

SESKOAD--TRAINING THE ELITE*

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Indonesia is dominated by the military; the Armed Forces are dominated by the Army; the Army is dominated by graduates of Seskoad (Sekolah Staf dan Komando--Angkatan Darat), the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School.¹ Begun in 1951, Seskoad has graduated over 3,000 students from a variety of regular and special courses. Among its alumni are President Soeharto, Vice-President Umar Wirahadikusumah, Minister of Defense and Security Poniman, Head of the MPR Amir Machmud, Minister of Political and Security Affairs Surono, Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare Alamsyah P., Head of the State Audit Board Yusuf, and dozens of other important members of the government.² From their first day of class Seskoad students are told that they are "the future leaders of the Army and the nation,"³ a highly accurate statement. The present article will examine the Seskoad experience. By analyzing who is selected, how the selection process works, and what subjects are emphasized, the author hopes to provide a better understanding of the future leadership elite of Indonesia and also indicate the characteristics that the current leadership is seeking to perpetuate.

The Seskoad System

The Sesko system embraces the four branches of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), with each service, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police, having its own school. In addition, there is a Joint Staff College (Seskogab) which is a step up from the service schools (previous graduation from service school, Indonesian or foreign, is a requirement for selection).⁴ These schools are all in the Bandung-

* The views expressed here are solely the author's and do not reflect those of the US Army.

1. Interviews with Indonesian student officers affirm the view that Seskoad is more a leadership school than its counterparts in the other services which are seen as more "technical."

2. Over thirty Seskoad alumni have been promoted to at least junior minister status or higher. Another 160 have occupied posts of major importance in the military services. Over eighty-five have been named secretary general, director general, governor, head of a national institute, or head of a nondepartmental government board. Many more are active in various civilian enterprises in leadership capacities. (*Daftar Alumni Siswa Kursus Singkat Seskoad Sesko ABRI Bagian Darat* [an undated compilation of alumni published by Seskoad in limited private edition, which includes classes 1951-82].)

3. Opening ceremony of Seskoad Regular Course 20 (1982-83), June 5, 1982.

4. Seskogab (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Gabungan) has a mixed student body from all the services. The course lasts six months. There are no foreign students. Graduates usually return to their previous postings.

Lembang area, except the Navy branch (Jakarta), and are administered by a central command headquarters. The National Defense Institute (Lemhannas), located in Jakarta, is the highest of the defense schools.⁵

Of the various schools, Seskoad is the most important, those of the Air Force, Navy, and Police being smaller and more technical in their scope. The other three services do not have the broad national development mission of the Army, so they spend less time on social development and security subjects than does the Army school. Their graduates are more easily absorbed into their respective services and into the comparatively few nonmilitary jobs (*karyawan*) allocated them.⁶ While Seskogab and Lemhannas are more influential at the top of the national leadership pyramid, their small and exclusive enrollment limits their graduates to the top echelons of the government in Jakarta. Seskoad has a much larger student body⁷ which is not entirely absorbed by the many headquarters in Jakarta, so that graduates are scattered throughout Indonesia and are influential in every location. In addition to the regular course, beginning in 1982 Seskoad is offering a second, the Army Staff and Administration Course (Sesminad).⁸ The role and importance of this course have yet to be assessed, but it is generally deemed less prestigious than the regular one.

For many years Seskoad also functioned as the doctrinal development body, or "think tank," for the Army. Most of the basic ideas of national strategy and policy were formulated there in the late 1950s and early 1960s, before the advent of the other schools. This fact continues to lend prestige to Seskoad, although the school no longer performs this function. Seskoad also feeds the higher schools with students, the majority of whom are Army officers. By virtue of its dominant position in the military community, Seskoad can currently claim to be the single most important source of leaders in Indonesia.⁹

5. Lemhannas (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional) has a mixed civilian/military student body. While foreign students are not admitted to the regular courses, "Special Courses" for foreign officers are occasionally conducted parallel to the main course, and these have been open to ASEAN representatives. Prior completion of a staff college is an entrance requirement. The percentage of combat arms officers in Lemhannas is lower than in the Sesko schools.

