“A SPIRIT OF DESTRUCTION”: THE ORIGINS OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY’S INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by

John Chang Hoon Lee

May 2013

ABSTRACT

The origin of the Indonesian military has its roots in the local militia forces (*Pembela Tanah Air*—PETA) formed by Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) during WWII. The Indonesian soldiers recruited into PETA units formed the nucleus of what eventually became the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* —TNI). However, while the importance of the PETA experience to the Indonesian military's formation is widely acknowledged, there has been little scholarship examining the nature of the training imparted, and how that foundational experience shaped the subsequent nature of the TNI. The profound influence of the IJA on the PETA soldiers resulted in a distinct military institutional culture that became ingrained during the Indonesian revolution, and further developed during subsequent decades of internal, counter-insurgency conflict.

This thesis traces that line between PETA and the modern TNI, and argues that many of the TNI's historically problematic characteristics have their roots during the PETA period. The study begins by examining the background of the formation of PETA, focusing on the nature of the training, especially in comparison to the Japanese Army's doctrine of that period. This is followed by an exploration of the role and influence of PETA-trained Indonesian officers on the formation and early years of the TNI, and how the PETA ethos became institutionalized in the military. In particular, a "scorched earth," guerrilla warfare mentality became central to the TNI's identity. By the beginning of the New Order, the PETA generation of officers had been firmly in control of nearly all the leadership positions in the TNI for two decades. It was this cohort that led the TNI through the two bloodiest post-independence events in Indonesian history: the 1965-66 killings, and the 1975 invasion and occupation of East Timor.

This thesis uses East Timor as a case study to demonstrate the enduring influence of the TNI's institutional culture. By 1975, most of the PETA generation officers in the TNI had retired and were no longer an active influence. The Timor case is also unique as the TNI's only large-scale, conventional military operation in a foreign territory, in contrast to its long history of internal conflicts. The TNI had also seemingly modernized, adopting much of U.S. and Western military doctrine and equipment. Yet, despite these outward changes, the TNI's actions in East Timor reveal an institutional culture still rooted in its PETA-era origins, and highlight the effects of deeply ingrained norms of "scorched earth" violence. The thesis concludes that the TNI's military institutional culture, which was repeatedly reinforced through decades of internal state violence, was both expressed and re-inculcated in the TNI's invasion and occupation of East Timor, perpetuating the institutional culture into a new generation.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

John Lee was born in Seoul, Korea and was raised in Los Angeles, California. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles in 2000 with a B.A. in English. John was then commissioned as an active duty officer in the U.S. Army, in which capacity he continues to serve. He has deployed to numerous overseas assignments including South Korea, Iraq, the Philippines, and Indonesia. John is a graduate of the Indonesian Army Command and Staff College, where as a foreign student he became interested in the history of the Indonesian military and its role in the country's history. After returning from Indonesia in 2011, John entered Cornell University as a Master's candidate in Asian Studies, with a focus on modern Southeast Asian history and politics. After graduation, John will resume duty as an Army foreign area officer. His next assignment is at the U.S. Embassy in Timor-Leste.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to my advisor and committee chair, Professor Thomas Pepinsky, without whose patient guidance, encouragement and support this thesis would never have come to fruition. I also thank the other member of my graduate committee, Professor Eric Tagliacozzo, for his advice, feedback, and generosity with his time while maintaining an impossibly busy schedule. I am also grateful to the staff of the Asian Studies department, especially Ms. Kim Scott, for her help navigating the university's administration and keeping me on track towards graduation. Sincere thanks also to all of the professors whom I have had the opportunity to study with, and who have exceeded all of my expectations. In particular, I thank Professor Keith Taylor, who I hold in the highest regard as a teacher and scholar.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Jennifer, for her inexhaustible patience and support through many late nights of writing and revisions, for her sharp proofreading eye, and for her love and encouragement throughout this process.

The views expressed in this thesis are solely my own, and do not represent the views of the U.S. military or any other entity of the U.S. government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The origins of the Indonesian military lie in the local militia forces formed by the Japanese Army during World War II called the *Pembela Tanah Air*—PETA. The Indonesian soldiers recruited into PETA units formed the nucleus of what eventually became the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*—TNI). However, while the importance of the PETA period to the Indonesian military's formation is widely acknowledged,[1] there has been little scholarship examining the nature of the training imparted, and how this foundational experience shaped the subsequent outcome of the TNI. Many writers of Indonesian history, while recognizing the role of the Japanese in fostering Indonesian nationalism, describe the PETA experience as a relatively discrete event, largely unconnected to the subsequent events in the military's history after its official founding. Yet, most of the Indonesian soldiers who became the core of the TNI's founding leadership, and who remained in power for decades after independence, had a shared background in PETA. What seems missing is a link in scholarship between the importance of the PETA experience at the moment of the TNI's genesis, and the course of the TNI's development through subsequent decades.

This thesis will attempt to trace that line between PETA and the modern TNI, and to argue that many of the TNI's problematic characteristics today have their roots during the PETA period. Specifically, that the PETA experience was a primary influence on the development of the *military institutional culture* of the TNI, which shaped the organization and its members' perspective and behavior. Thus, while the TNI soon after Indonesian independence began a process of "rationalization" and adopted many of the features of Western militaries, I argue that

[1] Among the many scholars who have written on PETA: Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*; Joyce Lebra, *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia*; Nugroho Notosusanto.

its underlying culture was still rooted in the guerrilla warfare mentality formed during its PETA days.

The persistence of this military institutional culture has many causes, but three are of particular importance. The first is the youth of the post-war TNI leadership cohort, many of who had been roughly 20-year old platoon or company commanders in PETA prior to the Japanese surrender. This young cohort occupied the top levels of leadership for decades after independence, through and beyond the invasion and occupation of East Timor. The second is the consolidation of the TNI's institutional culture through the elimination of competing factions, both military and civilian. While PETA-trained officers as a whole were the largest group and formed the core of the early TNI leadership, they were by no means unified, and competing alongside and with other factions of military and civilian elites. The process of consolidation and elimination of competing factions was a long one, highlighted historically by the September 30 coup attempt and the subsequent 1965-66 killings, in which a significant portion of the officer corps was purged concurrent to the larger national massacre. Finally, the nascent institutional culture born from the formative experience of PETA was repeatedly reinforced through participation in brutal guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. From the revolution to the post-independence counterinsurgency campaigns, the 1965-66 killings to the invasion and occupation of East Timor, these experiences inoculated the TNI's military culture against change.

This study begins by examining the background of the formation of PETA, focusing on the nature of the training, especially in comparison to the Japanese Army's doctrine and military culture of that period. The training and framework that the Japanese left behind in PETA at the end of World War II, and then forged during the independence struggle, formed a central element in the development of the Indonesian military institutional culture. The thesis will then

examine the role of PETA-trained officers in the early years of the TNI and the institutionalization of the PETA influence on the military culture. By the beginning of the New Order, this generation of officers was firmly in control of nearly all the senior leadership positions in the TNI. Next, the thesis will show why PETA influence endured in the TNI's institutional culture by examining how the PETA experience is reflected in the TNI's philosophy, organization, and doctrine; and the discrepancy between its professed values and actual behaviors. Finally, the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor will serve as a critical case study of the TNI's institutional culture and its expression in a national-level military operation.

Some caveats are in order. There is, of course, significant danger in studying the supposed "sources" of a culture, particularly when suggesting a transmission of values from one cultural group to another. Similarities and intriguing coincidences do not demonstrate causal relationships. One may also argue that the Indonesian military might have developed many of the same characteristics even if the Japanese had not formed PETA units. Additionally, since PETA was essentially the beginnings of the TNI, there is no pre-PETA Indonesian military for comparison. What this thesis demonstrates, then, is not proof, but rather connections and influences. While it cannot definitively be said that the PETA experience caused the post-war TNI to develop as it did, a convincing argument can be made that PETA introduced many important and enduring influences. Because this thesis is more narrowly concerned with the aspects of Indonesia's military institutional culture that derive from PETA influences, rather than a comprehensive analysis of TNI culture, many well-known characteristics of the TNI (such as *bapak-ism* and corruption, for example) are not explored or only briefly mentioned. However, by focusing on an understanding of the roots of TNI culture, as opposed to its contemporary

features, this thesis intends to provide a different perspective on many of the TNI's problematic attributes, which have often seemed contradictory, ambiguous, and confusing.

Understanding Military Institutional Culture

I define military institutional culture as a description of the set of values, norms, and assumptions that guides the behavior of a military and its members. This culture is developed through shared history and shared experiences, and deeply embedded over time.

Using and defining a phrase such as "military institutional culture" can be precarious because its component words (and their various combinations) are loaded with a multitude of meanings that can vary depending on context and application. The concept of "culture" alone is fraught, and further complicated by applying it to the military as a specific organization that possesses its own sociology and culture. Part of the difficulty is that a concept such as "military culture" can be approached from numerous perspectives and lies at the intersection of several academic disciplines, so that there is not yet a consensus on what military culture means.[2] My approach has been to try to identify the areas of common agreement in the scholarship on military culture that is applicable to the focus of this thesis. However, even among the scholars referenced for this thesis, each used the concept in related but different ways.

Much of the recent scholarship on military culture takes Edgar Schein's work on organizational culture as a broad theoretical framework that can be applied to the study of the military, and I also follow this lead. Schein's formulation, originally developed as a way to analyze the behavior of organizations in the field of business, is particularly salient because it offers a clear distinction between expressed and unconscious motivations.

[2] For a comprehensive review of the major approaches and literature on military culture, see Winslow.

Schein defines culture as:

> (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems ("Organizational" 111).

In other words, "culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration. Such learning is simultaneously a behavioral, cognitive, and an emotional process…the deepest level of culture will be the cognitive in that the perceptions, language, and thought processes that a group comes to share will be the ultimate causal determinant of feelings, attitudes, espoused values, and overt behavior" (111).

Schein further identified three basic levels of culture: "observable artifacts, values, and basic underlying assumptions" (111). *Artifacts* are the overt, visible, "palpable" level of culture, often material or physical. In the military context, artifacts would include uniforms, disciplinary rules, ceremonies, traditions and rituals, but also symbols, histories, and myths.

The second level, *values*, is "a culture's espoused and documented values, norms, ideologies, charters, and philosophies" (111). These are what an organization professes to believe as characteristics of its identity and the basis for its actions, and in a military context would include things such as professional ethos, creeds, and doctrines. However, as Isabel Hull points out in her study of Imperial German military culture leading up to World War I, "Not only is it common for individual and organizational behavior to contradict stated beliefs, it is common for individuals and organizations to deny the discrepancy" (Hull 95).

This leads to the necessity of probing the third and most important level of culture, *basic underlying assumptions*. These deeper, largely unconscious norms and beliefs structure organizations and members' "perceptions of their own essence and purpose, of the problems they must solve, and of the ways they should solve them" and are the true determinants of behavior (96). Hull, for example, offers a pair of corollary basic assumptions held by the Imperial German Army that had significant consequences for its tendency towards "absolute destruction": that war was always existential, and thus "unlimited" in nature; and that "civilians were a legitimate target of war" (124). Basic underlying assumptions are imbedded particularly deeply because such norms are often formed in response to critical incidents, or through a process of "trauma-learning" (Schein, "Organizational" 115; "Culture" 19-20). Organizations, as well as people, tend to institutionalize implicit lessons from extreme experiences, particularly those where survival is at stake (Hull 96; Schein, "Organizational" 115; Johnston 35-36). However, there is no guarantee that the lessons internalized are the correct ones, or ones that will be valid for future problems. And due to their typically unconscious nature, problematic assumptions can be difficult to identify and correct, even when they contradict overt values, leading to irrational and dysfunctional behavior by an organization at odds with its own welfare (Hull 92).

Naturally, the culture of a military or any organization is almost never homogenous. More typically, there are a number of sub-cultures, fragmentations, and factions within the same army that represent a range of beliefs, and norms can sometimes conflict (Wilson 18; Snider 125). The level of cohesiveness is a primary indicator of the strength of the prevailing culture, and the "extent its personnel think and act in ways distinct from other members of their society" (Wilson 18). Furthermore, like any organization, the military is continually inducting new members drawn from the larger society, creating natural pressure for evolution (Schein,

"Organizational" 116). The nature of the institutional culture determines the degree to which it resists these changes.

Primary Factors Influencing Development of a Military's Institutional Culture

Some scholars have attempted to identify a set of universal elements of military culture, as a means of enabling comparison between different armies (cf. Snider; Wilson; James Burk as cited in Winslow 27). Universal characteristics tend necessarily to be vague. While perhaps useful in other cases, my primary purpose is not comparative but rather to identify specific characteristics within one specific army, and trace their lineage and development over time.

While not all armies share the same cultural characteristics, all armies do have a culture and a relationship to its own history and the society that created it. Largely adapting from Hull, I identify six main factors (of her original seven) influencing the development of military culture in the context of the TNI[3]:

> 1) Mission: Generally speaking, any military's primary task and purpose is the organization and control of mass violence for the achievement of national aims. However, armies do acquire other tasks that may or may not be related to its primary mission. The way an army interprets its mission becomes an element of culture, either expressed overtly through doctrine or implicitly through underlying assumptions.
>
> 2) The military's place in, and relationship to state and society: How the military sees its role as an element of national power; and itself in relation to the government and to society.

[3] Adapted from Hull. The sixth factor on her list of seven is "gender constituency," which is not relevant for the purpose of this thesis.

3) The military's structure and organization: This refers to both internal organization, as well as the physical disposition of forces. This is somewhat reflective of the first, "Mission," since armies tend to be organized to accomplish its primary goals. However, this factor was particularly important during the formation of the TNI, since the military more or less inherited the territorial structure left behind by the Japanese.

4) The military's social base: The socio-economic class and background of members of the military, as well as the norms of its members prior to their entry into the military.

5) The military's resources: Not only funding, equipment and technology, but access to education and training.

6) Past history: Especially the military's most recent war, or in the case of the Indonesian military, its foundational independence struggle. (98)

In the TNI's case, its formative PETA identity—as both a revolutionary guerrilla army and the first professionally trained all-Indonesian force—imbued its members with a sense of eliteness as the chosen "defenders of the homeland." After achieving independence, this identity led the PETA-dominated army to assert its right to an increasingly active role in the governance of the nation, at odds with the civilian elites. Much of this conflict was class based. Although as a group PETA recruits tended to be well educated relative to the general population, an enormous gap existed between them and the civilian elites, who were generally members of the privileged and highly educated urban elite. The military's constant conflict with civilians in the government developed into a deep distrust of both civilian authority and political instability.

The TNI was structured territorially, in accordance with its primary missions of national defense via guerrilla warfare, and internal security or counter-guerrilla operations. This organization also reflected the military's general lack of resources, which required the military to rely on civilian assets, whether through cooperation or coercion. Lack of technologically advanced weaponry, relatively rudimentary training, and a perspective on war conditioned by guerrilla warfare meant that the TNI did not hold distinguishing combatants and civilians as an imperative. Finally, the TNI's foundational experience in a brutal guerrilla war against the Dutch ingrained norms of extreme violence that persisted even after its mission turned to internal security. Repeated conflicts against separatist rebellions reinforced both the military culture of "scorched earth" violence, and the military's growing obsession with instability. These tensions erupted in 1965, when, in the wake of a failed Communist-led coup attempt, the military unleashed a nation-wide purge of suspected Communists that led to the establishment of the military-dominated New Order regime. This culture of "scorched earth" violence and obsession with insecurity surfaced again less than a decade later, in the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor.

This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter will begin with an examination of the Imperial Japanese Army leading up to the Second World War—its training, structure, and military culture—as a background to understanding those influences in PETA and as a basis for comparison. The formation of PETA will then be explored, along with the organization's structure, training, and intended role as an auxiliary guerrilla force. This chapter lays the foundation for tracing the line of influence from the IJA to PETA to the Indonesian Army.

Chapter two examines the formation of the Indonesian Army in the crucible of the war for independence, and the institutionalization of the PETA ethos. Led mostly by PETA-trained

officers and soldiers, the Indonesian Army naturally absorbed and amplified their influence. The revolutionary nationalist spirit of the PETA officers came to define the entire generation of freedom fighters. The guerrilla warfare mentality of the PETA cohort also became the core of the military's identity, entrenched by the experience of the revolution and subsequent campaigns to suppress regional rebellions in the post-independence period. The PETA ideology was captured in General Abdul Haris Nasution's *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (*Pokok-pokok Gerilya*), which became the basis of TNI doctrine by the advent of the New Order. These characteristics were at odds with the outlook of the civilian elites and Dutch-trained Indonesians in the government, and the resulting friction reinforced the PETA-dominated military's sense of superiority and entitlement.

The third chapter explores the TNI's institutional culture in greater depth. After decades of nearly constant guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare, the TNI had developed and ingrained an institutional culture rooted in the PETA generation's values. Despite rapid modernization, the TNI's core culture remained the same. In large part, this was because the youth of the PETA leaders upon independence allowed them to dominate the leadership of the TNI for more than three decades. But the TNI's numerous campaigns of internal suppression also cemented a culture of unbounded violence, rooted in the PETA-era guerrilla warfare mindset. This was brought to a terrible climax in the 1965-66 killings that ushered in the New Order, which also brought the military to its dominant position in the government.

The fourth and final chapter deals with the Indonesian military's invasion and occupation of East Timor. East Timor serves as a useful case study because, by 1975, most of the PETA generation leaders had left the military except at the highest echelons. The TNI had adopted significant organizational and equipment modernization, giving it the appearance of a modern

military. Yet, the TNI's actions in East Timor belie that facade, and reveal an institutional culture that had perpetuated into a new generation. The devastation and violence perpetrated in East Timor was simply another expression of the "spirit of destruction" that traced its roots back to the TNI's foundation in PETA.

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PETA

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), upon its arrival in Indonesia in 1942, was a fascinating study in military contradiction. One the one hand, it was an army that was feared and respected for the superb discipline, tactics, and remarkable bravery of its soldiers. On the other, this same army only a few years earlier had been responsible for unleashing, at Nanking, one of the worst atrocities conducted by any military in the 20th century, and was on its way to several more such incidents before the war's end. It had thoroughly adopted modern military organization, tactics, and equipment, making it comparable to contemporary European armies. And yet despite the outward trappings of a professional Western military, the IJA possessed a troubling institutional culture at odds with its professed modernity.

Comparing the TNI with the Japanese Army, its primary progenitor, reveals an interesting contrast in two new nations' attempts to form modern militaries. Their respective histories are filled with many parallels that suggest that they are causally linked. For example, did the aspects of the IJA's culture underlying its actions at Nanking, and its brutal treatment of prisoners and civilians during the war, suffuse into the PETA recruits an "institutional culture of terror" (Robinson, *Genocide* 46), which later manifest itself in two of the largest mass killings of the post-World War II era? The possible sources of both armies' behavior have been debated at length, and the foundations of such behavior are too complex to reduce to a single definitive cause. In the PETA case, there is no evidence in existing records (to the author's knowledge) that the Japanese ever inculcated such training, and official Japanese policy disavowed such

actions. And there is certainly a danger in identifying a historical outcome and then "discovering" evidence in research that supports a specific teleological theory of the cause.

