

DEINDIVIDUATE THE SELF, INFRAHUMANIZE OTHERS

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science

by

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August 2011

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ABSTRACT

Research into the phenomenon of infrahumanization has consistently shown that people tend to subconsciously regard those outside their social group as somewhat less human than the people inside their social group. What is not yet well understood is what factors moderate this effect and why. I propose that social identity-based deindividuation effects (SIDE) may provide a partial answer. In support, I present the results of a pilot study where a deindividuating communications environment characterized by anonymous text-based computer chat resulted in exaggerated infrahumanization of the outgroup when compared to an individuating communications environment characterized by face-to-face discussion. Future research directions to probe this potential connection are proposed.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Bryce T. Hoffman spent his graduate career at Cornell University pursuing questions of group identification and intergroup dynamics. His academic background prior to matriculating at Cornell include a bachelor's degree in journalism, *summa cum laude*, from Eastern Michigan University, and a year of graduate-level study in multimedia at Saginaw Valley State University. As a nontraditional student, he worked full time as a writer and editor in the Cornell University Division of Alumni Affairs and Development throughout his student career at Cornell. He is now the executive director for marketing and communications at State University of New York College at Plattsburgh.

Dedicated to Sheila and Connor, my other thesis advisers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the contributions of the Cornell University Department of Communication faculty, especially the members of my graduate committee: Poppy L. McLeod, Jeff Hancock, and Michael Shapiro. I further wish to express gratitude to Deborah Tan, Matthew Manacher, Ishan Chellaney, and Matthew Sutherland, Cornell undergraduates who assisted with the design and data collection for the pilot study outlined herein.

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Introduction

In September 2010, the student newspaper of Eastern Michigan University printed an editorial cartoon (Promo, 2010) depicting two members of the Ku Klux Klan, a man and a woman, both wearing robes and hoods and looking into one another's eyes. The caption reads: "Honey, this is the tree where we met." Dangling from the tree behind them is an empty noose. The cartoon became the center of a campus controversy, with some labeling it as hate speech and others contending that it cleverly ridiculed the hypocrisy of loving some categories of people while blindly hating others. On a Facebook thread devoted to the topic, one alumna of the university voiced a very specific objection: "It makes me wince that the cartoon 'humanizes' a nostalgic KKK couple. I'd rather they be depicted as the dogs they are...and I mean no offense to dogs." (Wright Day, 2010)

Viewed through the lens of contemporary scholarship on intergroup perception, this episode is rich with meaning. Specifically, it illustrates on multiple levels the importance that people attach to what might be called "the human essence" or that which separates humankind from other types of creatures. By endowing his characters with tenderness toward one another and nostalgia—complex emotions widely considered unique to humans—the cartoonist forces his readers into an uncomfortable position: They must consider their fundamental similarity to members of a widely reviled group. Indeed, the alumna's revulsion at the cartoon goes beyond a simple condemnation of the acts or beliefs of the KKK. What she laments most is the proposition that people so different from her could still be thought of as human. The historical subtext of the cartoon is further steeped in questions of who is thought of as possessing the essence of humanity. The KKK's existence has historically been predicated, at least in part, on a theory of

racial superiority that relegated African Americans and other minority groups to status of less-than-fully-human compared with whites. The cartoon and the reactions it provoked raise questions of import to social science and to society: What is the social significance of “human” qualities? How readily do we recognize the human essence in groups other than our own? Does failure (or refusal) to do so constitute a form of bias? If so, can it be remediated?

Literature Review

Increased scholarly attention has been paid to such questions over the past decade, with particular emphasis on forms of bias that manifest below the level of conscious awareness (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). One especially fruitful line of research has concerned itself with the intergroup phenomenon known as “infrachumanization” (Leyens et al., 2000, 2001; Demoulin et al., 2004). In its most basic description, infrachumanization refers to the tendency of group members to associate more uniquely human attributes to members of the ingroup than the outgroup. The concept’s most prolific champion, Leyens (2009), elaborates that infrachumanization is distinct from dehumanization and its closely related cousins, delegitimization and moral exclusion, which are thought of as more severe and more conscious processes characterized by a full-out denial of the humanity of others. Infrachumanization, he explains, “does not deny the complete humanity of others but, simply, decreases it” (Leyens, 2009, p. 808). Scholars have attempted to explicate the factors that mediate infrachumanization (Cortes, 2005), but they have also expressed frustration at the elusiveness of suitable answers and identified a need for continued exploration. This paper proposes to contribute to this process. Specifically, it calls upon the social identity model of deindividuation effects or SIDE (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995) as a theoretical basis for considering how deindividuation of the self might influence infrachumanization of others. It presents the results of a pilot study and outlines a

program for more robust future studies that would further illuminate the relationship between infrahumanization and social identity-based deindividuation. While a successful research program of this kind would contribute to the development of at least two theoretical perspectives on intergroup bias—and could even lead to some level of integration between them—its value should also be measured by the likelihood that it could contribute to practical interventions in intergroup relations. Useful interventions might include recommendations concerning the optimal choice of communication medium for initial contact between groups or the development of techniques for overcoming the limitations of systems that are known to contribute to infrahumanization when all other factors are left equal.

Infrahumanization is “a process by which people consider their ingroup as fully human and outgroups as less human and more animal-like” (Leyens et al., 2007, p. 139). Researchers of this phenomenon have grounded it in the contexts of essentialism and ethnocentrism (Vaes et al., 2003; Paladino et al., 2002; Paladino & Vaes, 2009)—with emphasis on the well-documented tendency of social groups around the world and throughout history to describe themselves as the exemplars of humankind. Although ethnocentrism is overt, Leyens et al. (2001, 2003, 2007) conceive of infrahumanization as a subtle process (Gaunt, Leyens & Paladino, 2002) by which individuals subconsciously reserve the full essence of humanity for themselves and their social groups. The implications for intergroup relations are multiple. When the outgroup is perceived as less than fully human, acts of discrimination, bias, and aggression may be more likely to occur and easier for the ingroup to justify. For aggrieved parties, infrahumanization can pose an obstacle to forgiveness of outgroups for misdeeds, making reconciliation difficult (Tam et al., 2008). Infrahumanization may also reduce intergroup helping, as Cuddy, Rock, & Norton (2007) discuss in their study of the widespread failure to aid victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Investigations of infrahumanization have focused on the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions, such as pride or guilt, to members of the ingroup and the outgroup (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000; Paladino et al., 2002; Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005). This family of cognitively and morally complex emotions, sometimes called secondary emotions, is believed to be experienced only by humans, whereas primary or non-uniquely human emotions, such as fear and pleasure, are thought to be experienced by animals and humans alike. Demoulin et al. (2004) found that lay conceptions of the difference between uniquely human and non-uniquely human emotions hew closely to distinctions drawn by emotion scientists along dimensions such as intensity, duration, cognition, source of causation, and evidence of morality. That is to say, people seem to grasp intuitively the difference between what a person can feel and what an animal can feel (Rodriguez-Torres et al., 2005). Studies on infrahumanization have consistently shown that people are more willing to ascribe these uniquely human emotions, both positively and negatively valenced, to their own group than to members of an outgroup (Leyens et al., 2000, 2001; Paladino, et al., 2002; Gaunt, Paladino & Leyens, 2002). Because primary emotions such as fear are felt by animals and humans, these emotions provide no basis for differentiating human from animal. Thus, infrahumanization theory does not predict any difference in how readily primary emotions are attributed across groups, though multiple studies bear out the prediction for secondary emotions (e.g. Gaunt, Paladino & Leyens, 2002; Demoulin et al., 2005; Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007). Paladino et al. (2002) and Demoulin et al., (2004) also found evidence that primary emotions are more often associated with outgroups than with ingroups. Some attempts have been made to operationalize infrahumanization with new dependent variables that do not rely on the differential attribution of primary and secondary emotions. Viki et al. (2006) introduced a set of