6. For a detailed account of *karyawan* jobs, see John A. MacDougall, "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy," *Indonesia*, 33 (April 1982), pp. 89-121.

7. Seskoad averages about 150 students per year compared with sixty to seventy-five students in the other Seskos.

8. Sekolah Staf dan Administrasi Angkatan Darat--Army Staff and Administration School. The other services have also begun administration and staff courses. Several women officers have been selected for these courses, apparently the first time women have been able to enter higher military schools.

9. In the future that distinction may be shared with the Armed Forces Military Academy (Akabri, Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata) at Magelang, Central Java. That institution graduated its first class in 1960 and supplies 85-90 percent of Seskoad students. These officers are still too junior to have moved into the uppermost echelons of the leadership elite, but this is clearly only a matter of a few years. Already, officers of the "New Generation," i.e., commissioned after 1960, hold the majority of outer island Military District Commands (Kodam, Komando Daerah Militer). These commands are brigadier general billets. The new commander of Army Special Forces troops is also a Magelang graduate. By 1985, Magelang graduates expect to hold essentially all key subordinate command positions.

TABLE 1
Percentage Distribution by Branch of Service, 1980-83

Branch	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83	Average
Infantry	41.60	38.80	47.20	42.53
Artillery	11.80	17.10	15.30	14.73
Cavalry (Tank)	6.20	3.80	6.90	5.63
Intendence (Supply)	6.20	1.90	1.40	3.17
Engineer	9.30	18.40	6.90	11.53
Signal	8.70	6.30	6.20	7.07
Ordnance	5.50	5.70	5.50	5.57
Adjutant General (admin)	3.10	3.20	1.40	2.57
Military Police	2.40	2.50	2.80	2.57
Transportation	1.80	1.90	2.10	1.90
Finance	1.80	3.80	4.20	3.27
Dental Corps	0.60	--	--	0.20
Topographic Engineer	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.63
Judge Advocate General	--	0.60	--	0.20

Source: Various Seskoad yearbooks (*Buku Kenang-Kenangan*), all published privately in Bandung from 1969 through 1982.

The goal of every ambitious Indonesian Army officer is to be selected for Seskoad. Candidates are chosen "by computer" from a list compiled from three sources: military area commanders' recommendations; officer efficiency reports; and competitive examinations. The examinations are held annually and are primarily concerned with technical military subjects. While theoretically open to any officer with two years' service as a major, the nature of the examination ensures a high representation of the combat branches (infantry, artillery, and tanks), while the "professional" branches (dental, medical, and legal) are virtually unrepresented (see Table 1). No woman has ever graduated from the regular Seskoad course. Officers must be less than forty years old when selected.¹⁰ While not formalized, there is a tacit policy of recognizing service in East Timor through the selection process. This policy started in 1979 on the assumption that officers serving there did not have the opportunity for self-study and preparation that other officers had. Majors and lieutenant colonels with operational service in East Timor receive a virtual waiver of the examination requirement.¹¹

10. Some candidates may not be able to attend immediately upon selection and thus may be older than forty when they enter the school. They must, however, have been selected before that age. A waiver to the age limit criterion is possible but very rare. This prohibition does not apply to the Sesminad course, where many students are older.

11. Some students indicated this was the cause of a general deterioration in the test score averages of the Seskoad classes over the last three years. Test scores are not made public. The author estimates that approximately 50 percent of the 1982-83 class had seen active service in East Timor. This policy did not seem to cause great resentment or frustration among nonveterans of *Tim-Tim*, possibly because these students had been selected anyway.

TABLE 2
Estimated Percentage Distribution by Ethnic Group, 1980-83

<i>Ethnic Group</i>	<i>1980-81</i>	<i>1981-82</i>	<i>1982-83</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Indonesian Population*</i>
Javanese	55.30	56.70	57.20	43.00
Sundanese	17.40	10.10	16.60	9.00
Batak/Tapanuli	9.90	3.80	5.50	1.00
Minahasa	2.40	1.30	3.40	1.00
Bugis	1.90	1.30	3.40	2.50
Madurese	1.20	--	--	4.00
Balinese	1.20	0.60	1.30	2.00
Minangkabau	1.20	3.80	5.50	1.00
Palembang	1.20	3.20	1.30	1.00
Aceh	0.60	2.50	1.30	1.00
Makassar	0.60	--	--	1.00
Others/Unknown	7.10	16.70	4.50	33.50

Source: *Buku Kenang-Kenangan*.

