

# CHANGING TO ORGANIZE

## A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF UNION STRATEGIES

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In 1995 “changing to organize” became the mantra of a newly invigorated labor movement. There was talk of building a national organizing fund, recruiting thousands of new young organizers, and organizing millions of workers in new occupations and industries. In the years that followed, the AFL-CIO and its affiliates engaged in an aggressive effort to increase their organizing capacity and success. Staff and financial resources were shifted into organizing; leaders, members, and central labor bodies were mobilized to support organizing campaigns; and hundreds of new organizers were recruited from college campuses and the rank and file.

By 1999, it appeared that these efforts and initiatives were paying off when the media reported a net gain of 265,000 in union membership—the first such gain in more than twenty years (AFL-CIO 2000). But this would not last. Even leaving aside the tragic and unusual events of September 11, 2001, it is clear that despite all the new initiatives and resources being devoted to organizing and all the talk of “changing to organize,” American unions have been standing still at best. The major victories have been highly concentrated in a few unions (SEIU, HERE, UNITE, CWA, AFSCME, and UAW) and industries (healthcare, building services, hotels, airlines, telecommunications, and higher education), while the majority of unions continue to experience organizing losses and declining membership (BNA PLUS 2001).

In this chapter we seek to answer the following questions: Why has it been so difficult for unions to turn the organizing efforts and initiatives of the last six years into any significant gains in union density? Why have a small number of unions been able to make major gains through organizing? And most importantly, which organizing strategies will be most effective in reversing the tide of the labor movement's organizing decline?

What our findings will show is that while the political, legal, and economic climate for organizing continues to deteriorate, and private sector employers continue to mount aggressive opposition to organizing efforts, some unions are winning. Our findings also show that the unions that are most successful at organizing run fundamentally different campaigns, in both quality and intensity, than those that are less successful, and that those differences hold true across a wide range of organizing environments, company characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and employer campaign variables.

## **PREVIOUS ORGANIZING RESEARCH**

Industrial relations research has provided important insights regarding the influence of environmental factors, company characteristics, and employer behavior on the outcome of NLRB certification elections (Farber and Western 2001; Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1994; Freeman and Kleiner 1988; Maranto and Fiorito 1987; Rose and Chaison 1990). This research has also deepened our understanding of the factors shaping attitudes toward unions and the individual union voter decision making process (Jarley and Fiorito 1991; Freeman and Rogers 1999; Weikle, Wheeler and McClendon 1998). Another stream of research has focused on the impact that institutional characteristics of unions have on organizing success (Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney 1995; Hurd and Bunge 2002). Yet, with the exception of a handful of studies, most quantitative organizing research has failed to capture the critical role played by union strategies in organizing campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 1997a; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998; and Peterson, Lee, and Finnegan 1992).

A small but growing body of qualitative case study research does explore the role of union strategies in the organizing process, exposing the interactions between environmental factors, employer behavior, and union strategies (Hoerr 1997; Waldinger and Erickson et al. 1998; Sciacchitano 1998; Juravich and Hilgert 1999; Delp and Quan 2002). By capturing the dynamic role of union strategies, this research also provides much needed insight into how the organizing process actually develops. However, this literature suffers from the limitations of case study designs that can capture only a small number of organizing campaigns, representing the most dramatic or interesting cases

(and almost all victories), and as such, are often unrepresentative of union organizing behavior.

Bronfenbrenner's survey of 261 private-sector NLRB certification elections in 1986 and 1987 was the first detailed study of the role of union tactics in organizing and first contract campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 1993; 1997a). The study showed that unions were more likely to win NLRB elections if they used rank-and-file intensive tactics such as person-to-person contact, active representative committees, member volunteer organizers, solidarity days, and building for the first contract before the election. This research also found that union tactics as a group had a more significant impact on election outcomes than other groups of variables that have been the traditional focus of industrial relations research, such as election environment, bargaining unit demographics, and employer characteristics (1993; 1997a). This was an important finding, because some researchers (such as William Dickens 1983) had argued that union tactics were entirely reactive—determined solely by management tactics. Subsequent quantitative studies of both private-sector NLRB elections and public-sector organizing campaigns have reinforced Bronfenbrenner's earlier research (Bronfenbrenner 1997c, 2000, and 2002; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998; Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1998).

