INNOVATING ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION ​

FOR URBAN CARBON NEUTRALITY IN CHINA: THE CASE OF SHENZHEN 

  

  

  

  

  

A Thesis 

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 

of Cornell University 

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 

Master of Science 

  

  

by 

Xin “Fish” Yu 

August 2025 

 



 

  

  

   

 

 

   

   

  

© 2025 Xin Yu  

 



ABSTRACT  

Environmental public engagement and participation (E-PEP) are vital for advancing China’s 

carbon neutrality goals (CNG). This study evaluates the experiences and perspectives of 

professionals from government, NGOs, and businesses in Shenzhen regarding urban E-PEP and 

CNG. A notable finding is the "Yes-but" phenomenon: while Shenzhen provides a relatively 

strong foundation for E-PEP, limitations in official efforts hinder its overall effectiveness. 

Although CNG is broadly accepted in principle, professionals expressed lukewarm attitudes due 

to a lack of local leadership, understanding, connection, and capacity. These findings echo the 

existing literature on the need for systemic innovation in China’s urban climate governance. Four 

interconnected innovation strategies are identified: 1) administration and management, 2) 

collaboration, 3) societal dissemination, and 4) capacity building. Finally, the study offers 

practical recommendations, including innovating the institutional framework, establishing a 

public funding mechanism for collaborative E-PEP initiatives, and developing an interactive 

capacity-building system for information sharing, training, and talent cultivation. 

 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 

I was born in Nanjing, an old capital town by the Yangtze River when reform and opening up 

began in the PRC. My earliest memories are of playing under the city's enchanting Wutong 

(sycamore) trees on the sidewalk and observing the insects and plants in the limited urban green 

space. These experiences led me to become the Nature class representative in elementary school, 

a role that remains the only 'official' title I have ever held. 

While many of my peers embraced opportunities in the country's economic boom, I chose to 

begin my environmental career at Greenpeace's Beijing office. This decision allowed me to 

witness the awakening of environmentalism in both urban and rural China, observe the impacts 

of human behavior on the Arctic, which has lost its sea ice, and confront the shortcomings of 

global climate negotiations. 

My journey continued with further studies in London and a return to Beijing to lead corporate 

social responsibility programs in education and environment. Yet, concerns for my family's 

health amidst the smog led me to relocate to Shenzhen and work with The Nature Conservancy 

on urban conservation. My practices reinforced my belief in the undervalued role of urban 

environmentalism and the significant impact of community-level participatory governance on 

global sustainability. 

Since before the COVID-19 pandemic, I have been assisting environmental agencies in 

Shenzhen in innovating public engagement and participation work. Bringing these issues to the 

Civic Ecology Lab at Cornell University and working with intellectual peers in participatory 

research is another significant and exciting choice in my career. 

ⅲ 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To those participating in the effort for a more sustainable society 

in China and beyond. 

ⅳ 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Marinne Krasny, an approachable and 

incredibly energetic mentor. Her exemplary work in environmental stewardship, community 

building, and social activism has been a profound source of inspiration. I am also grateful to Dr. 

Jeremy Wallace for his invaluable academic guidance on contemporary governance in China.  

My sincere thanks go to Dr. Yue Li and Dr. Alex Kudryavtsev for inspiring me to return to 

academia after a decade and pursue my academic aspirations within the vibrant Cornell 

communities. Civic Ecology Lab and the Department of Natural Resources and Environment 

have provided me with invaluable opportunities for research, teaching, and practice. I am 

especially thankful to my lab members—Celeste, Elena, Felipe, and Hamid—for their 

encouraging discussions and steadfast support. I also extend my gratitude to the Center for 

Conservation Social Sciences grad seminar group, led by Dr. Bruce Lauber, Dr. Richard 

Stedman, and Dr. Steven Johnson, along with its participants, for their thoughtful suggestions 

and insights.  

I am deeply indebted to the professionals interviewed for this research, most of whom are based 

in Shenzhen, China. While I cannot name them individually, their goodwill and efforts made this 

study possible. Special thanks also go to JC Liu for assisting with part of the data organization. 

Finally, I extend my deepest gratitude to my family. My parents have always encouraged me to 

pursue my passions, and my sister, brother-in-law, and nephew have provided unwavering care 

and support to me and our family. I would like to thank Grace and Anto. Your love and vitality 

have empowered me to tackle this complex topic and cherish every moment of this journey. 

ⅴ 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

ABSTRACT 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
PREFACE: Context of Policy and Local Adaptation 
Introduction 
Literature Review 

E-PEP as part of official environmental governance 
E-PEP and global environmental governance 
Challenges and development of E-PEP 
E-PEP and China’s urban environmental governance 

Methodology & Methods 
Methodology 
Methods 

Interviewees 
Interviews 
Analysis 

Findings 
1. Prominent Experiences of E-PEP in Shenzhen 
2. Perspectives on the Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG) 

2.1 Lukewarm or Worried Reaction to CNG 
2.2 A Vague Sense of Connection and Self-positioning 
2.3 Action Limited by Multiple Deficiencies 

3. Innovative E-PEP for CNG 
3.1 CNG Communication and Outreach 
3.2 Multifaceted Collaboration 
3.3 Administration & Management Innovation 
3.4 Capacity Building 

Discussion 
Recommendations 

I. Institutional Frameworks 
II. Funding 
III. Interactive Learning and Capacity Building 

Limitations 
Conclusion (the paper) 
Conclusion: The Role of E-PEP in Achieving Carbon Neutrality in China 
REFERENCES 
 

ⅵ 



 

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 0: A timeline of Carbon Peaking & Carbon Neutrality policy development and interviews 

of this study 

Figure 1: E-PEP illustrated with three dimensions: What, Who, and How. 

Figure 2: A systemic model for E-PEP innovation suggested for Shenzhen’s CNG work. 

ⅶ 



LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1: Dimensions of Environmental Public Engagement and Participation (E-PEP): Scope, 

Actors, and Depth of Involvement. 

Table 2: The interviewees: sector, type of institution, position, and years of professional 

experience 

Table 3: A “Yes-but” pattern of strengths and challenges in experiences on E-PEP in Shenzhen. 

Table 4: Interviewee responses about Shenzhen’s E-PEP by sector. 

ⅷ 



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

CNG​ ​ Carbon Neutrality Goals 
CPC​ ​ Communist Party of China 
CPCN​ ​ Carbon Peaking & Carbon Neutrality 
CPIP​ ​ Carbon Peaking Implementation Plan 
EIA​ ​ Environmental Impact Assessment 
ENGO​​ Environmental Non-Governmental Organization 
EPA​ ​ Environmental Protection Agency (The US) 
E-PEP​​ Environmental Public Engagement and Participation 
GHG​ ​ Greenhouse Gases 
GONGO​ Government-organized Non-Governmental Organization 
GOV​ ​ Government 
K-12​ ​ Kindergarten through 12th grade 
NEPA​ ​ National Environmental Policy Act (The US) 
NGO​ ​ Non-Governmental Organization 
PCI​ ​ Personal Carbon Inclusion (tan-pu-hui) 
PEP​ ​ Public Engagement and Participation 
PRC​ ​ People’s Republic of China 
SCNPC​ Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
SEB​ ​ Social Enterprise & Business 
UN​ ​ United Nations 
UNECE​ United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
UNEP​ ​ United Nations Environment Programme 

ⅸ 



PREFACE 

In September 2020, China’s leadership announced its carbon peaking and carbon neutrality 

(CPCN) targets to the world, marking a significant shift in the country’s climate governance 

agenda. Over the following years, a series of policies were introduced by the ruling party, central 

government, ministries, and local governments. These policies have profoundly influenced the 

scope and direction of urban climate governance and environmental public engagement and 

participation (E-PEP), which are the central focus of this study. Given that all interviews for this 

research were conducted in mid-2022, it is necessary to provide a concise overview of the key 

national CPCN policies and their relevance to E-PEP. 