But it is impossible to maintain that the IJA had *no* influence at all on the TNI. The hidden beliefs and the deeper underlying assumptions of an institutional culture take root not just through conscious learning, but also through unconscious levels of influence and modeling. Thus, the entirety of what was taught to Indonesian soldiers cannot be deduced from simply looking at PETA training schedules, programs of instruction, drill manuals, or even interviews with ex-soldiers. When examining the roots of the culture of the TNI, the cultures of the influencing bodies must also be examined, in this case the IJA.

This is not to suggest other influences on the TNI should be ignored, or to assert that parallels constitute irrevocable proof. Nonetheless, I argue here that IJA military culture *must* have had an impact on the PETA soldiers, in the way that any significant colonial encounter etched an indelible mutual imprint on both parties. And specifically, as the creators of the first professionally-trained, all-Indonesian military force, the IJA's influence—overt as well as latent—haunted the development of the TNI. With that in mind, a brief examination of the nature of the Army that the Japanese brought to Indonesia may help illuminate what was passed on.

The Imperial Japanese Army

By the end of the 19th century, Japan had been long closed off but not blind to developments in the world, even prior to the arrival of Perry and the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854. Among the many modernizing reforms resulting from the Meiji Restoration was the establishment of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) in 1871. The creation of a modern national

military effectively ended the feudal system that had sustained the warrior class of *samurai*. But although "the new government could legislate the warrior class out of existence," especially with the establishment of national conscription in 1873, the new military's leadership was largely drawn from this same group, and "it did not displace the value system which had sustained it" (Humphreys 29).

The IJA's leadership enthusiastically adopted a Western military model, initially based on the system of the French, who set up Japan's first military academies and educational institutions. However, after German successes in the Franco-Prussian War, the Japanese became enamored with the Prussian model and the "total war" doctrine of the Imperial German Army.[4] Beyond the effectiveness of Prussian mobility-based tactics, IJA leaders embraced the idea that "military power...[did not] rest . . . solely on a head count of soldiers, nor even on the technical attributes of their weaponry, but on a 'remarkable trinity' of government, army, and people, each with an equal contribution to make. This was the 'nation-in-arms,' a society molded to sacrifice everything willingly for the sake of the nation when the call came" (Harries 39).

Actively seeking to establish itself as a world power, Japan deployed its forces in several major actions in the army's first decades. These included the first Sino-Japanese War and the international suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, and culminated in the Russo-Japanese War. Although the effectiveness of its tactics was questionable at times, particularly against vastly superior Russian weaponry that inflicted massive losses, these campaigns were considered national successes that brought the IJA international esteem as a modern, professional military (Drea, *Japan* 99, 104). Of particular note, Japanese soldiers drew approbation from Western

[4] See Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, for an account of Imperial German Army's military culture and the development of its total war doctrine.

observers for their discipline, restraint, and humane treatment of prisoners (Drea, *Japan* 120; Harries 96).[5]

After largely sitting out of the First World War the Japanese Army stagnated, and tensions between military leaders and the civilian administration rose in conjunction with severe cuts to the army's size and budget. The loss of prestige and funding initiated an effort among many elements in the army to increasingly militarize Japanese society. Military leaders managed to institute a national system of required military training education in public schools (*seinendan*), along with a national army reserve system that functioned down to the village level, which systematically and thoroughly established the military as a dominant social institution. More than simply providing physical training and military drills, the education emphasized patriotic and military values based on the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors, "so that the army's...ideals became an important layer of the rural value system" (Smethurst xv). The radicalization of the officer corps also manifested itself in the creation of numerous secret organizations advocating varying degrees of increased military dominance in government and society, alongside vehement anti-Westernism. This increased militarism, combined with Japan's resource deficiency, led to the Manchurian Incident and the re-engagement of hostilities with China, eventually resulting in the second Sino-Japanese War and Japan's entry into World War II.

A critical development in institutionalizing this militarism was the Kwangtung Army, which had been Japan's permanent territorial army in Manchuria since the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. The Kwantung Army was largely autonomous from central government

[5] From *Soldiers of the Sun*: "What most immediately impressed all Western observers about the Japanese soldier was the fanatical bravery and utter disregard for personal safety, which seemed at once admirable and sinister to the Occidental. But in this war the Japanese soldier was also seen as magnanimous—generous in his respect for brave enemies and chivalrous in his treatment of their casualties" (96).

control, and its leaders often acted of their own initiative and sometimes in violation of orders.[6] The establishment of the Manchukuo government in 1932, which was directly administered by the Kwantung Army, strengthened this independence from civilian oversight. As the IJA's only forward-deployed element, assignment to this unit was prestigious and much of the Japan's military leadership during World War II had rotated through the Kwangtung Army at some point during the inter-war period. This common experience in three decades of largely autonomous, low-intensity conflict in China would be an important factor later in aspects of IJA military culture that would emerge during World War II.

IJA Structure and Training

Much of the IJA's organizational structure resulted from the unique adaptation of the military to its financial and resource constraints at the same time it was also trying to modernize. The result was an especially infantry-focused army that espoused "fighting spirit" over technology or firepower.[7] The Japanese doctrine was "weighted heavily on the intangible factors of infantry in battle," reinforcing "a consistent theme in Japanese military thought that infantry, properly led and motivated, can overcome the material advantages of the foe" (Drea, *Essays* 63). This naturally led to a heavy emphasis in training and education on small unit infantry tactics and the development of *seishin*, or spirit.

Japanese infantry training was rigorous by any military's standard, with heavy doses of physical training, long forced marches, and battle drills in all terrains and environments. Training emphasized conditioning for hardness and resiliency, and was reinforced constantly

[6] Numerous incidents of unsanctioned military action by Kwantung Army elements include the Huanggutun incident and the Manchurian (Mukden) incident, among many other minor actions (Drea *Japan*, chapter 9).

[7] As an example of the emphasis on infantry: IJA was roughly 40-50% infantry during World War II, compared to the U.S. Army's combined arms focused units, which were about 20-25% infantry (cf. Drea, *Essays* 63)

through corporal punishment. The lack of resources and equipment facilitated the focus on basic soldiering skills and fieldcraft, and taught soldiers to survive for extended periods without logistical support. Above all, soldiers were continually inculcated with an aggressive tactical attitude stressing the offense, in what was termed the "spirit of the bayonet" (Daughtery 29).

This "philosophy of lack," in which absence of technology and resources was virtuized from a weakness to a strength, made the training excellent preparation for the kind of jungle fighting that characterized the Pacific war.[8] The mobile, small-unit based, self-sufficient character of the army was ideally suited for conducting an irregular or guerrilla warfare campaign.

The corollary to this kind of warfighting philosophy is that "Japanese officers were imbued with the spirit of the offensive at the expense of sound campaign and logistics planning" (Drea, *Essays* 69). The obsession with offensive spirit and infantry tactics was present in a perverse disregard for operational design and strategy even at the highest levels of military policy making in the government: "Rhetoric about national defense planning and transcendental civilian cabinets aside, in mid-1937 there was no integrated national defense strategy. There was no coherent and realistic rearmament plan. There was no joint operational planning. Nothing linked doctrine, operations, military budgets, hypothetical opponents, or future war" (Drea, *Japan* 189).

In nearly all militaries, the staff college has historically been the pinnacle of a modern military's officer professional education, designed to transition officers from thinking tactically to strategically, and train them in the critical thinking and conceptual skills needed to direct and coordinate the whole of an army's elements and functions at higher levels of command. In the

[8] This is despite the fact that IJA infantry training was doctrinally geared towards fighting against the Russians in Siberia.

IJA's case, however, the staff college was almost entirely focused on infantry tactics and rote memorization:

> Even at Staff College, the pinnacle of the army educational edifice, open only to the select few, notions of initiative, creativity, originality, and individual force of character were stifled. At what was effectively the university for the Imperial Army's intellectual elite, the generals of the future, there was no real preparation for leadership. There was no general discussion, no attempt to make the students talk freely, just more learning by rote—and this for men of thirty to thirty-five, few of them below the rank of captain. When asked a question in class, the Staff College student "immediately sat at attention and shouted 'Sir!', firmly grasping each side of the chair on which he sat—and fixing his eyes on the small of the back of the person immediately in front of him, he proceeded to bawl out at the top of his voice what appeared to be a carefully prepared answer" (Harries 174).[9]

IJA Culture

While the IJA adopted the tactics, equipment, and organization of Western militaries, its organizational culture was drawn from pre-existing Japanese social values that were adapted to meet the needs of the military. Drea writes that:

> Training methods of the Imperial Army did instill those values—leadership, interdependence, and cohesion—so highly prized by military leaders. They did this by building upon the existing values of the society, especially the creation of a surrogate family. To be sure, the prewar Imperial Japanese Army certainly

[9] Harries' source is the Papers of the British War Office in the Public Records Office, Kew, London: WO 208/1429, January 1937 Report.

> adopted Western forms of organization, uniform, rank structure, military education, and modern weaponry, along with the associated modem tools of warfare. It did not, however, attempt to impose either a Western or a modern model on the social structure inside the barracks ("Barracks" 71).

The "traditional values" that military leaders sought to inculcate were those of rural Japanese village society, which—during this period of rapid transition to modernity—military leaders feared were being eroded and threatened by the influx of "mass movements and Western ideologies" such as liberalism, internationalism, parliamentarianism, and other primarily urban trends that were sweeping the world (Smethurst xv).[10] As Japanese society quickly became more educated, industrialized, and thus increasingly diverse and socially mobile, military leaders developed an obsessive fear of national disunity (23).

The military reinforced its values by establishing a system of national military reserves and local youth military organizations to complement conscription down to the village level. Conscripts and officers would return to their hometowns after their service and enter the reserves, subsequently leading local youth organizations and providing mandatory instruction to school children in military values and skills. Thus, by the time a soldier actually entered into official military service at the advent of Japan's entry into World War II, he had received training on "how to use a bayonet, throw a grenade, fire a rifle, machine gun, and mortar, how to march in a unit and to attack, and how to scout, use a map and compass, and give first aid" and had been indoctrinated with the "basic information necessary for a good soldier and militarized citizen" from the time he was 13 or 14 years old (155).

Japanese military leaders also exploited the cohesive and cooperative elements of rural village life. The funding for the militarized local organizations came from the community, not

[10] For "Japanese traditional values," see also Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, 1946.

the national government, reinforcing each village's financial and psychological sense of investment in the military. Responsibilities for civic services such as fire departments were given to local military reserve units, so that the line between civil and military functions often disappeared. Furthermore, the army "inducted draftees into the barracks based on the area of their homes of record," so that members of a given infantry unit were drawn from the same "regimental districts" and would often serve with officers and fellow soldiers of similar backgrounds (Drea, *Essays* 79-80). Thus, the village basis of military service created a structure for conflating and integrating the military's ideals with the rural value system, such that "by the 1930s . . . loyalty to the army and loyalty to the hamlet and village had become synonymous" (Smethurst xvi).

The IJA also relied heavily on two other traditions to "connect past to present when formulating national values" (Drea, *Japan* 31). The first was absolute loyalty to the emperor, the paramount soldierly obligation and the apex of national concentric circles of family, loyalty, and duty. The special relationship between the soldier and the emperor was embodied in the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors. Issued in 1882 following a rebellion, and intended to promulgate the "traditional samurai values" of the soldier and his loyalty to the emperor, the Rescript became the most important basis of the military's ideology. The Rescript was seen as a transcendent document that was presented directly to the army by the emperor, and carried a "religious aura" of spiritual duty (Harries 25). Because of this direct transmission, and because it also predated the 1889 Constitution, the military believed that the Rescript "placed the army and the navy in a position subordinate only to the emperor and not the civil government," concomitant with a special role in the nation (Smethurst 164-65). The rescript became required memorization for every soldier, and was recited continually in schools and military ceremonies.

The second tradition increasingly relied upon by the IJA was a re-invention of the Bushido tradition that emphasized, "the transcendence the samurai achieved over his own mortality" (Harries 7). The Bushido values of absolute loyalty and obedience, frugality, and the fulfillment of duty to the death were expressed in the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors. But early 20th century Japan was characterized by increasing polarization between a largely urban civilian government and a hardline officer corps, as well as a lack of financial and industrial capability to modernize the military. In this environment, the emphasis on Bushido metastasized into an extremist philosophy in which *seishin* was more important than material. This fed well into an anti-Western, anti-materialistic attitude of elements in the army, which seized upon the re-formulated Bushido ethic as the soul of the national character. This eventually evolved into "a range of mental attitudes that bordered on psychopathy: a view of death as sublime and beautiful . . . [and] surrender as the ultimate dishonor, a belief whose corollary was total contempt for the captive; reverence for the sword, inherited directly from the samurai, which gave beheading as a punishment a special mystical significance" (Harries 481). This is not to say that Japanese soldiers were psychopathic, but rather that this formulation of Bushido values was increasingly promulgated as the institutional and public norm. The value of death before dishonor slowly became an inculcated societal tenet, such that the "shame of captivity and its accompanying stigma of cowardice" (Drea, *Japan* 119) helped to ensure adherence to the organizational norms of behavior, in which suicide was an acceptable option.

The pre-World War II Japanese army was thus a complex combination of a modern, Western military structure laid atop a largely anti-Western, neo-traditionalist culture that simultaneously embraced and rejected military modernization. The underlying culture of the

IJA, reinforced by social structure and radical indoctrinated philosophy, would become "the ghost in the modern machinery of the Imperial Japanese Army" (Harries 7).

The Formation of PETA

Global war spread into Southeast Asia through Japan's protracted campaign in China, which stretched Japan's national resources to their limit. In the summer of 1941, seeking to cut off Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang Army from its last lifelines to western aid, Japan sent troops to occupy French Indochina. Western powers responded by embargoing crucial raw materials and oil, confronting Japan with a resource crisis that committed the IJA to seizing the Southeast Asian colonies, the Netherland East Indies in particular (Drea, *Japan* 209-212). By May 1942, Japan's lightning advances across Southeast Asia had swept aside in half a year the architecture of more than three centuries of Western colonialism.

But the illusion of this strategy's feasibility quickly faded, and successful Allied counter-offensives exposed the IJA's over-extended posture. By late 1943, Japan's deteriorating strategic situation in the Pacific led the Japanese Military Government in Jakarta to create an Indonesian militia force called the "Volunteer Army of the Defenders of the Homeland" (*Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tahah Air*, or PETA), in order to augment Japanese military forces in defending against an expected Allied invasion (Kanahele 116). Although various other local militia and resistance groups existed throughout the archipelago, many fostered by the Japanese, and the IJA earlier that year had already established the *Heiho* system for recruiting Indonesians as auxiliary support soldiers, PETA represented the first professionally organized Indonesian military force specifically trained for combat and led by Indonesians (116). With the core of the invading Japanese occupation forces having been sent to more desperate combat zones such as

Guadalcanal, only around 10,000 IJA soldiers remained in the Indies to defend the entire archipelago, only a fraction of which were actual combat troops (Oba 1-2; Kanahele 116). The military exigencies facing the Japanese forces thus intersected with the increasingly urgent desire of Indonesians for independence and a stake in defending their land against the return of Western colonial forces. These PETA recruits later formed the nucleus of what was eventually to become the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* —TNI).

PETA Organization

PETA was started as an initiative of the Japanese 16th Army, which was responsible for Java, under the broader program of *giyugun*, meaning "volunteer army" (Sato 197). Strictly speaking, PETA referred only to the Java Giyugun[11] (Miyamoto 221). PETA initially fell under the direction of the *Beppan* (Special Section), which was an intelligence section assigned to the 16th Army Headquarters in Jakarta led by First Lieutenant (later Captain) Yanagawa Motoshige. In January 1943, the Beppan established a training center in Tanggerang and selected a small group of Indonesians as a test class, among them future TNI general Kemal Idris (Kanahele 117; Reid footnote in Miyamoto 221; Notosusanto, *Peta* 87). The success of the initial pilot class led to the rapid expansion of the program, with an officer candidate school established in Bogor in the fall of 1943, and the organization of the PETA into battalion (*daidan*) sized elements (Kanahele 123). The initial Jawa Giyugun was composed of 33 *daidan* of 500 soldiers, each with three companies (*chudan*) of three platoons (*shodan*) each, for a total strength of 16,500 Indonesians in 1944 (Miyamoto 222). Each *daidan* was assigned a Japanese officer-advisor

[11] Other *giyugun* were established on Sumatra and Bali, each with slightly different characteristics. The Java Giyugun was the largest, and the TNI has been dominated by Javanese officers since its inception.

supported by several Japanese NCOs.[12] As more PETA units were established with trained commanders, the Indonesians increasingly conducted the training themselves (Sato 211).

Indonesian officer candidates were selected and trained for all three levels of command, but with significant differences in qualification requirements. The battalion and company commanders were largely selected from older, well-established members of local communities (many of them were teachers or religious leaders), who were expected by the Japanese to be able to wield influence over their younger subordinates and recruit effectively in their home territories (Kanahele 123-24). Commensurate with their intended role, the military training for these *daidancho* and *chodancho* was relatively brief and leadership focused, usually lasting only a couple months. The Japanese intent for the *shodancho* was quite different. These platoon commanders were generally selected from among young, relatively well-educated, and nationalistic Indonesian men. They were given intensive military training beyond that of the battalion and company commanders, and were the closest to being professionally trained military officers (124). It is this generation of young, educated officers that formed the "backbone of the revolutionary officer corps" (McVey, "Part I" 133). Some of the particularly promising young Indonesian lieutenants, such as Zukifli Lubis, were selected for follow-on special intelligence training (Conboy, *Kopassus* 15-16; Notosusanto, *Peta* 132-35).[13]

The success of the PETA program and the popularity of the units, as well as Japanese concerns about Allied victories in the Pacific, spurred the creation of another Giyugun consisting of 22 battalions in the summer of 1944, and later an additional 12 battalions (Miyamoto 222-3). By the end of the war, the total PETA force on Java and Bali was 69 battalions with a combined

[12] Non-commissioned Officer

[13] Zukifli Lubis, later the first head of the National Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Nasional*—BIN), was a PETA contemporary of Suharto who was selected to attend an intelligence officer course in Singapore.

strength of approximately 38,000 Indonesian soldiers, including over 922 trained officers (Sato 201).

From its inception, PETA was designed to be a territorial defense force, the design of which would have far reaching implications:

> Significantly, the territorial organization of Peta was to a degree determined by one man, the *daidancho*. A battalion was located in the geographical area of his influence as a local leader. Recruits were taken from the area [...]. Appeals to public support were to be made in his name or related to local communal loyalties which he might have represented. As a consequence, once located, a battalion remained there almost permanently so that in time it would have become fully identified and integrated with the region (Kanahele 126).