20 words that have clear associations either with humans or with animals and found that human-related words were preferentially awarded to the ingroup, the British, in comparison to outgroups, the Germans and the French. Infracommunication has behavioral consequences. In a series of studies, Vaes et al. (2002, 2003) found evidence that expressions of secondary emotions by ingroup members resulted in more positive and pro-social reactions by study participants, whereas secondary emotions expressed by outgroup members elicited increased negativity and discriminatory behavior. The studies by Vaes showed a pattern of behavioral discrimination against outgroup members who display uniquely human characteristics thought to be the exclusive property of the ingroup.

Although “infracommunication theory” is a term used by its researchers, studies to date have concerned themselves mainly with documenting infracommunication as a phenomenon. For instance, Leyens et al. (2001) showed that high- and low-status groups alike engage in infracommunication—in this case low-status individuals from the Canary Islands and high-status individuals from mainland Spain. In a separate study involving participants in three countries, Demoulin et al. (2005) further found that individuals are highly motivated to conclude that their group is uniquely human but have low motivation to reach the same conclusion about an outgroup. These studies suggest that infracommunication is a commonplace phenomenon, yet it is also established that not all groups infracommunicate. Demoulin et al. (2007) created minimal groups of varying significance (e.g. meaningless random assignment, or a meaningful assignment based on color or job preference). All groups favored the ingroup in a resource allocation task, yet only the groups based on the relatively more meaningful criteria also infracommunicated the outgroup. This finding not only distinguishes infracommunication from simple ingroup favoritism, it also suggests that pre-existing conflict between groups is not a necessary

condition for infrahumanization. Further studies found that high-identifiers within groups tend to infrahumanize outgroups more readily than those who feel weak emotional or cognitive ties to an ingroup (Leyens et al., 2007). These findings suggest that the tendency to infrahumanize intensifies as the meaningfulness of the ingroup to the individual increases. Further, Leyens et al., (2007) concluded that the ability of the outgroup to affect the ingroup negatively, is a key predictor of infrahumanization. It is not surprising, then, that Pereira, Vala, and Leyens (2008) discovered a positive correlation between infrahumanization and appraisals of the outgroup as a symbolic threat to the ingroup. Taken together, these studies provide a strong indication that infrahumanization is intertwined with social identification processes. Even though many aspects of infrahumanization remain to be examined, what is already known provides a useful starting place for connecting it with other theories and perspectives on intergroup bias.

Leyens has characterized the key problem for infrahumanization going forward as the search for factors that promote or inhibit infrahumanization: “In my view, at least, the most challenging problem facing infrahumanization is to find the conditions that lead an outgroup to be infrahumanized or not. We have not the slightest solution to this problem,” (Leyens, 2009, p. 809). Indeed, only recently have scholars attempted to develop a theoretical framework that might account for the motivations behind infrahumanization. Demoulin et al. (2008) emphasized social identification processes, suggesting that group members believe themselves to share a common “essence” that cannot be possessed by outsiders. Demoulin’s perspective is supported by a robust literature that has grown up around the social identity tradition, beginning with the pioneering minimal group studies conducted in by Tajfel (1970) and later refined by Tajfel & Turner (1979, 1986). The central argument of SIT (for a critical review, see Brown, 2000b) is that individuals define themselves, at least partially, in terms of their group memberships (e.g. on

the basis of gender, race, sports team loyalty, and so forth), that they derive value from these affiliations in the form of self esteem, and that they are consequently motivated to belong to groups that compare favorably to other groups. SIT research has documented a pervasive ingroup favoritism, even in so-called minimal groups where no meaningful criterion is used for dividing people (Brewer, 1979). Although a psychological orientation toward benefitting the ingroup does not automatically correspond with active harming of the outgroup, Brewer (1999) asserted that it does open the door to outgroup derogation based on such factors as perceived moral superiority or perceived threat. The program of research proposed here draws on an established body of work rooted in the social identity tradition. Specifically, it seeks to introduce social identity-based deindividuation of the self as a potential cause of infrahumanization.

Virtually all infrahumanization studies measure the reaction of one group (or group member) to members of another group, and “group” has most frequently been operationalized along national or ethnic lines. For example, Viki and his colleagues (2006, studies 2a and 2b) asked British students to associate typical German and French names with either human- or animal-related terms, such as “person” and “mongrel.” Demoulin et al. (2005) employed the Wason Selection Task to investigate evaluations that Belgian Walloons have of the French and that Americans have of Mexicans. Boccato et al. (2007) measured the how quickly subjects responded to images of black and white faces when paired with different types of emotion words. Gaunt (2009) asked Jewish Israelis to associate emotion words with Arab Israelis. Several studies (e.g., Leyens et al., 2000; Viki et al., 2006, study 1; Paladino et al., 2002) have made use of the Implicit Association Task , with the goal of assessing the qualities that ingroup members ascribe more readily to themselves than to others.