​

Figure 0: A timeline of Carbon Peaking & Carbon Neutrality policy development and interviews 

of this study 

1. The “1+N” Policy Framework and E-PEP 

ⅹ 



China’s CPCN policy is structured around a top-down “1+N” framework, reflecting the strategic 

importance and high-level coordination required for this ambitious climate goal. The “1” refers 

to the overarching policy guidance, while the “N” encompasses a series of supporting sectoral 

action plans. 

In September 2021, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the State 

Council jointly issued the “Opinions on Fully and Accurately Implementing the New 

Development Philosophy and Doing a Good Job in Achieving Carbon Peaking and Carbon 

Neutrality” 1 (hereafter referred to as the Opinions). This foundational document serves as the 

“1” in the 1+N framework, providing long-term, overarching policy direction. It emphasizes the 

need for systemic change, including economic restructuring, technological innovation, and broad 

social mobilization, thereby affirming the political significance of CPCN as a core national 

strategy (Xinhua, 2021). 

A month later, the State Council released the “Action Plan for Carbon Peaking Before 2030” 2 

(hereafter referred to as the Action Plan), the first and most essential component of the “N” 

series. It sets concrete targets for the peaking phase, such as reducing energy consumption per 

unit of GDP by 13.5% by 2025 and cutting carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by over 

65% from 2005 levels by 2030. Over the next two years, ministries issued dozens of 

sector-specific implementation plans, further elaborating the technical pathways for carbon 

reduction. 

Crucially, E-PEP was integrated into this policy matrix from the outset. The Opinions include 13 

major policy recommendations, with Recommendation No. 3—“Promoting a comprehensive  

2 《2030年前碳达峰行动方案》 
1 《中共中央 国务院关于完整准确全面贯彻新发展理念做好碳达峰碳中和工作的意见》 

ⅺ 



green transformation of economic and social development”—explicitly addressing public 

engagement through national education, public demonstration projects, and “building broad 

social consensus and accelerating public participation.” Meanwhile, the Action Plan includes 

“Green and Low-Carbon Public Action” as one of its ten key actions, outlining specific tasks 

related to public education, sustainable lifestyles, corporate social responsibility, and leadership 

training. 

2. Local Adaptation of the Policy Framework: Guangdong and Shenzhen 

The 1+N framework has been adapted by local governments to reflect regional priorities and 

resource conditions. Following the national guidance, provincial and municipal governments 

were required to issue their own CPCN plans by April 2023 (Economic Daily, November 2023). 

For example, Guangdong Province, where Shenzhen is located, a major economic and 

manufacturing hub, released its Carbon Peaking Implementation Plan (CPIP) in early 2023. This 

plan sets a higher bar than the national target, aiming for non-fossil fuel energy to comprise 32% 

of total energy consumption by 2030 (compared to the national goal of 25%). The plan’s E-PEP 

section emphasizes the importance of public engagement, including incorporating green and 

low-carbon development into the education system from universities to elementary schools, 

volunteer activities, media oversight, and the personal-carbon-inclusion (PCI,碳普惠, 

tan-pu-hui) incentive initiative or for households and businesses. Notably, Guangdong’s plan also 

introduces a unique “Multi-level Pilot and Demonstration Action”, encouraging the creation of 

near-zero or zero-carbon enterprises, industrial parks, communities, and schools, reflecting a 

more structured approach to E-PEP. 

ⅻ 



As a sub-provincial city and national demonstration zone, Shenzhen has developed its own 

distinctive approach to CPCN. In September 2023, the city issued the “Shenzhen CPIP”, 

followed by the “National Carbon Peaking Pilot Plan (Shenzhen)” in July 2024. These two 

documents set ambitious goals, including a 14.5% reduction in energy consumption per unit of 

GDP from 2020 levels by 2025, surpassing the national benchmark of 13.5%. Shenzhen’s plans 

emphasize technological innovation, market mechanisms, and cross-border collaboration with 

Hong Kong, aligning closely with the city’s broader economic strategy. 

However, Shenzhen’s approach to E-PEP reveals both strengths and gaps. For example: 

●​ The city has pioneered by including “Carbon Peaking Demonstration” as one of its ten 

major actions, focusing on scalable, multi-level near-zero carbon pilot programs for 

enterprises and communities. 

●​ In the CPIP, Shenzhen follows the Guangdong CPIP to include the PCI incentive 

initiative, a government-led, voluntary initiative that encourages individual low-carbon 

practices through a dedicated digital trading platform (Wei et al., 2024). 

●​ Yet, unlike the national and provincial-level plans, Shenzhen’s documents do not include 

a standalone section on “leadership training” as part of its public action strategy. 

Instead, these topics are integrated into broader ecological education, potentially limiting 

the development of local leadership capacity for CPCN. 

●​ Furthermore, the current E-PEP framework lacks clear support for bottom-up innovation, 

with limited mention of community organizations, social groups, or environmental NGOs 

as key actors. 

Balancing Top-Down and Bottom-Up Dynamics 

xiii 



In sum, China’s CPCN goals are supported by the country’s top political authority and 

implemented through a highly structured 1+N policy framework. While this approach provides 

clear direction and strong central oversight, it also risks limiting local innovation and public 

participation if not adapted to regional contexts. 

Shenzhen’s experience illustrates both the potential and challenges of local CPCN 

implementation. On one hand, the city has made significant strides in integrating digital tools 

like “Carbon-Inclusion” and emphasizing cross-border collaboration. On the other hand, its 

CPCN plans have not fully embraced the community-driven, bottom-up elements that could 

enhance long-term public engagement and policy legitimacy. If Shenzhen, as a national pilot city, 

can overcome these challenges and fully leverage its innovation advantages, it may not only 

achieve its own carbon goals but also set a valuable precedent for other cities, thereby 

strengthening the overall sustainability and legitimacy of China’s CPCN agenda. 

xiv 



Introduction 

Climate change is a wicked problem, made worse by the fact that humans are both its cause and 

the ones who must address it. As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG), contributing 

over 25% of the world's total in 2022 (Ritchie et al., 2024), the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) has become a pivotal player on the international climate stage (Wang et al., 2018; Teng & 

Wang, 2021). At the 75th United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2020, Chinese 

President Xi Jinping announced the nation’s ambitious Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG), 

committing to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and to carbon neutrality by 2060 (UN, 2020; 

Xinhua, 2020). While this commitment is a promising step toward addressing the global climate 

crisis, it raises concerns due to the lack of a clear implementation roadmap and interim 

milestones (He et al., 2022).  

