	2.74*** (0.83)	2.63*** (0.83)	2.87*** (0.79)	
Civilian	-2.49*** (0.72)	-2.14*** (0.73)	-1.62** (0.76)		-1.96** (0.83)	-2.36*** (0.83)	-1.56** (0.79)	-2.67*** (0.87)	-1.28 (0.84)	-2.36*** (0.83)	
N=	4,020	4,020	4,020		4,020	4,020	4,020	4,020	4,020	4,020	

Note: This table shows regression coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table B.9: Regression results by professional background condition, Mexico

	Police chief		Police		Mayor					Municipality
	Approve ap- pointment	Trust	Trust	Trust	Improving public safety	Improving police	Effectiveness in public safety	Tough-on- crime	Fighting cor- ruption	Feel secure
Military	2.99*** (0.88)	3.70*** (0.92)	1.93* (0.99)	3.63*** (1.05)	4.20*** (1.07)	3.79*** (1.02)	4.04*** (1.17)	4.04*** (1.10)	4.04*** (1.10)	3.47*** (1.04)
Civilian	-3.09*** (0.90)	-2.71*** (0.94)	-2.50** (1.03)	-1.99* (1.09)	-2.91*** (1.09)	-2.19** (1.04)	-2.40* (1.23)	-1.76 (1.11)	-1.76 (1.11)	-2.93*** (1.09)
N=	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017

Note: This table shows regression coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table B.10: Regression results by professional background condition, Brazil

	Police chief		Police		Mayor				Municipality	
	Approve ap- pointment	Trust	Trust	Trust	Improving public safety	Improving police	Effectiveness in public safety	Tough-on- crime	Fighting cor- ruption	Feel secure
Military	2.86*** (1.08)	2.37** (1.10)	1.30 (1.10)	1.20 (1.17)	1.02 (1.17)	1.60 (1.13)	1.52 (1.17)	1.22 (1.25)	2.01* (1.16)	
Civilian	-1.95* (1.09)	-1.60 (1.11)	-0.84 (1.12)	-1.02 (1.17)	-2.02* (1.21)	-1.07 (1.17)	-2.90** (1.22)	-0.84 (1.27)	-1.98 (1.22)	
N=	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	

Note: This table shows regression coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

B.6.2 Regression Results for Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3

The independent variables are dummy variables that measure the police chief's professional background and the context in which the appointment took place. "Crime, military" takes the value of one when the police chief is a former military member, and the appointment took place due to rising crime. "Start, military" takes the value of one when the police chief is a former military member, and the appointment took place at the start of the mayor's administration. "Crime, civilian" takes the value of one when the police chief is a civilian, and the appointment took place due to rising crime. "Start, civilian" takes the value of one when the police chief is a civilian, and the appointment took place at the start of the mayor's administration. "Crime, police" takes the value of one when the police chief is a career police officer, and the appointment took place due to rising crime. The control group (baseline) is the appointment of career police chief at the start of the mayor's administration.

Table B.11: Regression results by professional background and context condition, Pooled

	Police chief		Police		Mayor				Municipality	
	Approve ap- pointment	Trust	Trust		Improving public safety	Improving police	Effectiveness in public safety	Tough-on- crime	Fighting cor- ruption	Feel secure
Crime, military	2.86*** (0.98)	3.46*** (1.01)	0.78 (1.05)		1.93* (1.13)	2.15* (1.10)	2.51** (1.07)	1.90* (1.14)	1.90* (1.15)	2.26** (1.07)
Start, military	3.87*** (1.21)	1.92* (1.01)	0.79 (1.04)		2.04* (1.12)	1.65*** (1.14)	3.02*** (1.08)	1.51 (1.17)	1.86 (1.17)	2.14** (1.09)
Crime, civilian	-1.51 (1.00)	-2.27** (1.04)	-2.16** (1.08)		-2.19* (1.17)	-2.41** (1.16)	-0.90 (1.11)	-2.76** (1.21)	-1.71 (1.18)	-3.32*** (1.15)
Start, civilian	-3.85*** (1.01)	-2.70** (1.01)	-2.87*** (1.07)		-2.84** (1.16)	-3.98*** (1.16)	-2.25** (1.11)	-4.64*** (1.20)	-2.35** (1.19)	-3.01** (1.17)
Crime, police	-0.38 (0.93)	-0.71 (1.01)	-1.83 (1.04)		-1.15 (1.13)	-1.71 (1.14)	-0.03 (1.08)	-2.11 (1.20)	-1.54 (1.17)	-1.37 (1.12)
N=	4,020	4,020	4,020		4,020	4,020	4,020	4,020	4,020	4,020

Note: This table shows regression coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table B.12: Regression results by professional background and context condition, Mexico