However, in the more than ten years since this research was initiated, a great deal has changed in the economy, employer behavior, and the labor movement itself. Workers in almost every industry face more sophisticated employer opposition to organizing that is coupled with dramatic increases in corporate restructuring, foreign trade and investment, and shifts in work and production to other companies and other countries (Bronfenbrenner 2000, 2001). As Bronfenbrenner and Juravich found in their study of 1994 NLRB campaigns, traditional organizing approaches and the isolated use of innovative tactics have decreased in effectiveness (1998). Although some individual tactics, such as representative committees, workplace job actions, and media campaigns have a statistically significant positive impact on election outcomes, other tactics, such as house-calling the majority of the unit, holding solidarity days, staging rallies, or running a community campaign, did not have a significant impact. Yet, when these variables were combined into a single union tactics variable, adding one unit for each additional tactic, the probability of the union winning the election increased by as much as 9 percent for each additional tactic used. This suggests that the effectiveness of union tactics is strategically significant when unions combine tactics in a more comprehensive campaign.

In the years following the 1994 study, research by Bronfenbrenner and others has continued to show that comprehensive union tactics still hold the key to successful organizing efforts. Unions that use a broad range of union tactics as part of a multifaceted comprehensive strategy display greater organ-

izing success across all industries, bargaining unit demographics, and employer characteristics and behaviors (Bronfenbrenner 1997c, 2002; Sherman and Voss 2000).

Sherman and Voss (2000), in their study of local union organizing in Northern California, argue that the implementation of innovative tactics, such as rank-and-file intensive organizing and strategic targeting, requires far-reaching organizational transformation. Without such organizational transformation, unions may use some innovative tactics, but are unlikely to integrate a comprehensive union-building strategy. Indeed, Sherman and Voss found that the locals using a comprehensive union-building strategy are also the most innovative organizationally. This challenge to transform organizationally in order to fully implement innovative tactics suggests one reason why the dispersion of comprehensive union-building strategies has been so limited.

## RESEARCH METHODS

The data analyzed in this chapter were collected as part of a larger study commissioned in May 2000 by the United States Trade Deficit Review Commission to update Bronfenbrenner's previous research on the impact of capital mobility on union organizing and first contract campaigns in the U.S. private sector (Bronfenbrenner 1997b, 2000). Using surveys, personal interviews, documentary evidence, and electronic databases, we compiled detailed data on election background, organizing environment, bargaining unit demographics, company characteristics and tactics, labor board charges and determinations, union characteristics and tactics, and election and first contract outcomes for 412 NLRB certification election campaigns held in 1998 and 1999.

Our original random sample of 600 elections was derived from data compiled by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) of all NLRB single-union certification election campaigns in units with fifty or more eligible voters that took place in 1998–1999 (BNA PLUS 2000).<sup>1</sup> For each case in the sample we conducted in-depth surveys of the lead organizer for the campaign by mail and phone. We also searched computerized corporate, media, legal, and union databases, and reviewed Security and Exchange Commission filings, IRS 990 forms, and NLRB documents to collect data on company ownership, structure, operations, employment, financial condition, unionization, and employer characteristics and practices.

We were able to complete surveys for 412 of the 600 cases in the sample, for a response rate of 69 percent. Further, we were able to collect corporate ownership, structure, and financial information for 99 percent of the 412 cases. NLRB data were compiled from the FAST database for 65 percent of the

136 cases where NLRB charges were filed, while NLRB documents were collected for 46 percent. Summary statistics for the sample reveal that it is representative of the population of all NLRB certification elections in units over fifty that took place in 1998–1999 in terms of both industry and outcomes (BNA Plus 2000).

Descriptive statistics were calculated for a wide range of variables in order to capture the nature and extent of union and employer organizing activity and the broader context in which they operate. In addition, binary logistic regression was used to determine whether the number of comprehensive union-building strategies has a statistically significant impact on certification election outcome when controlling for the influence of election background, company characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and employer opposition.