An important commonality in the infrahumanization research paradigm, then, is its reliance on evaluations of the outgroup in general. Leyens et al. (2003) contend that infrahumanization should not be expected in evaluations of people who can be identified as “specific human beings” (p. 710) apart from their group membership. They mention in support an unpublished study wherein individuating a member of the outgroup, by revealing their first and last name, had the effect of diminishing infrahumanization. Infrahumanization, they argue, is an intergroup effect, not an interpersonal one. This argument should be more closely examined on two fronts. First, it seems to imply a clean dichotomy between situations that are interpersonal versus those that are intergroup in nature. Brown (2000a) advances a more nuanced view of an interpersonal-intergroup continuum:

Most situations will contain elements of both interpersonal and intergroup behaviors. After all, people enter even the most group-based interaction with a unique prehistory and set of personal dispositions, and even the most intimate exchange between two lovers will contain some group stereotypic features. (Brown, 2000)

It is with Brown’s view in mind that this work will argue in favor of a continuum-based view of interpersonal-intergroup dynamics and that individuation is a factor that can move interactions toward one end or the other. Second, it is notable that Leyens’ argument is limited to one half of the interaction. It accounts for whether the target of evaluation is individuated, creating an interpersonal dynamic in place of the intergroup dynamic. But what of the evaluator? Research on group behavior has repeatedly shown that people are capable of adopting a group-centered awareness, where they lose their own sense of individuality and instead act and feel on behalf of their group (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989). This process, known as deindividuation, should also have implications for infrahumanization because it will emphasize the intergroup dynamic over the interpersonal. Consequently, this proposal argues that deindividuation of the self should increase infrahumanization of outgroups in contexts where social identity is salient.

The group-centered level of awareness that characterizes deindividuation should exaggerate the motivation to favor the ingroup and derogate the outgroup and to uphold salient group norms, which would be consistent with both classic social identification studies and the infrahumanization paradigm. It is also possible that social identity-based deindividuation could lead to an over-attribution of uniquely human characteristics to the ingroup or “suprahumanization” (see Demoulin, Saroglu, & Van Pachterbeke, 2008; and Viki & Calitri, 2008), a possibility which will not be pursued here but which could provide a fruitful line of future research.

Deindividuation is not discussed within infrahumanization literature, per se, but the concept has long history in social science. Reicher, Postmes, and Spears (1995) point out that deindividuation traces to theories that were advanced near the turn of the 19th century about the unruly behavior of crowds (e.g. Le Bon, 1916). The core idea at that time was that immersion in a crowd could cause individuals to lose all sense of selfhood and self-restraint. As a consequence, they would become highly susceptible to emotions, ideas, and actions of the uncontrolled mob and act in ways they might ordinarily resist. Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (1952) are widely credited with introducing the concept of “deindividuation” as a psychological state characterized by a loss of self-awareness and the reduction of inhibitions. They proposed that participating in group settings wherein people no longer pay attention to one another as individuals reduces restraints on proscribed behaviors. They offered as evidence a study wherein male students were more likely to make statements critical of their parents in a group setting where it was more difficult to recall who had said what than in a setting where statements were more easily linked to individuals. Zimbardo’s subsequent work on deindividuation (1969) emphasized the identification of input variables, particularly anonymity,

that contribute to a deindividuated state and, as a consequence, lead to anti-normative behavior and a loss of concern about the evaluation of others. Other factors pointed out by Zimbardo as potentially conducive to deindividuation include emotional arousal, proximity and size of the group, and temporal distortion (i.e. a sense of being out of time), though Diener (1977) and Postmes and Spears (1998) point out in their reviews that results of studies based on these factors were mixed and did not establish a clear causal relationship between deindividuation as a subjective state and anti-normative behavior. Diener (Diener & Walbom 1976; Diener 1977, 1979) de-emphasized the power of anonymity in his own updated theory of deindividuation. Rather, he stressed the importance of “group cohesiveness and uniformity, group activity, and an outward focus of attention. Each of these seems to be a likely cause of deindividuation because it can diminish or prevent self-awareness” (1979, pp. 1161). Self-awareness is for Diener a critical variable because the individual who loses self-awareness becomes less attuned to their personal standards and long-term plans and more susceptible to close-at-hand behavioral cues. For example, in a study on the role of self-awareness in anti-normative behavior Diener and Walbom (1976) found that 7 percent of study participants cheated on an anagrams test when made self-aware by sitting before a mirror and listening to a recording of their own voice. Conversely, 71 percent of subjects cheated when seated to the side of the mirror and made to listen to the recorded voice of another person.

More recently, Reicher, Spears, and Postmes have argued that these and other theoretical views on deindividuation (e.g. Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989) rest on an overly simple concept of a unitary individual whose natural state is one of detachment from the social world. They have advocated convincingly for a more nuanced view of deindividuation—they call their model the

social identification model of deindividuation effects or SIDE—that accepts social identities and group memberships as integral aspects of a multi-layered self:

Thus, in becoming part of a group, individuals do not *lose* all sense of self, rather they *shift* from the personal to the social level of identification. It follows that, in becoming a group member, individuals do not necessarily lose all bases for the control of behavior. Rather, the criteria for action may shift from the personal to the social categorical level. (Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995, pp. 177)

SIDE theorists ground their view of deindividuation within the context of social identification theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). An extension of SIT, social categorization theory holds that people selectively attend to different levels of social membership, from the interpersonal to the intergroup to an inclusive unified humanity, based on the immediate situation they find themselves in, with a tendency toward emphasizing group memberships that confer highest status (Pittinsky, Shih & Ambady, 1999) in the present social context. From the social identity/self-categorization perspective, then, the individual is not a closed system that becomes lost in the social world from time to time but is, instead, a multi-faceted product of (and participant in) the social world. Consequently, Reicher et al. (1995) conceive of deindividuation not so much as a loss of self but as the ascendance of a salient social identity, which brings with it a prescribed set of group-oriented norms, behaviors, and beliefs. When this takes place in a context that is intergroup in nature, identification with group and situational norms is exaggerated, resulting in the expression of group-based attitudes and behaviors that the individual may not exhibit or would perhaps even oppose in a different social context.

Studies conducted within the SIDE framework have provided support for this multi-layered construction of the self and of deindividuation as an intrapersonal shift from a self-focused awareness to a group-focused awareness. In an initial study, (Reicher et al., 1995), a

group of scientists who were seated together in a room and told they would be rated as a group exhibited much stronger consistency with a group norm (in this case, adopting pro-vivisection arguments) when confronted with a unified opposing group, social scientists, than when members of the two groups were interspersed and told they would be rated individually. Social scientists showed the same response in support of anti-vivisection arguments, with the support growing in the high-group-salience condition. As predicted, deindividuation promoted by visual anonymity (participants wore masks and baggy clothes) increased polarization and adherence to group norms in the high-group-salience condition but decreased it in the low-group-salience condition. That is, deindividuation seems to drive people toward conformity with the expectations and norms of a salient social identity, not the abandonment of all standards of personal behavior. They also regard depersonalized others, about whom few individuating details are discernable, on the basis of group-level characteristics.