Cities in China primarily contribute to national GHG emissions (Liu et al., 2022), with 66% of 

the population now residing in cities (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2024). These urban 

areas account for 85% of direct carbon emissions and consume, on average, three times more 

energy per capita than rural regions (Wang et al., 2019). As hubs of economic activity and 

innovation, cities have also become focal points for environmental governance, facilitated by 

higher education levels and improved access to environmental information (Yu, 2014). The state 

treats urban dwellers, empowered by their collective influence, carefully (Wallace, 2014). 

Although China’s climate governance is largely top-down and state-driven (Wu et al., 2024), the 

roles of market actors and civil society are increasingly significant (Wang et al., 2018), supported 

by formal central government policies (Li et al., 2018).  

1 



Achieving Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG) will require extensive societal support and active 

public involvement, as highlighted by recent studies on climate science and governance (Wang et 

al., 2022; Fankhauser et al., 2022). In the environmental context, the terms public engagement3 

and public participation4 are similar yet distinct, with nuanced differences. Public engagement 

often emphasizes individual learning and behavior change, while public participation typically 

focuses on involvement in political decision-making (Wibeck, 2014; Kumpu, 2022; Suškevičs et 

al., 2023). These terms have been interpreted in various ways by practitioners and scholars and 

are both reflected in Chinese regulatory frameworks, particularly in the Measures for Public 

Participation (and Engagement) in Environmental Protection issued in 2015. The regulation 

defines participation as:  

“The activities concerning citizens, legal persons, and other organizations’ participation 

in such environmental protection public affairs as the formulation of policies and 

regulations, implementation of administrative licensing or imposition of administrative 

penalties, supervision over illegal acts, or implementation of publicity and education” 

(Ministry of Environmental Protection of People’s Republic of China, 2015, para. 3).  

To avoid misunderstandings or missing information in the translation, this study uses 

Environmental Public Engagement and Participation (E-PEP) to denote this combined concept. 

E-PEP is anticipated to play a critical role in achieving CNG through its ability to mobilize urban 

communities and organizations and foster collaborative solutions.  

4 According to the US Environmental Protection Agency (2014, para. 1), public participation refers to “any process that directly 
engages the public in decision-making and gives full consideration to public input in making that decision”. 

3 Sasse et al (2021, p. 2) described public engagement for UK government’s net zero work, as “a range of approaches, including 
communications to raise awareness, interventions to change behaviour and processes to enable participation in policy design.” 

2 



E-PEP practices in China vary depending on local authorities’ approaches and environmental 

priorities. Governmental agencies facilitate E-PEP either passively or actively with stakeholders 

(Who) to address environmental governance matters (What) in ways (How) that differ in their 

level of authenticity (See Figure 1, p.6) and creativity. Conventional E-PEP efforts are often 

limited in scope and authenticity, primarily aiming to mitigate public dissatisfaction caused by 

visible environmental degradation. This frequently results in performative governance with 

minimal stakeholder involvement (Ding, 2020). Climate change, with its intangible nature and 

perceived lack of individual impact, presents additional challenges for local E-PEP efforts as 

public motivation remains low (Mees, 2022). However, China’s CNG offers an opportunity for 

local governments to transition from passive to more innovative and proactive forms of E-PEP in 

municipal governance.  

This study examines the nature of E-PEP in Shenzhen, one of China’s most progressive cities in 

terms of socio-economic development and institutional reform (Liu et al., 2016). Adjacent to 

Hong Kong in South China, Shenzhen was designated as the PRC’s first Special Economic Zone 

by the central government in 1979, becoming a model city for modernization and governance 

innovation during the country’s reform and opening-up era. Over the last four decades, 

Shenzhen’s population has grown from 314,100 in 1980 (Shan et al., 2022) to over 17,560,000 in 

2020 (Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2021), alongside an impressive annual gross domestic product 

(GDP) growth rate of 20.7%  from 1980 to 2020 (Quattrone & Chen, 2023), making it one of 

Asia’s top five economic hubs (Jiang et al., 2023). However, rapid urbanization has brought 

significant environmental challenges, such as water pollution (Liu et al., 2016) and habitat loss 

from land-use changes (Quattrone & Chen, 2023). In response, Shenzhen has aligned its 

environmental protection strategies with its economic growth initiatives. Notably, it launched 

3 



China’s first carbon market in 2013 (Huang et al., 2015) and updated its Regulations on the 

Protection of the Ecological Environment in 2021, emphasizing proactive environmental 

governance (Shenzhen Municipal People's Congress Standing Committee, 2021). Agencies such 

as the Shenzhen Ecology and Environment Bureau and related governmental bodies have 

demonstrated a commitment to advancing E-PEP through new methods based on limited prior 

experience in urban contexts (Chen & Han, 2018; Quattrone & Chen, 2023; Zhang et al., 2022).  

The concept of innovation is central to this study for several reasons. First, existing 

Environmental Public Engagement and Participation (E-PEP) efforts face significant challenges 

in advancing China’s Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG), necessitating the introduction of new 

ideas, strategies, and methods. Second, innovation is a highly endorsed concept within China’s 

official discourse, and governance innovation is a key evaluation criterion for government 

officials. Third, innovation is fundamental to Shenzhen’s identity as a city of multiple pilot 

demonstrations; discussing innovation is relevant to Shenzhen and contributes to China’s broader 

urban governance experiments. Furthermore, innovation is not limited to governmental 

efforts—it also applies to the roles and actions of social actors, whose real-life circumstances 

should serve as a crucial starting point for innovation efforts. Lastly, it is essential to emphasize 

that innovation is not the ultimate goal. Instead, it represents a pathway to discovering hopeful, 

proactive, effective, and equitable approaches to achieving long-term objectives. 

Despite Shenzhen's progressiveness in urban governance, there is a gap in our understanding of 

E-PEP in this pilot city. This study seeks to address the gap in the literature regarding E-PEP’s 

role in achieving CNG in urban China. Specifically, it aims to explore the following research 

questions: 

4 



1)​ What are the current experiences of E-PEP practitioners in Shenzhen?  

2)​ What insights can be drawn from their perceptions of CNG?  

3)​ What strategies can be learned to enhance E-PEP's potential in achieving CNG? 

Recognizing the pivotal role of municipal governments and their resources in advancing national 

environmental objectives at the local level, this study incorporates perspectives from 

government, NGOs, and businesses to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges associated 

with achieving CNG. The research aims to propose actionable strategies and mechanisms for 

future E-PEP initiatives in urban China by analyzing insights from professionals across diverse 

fields.  

5 



Literature Review 

As governments worldwide grapple with the complexities of environmental governance, E-PEP 

has emerged as a crucial mechanism for fostering public awareness, enhancing policy legitimacy, 

and improving environmental outcomes (Fiorino, 1989; Newig, 2007; Reed, 2008). While E-PEP 

has been widely institutionalized, its implementation varies significantly across governance 

models, particularly in terms of scope (What), inclusivity (Who), and depth of engagement 

(How) (Arnstein, 1969; Fung, 2006; Hartley & Wood, 2005). In some cases, public participation 

is genuinely incorporated into decision-making processes, while in others, it remains a 

superficial formality shaped by bureaucratic constraints and political considerations (Spires, 

2020; Munro, 2021).  