* Estimated from Nene Vreeland, et al., *Area Handbook for Indonesia 1975* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 87-107.

TABLE 3
Percentage Distribution by Religion, 1980-83

<i>Religion</i>	<i>1980-81</i>	<i>1981-82</i>	<i>1982-83</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Indonesian Population</i>
Christian	24.20	Data	17.40	± 5.00
Muslim	73.20	not	81.90	± 90.00
Hindu	0.60	available	0.70	1.80-2.00

Source: Compiled from *Buku Kenang-Kenangan*, Seskoad class 1980-81, and an individual information sheet distributed to the 1982-83 class by the course administrator's office.

TABLE 4
Estimated Percentage Distribution by Island Group, 1980-83

<i>Island</i>	<i>1980-81</i>	<i>1981-82</i>	<i>1982-83</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Indonesian Population*</i>
Java	73.90	66.80	74.40	61.90
Sumatra	14.90	16.20	15.90	18.90
Sulawesi	6.10	3.20	5.40	7.00
Nusa Tenggara	1.80	0.60	1.30	5.70
Kalimantan	1.80	2.50	1.30	4.60
Maluku	0.60	--	--	0.90
Irian Jaya	--	--	--	0.80
Others/Unknown	--	10.70	--	--

Source: *Buku Kenang-Kenangan*.

* According to still unofficial data gathered in October 31, 1980 census, quoted in a fact sheet distributed in January 1983 to Seskoad students.

TABLE 5
Percentage Distribution by Branch Specialty of Seskoad Students, 1972-77

<i>Branch</i>	<i>1972-73</i>	<i>1974-75</i>	<i>1975-76</i>	<i>1976-77*</i>
Infantry	27.70	20.20	31.00	33.30
Artillery	14.40	19.00	11.50	13.30
Cavalry (Tank)	14.40	15.40	12.60	8.90
Intendence (Supply)	1.20	--	--	4.40
Engineer	25.30	34.50	25.20	16.70
Signal	4.80	3.60	5.70	7.70
Ordnance	6.00	4.80	9.20	7.70
Adjutant General (admin)	--	--	--	--
Military Police	2.40	1.20	1.10	3.30
Transportation	--	--	1.10	3.30
Finance	--	--	2.30	--
Dental Corps	--	--	--	--
Topographic Engineer	--	--	--	--
Judge Advocate General	--	--	--	--
Medical Corps	3.60	--	1.20	--

* First year of main eligibility of Military Academy graduates. See Table 1 for current distribution.

A preliminary analysis of the student classes for the years 1980-83 shows some rather interesting contrasts (see Tables 1-4). The average student is a Javanese, infantry lieutenant colonel of the Islamic faith, who graduated from the military academy fourteen to fifteen years previously.¹² As such, he represents the dominant ethnic and religious groups of Indonesia. There are, however, some anomalies in this situation. Relative to their percentage of the total Indonesian population (9 percent and 1 percent), Sundanese and Batak representation in the Seskoad student body is high--about 15 percent and 5 percent (see Table 2). There is a similar situation in the area of religion. While Christians constitute only 5-10 percent of the entire population, they account for some 21 percent of the students (see Table 3). Christians in the student body tend to be Javanese Christians. Interesting also are the groups underrepresented. While it is hardly surprising that there are no East Timorese and Irianese students,¹³ Maluku, Nusa Tenggara (Lesser Sunda), and Kalimantan are also poorly represented (see Table 4). There are no fixed quotas for admission to the officer corps or Seskoad.