Numerous studies within the SIDE paradigm have taken advantage of the depersonalizing context afforded by visually anonymous forms of computer-mediated communication as an experimental setting. SIDE researchers have characterized the computer-mediated context as an ideal forum: “Visual anonymity, which is greatest in remote, text-based CMC (relative to normal, face-to-face interaction) tends to depersonalize perceptions of the self and others and encourages behavior that is normative for salient groups” (Lea et al., 2000, pp. 4). Not surprisingly, SIDE studies have repeatedly found that visually anonymous CMC under conditions of high group salience contributes to greater polarization toward salient group norms (Lee, 2006), that it increases attraction to the group, increases the rejection of outgroup norms, enhances stereotyping of the outgroup, and makes it possible for ingroup members to coordinate and express hostile opinions concerning a more powerful outgroup (Lea et al., 2000; Postmes,

Spears & Lea, 1998; Lea, Spears & de Groot, 2001; Spears, Lea, Corneliussen, Postmes, & Ter Haar, 2002; Lee, 2004). A longitudinal study of intercontinental, intergroup communication using visually anonymous CMC (Postmes, Spears & Lea, 2002) is of special interest because of its direct correlation with the methodology proposed in this paper for linking infrahumanization and SIDE. In a situation where two groups with different norms, in this case Dutch and English college students, were made to interact via computer-based chat, groups whose members were only partially unidentifiable (i.e. identified only by their initials and a group “tag”) were shown to diverge more toward their respective group norms than groups whose members were individuated by full first name, group tag, and photograph. Moreover, under depersonalized conditions group characteristics were shown to be more salient in the discussion than individual ones and instances of stereotyping between groups were more prevalent. More than a cognitive effect, SIDE also has been shown to possess a strategic dimension that impacts intergroup situations. For example, studies have shown that less powerful groups will choose to interact using CMC, as opposed to face-to-face, in order to build greater levels of ingroup social support and, ultimately, express resistance to more powerful groups (Spears et al., 2002). This strategic dimension of SIDE – specifically the notion that members of less powerful groups gravitate toward the deindividuating medium in order to gain social support from one another – further buttresses the idea that medium matters when it comes to how people view intergroup interactions.

The social identity model of deindividuation effects has been a useful platform for studying ingroup favoritism and intergroup conflict. It has not yet been applied to the study of infrahumanization, but the opportunity for integration is appealing for several reasons. First, it could provide a partial answer to question of what factors motivate and mediate

infracommunication, which Leyens' has identified as the most pressing problem for infracommunication research. Second, it might establish a path toward interventions that would effectively mitigate infracommunication, for example by stressing the individuality of actors in a social situation over group membership. Finally, it could address a heretofore unexamined methodological limitation in infracommunication research, which has not explicitly examined the psychological orientation—toward the individuated self or toward a salient group—of the participants in its studies who are asked to judge outgroups. SIDE meanwhile, would also benefit from the addition of a new dependent variable that is capable of illuminating bias on a subconscious level. Such an addition might make it possible to discern subtle intergroup bias, even when no overt bias is detectable.

Before proceeding with the proposal for integrating these perspectives, it is important to acknowledge some underlying assumptions. First, I assume that social identity-based deindividuation of the self is conceptually distinct from, albeit related to, two other phenomena that might be called “deindividuating context” and “deindividuation of the other” respectively. Deindividuation of the self is characterized by an internally experienced change in perspective in line with the descriptions Reicher et al. outline in their SIDE model: The idiosyncratic self recedes and a group-centered awareness takes hold, bringing with it a more pronounced adherence to group norms and goals and a heightened motivation to compare the ingroup favorably with relevant outgroups. For the purposes of this research proposal, a “deindividuating context” simply refers to a set of conditions that constrict the amount of information available that could be used to distinguish the participants in an interaction, as individuals, from their larger social groups. This mirrors the sense in which Leyens operationalized individuation in his unpublished study, wherein providing the names of outgroup members resulted in their being

less inhumanized by others. “Deindividuation of the other” can be regarded as either a failure or a refusal on the part of one person to recognize the unique qualities of individuals beyond their group affiliation (for further commentary on this distinction, see Lee, 2006). Such a definition would place the deindividuation of others into the same family of bias as inhumanization itself.

The second assumption is that social-identity based deindividuation of the self will vary based on social context, defined here as the conditions under which people find themselves interacting. This assumption is grounded in the decades of work deindividuation researchers have committed to identifying factors that lead to people behaving in a deindividuated way. Contextual factors that may impact deindividuation include the physical environment, the purpose of the interaction, the number of people present, the identifiability of actors, the relative social status of participants, the likelihood of further interactions in the future, and the presence or absence of intergroup conflict. Some contexts, such as a first date, are highly individuating and are apt to lead to individuation of the self and others through the exchange of personal information, physical co-presence, and the lack of immediate salience for social categories to which either party might belong. Other social contexts, such as a sporting event between rival teams, emphasize social categorization and anonymity, elevating the salience of the social identity and resulting in a deindividuating context. Although the purpose of the interaction between individuals or groups of people is one way of defining social context, the form of the interaction can also play a role.

A third assumption is that communication media are not neutral when it comes to establishing a deindividuated or individuated social context. On the contrary, they are a key variable. Numerous researchers have commented on the ability of communication media to

magnify or obscure different aspects of the communication process. Whittaker (2003) observed that media have “affordances” or structural characteristics that determine what types of information can be transmitted and in what manner. Affordances include synchronicity, the presence or absence of sound, text, and visual cues. This is important because different combinations of affordances result in qualitatively different types of communication. For instance, individuals in a telephone conversation will receive more instantaneous emotional cues than if they conducted the same conversation in a computer chat room where thoughts take longer to express and tone of voice is not easily conveyed (although attempts can be made to compensate textually). As has already been noted, SIDE researchers have exploited CMC as fertile ground for creating a deindividuated communications context. CMC enables researchers to manipulate the amount of individuating information that is available to the participants in the interaction and, therefore, to establish a deindividuated context in comparison to face-to-face interactions.

