Augustine on Reasoning from One’s Own Case

GARETH B. MATTHEWS
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Forty years ago Norman Malcolm presented a now-famous paper at the Eastern Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association in Burlington, Vermont. Malcolm’s paper, like the symposium itself, was titled “Knowledge of Other Minds.” The paper focused on the Argument from Analogy for Other Minds, which, of course, Malcolm roundly criticized. After making a number of preliminary points, Malcolm stated:

I have not yet gone into the most fundamental error of the argument from analogy. It is present whether the argument is the classical one (the analogy between my body and other bodies) or Price’s version (the analogy between my language and the noises and signs produced by other things). It is the mistaken assumption that one learns from one’s own case what thinking, feeling, sensation are.¹

What Malcolm here calls the “classical” Argument from Analogy he illustrates with a passage from John Stuart Mill. While many have attributed this argument to Descartes, no such argument can be found in his writings.² It is correct, however, to think that the Argument from Analogy predates Mill; it is, in fact, to be found in Augustine. One interesting thing about Augustine’s formulation, which, to my knowledge, is the earliest statement of the argument, is that it makes quite explicit the very feature that Malcolm calls its “most fundamental error,” namely the fact that the argument’s reasoning is “from one’s own case.” According to Augustine, each of us learns what a mind or soul is from one’s own case. As Augustine formulates it:

For we also recognize, from a likeness to us, the motions of bodies by which we perceive that others besides us live. Just as we move [our] body in living, so, we notice, those bodies are moved. For when a living

body is moved there is no way open to our eyes to see the mind \textit{animus}, a thing which cannot be seen by the eyes. But we perceive something present in that mass such as is present in us to move our mass in a similar way; it is life and soul \textit{anima}. Nor is such perception something peculiar to, as it were, human prudence and reason. For indeed beasts perceive as living, not only themselves, but also each other and one another, and us as well. Nor do they see our soul \textit{anima}, except from the motions of the body, and they do that immediately and very simply by a sort of natural agreement \textit{quadam conspiratione naturali}. Therefore we know the mind \textit{animus} of anyone at all from our own; and from our own case we believe in that which we do not know \textit{ex nostro credimus quem non novimus}. For not only do we perceive a mind \textit{animus}, but we even know what one is, by considering our own; for we have a mind \textit{animus}.\footnote{3} (De trinitate 8.6.9)

Although Malcolm criticizes the Argument from Analogy in more than one way, his main criticism focuses on the idea that a “philosopher who believes that one must learn what thinking, fear, or pain is ‘from one’s own case,’ does not believe that the thing to be observed is one’s behavior, but rather something ‘inward.’”\footnote{4} Malcolm quotes H. H. Price to support this point: “I know from introspection,” Price writes, “what acts of thinking and perceiving are.”\footnote{5} It is then these “inward” perceptions of thinking and feeling that must be correlated with one’s own bodily activities, which are in turn correlated with the bodily activities of other bodies, so that similar “inward” episodes of feeling and thinking can be inferred in others. Here, according to Malcolm, is the major problem:

But the question to be pressed is, Does one make correct identifications? The proponent of these “private” identifications has nothing to say here. He feels sure that he identifies correctly the occurrences in his soul; but feeling sure is no guarantee of being right. Indeed he has no idea of what being right could mean. He does not know how to distinguish between actually making correct identifications and being under the impression that he does (See Wittgenstein’s \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, secs. 258–59). Suppose he identified the emotion of anxiety as the sensation of pain? Neither he nor anyone else could know about

3. I should, no doubt, insert a terminological comment at this point. In this passage Augustine shifts back and forth between the feminine noun, \textit{anima}, and the masculine noun, \textit{animus}. He thinks of an \textit{animus} as a rational kind of soul, that is, a rational \textit{anima}, which he also calls, especially, perhaps, in Book X of the \textit{De trinitate}, a “mind” \textit{mens}. Augustine never distinguishes as two distinct entities, the way Descartes does, the entity with which we think and the entity that animates our body. Instead, he thinks of our human animator as a rational \textit{anima}, an \textit{animus}, that now animates our physical body, that will also give us life after death, and that will eventually animate our spiritual body in the resurrection.


this “mistake.” Perhaps he makes a mistake every time! Perhaps all of us do! We ought to see now that we are talking nonsense. 6

Malcolm’s criticism of the Argument from Analogy presupposes that the argument moves from the identification of specific types of mental state, or types of mental act, to their characteristic bodily correlate, for example, from inwardly identified anxiety to a characteristic bodily correlate, say, a certain identifiable grimace, and from inwardly identified pain to a characteristic bodily correlate, say, writhing and groaning.