After being selected, the Indonesian student prepares himself and his family for the eleven-month course. Families are not officially permitted to join the student at Seskoad. All the students live in the mess (*wisma*) and visit their families on weekends and holidays, if they obtain travel passes. There is a bed-check nightly at 10:00 PM. Officers previously assigned in the Bandung area may maintain their families in government housing, but they are still expected to "live in." The impact of a situation where all students live in the mess is that there are virtually no distractions or truancy and a total commitment to the Seskoad experience. Finally, each officer must get by financially on his basic pay and allowances (major = \$200; lieutenant colonel = \$250), as he is cut off from other "informal" income. Saving for Seskoad is essential.

The organization of the student body is designed to promote group consciousness and facilitate consensus (*musyawarah-mufakat*). Although homework is almost a daily occurrence, these assignments are rarely turned in or evaluated, especially after the first two months. Homework problems are discussed in class. Individual evaluation is done through quizzes, weekly tests, and semester final examinations.

The basic study unit is the *kelompok* (group) of three or four students. Three *kelompok* comprise a *sindik* (syndicate) of ten or eleven students. The majority of class time is in *sindik* discussion of homework assignments. Each *kelompok* presents and defends its solution to the *sindik* and the *patun* (faculty supervisor). The "group" solution is usually the work of an individual member of the *kelompok*, who presents it, on behalf of his group, to the rest of the *sindik*. Theoretically, however, this solution has been reached through group consensus. The discussions are often very detailed and open, with rank and experience no protection from

12. Prior to the time the first Magelang class became eligible to enter Seskoad, the student body was predominantly from the technical branches of the Army (especially Engineers) (see Table 5). These technical officers graduated from a technical officers' academy (now dissolved). They tended to be more competitive in examinations, general education, and overseas schooling than regular officers from the Army officers' candidate school.

13. According to the faculty no East Timorese or Irians have even attended the academy. Private conversations indicate that East Timorese have not yet entered the officer corps, while there is only a token number of Irianese. Poor educational background is the standard reason given, although this may be only part of the problem. Several students indicated that efforts were being made to increase the number of East Timorese and Irianese students in the military academy.

awkward questions. Each student is graded on his class participation, both during presentations and in questioning.

Occasionally three *sindik* will be grouped into a *kelas sedang* (working class) of thirty to thirty-four students and two or three *patun*. The *kelas sedang* functions like a very large *sindik*. Solutions representing the *sindik* consensus are presented, discussed, and defended there. The *patun* guides the discussion and usually summarizes the results. Lectures are given to the entire student class in a lecture hall or auditorium. Beginning in 1982-83, many of the formal lectures are given to the combined *Sesko*-*Sesminad* classes. Question-and-answer periods are infrequently included in formal lectures.

The emphasis on group rather than individual effort is reinforced in the various command post exercises, map problems, field trips, and surveys that are held. *Sesko* lectures are long by Western standards. A normal lecture period is over six hours, with two or possibly three breaks, and lectures on some subjects, especially those of a philosophical nature, are even longer. It is by no means uncommon for a lecturer (or team) to address a subject from 7:30 AM until 5:20 PM, with a mid-morning and a lunch break of less than an hour. The attention span of all students suffers predictably.

The Education Process

Having examined the structure and composition of the student body, it is logical next to examine the curriculum. As the Indonesian Army has gone to considerable trouble to assemble its "best and brightest" for *Sesko*, it should be possible to discern by examining the subject matter of the courses there, what the current leadership believes is important--and what is not. It is useful to recognize that there is no shortage of class periods. Instruction periods are forty minutes long, and the class schedule runs from 7:30 AM until 4:00 PM Monday through Thursday; 7:30 AM until 5:20 PM on Friday, with a three-hour midday break for prayers; and 7:30 AM until 12:00 noon on Saturday. Almost every Friday night there are classes. Night classes are irregular but frequent. An average week of instruction would fill forty-six classroom hours. Special exercises, guest lectures, homework, night seminar discussions, and other projects increase this average. There is, then, over the full eleven months, ample time to explore any relevant subject or concept.

For the purpose of this analysis, I have divided the course curriculum into five groupings: Administration, Social Sciences, Military Theory, Practical Military Subjects, and Nation Building. This division is arbitrary and is not that used by the school. Inevitably some subjects could be counted in more than one category, and with regard to two subject areas, in particular--"Operations within Indonesia" and "Territorial Development"--the relationship was too complex and interwoven for a clear distinction to be made. Class time devoted to these subjects accounts for 12 percent of the course, and, as a best "solution," that 12 percent has been evenly split between the Nation Building category and Practical Military Subjects category (see below p. 94).