Hypotheses

With these assumptions in place, it becomes possible to propose a theoretical relationship between SIDE and infrahumanization and to design a means of testing it experimentally. In its most reduced form, this theoretical integration proposes that people who are in a social identity-based deindividuated psychological state will be more likely to infrahumanize relevant outgroups and outgroup members than people who are not. This assertion relies on premises that are already firmly established within the SIDE and infrahumanization literatures. First, SIDE studies have shown that one effect of social identity-based deindividuation is to exaggerate intergroup bias, including ingroup favoritism and outgroup stereotyping and derogation. Infrahumanization is introduced as novel dependent variable within the SIDE framework. However, it can be argued

that many aspects of the SIDE model have already been deployed within infrahumanization studies, though perhaps not deliberately. When students in one nation are asked to provide judgments about the people of another nation using a word selection task, for instance, at least two important elements that can contribute to social identity-based deindividuation of the self are already present. There is anonymity—the evaluators are unidentifiable to the target group and to one another—and group membership is salient by virtue of the task itself. This possibility provides still another reason to investigate the interaction between deindividuation and infrahumanization. Several hypotheses can be derived that treat infrahumanization of the outgroup as a potential outcome of social identity-based deindividuation. It is necessary to begin with the essential hypothesis of infrahumanization research and then to propose variations specific to how integration with SIDE might alter it.

H1: All else being equal, individuals will attribute fewer uniquely human characteristics to the outgroup than the ingroup.

Recalling the assertion by Leyens et al. that infrahumanization is an intergroup effect, not an interpersonal one, it should follow that evidence of infrahumanization would be found in evaluations of outgroups in general (e.g. “Republicans” and “Democrats”) but not in evaluations of specific individuals who happen to be members of outgroups. But Leyens is less clear about how the shift occurs from regarding an outgroup member as symbolic of the group to regarding them as a idiosyncratic person. I propose that social-identity based deindividuation may be at least partially responsible. In a deindividuated interaction people are relating on the basis of their group memberships, not individual characteristics. Absent a means of separating the person from the group, infrahumanization toward the outgroup member should proceed as if it were an intergroup interaction. By exploiting the well documented differences between text-based CMC

versus face-to-face communication, it is possible to manipulate the level of individuation in an interaction such that one context is highly deindividuating and the other is not. A prediction can be tested:

H2a: People who interact with an outgroup member via computer-mediated communication will attribute fewer uniquely human characteristics to their partner than participants who interact with an outgroup member face-to-face.

The reasoning is simple. When you talk to somebody face to face, a wealth of information is transmitted verbally and nonverbally, but in addition to that self-awareness increases. You become more aware of yourself and the other person as distinct individuals, and you become more aware of the person being aware of you. If evidence for hypothesis H2a were discovered, it would indicate that the type of intergroup communication – specifically whether it provides a deindividuated setting for interaction – is an important factor contributing to whether infrahumanization takes place at the person-to-person level. Such a finding would add nuance to Leyens' contention that infrahumanization is not an interpersonal phenomenon. Specifically, it would provide initial evidence that one-on-one interactions can still be treated as intergroup interactions by their participants, if those participants are assessing their interaction from a deindividuated, group-centered awareness. In other words, using Brown's concept of a long continuum from purely interpersonal to purely intergroup, deindividuation will have the effect of sliding the psychological orientation of participants toward the intergroup side of the scale.

If a social identity-based deindividuating effect of media is responsible for exaggerated infrahumanization of the individual, it should also manifest in exaggerated evaluations of the outgroup generally because of the strong motivation to positively differentiate the ingroup.

H2b: Participants who interact with an outgroup member via computer-mediated communication will attribute fewer uniquely human characteristics to the outgroup in general than participants who interact with an outgroup member face-to-face.

Because of the group-oriented psychological orientation it creates, social identity-based deindividuation should also have noticeable intragroup effects in addition to intergroup effects already posited. Specifically, following the predictions of SIDE, it should result in an exaggerated ingroup favoritism, resulting in the over-attribution of positive qualities to the ingroup and its members. If infrahumanization is grafted onto this reasoning as a dependent variable, then it should result in an heightened attribution of uniquely human qualities to other ingroup members. It may also manifest in the form of exaggerated infrahumanization of the outgroup because of a heightened motivation to positively distinguish the ingroup from the outgroup. Two predictions are drawn from this reasoning:

H3a: Members of the same group will attribute more uniquely human qualities to one another after a computer-mediated interaction than after a face-to-face interaction.

The second prediction in this set is especially interesting because it forecasts a change in the way the outgroup is treated based purely on the way ingroup members are communicating with one another. The logic is the same as before, however. If people are deindividuated and their social identities are salient, they will be more likely to infrahumanize.

H3b: Members of the same group will attribute fewer uniquely human characteristics to a relevant outgroup after a computer-mediated interaction than after a face-to-face interaction.

In order to begin an assessment of the theoretical argument, the above hypotheses were tested in a pilot study.

Method

A pilot experiment, with a 2x2 between-subjects design (see Table 1), was conceived to measure infrahumanization levels following interpersonal interactions under multiple conditions: with an ingroup or outgroup member, and by CMC or face-to-face. Participants were asked to participate in a 10-minute discussion with another person and then rate their conversation partner as well as their ingroup and the outgroup generally.

Table 1 Experimental Design and Main Variables		
	Ingroup Partner	Outgroup Partner
CMC	Condition 1	Condition 2
Face-to-Face	Condition 3	Condition 4

Table 1

Consistent with experiments in the SIDE paradigm, the study uses CMC and face-to-face interaction as a means of manipulating social-identity-based deindividuation. The ingroup/outgroup conditions make it possible to compare results both across media and from both intergroup and intragroup pairings. This is valuable in that it provides a richer context for comparing measurements of infrahumanization and also gives a window into how intragroup communications might exacerbate infrahumanization of relevant outgroups, even when they are not present. The dependent variable for the study is infrahumanization, measured in relation to three groups: the partner, the ingroup generally, and the outgroup generally.

Participants were recruited for a research study on “political negotiation” and told that they would have a conversation with someone whose views may or may not be different from their own. Researchers further instructed participants that they would be asked to answer a few short questions at the end of the experiment. The intergroup condition in this experiment

involved political party identification in the United States of America, using the two major political parties. The sample (n=16) consisted of 10 males and six females, with a mean age of 20.2 years. Thirteen participants self-identified as Democrats, three as Republicans. This allowed for three intergroup pairings of Republicans with Democrats and five intragroup pairings, all Democrats. Of the three intergroup pairings, two took place face-to-face and one via CMC. Of the five intragroup pairings, two took place face-to-face and three took place via CMC. Across all pairings, eight participants participated in the face-to-face condition, and eight participated in CMC. One set of responses was discarded because a participant did not follow the directions provided. Fifteen response sets are included in this analysis. All participants were granted course credit in exchange for their participation.