### **THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES**

This research builds on the theoretical model developed by Bronfenbrenner (1993), and Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1997) in previous organizing studies. According to this model, environmental factors plus union and employer characteristics and strategies combine to affect the election outcome both indirectly as they moderate the effect of other factors and directly as they influence worker propensity to vote for the union.<sup>2</sup> Under this model, union organizing tactics are an extremely important element of the organizing process. They play just as much—if not even a greater—role in determining election outcome than environmental factors and company characteristics and tactics.

This study tests two hypotheses. The first is that union success in certification elections depends on a comprehensive union-building strategy that incorporates the following ten elements, each of which is a cluster of key union tactics, that we argue are critical to union organizing success in the current environment: (1) adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources, (2) strategic targeting, (3) active and representative rank-and-file organizing committees, (4) active participation of member volunteer organizers, (5) person-to-person contact inside and outside the workplace, (6) benchmarks and assessments to monitor union support and set thresholds for moving ahead with the campaign, (7) issues which resonate in the workplace and in the community, (8) creative, escalating internal pressure tactics involving members in the workplace, (9) creative, escalating external pressure tactics involving members outside the workplace, locally, nationally, and/or internationally, (10) building for the first contract during the organizing campaign.<sup>3</sup>

This model expands upon Bronfenbrenner and Juravich's 1998 study by arguing that in the current organizing environment it is not enough to use as many union tactics as possible; rather, certain strategic elements, each comprised of clusters of key tactics, are essential ingredients for union organizing success. These strategic elements, which we will call comprehensive organizing tactics, may each be associated with higher win rates and/or have statistically significant positive effects on election outcomes. However, given the hostile climate in which unions must operate, we hypothesize that the use of these individual comprehensive organizing tactics will not be enough. Instead, union gains will depend on a multifaceted campaign utilizing as many of the ten comprehensive organizing tactics as possible. We hypothesize that the likelihood a union will win an election significantly increases for each additional comprehensive organizing tactic used by the union.

Our second hypothesis is that differences in the quality and intensity of the campaigns between unions are a better predictor of differences in election outcomes for those unions than employer opposition, bargaining unit demographics, or company or industry characteristics. We do not suggest that industry, corporate structure, unit type, worker demographics, or employer opposition do not matter. As our previous research has shown, all of these factors have a very powerful and significant impact on union win rates (Bronfenbrenner 1997a, 1997c, 2001; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998). Indeed, it is more difficult to organize mobile industries, such as metal production and fabrication, garment and textile, food processing, and call centers, in the current global trade and investment climate. It is also more difficult to organize subsidiaries of large multinational corporations that have the resources to launch a full-scale counterattack against the union campaign. Furthermore, higher paid, primarily white male, blue collar, white collar, and professional and technical occupations are more difficult to organize in the current climate, because they tend to be more invested in the internal labor markets and more affected by threats of job loss or blacklisting that are typical in employer campaigns today (Bronfenbrenner 1997a; 2001). Although industry, unit type, worker demographics, and employer characteristics and tactics matter, union tactics matter more, because unions have so far to go before they live up to their full potential. While the majority of unions today run very weak campaigns with no underlying strategy, the majority of employers run very strategic campaigns, taking full advantage of the range of effective anti-union tactics available to them, and adapting and tailoring those tactics, depending on the organizing environment and the union's campaign.

If all unions were running aggressive comprehensive campaigns, and win rates continued to vary across the organizing environments in which individual unions operate, then these differences in organizing environment would play the primary role in explaining the variance in organizing success

between unions. Instead, we hypothesize that the more successful unions owe their organizing victories to the nature, quality, intensity, and comprehensiveness of their campaigns, across a diversity of industries, companies, bargaining units, and employer campaigns. Similarly, unions with lower win rates lose more elections because of the lack of intensity, quality, and comprehensiveness of the campaigns they run, rather than the organizing environment in which they operate.