While Price, it seems, does proceed in this way, it is not at all clear that Mill thinks of himself as doing so. He opens with talk about being “led to believe, that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or in other words, possess Minds.” 7 He talks, in the argument, about “feelings” being sandwiched between “modifications of the body” and “outward demeanor.” He reasons that “others” must either be alive, like him, and so have feelings, or else be simply automata.

Let me linger for a moment on the issue of life. Descartes, as I have already mentioned, discounts the relevance of life to mind. In the fifth set of replies to objections to his Meditations Descartes had this to say:

primitive man probably did not distinguish between, on the one hand, the principle by which we are nourished and accomplish without any thought all the other operations which we have in common with the brutes, and, on the other hand, the principle in virtue of which we think. He therefore used the single term ‘soul’ to apply to both; . . . I, by contrast, realizing that the principle by which we are nourished is wholly different—different in kind—from that in virtue of which we think, have said that the term ‘soul’, when it is used to refer to both these principles, is ambiguous . . . I consider the mind not as a part of the soul but as the thinking soul in its entirety. 8

Mill, like Augustine, but unlike Descartes, assumes that there is an intimate connection between whether some other human being is alive and whether it is conscious, that is, has a mind. Thus Mill writes:

I must either believe [these other human beings] to be alive, or to be automatons: and by believing them to be alive, that is, by supposing the link to be one of the same nature as in the case of which I have experience, and which is in all other respects similar, I bring other

human beings, as phenomena, under the same generalizations which I know by experience to be the true theory of my own existence. 9

Malcolm may, of course, suppose that none of this will be in the slightest degree plausible unless Mill is prepared to be much more specific and to link specific “feelings” with specific types of “outward demeanor.” But it is worth noting that Mill does not build up the case for other minds, so to speak, “from the bottom up,” that is, from specific thoughts or feelings and certain “outward” expressions of those thoughts and feelings to the conclusion that there are other minds.

Nor does Augustine take this approach. He gets into the Argument from Analogy by first worrying about how one can know what a just mind is, that is, what a mind imbued with the quality of justice is, if one’s own mind does not have that quality. He responds to that worry by consoling himself with the thought that one can at least know what a mind is from one’s own case, even if, since one’s own mind does not have the quality of justice, one cannot learn from self-examination what a just mind is.

In putting together his Argument from Analogy, Augustine does not, any more than Mill does, focus on specific types of mental state, such as anxiety or fear, or specific types of mental act, such as thinking that \( p \) or willing that \( q \). He reasons from a “likeness” between the “motions” of other bodies and the motions of our own body to there being a mind \([\text{animus}]\) or soul \([\text{anima}]\) that moves those other bodies analogous to the mind or soul that, as he thinks we can perceive, moves our own.

This point is far from trivial. But to appreciate its significance we need, first, to note something that, from our post-Cartesian point of view, is truly remarkable. In the \textit{De trinitate} passage Augustine attributes to nonhuman animals a sort of instinctual recognition of other minds and souls that gives them what we might call “the functional equivalent” of the Argument from Analogy. It is not that, as he thinks, they reason their way to the conclusion that there are other minds; it is rather that, as he supposes, they recognize by a sort of “natural agreement” what we human beings—or at least the more philosophical among us—can capture rationally in the form of an argument for the conclusion that there are other minds.