Upon signing an informed consent form (Appendix A) and filling out a short survey about their political attitudes, political party membership, and strength of identification (Appendix B), participants were brought to a designated location in order to participate in either a face-to-face discussion or a computer-mediated discussion via a text-based instant messaging program. In order to maximize the differences between the media, the CMC condition was operationalized as an anonymous text-based instant messaging chat interaction where generic user names (e.g. "studyparticipant1") were assigned. People who interacted via CMC were never physically co-present during the course of the experiment. Separate testing rooms with closed doors were set up with a desk and computer. Subjects were prevented from seeing each other prior to their participation so as to preserve visual anonymity. By contrast, participants in the face-to-face condition were seated in a small room together, introduced by name, and permitted to interact freely during their discussion time.

Participants were given instructions verbally and in writing (Appendix C) to discuss the performance of President Barack Obama during his first 15 months in office and to come to agreement on what they believed to be a fair letter grade for the Obama administration (i.e., A,B,C,D, or F). They were given a 10-minute time limit. One face-to-face dyad reached an agreement in less than five minutes and was asked to continue its discussion with a focus on justifying its decision. Group membership was made salient in three ways. First, participants actively self-identified at the outset of the study by filling out a questionnaire concerning their political beliefs. Researchers also directly informed each participant of their own and their partner's political views prior to the exercise. For example a Republican who would be speaking to a Democrat was told: "You are a Republican, but the person you will be speaking with is a Democrat." In the case of intragroup pairings, participants were told that they would be speaking with a fellow Republican or Democrat. Furthermore, the partisan subject of the exercise itself was designed to heighten the salience of political identification. At the time of the study, President Obama was regarded as a polarizing figure whose presidency inspired strongly positive feelings among Democrats and strongly hostile feelings among Republicans. Subsequent to the 10-minute discussion, all participants were separated and asked to complete a word selection task. Researchers then debriefed each participant (Appendix D) and answered any questions they had.

The word selection task (Appendix E) was designed to detect infrahumanization and was based on measures used in published infrahumanization studies, specifically Leyens et al. (2001), who used a word selection task with primary and secondary emotion words, and Viki et al. (2006), who used a battery of "human" and "animal" related descriptive words in a word selection task. Both studies demonstrated that ingroups will tend to preferentially choose words

associated with uniquely human qualities to the ingroup. We combined these approaches, using both emotion words and human or animal descriptors plus filler words that concerned competence and morality judgments. Based on pilot testing with a population of college students similar to those who participated in the study, we developed a list of 32 terms in these four categories (See Appendix C). Each category contained eight words and was balanced for positive and negative valence. The emotion and human-animal categories were also balanced with four uniquely human words and four non-uniquely human words. The level of unique or non-unique humanness associated with the terms was determined by ratings of pilot testers.

All words were presented in a randomized order. Participants were asked to choose eight words from the list they felt best described their partner. Using the same set of words, participants were then asked to choose sixteen words—the eight they felt best described members of their ingroup in general and the eight they felt best described members of the outgroup in general. For this second portion of the task, all 32 words were available but participants were asked not to ascribe the same word to more than one group, thus if a participant described Democrats as “folksy” he or she could not also describe Republicans with that term. Eight of the 32 possible descriptors respondents could choose in their word selection task were identified as “uniquely human.” Four represented secondary emotions: hopeful, resentful, disenchanted, and optimistic. Four were characteristics that can describe humans but not animals: educated, citizen, folksy, and criminal.

Results

For each participant, three scores were calculated based on the number of “uniquely human” attributes they ascribed to 1) their partner 2) outgroup members in general and 3) ingroup members in general. These scores were then averaged across all participants and within

experimental conditions. The differences reported in this section, then, are differences in the average number of uniquely human words used to describe the relevant target individual or group (see Table 2).

	Mean # of "Uniquely Human" Descriptors Chosen		
Ingroup Partner	Partner	Ingroup	Outgroup
Face to Face	3.25	4	1.5
Computer Chat	3.67	3.33	1
Outgroup Partner	Partner	Ingroup	Outgroup
Face to Face	3	2	3.33
Computer Chat	2.5	1.5	2
Across All Conditions	Partner	Ingroup	Outgroup
	3.26	3	1.733

Because of the small sample size, results will neither be analyzed nor discussed in terms of statistical significance. However, trends in the data relative to our hypotheses can be identified. We began by predicting the classic inhumanization effect:

H1: All else being equal, individuals will attribute fewer uniquely human characteristics to the outgroup than the ingroup.

We expected that participants across all conditions would preferentially attribute uniquely human qualities to the ingroup over the outgroup. Our data offer support for this hypothesis. Ingroup members in general were described with an average of 3 (SD=1.1) uniquely human words, while outgroup members were described with notably fewer, an average of 1.73 (SD=1.1).

We further predicted that social identity-based deindividuation would create conditions where individual outgroup members are inhumanized along with their group in general. This hypothesis specifies an exception to Leyens' contention that inhumanization is not an interpersonal phenomenon. It suggests that interpersonal interactions can be treated as intergroup

interactions by participants when they are regarding a social situation with a deindividuated, group-centered awareness.

H2a: Participants who interact with an outgroup member via computer-mediated communication will attribute fewer uniquely human characteristics to their partner than participants who interact with an outgroup member face-to-face.

This prediction appears to be supported by the pilot data. Participants who spoke face-to-face with an outgroup member chose an average of 3.0 (SD=0.58) uniquely human words to describe them. In a CMC condition, that they chose 2.5 (SD=0.71) on average (see Table 2).

If a deindividuation effect is responsible for exaggerated inhumanization of a specific outgroup member, it should also manifest in exaggerated inhumanization of the outgroup generally. From this, we draw a corollary hypothesis concerning the probable effect of social identity-based deindividuation on inhumanizing the outgroup as a whole.

H2b: Participants who interact with an outgroup member via computer-mediated communication will attribute fewer uniquely human characteristics to the outgroup in general than participants who interact with an outgroup member face-to-face.

Again, the trend supports the hypothesis (see Table 2). Individuals who interacted with an outgroup member rated the outgroup in general as more human when the interaction was face-to-face (3.33, SD=0.58) than when it was computer-mediated (2, SD=1.41).

When ingroup members communicate amongst themselves, a deindividuating communication context should have a different effect. It should result in an exaggerated ingroup favoritism, resulting in the over-attribution of uniquely human qualities to ingroup members and exaggerated derogation of the outgroup.

H3a: Members of the same group will attribute more human qualities to one another after a computer-mediated interaction than after a face-to-face interaction.

The trend in the data lends support to this hypothesis, at least on the individual level (see Table 2). Members of the same group who chatted by computer attributed an average of 3.67 uniquely human words to their partner compared to 3.25 in a face-to-face condition.