To illustrate these variations, Figure 1 employs a cylindrical model—conceptualized 

metaphorically as two cakes—to compare two cases of E-PEP. The horizontal scale of each 

“cake” represents the scope of environmental matters addressed (What), while the partitioning of 

the circular surface indicates the range of actors and perspectives involved (Who). The vertical 

dimension reflects the depth and authenticity of engagement (How), capturing the degree to 

which public participation influences decisions. In Case A, although governmental 

environmental agencies occupy a dominant share of the process, the meaningful inclusion of 

other public actors contributes to a more inclusive and substantive participatory structure. By 

contrast, Case B demonstrates a minimal share for public actors, with limited scope and depth of 

engagement. This form of participation, largely directed by government agencies, curtails the 

transformative potential of E-PEP and tends to reproduce formalistic or symbolic involvement 

(Gao & Teets, 2023). 

6 



​

Figure 1. Environmental Public Engagement and Participation (E-PEP) illustrated with three 

dimensions—What (scope), Who (inclusion), and How (extent). Left diagram illustrates a 

theoretical case of greater engagement, whereas right diagram illustrates a theoretical case of 

little engagement.

 

To complement this visual model, Table 1 defines each of the three dimensions—What, Who, 

and How—and maps them against representative elements found in E-PEP practice by referring 

to the Aarhus Convention (UNECE, 1998)5. Together, the diagram and the table provide a 

conceptual framework for assessing the design and quality of participatory mechanisms. 

 

Table 1. Dimensions of Environmental Public Engagement and Participation (E-PEP): Scope, 
Actors, and Depth of Involvement. 

5 The Aarhus Convention, formally the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, was adopted in 1998 under the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). It establishes a legal framework to ensure the public's rights to access 
environmental information, participate in environmental decision-making, and seek justice in environmental matters. 

7 



Dimension Definition Indicative Components from E-PEP 
Cases 

What (Scope) The breadth of environmental 
issues or topics addressed 
through participation. 

Climate mitigation, pollution control, 
land use, carbon neutrality, energy 
transition, environmental education, etc. 

Who (Inclusivity) The range and diversity of 
stakeholders involved in 
participation, and the relative 
weight of their input. 

Government departments, NGOs, 
community groups, academics, private 
sector, marginalized populations, youth, 
professionals, informal actors. 

How (Depth) The modes and intensity of 
participation, reflecting the 
level of influence and 
meaningful engagement. 

Timely and sufficient time, information 
provision, consultation, co-design, 
co-production, joint decision-making, 
capacity building, participatory 
monitoring, digital platforms. 

 

Understanding these distinctions is essential for assessing how E-PEP can be innovated to 

support China’s Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG). In China, where environmental governance has 

historically been characterized by state dominance and controlled participation (Li & de Jong, 

2017; Zhang et al., 2023), questions remain regarding the effectiveness of existing E-PEP 

strategies. Given these challenges, the following sections will explore how different governance 

models, international frameworks, and evolving participatory mechanisms influence E-PEP's role 

in advancing urban environmental governance.  

 

E-PEP as part of official environmental governance 

As environmental issues gained global prominence, many developed countries established 

official agencies and introduced legislation to address environmental pollution in the early 1970s 

(Dryzek, 2013). Environmental Public Engagement and Participation (E-PEP) was formally 

recognized as a strategic approach in several nations. In the United States, the National 

8 



Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), signed by President Nixon in 1969, mandated environmental 

impact assessments (EIA) for actions or projects that could "significantly affect the quality of the 

human environment" (NEPA, §1500.1 Purpose and Policy). This legislation also introduced a 

framework for public participation in policy processes (Caldwell, 1988; Dryzek, 2013). The 

establishment of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 further 

institutionalized environmental governance.  

At the same time, urban planner Arnstein (1969) critically examined the unequal distribution of 

power in decision-making processes, introducing the influential "Ladder of Citizen Participation" 

model. This framework, which categorized varying degrees of public involvement, became  

foundational in discussions about participatory governance. Arnstein’s ladder is particularly 

relevant to understanding the US NEPA process: while NEPA created formal channels for public 

input, Arnstein’s analysis highlights that not all forms of participation are equal. Much of the 

participation under NEPA aligns with the lower or middle rungs of the ladder—such as 

"informing" or "consultation"—where citizens are given a voice but limited actual influence over 

outcomes. Thus, Arnstein’s critique underscores ongoing debates about whether official 

mechanisms like NEPA truly empower the public or merely provide the appearance of 

engagement, a discussion that has accompanied E-PEP since its inception.  

Governments worldwide increasingly recognized the importance of E-PEP and implemented 

legislative measures to enhance public involvement in environmental decision-making. In the 

following decades, other countries adopted similar regulations to those in the US, including 

China (Zhang & Wen, 2008; Morgan, 2012; Yakubu, 2018; Suškevičs et al., 2023). In the U.S., 

9 



additional legislation, such as the Freedom of Information Act (1966) and the Government in the 

Sunshine Act (1976), expanded public access to governmental information and decision-making 

processes (Beierle, 2002). Additionally, the Environmental Education Act, passed by the US 

Congress in 1970, sought to improve environmental literacy among the public (US EPA, 1990). 

China issued its first E-PEP Act, Interim Measures for Public Participation in Environmental 

Impact Assessment, in 2006 (National Environmental Protection Bureau). This era raised critical 

questions about whether technological societies could employ democratic processes to address 

emerging environmental challenges, especially as technical expertise became increasingly 

politicized (Fiorino, 1989).   

E-PEP and global environmental governance  

The first global environmental conference, the United Nations Conference on the Human 

Environment, was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972 to develop a unified perspective on 

addressing humanity's environmental challenges (Handl, 2012). This conference emphasized the 

importance of environmental education for influencing the opinions and behaviors of individuals, 

businesses, and communities, enshrining it as one of the twenty-six principles in the Stockholm 

Declaration. It also led to the establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme 

(UNEP), tasked with providing leadership in global environmental governance, including efforts 

to combat climate change (United Nations, 1972; Esty, 2009). It was the first global conference 

that China attended and actively participated in following its formal entry into the United 

Nations (Ma, 2021).  

10 



In the late 1970s and 1980s, E-PEP emerged as a critical focus within global environmental 

governance, closely tied to the development of environmental education. In 1977, UNESCO and 

UNEP convened the first international conference on environmental education in Tbilisi, 

Georgia. The resulting Tbilisi Declaration positioned public participation as a central objective of 

environmental education, alongside fostering awareness, knowledge, attitudes, and skills (UNEP, 

1977). At the time, environmental public participation lacked a strong foundation, as limited 

environmental education and awareness impeded meaningful engagement by the public (Gough, 

1997; Palmer, 2002). This alignment of public engagement with global environmental goals was 

further emphasized in the 1987 Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, which called for 

collective action to address sustainability challenges. The report underscored the importance of 

education, public debate, and participation as fundamental drivers of change within the 

framework of sustainable development (World Commission on Environment and Development, 

1987).  