This talk about nonhuman animals deploying the functional equivalent of the Argument from Analogy points up a further aspect of Augustine’s thought that needs emphasis. Unlike Descartes, Augustine does not consider nonhuman animals to be mere automata. He attributes consciousness to them, but supposes they lack freedom of the will. They are thus not genuinely moral beings, according to Augustine, although their behavior often mimics genuinely moral and genuinely immoral behavior in such a memorable fashion that Augustine likes to use animal examples

when he composes homilies in which he exhorts his auditors to behave morally. Here is an example:

Just as some people, zealous of acquiring such knowledge, recount of stags, that when a herd crosses over a body of water to an island for the purpose of feeding, the stags so arrange themselves that they support by turn the burden of their heads, which are heavy with the weight of their horns; and they do this in such a manner that each stag places his outstretched head on the back of the stag in front of him. And since of necessity the one preceding all the other has no support before him on which to rest his head, they are said to assume this position by turns, so that the one which preceded the others, when wearied by the weight of his head, retires behind all the others, and his place is taken by one whose head he was supporting when he was in the first place himself. Thus bearing one another’s burdens by turn, they cross over the water to solid land. Solomon perhaps had this custom of the stags in mind when he said, “Let the stag of friendship . . . have converse with you,” for nothing so [much] proves friendship as the bearing of a friend’s burden. (De diversis quaestioribus 83, 71.1, Mosher trans.)

Does Augustine, like Thomas Nagel, suppose, in Nagel’s memorable phrase, “there is something it is like to be a bat”? Or, for that matter, there is something it is like to be a stag? I think there can be no doubt that he does. That is, I think that Augustine, like Nagel and like most of the rest of us, supposes that mammals and birds, and perhaps other living creatures as well, have subjective experience, even when, as is the case with bats, the animal has such a different sensory apparatus from human beings that a bat’s phenomenal world may be beyond our ability to imagine. Nagel makes that “may” a “must.” “So if extrapolation from our own case is involved in the idea of what it is like to be a bat,” Nagel writes, “the extrapolation must be incompletable.”10

Nagel generalizes this conclusion. He claims that “if there is conscious life elsewhere in the universe, it is likely that some of it will not be describable even in the most general experiential terms available to us.” Then he adds a comment that brings us back to Augustine, Malcolm, and the Argument from Analogy. “The problem is not confined to exotic cases, however,” he writes;

for it exists between one person and another. The subjective character of the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him. This does not prevent us each from believing that the other’s experience has such a subjective character.11

Augustine’s Argument from Analogy is an argument for the conclusion that there are rational souls, or minds, in other rational organisms, that is, in other human animals, and there are souls, even though they are not rational ones, in certain nonrational organisms, that is, in certain nonhuman animals. It does not require that we reach our conclusion about other minds and souls by building up a case for supposing that there are specifically identifiable acts or states in these other minds and souls that are like acts and states we can identify in our own mind and soul. Indeed, it seems compatible with considerable agnosticism about what exactly the subjective experience of, say, a bat, or even a dog, or a human person who has been deaf and blind from birth, really is.

In fact, Augustine expresses such skepticism in, for example, this exchange from his earliest extant dialogue, *Contra academicos*:

“Tell me instead whether the leaves of the wild olive-tree, which the goat so stubbornly desires, are bitter in themselves.”

“You shameless man! The goat itself has more modesty! I don’t know how they are to brute animals, but they are bitter to me.” (3.11.26. King trans.)

Although Augustine expresses agnosticism about how the leaves of the wild olive tree taste to the goat, he is in no doubt that they have some taste or other for the goat, that there is something it is like for the goat to taste the leaves of a wild olive tree.

I said Augustine’s conclusion about other minds is compatible with “considerable agnosticism” about what the subjective experience of another minded creature might be. But surely, someone may appropriately insist, *not* complete agnosticism. We may be quite puzzled about how a dog can walk long distances on a broken leg, as if feeling no pain. But surely the yelping behavior of an injured dog contributes, indeed contributes essentially, to our assurance that a dog has real pain and hence has a phenomenal world and is not, as Descartes tells us, a mere automaton. So even if the Argument, as stated in Augustine, is too general to mention specific mental states and episodes as correlates to bodily activity, anyone who takes the argument seriously will have to rest its plausibility on some such rather specific correlations. And then Malcolm can bring up his objection that it makes no sense to suppose we can learn to recognize, for example, pain from our own case.