The Japanese rationale for such a territorial-based force was clear: to maximize the PETA forces' advantage in guerilla warfare against a numerically and technologically superior invading enemy force (127). However, also evident are the inevitable disadvantages of such a locally-based system: loss of overall organizational unity and discipline as each unit develops a local identity stronger than a national one; nepotism; distractions caused by non-military or personal matters; the mixing of military leadership and local politics; and the coalescing of significant power into the hands of a local "warlord." The problems arising from the territorial entrenchment of PETA units, and the military institutionalization of what many writers have called the *Bapak-anak* (father-son) relationship between leaders and subordinates, has been a continuous theme since

their beginnings in PETA (McVey, "Part I" 154-55; slightly different impression in Utrecht 46).[14]

PETA Training

Although the Japanese were not intent on creating a copy of the IJA in PETA, the worldview and military culture of the Japanese trainers had a significant impact on the Indonesian recruits. The methodology of the training was very clearly modeled on the Japanese officers' own training experiences as described earlier, and was perfect preparation for training a guerrilla force. As the PETA program evolved and training became more dispersed, the quality of training provided by the Japanese instructor-advisors varied from unit to unit. In spite of this, some common elements of the Imperial Japanese Army's military culture of that period were clearly passed on to all the PETA units, the imprint of which was retained in the later TNI.

The Japanese training of Indonesian PETA recruits largely followed the priorities inherent in their own training experience, and in some cases were based directly on translated versions of Japanese training manuals (Miyamoto 233). The foundational principle was that *seishin* (which was translated in Indonesian as *semangat*) was more important than any other aspect of warfare, enabling the triumph of will over the military technological advantages of the West (Lebra, "Significance" 222). There also seems to have been a cultural consonance between Japanese military *bushido* ethics and Javanese culture, such as classical "*wayang* values," the focus in Javanese mysticism on *jiwa* (soul), as well as the Javanese *ksatria* (knight) tradition

[14] Kanahele and Anderson both suggest that General Nasution's post-war Territorial Defense Doctrine may have been inspired by the PETA territorial organization. Nasution cites other sources of inspiration, such as the German *wehrkreise* system, which he cites repeatedly. One might also argue that there are simply common rational military factors in planning for a deliberate guerrilla warfare defense against an invading force. Nasution may also have been reluctant to credit the Japanese as an influence, especially since he was not a PETA officer. However, one cannot escape the fact that the revolution coalesced around PETA units that were already territorially based at the start of the independence war.

(Anderson, *Aspects* 48; McVey, "Part I" 140; Notosusanto, *Peta* 69-73, 99, 142). Additionally, emphasis on *semangat* complemented the rising nationalism that was fostered by the Japanese trainers.[15] The self-image of the PETA soldiers, despite the reality that they were under Japanese control as firmly as they had been under the Dutch, was that they were the vanguard of a nascent independent Indonesian national army and nation (Notosusanto, *Peta* 114). They "developed an intense pride in their training and their capabilities" and "felt they were members of a highly favored elite" (Jenkins, "Occupation" 71).

The structure and content of the training, aside from the constant emphasis on *semangat*, varied from class to class as the PETA program evolved, but generally focused on basic military skills with a significant dose of physical training. According to Nugroho Notosusanto, the pilot PETA program led by Lieutenant Yanagawa in Tanggerang consisted of the following:

> The curriculum included general subjects (inculcation of the spirit, history of the Netherlands East Indies, the world situation, war history, tactics, communication, interior duties, etc.), special subjects (espionage, stratagem, counter-intelligence, propaganda, etc.), practical courses (drill, gymnastics, sumo-wrestling, swimming, fencing), technical courses (shooting, reconnaissance, liaison, camouflage, etc.), field study (visits to farms and factories), and extracurricular activities like singing martial songs. (*Peta* 87)

Subsequent PETA training courses modified the curriculum based on the time and resources available and the quality of the recruits. In the first Bogor class, for example, training time was cut to two months, making it impossible to train properly well-rounded officers, so the trainers

[15] Although the Japanese role and motivation in fostering Indonesian nationalism is a matter of debate, the rhetoric of militant nationalism was clearly used in the training of PETA recruits (cf. Jenkins "Occupation"). This was a natural by-product of the Japanese officers' own training, which heavily emphasized the development of Bushido as the national character, and which would very much have been passed on by young, idealistic officers such as Yanagawa.

"concentrated on instilling fighting spirit, on teaching basic infantry skills, and on building up the physical strength of the cadets" (57).[16]

SAMPLE DAILY CURRICULUM OF PETA TRAINING
A newspaper report gave the following schedule at the *Jawa Bo-ei Giyugun Kanbu Renseitai*, the PETA training center in Bogor, in 1943:

Morning (0900-1200):

1. Roll Call
2. Raising the flag, bowing to the Emperor
3. Morning gymnastics
4. Breakfast

1. Japanese language lessons, tactics, drill regulations
2. History of the United States and England, security
3. Daily etiquette
4. *Bushido*

Afternoon:

1. Afternoon nap (half an hour)
2. Health examination
3. Rifle and bayonet exercises

Evening:
1900 Return from field exercise, cleaning of arms
2000

1. Dinner (rice, tomato, peanuts, etc.)
2. Private study
3. Prayers

Figure 1: Sample Daily Curriculum of PETA Training

The training was intense, and mentally and physically demanding in keeping with the IJA's methodology of training for toughness and development of spirit. Training took place in all weather conditions and—in spite of the training schedule—could occur at any hour. During the first official Bogor PETA class, for example, one Japanese trainer forced the trainees out for "midnight maneuvers" after a day that had already been spent training in heavy rain (Jenkins, "Occupation" 61).

[16] Jenkins writes that, "the Japanese did not give the any lessons on guerrilla warfare because, at the time, they still thought they could fight an "authentic war." The idea of guerrilla training came later, when the Japanese army began to realize it was losing the war." This is from an interview with Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2, 1999.

The physicality of the training was reinforced by corporal punishment, often conducted en-masse despite the error of a single man in a company. These ranged from stress positions, caning, and sometimes slapping on the face, "a common practice in the Japanese army, but one the Indonesians found deeply humiliating" (61). Although much has been written about the cultural friction resulting from some harsh Japanese training methods, especially the slapping on the face, Jenkins writes that many ex-PETA officers looked back on the hard training as a necessary method (61-62). "Whatever the truth of the matter," Jenkins continues, "the experience left a mark on some of Indonesia's future army officers. Bashed by the Japanese, a number of them went on to become bashers themselves" (62).[17]

The nature of the training itself seems to have evolved as the program expanded and the war changed, with guerrilla warfare training playing an increasingly larger role as the likelihood of Japanese defeat grew (Suwondo 13). Many graduates of the pilot course and the first Bogor course were selected for additional training, becoming the initial cadre of the *Bo-ei Giyugun Tokusetsu Yugekitai*, also known by its code name *Iggo Kimmutai*, which was "geared more toward 'intelligence type' warfare rather than 'ordinary' guerrilla warfare" (Notosusanto, *Peta* 133).[18] These men underwent six additional months of training from August to December 1944, in subjects including "Japanese Language, general military tactics and technique, tactics and technique for infantry support weapons (mortar, LMG [light machine gun]), guerilla tactics, theory of intelligence and territorial operations" (132). Officially established on January 8, 1945, the *Iggo Kummitai* had the dual function of setting up further *yugeki* (guerrilla) branch training

[17] Some Japanese training commanders, such as First Lieutenant Tsuchiya Kiso, forbid face slapping and other culturally humiliating forms of punishment, in addition to demonstrating a deep sense of professionalism and solidarity with the Indonesian trainees. This made a lasting impression and earned the deep respect of the PETA officers. Jenkins writes that "When Soeharto went to Japan for the first time, he asked to see Tsuchiya as his old trainer" (62, footnote; source is Ruth McVey interview with Tsuchiya Kiso and Yoshitake Chikao, October 1980).

[18] Notosusanto translates the names as follows: tokusetsu = special; yugeki = guerilla; iggo (ichi go) = number one, but the "I" was also considered as signifying "Indonesia"; kimmu = duty

centers, as well as conducting intelligence collection, and "advanced force" style territorial operations such as emplacing caches (134-5).

A few PETA trainees also underwent specialized training in health and medicine, accounting, ordinance, or basic motorized cavalry operations (121-124). However, no PETA officers received training in the command and staff functions necessary to coordinate the elements of a battalion or larger unit and keep it running. While well trained specifically to fight a revolutionary guerrilla war using small-unit, light infantry tactics, they received no real professional military education at the operational level, such as complex, large-scale maneuver operations. That meant that "the officers who were to form the backbone of the TNI for the best part of three decades had, for the time being, at least, no higher military education and were capable of mounting nothing more than battalion-size operations, if that. That limitation was to play into the hands of officers . . . who had attended either the pre-war Royal Military Academy in Breda in the Netherlands or the substitute academy established in Bandung after the German invasion of Holland in 1940. Not surprisingly, these officers were considered more suitable for senior staff and command positions in the early years of the TNI" (79).

Japanese Strategy and the Role of PETA

The Japanese territorial strategy for defending Java against invasion towards the end of the war, based on the their hard-won lessons fighting against the vastly superior firepower of the Allied forces, seems to have relied increasingly heavily on the role of PETA units[19]:

[19] There is considerable debate about the role the Japanese saw for PETA in the expected final invasion, with various writers having differing interpretations of Japanese motivations, and citing sometimes contradictory Japanese documents of the period. This may reflect a shift in Japanese strategy, or lack of consensus within the IJA command, or both. In any case, I side with the simplest explanation that the Japanese formed PETA as a guerrilla force to assist in the defense against invasion, and intended to use them as such.

> Their revised strategy was therefore to have a three-tiered coastal defence. The outer ring, nearest the coast [...] would bear the brunt of the Allies' opening onslaught. Behind them would stand a secondary line of Japanese troops [...] concentrated on the perimeter of Java's *massif central* [...]. Finally, high up in the hills, there would be a group of Japanese and Indonesians specially trained in the techniques of sabotage and prolonged guerrilla warfare. The general expectation was that fighting between the enemy and the Peta would fire the whole population behind the anti-Allied cause. [...] If and when the Allies finally crushed them, the guerillas would remain a running sore on the body of the victorious Dutch or Allied administration. (Anderson, *Aspects* 38)

How much of this "grand strategy" was imparted to the Indonesian PETA officers is not clear, but the three-phased plan, in combination with the locality-based nature of the battalions, describes the essence of later TNI territorial defense doctrine.[20] With some variations, Indonesian defense doctrine has always been predicated on the strategy of an initial conventional military defense at the outer limits, transitioning into a territorially based defense-in-depth, and ultimately falling back on guerrilla warfare.

With the PETA battalions' local roots and territorial defense function, combined with professional military training and organization, PETA units "gradually became the nucleus of the people's resistance organization in their areas" (Nasution, *Fundamentals* 55). While some writers such as Nugroho Notosusanto downplay any special role of PETA officers in the post-revolution army, instead citing the "common experience . . . not very different from the experiences of millions of other Indonesians at the time who also had some Japanese military

[20] For an overview of Indonesian defense strategy and capabilities, see Robert Lowry, *Indonesian Defence Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces,* 1993, p. 36.

training" (183), there was no other organization with the complete level of professional training and organization that PETA possessed. It was natural that PETA would become the nucleus of revolutionary resistance as well as the core of the later TNI. Furthermore, the forces' territorial organization was specifically designed so that PETA battalions would coordinate and train the local population for "total resistance" (Nasution, *National* 1, 55).

Summary

When on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito declared Japan's surrender, the PETA army which had been in development for over two years was thrust into a new role in Indonesia's struggle for independence. The force that the Japanese left behind would be tempered through the forge of revolution and play a central role in the creation of the Indonesian military, and subsequently the trajectory of the nation. The following is a distillation of the framework that remained upon IJA's departure.

Aside from PETA, the Japanese formed and fostered a number of other nationalist and religious paramilitary groups, and provided some of them with rudimentary training and drill. These would join with PETA units to form a popular, youth-centric, amalgamated revolutionary force. However, only two groups could truly call themselves soldiers: former members of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (*Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger*—KNIL), and ex-PETA recruits. Although ex-KNIL officers would play an important role as individuals, as a group the ex-PETA units were the leading core of the revolutionary force. Furthermore, the PETA force, although largely drawn from a largely middle-class, comparatively well-educated strata, was a caste apart from the culture of Western-educated, civilian elites such as Sukarno and Hatta, or the upper class background that would have been necessary to gain access to Dutch

officer education prior to Japanese occupation.[21] The PETA officer group largely came from rural or semi-rural backgrounds, more likely to adhere to "traditional" values, and more likely to reject the influx of modernization and Westernization than their elite counterparts.

A corollary point is that although PETA officers were trained *by* professional soldiers, they were not trained to *be* professional soldiers. Although military professionalism[22] is a relative term, the fundamental purpose behind Japan's creation of PETA was to create an auxiliary fighting force trained in guerrilla warfare. Rhetoric and propaganda aside, the primary purpose was not to create a modern national army, with an officer corps versed in military art and science.

With PETA having been formed in this way, it is no surprise that a guerrilla warfare mentality became central to the TNI's identity. A critic may argue that revolutionary warfare was every Indonesian soldier's heritage. But that alone does not pre-destine an army to adopt guerrilla warfare as the basis of its national military identity. The regional defense alignment of PETA organization became the basis for the territorial command system, which persists to this day. This system is mutually reinforcing with the principles of guerrilla warfare, in which cohesion with, and control of the population is vital, and is a reason why the TNI has never "left the village."[23]

---

[21] For a breakdown of PETA officer socio-economic and education backgrounds, see Nugroho Notosusanto, *The Peta Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia*, 105-109. More than half of PETA officers belonged to either "little Priyayi," or commoner backgrounds; and nearly two-thirds had a junior high school education or less. The numbers are skewed even more towards the lower level classes when looking only at the young *shodancho* group, which would have the longest longevity and greatest impact in the TNI. Yet, Notosusanto rejects the possibility that the PETA officers as a group had a substantially different outlook than ex-KNIL or other Indonesians of more privileged background. Like much of his writings, this seems to be New Order historical revisionism.

[22] The debate on "professionalism" in the TNI, as defined by western perspectives on military professionalism, is a discussion too long for this venue. The key point here is that there is an obvious qualitative difference between a soldier trained to be guerrilla, and a soldier trained to be a member of a conventional national army.

[23] A reference to the Indonesian military's *ABRI masuk desa* ("Armed Forces enters the village") program in the 1980s, in which the military undertook civic works projects and indoctrination in local communities, exerting further control in daily domestic life.

Perhaps most importantly, the Japanese seem to have incited the revolutionary nationalism of their trainees, "in whom the patterns to be expected of the Japanese military personality found an inevitable reflection" (Anderson, *Aspects* 48). The PETA, in particular, as "an elite corps, gradually came to see itself as the vanguard of revolutionary nationalism . . . and developed an increasingly intense *esprit de corps*" (47). Perhaps in this process, too, the PETA troops absorbed some of the Japanese brand of military nationalism, in which the military had not only the right, but also the obligation to play a role in state affairs. In 1979, former TNI chief-of-staff General T.B. Simatupang noted the link between the ex-PETA dominated military and the Japanese occupation military's attitudes: "Since liberation from the control of the Japanese military, the national armed forces, whose members were influenced by the education and training these provided, show the same dangerous militarist tendencies as the Japanese army" (Indonesia Tsushin, 5 December 1979, cited in Goto 543).

How much of the underlying IJA culture the PETA officers absorbed, and carried forward into the TNI will be explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

INSTITUTIONALIZING THE PETA GENERATION

"There are those who say that a guerrilla war brings more disaster than blessing, arguing that a guerrilla war is indeed destructive in nature. The destruction is intensive and extensive, not only materially because it uses sabotage and scorched earth, but also what is more, it causes psychological, political and social damage. A guerrilla fighter is bred on a spirit of destruction and is not easily repatriated into the community as an ordinary citizen. If one is accustomed to using harsh and brutal measures, he does not easily change and become a tactful and patient man again. If one is used to being active in underground activities, he is not easily moved to pay attention to legal rules. Most standards and values common in law-abiding countries and ordered societies have tumbled down and many have become old-fashioned. The spirit of revolution, of guerrilla warfare and of scorched earth is aimed at destroying the whole existing religious, legal, socio-economic order which forms the organization of the dominating power. How can the guerrilla accept again a legal, political and socio-economic situation since to him it has the taint of the old system? Many nations and countries, in fact, continue to be chaotic years and decades after a guerrilla war overturns and rubs out the ethical, legal standards which are normally found in a society. Burning, sabotage, killing and kidnapping at the expense of the enemy have a heroic value. To have participated in guerrilla activities makes it difficult for one to adapt oneself to an ordered society, a society based on law."[24]

"The guerilla must be fought with his own tactics. This is the essence of anti-guerilla strategy."[25]

> —General Abdul Haris Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian Defence System Past and Future*, 1953

The period between the end of World War II and the beginning of the New Order saw the nascent Indonesian Army engaged in almost constant warfare, both in guerrilla form during the independence struggle, as well as in multiple counter-insurgency campaigns against separatist movements throughout the archipelago. Ex-PETA soldiers and officers made up the bulk of the army from the beginning (Notosusanto, *Struggle* 111), and the foundations of their common training shaped a common outlook among their generation. This was not without significant

[24] Nasution, *Fundamentals* 49-50
[25] Nasution, *Fundamentals* 64

internal conflict, as ex-PETA officers clashed with their ex-KNIL counterparts as well as with civilian nationalist leaders over the identity and future of the armed forces. These repeated experiences of guerrilla warfare and internal conflict would set patterns and ingrain norms in the TNI that would persist for decades.

Formation of the Indonesian Armed Forces

The Japanese Emperor's August 15, 1945 declaration of defeat threw PETA into chaos. The Allies' insistence that the Indonesians be disarmed and demobilized placed the Japanese in a difficult situation. They neither wanted to arm the population and create a potentially more explosive situation upon the Allies' arrival, opening themselves to accusations of not fulfilling their obligations under terms of peace; nor did they want to risk confronting the already inflamed Indonesian population by appearing to prepare them for re-subjugation. Further, many of the Japanese PETA advisors had developed close ties with their Indonesian counterparts, and were sympathetic to their desire for independence (Oba 2; Miyamoto 220).

The lack of a central, unified Indonesian command for the PETA resulted in each territorial PETA battalion undertaking "demobilization" on its own terms. This ranged from violent raiding of weapons and supply depots, to "the peaceable transfer of large quantities of military equipment to the local PETA Battalion Commander," as happened in Banjumas with General Sudirman, the future first Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Anderson, *Aspects* 118).[26] While eventually most of the PETA units joined and formed the core of the first Indonesian national military, power remained strongly territorialized under each locality's

[26] According to Reid and Oki (footnote 338), this easy acquisition of such a large cache of arms made Sudirman's Banyumas Battalion the best equipped in the whole Army at the time. This may have helped jump start his success as a revolutionary commander, making him "first among equals" of basically 67 separate militia units on Java at the time. In addition to his legendary charisma, the influence of early local units in the army was in direct correlation to the number of arms in their possession.

leading *bapak*. Having already been set in place under the Japanese PETA *daidan* system, and having natural cultural roots in Javanese society, the mass of *pemuda* tended to collect around local "respected elders." This had long-term consequences, setting up a recurring theme in the Indonesian military regarding the balance of power between the center and the territories. Particularly in the early days of the nation, the *bapak* were in a strong position relative to the national authority and could not be "ordered" or removed (Nasution, *National* 154-155; Anderson, *Java* 236).