We first test the hypotheses by comparing means, frequencies, and win rates for each of the comprehensive organizing tactics that make up our model, both individually and as part of the additive comprehensive organizing tactics variable. This will allow us to see whether, in accordance with our first hypothesis, win rates improve as the number of comprehensive organizing tactics increases. We will also test different combinations of comprehensive organizing tactics in order to ensure that all of the elements of our model contribute to union organizing success when added together with the other elements of the model. Next, we will compare means, frequencies, and win rates for company characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and employer behavior in campaigns where unions used a comprehensive union-building strategy, including more than five of the comprehensive organizing tactics listed above, as compared to campaigns where unions used five or fewer comprehensive organizing tactics.<sup>4</sup> This will allow us to see both the nature of the environment in which unions are organizing today and whether, in accordance with our second hypothesis, union win rates increase across different industry, company, unit, and employer characteristics when the union runs more comprehensive campaigns.

We then will use binary logistic regression to test the hypothesis that the odds of winning the election will significantly increase for each additional comprehensive organizing tactic used, when we control for election background, employer characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and employer tactics. We will also standardize the logistic regression coefficient in order to further test the relative effects of each of the statistically significant variables. We will use two models. Model A will include each of the individual elements of the comprehensive strategy, while model B will substitute a number of union tactics adding one point for each additional comprehensive tactic used. As described in appendix 1.2, the following control variables (with their predicted impact) will be included in both models: number of eligible voters (+/-);<sup>5</sup> manufacturing sector (-); subsidiary of a larger parent company (-); ownership change before the election (+);<sup>6</sup> good to excellent financial condition (+);<sup>7</sup> board determined unit (-); other organized units (+); professional, technical, or white collar unit (-); unit at least 60 percent women (+); unit at least 60 percent workers of color (+);<sup>8</sup> and number of employer tactics used (-).

We will further test the second hypothesis by examining frequencies, means, and win rates across unions. This will allow us to evaluate the relative intensity and quality of union campaigns for each union and assess which unions are most likely to use each of the comprehensive organizing tactics in our model. It will also allow us to compare win rates across unions, depending on the number of comprehensive organizing tactics used, to see whether differences in union win rates are associated with the number of comprehensive organizing tactics they use.

### **ELEMENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE UNION-BUILDING STRATEGY**

According to our hypotheses, each of the ten tactical clusters, or comprehensive organizing tactics in our model enhances the union's organizing power in a unique way. Unions that allocate adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources,<sup>9</sup> for example, make an institutional commitment to be more intensely engaged in the campaign, recruit staff who are demographically representative of the workers they organize, and run more campaigns. Unions that engage in strategic targeting have approached organizing as a means to build bargaining power within certain sectors and industries, in contrast to the non-strategic "hot shop" organizing approach. Perhaps the single most important component of a comprehensive campaign is an active representative committee that gives bargaining unit members ownership of the campaign and allows the workers to start acting like a union inside the workplace, building trust and confidence among the workforce and counteracting the most negative aspects of the employer campaign.

The use of member volunteers to assist in organizing campaigns reflects a combination of greater institutional integration of current and potential new members and an emphasis on a worker-to-worker approach to organizing. Person-to-person contacts made inside and outside the workplace enhance the union's organizing power by providing the intensive one-on-one contacts necessary to build and sustain worker commitment to unionization both at home and in the increasingly hostile election environment at work. The combination of benchmarks and assessments allows unions to evaluate worker support for the union at different stages of the campaign in order to better adjust their strategy to the unit they are trying to organize and to set thresholds to determine when, and whether, they are ready to move on to the next stage of the campaign.

A focus on issues that resonate with the workers and the community, such as respect, dignity, fairness, service quality, and union power and voice, is essential both to build worker commitment to withstand the employer campaign and to gain community support. Internal pressure tactics allow the



union to start acting like a union before the election takes place, building solidarity and commitment among the workers being organized and restraining employer opposition. External pressure tactics, which exert leverage on the employer both in the local community and in their national or international operations, are essential to organizing in the increasingly global corporate environment. Finally, building for the first contract before the election helps build confidence in the workers being organized, showing them what the union is all about and signaling to the employer that the union is there for the long haul.