Augustine certainly does say, indeed he says it in the very passage I quoted near the beginning, that I learn what a mind is from my own case. I want to explore in a moment why he says this and what he could mean by saying it. At the same time, he does not say, nor, I think, would he want to say, that I learn what a pain is from identifying pains in myself. And the reason is that such learning, if it were to take place, would have to be learning by a sort of private ostension, and Augustine is quite as insistent as Wittgenstein that ostension is, by itself, inadequate for learning.
Wittgenstein is, of course, quite well known for being skeptical about the efficacy of learning merely from ostension, whether “inner” or “outer.” To illustrate this point, Wittgenstein notes that:

The definition of the number two, “That is called ‘two’”—pointing to two nuts—is perfectly exact,—But how can two be defined like that? The person one gives the definition to doesn’t know what one wants to call “two”; he will suppose that “two” is the name given to this group of nuts!—He may suppose this; but perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake; when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might understand it as a numeral. And he might equally well take the name of a person, of which I give an ostensive definition, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of the compass. That is to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case.\(^{12}\)

As it turns out, Augustine is equally skeptical of the efficacy of ostensive learning. Perhaps the best place to look for evidence of Augustine’s skepticism about ostensive learning, that is, learning by having examples pointed out or displayed to the learner, is his early dialogue, *De magistro*. Here is a particularly striking passage:

Augustine: Now do this: tell me—if I were completely ignorant of the meaning of the word ["walking"] and were to ask you what walking is while you were walking, how would you teach me?

Adeodatus [Augustine’s real-life son, and sole interlocutor in this dialogue]: I would do it a little bit more quickly, so that after your question you would be prompted by something novel [in my behavior], and yet nothing would take place other than what was to be shown.

Augustine: Don’t you know that *walking* is one thing and *hurrying* another? . . . We speak of “hurrying” in writing and in reading and in countless other matters. (3.6, King trans.)

In the dialogue Adeodatus later returns to this example of walking:

Adeodatus: For example, if anyone should ask me what it is to walk while I was resting or doing something else, as was said, and I should attempt to teach him what he asked about without a sign, by immediately walking, how shall I guard against his thinking that it’s just the amount of walking I have done? He’ll be mistaken if he thinks this. He’ll think that anyone who walks farther than I have, or not as far, hasn’t walked at all. (10.29, King trans.)

Later in the dialogue Augustine discusses whether someone could be shown what bird-catching is by demonstrating the practice. Adeodatus is

skeptical: “I’m afraid that everything here is like what I said about the man who asks what it is to walk.” Augustine tries to reassure him. “It’s easy to get rid of your worry.” he replies;

I add that he’s so intelligent that he recognizes the kind of craft as a whole on the basis of what he has seen. It’s surely enough for the matter at hand that some men can be taught about some things, even if not all, without a sign. (10.32, King trans.)

I should explain that the discussion of whether one can teach another what walking or bird-catching is “without a sign,” is primarily a discussion of whether it can be done without using words, that is, by simply pointing out, or by displaying, examples. Augustine later argues that there really is no teaching with signs either, that is, there is no ostensive teaching of the meaning of words by using signs. One has to learn for oneself, by consulting the “inner teacher.” This is the so-called “doctrine of illumination” in Augustine. It presupposes that Platonic-style ideas are immediately available to each of us. Ostension or discussion in language can prompt us to consult the “inner teacher” and locate walking or bird-catching either as themselves Platonic ideas or as complexes made up to Platonic ideas.

Actually, it is not quite accurate to say that Augustine’s theory of “illumination” and “the inner teacher” are Platonic, since Augustine himself tried to distinguish his views from Plato’s. In Book XII of the De trinitate, after making a reference to Plato’s story in his dialogue, Meno, in which the slave-boy is able to figure out for himself how to construct a square with an area twice that of a given square, Augustine says this, with, I think, a touch of humor:

But if this were a recollecting of things previously known, then certainly everyone, or almost everyone, would be unable to do the same thing if questioned in this manner. For not all have been geometricians in their previous life, since there are so few of them in the human race that one can hardly be found.

Augustine continues, quite seriously now:

But we ought rather to believe that the nature of the intellectual mind is so formed as to see those things which, according to the disposition of the Creator, are subjoined to intelligible things in the natural order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind, as the eye of the flesh sees the things that lie about it in this corporeal light, of which light it is made to be receptive and to which it is adapted. (12.15.24, McKenna trans.)