The first manifestation of the Indonesian military was the *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* (BKR; People's Security Body), formed by the PPKI (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*; Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) under Sukarno on August 29, 1945, as an interim hybrid between a national army and a security police force, largely as a vehicle to absorb the various independent militia units. The BKR was quickly superseded in October by the *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* (TKR; People's Security Army) in an attempt to impose greater hierarchical organization and control. Both early forms of the army were led by Major Urip Sumohardjo, a retired career KNIL officer who had achieved the highest position by an Indonesian within the Dutch colonial army (Anderson, *Java* 232). While the bulk of the new national army's tactical leadership cadre was made up of former PETA officers, Urip naturally relied on ex-KNIL officers, the only ones with any experience in a professionally structured military, to "form an effective central organizational structure around which the national army could grow" (233-4). The core of this national military leadership were young former KNIL officers known as the "Bandung Group," among whom were Nasution and Simatupang. "The most significant characteristic of the core of the Bandung group was that . . . they were intellectuals who became army officers largely by accident . . . Almost all of them came from the

Sundanese upper class or from well-to-do families in the Outer Islands. With these family connections and good Dutch educations, as well as the experience of studying in the relatively cosmopolitan atmosphere of Bandung, they had far better access to and sympathy with the Djakarta intelligentsia than either the older KNIL officers or, as we shall see, the bulk of the Peta" (234-5).

The clash of worldviews was evident in conflict between the mostly ex-KNIL regional commanders (divided into West, East, and Central Java regions, for example), and the mostly ex-PETA division and battalion commanders under them. The KNIL veterans, with "their expertise in staff organization and military theory, and their conventional professional training," were far out of touch with the mass of *pemuda perjuangan* ("youth of the struggle"), who tended to gravitate to the PETA officers, with their indoctrination in the revolutionary ideology of the guerrilla army of the people (238-39). One of the early milestones in this conflict was the selection of the first *panglima besar* (Commander-in-Chief)[27] at a conference in November 1945. Urip was the KNIL faction's candidate, and Sudirman was the favorite of the PETA officers. Sudirman won, though narrowly, in no small part due to his legendary charisma and leadership, but also his exceptional battlefield reputation. These qualities soon enabled him to overcome many of the internal frictions within the army and gain loyalty from members of both sides. His selection, however, entrenched a different conflict and precedent:

> The strength of Sudirman's new position . . . also derived from the way in which his office was regarded by the dominant Peta component of the army. The Peta had been nurtured in the Japanese tradition, and by that tradition, at least in the latter days of the Empire, the effective head of the army, the chief of staff, was chosen by consultations among the senior officers from which civilians were

[27] For an interesting discussion of the title *panglima besar* and its history, see footnote 22 in Anderson, *Java* 244.

> rigidly excluded. Moreover, the chief of staff was not subordinated to the Japanese cabinet but reported directly to the Emperor. From the start Sudirman made every effort to live up to this tradition. He regarded himself as coequal to the cabinet leaders, not subordinate to them, and in this interpretation of his role received strong support from within the army. (246)

If the conflict between the KNIL and PETA officers was more than simply a clash of class upbringings and experiences, but fundamentally a fight over what kind of army Indonesia should have, the parallel but related struggle that raged between the army and civilian leadership was over what the military's role should be within the larger structure of the future Indonesian government and society (248). Civilian leaders such as Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin were particularly "anxious to assert civilian control over the armed forces, in whose independence they spied the seeds of fascism" (McVey, "Part I" 136).

It would be overly simplistic to characterize the KNIL faction as being aligned with the civilian national leadership, as there were numerous shifts in alliances throughout the period. The KNIL faction was primarily interested in developing a modern national military. Civilian leaders were mostly concerned with gaining control over the military, a goal that often aligned with the modernist KNIL faction's efforts to rationalize the structure of the military.

Generasi '45

The defining trait of the PETA officers in the post-war era was their continuing sense of revolutionary nationalism, a sentiment shared deeply and broadly across their cohort as to define them as the *Generasi '45*. Having risen through shared experiences and training, and having fought together as the military core of the national struggle for independence, this generation was

united by an outlook that they alone had earned their namesake, "Defenders of the Homeland." Most saw themselves not as "professional" soldiers in the Western military sense, but more as nationalist freedom fighters dedicated to upholding the ideals of the Revolution. The corollary to this worldview was a general suspicion of the civilians in the government, as well as distrust in the ideological strength of the succeeding generation that had not shared in its trials, and whom they would keep from the highest positions of power for nearly 40 years.[28] Their ideology of *perjuangan*, or struggle in unity with the populace, infuses official military rhetoric even today. The shared beliefs of this cohort were magnified by their overwhelming numbers among the TNI officer corps, which, as late as 1971, still made up three-fourths of the upper leadership echelons in the army (Nugroho, as cited in Lebra, "Significance" 225).[29]

The revolutionary instincts of *Generasi '45* came into conflict, however, with the realities of nation building and a new national army's needs for modern organization, equipment, and doctrine. This "rationalizing" of the military was championed by former-KNIL officers led by Generals A.H. Nasution and T.B. Simatupang, who together monopolized the position of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces from 1950-1966 (Haseman, "Security" 292). Under Nasution, the "operational units in all three services were reorganized in accordance with organizational tables borrowed from Western armed forces" (292). Their efforts to streamline and increase the efficiency of the military establishment were a continuation of initial efforts by Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta, who was also from a similar Dutch-educated, privileged background (D. Anderson 1-2). Many of the PETA officers, however, strongly resisted the changes, as the Western-oriented "professionalism" seemed at odds with the decentralized, "revolutionary spirit" of their guerrilla warfare outlook, as well as seeming to provide an advantage to the ex-KNIL

[28] The first non-PETA trained officer to become Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (after Simatupang and Nasution) was Mohammed Jusuf in 1978, followed by Benny Moerdani in 1983.

[29] Lebra cites Nugroho Notosusanto, "The Peta Army in Indonesia," mimeo., Djakarta, I97I, p. I2.

officers in the post-war government (Haseman, "Security" 292). This modernizing process also implied a separation of the military from its political role, an idea that was highly unpopular in a post-revolution military that considered participation in governance a right that it had earned.

The ideological conflict between the ex-PETA faction and the ex-KNIL can also be explained in part by differences in class. Former KNIL soldiers such as Nasution, who had attended the Royal Netherlands Military Academy before the Japanese invasion, generally came from a privileged background that enabled them to acquire an advanced Western education (McVey, "Part I" 133-34). The PETA trained officers, by contrast, represented a much broader swath of Indonesian society. While most of the officers did have a decent educational background when compared to the majority of their countrymen and had undergone some schooling,[30] they did not come from the "highly advantaged group of the university-educated which served in the top nationalist leadership" (133-34). Moreover, the foundational training received in the PETA and the subsequent revolutionary experience fostered a "profoundly anti-hierarchical impulse" at odds with the "image of rationalism, order, and expertise employed by the Dutch" (139). These men, for whom the revolution *was* their military education, and who had fought relying on the support of the rural population and valued *semangat* over science, hewing too close to a Western mold amounted to a re-entrenchment of colonialism and a betrayal of the spirit of the struggle (D. Anderson 2).

A critical area in which the difference between the ex-KNIL modernizers and the more reactionary PETA-trained officers surfaced is in the realm of military education, which was seen as a tool for ideological control of the military and inculcating the next generation's values (McVey, "Part II" 162-63). The centralization and modernization of the Indonesian military's

[30] According to the 1930 census, the literacy rate was 6.4 percent. A. Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution*, 1974. p. 2.

education system can almost entirely be attributed to General Ahmad Yani, who in 1956 was one of the early Indonesian officers to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (Evans 38).[31] Prior to Yani's campaign to reform the TNI's education system, military training was somewhat widely dispersed throughout the various military districts, frequently in the same facilities previously used for PETA training. For example, military academies were run in both Tanggerang (at the initial *Beppan* complex) and Jogjakarta, and cadet schools operated in multiple locations throughout Java and Sumatra at old PETA training sites. With few exceptions, they were run almost entirely by ex-PETA instructors who modeled the curriculum on their *shodancho* training (*Sejarah* II, 69-80). In Tanggerang, for example, the first director of the military academy was Mayor Daan Magot, who had been one of the first Indonesian officers trained there by the *Beppan* cadre, and was followed by Kemal Idris, who was also a graduate of the same class (70). Their staff of instructors consisted mostly (80 percent) of ex-PETA officers. The PETA influence on instruction was so total that, at the East Java Officer School (*Sekolah Kader Perwira Divisi III*) in Mojoagung, newly graduating second lieutenants were presented with samurai swords (71).

Upon Yani's return to Indonesia from Fort Leavenworth, he began to direct the reform of the military education system as the head of operations section for the General Staff (SUAD II), and later as the Army Chief of Staff (Evans 38). Several significant changes had occurred in the period between 1950-57 (particularly following the 1949 Hague Round Table Conference), with the establishment of several new military schools and increased access to foreign military training (*Sejarah* II, 41-64). However it was Yani, freshly returned from CGSC in 1957, who truly implemented the modernization of education by greatly increasing the number of TNI

[31] Yani, although he joined PETA, previously had served in the KNIL. Furthermore, his father worked for a Dutch general and Yani was afforded significant educational opportunities, aligning him more with the modernizer camp.

officers being sent to U.S. military schooling, and requiring them to serve at the corresponding TNI school as instructors for a year upon their return (Evans 38). Yani's impact is most clear in his restructuring of the two most important schools in the Indonesian military—the Military Academy, and the Indonesian Army Command and Staff School—which he largely revamped to duplicate their American counterparts (39-40).[32] In doing so, Yani centralized the education system and removed any authority for doctrine from the regional military training centers, which to this point had largely been responsible for producing their own curriculum. This effectively completed the erasure of *formal* PETA training from the Indonesian military system. Between 1954-65, over 2,800 Indonesian officers were trained in the U.S., including 53 officers who attended the U.S. CGSC (Evans 40, 44).[33]

According to McVey, the goal was nothing short of the ideological transformation and standardization of the TNI officer corps:

> The immediate ideological goal sought was, with gestures to the Indonesian revolutionary heritage, the Western ideal of the professional soldier: a nationalism deemed to be above partisan politics, a stress on hierarchy and discipline, and a sense of pride at being part of a vital and highly trained organization. By intensive indoctrination and the development of military skills, it was hoped, army men would adopt a more "modern" and professional way of looking at their role and would cease to be distracted by the anti-hierarchical ideals of the

[32] McVey states that the structure of the Akademi Militer was to be based on the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, and other influences for the higher-level courses included the British-based Indian and Pakistani staff colleges (Kedaulatan Rakjat, April 26, 1958, statement by General Nasution; cited in McVey, "Part II" 170). However, it seems to me that the *doctrinal* instruction that was adopted (aside from territorial doctrine) was mostly based on the U.S. Army doctrine, especially after 1967.

[33] The prestige and importance accorded to the U.S. CGSC during that period was probably equal to the role SESKOAD came to play in the TNI, and certainly the role that it plays today.

> revolution, by patron-client ties, and by regional and religious loyalties. ("Part I" 167)

This transformation was not without growing pains, however, and was never adopted wholesale by the largely ex-PETA officer corps, who by this time would have occupied most of the middle-to-upper echelon of leadership in the military. Given their revolutionary background, "the army's leaders found it hard to reconcile Western ideas of professionalism with a larger social role . . . and above all they possessed no sure vision of Indonesia's goals themselves. They continued to think of themselves and the army as revolutionary in spite of the military's increasingly conservative social role" (McVey, "Part II" 171). The ideological conflict and confusion within the military can be seen in Nasution's own formulation of the sufficiently vague "middle way," which advocated "neither accepting direct leadership of and responsibility for the country's course nor yet abandoning its claims to participate in political and economic life" (171). Yet, this understanding describes what the army should *not* be (neither dominated by civilians nor dominating politics), but not what the army *should* be, and it "did not provide the clarity of purpose essential to give meaning to the army's broader role" (171).

Despite the internal resistance to Westernizing the military, the large number of Indonesians officers trained in foreign schools, in addition to Yani's *fait accompli* of modernizing the TNI education system, begs the question of why these changes did not have a greater impact on the TNI.

One explanation for the considerable unease in adopting Western doctrines of warfare was that they seemed completely at odds with the very different experience of combat the former Indonesian guerrillas had fought. The concepts of large-scale maneuver warfare seemed ill suited for both the social and political conditions of the post-independence nation, the new

military's actual capabilities, and the strong institutional self-conception of the military as freedom fighters and defenders of the nation, not as an army for expeditionary combat.

A more important reason for the stagnation of new ideas has to do with the PETA generation itself, which would not have received the bulk of the foreign training, except for a few cases like Yani. They were too senior when the flood of opportunities became open in the late 1950s (Yani having been largely the one who opened the gates), and most did not have the linguistic or educational background to take advantage of it. As previously discussed, while the PETA officers were generally better educated than the average population in 1945, most were from modest backgrounds and largely from rural areas.

The *Generasi '45* officers also had entered into the service in war while they were in their teens and twenties, and were "roughly the same age from private to chief of staff" (McVey, "Part I" 154). While the TNI later passed a mandatory retirement age of 55, this made for an exceptionally long career, and entrenched these ex-PETA officers in power for decades, well into the late 1970s and early 1980s. With all of the major leadership posts held by the Generation of 1945, there were few chances for promotion to general. Hundreds of less senior *Generasi '45* officers choked the lieutenant colonel and colonel ranks. The Generation of 1945 was reluctant to pass along power and access to promotion because of a natural desire to retain power as well as a very real feeling that the New Generation officers were not ready to receive power (Haseman, "Dynamics" 888). With few prospects or expectations for an equally lucrative career outside of the military, most officers chose to remain in the service until forced to leave. This resulted in a stagnation of new blood and new ideas flowing up into positions able to affect change. For example, the first non-PETA trained officer to become Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (aside from Simatupang and Nasution) was Mohammed Jusuf in 1978,

followed by Benny Murdani in 1983. Perhaps more tellingly, the first Indonesian Military Academy (AKMIL) graduate to become Panglima ABRI, in 1993, was Edi Sudradjat, who had graduated from the first official AKMIL class in 1960. In other words, it was not until 1993 that an officer who had received a foundation of professional, modern military education not based on PETA training, became leader of the Indonesian Armed Forces. These men demonstrated a significantly different outlook from the PETA generation when they finally reached the pinnacles of military power and no longer had to be concerned about being sidelined for promotion. Even Benny Murdani, who had attended the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia as a young officer in the early 1960s, demonstrated a worldview very different from his PETA predecessors. While Murdani was very much a product of the TNI's institutional culture, he was a proponent of modernization. Upon taking command of the military, he immediately implemented a wide-ranging modernization program (*Sejarah V*, 1-23).

The Development of Guerrilla and Anti-Guerrilla Warfare Doctrine

The Indonesian army's developing doctrine was captured and codified in Nasution's *The Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (*Pokok-Pokok Gerilya*), first published in 1953. The book encapsulates what would become the basis of the Indonesian defense system, especially its concept of "total people's defense" (*pertahanan rakyat semesta*). Like other writers on guerrilla warfare, Nasution stresses the symbiotic relationship between the guerrilla and the people, the importance of ideology, and the fundamentally asymmetric nature of such warfare. In an echo of the PETA indoctrination's influence throughout the TNI, he repeatedly stresses the importance of "a strong inner spirit" and the "fighting spirit which is burning in the heart of the guerrilla" as

essential and enabling elements of victory that could overcome a materially superior but ideologically inferior foe.

Nasution demonstrates familiarity with some of the existing theories and guerrilla wars contemporary to his time, quoting Mao Tse-tung and T.E. Lawrence. However, he adapts general guerrilla warfare principles to Indonesia's unique strategic situation, and lays out a doctrine that is specific to the country's moment in history. Elucidated by actual command directives that were sent to TKR units in the field from 1948-1949, the book represents a kind of historical record of how the Indonesian army actually fought.

The key concept of "total people's defense" involved the complete integration of military and civilian components into a unified resistance, in which "the military was the senior partner on the team" (Notosusanto, *Struggle* 126). In Nasution's construction, a military government would exist in parallel with the existing civilian structure extending down to the village level, forming a military territorial command system. One of the key tasks of the military district commands was the recruitment and training of local village auxiliary units that he designates as *Pasukan Gerilya Desa* (or *Pager Desa* in condensed form; Nasution, *Fundamentals* 170-172). The formation of local militia units was a natural outgrowth of the PETA experience in which, aside from having been trained as a militia themselves, PETA-trained cadre were expected to recruit and train battalions from the local population in their home areas. During the war for independence, there would have been a rather narrow distinction between *pager desa* volunteers and "official" guerrilla fighters in the TKR. However, the formation of local militia groups would become a mainstay of Indonesian military operations. It is a practice that appears in every named conflict in the TNI's history, and, during the New Order, became a tool of internal security.

A unique aspect of Nasution's *Fundamentals* is the second section, in which he offers an accurate assessment of Indonesia's strategic security situation in 1953, and pragmatically lays out the kind of army needed for the foreseeable future. Of note, Nasution identifies Indonesia as a vulnerable, fledgling state, and stresses the necessity of maintaining guerrilla warfare as the central element of Indonesian defense strategy for the coming decades. This strategy called for a light infantry-focused force structure, organized territorially. Nasution also correctly identifies anti-guerrilla operations as the primary mission for Indonesia's army in the post-independence period. For Nasution, such operations are simply a logical extension of guerrilla warfare: "The guerrilla fighter must be separated from the people. The guerrilla must be fought with his own tactics. This is the essence of anti-guerrilla strategy" (64).

It is in describing these tactics, however, that we see the seeds of the TNI's institutional culture. While recognizing many of the typical counterinsurgency tenets found in other works, such as knowledge of the people and land, tactful treatment of both civilians and enemy, the all-encompassing political and social nature of such wars, Nasution is extremely frank in describing the kind of violence that guerrilla warfare entails. He states that the guerrilla force must be prepared for fact that the occupying force will undertake "Collective punishment, extensive torturing, even the elimination of whole kampongs and the machine-gunning of the people on a mass basis" (35). In retribution, the guerrilla army must be prepared "to launch even harsher measures against the enemy" (35).

