In a letter to the editors following the publication of his article, Mr. Soerjono provided the following important information, as well as corrections to the translator's footnotes:

At note 16:

There were four members of Pesindo named Soerjono. This lack of Javanese surnames is always a problem. So in Central Java the practice is usually to add his profession to a man's name. Thus, if someone asks: "Which Soerjono?" the answer is "Soerjono wartawan [Soerjono Reporter]." Or it can be a childhood nickname [paraban]. In East Java, and especially in Surabaya, if people have the same name they are distinguished by some physical characteristic, usually a defect.

He then refers to three well-known figures named Sidik in Surabaya, two from Pesindo and one the head of the PNI: Sidik Arselan (see note 32) was known in Surabaya dialect as Sidik Ko'tung [Handless Sidik] because he had lost a hand; the other Sidik from Pesindo was known as Sidik Piteng [One-eyed Sidik] because one of his eyes was larger than the other; and Pak Sidik [Djojosoekarto], head of the PNI, was known as Sidik Dingklang, Lame Sidik.

Now the Soerjono you refer to in your footnote as Soerjono-Pak Kasur, was the Soerjono from Pesindo's Priangan Regional Commissariat. Another was the Soerjono from the Yogyakarta Regional Commissariat, who became a military man because he headed Pesindo's Local Defense organization. A third Soerjono was in Malang, in the armaments section of Pesindo's Supreme Headquarters. And the Soerjono who sat with Sudisman and Lagiono as Pesindo representatives in the FDR was the author himself.

At note 36:

Ngadiman had led the famous Bedadung (Banyuwangi) uprising in 1926. He returned from Australia at the time of the formation of the PKI in Surakarta [spring of 1946] under Sardjono, before Musso's arrival, and became secretary-general. At the beginning of the 1950s, when Aidit's Politbureau was ascendant, he and Tan Ling Dje were removed from office for incorrect handling of the West Irian question. . . . Thus he did not die with Amir Sjarifuddin, and indeed, by 1965 had been restored to an active role in the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

At note 68:

On this Soepeno, I should add that I shared a house with him in Yogya for a long time during the revolution. Because he attended the Inter-Asiatic Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947, his name was often linked to the Madiun Affair in foreign broadcasts and articles. It was said that the decision or the "instruction" to launch the Madiun Affair had been transmitted

[to Indonesia] through him at this conference. But after his return from New Delhi, in talks with me, including some long after the Madiun Affair, he never mentioned any such thing. In fact, on September 19 or 20 [1948] --I don't remember exactly, but that evening Bung Karno made his radio broadcast--when Soepeno received a long distance phone call from Madiun in the early afternoon [siangnya], he seemed surprised and upset [kaget]. He printed the news in Revolusioner without any commentary. The call had come from Bambang Kaslan, chief of staff of Sumarsono at the Youth Congress Body [Badan Kongres Pemuda] in Madiun. Kaslan said that in Madiun there had been an armed clash between Brigade 29 and the Siliwangi General Reserve Unit, and that after it was over the town was calm. This was what Revolusioner reported in what turned out to be its last issue. But this is not the most important thing. The important thing is that when Soepeno went to New Delhi he wasn't yet a member of the PKI. And the only communist he met there was a pemuda from Vietnam who always wore shorts and came to every session on foot. This pemuda turned out to be Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister of Vietnam. Soepeno told me that Pham Van Dong had been critical of the Linggajati Agreement, and asked his views to be conveyed to Bung Amir Sjarifuddin. According to what Soepeno told me, Pham Van Dong criticized the Linggajati Agreement as giving American imperialism a breathing-space. To be quite frank, at the time I didn't understand his point. We were fighting Dutch colonialism, and Vietnam French colonialism. Why were we giving an adempauze to American imperialism, what was the [logical] connection?

It was only later when he read Andrei Zhdanov's speech, "The International Situation," at the formation of the Cominform in early 1948, that Soerjono came to believe that the Vietnamese view accorded with the one put forward by Zhdanov.

Vietnam regarded the revolution in the colonial zones as already part of the struggle between the Western and Eastern camps. We, on the other hand, were still basing ourselves on the teachings of Sutan Sjahrir's book Perjuangan Kita with regard to the "Southeast Asia Region" and the derde macht-faktor [third force].