Augustine goes on to say that sensible things, including, presumably colors, or bodily actions such as walking or bird-catching, must be observed
with our senses, though, as we have seen, he thinks that we will not be able
to pick out what a color is, or what walking or bird-catching is, without the
illumination of the “inner teacher.”

With these views about the ineffectiveness of ostensive teaching and
learning, it would be inappropriate for Augustine to assume that we can
learn what a pain is, or what anxiety is, or what thinking about Vienna is
(Augustine’s stock case is thinking about Alexandria, which is a city he seems
to have fantasized about, though he never visited it) by a kind of inner
ostension. To be sure, Augustine does not, like Malcolm, or Wittgenstein
before him, express worries about what would be the difference between
getting a re-identification of a pain right and only seeming to do so. But he
already has sufficient worries about the efficacy of ostensive learning to make
it quite inappropriate for him to think one could teach oneself what pain is.

Thus one would not expect Augustine to develop a “bottom-up” argu-
ment for other minds (there must be pain, anxiety, desire, thoughts about Al-
exandria, and so on, in that body over there; thus, it has a mind). And, in fact,
we find no such thing. Indeed, it is a “top-down” argument—from a whole
repertoire of bodily movements that resemble movements in my body that I
notice my mind bringing about, to the conclusion that there must be a mind
in that other body that brings about that repertoire of movements. This argu-
ment is, I think, quite compatible with considerable agnosticism about the
phenomenal character of that other organism’s inner life, agnosticism about
what it is actually like to be that bat or other human being.

Yet the argument does depend on the assumption that I can know what
a mind is from my own case. And Augustine insists on this assumption, “We
can also know what a mind [animus] is by considering our own,” he writes,
“for we have a mind” (De trinitate 8.6.9). This is clearly reasoning from one’s
own case, even if it is not reasoning from specific mental acts or states to the
attribution of the same, or the same type of, mental act or state to another.

Why is Augustine not skeptical about my ability to pick out my own mind?
The answer is, as pages and pages of the De trinitate try to impress on
us, that the mind is by nature an entity that is immediately present to itself.
It does not need to pick itself out. In fact, Augustine is puzzled about what
it could possibly pick itself out from. In Nagel’s language, if there is some-
thing it is like to be the sort of entity I am, then I cannot help but know
what it is. The activities and passivities of my mind constitute what it is like
to be the kind of thing I am. My thoughts, my feelings, my dreams, my
day-dreams, my desires, my fears—all these help make up what it is like to
be my kind of thing.

Augustine tries to bring out the immediate availability of the mind to
itself by puzzling over the classical Greek admonition, “Know thyself!” “How
can the mind come into the mind,” he asks,

just as though it were possible for the mind not to be in the mind? Add
to this, that if a part has been found, then the mind does not seek itself
as a whole, but yet it does seek itself as a whole. Therefore, it is present to itself as a whole, and there is nothing further to be sought. For nothing is wanting to the mind that seeks; only the object that is sought is wanting. Since it, therefore, seeks itself as a whole, nothing of itself is wanting to it. (De trinitate 10.4.6, McKenna trans.)

Augustine concludes that the command, “Know thyself!” must not be an admonition to the mind to seek out something of itself that it does not yet know, there being no such thing. Rather, he says, this admonition must be a command to the soul to “consider itself and live according to its nature, namely, under Him [that is God] to whom it must be brought into subjection.” He adds that the mind “does many things through evil desires, as though it had forgotten itself” (De trinitate 10.5.7). This forgetfulness Augustine conceives as a sort of “turning away” from the mind’s true nature, but not a real ignorance of what it is.

So the picture seems to be this. Augustine reasons by analogy to the conclusion that other organisms have minds. He considers a mind a subject of experience that is completely available to itself. He thinks each of us knows what it is to be a conscious subject from our own case. But, since Augustine does not try to construct his analogy from behavior routines to specifiable mental states or acts, and from those to a mind, his reasoning does not seem to fall victim to Malcolm’s criticisms, at least not immediately or directly.