The extreme nature of violence in guerrilla warfare is a theme repeated throughout the book, and if it can be taken as a reflection of actual experience, Nasution's description of warfare reveals something of what was imprinted on the TNI's collective psyche during these years. While never directly advocating behavior such as torture, illegal killing, or the targeting of

civilians, Nasution matter-of-factly discusses such brutal excesses as a given condition in guerrilla warfare:

> Experiences in guerilla war have shown that retaliatory measures from both sides become increasingly cruel. The spirit of revenge drowns out sound reasoning and the sense of fair play. The anti-guerilla units retaliate against the people collectively because they aid or hide the guerilla fighters. The anti-guerilla units torture the members and relatives of guerilla troops to make them fearful; sometimes whole villages are burned to the ground. The guerilla fighters take revenge by being even more inhuman; every collaborator and every enemy soldier who falls in their hands is tortured just as mercilessly. Be that as it may, it must be remembered that guerilla activities are not the final aim; they are merely an effort to defend an ideology, to defend freedom, the principles of human rights and the holy rights of a nation, which determine the future of generations to come. (50)

Nasution, then, seems to regard this kind of violence not with condemnation, but rather in an instrumental way, as an unfortunate but necessary means to freedom: "A nation is fortunate if it has sufficient military power . . . to fight a regular war. However, if that is not possible . . . the nation must resort to guerrilla warfare . . . with all of the necessary consequences" (50). In this kind of war, "Burning, sabotage, killing and kidnapping at the expense of the enemy have a heroic value" (50). In fact, Nasution lists "execute scorched earth policy" among the specified duties of guerrilla units in military sub-district commands (170). Although he never defines exactly what he means by "scorched earth," we may infer that it entails the absolute destruction of the enemy by every means possible.

Although Nasution was an ex-KNIL officer and had not been a member of PETA, his writings about guerrilla warfare reflect the general experience and outlook of the Indonesian revolutionary army, which was led at the *tactical* level mostly by ex-PETA officers. Nugroho Notosusanto also notes that Nasution was not the only one with such ideas, but the one best equipped to codify and express them (*Struggle* 116). And while it may stretch the imagination to say that the lessons in the book were directly imparted by the Japanese, they would certainly have resonated with ex-PETA soldiers in the TNI, and likely with their former Japanese mentors as well, whose own brutal experiences in counter-guerrilla warfare in northern China Nasution references.

The two decades following the formation of the Indonesian military offered a continuous opportunity to put these ideas into practice against a variety of rebellions and separatist movements. From the 1948 Communist uprising in Madiun, the Permesta rebellion in Sulawesi (1958-1961), and the Darul Islam movement (1949-1962) among others, the TNI gained considerable experience in anti-guerrilla warfare which ingrained certain lessons that became essential elements of TNI organizational culture. While there is a dearth of historical information on the TNI's early counterinsurgency operations, particularly regarding the kinds of violence employed, a central theme that emerges is the conflicting impulses within the post-revolution army, which had been conditioned to the unbridled and total violence of warfare as guerrillas but were now acting as an anti-guerrilla force. This tension is inherent in Nasution's own work, where, alongside and in contrast to the "scorched earth" truths previously noted, he insists on the necessity of restraint in anti-guerrilla operations:

> To ensure the right attitude and good behaviour of an occupation army and an anti-guerilla army is a primary condition for conquering the guerillas. Desires

> must be bridled, the spirit of revenge must be controlled and cruelty must be avoided. Collective arrests, collective punishment, and the burning of civilian houses because these civilians assisted or hid guerilla fighters become the most potent weapons to serve the guerilla cause since it makes them appear even more as the people's protectors or avengers against tyranny and injustice. On the other hand, the anti-guerilla members must work for true justice and virtue. They must practice justice in action, maintaining principles of humanity, and everything that creates and increases the feeling of appreciation and respect of the people. (*Fundamentals* 56)

Nasution also states the paramount importance of political, social, and economic factors in an overall plan. Yet, he acknowledges the TNI's own behavior was focused mainly on offensive actions:

> But the strange thing was that after 1950 we assumed, whether consciously or unconsciously, the mistakes of the former Dutch army . . . We did not draft one systematic plan of operation in all fields, but we limited ourselves to military operations only. In many ways we did not pay enough attention to the factor of the people. Many of our measures resulted in increasing our enemies (66).

Despite its struggle in adapting to this role reversal, the TNI was successful in suppressing these rebellions through military force. A key component of that success was its use of local militias, which became a standard practice. Based in PETA training and building on its application during the independence struggle, mobilization of civilian forces to augment the military became a part of the TNI's doctrine. However, one particularly successful variation of

militia mobilization, first used in the campaign against the Darul Islam, was called *pagar betis*, or "fence of legs." The tactic involved conscripting civilians from villages around an enemy guerrilla base, and forming them into an encircling and tightening cordon to trap the guerrillas. The guerrillas "either had to stay and be captured, or break out, potentially killing local villagers" (Kilcullen 50). The use of *pagar betis* aided in the capture of the key Darul Islam leaders, leading to the collapse of the movement. The success of the approach cemented its use as a key TNI tactic, and was used again later in much more devastating form in the 1965-66 killings, and again in East Timor (Robinson, "People's War" 291).

The New Order

The advent of the New Order, in a sense, was both a culmination and resolution to many of the conflicting themes that marked the post-independence period. The problems of political strife in the government, the proper role of the military in the nation, and the conflicted relationship between the military and civilians were swept aside by the October 1, 1965 coup and the subsequent national massacres, in which an estimated 500,000 to as many as three million Indonesians were killed.[34] Additionally, in "direct connection with the coup, approximately 15,000 soldiers ranking from privates to generals were arrested" or killed during the 1965-67 period (Utrecht 163).

The terrible violence of the 1965-66 killings, while having multiple and complex underlying causes,[35] can be seen as the climax of the pattern of "scorched earth" practices combined with the mobilization of civilian militias. While the extent of the army's involvement

[34] For discussion of the various estimates, see Robert Cribb, "Unresolved Problems of the 1965-66 Killings," p.557-59.

[35] For example, see Geoffrey Robinson, *Dark Side of Paradise*, and Robert Cribb, "Unresolved Problems of the 1965-66 Killings."

is a matter of some debate, the critical role of the military in inciting and enabling the killings is well established (Cribb, "Unresolved Problems" 551-53; Crouch 148-55). For example, the TNI's Para-commando Regiment (RPKAD)[36], led by Sarwo Edhie Wibowo (a PETA classmate of Yani), attacked suspected Communist villages throughout Central and East Java, often organizing and equipping local militias to carry out the killings (Thaler 207; Crouch 149-51). RPKAD, which had also played a key role in the Darul Islam campaign, would play a similar leading role in the East Timor campaign in the form of its successor unit, Kopassandha.

Thaler writes, "This pattern manifested itself across all the regions of the slaughter: civilians, usually part of larger organizations, carried out the majority of the killings, but they had support, weapons, and training from the military, which still directly participated in many of the killings" (Thaler 208). The nature of the violence harkened back to the chaos of the revolutionary period, and involved the "common methods" of "beating, throat cutting, and decapitation," in addition to torture, rape, and sexual mutilation (208-9). Many of these were "adaptations of methods learned under Japanese rule" (Robinson, "People's War" 291). The bloody years of revolution had ingrained a mode of violence that repeated and reinforced itself, and these "habits and norms of extreme brutality that spread and became institutionalized . . . shaped military and militia behavior" (314).

The New Order also permanently entrenched the PETA generation's ideas of the military's role in the Indonesian nation as both a revolutionary guerrilla force and a social-political force, involving the military in every facet of the country's political, economic, and social life. In 1962, the guerrilla warfare doctrine of territorial defense was formalized as the TNI's official doctrine, recreating "the territorial apparatus of the military running parallel to the government apparatus as had existed during the guerilla war from 1948 to 1949" (Singh, *Dual*

[36] The RPKAD is the predecessor to the Special Forces (Kopassandha, later called Kopassus).

79-81). This was followed in 1966 by the promulgation of a new doctrine called *Tri Ubaya Sakti*[37], which established the basis for the military's "comprehensive involvement in non-military activities," (87-90). It was accompanied by a strategic doctrine of "Total People's Defense System" (Sishankamrata—*Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta*), which adopted Nasution's view that the nation could not defend itself against an invading force by conventional means, and would have to rely on guerrilla warfare, in which the populace would play a significant role. The combination of these three doctrines formed the rationale for the New Order military's pervasive and total presence in Indonesian society. In practice, since the true threats to the government were internal, these served as a basis for the reach of the New Order's apparatus of control and violence down to the village level.

[37] Originally called *Tri Ubaya Cakti* in its original formulation in the First Army Seminar of April 1965. It was renamed *Tri Ubaya Sakti* in the Second Army Seminar of August 1966 to reflect the removal of "Sukarnoisms" from the doctrine. The translation of the term, meaning "three sacred efforts," is the same in either spelling. MacFarling 1996, 89.

CHAPTER 3

THE TNI'S INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

By 1975, the year that Indonesia invaded East Timor and began its notorious counter-insurgency campaign, the TNI looked outwardly like a modern military. Under Suharto, the TNI's organization had been increasingly centralized and modernized, its personnel and promotion system had been rationalized, and its official tactical battle doctrines[38] were largely derived from the U.S. and Australia along with much of its equipment.[39] The number of ex-PETA officers and soldiers in the services was limited to a handful, mostly at the upper echelons and largely removed from operational command and the daily duties of the military. Most of the officers from the PETA generation had retired or were nearing retirement, and there was a growing disconnect between the PETA generation and its more professional, educated successor generation.

But despite these outward transformations, the underlying culture of the TNI remained largely the same. Typically, only failures in wars or extreme changes in technology cause militaries to change their institutional cultures, in spite of apparent developments in doctrine.[40] As one military scholar notes, "If the way an army fights is a function of its 'mindset' more than the contents of its formal doctrine manuals, then so too does that mindset change not simply in

[38] I mean here the maneuver-level unit tactics of actual fighting, not the national strategic doctrine.

[39] Need citations for: actual tactical doctrine from ca. 1965-75; U.S. weapons sales to Indonesia compared to other sources.

[40] See also Kilcullen, "Globalization and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Doctrine": "Indeed, it may be that operational success raises barriers to future adaptation: most successful reorganisations of military forces and their tactics have been responses to failure and defeat, not success. For example, Prussian reforms after defeat by Napoleon, US reorganisation and professionalisation after Vietnam, German tactical innovation on the Western Front in 1918 and Soviet resurgence after 1941 all seem to indicate that militaries evolve through response to the shock of defeat" (60).

response to what is written into the doctrine manuals, but in response to vivid experience . . . What experiences form an army's real culture? Unfortunately for those who would try to reform an army between wars, the historical record suggests that it is wartime experience rather than peacetime innovation that changes an army's corporate culture" (Johnston 35-36).

In the case of Indonesia, every experience of combat preceding the invasion of East Timor had been a successful suppression of an internal and regionalized conflict—the only exceptions being the limited, low-intensity *Konfrontasi* campaign, and operations in Papua against the Dutch. In every case, these served to reinforce the existing attitudes and culture within the TNI, and re-inculcate them in the new generation. The 1965-66 killings, which occurred only nine years before East Timor, can be seen as the culminating pre-Timor expression of the TNI's use of force. The guerrilla warfare mindset of the military originating from PETA was repeatedly applied against Indonesians. Simultaneously, the military was adopting U.S. military doctrine and equipment in ever-greater numbers.[41] But the recurring collective experiences of the TNI in its counter-insurgency operations shaped the military's culture far more than the influx of American guns and manuals ever could. Thus, despite the aging demographic of the PETA generation, the swelling of post-PETA generation officers in the ranks, and an evolving force structure, the institutional culture of *Generasi '45* was still the dominant force in the military. Writing in 1975, Nugroho Notosusanto stated that, "at the present time, the generation of 1945 are still very much in control, especially in the Army" (*Struggle* 135).

[41] Ken Conboy relates Benny Murdani's account of meeting with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft during Nixon and Kissinger's visit prior to the invasion of East Timor. In response to Scowcroft's question "Will you be using U.S. weapons?" Murdani replied, "Our military is largely built around U.S. weapons," and "We have no choice" (242).

Guerilla Warfare and the TNI's "Psyche"[42]

The core of the TNI's organizational culture derives from its guerrilla warfare mentality, and the corollary self-perception of the TNI soldier as first and foremost a revolutionary. As Nugroho Notosusanto states, "it is the deliberate policy of the Armed Forces leadership up till the present time, not to become a professional armed forces in the western sense of the term. The professed ideal is that of a 'people's army, national army and freedom-fighters' army'" (*Struggle* 85).

The most visible outward manifestation of the guerrilla warfare mentality is the territorial command structure descended from the PETA battalions. The Japanese restricted contact between PETA units in order to prevent them from developing any kind of unity, and also encouraged and laid the framework for the territorialism of the battalions. Despite the fact that the command structure of the military was greatly centralized under Suharto, autonomy has always been built into the nature of the territorial system. While regional commanders could no longer refuse orders from the center, as had happened to varying degrees up until the New Order, a KODAM (*Komando Daerah Militer*; a regional military command) commander still had considerable independence. Also, the culture of *bapak*-ism remained a strong theme in informal military relationships, and the "warlord-ism" of the early territorial commands later enabled institutional activities such as military businesses.

The character of the territorial command system may seem like a historical inevitability, given Indonesia's archipelagic nature and defensive-oriented doctrine. However, if we look at the attitudes of the few fully KNIL-trained officers in the early TNI, we can see how differently the TNI might have turned out if they had been the dominant force. The ex-KNIL officers'

[42] The phrasing borrows from the title of McElhatton's article, "Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian Strategic Psyche."

outlook had been shaped by the bureaucratic rationale of the colonial army, where rank was more important than ability, discipline more important than courage, and efficiency more important than charisma. In contrast to the PETA officers, who were "explicitly organized on a regional basis," the KNIL officers had already been part of a national institution that transcended local identity (Anderson, *Java* 237). Almost none commanded any particular loyalty from men in their hometowns, and few KNIL-trained officers were able to successfully command a territorial unit during the revolution (235, 237, 240-41). It is not hard to imagine that if Urip and the cohort of ex-KNIL officers had been able to shape the TNI to a greater extent, it would have looked much more like a centralized, modern Western army.

The TNI's self-conception is enshrined in its code of conduct, known as the *Sapta Marga*, or seven oaths:

1. We are citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia based on the Pancasila.
2. We are Indonesian patriots, bearers and defenders of the state ideology, who are responsible and know of no surrender.
3. We are Indonesian knights, who are devoted to the One God, and who defend honesty, truth and justice.
4. We are soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces, guardians of the Indonesian state and nation.
5. We, soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces uphold discipline, are obedient and observant to our leadership, and uphold the soldiers' attitude and oath.
6. We, soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces set ourselves to perform our task with courage, and are always ready to devote ourselves to the state and nation.
7. We, soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces are loyal and keep our word and the Soldiers' Oath.

Note that before defining the TNI member as a soldier, he is first defined as a patriot and a "knight" (*ksatria*), a term rich with cultural connotations. The *ksatria* tradition and its

implications for the PETA generation soldiers has been taken up more fully elsewhere,[43] but in short, it refers to the traditional Javanese societal divisions along the Hindu class lines of *Brahmins*, *Kshatriyas*, *Sudras*, and *Vaishyas*. The *Kshatriya* caste was the class of warriors and politicians who were responsible for administration and rule of the state. The philosophy is reflected in oaths two and four, which describes the soldier's role as a keeper and defender of the nation's ideology, as well as his obligation to serve as the nation's guardian. Many militaries have similar oaths to defend country and ideals, but the difference is that the *Sapta Marga* implies that the understanding of the true "soul" of the nation rests with the military, a responsibility that lends itself to a role of particular power. The military, then, is not a servant of the people, and not subordinate to a government, but rather a caretaker who has the duty to ensure that the nation is not threatened by deviation from *Pancasila* and the "state ideology."[44]

This element of superior purpose traces back to the sense of eliteness imbued in the PETA units. While there were numerous other pro-independence forces, none had the training and resultant credibility of being a truly indigenous military for the Indonesian nation. They were indoctrinated to consider themselves as the heroic, self-sacrificing vanguard of the struggle for Indonesian independence. They were the true leaders of the revolution.

The sense of being from, yet superior to, a civilian populace became an ingrained organizational attitude that deepened over time. During the revolution, when Nasution's nascent guerrilla warfare doctrine was being put into practice in the field, TKR units imbedded themselves down to the village level, in a partnership of military and civilian authority. But as Nugroho Notosusanto points out, it was always the military that was "the senior partner on the

[43] For example see Benedict Anderson, *Java*; Ruth McVey, "Transformation" part I; Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965*; Sundhaussen, *Road to Power*, 270

[44] Compare, for example, to the U.S. Army's soldier's oath, in which one swears to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States," and to "obey the orders of the President...and the orders of the officers appointed over me."

team" (*Struggle* 126). This approach to territorial guerrilla warfare, first codified in Nasution's *Principles* and later made official national doctrine in *Sistem Pertahanan Semesta* (Total People's Defense System), created a permanent organizational structure that reflected this belief. Thus, despite the frequent rhetoric about *kemanunggalan TNI dengan rakyat* (the military's unity with the people), the relationship was more akin to the old *bapak-anak buah* pattern. The gap between stated ideals and underlying behaviors was ironically deepened in the post-PETA generation. Whereas most PETA officers had indeed come from the *desa*, the newer generation of officers represented a highly selective elite more distant from Indonesian society at large.[45] During the New Order's drive for national modernization and development this relationship became increasingly fixed, as the rapidly modernizing and comparatively well-off military carried out its "duty" to bring up the standard of living of the general populace. In practice, however, "the army elite itself became a neo-feudal class" (Utrecht 178-81).

The constant struggle between civilian elites and military leaders throughout the revolution and post-independence period further ingrained the sense of military superiority. The "betrayal" of the *merdeka atau mati* (freedom or death) commitment of the *pemuda* struggle by the civilian elites, who had capitulated and negotiated with the Dutch enemy during the revolutionary struggle, became mythologized in TNI history as the original sin that justified the military's premier role in "safeguarding" the nation. Furthermore, civilian-led, parliamentary style of government was widely seen as a failure in the eyes of PETA generation military leaders, who were suspicious of the factionalism and partisanship produced in the new democratic process. This destructive internal discord also infected the military, and was at odds

[45] See Sundhaussen, *The Military in Indonesia,* p. 62. He cites that in 1974, only 267 new cadets were selected for all four service branches, out of a pool of more than 20,000 candidates. See also MacGregor 137 for a personal observation of the interaction of new generation of TNI cadets with the local community.

with the "total unity" required for a successful national struggle that for many had not ended. Among the military, these pathologies justified the TNI's active role in governance.

The similarities in the TNI's attitude toward the government and civilians with the pre-World War II Imperial Japanese Army are striking. While the link is not directly causal, it is probable that the deep impression left on PETA recruits by their Japanese mentors would have extended beyond official instruction, and that the Japanese civil-military model would have been informally learned through example. Many authors, such as Benedict Anderson, have noted this connection, and anecdotal evidence suggests its validity:

> The Peta had been nurtured in the Japanese tradition, and by that tradition, at least in the latter days of the Empire, the effective head of the army, the chief of staff, was chosen by consultations among the senior officers from which civilians were rigidly excluded. Moreover, the chief of staff was not subordinated to the Japanese cabinet but reported directly to the Emperor. From the start Sudirman made every effort to live up to this tradition. He regarded himself as coequal to the cabinet leaders, not subordinate to them, and in this interpretation of his role received strong support from within the army. In effect, Sudirman strengthened his personal position within the military by emphasizing the special position of the army as a whole within the government and the revolutionary movement. (*Java* 244)

The decades of post-independence internal conflict and factionalism, as well as the constant struggle against regional rebellions, fostered something of an obsessive institutional fear of disunity, weakness, and disintegration. This was understandable given the circumstances. But this institutional insecurity, when combined with the deepening TNI attitudes towards its

relationship with the populace, resulted in an institutional culture in which civilians needed to be controlled rather than served.