	Police chief		Police		Mayor				Municipality	
	Approve ap- pointment	Trust	Trust	Trust	Improving public safety	Improving police	Effectiveness in public safety	Tough-on- crime	Fighting cor- ruption	Feel secure
Crime, military	3.12** (1.29)	4.82*** (1.31)	1.64 (1.42)	3.81** (1.54)	4.20*** (1.49)	3.97*** (1.43)	4.31*** (1.65)	3.56** (1.55)	2.46* (1.47)	
Start, military	3.87*** (1.21)	3.35*** (1.27)	1.73 (1.40)	4.09*** (1.49)	4.08*** (1.53)	5.21*** (1.46)	3.44** (1.64)	3.75** (1.58)	3.13** (1.45)	
Crime, civilian	-2.20* (1.29)	-3.07** (1.34)	-2.92** (1.46)	-2.18 (1.59)	-3.18 (1.53)	-1.11 (1.46)	-2.07 (1.75)	-2.06 (1.57)	-4.24*** (1.52)	
Start, civilian	-2.98** (1.28)	-1.55 (1.29)	-2.58* (1.44)	-1.15 (1.56)	-2.76* (1.55)	-1.68 (1.47)	-3.04* (1.71)	-2.24 (1.61)	-3.01** (1.53)	
Crime, police	1.02 (1.15)	0.82 (1.26)	-0.51 (1.39)	0.66 (1.48)	-0.12 (1.49)	1.61 (1.43)	-0.32 (1.68)	-0.80 (1.52)	-1.40 (1.47)	
N=	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	2,017	

Note: This table shows regression coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table B.13: Regression results by professional background and context condition, Brazil

	Police chief		Police		Mayor				Municipality	
	Approve ap- pointment	Trust	Trust		Improving public safety	Improving police	Effectiveness in public safety	Tough-on- crime	Fighting cor- ruption	Feel secure
Crime, military	2.20 (1.46)	2.05 (1.53)	-0.17 (1.54)	-0.15 (1.61)	-0.10 (1.57)	-0.47 (1.58)	0.90 (1.57)	0.22 (1.72)	1.89 (1.53)	
Start, military	1.77 (1.53)	0.45 (1.56)	-0.28 (1.54)	-0.27 (1.65)	-1.01 (1.66)	-0.36 (1.66)	0.67 (1.58)	-0.02 (1.73)	0.95 (1.61)	
Crime, civilian	-0.94 (1.53)	-1.58 (1.57)	-1.58 (1.56)	-2.50 (1.67)	-1.95 (1.67)	-3.44** (1.68)	-0.90 (1.63)	-1.44 (1.75)	-1.49 (1.64)	
Start, civilian	-4.77*** (1.56)	-3.90** (1.56)	-3.19** (1.57)	-4.64*** (1.67)	-5.29*** (1.67)	-6.27*** (1.69)	-2.89* (1.66)	-2.49 (1.75)	-3.70** (1.68)	
Crime, police	-1.82 (1.48)	-2.32 (1.58)	-3.19** (1.57)	-2.94 (1.66)	-3.27* (1.70)	-4.02** (1.71)	-1.69 (1.62)	-2.32 (1.81)	-1.23 (1.68)	
N=	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	2,003	

Note: This table shows regression coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

B.6.3 Regression Results and Coefficient Plots for Mayor’s Competence Score by Professional Background

The independent variables are dummy variables that measure the police chief’s professional background. “Military” takes the value of one when the police chief is a former military member and “Civilian” takes the value of one when the police chief is a civilian. The control group (baseline) is a career police chief.

The dependent variable is the mayor’s competence score which is comprised of the following questions: (1) mayor, improving public safety; (2) mayor, improving the police; (3) mayor, effectiveness in public safety; and, (4) mayor, fighting corruption. The score is constructed two ways: using Principal Component Analysis or taking the average of the dependent variables that comprise the score.

Table B.14: Regression results for mayor’s competence score by professional background condition, Pooled

	PCA	Average
Military	3.57*** (0.93)	2.67*** (0.70)
Civilian	-2.41** (0.97)	-1.79** (0.73)
N=	4,020	4,020

Note: This table shows regression coefficients robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*p<0.1 **p<.05***p<.01

Table B.15: Regression results for mayor's competence score by professional background condition, Mexico

	PCA	Average
Military	5.22*** (1.25)	3.91*** (0.94)
Civilian	-2.96** (1.29)	-2.21** (0.97)
N=	2,017	2,017

Note: This table shows regression coefficients robust standard errors in parenthesis.

*p<0.1 **p<.05***p<.01


Table B.16: Regression results for mayor's competence score by professional background condition, Brazil

	PCA	Average
Military	1.68 (1.38)	1.26 (1.03)
Civilian	-2.06 (1.42)	-1.52 (1.07)
N=	2,003	2,003

Note: This table shows regression coefficients robust standard errors in parenthesis.

*p<0.1 **p<.05***p<.01

Figure B.5: Survey experimental results: mayor's competence score by professional background condition (PCA)



Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on the mayor's competence score. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer black bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter gray bars represent 90 percent. The baseline category is a career police officer.