### RESULTS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 1.1 provides summary statistics on the election background and outcome for the 412 elections in our sample. In an improvement over past years, these data suggest that today's unions are beginning to target and win in slightly larger units. With an election win rate of 44 percent, first contract rate of 66 percent, and average unit size of 192 eligible voters, the percentage of eligible voters who gain coverage under a contract has increased to 37 percent, compared to less than 25 percent in the early 1990s (Bronfenbrenner 2001, 2002).

Still, this progress must be put in perspective. At a time when union density in the private sector has dropped below 10 percent and total private sector employment continues to increase by an average of 2.1 million workers each year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002), a 9 percent increase in the unit size of elections won is simply not enough. If unions are going to reverse the tide of union density decline, they will need to target units of 5,000, or 10,000 or more; significantly increase the number of organizing campaigns; and dramatically increase the percentage of eligible voters who gain coverage under a union contract.

The overall drop between the percentage of the unit who signed cards before the petition was filed and the percentage of the unit who actually ended up voting for the unit remains quite high (17 percentage points). However, in winning units, where the percentage of card signers averages as high as 71 percent, the percent union vote is only five percentage points lower (66 percent).<sup>10</sup>

### COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIZING TACTICS

Table 1.1 also lists the frequencies and win rates associated with the ten comprehensive organizing tactics included in our strategic model. As predicted,

TABLE 1.1

Comprehensive organizing tactics and election outcome

	Proportion or mean of elections	Proportion or mean of elections won	Proportion or mean of elections lost	Win rate*
<b>Election background</b>				
All elections	1.00	1.00	1.00	.45
1998	.49	.54	.51	.42
1999	.51	.46	.49	.47
Elections lost by union	.56	.00	1.00	.00
Elections won by union	.44	1.00	.00	1.00
<i>First contract achieved</i>	.30	.66	.02	—
Average number of eligible voters	192	201	185	—
Total number of eligible voters	79,167	36,706	42,461	—
<i>50–99 eligible voters</i>	.41	.39	.42	.43
<i>100–249 eligible voters</i>	.42	.43	.42	.45
<i>250–499 eligible voters</i>	.12	.12	.12	.45
<i>500 or more eligible voters</i>	.05	.06	.05	.50
Percent union vote	.49	.66	.35	—
Percent signed cards before petition filed	.66	.71	.62	—
<b>Comprehensive organizing tactics</b>				
Adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources	.14	.21	.09	.64 (.41)
Strategic targeting	.39	.45	.34	.51 (.40)
Active representative rank-and-file committee	.26	.33	.21	.56 (.41)
Effectively utilized member volunteer organizers	.27	.31	.23	.52 (.42)
Person-to-person contact inside and outside the workplace	.19	.23	.16	.53 (.43)
Benchmarks and assessments	.24	.35	.14	.66 (.38)
Issues which resonate in the workplace and community	.23	.25	.21	.49 (.43)
Escalating pressure tactics in the workplace	.37	.42	.33	.50 (.41)
Escalating pressure tactics outside the workplace	.17	.18	.16	.48 (.44)
Building for the first contract before the election	.35	.39	.31	.50 (.42)

TABLE 1.1—cont.

	Proportion or mean of elections	Proportion or mean of elections won	Proportion or mean of elections lost	Win rate*
<b>Number of comprehensive organizing tactics used</b>	2.60	3.11	2.19	—
<i>Zero</i>	.14	.10	.17	.32
<i>One</i>	.19	.12	.25	.28
<i>Two</i>	.21	.22	.20	.47
<i>Three</i>	.16	.15	.16	.43
<i>Four</i>	.15	.18	.13	.53
<i>Five</i>	.06	.08	.04	.63
<i>Six</i>	.06	.09	.04	.62
<i>Seven</i>	.02	.03	.01	.67
<i>Eight</i>	.01	.03	.00	1.00
Union used no comprehensive organizing tactics	.14	.10	.17	.32 (.47)
Union used one to five comprehensive organizing tactics	.77	.75	.77	.44 (.46)
Union used more than five comprehensive organizing tactics	.10	.15	.06	.68 (.42)