Unfortunately, the design of the study instrument made it impossible to accurately record whether ingroups in general also benefitted from over-attribution of uniquely human qualities.

An additional hypothesis considers outgroup derogation.

H3b: Members of the same group will attribute fewer uniquely human characteristics to a relevant outgroup after a computer-mediated interaction than after a face-to-face interaction.

Again, the trend in the data is supportive. Ingroup members who spoke face to face attributed an average of 1.5 (SD=0.58) uniquely human words to the outgroup generally (see Table 2). Those who spoke by computer chat awarded relatively fewer, an average of 1 (SD=0.63).

These results, though highly preliminary, provide encouragement for a more robust and diverse program of research dedicated to the interaction between infrahumanization and SIDE. Trends in the data suggest that a deindividuating communication medium can impact infrahumanization when social identities are salient. Individuals who are deindividuated in a computer-mediated context are more prone to infrahumanize the outgroup and, possibly, to suprahumanize the ingroup. By contrast, when face-to-face interaction reinforces an interpersonal and individuated dynamic, infrahumanization of the outgroup is reduced. Anecdotal evidence from within the study supports the idea that a individuated or deindividuated context can impact perception of the interaction. One intergroup pairing of a Republican and Democrat ended with the participants

walking out of the room where they had been talking and informing the researchers that “We’re friends now.” By contrast, a participant in the CMC condition asked, “Was I even talking to a real person?”

Discussion

The evidence obtained in this pilot study suggests that social identity-based deindividuation may be an important moderating factor in infrahumanization and that the choice of communication medium for intergroup interactions likely plays an important role in whether deindividuation takes place. It also suggests that deindividuation can create conditions where a seemingly interpersonal interaction is moved into the intergroup dimension because of a change in psychological orientation of the participants. A full scale version of the above study should be conducted but with several methodological refinements. The list of “uniquely human” and “non-uniquely human” words that was employed in this study was pre-tested, but it would be beneficial to do post-hoc testing within the study itself in order to ensure that participants also view these words as indicative of humanness or non-humanness. It would also be desirable to test the level of group salience experienced by participants following the experiment. The experiment as administered attempted to raise salience in multiple ways but did not measure the efficacy of these attempts. Some participants in the pilot study indicated “middle of the road” tendencies or weakly felt political loyalties, which may have muted the ingroup/outgroup dynamic of the pilot study.

By its nature, the pilot study has too few participants to determine statistical significance for any findings. N size should be increased to allow for more robust computation with greater levels of confidence in results. Moreover, it will be important to have better balance in the study population. The participant pool for the pilot study skewed heavily toward one group,

Democrats. Future studies should include more Republicans if the same groups are used. Ultimately, it would be advisable to conduct studies using a variety of ingroup-outgroup pairings, including national identity, religious affiliation, and casual allegiances such as to rival sports teams, and also minimal groups. In order to exercise better control over the intra- and intergroup conditions, use of a confederate may be advisable in order to ensure consistency with ideological positions and to emphasize similarities in the intragroup condition and differences in the intergroup condition.

One major concern with the present methodology is the operationalization of the deindividuated condition. Although the paper theorizes that deindividuation of the self results in greater infrahumanization of the outgroup, the pilot study does not adequately isolate this variable. In the CMC condition, it can be argued that the self and the target are both deindividuated. Likewise, in the face-to-face condition, it can be argued that the self and the target are both individuated. A study that employs a one-sided deindividuation condition is necessary to fully address the theoretical question issued in this proposal. This could be achieved, for example, by engaging participants in a one-way video chat where one person is visible but the other is not.

Establishing a linkage between deindividuation and infrahumanization would open a new realm of inquiry within infrahumanization and SIDE research. A systematic approach to exploring this linkage is advisable. A first step would be to elaborate on the pilot study presented here with a full-scale investigation of the hypotheses. Such a study should be altered to compensate for methodological limitations and would provide a basis from which further questions may be pursued. For example, if deindividuation per se can be established as a moderator of infrahumanization, a logical next step is an investigation of which factors related to

deindividuation have the strongest influence. Factors to explore would include nominal identification, visual anonymity, self awareness, co-presence of ingroup members, and the presence or absence of intergroup conflict. A corollary line of research would be to search for circumstances where deindividuation does not contribute to infrahumanization. One study might be to explore situations that are ostensibly intergroup but where the intergroup condition is characterized by neutral or indifferent feelings (e.g. students from different majors or people in unrelated professions, like bakers and bus drivers). Because communication is so intimately intertwined with intergroup processes, it would be ideal to launch an investigation into which forms of media are deindividuating and why. Such research would not only take up the question of affordances and context but could explore ancillary questions such as the role of time (i.e. does deindividuation persist over multiple interactions or does it erode with time, and, if so, under what conditions?).

Finally, a particularly interesting approach may be to reverse the question and ask whether infrahumanizing the outgroup can inspire in people a need, perhaps driven by cognitive dissonance, to deindividuate themselves. One intriguing method of doing so might be to ask participants in a study to draw animal characteristics onto pictures of outgroup members. For example, Americans might be asked to draw horns and a tail on a photo of an Iranian or asked to draw a house next to an Iranian. An assessment of ingroup identification would then be administered. If evidence is found that people associate more strongly with the ingroup while infrahumanizing an outgroup, it would provide compelling evidence for how people cope psychologically with acts that demean other people. “It wasn’t really me,” they might believe, “but my group who did this.”

A research program exploring these questions bears the potential to shape our understanding of communication, conflict, and ultimately the ways that groups of people interact for good and for ill. Indeed, returning to the cartoon involving members of the KKK, it might lead us to ask a different question than was posed by the outraged readers of the Eastern Echo. They wanted to know how such inhuman people could be portrayed as human. A more pertinent question, might be: Why people who do such inhuman things have an easier time doing it when they are wearing hoods and robes?

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APPENDIX A

Political Negotiation Study

Consent Form

You are being asked to take part in a research study of negotiation. We are asking you to take part because of your strong interest in the topic of U.S. politics. Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to take part in the study.

What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to learn how people with different points of view express and interpret social information.

What we will ask you to do: If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to participate in a conversation with someone whose point of view may be different from yours. We will then ask you to respond to several short questions about the interaction. Your participation will take about 35 minutes to complete from beginning to end.

As part of the study, we may record your conversation using a digital device. The audio file will be transcribed and then destroyed within 30 days. No personally identifying information will be used to link any participant in the study with a specific recording.

Risks and benefits: There is the risk that you may find it uncomfortable to converse with someone whose views are different from your own. We do not anticipate any risks other than those encountered in day-to-day life.