B.6.4 Regression Results and Coefficient Plots for Mayor's Competence Score by Professional Background and Context

The independent variables are dummy variables that measure the police chief's professional background and context in which the appointment took place. "Crime, military" takes the value of one when the police chief is a former military member, and the appointment took place due to rising crime. "Start, military" takes the value of one when the police chief is a former military member, and the appointment took place at the start of the mayor's administration. "Crime, civilian" takes the value of one when the police chief is a civilian, and the appointment took place due to rising crime. "Start, civilian" takes the value of one when the police chief is a civilian, and the appointment took place at the start of the mayor's administration. "Crime, police" takes the value of one when the police chief is a career police officer, and the appointment took place due to rising crime. The control group (baseline) is the appointment of career police chief at the start of the mayor's administration.

The dependent variable is the mayor's competence score which is comprised of the following questions: (1) mayor, improving public safety; (2) mayor, improving the police; (3) mayor, effectiveness in public safety; and, (4) mayor, fighting corruption. The score is constructed two ways: using Principal Component Analysis or taking the average of the dependent variables that comprise the score.

Table B.17: Regression results for mayor's competence score by professional background and context condition, Pooled

	PCA	Average
Crime, military	2.84** (1.30)	2.12** (0.98)
Start, military	2.87** (1.32)	2.14** (0.99)
Crime, civilian	-2.40* (1.36)	-1.80* (1.02)
Start, civilian	-3.84*** (1.36)	-2.86*** (1.02)
Crime, police	-1.46 (1.32)	1.10 (0.99)
N=	4,020	4,020

Note: This table shows regression coefficients
robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*p<0.1 **p<.05***p<.01

Table B.18: Regression results for mayor's competence score by professional background and context condition, Mexico

	PCA	Average
Crime, military	5.19*** (1.78)	3.89*** (1.34)
Start, military	5.73*** (1.78)	4.28*** (1.33)
Crime, civilian	-2.84 (1.82)	-2.13 (1.36)
Start, civilian	-2.61 (1.85)	-1.96 (1.39)
Crime, police	0.49 (1.75)	0.34 (1.31)
N=	2,017	2,017


Note: This table shows regression coefficients
robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*p<0.1 **p<.05***p<.01

Table B.19: Regression results for mayor's competence score by professional background and context condition, Brazil

	PCA	Average
Crime, military	0.23 (1.87)	0.22 (1.40)
Start, military	-0.21 (1.94)	-0.16 (1.46)
Crime, civilian	-2.27 (1.98)	-1.70 (1.36)
Start, civilian	-5.17*** (1.97)	-3.82*** (1.47)
Crime, police	-3.41* (1.75)	-2.55* (1.31)
N=	2,003	2,003

Note: This table shows regression coefficients robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*p<0.1 **p<.05***p<.01

Figure B.6: Survey experimental results: mayor's competence score by professional background and context condition (PCA)



Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) and context (at the start of the mayor's administration or increasing crime) on the mayor's competence score. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer black bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter gray bars represent 90 percent. The baseline category is a career police officer.


B.7 Additional Results of Interest

This section graphically presents the average difference in responses by professional background condition by subgroups of respondents. The subgroup analysis includes graphical summaries for:

- **Figure B.7:** Age (above median vs below median)
 - Mexico: 36 years old
 - Brazil: 40 years old
- **Figure B.8:** Sex (male vs female)
- **Figure B.9:** Education (below high school vs high school or above)
- **Figure B.10:** Income (medium-high vs medium-low)
- **Figure B.11:** Trust in the military (high vs low)
- **Figure B.12:** Trust in the police (high vs low)
- **Figure B.13:** Victimization (yes vs no)
- **Figure B.14:** Support military's participation in policing (support vs oppose)
- **Figure B.15:** Agree with armed forces' participation improving public safety (agree vs disagree)
- **Figure B.16:** Perceived safety in state of residence (safe vs unsafe)
- **Figure B.17:** Country's direction (good vs bad)
- **Figure B.18:** Five-year average homicide rate in respondents' state of residence (above median vs below median)


- Mexico: 20 per 100,000 people
- Brazil: 32 per 100,000 people

Figure B.7: Age




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by age subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.8: Sex




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by sex subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.9: Education




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by education subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.10: Income




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by income subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.11: Trust in the military




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by trust in the military subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.12: Trust in police




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by trust in the police subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.13: Victimization




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by victimization subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.14: Supports military's participation in policing




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by supports military's participation in policing subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.15: Agree military's participation improves public safety




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by agreement with military's participation improves public safety subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.16: Perceived security in state of residence




Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by perceived security subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.17: Country's direction



Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by country's direction subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

Figure B.18: Five-year average homicide rate in respondents' state of residence



Note: This plot shows the estimates of the effect of randomly assigned professional backgrounds (military, civilian, or career police) on perceptions of the police chief, mayor, police force, and municipality by five-year average homicide rate and municipality by five-year average homicide rate subgroup. Estimates are based on OLS models with robust standard errors. Longer bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals, and shorter bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The baseline category is a career police officer.

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