During the 1990s, international environmental agreements significantly advanced the acceptance 

and institutionalization of E-PEP. The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro catalyzed global 

discussions on sustainable development and climate change, embedding public participation into 

foundational international documents such as Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration (United 

Nations, 1992a; United Nations, 1992b; Newig, 2007; Handl, 2012). Later, the Aarhus 

Convention, adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) in 

1998, became the first legally binding global instrument for E-PEP. It established public rights to 

access information, participate in decision-making, and seek justice in environmental matters 

11 



while imposing obligations on member states (UNECE, 1998; Ebbesson et al., 2014). The 

Aarhus Convention strengthened participation processes and provided a framework for 

addressing global challenges such as climate change and biodiversity loss through E-PEP 

(Palerm, 1999; Hartley & Wood, 2005). These milestones laid the groundwork for the evolving 

role of E-PEP as scholars increasingly recognized its integration into multilevel governance 

frameworks and its potential to facilitate collaboration among local, national, and international 

actors (Gupta, 2010; Newig & Fritsch, 2009). This institutional progress set the stage for more 

dynamic and inclusive approaches to public participation in environmental governance, forming 

the basis for addressing the challenges and opportunities of E-PEP in the 21st century.  

Challenges and development of E-PEP 

While E-PEP has become a standard feature of environmental decision-making, it continues to 

face persistent challenges related to legitimacy, justice, implementation, and effectiveness 

(Ventriss, 1985; Konisky & Beierle, 2001; Mostert, 2003; Fung, 2006; Reed, 2008; Quick & 

Bryson, 2022). E-PEP plays a vital role in addressing public needs and garnering support for 

environmental policies, thereby enhancing their legitimacy (Fung, 2006; Ansell & Torfing, 

2022). However, political inequalities often exclude marginalized groups, undermining 

inclusivity and limiting the scope of engagement (Arnstein, 1969; King et al., 1998; Fung, 2006). 

Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), a prominent form of E-PEP, offer valuable 

opportunities to mitigate conflicts but are often criticized for failing to address systemic distrust 

in environmental policymaking (Hollick, 1986; Caldwell, 1988; Fiorino, 1989).  

12 



In the context of climate governance, E-PEP encounters additional barriers. The complexity of 

climate issues often deters meaningful public involvement due to gaps in understanding and 

awareness (Hügel & Davies, 2020). Paradoxes in participatory mechanisms—where efforts to 

include citizens fall short of ensuring genuine engagement—frequently lead to public 

disillusionment and even confrontation with administrators (King et al., 1998; Sprain, 2016). 

Effective climate adaptation and mitigation require technical expertise, local knowledge, and 

active community participation, yet these elements are often insufficiently integrated into 

decision-making processes (Cloutier et al., 2015).  

The emergence of digital technologies in the 21st century offers new avenues for addressing 

these challenges. Tools such as online consultations, social media platforms, and geographic 

information systems (GIS) have enhanced the accessibility, transparency, and inclusivity of 

E-PEP processes (Rowe & Frewer, 2005; Reed, 2008; Fung, 2015). Additionally, global 

networks such as ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability) have fostered the exchange of 

best practices and innovative solutions among cities, promoting urban sustainability and 

environmental governance (Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011; Wolfram et al., 2019).  

Equity and justice remain critical concerns within E-PEP, particularly in climate governance and 

biodiversity conservation. Ensuring the meaningful inclusion of marginalized and vulnerable 

populations is essential to fostering fair and effective participatory processes (Sovacool & 

Dworkin, 2015; Schlosberg et al., 2017). Meanwhile, participatory approaches to climate 

adaptation and mitigation have demonstrated the potential to enhance the legitimacy and efficacy 

13 



of policies by engaging local communities and stakeholders (Hügel & Davies, 2020; Sarzynski, 

2015). 

Cities worldwide increasingly leverage E-PEP to address environmental challenges through 

innovative and community-based practices. These efforts, which integrate environmental 

education, participatory processes, and a sense of place, enhance the resilience of urban 

socio-ecological systems and foster positive environmental outcomes (Krasny & Tidball, 2009; 

Kudryavtsev et al., 2012). As urbanization accelerates globally, the need for robust, inclusive, 

and innovative E-PEP mechanisms has never been more urgent. These approaches improve 

environmental quality and ecosystem services, strengthen community adaptive capacity, and 

provide valuable opportunities for scientific and policy collaboration (Delia & Krasny, 2018; 

Spiegel-Feld et al., 2023). 

E-PEP and China’s urban environmental governance  

The concept of E-PEP has been formally recognized and increasingly adopted in the PRC, 

though institutional support remains insufficient (Li et al., 2012), leading to obstacles in actual 

practices. The country’s first Environmental Protection Law, enacted in 1979, incorporated 

E-PEP in its general provisions6 and included a chapter on Scientific Research and Education 

(Standing Committee of the National People's Congress [SCNPC], 1979). In the 2014 revision, 

this chapter was updated to "Information Disclosure and Public Engagement," thereby enhancing 

6 “Reliance upon the masses with everybody taking part in the protection of the environment for the 
benefit of the people (依靠群众，大家动手，保护环境，造福人民)”, 
https://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=44690. The General Provision was updated to 
“All entities and individuals shall have the obligation to protect environment (一切单位和个人都有保护环境
的义务)”. https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=18126&lib=law. 

14 

https://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=44690
https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=18126&lib=law


the rights of citizens, legal entities, and organizations to participate in E-PEP through more 

transparent processes (SCNPC, 2014; Zhu & Wu, 2017). This shift reflected growing public 

concerns over environmental quality (Zhang et al., 2013). The issuance of the Measures for 

Public Participation in Environmental Protection in 2015 further provided detailed guidelines by 

the Ministry of Environmental Protection. The government seems to aim at two objectives: 

narrowing the enforcement gap by engaging the public in policy implementation and directing 

public concerns toward avenues that bolster the Communist Party's legitimacy while mitigating 

societal tensions (Grano, 2016; Munro, 2021). However, initiatives such as Environmental 

Impact Assessments (EIAs), a prominent form of E-PEP, have often faced limitations or been 

discouraged during the implementation phase (Chen et al., 2015; Alberton, 2017; Zhou et al., 

2019). Local governments have historically responded passively to public demands during 

environmental crises (Li et al., 2012; Hensengerth & Lu, 2019), frequently avoiding formal or 

effective power-sharing mechanisms (Grano & Zhang, 2016; Owen, 2020; Pien, 2020; Gao & 

Teets, 2021).  

Despite these challenges, E-PEP is gaining traction in urban environmental governance in the 

PRC (Turiel et al., 2020). Recent studies show that E-PEP enhances citizen satisfaction with 

environmental policies (Li, 2022), strengthens governmental regulatory capacity, restricts 

environmental violations by corporations (Zhang et al., 2023), and contributes to positive 

environmental outcomes and policy impacts at the local level (Fu & Geng, 2019; Ge et al., 2021; 

Fu et al., 2022; Zhang & Liao, 2022; Yang et al., 2023). Bottom-up E-PEP has become 

15 



increasingly dynamic, involving various stakeholders to improve quality of life while 

implementing low-carbon initiatives (Huang et al., 2020).  