\* Number in parenthesis equals win rate when characteristic or action is not present.

each of the individual elements in the model are associated with win rates that average between 4 to 28 percentage points higher than in campaigns where they are not used. Most dramatic are the win rates associated with adequate and appropriate resources (64 percent when present, 41 percent when not present), active representative committee (56 percent when present, 41 percent when not present), and benchmarks and assessments (66 percent when present, 38 percent when not present). The smallest differences are associated with issues that resonate in the workplace and community (49 percent when present, 43 percent when not present) and external pressure tactics (48 percent when present, 44 percent when not present). This is to be expected, given that escalating external pressure tactics tend to be only used in campaigns with aggressive employer opposition, while the effectiveness of issues is highly dependent on the tactics unions use to get their message across.

Although organizer training programs and materials have been emphasizing the importance of these tactics for more than a decade (CWA 1985; Diamond 1992), these data suggest that even today only a small number of unions are actually using them, and those that do so tend to use them in isolation, not as part of a comprehensive multifaceted campaign. Most significantly, in light of labor's much touted effort at "changing to organize," there has been only a minimal increase in the use of these tactics, both individually and in combination since 1995.

As shown in table 1.1, only 14 percent of all the union campaigns in our sample devoted adequate and appropriate resources to the campaign, only 19 percent engaged in person-to-person contact inside and outside the workplace, and only 17 percent engaged in escalating pressure tactics outside the workplace. Fewer than 30 percent had active representative committees or effectively used member volunteer organizers, while fewer than 25 percent used benchmarks and assessments or focused on issues that resonate in the workplace and broader community. The highest percentages were found for strategic targeting (39 percent), escalating pressure tactics inside the workplace (37 percent), and building for the first contract before the election is held (35 percent).

All of the comprehensive organizing tactics in our model were much more likely to be used in winning campaigns than in losing ones. For example, only 9 percent of losing campaigns devoted adequate and appropriate resources, compared to 21 percent of winning campaigns, while 33 percent of winning campaigns had active representative committees, compared to only 21 percent of losing campaigns.

Consistent with earlier research (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998), the results for number of comprehensive organizing tactics used suggest that the overwhelming majority of unions continue to pick and choose individual tactics, in most cases without any coherent plan or strategy, rather than pulling

them together into a more comprehensive, multifaceted strategy. Fourteen percent of all campaigns and 17 percent of losing campaigns used no comprehensive organizing tactics, while only 10 percent of all campaigns, and 6 percent of losing campaigns, used more than five tactics. This occurred despite the fact that, in accordance with our hypothesis, union win rates increase dramatically as the number of comprehensive organizing tactics increase, ranging from 32 percent for no comprehensive organizing tactics, to 44 percent for one to five tactics, to 68 percent for more than five tactics, and 100 percent for the 1 percent of the campaigns where unions used eight tactics.

We also tested a series of different combinations of six comprehensive organizing tactics from the ten elements of our model, making sure to include all of the different elements in an equal number of combinations so that, out of a total of 51 different combinations, each element was included in 31 combinations. As described in appendix 1.4, we found that for almost every different combination of six tactics, win rates increased for each additional comprehensive organizing tactic used.<sup>11</sup> The average win rates for all the combinations start at 32 percent, increasing to 38 percent for one tactic, 48 percent for two, 55 percent for three, 60 percent for four, 78 percent for five, and 93 percent for six tactics. Similarly, win rates range from a minimum 29 percent and a maximum of 38 percent for elections where no tactics in the combination were used, to a minimum of 67 percent and a maximum of 100 percent for six tactics. While some tactics, such as representative committee, have a greater impact on win rates than others, these data suggest that each of the ten comprehensive organizing tactics play a key role in improving union organizing success when used in combination with other comprehensive organizing tactics in the model. These findings also show that resources alone cannot be used as a proxy for comprehensive campaigns, because win rates increase as the number of comprehensive organizing tactics increase even for those combinations that do not include the resource variable.<sup>12</sup>