Administration of the course accounts for 6.3 percent or about 137 instruction periods, of forty minutes. Most of this time is used for tests, major examinations, and administrative briefings.

Social Science periods are an important part of the course, about 17.4 percent or 376 periods. A wide variety of topics are included in this category, such as Value Theory,¹⁴ Philosophy, Personal Communications, Ethics, and so on. Two

14. Value Theory (*Teori Nilai-nilai*) classes examine the establishment of individual

large sub-blocks are the week-long "Social Survey" and the weekly classes on either Japanese or Chinese language and culture. Civilian guest lecturers usually present these subjects, and the caliber of instruction varies, but is generally quite good. As the majority of students have graduated from the military academy, much of the material in this section is relatively new to them. Because many Seskoad graduates will go on to positions in industry and the civil government, these subjects will broaden their background and nontechnical education. Many of these subjects "tie in" to subjects in the Nation Building category.

Military Theory is given a slightly larger share of the course, 18.4 percent or 397 class periods. Topics in this group include Military Theory, Staff Procedures, and orientations on the other services (Air Force, Navy, and Police). The bulk of the time, however, is allocated to the routine, even tedious, aspects of staff processes and formats, rather than to the very important studies, reports, estimates, and analyses on which one might logically expect effort to be concentrated. Military Theory is the core of most higher military colleges. This is not the case at Seskoad as less than one-fifth of the total course time is spent on subjects in this category.

If Military Theory is the basis of military education, *Practical Military Subjects* are the "nuts and bolts." This is only partially true at Seskoad, where teaching tactics and conducting simulation exercises is limited to a rather modest 26.8 percent of the course (706 periods). Even then, the total is as high as it is only because of the very lengthy map exercises which are the least intensive learning time of the course. The map exercises are frequently based on actual historical operations, although frequently fictionalized by using new names for familiar places. Critical analysis of these operations is not the main thrust of these exercises. Instead, the focal point is staff procedures. Much of the time is spent on civic action and territorial operations as they bear on the Indonesian concept of "People's Defense." As a result, only about three-fourths of the instruction periods can be clearly separated from nation building/developmental exercises.

The largest single block of instruction can be loosely termed *Nation Building*. Included here are *Pancasila*, the Constitution of 1945, the Government Five Year Development Plan, Territorial Development, and Operations. Over 32 percent (798 periods) of time is devoted to these subjects. This does not, of course, include oblique references and discussions that frequently surface in subjects far afield from Nation Building. Such an emphasis is hardly surprising. Given the Army's historical background and its many extramilitary responsibilities, a thorough and firm grounding in the national plans, goals, and philosophy is essential. Overlapping lectures and speeches repeat the message in detail. The Indonesian graduate is thus thoroughly exposed and, presumably, committed to the government programs designed to support the national philosophy of Pancasila.

A quick analysis of the curriculum reveals that the Army Staff and Command College teaches purely military subjects less than 50 percent of the time. Some of the reasons for this are self-evident. The remainder of this paper will suggest some possible causes and results of this situation.

Goals and Objectives

It is the stated goal of Seskoad to prepare mid-level Army officers for positions of higher responsibility by teaching leadership, professionalism, and the Dual

and group value systems, the competition between and mutual reinforcement of different value systems, and the importance of fostering certain values and principles in the development of the nation.

Function of the Armed Forces. The first two goals are common to any military college in the world. The Dual Function concept (*Dwi Fungsi*) is a bit more unusual. The Dual Function concept is too complex to be analyzed here, but generally may be said to embody the duty of the Armed Forces to assist in the development of the country in a wide variety of ways in virtually every field of government. The Seskoad course is designed to prepare officers for command and staff positions throughout the upper echelons of the Army and government.