It should be remembered, too, that many of the methods of internal state control through special police and intelligence also have their roots in the PETA period. Prior to the end of World War II, the Japanese Army had begun to develop special intelligence units under the umbrella of PETA. Some PETA officers received significant intelligence training, such as Zukifli Lubis, Indonesia's first spy chief and later Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, who spent several months in Singapore under direct mentorship from Japanese intelligence officers (Conboy, *Intel* 15-16). Many Indonesian officers also served as auxiliaries to the Japanese special police, the *Kempetai*, who had a reputation for brutal coercive methods.

The TNI's relationship with the civilian populace also supported one other recurring organizational norm: the use of civilians as auxiliaries in the use of force, either as coerced help (as in *pagar betis*), or recruited as militias or youth gangs. As discussed in the previous chapter, the use of civilian militias was the natural outgrowth of the PETA-trained army's experiences during the revolution. The successful use of conscripted local civilians in suppressing rebellions strengthened this inclination. During the 1965-66 purges and throughout the New Order, however, the use of civilians to "outsource" violence took on a different character, and became increasingly a means of population control through coercion and terror (Anderson, *Violence* 15-18).

The Primacy of Semangat

The importance of *semangat* as the essential characteristic for military success is the most evident organizational value that can directly be attributed to the PETA experience. Ben

Anderson, among others, has noted the resonance of *semangat* and Japanese warrior culture with existing Javanese cultural beliefs and the *ksatria* tradition:

> At the same time, the impact of the Japanese style was powerfully enhanced by the familiar traditional resonances it evoked. The great importance attached by the Japanese military to spiritual strength has already been noted. Official spokesmen never tired of stressing its superiority over technological skills and material prosperity. In countless lectures and speeches they insisted that victory in the war and independence for Indonesia depended on the semangat (spiritual power) and discipline of the Indonesian people themselves. The similarity between these ideas and traditional Javanese conceptions of power as cosmic energy, to be concentrated and accumulated by ascetic purity and spiritual discipline, was quite apparent. The value attached to semangat also implied a contempt for the rationalist calculus of marginal advantage, and conversely, a confirmation of the traditional importance ascribed to sudden inspiration (ilham). The new prestige of the military in the occupation order could also be seen as a kind of restoration. Under the Dutch the native military had been merely the abject and mercenary appendages of colonial power. But in the collective memory of precolonial greatness, constantly renewed by the wajang shadow-plays, the warrior-knight, selfless and valiant, was remembered as the guarantor of society's happiness and prosperity. The fact that these ancient ideas seemed to be reflected in the state doctrines of the Japanese Empire can only have reinforced the sense of their inherent truth. (*Java* 32-33)

Anderson notes the resonance of Japanese spiritual values in order to illustrate the awakening of a latent Indonesian revolutionary psyche. But for the PETA soldiers in particular, the belief in *semangat* did not only accord with cultural values, but was naturally an indispensible characteristic in facing the realities of guerrilla warfare, with its inherent asymmetry of physical resources. *Semangat* was as much a tool and weapon as a rifle, and the lack of material power could be balanced by superior spiritual power.[46] Synonymous with "revolutionary spirit," in his *Principles of Guerrilla Warfare*, Nasution frequently mentions the importance of cultivating and maintaining *semangat* as the essential condition for victory in guerrilla warfare.

But the reliance on *semangat* to overcome material disadvantages had unexpected consequences for the organizational culture of the TNI, just as it had for the IJA. The devotion to *semangat* sometimes led to a disdain or even rejection of logic, reason, analysis, and technology as elements of Western imperialism. During the revolution, this put the PETA generation at odds with Western-educated, modernist civilian elites, who maintained a more rationalist attitude towards resolving the war. One such official declared that, "Japanese flattery has exaggerated the importance of semangat beyond all limits, and has derided and aroused hatred for *akal* [reason], as though akal were simply a Western invention,"[47] and that "the semangat people, who advocated sending pemuda armed with bamboo spears against Allied troops with machine guns, were stupid, if not criminal"[48] (310-311).

[46] This characteristic persists in the modern TNI, although in official planning *semangat* is replaced by the word *moril* (morale). Morale is often the decisive factor in war-gaming exercises, in which the enemy is assessed to be technologically and numerically superior, but expected to lose due to weak *moril* and the TNI's always-superior *semangat*. Author's personal observation at SESKOAD, 2010.

[47] Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, quoted in Anderson, *Java*, p. 310 (the quote appears in footnote 1 of Chapter 14).

[48] The second quote is Anderson's paraphrasing of Sjafrudin's remarks.

During the post-independence period, too, the conflict between *semangat* and *akal* played out in the push to modernize the TNI, as a significant element of ex-PETA members rejected "the cold rules of a modern military training advocated by Nasution, Simpatupang" and others (Utrecht 43). There were other factors in this resistance, such as the loss of livelihood for many of the under-educated and lesser-qualified freedom fighters who had fought in the "spirit of the 1945 Revolution." But the conflict went to the heart of what many of the PETA generation viewed as the foremost characteristic of an Indonesian soldier. Namely, that an Indonesian soldier should be judged on the ardor of his revolutionary spirit, his *semangat*, and not his class, education level, or even professional knowledge. In the PETA generation's mythology, *semangat* had won the war.

Modernization eventually won out in the formal structure of the military, but the underlying adherence to *semangat* never disappeared, and often served as a catchall excuse for the failure to fully grasp the lessons and technologies of a modern military.[49] Despite the fact that by 1965, nearly 2,800 officers had undertaken training in the U.S., and the Indonesian military had adopted much of U.S. and Western training models and programs for its own schools, the absorption of that training into the body of TNI remained uneven (Evans 40, 44).[50] Unlike other fields such as economics, where a small group of technocratic elite can greatly shape the direction and development of a nation[51], the absorption of military education in an army is realized only through widespread and repetitive application in either training or operations. In other words, a military is what it practices and does, which not necessarily the same as what is written in its manuals. And for the greater part of the TNI in its early decades

[49] The same problem had plagued the IJA, as noted earlier, when the overemphasis on *seishin* led to neglect of some critical aspects of military science.

[50] I am using figures from Evans' article; however, he comes to a different conclusion regarding the impact of the training.

[51] For example, the "Berkeley Mafia" during the New Order.

(despite the significant outward changes in the military education system and structure) there was an enormous gap between what was taught and what was practiced. Although the TNI adopted many of the tactical doctrines from the U.S., the TNI was not sufficiently structured to fight as a conventional force, nor were the new doctrines aligned with its actual experiences in counter-guerrilla warfare.[52] Furthermore, as one TNI general pointed out, it was nearly impossible to teach a soldier how to operate a tank when he had never even used a telephone (Lowry 90).[53] The lessons that were learned most, then, were the same ones that the Japanese had instilled: hard physical training, rote discipline, basic small-unit tactics, and above all, the importance of *semangat*.

Searching for the Roots of a "Culture of Violence"

A central paradox of the TNI is the difference between its stated core value of "oneness with the population," and its historical use of extreme violence against its own citizens (however nominal or contentious their status as "citizen" may be, as in the case of East Timor). In accounting for the violence, much of the criticism of the New Order has been leveled at its official policies of violent internal repression and disappearances, such as in the case of the *Petrus* killings. Human rights and other groups claim that these draconian policies were intentionally carried out on a genocidal scale in East Timor, but it is doubtful that killing as much as one-third of the Timorese population was any directed official policy.[54]

[52] A prime difference being that U.S. doctrine since the Civil War has been based on the idea of an expeditionary war, not an internal conflict.

[53] Lowry is citing Major General T.B. Silalahi from "Ancaman, Postur ABRI dan Teknologi," *Karya Vira Jati,* No. 76-77, 1992. p. 164

[54] See Geoffrey Robinson, *If you leave us here we will die*, 2012; and Robert Cribb, "From total people's defence to massacre: Explaining Indonesian military violence in East Timor," in Colombijn and Lindbld (eds.), *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*, 2002.

Other scholars have searched deeper for the roots of this "culture of violence." There are those, including some Indonesians, who cite ancient pre-colonial cultural predispositions, claiming that explosions of extreme violence were "part of an Indonesian cultural pattern of 'running amok'" (Robinson, *Genocide* 12).[55] Others claim that communal violence was a byproduct of the brutal state suppression during the Dutch colonial period, or the Japanese occupation. As Benedict Anderson points out in the introduction to *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*, a 70-year-old Indonesian woman would have directly experienced the police state Dutch colonial rule; Japanese occupation; national revolutionary war; repeated internecine violence based on race, class or religion; numerous rebellions and uprisings; the 1965-66 killings; state violence in the New Order; the resurgence of religious and separatist violence in Sulawesi, Moluccas, Papua, and Aceh; and the widespread rioting in 1998 (9-10). Geoffrey Robinson, writes that:

> past violence can significantly increase the likelihood of future violence. That is partly because the experience or memory of violence can help to create or deepen a sense of group identity and enmity. In part too it is because history, including memories of past violence, provides the essential raw material for political leaders seeking to mobilize populations to take part in or at least acquiesce to mass violence. Crucially, historical experience and memory also provide the organizational and behavioral models as well as the rhetorical tool kit that are the foundation of future violence, and shape its character. (13)

In searching for the causes of the TNI's culture of violence, however, I want to distinguish between the violence conducted by civilians at large and that directed and conducted

[55] Robinson cites the comments of Major General Zacky Anwar to journalists in 2000, regarding the post-ballot violence in East Timor.

by the TNI (while recognizing that the two are frequently related). Certainly, TNI soldiers as members of the Indonesian society would be affected by the same factors as other citizens. However, lumping together both kinds of violence obscures a specific recurring motif in the TNI's history. Following in the model of Geoffrey Robinson and Robert Cribb, I propose that the nature and level of violence that resulted in the large-scale deaths in East Timor was an expression of the TNI's military organizational culture, which had developed since its origins in PETA. More specifically, I argue that the structural foundation of PETA training and guerrilla warfare mentality instilled certain attitudes and expressions of violence that were reinforced through the successive decades of conflict.

Of course, all militaries are structures for the organization and control of violence. Yet there is a clear difference between a conventional and a guerrilla army, and an even greater difference with an army that subscribes to guerrilla warfare as a core national doctrine. Whereas nearly all conventional armies bind themselves to international conventions, laws of warfare, and international norms for acceptable conduct in war, guerrilla warfare is intrinsically outside the bounds of "civilized" combat and makes use of methods illegal under conventional norms.[56] As Nasution wrote regarding the "scorched earth" policy of guerrilla warfare, "burning, sabotage, killing and kidnapping at the expense of the enemy have a heroic value" (*Fundamentals* 50). The TNI's culture, being rooted in a guerrilla warfare identity, leads to *organized but unbounded violence*.

[56] Although Indonesia signed on as a party to the 1949 Geneva Convention (in 1958), this has had no effect on its underlying military culture derived from its roots as a guerrilla force. Additionally, the convention applies to *international* conflicts, which in Indonesia's case would only apply to its *konfrontasi* with Malaysia, the conflict over Papua with the Dutch, and East Timor in the eyes of the international community. Interestingly, Indonesia has not yet signed on to the three amendment protocols. Protocol I (1977) specifically outlaws indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations, or their sources of food, water, and survival, and clarifies the status of guerrilla forces.

The brutal methods of the TNI are not, of course, limited to Indonesia, and many Western nations went through periods using the same kinds of tactics. The British, French, and German armies all used "scorched earth" tactics in counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare. In Indonesia, however, like Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan, recurring experiences reinforced that "the dynamic toward extremes was (unintentionally) built into the system" (Hull 165).

Nearly all of the TNI's combat experiences were against guerrillas, often mixed into the civilian population. Under such circumstances, in applying the scorched earth methods of the independence struggle, it was inevitable that suppression meant that civilians were frequently killed due to real or presumed association with the enemy. The PETA generation's own values held that soldiers were freedom fighters and members of the Indonesian populace first. Thus, placed in the reverse role, the TNI fought guerrillas as guerrillas, fulfilling Nasution's axiom that "the guerrilla must be fought with his own tactics." The next chapter illustrates this in the case of East Timor.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TNI IN EAST TIMOR

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 constituted the single largest and most intensive military campaign in the nation's history, and the greatest test of its capability to function as a modern armed forces. Preceded by months of propaganda operations, psychological warfare, unconventional warfare using Timorese militias, and low-level skirmishes, Indonesia ultimately invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975, beginning what would become a 24-year long occupation and ultimately unsuccessful attempt at integration.

The TNI's[57] actions in East Timor offer a unique case study of the effects of its military culture. While Indonesia had continuously engaged in anti-separatist and anti-guerrilla warfare throughout its post-independence history to that time, the East Timor campaign was the TNI's first and only large-scale, full-spectrum, total military effort. This means that, for the first time, the TNI was functioning as a conventional military force. In many ways, it succeeded in doing so. And yet, despite the effort to apply modern military technology and tactics, the behavior of the TNI often belied its projected image, and indeed its self-perception, as an army that had outgrown its guerrilla roots. The timing of the invasion, too, is useful from a generational standpoint: the early years of the East Timor campaign marked the career end of the last PETA generation military officers still in power, and the early operations were all directed by *Generasi '45* officers.

[57] During the New Order, the Indonesian military's name was changed to *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (ABRI), and included the police forces as a part of the armed forces. For simplicity, I have maintained the usage of the name TNI (although not the official name during this period) to indicate my focus on the military alone. Additionally, my references to TNI should be understood in most cases as applying to the ground forces component, which is the army and to a lesser degree, the Marines.

Histories of the war in East Timor from the TNI's perspective tend to be hagiographic and focus on technical details of the conflict, emphasizing a professional military's adaptive attempts to defeat a stubborn resistance, and the ideological goal of fighting insecurity and instability instigated by Communist separatists. Yet these histories ignore the comprehensive evidence that points to a brutal occupation in which as much as one-third of the Timorese population died, and was consistently marked by terrible human rights abuses. While a full accounting of events is complicated by the fact that the internal TNI records regarding East Timor have remained closely guarded, and many operations seem to have been conducted without formal written orders,[58] the sum of all the testimonies to Indonesian brutality, destruction, torture, and unlawful killing is too overwhelming to be dismissed. Even after the Indonesian government opened up East Timor to foreign observers and journalists beginning in 1989, long after the worst of the fighting was over, repeated incidents of TNI excess such as the Dili Massacre of 1991 give lie to the assertion that these were anomalous events, but rather an ingrained pattern of behavior.

The gap between the two perspectives, in fact, can be interpreted as the space between the TNI's stated beliefs and self-perception, and the actual expression of its underlying norms through its conduct. The TNI's understanding of its actions in East Timor was filtered through its institutional culture, and its histories of the war reflect a belief of legitimate purpose that cannot simply be attributed only to New Order indoctrination. Rather, the TNI's history of guerrilla and anti-guerrilla conflict shaped an "invisible" understanding of the way that it was supposed to conduct war, in which its practices of "scorched earth" were an unacknowledged default. These practices are thrown into sharp relief in the East Timor campaign because, unlike

[58] Ken Conboy quotes former New Order general and Kopassus commander Prabowo Subianto as saying, "Indonesia is the best country for conducting covert operations because there are no written orders." *Kopassus*, 316.

in earlier, post-revolution internal operations to suppress rebellions, by 1975 the TNI purported itself to be a modern military built upon modern U.S. and Western doctrine and equipment.

Background to the Indonesian Occupation

In the 500 years of Portuguese colonization, East Timor[59] was administered with the bare minimum of effort and investment, with a skeletal colonial bureaucracy ruling largely through existing tribal structures. By 1974, there were still only 30 kilometers of paved road in the entire country; less than one percent of the population had more than elementary level education; and the capital city, Dili, had only developed electrical infrastructure within the past decade (Conboy, *Kopassus* 195).

In 1974, however, the Portuguese government was overthrown in a coup led by a group of military officers embittered by their experiences in the country's anti-independence wars in the African colonies. This was soon coupled with popular support for regime change, so decolonization became a priority for the new government in Lisbon. Although East Timor was barely an afterthought in the scope of Portugal's colonial holdings, the specter of impending decolonization drastically changed the political calculus for Suharto's New Order government.

Following Portugal's coup, political organizations emerged for the first time in East Timor, quickly coalescing into three main parties that represented the different decolonization options facing the territory. The *Unaio Democratica Timorense* (UDT) favored a deliberate and measured process, in which Timor would progressively become autonomous while remaining under Portuguese governance. The UDT also later adopted the goal of eventual independence

[59] Known prior to integration with Indonesia as Portuguese Timor.

(Singh, *Myths* 21-22). The *Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente* (FRETILIN)[60] called for immediate independence, and stressed Timorese nationalism and the right to self-determination. The *Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense* (APODETI) argued for integration with Indonesia, under the logic that the Timorese were one people and one culture artificially divided by colonialism. They believed that East Timor was unviable as an independent state, and therefore, union with Indonesia was the most beneficial and realistic outcome. Although FRETILIN quickly became the most popular party, its somewhat radical rhetoric and perceived tint of Marxism drew the wariness of Indonesia and others in the international community (22-23).

Since independence, the Indonesian government had consistently recognized Portugal's sovereignty in East Timor and disavowed any interest in the territory. But contemporaneous regional events in Southeast Asia, at the height of the Cold War, prompted a change in Indonesian perceptions of East Timor's importance. The U.S. was withdrawing from its long war in Vietnam, and within a year of East Timor's independence, both Saigon and Phnom Penh would fall to Communist rule. For the New Order's military and national elites, who only seven years prior had experienced Indonesia's own bloody anti-Communist purge, avoidance of internal instability was an obsession. An unstable, undeveloped, newly independent state susceptible to leftist influence that could threaten to turn East Timor into Indonesia's Cuba was unacceptable (59). From the New Order's perspective, pre-emptive efforts to integrate East Timor made even greater sense, and Indonesia gained tacit agreement from other nations with a stake in regional stability, such as Australia and the United States.

[60] The party was originally known as the *Associacao Social Democratica Timorense* (ASDT), but changed its name to FRETILIN within four months.

The TNI undertook this pre-emption beginning in late 1974 through a low-key clandestine effort named "Operation Komodo." Conceived by Generals Yoga Sugama, the head of the national intelligence service (BAKIN—*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara*), and his deputy Ali Murtopo, both *Generasi '45* officers and influential members of Suharto's inner circle, the operation involved intelligence collection in East Timor, financial support for APODETI and select members of the UDT, pro-Indonesia propaganda broadcasts, and other subversion operations to influence internal Timorese politics (Conboy, *Kopassus* 198). As the political climate in East Timor continued to shift unpredictably, and as FRETILIN became increasingly popular, other generals began preparing more direct methods of intervention. Beginning in early 1975, General Benny Murdani directed the formation of a new covert, special forces-led effort that was known as "Operation Flamboyan." The operation involved training APODETI and other Timorese partisan recruits as paramilitary forces, as well as collecting tactical intelligence along the border.