### **CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS**

Table 1.2 provides an overview of the characteristics of companies involved in certification election campaigns. The findings suggest that unions organizing today are operating in a much more global, mobile, and rapidly changing corporate environment. The majority of union private-sector organizing campaigns continue to be concentrated in relatively small units in U.S.-owned-for-profit companies. However, in the last five years there have been significant shifts in the industrial sector and ownership structure of private sector companies where organizing is taking place, reflecting both changes in union tar-

TABLE 1.2

Company characteristics, union tactics, and election outcome

	All elections			Elections with more than five union tactics			Elections with five or fewer union tactics		
	Proportion or mean of elections	Proportion or mean of elections won	Win rate*	Proportion or mean of elections	Proportion or mean of elections won	Win rate*	Proportion or mean of elections	Proportion or mean of elections won	Win rate*
<b>Industrial sector</b>									
Manufacturing	.33	.22	.30	.20	.19	.63	.34	.22	.28
Service sector	.43	.55	.57	.70	.70	.68	.40	.52	.55
Other sectors**	.25	.24	.42	.10	.11	.75	.26	.26	.41
<b>Mobile industry</b>									
Mobile	.47	.36	.34	.23	.19	.56	.50	.39	.33
Immobile	.53	.64	.54	.78	.82	.71	.50	.61	.51
<b>Ownership structure</b>									
Subsidiary of larger parent	.84	.77	.41 (.63)	.83	.78	.64 (.86)	.84	.76	.38 (.61)
Non-profit	.23	.30	.58	.40	.33	.56	.21	.30	.58
For profit	.77	.70	.40	.60	.67	.75	.79	.70	.37
<i>Publicly held</i>	.40	.30	.33	.35	.33	.64	.41	.30	.31
<i>Privately held</i>	.37	.39	.48	.25	.33	.90	.48	.40	.45

TABLE 1.2—cont.

	All elections			Elections with more than five union tactics			Elections with five or fewer union tactics		
	Proportion or mean of elections	Proportion or mean of elections won	Win rate*	Proportion or mean of elections	Proportion or mean of elections won	Win rate*	Proportion or mean of elections	Proportion or mean of elections won	Win rate*
<b>Global structure</b>									
U.S.-based, all sites U.S.	.33	.34	.45 (.44)	.20	.26	.88 (.63)	.35	.35	.43 (.42)
U.S.-based multinational	.31	.28	.39 (.47)	.33	.37	.77 (.63)	.31	.26	.35 (.45)
Foreign-based multinational	.12	.08	.29 (.46)	.08	.04	.33 (.70)	.13	.09	.29 (.44)
Any foreign sites, operations, suppliers or customers	.55	.56	.45 (.44)	.70	.67	.64 (.75)	.54	.54	.42 (.42)
<b>Financial condition</b>									
Good to excellent	.65	.63	.43	.53	.56	.71	.68	.64	.41
Fair to poor	.35	.37	.47	.48	.44	.63	.34	.36	.44
<b>Unionization</b>									
Other organized units as same site	.15	.22	.65 (.41)	.35	.33	.64 (.69)	.13	.21	.65 (.38)
Other organized units at other locations	.60	.63	.47 (.41)	.73	.67	.62 (.82)	.59	.63	.45 (.38)
Unit is located in AFL-CIO union city	.12	.16	.59 (.42)	.28	.33	.82 (.62)	.11	.14	.53 (.41)
Previous attempt to organize this unit	.46	.44	.43 (.46)	.53	.56	.71 (.63)	.45	.42	.39 (.44)
<b>Pre-campaign company practices</b>									
Threat of full or partial plant closing	.21	.17	.35 (.47)	.33	.33	.69 (.67)	.20	.14	.29 (.45)
Employee involvement program before election	.31	.28	.40 (.47)	.30	.29	.58 (.71)	.32	.28	.38 (.44)
Ownership change in two years before the election	.18	.22	.55 (.42)	.25	.30	.80 (.63)	.18	.21	.51 (.40)

\* Number in parenthesis equals win rate when characteristic or action is not present.

\*\* Other sectors include communications, retail and wholesale trade, transportation, construction, utilities, and sanitation.