Nevertheless, E-PEP in China’s urban environmental governance continues to face significant 

challenges related to its maturity, scope, and sustainability (Zhou et al., 2019; Gao & Teets, 

2023). While innovative participatory mechanisms are becoming more critical to local 

governance (Owen, 2020), governmental E-PEP initiatives frequently fail to produce meaningful 

outcomes (Gao & Teets, 2023). Despite advancements in information technology, E-PEP 

engagement levels remain relatively low (Dai, 2024); participation is higher among urban 

residents and individuals with greater educational attainment (Li & de Jong, 2017; Munro, 2021). 

Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) also play a role in reducing carbon 

emissions; however, their effectiveness depends on strong official support and their ability to 

maintain independence (Yang et al., 2023; Chu et al., 2022).  

The announcement of China’s Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG) in 2020 marked a new phase in 

environmental governance, positioning climate change as a key metric for political performance 

legitimacy (Teng & Wang, 2021). However, significant gaps remain, including a lack of 

coordination and synergy in national climate laws, trade-offs between central and local 

government priorities, and insufficient public engagement (Wu, 2023). A recent national public 

survey by Wang et al. (2024) revealed higher awareness of CNG among those who work in 

government (78%) compared to university/research institutes (64%), students (61%), and 

business/self-employed (57%) attributed to top-down policy communication. Huang et al. (2020) 

observed that urban community advocacy for local interests indicates a need for effective 

16 



adjustments or transformations in climate policies through E-PEP.  Furthermore, Zhang et al. 

(2023a) highlighted that interactive participation between residents, governments, and ENGOs 

leads to substantial emission reduction. Despite these developments, exploring innovative 

approaches to enhance E-PEP to achieve CNG in the country’s urban governance remains in its 

infancy (Gao & Teets, 2023). Advancing E-PEP in the PRC is critical to addressing the climate 

crisis effectively. 

17 



Methodology & Methods 

Methodology 

Phenomenology seeks to understand a phenomenon's very nature by exploring its lived 

experiences and meanings (van Manen & van Manen, 2021). A phenomenological study aims to 

understand the shared lived experiences related to a concept or phenomenon as perceived by 

multiple individuals (Creswell & Poth, 2018). "Experience" is at the center of providing answers 

for the research approach to pursue knowledge through exploring subjective perspectives 

(Knaack, 1984; Polkinghorne, 1989; van Manen, 2007). Polkinghorne (1989) pointed out that the 

nature of experience is characterized by the active processes that encompass and create the 

diverse contents that come into our awareness, including the objects we perceive and those 

derived from memory, imagination, and emotions. This human experience may include a 

phenomenon such as insomnia, being left out, anger, grief, or undergoing coronary artery bypass 

surgery (Moustakas, 1994). van Manen (2007) claims that educators and scholars are intrigued 

by phenomenology's potential for practical application. In public administration, phenomenology 

involves the exploration of the interpretations and significances that social actors assign to 

events, works, and symbols, and its process can include recruiting business firms and 

governmental institutions (Thani, 2012).  

The strengths of phenomenological research include the in-depth exploration of subjective 

perspective, rich descriptive data, holistic understanding with facilitation of empathy and 

learning, and practical applications across various disciplines (van Manen, 2014; Creswell and 

Poth, 2018). Phenomenology also raises challenges for researchers, including bracketing (i.e., 

18 



putting aside presuppositions and assumptions) and maintaining objectivity while actively 

exploring fundamental themes to grasp the essence of the lived experience (Polkinghorne, 1989). 

The resulting descriptive account maintains a profound connection to the subject of investigation 

and achieves a harmonious balance between the individual parts and the entirety of the writing 

(Creswell and Poth, 2018). In this study, phenomenology provides the methodological 

foundation for exploring how professionals in Shenzhen experience E-PEP in the city, and how 

they respond to, reflect on, and interpret E-PEP in the context of China’s carbon neutrality goals. 

By focusing on the lived experiences and constructed meanings of these professionals, this 

approach enables a deeper understanding of how E-PEP is perceived, implemented, and 

potentially enhanced within local governance. 

 

This research is also informed by the case study approach, which focuses on a case or cases to 

understand how or why a social phenomenon works in contemporary circumstances (Yin, 2014; 

Creswell, 2018). The E-PEP work and its relation with CNG in the city of Shenzhen are a 

specific case to be examined and bounded (Yin, 2014) by the definition of E-PEP and the scope 

of practices under municipal governance. By analyzing the interviews from the case, I identify 

essential phenomena and their related causes to gain a general understanding of these 

phenomena. By examining and comparing different perspectives and reviewing supplementary 

materials, I aim to uncover variations and connections among the various categories of 

respondents. Ultimately, this process provides practical insights into the research topic. 

19 



Methods 

This study explores the perspectives of key urban professionals in Shenzhen regarding 

Environmental Public Engagement and Participation (E-PEP) and China’s Carbon Neutrality 

Goals (CNG). It also seeks urban professionals’ insights into how E-PEP might be enhanced to 

better support local efforts in achieving CNG. Gathering evidence from a variety of viewpoints 

can deepen understanding of the phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994; Creswell & Poth, 2018), in this 

case, by identifying inclusive and actionable recommendations for E-PEP. 

In conducting the inquiry, I maintained a neutral stance and applied varied perspectives within 

E-PEP to help clarify specific responses. During interviews, I employed "bracketing" to set aside 

my own biases, inviting participants to openly share their experiences and perspectives related to 

the research topic, allowing for an authentic phenomenological understanding of their lived 

experiences (Brinkmann, 2014). At times, I posed targeted follow-up questions to delve deeper 

into aspects of urban participation. I also observed that “utterances that ‘spill beyond the 

structure’” often provided critical insights, complementing responses to the pre-structured 

questions (Brinkmann, 2014, p. 285).  

Interviewees 

Interviewees were recruited from professional networks and through snowball sampling. 

Between 2017 to 2022, I led urban conservation programs for an ENGO in Shenzhen before 

transitioning to a consultancy role supporting environmental education and public engagement 

initiatives for city environmental agencies. These roles enabled me to develop a strong network 

20 



of stakeholders involved in urban E-PEP. For this study, I selected interviewees from 

governmental institutions, NGOs, and private firms, focusing on official leaders, executives, and 

senior managers with at least five years of experience in E-PEP. The initial interviewees 

recommended additional participants (snowball sampling). A total of eighteen interviewees 

participated, each bringing substantial professional expertise, with many having extensive 

experience in developing and managing local E-PEP initiatives.  

I divided the interviewees into three categories: Government (GOV, including governmental 

agencies and government-organized NGOs or “GONGOs”), NGOs (including NGOs, 

foundations, and individual contributors), and SEB (Social Enterprise and Business) (see Table 

2). In the Government category, participants are from governmental agencies and 

government-organized non-profit institutes. In the NGO sector, participants work for non-profits 

registered as private non-enterprises (民办非企业) or private foundations (非公募基金会); I 

also included one independent researcher. For the SEB sector, participants were employed by 

entities with dual registration as private non-enterprises and business companies or as standard 

business companies.  