There are no benefits to you. We hope to learn more about how different points of view affect social situations.

Compensation: We will offer the possibility of course credit, with permission of your instructor.

Your answers will be confidential. The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report we make public we will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you. Research records will be kept in a locked file; only the researchers will have access.

Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any questions that you do not want to answer. If you decide not to take part or to skip some of the questions, it will not affect your current or future relationship with Cornell University. If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time.

If you have questions: The researchers conducting this study are Bryce Hoffman, Deborah Tan, Matthew Manacher, Ishan Chellaney, and Matthew Sutherland under the guidance of Professor Jeffrey Hancock. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Bryce Hoffman at bth25@cornell.edu or at 607.254-5138. You can reach Prof. Hancock at jth34@cornell.edu 607.255-4452.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, you may contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 607-255-5138 or access their website at <http://www.irb.cornell.edu>. You may also report your concerns or complaints anonymously through

Ethicspoint or by calling toll free at 1-866-293-3077. Ethicspoint is an independent organization that serves as a liaison between the University and the person bringing the complaint so that anonymity can be ensured. You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study.

Your Signature _____ Date

Your Name (printed) _____

Statement of Consent To Be Digitally Recorded: I have read the above information, received answers to my questions, and consent to have my participation in portions of this study digitally recorded using an audio-recording device.

Your Signature _____ Date

Your Name (printed) _____

Signature of person obtaining consent _____ Date

Printed name of person obtaining consent _____ Date

This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of the study and was approved by the IRB on [3.28.2010].

APPENDIX B

Political Negotiation Study Participation Form

Do not write your name on this form, but please answer the questions below:

Age:

Gender:

On a scale of 1 to 7, with one being “very low” and 7 being “very high” please circle the number that best represents your level of interest in U.S. politics:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

On a scale of 1 to 7, with one being “very conservative” and 7 being “very liberal” please circle the number that best represents your political views:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The major political party that I feel most shares my values and that I feel most aligned with is (circle one): Democratic Republican

Finally, on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being “strongly agree” and 7 being “strongly disagree,” please circle the number that best represents your feelings toward your political group as a whole.

“I feel strong ties to fellow (Republicans/Democrats)”

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

“In general, being in a (Republican/Democrat) is an important part of my self-image”

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

“In general, I’m glad to be a (Republican/Democrat)”

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

APPENDIX C

Procedure Explanation: Political Negotiation Study

As a participant in this study, you will be asked to engage in conversation with someone whose political affiliation may or may not be different from your own for a period of 10 minutes. Your task will be to negotiate what you believe to be a fair letter grade (e.g., A, B, C, D, F) for the Obama administration.

For some people, participating may result in feelings of strong emotions. Please remember that you may leave at any time without any adverse consequences.

At the conclusion of this task, you will be asked to fill out a simple evaluation form.

APPENDIX D

Debriefing for Intergroup Negotiation Study Cornell University Department of Communication

This study is concerned with how the communication medium – in this case, face-to-face versus instant messaging – affects how we view people in different social groups than our own. Past research has shown that people sometimes regard outsiders, in subtle ways, as somewhat less “human” than people in their own social group.

In this study, you were asked to answer a preliminary question about your belief system and then to participate in a conversation with someone whose beliefs were similar or different. Some participants conversed via instant messaging while others did so face-to-face. Afterward, all participants were asked what emotions they thought the other person expressed and to select from a list of words those they thought best characterized their conversation partner.

We expect to find that those who conversed face-to-face with another person will have perceived more psychologically complex emotions from their partner than those who conversed in instant messaging. We also expect to find that those who conversed face-to-face will select more words that are associated with humanness, such as “citizenship,” rather than words associated with animals, such as “carnivore” to describe their partner than people who conversed over instant messenger.

We are interested in these ideas because better understanding how groups of people become biased against one another, even on a subconscious level, can help us understand how intergroup conflict can be mitigated or avoided in the future.

Whom to contact for more information:

If you have questions about this study, or if you would like to receive a summary report of this research when it is completed, please contact Bryce Hoffman at bth25@cornell.edu or at 607 254-5138, or Prof. Jeffrey Hancock at jth34@cornell.edu or 607 255-4452.

Whom to contact about your rights in this experiment:

You may contact Cornell’s Institutional Review Board for Human Participants at 607 255-5138, or: Institutional Review Board East Hill Office Building 395 Pine Tree Road, Suite 320 Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14850

If you feel that you are experiencing adverse consequences from this study:

Please contact Counseling and Psychological Services at Gannett Health Services, 607 255-5155.

Thank you for your participation!

APPENDIX E

Political Negotiation Study, Evaluation Form

In the space below, using one-word answers, please quickly write down all of the emotions (e.g., fear, happiness) you believe your partner expressed and felt during your conversation:

Of the 32 words listed below, please choose the 8 words that you feel best characterize your partner. Please do not choose the same word more than once.

- | | | | |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| off-putting | hopeful | unfriendly | immoral |
| wild | ineffective | caring | virtuous |
| optimistic | wicked | folksy | excited |
| important | unrighteous | instinctual | praiseworthy |
| approachable | moral | resentful | civilized |
| gloomy | friendly | fearful | righteous |
| effective | disenchanted | criminal | primal |
| educated | unimportant | beastly | condemnable |

Partner

Political Negotiation Study, Evaluation Form (page 2)

Now, using the same list of words as before (included below), choose the 8 words that best represent political conservatives (e.g., Republicans) in general, and the 8 words you feel best represent political liberals (e.g., Democrats) in general. Please use each word only once. That is, if you choose a word to describe one group you may not also choose it to describe the other group. Take as much time as you need.

off-putting	hopeful	unfriendly	immoral
wild	ineffective	caring	virtuous
optimistic	wicked	folksy	excited
important	unrighteous	instinctual	praiseworthy
approachable	moral	resentful	civilized
gloomy	friendly	fearful	righteous
effective	disenchanted	criminal	primal
educated	unimportant	beastly	condemnable

Conservatives

Liberals

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

Political Negotiation Study, Evaluation Form

Word Matrix Key:

Emotion Words	Animal/Human	Morality	Filler
Pleased	wild	virtuous	effective
Excited	civilized	wicked	ineffective
Caring	instinctual	moral	important
Loving	intellectual	immoral	unimportant
Optimistic	beastly	justified	friendly
Hopeful	folksy	unjustified	unfriendly
Fearful	primal	righteous	popular
Angry	criminal	unrighteous	unpopular
Panicked	tame	good	approachable
Resentful	community-oriented	evil	off-putting
Disenchanted	pedigreed	praiseworthy	competent
Gloomy	educated	condemnable	incompetent