How might Malcolm have responded to the argument I have reconstructed from Augustine? I suspect he would have presented two lines of attack. First, he would note that the vague reference to behavior routines, or more sanitarily, movement routines, cannot be persuasive. We need to attribute pain to the writhing bat, or thinking that the ball is in behind the couch to the infant child who is playing hide-and-seek, to give the Argument from Analogy any purchase at all.

I myself feel torn on this question. On the one hand, our confidence that the stroke victim, or the Alzheimer’s patient, does have a mind, does indeed seem to hang to some extent on identifiable behavior routines. But, on the other hand, I do not think I have any good idea at all of what it is like to be a stroke victim, or a patient suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. Yet that in no way shakes my confidence that there is something it is like to be those people—that they do have minds. And the same is true for bats.

I suspect Malcolm’s second objection would be that it is a mistake to suppose we attribute a mind to another being on the basis of an argument. This response might find some support from Wittgenstein’s famous saying in the Investigations, “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.”13

as develop an attitude of empathy, or resentment, or concern, or whatever, towards another soul.

I feel myself rather ambivalent about this response as well. In becoming a vegetarian I did not so much change my opinions about steers and chickens as I did change my attitude towards them. However, it is not as though reasoning played no role at all. Thus it was important to me to be given evidence that all birds and all mammals, except the odd nontherian group in Australia, dream. There is not similar evidence, I understand, for dreaming in amphibians, fish, or lower animals. I reasoned that any organism that dreams very likely has subjective experience of some sort, perhaps not totally unlike mine. Thinking about that, I found myself not wanting to eat the dreamers. Reasoning affected my attitudes.

Is there then nothing it is like to be a frog or a lobster, since they, apparently, do not dream (or, more cautiously, since we do not have similar reason to think that they dream)? I do not know. But that seems to me a question that can be discussed. It is reasonable, I think, to have an opinion about it. And relevant to forming such an opinion is, I think, not only the neurophysiology of such organisms, but also the behavior patterns that might offer analogies to patterns in higher animals.

In some passages, Wittgenstein himself seems to support the search for analogies to support the attribution of “soul” to other creatures. Thus, he tells us that “only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious” (281). And again: “Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains” (283). And further: “We say only of a human being and what is like one that it thinks” (360).

Two things strike me as especially important about those last remarks of Wittgenstein. First, Wittgenstein’s idea of supposing that only what is like a human being thinks, and only what behaves like one has pains, makes clear that Wittgenstein is using some analogical thinking of his own. The second thing is that, in the first quote, he says that only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains. He might have contented himself with a psychological or social observation and remarked that only of such beings are we inclined to say that they have pains. But by saying, only of such beings can we say that they have pains he seems to be introducing a question about what it is legitimate to say, or what one could be justified in saying. And that seems to mean that the perceived analogy he is insisting on is not merely efficacious in getting us to talk empathetically about those creatures, but that it is also the required basis for the legitimate attribution of pain or other mental states or acts to those beings. And that seems to me to be so close to the very general Argument from Analogy for Other Minds that we find in Augustine, and in Mill, that I am no longer confident Wittgenstein should be viewed as a critic of this general argument.
In fact, Wittgenstein even inches a little closer, as in this immediately following passage:

Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations.—One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? One might as well ascribe it to a number!—And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here (der Schmerz scheint hier angreifen zu können).14

Admittedly, Wittgenstein does not explain why the wriggling of the fly gives the attribution of sensation a foothold, or what more would be required to give such attribution a solid foundation. But he has invited us to think about that question, even if only somewhat coyly. It would be natural to answer the question with some form of the Argument from Analogy for Other Minds.

So what, again, is the Wittgensteinian objection to the Argument from Analogy for Other Minds supposed to be? Is it just the idea that one learns from one’s own case by “private” introspection what a pain is, or what the feeling of anxiety is and then, on the basis of similarities in the behavior of other bodies to my own, attributes that same feeling to another organism? If so, there may not be as much to separate Augustine from Wittgenstein as we had first thought. As we have seen, Augustine is, in his way, as skeptical about the efficacy of ostensive learning as Wittgenstein is. But, whereas Augustine responds to this skepticism with a close relative of Platonic innatism, Wittgenstein responds with an appeal to “outer criteria” for the ascription of “inner episodes” and, more generally, to language games and to forms of life.