Following Cornell Institutional Review Board (IRB) policy, this study does not disclose personal 

or organizational identifiers to protect participant privacy. To ensure confidentiality, participants 

are referred to as “No. X (employer sector)” in this research.  

Table 2. Sector, type of institution, position, and years of professional experiences of the 

interviewees. 

21 



Sector Type of Institution Position 
Work 

Experience:​
(Years) 

GOV Agency Director 10-15 

Agency Vice Director 10-15 

GONGO Director 6-9 

GONGO Vice Director 6-9 

NGO ENGO Executive Director 16-20 

NGO/Foundation Deputy Secretary-General 16-20 

NGO/Foundation Secretary-General 10-15 

ENGO Board Member & Adviser 10-15 

NGO of education Founder & Director 10-15 

NGO of education  Vice Director 10-15 

Individual Researcher & Adviser 6-9 

NGO/Foundation Vice Director 6-9 

SEB ​
(Social 

Enterprise 
and 

Business) 

Social Enterprise Founder & CEO 6-9 

Social Enterprise General Manager 10-15 

Regular Business CSR Specialist 10-15 

Social Enterprise Co-Founder & CEO >20 

Regular Business Co-Founder & CEO (2) 6-9 

 

Interviews 

In 2022, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 18 stakeholders in Shenzhen, China. This 

included 15 in-person interviews and two conducted via Zoom, one of which involved two 

22 



interviewees at the same time. Each interview was conducted in Chinese and lasted between 40 

and 110 minutes. 

Four primary question themes guided the interviews:  

1) How do you view E-PEP's current status and specifics in Shenzhen?  

2) What is your perception of CNG? 

3) How do you assess the city government’s E-PEP efforts in advancing CNG? 

4) What challenges does the government need to overcome, and how could it innovate to 

improve E-PEP for CNG?  

Participants were asked to share their experiences, perspectives, critiques, and ideas. Some 

interviewees connected their responses to current projects they were working on, which naturally 

became a focal point in their responses. This open format allowed participants to articulate their 

thoughts without being constrained to the predefined questions, creating a more organic and 

expressive discussion within each theme. 

Analysis 

I transcribed the interview audio recordings and then corrected and organized the text. Using the 

iFlyrec transcription service, I transcribed all 17 interview recordings into text. I carefully 

reviewed and corrected each transcription with partial support from a research assistant. In Word 

documents, I organized the text by marking paragraphs based on interview themes and 

annotating key points related to participants' experiences, emotions, and thoughts. I frequently 

23 



revisited the original audio recordings throughout this process to ensure accuracy (Braun & 

Clarke, 2006; Poland, 2001). 

I performed multiple rounds of cumulative coding using the Taguett qualitative data analysis 

software. Initially, I highlighted key responses in each interview transcript according to the 

thematic framework of the interviews. Given the recurring nature of the interview topics, many 

participants provided additional responses to similar questions at different stages of the 

interviews. During the iterative coding process, I combined notes from the first round of reading 

to identify 37 unique tags, comprising 20 predetermined question categories from the interview 

questions and 17 categories that emerged from answers. Each “highlighted section” could 

contain one or more “independent tags.” These tags were applied hierarchically to the interview 

texts, resulting in 867 "highlighted sections" or "hierarchical tags" (Rampin & Rampin, 2021) 

and a cumulative total of 5,140 "independent tags." This approach allowed for detailed 

annotation of the interview data while facilitating subsequent retrieval and analysis (Miles et al., 

2013). 

I conducted a systematic analysis based on the coding results (i.e., the codebook). I exported the 

coded data from Taguett into a spreadsheet, constructing an index database based on interview 

themes, question categories, and content points. This database enabled me to efficiently retrieve 

and combine responses from different participants and their associated categories and points, 

providing robust support for in-depth research. Subsequently, I utilized word processing software 

to analyze findings under each research theme and began drafting the related sections (Saldaña, 

2016). 

24 



To avoid misinterpretation of participants' oral expressions, I reconnected with some 

interviewees via written or audio communication during the coding analysis phase. During 

semantic verification, I provided participants with the research background and the context of 

specific questions while ensuring that all participants’ identities remained confidential. No 

participant revised or contradicted their earlier statements during this process. Additionally, 

many interviewees mentioned particular cases during the interviews. To better understand the 

context and strengthen data analysis, I conducted supplementary research on these cases, which 

included various E-PEP initiatives led by Shenzhen’s government, communities, and commercial 

sectors. I gathered information about these E-PEP projects from a variety of sources, including 

academic articles, project reports, local media, and the websites of relevant institutions, as well 

as social media platforms like WeChat public accounts. 

I coded the data in its original language (Chinese) to minimize potential semantic bias or 

information loss during translation. During the writing phase, I translated the content from 

Chinese into English. I initially utilized Google Translate and ChatGPT to enhance translation 

efficiency. I then followed up with thorough proofreading and corrections to ensure accuracy and 

coherence, considering context and cultural nuances (van Nes et al., 2010; Temple & Young, 

2004).  

 

25 



Findings 

This section begins by presenting the overall experiences shared by E-PEP professionals, 

followed by an analysis of the specific experiences of the three interviewee groups. It then 

explores their perspectives on the national Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG) across three 

dimensions: attitudes and reactions, sense of connection and self-positioning, and action-oriented 

deficiencies. Finally, the findings highlight interviewees’  ideas for innovative E-PEP approaches 

to support CNG, focusing on communication and societal dissemination, collaboration, 

administration and management, and capacity building. 

1. Prominent Experiences of E-PEP in Shenzhen 

When evaluating E-PEP experiences in Shenzhen, a clear "Yes-but" pattern emerged from 

interviews with urban professionals, beginning with initial praise followed by critical reflections 

(Table 3). On the positive side, urban governance in Shenzhen is characterized by its relative 

openness, fostering a supportive environment for public participation. The city boasts a vibrant 

civil society with active citizen engagement, and the work quality of NGOs and private 

organizations is widely commended. Interviewees highlighted efforts in environmental 

education, especially nature education and waste sorting education programs, co-organized by 

local NGOs and governmental agencies, which have significantly contributed to raising public 

awareness and promoting engagement. 

However, several challenges persist. E-PEP in Shenzhen remains constrained in its scope, depth, 

and professionalism. Formalism—focusing on the form of work rather than its 

effectiveness—often hinders official initiatives, while government support and trust in NGOs are 

26 



frequently limited or conditional. Additionally, insufficient resource allocation and a lack of 

transparent information sharing from government agencies restrict the potential of public and 

NGO-led environmental initiatives. These issues underscore the need for greater collaboration 

and institutional support to enhance E-PEP’s effectiveness. 

Table 3: A “Yes-but” pattern of strengths and challenges in experiences on E-PEP in Shenzhen. 