In August 1975, a brief civil war broke out in East Timor following an attempted coup by the UDT that sought to dislodge FRETILIN from their local power base. Among the factors leading to this was Indonesia's aggressive courting of UDT leaders and continued characterization of FRETILIN as a radical socialist group.[61] The civil war resulted in FRETILIN pushing UDT and other opposition groups into West Timor, leaving FRETILIN in political and military control of East Timor. Their hand having been forced, UDT leaders signed a petition in September calling for the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. Meanwhile, clashes along the border between FRETILIN and various UDT and APODETI forces under Flamboyan heated up. This led the TNI to ramp up its intervention plans, and in September it developed a larger invasion campaign plan called "Operation Seroja," under which the existing "Flamboyan" was

[61] In the New Order, the government made little, if any, differentiation between socialists and communists.

subsumed. In October and November, Indonesian-led forces attacked and seized the East Timor border villages of Batugade, Balibo, and Atabae.

Already in a de-facto state of war, FRETILIN declared East Timor an independent state on November 28. The following day, UDT and APODETI leaders in West Timor, with Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik, formally declared that East Timor was integrating with Indonesia. On December 7, 1975, Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion into East Timor.

Operation Seroja

The initial invasion of East Timor was a complex, joint operation involving all branches of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and included some 15,000 troops armed with modern weaponry and equipment. An airborne assault by a combined force of Kopassandha and Kostrad units directly into the city was coordinated with marine amphibious landings, and joined by several ground units from the territorial *Brawijaya* and *Silawangi* divisions, all supported by air force and navy elements. By most accounts, the operation was a disastrous display of military ineptitude,[62] which succeeded in its goal of taking Dili only through the overwhelming application of force, and because FRETILIN had long decided to cede the city in the event of an invasion in order to retreat into the hills (Dunn 70). While chaos is always present on the battlefield, the TNI's invasion plan disintegrated almost from the start, resulting in ad hoc execution on the ground, and soldiers lacking command and control acting instead by instinct. Although the operation had been planned according to doctrine similar to a comparable U.S. operation, the invasion revealed that the TNI was still very much a territorial army with a

[62] Even General Benny Murdani later characterized the operation as unprofessional : "These troops had no discipline at all. They shot one another. Ah, over all it was totally embarrassing." Quoted in Julius Pour, *Benny Moerdani: Profile of a Soldier Statesman*, 1993.

guerrilla warfare identity. In other words, the TNI performed not what its soldiers had been taught to do, but what they had been practicing to do through the military culture that they had absorbed. And what was supposed to be a demonstration of the TNI's conventional military capability devolved into "a savage battle with much plunder, looting, and violence" (Singh, *Myths* 47).

Problems plagued the mission from the start. Despite months of intelligence collection and reconnaissance, the plan was based on poor intelligence analysis, with little preparation. The TNI was apparently unaware that the Portuguese military garrison in Dili had been stocked with modern NATO weaponry and ammunition, by one estimate equaling 15,000 light weapons, which were left behind when the Portuguese evacuated Dili and were now in FRETILIN control (Pour 335). The intelligence that "Operation Komodo" operatives collected likely would have tended towards political intelligence, more useful for internal state security and territorial operations. For example, one Operation Komodo officer noted that, "the FRETILIN office in Dili had a stack of Mao Tse-tung's red books on offer" (Conboy, *Kopassus* 197). Yet, basic military intelligence data about terrain and weather patterns, and enemy strengths and capabilities was limited and inaccurate:

> Combat Detachment 1 was briefed on the latest intelligence at Cijantung. "Sun Tzu said to know thy enemy, the terrain, and the climate," said Captain Soembodo, the Batu Jajar operations assistant now serving on Suweno's Kogasgab staff. "We did not know enough about any of these."
>
> Case in point was information fed to Kopassandha about the Komoro River. Flowing into the sea just west of Dili, the Komoro, briefing officers at Cijantung reported, was at flood stage and brimming with crocodiles. Lacking a proper

bridge, the river would be all but impossible to ford given the alleged presence of these man-eating reptiles.

The Kopassandha audience was also soft-sold on the resistance they would likely face. "They told us that the Timorese would see the parachute canopies and clap, and we would have a victory parade the next day." (241)

These deficiencies reflect more than ineptitude or incompetence: they reflect the TNI's *cultural* views on military intelligence and analysis. All of the elements of intelligence planning for an operation found in a U.S. military manual—terrain, weather, enemy capabilities, etc.—would likely have been covered during the briefing described above. Yet the analysis behind the checklist of facts is what makes the information useful. Despite the fact that a number of officers had attended U.S. military schools over the preceding decade, the TNI's educational system, with its emphasis on rote learning and appearance over function, had trained a generation of officers to observe the form of military doctrine but not its underlying intent. Here, this manifested itself in a wildly unrealistic assessment of environmental and enemy conditions in East Timor. Additionally, in the Indonesian military's intelligence system, founded on its territorial guerrilla warfare roots, such granular, local knowledge is implicit since the army operates in its own area. Intelligence in that case is the natural outcome of deep familiarity. But this time, the TNI was attempting to operate as a conventional military in foreign territory. Once again, the TNI performed as it had been practicing for decades, in contradiction to its new doctrinal manuals, and its soldiers' fundamental conception of military intelligence was at odds with their required mission.

The operation was further complicated by a lack of coordination and communication, both between units and within them. While the organization of TNI combat units, particularly

the non-territorial Kostrad and Kopassandha, mimicked U.S. and British force structures, these units were never trained or employed in the manner of the Western units they were modeled on. "Within Kostrad, theoretically the army's spearhead, the problem was particularly acute. Due to the expenses involved, Kostrad's two airborne brigades rarely had the opportunity to exercise as a coherent whole; rather, they were usually wielded as individual battalions" (Conboy, *Kopassus* 238). Having never been required to operate together before, much less for a large-scale invasion, synchronization evaporated on the ground and individual units acted of their own volition, sometimes in opposition to mission objectives (248). Although there are no official TNI reports of fratricide during the operation, given the chaos and lack of communication between units, some degree of friendly fire death almost certainly took place. For example, during one parachute drop of Kostrad soldiers near the Komoro River, the paratroopers began shooting and tossing grenades down on a unit below that turned out to be a TNI amphibious task force, some members of which began shooting back despite the fact that it was clear the parachutists were TNI soldiers[63] (248; Subroto170).

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the operation, and a harbinger of things to come, was the conduct of TNI soldiers who reverted almost immediately to "scorched earth" practices. Widespread looting, raping, burning of homes and buildings, as well as summary executions and random killing of civilians were reported in numerous witness and survivor interviews. In a disquieting echo of the 1965-66 massacres, the TNI is reported to have killed entire families on the suspicion of FRETILIN sympathies, because "they were infected with the seeds of FRETILIN" (Dunn testimony in *U.S. Congress Hearing 1977*, 30). Estimates of the invasion's death toll vary, but according to one estimate, around 2,000 civilians in Dili were killed in the first few days of the invasion alone, with several hundred Chinese members of the city

[63] FRETILIN, of course, had no air capability.

particularly being singled out (Budiardjo and Liong 128).[64] This is all the more troubling in light of the fact that FRETILIN forces had largely abandoned the capital early on the first day, and the fighting in the city itself was over relatively quickly, giving even greater credence to the charges that Indonesian soldiers undertook such actions systematically and without facing any direct threat.

In spite of the invasion's conduct, the TNI succeeded in capturing Dili and subsequently other major population centers, while steadily bringing in more troops. By April 1976, TNI troop numbers in East Timor were estimated at 32,000, more than double the original invasion force size (23). Yet, despite its vast numerical superiority, after eight months the TNI had only managed to clear the major villages and towns. FRETILIN still controlled 80 percent of the country outside of the population centers, and was exacting a high price on the TNI during its crawling push into the hinterlands.

Scorched Earth Warfare

Once the TNI firmly established its hold on the major towns and villages, it began a long counter-guerrilla campaign punctuated by several periods of intensive operations to destroy FRETILIN resistance. The first of these occurred from September 1977 to March 1979, and consisted of three major offensives to encircle and reduce the area under resistance control. The intensity of these operations was of a new dimension, even compared to the initial invasion, due to the Indonesian acquisition of several shipments of U.S. military equipment in 1976 and 1977. Primary among these were 16 OV-10 Bronco aircraft, a light attack and observation plane that was specially designed for counter-insurgency operations. These were followed in 1978 by the

[64] The authors cite Dunn, *Timor, A People Betrayed*, as a source for this figure.

purchase of eight British Hawk and 16 American A-4 Skyhawk jets (Budiarjo and Liong, 30). With this new arsenal, the TNI conducted aerial bombardment campaigns unprecedented in its history. These included the use of napalm (27; Conboy, *Kopassus* 276).[65]

But despite the technological advances and increased lethality, TNI counter-guerrilla attitudes and techniques were much the same, if different in scale. The same guerrilla scorched earth tactics the TNI had always used were simply disguised by the new terminology and equipment of the military. From the beginning, the TNI attempted to "Timorise" the war, using locally developed militias to fight in conjunction with regular forces (Budiarjo and Liong 39). Already by 1976, two Timorese infantry battalions had been formed and a civil defense corps program called *Hansip* (*Pertahanan Sipil*) was being expanded. The development of local militias continued to expand after 1979, when the TNI established a *Korem* (sub-regional military command) in East Timor as one of its provinces. In addition to the use of Timorese recruits in military formations, the TNI also developed unofficial local militias and gangs as proxies to control the population through subversion, terror, propaganda, and targeted killing. This pattern had its roots in the revolutionary period, as noted in previous chapters. For example, consider the following description of one PETA officer during the revolution, who became notorious for his use of local groups to conduct brutal population control measures:

> The chief instruments for this activity were villagers, sometimes led by serving or former TNI men. It was frequently a harsh and destructive method in which the distinctions between military action and *rampok* were largely invisible to the populace. Another tactic on which Sungkono came to rely very heavily was the use of local groups (and sometimes individuals) to kidnap and often kill civilian

[65] The napalm used by the TNI is mentioned as a footnote (f.n. 19 in Chapter 18) in Conboy, who describes it as a Soviet-made variant called "Opalm" that Indonesia had acquired in the early 1960s.

> officials and others who were not cooperative or who showed signs of working for or being sympathetic to the Dutch. These tactics were not only brutal, they also became remarkably bureaucratized. By the time of the climax of the Revolution in the latter half of 1949, for example, TNI officers were sending off—from their guerrilla strongholds in the mountains or deep in the countryside—typed, stamped, and sometimes thumbprinted orders; for example, 'Go to daerah [area] X and organize resistance' or 'Murder Pak L__'.[66]
>
> These policies had disastrous effects. Sungkono's command and the core units of the TNI in East Java were never able to control the violence they had summoned to life. Efforts to direct forces of violence by absorbing them into the TNI . . . were rarely successful and often created more rather than less conflict . . . Draconian measures such as burning villages and crops quickly got out of hand, and the TNI became increasingly unpopular in precisely those areas where it most needed broad support. (Frederick 165-66)

The TNI's instrumental use of civilians once again involved use of the *pagar betis* technique, which had been used first during the *Darul Islam* campaign, and later in the 1965-66 killings (Robinson, "People's War" 291). The TNI resurrected this technique after 1980, when FRETILIN regrouped and reorganized under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao following its near decimation in 1977-1979, and began conducting numerous highly effective guerrilla attacks (Budiarjo and Liong 41). In response, the TNI launched another major operation from May to September 1981, *Operasi Keamanan* (Operation Security), involving some 12 TNI battalions and an estimated 33,000 to 50,000 Timorese civilians (41-42; Conboy, *Kopassus* 298). The key

[66] Author cites the following sources for this: MvD-CAD, MB B31 311, Interrogation report SHK8/2468/10-12-1948, and Interrogation report SHK8/1804/30-6-1948; MvD-CAD, VALIGG49 163.

to the operation was the formation of two *pagar betis* lines stretching across the island—one starting in the east and the other in the west—to sweep the resistance into a killing zone near the center of the island.

The operation was a failure, both militarily and strategically. According to one estimate, nearly "the entire male population from the ages of 15 to 50 was pressed into service" (Budiarjo and Liong 42). The operation failed to affect significantly FRETILIN capability or to capture any key leaders. The conscription of Timorese manpower caused enormous resentment and strengthened support for FRETILIN, in addition to further disrupting agricultural activities and worsening a food crisis. The failure to eliminate the resistance, however, simply resulted in the TNI applying even more punitive measures with the same tactics. In 1983, the TNI launched its third large-scale offensive, *Operasi Persatuan* (Operation Unity), again involving heavy aerial bombardment, *pagar betis*, and forced relocation.

The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR) estimates that between 84,200 and 183,000 East Timorese died from hunger or illness during the Indonesian occupation, with the vast majority of deaths occurring in the early years from 1975-1979 (CAVR Executive Summary, 73). Other estimates indicate that there may have been more than 200,000 deaths (Budiarjo and Liong 81). After the invasion, swaths of farmland were destroyed, along with much of the livestock on which crop cultivation depended (84-85). Thousands of Timorese were dislocated from their homes, either in their own attempt to escape bombing and ground operations, or due to forcible relocation by the TNI into *daerah pemukiman* (resettlement areas) in Indonesian-held territory.

Resettlement camps were a new aspect of TNI counter-insurgency operations designed to "separate the guerrilla from his support." It is likely that the TNI developed this strategy from

the use of the "New Villages" in the British Malayan Emergency (and to some degree also from the "strategic hamlets" used by the U.S. in Vietnam).[67] But unlike in the British in Malaya, the TNI never provided the resources to adequately support the displaced population. The result was widespread and devastating famine and disease. Where the British made a concerted effort to ameliorate the hardship of relocation and to "win hearts and minds," the Timor example was more akin to a concentration camp.[68] Once again, the TNI adopted the form of a new doctrine, but without implementing its underlying intent, context, and nuance.

"A Spirit of Destruction": The TNI's Culture of Terror

The CAVR report estimates that between one-sixth to one-third of the Timorese population was killed as a direct result of the war. In addition to the mass death, the overwhelming number of reports of indiscriminate killing, torture, sexual assault, disappearances, and other human rights violations indicate a pattern of behavior that was pervasive across the entire TNI, in what Geoffrey Robinson describes as "a culture of terror" (Robinson, *Genocide* 15).

Yet, Robinson also argues that "there is no evidence that the Indonesian army commanders who planned the operations in East Timor intended to kill one-third of the population," and that it was instead an institutional culture of violence that had developed

[67] The success of the New Villages in the British anti-Communist counter-insurgency campaign was well publicized even during its time (although similar techniques have been used elsewhere), and after *Konfrontasi*, there were significant exchanges of training and cooperation between the TNI and Malaysian military forces. Additionally, General Benny Murdani, the chief architect of the invasion of East Timor, made several unofficial visits to South Vietnam in 1968 to review U.S. counter-insurgency operations. See Conboy, *Kopassus*, 192-194. Nasution also mentions the Malayan insurgency in his *Fundamentals*, although the conflict was ongoing and it is unclear how much he knew about the British counter-insurgency tactics.

[68] While the British COIN campaign also has many critics, and must be considered in relative terms, the strategic purpose behind the New Villages was not punitive, and the British managed to relocate a greater number of people than the TNI without resulting in famine and widespread death.

through the course of shared historical experiences, and perpetuated "through a process of socialization and indoctrination," that shaped the attitudes and decisions of TNI soldiers at every level (46-49). While every individual soldier is responsible for his actions, all soldiers are also the byproduct of the military institutional culture in which they have been trained. And like soldiers in other historical armies that have perpetrated horrific levels of destruction and killing, TNI soldiers were "quintessentially ordinary men, driven by fear, propaganda, the brutalization of war, and self-preservation, but also by ties of family, political patronage, and institutional culture" (13).

In accounting, then, for the seemingly irreconcilable difference between the romantic *ksatria* values and self-image of the TNI, and the horrific brutality that they inflicted on the Timorese population, it is too simplistic to dismiss the former as empty rhetoric and claim the latter as indicating the true evil nature of Indonesian soldiers. Indeed, TNI soldiers saw themselves as valorous patriots executing a mission on behalf of the Indonesian nation against Communist insurgents. This kind of self-image is reflected in a hagiographic account of the East Timor invasion written by an Indonesian journalist who accompanied the TNI during Operation Seroja, which vilifies the brutality of FRETILIN and praises the professionalism of the TNI. An anecdote is recounted by the author regarding the capture and treatment of Xavier Do Amaral, the first FRETILIN president, by BG Dading Kalbuadi, the ground commander of Operation Seroja and later Commander of the Regional Defense and Security of East Timor:

> Brigadier General Dading Kalbuadi who I asked to comment on his special treatment of Xavier, instead returned the question, "Hey, nDro," (short for Hendro), "why should a captured enemy be killed. Where is the essence of Pancasila in such act?"

> When seen through the philosophy of a shadow puppet player, Brigadier General Dading's attitude would reflect that of a *begawan* or *satria pinandita*, a knight who has risen to priestly status and is an example for all knights. A *begawan*, with his great-skill and wise [sic] would only fight in battles with the principle of "*Menang datan ngasorake mungsuh*" or "Victory without degrading the enemy." Xavier had been defeated, but his dignity was still intact. (Subroto 255)

Leaving aside the rather fantastical nature of the story, how could such a chivalrous self-perception in one important leader accord with the widespread pattern of human rights abuses for which the TNI became infamous in East Timor?

One answer is that the institutional acceptance of such violence was so deeply an ingrained norm that it no longer was seen in moral terms that would conflict with the self-perception of virtuousness. Extreme violence was no longer a moral issue, but rather simply an aspect of the kind of combat the TNI had been experiencing for decades, most recently during Indonesia's paroxysm of violence in 1965-66. The 1965-66 massacres have long been a suppressed memory in Indonesia, until recently never discussed, its details occupying an invisible chapter in the New Order history books. Yet that bloody affair, in which as many as a million people were killed under the guise of an anti-Communist purge, would have imprinted an indelible mark on the entire generation of TNI soldiers who invaded East Timor in 1975, many of whom would have been participants less than a decade prior. Kai Thaler, in an essay comparing the 1965-66 killings with the violence unleashed in East Timor, notes the continuity in the kind of violence between the two events: "Patterns of rape and massacre learned and used

during the Killings were embedded in the institutional repertoire of the Indonesian military and state, then applied to East Timor" (217).