What remains in the Augustinian picture to raise further questions about are, I think, two principal points. First, one wants to know whether the so-called “Theory of Illumination” with which Augustine responds to his skeptical worries about ostensive learning is a satisfactory response to those worries. And second, one wants to think about whether the idea that the mind is completely available to itself is defensible, particularly in the light of Freudian psychology and other modern attempts to help us uncover repressed thoughts and desires and otherwise apparently quite hidden mental acts and states. I shall conclude with a few reflections on this last point.

One way to try to defend Augustine’s claim that the mind is completely present to itself is to say that what Augustine is talking about here is what we might call “the phenomenal mind”—the mind as it seems to itself, including its apparent contents, and those of its acts and states that are immediately known to itself, but only those. Someone might object that this way of making Augustine’s claim plausible is so patently question-begging

as to be of no philosophical interest. But I do not think that that is so. If I am primarily interested in what it is like to be my kind of thing, or to be a cat or a gorilla, then I am interested precisely in the experience of being me, a cat, or a gorilla. One might then plausibly say that what I am interested in is the phenomenal mind.

Can Augustine be understood as arguing simply for other phenomenal minds? Here, we must be cautious. I have already suggested reasons for saying, “Yes, that is what he is interested in.” But we must also remember that he argues for the mind as an agent, something that moves “that mass,” that body over there, in the way that my mind moves my body. But my mind moves my body—if we are going to allow ourselves to talk that way—not only in fully conscious and self-aware ways, but also in ways that express repressed thoughts and desires and even in ways that we call “thoughtless” and “absent-minded.” Typically, absent-minded and thoughtless actions are not random or pointless actions, but rather goal-directed actions that have simply not been deliberately chosen or even freshly considered at the time of the action. Insofar as Augustine’s Argument from Analogy for Other Minds is an argument from movements that are purposive actions to a mind as their cause, it may seem that he must include in the mind much that does not belong to what I am calling the “phenomenal mind.”

All of that is, I think, quite plausible. But I see no reason why, if pressed, Augustine should not insist that all he expects from his Argument from Analogy is justification for attributing phenomenal minds to other creatures—something it is like to be them. After all, whatever I do in a less than fully conscious fashion is, for that very reason, something whose source in me I do not fully monitor. To some degree or other, I must infer the sources of such actions in me, much as, according to the argument, I must infer mental sources of actions in other people. When one considers actions whose inner sources are opaque to the agent, the Argument from Analogy for Other Minds, it seems, is neither necessary nor possible. It is not necessary because I would have no reason to attribute an awareness to some other being when I myself was unaware of the source of my own analogous action. It is not possible, since, ex hypothesi, I would be aware of nothing on the basis of which I could attribute a similar awareness to the agent whose action resembles mine.

So what is the verdict on Augustine’s reasoning from his own case in his Argument from Analogy for Other Minds? Conceived as an argument for other phenomenal minds, that is, for there being something it is like to be this or that other individual, whether human or not, it seems not to presuppose ostensive learning of specific kinds of act and state in a way that might make it directly vulnerable to Malcolm’s criticisms. Thus, it seems compatible with considerable agnosticism as to what exactly it is like to be you, or a bat, or an orangutan. It is, understood in this way, only an argument for the conclusion that there is something it is like to be you, or the bat, or the orangutan.
My conclusion is that Augustine’s reasoning from his own case to the conclusion that there are other minds is not so clear a target for Norman Malcolm’s criticisms as we might at first have supposed. Augustine’s Argument from Analogy for Other Minds can be interpreted, I have tried to persuade you, as reasoning for the conclusion that there is something it is like to be you, or a bat, or a giraffe. Even Wittgenstein seems to make at least fleeting appeal to reasoning of this sort.

I certainly do not want to suggest that there are no battle lines left between Augustine and Malcolm, or between Augustine and Wittgenstein, on issues concerning other minds. I have tried rather to suggest that the lines are not located quite where we might have thought they were and might not even be as clearly drawn as we are inclined to suppose. The benefit I look for in retracing the lines of battle is not to be able to declare a clear winner, or even to say who is ahead. It is rather to induce a fresh consideration of the fascinating and knotty questions that interested these philosophers, and continue to interest us as well.