Seskoad, however, has other implied objectives. The first of these may be called national unity. The Indonesian Army has not forgotten that the majority of its virtually uninterrupted combat operations have been against people who were, at least nominally, Indonesian. Loyalty to the nation, as represented by the government in Jakarta, has been a factor in every campaign, with the arguable exception of the Confrontation with Malaysia.¹⁵ Of these disturbances, the most serious and dangerous have been led by disaffected military personnel (including the G30S/PKI attempted coup in 1965).

A second implied objective is the reinforcement of the web of personal relationships. The forced cooperation, at all levels, and the formation of friendships based on that cooperation, is very important. The faculty officer responsible for student affairs has said that "cooperation and learning to function as a group" was the key to success "in the school *and later*" (emphasis added). In short, this is where one of the "old-boy networks" is formed, and formed quite deliberately. This process occurs to some extent at all staff colleges, but is greatly facilitated at Seskoad. It also complements the Army's efforts to break up the regional cliques that previously played such an important role in military and national politics. Regular changes of commanders and careful selection have largely broken up these historically strong associations.¹⁶ Since almost all generals are Seskoad alumni, it is perhaps natural that they assume an elitist outlook.

15. One can stretch the point by arguing that since 1945, the central government has been fighting continuously, at some level, against separatist rebels or "disloyal" elements of the nation. A summary of these events follows:

<i>Time</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1945-50	Java, Sumatra, some outer islands	Revolutionary War. Many Indonesians in the Dutch Indies Army.
1948	Madiun, Central Java	Communist Revolt.
1950	Bandung, West Java, Ambon, Makassar, Maluku	Westerling affair--ex-KNIL soldiers revolt.
1948-60	West Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi	Darul Islam/TII fanatic Muslim revolt.
1956-61	Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan	PRRI-Permesta separatist revolt.
1962-63	Irian Barat	Irridentist annexation campaign against Dutch and local forces.
1963-66	Kalimantan	Confrontation with Malaysia to permit its people to join Indonesia if they wanted to.
1965-68	Indonesia	Communist attempted coup and ensuing anti-Communist campaign.
1969-?	Irian Barat	Free Papua Movement guerrilla warfare.
1975-?	East Timor	Integration of East Timor and anti-Fretelin campaign.
1968-?	West Kalimantan	Anti-Communist campaign along Indonesian-Malaysian border.

16. The complex and shifting pattern of alliances and cliques is a subject that could fill a book(s). The historic power groupings along the lines of the Siliwangi,

Another objective, unstated but apparent, is the testing and examination of the prospective elites in a competitive environment. At one time all students would replace their actual rank insignia with special, identical Seskoad rank badges. Although this system has been abandoned, it is an indication of Seskoad's commitment to stimulating and open discussion, regardless of a student's rank. Considering the exaggerated deference paid to rank outside the school, the extent to which a student is willing to question his superior's conclusions is remarkable. The discussions, where the students are expected to support and defend their positions, are usually conducted using the term *Pak* and the nickname rather than the more formal *Pak Letnan Kolonel* (or *Mayor*) and the full name. Athletic competitions at the school are also "rank free," with each student competing equally. Other benefits derive from mixing the officer corps at Seskoad. Many students have previously had a very narrow range of assignments and experiences, and some have served many years in remote areas.¹⁷ Seskoad brings these officers back into the mainstream of the Army, and allows an otherwise rare sharing of experiences.

The Seskoad experience is also interesting for the subjects that are not emphasized or, indeed, even included. Inevitably this involves a comparison with other staff colleges. The Indonesian Army has a wealth of foreign college graduates, well aware of the differences between overseas schools and Seskoad. A proportion of the top leadership echelons of the Armed Forces have received foreign military schooling.¹⁸ There is no doubt, then, that the differences in curriculum and methods are deliberate and have been well thought out. Certainly they have not been resorted to because of lack of time. Subjects taught are taught exhaustively.