Yet, while there is little historical detail on the kind of violence conducted in the TNI's previous conflicts, some of what exists suggest that, like other ingrained elements of the military's culture, the TNI's patterns of extreme violence go back even further to its genesis. As William H. Frederick discusses in an essay about the "savage violence Indonesians leveled against their own countrymen" during the revolution (and the dearth of scholarly research on it), such extreme violence as "beheading, torturing, and burning or burying alive" tended to be accepted to some degree as a natural wartime phenomenon (Frederick 146, 152). Extreme violence was not necessarily perceived in ethical terms, but in a relative and instrumental way:

> In the revolutionary circumstances, extreme violence tended to be seen in practical terms before moral ones. It appears to have been understood as a 'natural' social force, one which could not be weighed in absolute terms of 'good' and 'evil,' and one which could not be controlled by simple eradication. Neither the violence itself nor its use were necessarily immoral, and the roots and sources of the violence need have nothing to do with the uses to which it was put. (Frederick 157)

This does not justify such violence, or imply that all violence was viewed as such. Rather, it helps to explain that there was a deeply rooted institutional acceptance of extreme violence in TNI, one conditioned by the repeated instances of bloody conflict that the TNI had participated in through its history.

In East Timor, violence was again an intrinsic and accepted means to an end. The following are excerpts from a TNI command's instructions in East Timor, dated July 1982, detailing interrogation procedures:

> **Military Regional Command XVI, Udayana**
>
> **Established Procedure for the Interrogation of Prisoners.**
>
> **PROTAP/01-B/VII/1982**
>
> (From Part I—Introduction):
>
> As soon as these prisoners are taken, the information obtained must be quickly processed as part of data-gathering activity. Data-gathering activity requires the skill or ability to interrogate people so that correct conclusions can be drawn about where the GPK leaders or units are hiding. Incorrect data gathering methods will lead to wrong conclusions and will result in sending our troops in the wrong direction.
>
> (From Part V—Things That Must be Avoided):
>
> 13. The use of violence and threats.
>
> Hopefully, interrogation accompanied by the use of violence will not take place except in certain circumstances when the person being interrogated is having difficulty telling the truth (is evasive).
>
> If it proves necessary to use violence, make sure that there are no people around (members of TBO, Hansip, Ratih or other people) to see what is happening, so as not to arouse people's antipathy. The use of violence often results in the person under interrogation being forced to admit guilt because of fear, and thereafter he/she will just comply with all the wishes of the interrogator.

> Avoid taking photographs showing torture in progress (people being photographed at times when they are being subjected to electric current, when they have been stripped naked, etc). Remember not to have such photographic documentation developed outside, in Den Pasar, which could then be made available to the public by irresponsible elements.
>
> It is better to make attractive photographs, such as shots taken while eating together with the prisoner, or shaking hands with those who have just come down from the bush, showing them in front of a house, and so on. If such photos are circulated in the bush, this is a classic way of assuredly undermining their morale and fighting spirits. And if such photos are shown to the priests, this can draw the church into supporting operations to restore security. (Budiarjo and Liong 233-236)

If this remarkable sample of an official TNI document discussing torture can be taken as representative, it highlights two main points. The first is that torture was officially sanctioned and was a consciously accepted practice. The second is the pragmatic terms with which the document outlines torture. It is simply one means of "data gathering" that "hopefully" would not need to be used, but would be necessitated in the vague event that the detainee was "having difficulty telling the truth." Torture is described as an instrument that needed to be employed correctly in order to achieve its purpose, with complete indifference to its morality. Of course, every military force to some degree desensitizes the violence conducted by its members. The difference is that modern Western militaries place explicit limits on the extent of acceptable violence, even if they are sometimes violated. The TNI may have acquired the tools of modern militaries such as the U.S., but not its values.

This tendency towards the normalization of the extreme can also be seen as a result of the TNI's long evolution of increasing autonomy from civilian oversight. The conflict between Indonesia's military and civilian elites came to its apotheosis and abrupt end in the 1965 Coup attempt and subsequent purge in which the New Order was born. The trajectory from that event to East Timor is clear. The New Order government's embodiment of the military's doctrine—of its right and obligation to involvement in every facet of civic life—bolstered the tendency towards extreme violence. As Geoffrey Robinson notes:

> Where states are dominated by military institutions, the likelihood of mass violence increases dramatically. That pattern stems partly from the fact that in such regimes, the military tends to have broad autonomy and to exist beyond the control of other state institutions. In those circumstances, commanding officers—and other authorities—commonly fail to control or punish unlawful or exceptionally brutal behavior. That failure invariably leads to a climate of impunity, which in turn makes future unlawful violence far more likely to occur. These general patterns are arguably compounded in the context of war, partly because of war's brutalizing effects on soldiers and civilians alike, and partly because it provides both the opportunity and rationale for the use of extreme violence. In such contexts, furthermore, military and police forces—and their proxies—frequently develop distinctive institutional cultures that can make the resort to unlawful violence by their members more likely. (Robinson, *Genocide* 15)

Following this trajectory, we can see that a new generation of soldiers was acculturated to the TNI's institutional norms through their experiences in East Timor. The destruction wrought by

the TNI and its proxy militias on Indonesia's withdrawal in 1999 shows that the "transfer of values" from *Generasi '45* to the new generation had indeed continued.

An irony of the TNI's occupation of East Timor is that in many ways, it mimicked the colonial experience that Indonesia had undergone in its own pre-independence history. Much of the same rhetoric of bringing civilization, modernization, and stability to East Timor infuses TNI accounts of the conflict. TNI soldiers viewed their mission as a heroic one, embodying the revolutionary spirit of *Generasi '45*. Kathleen McGregor, in *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past*, recounts a conversation with a TNI officer who "revealed to me that during his experience as Field Commander in East Timor he would often recite stories of Sudirman in order to lift the morale of his troops" (139). Despite the fact that "the [Timorese] resistance leaders bore greater similarities to Sudirman as a guerrilla fighter, while [they] could be compared to the better-armed colonialists," for many of the TNI soldiers "this irony was not apparent" (139).

Nasution's post-revolution observation that the guerrilla's tactic of "scorched earth is aimed at destroying the whole existing religious, legal, socio-economic order which forms the organization of the dominating power" was borne out again in East Timor. But here it was the TNI that was paradoxically both the dominating power and the executor of scorched earth guerrilla tactics. Despite its formal resemblance to an evolved modern military, the TNI's ingrained habits and underlying beliefs expressed themselves in the same tendency towards unbounded violence that had been its characteristic since the Indonesian revolution.

CONCLUSION

The origin of a military, the way it has been collectively trained and educated, matters a great deal in determining the kind of identity it will assume. In attempting to account for the often-troubling characteristics of the TNI throughout its history, this thesis has sought to trace the TNI's institutional culture to its roots in the formation of PETA. The PETA-trained generation of officers who controlled the TNI for over three decades were inculcated with a unique mixture of revolutionary nationalism, guerrilla warfare training, and a belief in the power of *semangat* to triumph over steel. In other words, the Japanese had trained an army of guerrillas, but not soldiers in a professional sense. Formed as a revolutionary guerrilla army, this identity was reinforced during the war for independence. The war also ingrained normative patterns of extreme violence that would be reinforced over the succeeding decades in numerous internal conflicts, reaching a peak in the 1965-66 killings, and again in the 1975 invasion of East Timor.

The central tension within the TNI's culture is the incongruence between its deep-rooted identity as a guerrilla warfare force, and the requirements inherent in its role as the national army of a modernizing country. These conflicting impulses were institutionalized during the New Order, when the military largely adopted the tactics and equipment of the U.S., but continued to operate based on an underlying military culture rooted in its guerrilla past. In its invasion and occupation of East Timor, the TNI demonstrated patterns of behavior that continued to harken back to 1965, and 1945, while in the guise of a military operating with a modern structure and modern equipment.

Aside from the training provided to Indonesians in PETA, the parallels between the IJA and the TNI are striking, and possibly offer a source for deeper comparison in the future. Some elements were clearly transmitted, such as the reliance on *semangat* in a resource poor army to compensate for the lack of material power. In both countries, the military was never fully under civilian control and contested power within the government, in both cases becoming the dominant authority. This led to lack of civilian oversight of its conduct and cultures of military impunity, particularly in expeditionary wars such as in Manchuria and East Timor. In both cases, years of brutal counter-guerrilla warfare conditioned and habituated both armies to increasing levels of acceptable violence that spiraled into the extreme. These self-reinforcing norms were highlighted respectively in the assaults on Nanking and East Timor.

In seeking to connect the TNI's institutional culture to the IJA, I acknowledge many limitations in this thesis. First and foremost is that this thesis relies largely on correlations, parallels, and suggestive patterns in order to support its argument. A prime example of this is my attempt to suggest a link between the kinds of extreme violence notoriously perpetrated by the IJA, and the similar kinds of violence conducted by the Indonesian army in subsequent decades. There is no proof that the IJA taught their PETA recruits any methods of torture or the like. In fact, a related problem is the dearth of historical documentation on the nature of violence conducted by Indonesian Republican forces during the revolution or in subsequent campaigns[69]. However, even a less contentious suggestion, that the IJA's views on the military's role in government were passed on to the Indonesian PETA recruits (a suggestion also made by Benedict Anderson, among others), relies mostly on the suggestive historical parallels between the two armies' relationships with their respective governments.

[69] A topic addressed by William Frederick, "Shadows of an Unseen Hand," in Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002.

Indeed, in describing the roots of a culture of extreme violence within the TNI, I have intentionally narrowed my focus to military actions, and limited my study to the origins of the military in PETA. This has been in order to focus on the military as an instrument of state violence, which in this case overtook the state. This neglects the growing body of scholarship on the deeper "roots of violence" in Indonesia which highlights other historical and cultural complexions, such as the Javanese traditions of the *jago* (local strongman and/or thief) and *preman* (local thug/vigilante), Dutch colonial mass killings and internal policing measures, or "gangster revolutionaries."[70]

Additionally, a critic might point out that this thesis rests largely on two incidents that I use to demonstrate the conditioning of the TNI's attitudes toward violence—the revolution and the 1965-66 killings—and in both cases the violence perpetrated was not by the military alone, but by large swaths of society. This is a valid point, and these were national "trauma learning" events, not restricted to the military. Yet, in both cases the military played a special role as the focal source of the violence, bearing the greatest responsibility for the outcome. And while individuals and gangs dispersed back into society after these events, the military institutionalized the lessons of this violence, reinforcing these extreme norms in its veterans and socializing its new members into the military culture, and ensuring its perpetuation into the future. Although this thesis ends with the consolidation of TNI forces in East Timor, roughly contemporaneous with the retirement of the last of the PETA generation officers, it is clear from subsequent TNI actions in East Timor, as well as in Indonesia proper, that the culture of extreme violence and impunity had not ended.

Of course, any national military is made up of members of its own society, who bring with them values and beliefs common to the culture. This is especially so in a self-professed

[70] Refers to Robert Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries*.

guerrilla army, in which, as Nasution repeatedly exhorts, the army acts in unity with the people. Yet, there is a danger, too, in the kinds of norms that are institutionalized in a former guerrilla army. Militaries tend naturally to be closed cultures, appropriate for their specialized task in managing the official monopoly on killing and organized mass violence. In most modern armies, the military culture helps to both enable its members to conduct violence, as well as to strictly limit violence and control its form and extent. This is predicated, however, on the norm of acceptable violence. In the case of the TNI, its origins as a guerrilla militia army conditioned an attitude toward *unbounded* violence that became a part of its military culture.

Although the TNI's institutional culture developed in circumstances unique to Indonesia, its experience as a revolutionary guerrilla army that became a national military is certainly not a singular one. From wars of decolonization, to separatist movements, and civil wars and revolutions worldwide, wars of the weak against the strong continue to reshape nations around the globe. These wars tend to be brutal in the total violence inflicted by both sides, scarring the population and the combatants for decades. In many cases, these guerrilla armies for independence, often supported by outside powers, become national armies themselves. Sometimes, these new national armies of ex-guerrillas continue to be trained by the armies of foreign powers. History shows us that the ideals upon which many of these independence movements come to power can quickly be usurped by chaos and instability, and a return to internecine violence. But it also suggests that institutional culture can, in fact, be transmitted or at least influenced, by external organizations through deep or sustained contact. In the case of PETA, many of the IJA's values became the TNI's values. And in spite of the problematic characteristics of the TNI's institutional culture, the corollary point is that positive values can also be ingrained. Perhaps what can be made from all this is that in the case of supporting new

armies, simply providing the tools for violence is not enough to mitigate unintended outcomes. And the way in which armies are trained and educated from their origin, and by whom and how, matters a great deal in ensuring that freedom fighters do not become the new oppressors.

WORKS CITED

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. Print.

---. *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation, 1944-1945*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1961. Print.

Anderson, David Charles. "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair." *Indonesia*.21 (1976): 1-63. Print.

Benedict, Ruth. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1946. Print.

Budiardjo, Carmel, and Soei Liong Liem. *The War Against East Timor*. London; Totowa, N.J.: Zed Books ; US distributor, Biblio Distributor Center, 1984. Print.

Colombijn, Freek, and J. Thomas Lindblad, eds. *Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective*. Leiden: KITLV, 2002. Print.

Conboy, Kenneth J. *Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces*. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2003. Print.

---. *Intel: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service.* Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2004. Print.

Drea, Edward J. *In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. Print.

---. *Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2009. Print.

---. "Army Barracks of Imperial Japan." *The Military and Society: A Collection of Essays.* Ed. Peter Karsten. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2002. 57-71. Print.

Dunn, J.S. *The Timor Story*. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, Legislative Research Service, 1976. Print.

Evans, Bryan. "The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army (1954-1964)." *Indonesia*.47 (1989): 25-48. Print.

Frederick, William H. "Shadows of an unseen hand: some patterns of violence in the Indonesian revolution, 1945-1949." *Roots of Violence in Indonesia.* Ed. Freek Colombijn & J. Thomas Lindblad. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002. 143-172. Print.

Goto, Ken'ichi. "Modern Japan and Indonesia: The Dynamics and Legacy of Wartime Rule." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 152.4 (1996): 536-52. Print.

Hasemen, John B. "Chapter 5: National Security." *Indonesia: A Country Study*. Eds. Frederick, William H., Robert L. Worden, and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. 1993 : 279-462. Print.

---. "The Dynamics of Change: Regeneration of the Indonesian Army." *Asian Survey* 26.8 (1986): 883-96. Print.

Hull, Isabel V. *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. Print.

Jenkins, David. *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1984. Print.

Jenkins, David. "Soeharto and the Japanese Occupation." *Indonesia*.88 (2009): 1-103. Print.

Johnston, Paul. "Doctrine is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies." *Parameters* XXX.3 (2000) Print.

Kanahele, George S. "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia, Prelude to Independence." s.n.], 1967. Print. S.l

Kedaulatan Rakjat, April 26, 1958, Unknown Article cited in: McVey, Ruth. "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part II." *Indonesia*.13 (1972): 147-81. Print.

Kilcullen, David. "Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 17.1 (2006): 44-64. Print.

Lebra, Joyce. *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces in World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Print.

---. "The Significance of the Japanese Military Model for Southeast Asia." *Pacific Affairs* 48.2 (1975): 215-29. Print

Lowry, Robert. *Indonesian Defence Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces*. Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1993. Print.

MacFarling, Ian. *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia*. [Australia]: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996. Print.

McElhatton, Emmet. "Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian Strategic Psyche." *Small Wars Journal* (May 8, 2008) Print.

McGregor, Katharine E. *History in Uniform : Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past*. [Canberra]; Honolulu: Asian Studies Association of Australia; In Association with University of Hawai'i Press, 2007. Print.

McVey, Ruth. "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army." *Indonesia*.11 (1971): 131-76. Print.

---. "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part II." *Indonesia*.13 (1972): 147-81. Print.

Mrázek, Rudolf. *The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965 : A Study of an Intervention*. Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, Pub. House of the Czechoslavak Academy of Sciences, 1978. Print.

Nasution, Abdul Haris,. *Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare and the Indonesian Defence System Past and Future.* [Djakarta]: Indonesian Army Information Service, 1953. Print.

Notosusanto, Nugroho. *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia*. [Jakarta]: Dept. of Defence & Security, Centre for Armed Forces History, 1980. Print.

---. *The Peta Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia*. Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979. Print.

---. *The Peta Army in Indonesia, 1943-1945.* [Djakarta: Centre of Armed Forces History, 1971. Print.

Oba, Sadao. *My Recollections of Indonesia, 1944-1947*. [London]: International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, 1979. Print.

Pour, Julius, Tim Scott. *Benny Moerdani, Profile of a Soldier Statesman*. Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993. Print.

Reid, Anthony, and Akira Ōki. *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986. Print.

Reid, Anthony. *The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-1950*. Hawthorn, Vic.: Longman, 1974. Print.

Robinson, Geoffrey. "People's War: Militias in East Timor and Indonesia." *South East Asia Research South East Asia Research* 9.3 (2001): 271-318. Print.

---. *"If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die": How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print.

Sato, Shigeru. “Gatot Mangkupraja, PETA, and the Origins of the Indonesian National Army.” *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde.* 166.2 (2010): 189. Print.

Schein, Edgar H. “Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization Studies.” *Administrative Science Quarterly.* 41.2 (1996): 229. Print.

---. “Organizational Culture.” *American Psychologist* 45.2 (1990): 109-19. Print.

Sejarah TNI, Jilid II (1950-1959). Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Pusat Senjarah Dan Tradisi TNI, Jakarta, 2000. Print. Sejarah TNI

Sejarah TNI, Jilid IV (1966-1983) . Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Pusat Senjarah Dan Tradisi TNI, Jakarta, 2000. Print. Sejarah TNI

Sejarah TNI, Jilid V (1984-2000) . Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Pusat Senjarah Dan Tradisi TNI, Jakarta, 2000. Print. Sejarah TNI

Singh, Bilveer. *Dwifungsi Abri : The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces : Origins, Actualization, and Implications for Stability and Development*. Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1995. Print.

---. *East Timor, Indonesia, and the World: Myths and Realities*. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: ADPR Consult (M), 1996. Print.

Smethurst, Richard J. *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Print.

Snider, Don. "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," in Sicherman, Harvey, and John F. Lehman. *America the Vulnerable: Our Military Problems and How to Fix Them*. Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2002. Print.

Subroto, Hendro. *Eyewitness to Integration of East Timor*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997. Print.

Sundhaussen, Ulf. *The Military in Indonesia.* Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974. Print.

---. *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Print.

Suwondo, Purbo S. *The Genesis of the Indonesian National Army and Some Political Implications*, 1996. Print.

Thaler, Kai. "Foreshadowing Future Slaughter: from the Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966 to the 1974–1999 Genocide in East Timor." *Genocide Studies and Prevention*. 7 (2012): 204-222. Print.

United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Organizations, and United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. *Human Rights in East Timor and the Question of the use of U.S. Equipment by the Indonesian Armed Forces : Hearing before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Asian and Pacific*

Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, March 23, 1977. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. Print.

Utrecht, Ernst. *The Indonesian Army : A Socio-Political Study of an Armed, Privileged Group in the Developing Countries*. [Townsville, Australia]: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1979. Print.

Wilson, Peter H. P. H. "Defining Military Culture." *The Journal of Military History*. 72.1 (2008): 11-41. Print.

Winslow, Donna. "Army Culture." Research Note 2001-04. Alexandria, VA: Research and Advanced Concepts Office, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2000. Print.