There is a surprising lack of emphasis in some areas that would be considered basic in other staff colleges. Foremost among these is the disinterest in individual analysis and original professional writing. Formal written requirements are few and the scope generally limited.¹⁹ Professional journals publish articles, but these tend to be translations of general articles appearing in Western journals or magazines. Citation of sources and references is often sketchy. The more original, indigenous

Diponegoro, and Brawijaya divisions are no longer a major factor below the rank of, perhaps, lieutenant colonel. This means there is no longer a power base, although the older officers may still maintain contacts along the old lines. These would more properly be considered personal/nostalgia groups rather than self-perpetuating cliques. The *Kopassandha* (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha--Special Forces Command) and the *Linud* (Lintas Udara--Airborne) elements of Kostrad (Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat--Army Strategic Command) have some group loyalty because of their repetitive assignments, their natural elitism, and their lack of territorial ties. Probably neither group has anything like the influence of the Siliwangi Division in the 1950s and early 1960s.

17. One Javanese student proudly proclaimed he had spent thirteen straight years in Irian Jaya.

18. This includes General Widodo, retired Army Chief of Staff who is an alumnus of the American Army Command and Staff College, and the current deputy commander of Seskoad, Brigadier General Hendrato.

19. In October 1982, then Minister of Defense and Security, General M. Yusuf, addressed a joint session of all four Bandung area staff colleges. This address, not open to foreign students, directed a study of twelve subjects to be done by each student. These subjects have not been made public. It appears this was a one-time only, totally unexpected, exercise.

articles are also, almost exclusively, general treatments of broad subjects such as Pancasila or National Strategy.

While development and modernization are stressed, historical lessons (both political and military) receive the briefest treatment. Even now there are virtually no professional articles on the activities in East Timor, lessons learned from joint exercises, or case studies of previous successful or unsuccessful operations. This may well increase the likelihood of recurring problems. The intellectual ferment that often characterizes military staff colleges is largely absent, a situation highlighted by the tiny library which actively subscribes to no foreign military journals and is closed except during student class hours, thus making it largely unavailable to the students.

Another void in the education process is the "nonevent." Many books, documents, and articles can be obtained on certain aspects of Indonesian military history, including the Revolution, the PRRI-Permesta rebellions, and the 30 September attempted coup. Other events are almost undocumented. These include the Malaysian Confrontation, the ongoing rebellion in Irian Jaya, and the military aspects of the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. To what extent such information is circulated in classified briefings and classes is not known. If there are relevant documents available on these subjects, they are not available to the public.

Perhaps the most significant subject area that is underemphasized is any close study of the formation and implementation of national policy. On the philosophical and semantic level there is considerable discussion, but on the practical or comparative level there is none. The study of problems concentrates on defining and describing situations. Solutions, if introduced, are polemical and very general.

Conclusions

The Indonesian student at Seskoad is exposed to a wide variety of subjects, both civil and military, but is not always required to assimilate or demonstrate understanding of many of these. This is true of numerous staff colleges throughout the world, but most of these do not have the Dual Function mission assigned to the Indonesian Army.

Confidence, both self-confidence and mutual confidence, is an important by-product of Seskoad training. Each officer must present and defend his solutions to various types of problems. Fellow students criticize these solutions. These give-and-take sessions occur daily and constitute the only feedback a student receives. Tests, quizzes, and all other written work are never returned or reviewed.

The educational system used produces a unified outlook and commonality of approach among the graduates. In a country of limited communications and facilities, this is undoubtedly beneficial. The ability of the constituent parts of the Republic to function in the event of war or natural disaster and do so without extensive central coordination could be crucial to the nation's survival. The price, however, may be a loss of initiative and creativity. The unified outlook also ensures that the informal alliance system will continue to flourish.

The importance of Seskoad as a source of future leaders is unquestioned.²⁰ Most of the top echelons of the Army and government, as alumni themselves, are

20. General Poniman, Minister of Defense and Security, and General Rudini, Chief of Staff of the Army, made such remarks to the graduating class of 1983. The Chief of Army Personnel personally handed each graduating officer his assignment orders in a ceremony separate from the actual graduation.

familiar with the present system. Analysis of the course content shows it has been designed to complement and reinforce the current government structure. Seskoad is designed to produce loyal, reliable leaders with a clear understanding of, and commitment to, the current system of government. Divisiveness, introspection, and self-criticism of the system are not encouraged. The goal is to produce a future generation of leaders with the same core values as the present leadership elite. Time will tell how effective this process has been.