Strengths (Yes, …) Challenges (but …) 

●​ The general openness and performance 
of urban governance 

●​ PEP insufficiencies: scope, depth, and 
professionalism 

●​ The existence of civil society and 
citizen participation 

●​ Formalism of official work 

●​ Quality of NGO & private project work ●​ Limited or conditional official support 
and trust in NGOs 

●​ Nature education work ●​ Limited resources and information 
sharing from the government 

 

A "Yes-but" approach (Table 4) also helps capture the dual nature of the feedback shared among 

interviewees in the three sectors (GOV, NGO, SEB). Yet, each sector noted different strengths 

and challenges in their experiences.  

Table 4: Interviewee responses about Shenzhen’s E-PEP by sector. 

Sector Strengths (Yes) Challenges (But) 

GOV ●​ Recognition of practicing PEP and 

the value of collaboration 

●​ Recognition of NGO and SEB's 

ability 

●​ Recognition of nature education and 

local NGOs' contribution to it 

●​ Lack of pubic awareness and ability 

●​ Implementation challenges 

●​ Government caution, esp. on influence on 

the local economy 

●​ Lack of effective PEP pathways 

●​ Lack of depth and variety 

27 



NGO ●​ A relatively open attitude and 

modern governance methods of the 

municipality 

●​ A vibrant civil society, with citizens 

having a strong sense of belonging 

and public spirit 

●​ A good natural environment and 

innovative nature education 

programs 

●​ Insufficient extent and impact of E-PEP 

●​ Insufficient resources and official support 

●​ Lack of trust and support of the 

government for NGOs 

SEB ●​ Regular pathway of E-PEP 

recognized 

●​ Government's attention and support  

●​ Pro-nature awareness and nature 

education  

●​ NGO's quality of work 

●​ Insufficient extent of E-PEP 

●​ Conditional support and mistrust of the 

government to NGOs 

●​ Formalism and inadequate 

implementation of government programs 

●​ Inadequate access to information and 

resource sharing 

●​ Insufficient education and training 

 

❖​ Government 

Government interviewees prioritized achieving results while safeguarding their reputations. They 

often perceived E-PEP as a form of resource management and a mechanism for cross-sectoral 

cooperation. Most government officials acknowledged the significance of E-PEP in Shenzhen 

and its notable contributions, particularly in physical environment and nature education, which 

was highlighted as a local strength.  

The government actually quite emphasized (E-PEP), as now we often talk about 

‘extensive consultation/deliberation, joint contribution and shared benefits.’ So I think it 

28 



(E-PEP) is still the trend of the main body of the government, including our management 

work, now also requires a lot of things that will not be a leader’s say. (No.15 GOV) 

(Most impressive experience is) The overall nature education in Shenzhen and the nature 

education work done by (NGO) is really well done. (No.14 GOV) 

However, challenges were evident. Officials characterized E-PEP as being in its early stages, 

constrained by limited strategies, and lacking professionalism and efficacy. Some expressed 

concerns over citizens’ inability to engage effectively, while others pointed to passiveness and 

cautiousness within government departments.  

At present, there is no very good and guaranteed way to get the results of effective public 

participation. I mean, the current pathway is particularly simple and crude, for example, 

to organize an online poll, so the Government will be very afraid because the results of 

your online voting are usually inaccurate. (No.11 GOV)  

❖​ NGOs 

NGO managers provided the most detailed insights, likely due to their extensive experience with 

E-PEP. They generally praised Shenzhen’s performance in urban governance, emphasizing the 

collaborative contributions of government, residents, and NGOs.  

There is a group of active environmental intellectuals in the private sector who are more 

committed to Shenzhen; The private sector is quite active and influenced by Lingnan 

culture, which is reflected in the design of the program, very practical. (No.01 NGO) 

Nature education, supported by official initiatives and NGO-led activities, was frequently 

highlighted as a key aspect of Shenzhen’s E-PEP efforts.  

Shenzhen's natural conditions are rich in ecosystems and relatively easy to access……I 

think systematic nature education was initiated in Shenzhen, and its influence in 

Shenzhen and the changes it can bring from the government to the civil society are very 

big. (No.10 NGO) 

29 



However, NGOs highlighted significant challenges, including government distrust of their work, 

ambiguous attitudes toward citizen participation at a broader level, and limitations in the 

professionalism and effectiveness of government-led E-PEP initiatives.  

(Deep E-PEP) It is actually very rare; our government is actually wary of environmental 

organizations; ...... I don't have much confidence in the government as a pathway because 

of this vigilance. (No.17 NGO) 

Additionally, NGOs noted insufficient public resources and inconsistent government support for 

their work.  

There is a lot of publicity but less action; the government's work is not refined enough to 

put the implementation onto the ground. It is poor at the project level; it is too 

fragmented, not systemic enough; we need to be trained and learn. The official resources 

are not connected and lack integration. (No.05 NGO) 

❖​ Social Enterprises and Business  

SEB leaders offered critical reflections, emphasizing challenges while acknowledging the quality 

of NGO work and residents’ enthusiasm for the city’s public nature education programs.  

The government pays attention to the environment, and there are certain laws and 

regulations. The public has environmental literacy; the work of NGOs is more precise 

and with higher quality, with better effects and feelings, more grounded with equal 

communication and sharing. (No.04 SEB) 

There is a fairly positive interaction between the general public and government 

departments. The government does do something. (No.07 SEB) 

They observed that government-led E-PEP initiatives often focused on procedural formalities 

rather than achieving meaningful outcomes.  

Government activities are more about formality than significance. They are not planned 

in advance and are done for the sake of doing; it’s a bit of formalism. (No.04 SEB) 

30 



SEB leaders stressed the importance of communication and education, noting that these areas 

remain underdeveloped. They also expressed concerns over limited resources and income 

opportunities, which hindered their ability to operate effectively. Drawing from their 

experiences, SEB leaders agreed that stronger collaboration between the Shenzhen government 

and the private sector could significantly enhance E-PEP outcomes.  

The government is superficially welcoming, with few supporting resources; government 

programs can be ‘tiger's head, snake's tail’ (all flash and no substance), and the results 

are not fed back to the public. (No.08 SEB) 

2. Perspectives on the Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG) 

Urban E-PEP professionals in Shenzhen expressed generally reserved or concerned reactions to 

China’s Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG). While none of the interviewees opposed the goals, their 

responses lacked enthusiasm, mainly due to limited understanding or expertise in addressing 

such a complex issue. Professionals working within climate-specific mandates tended to respond 

more positively but raised concerns about the practical implications of CNG and the risks of 

media exaggeration. Many respondents recognized a vague connection between CNG and their 

work but noted the absence of clear guidelines, actionable strategies, and local leadership to align 

their efforts with the goals. Key barriers included ineffective public communication, constrained 

organizational capacity, and insufficient administrative mechanisms and resources. Concerns 

over social equity and the need for locally tailored approaches further underscore the challenges 

professionals face in advancing CNG. 

31 



2.1 Lukewarm or Worried Reaction to CNG  

The announcement of carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 was broadly 

accepted, with no explicit objections. However, most urban E-PEP professionals reacted without 

enthusiasm, citing limited knowledge or capacity to address such a broad and complex issue. 

Respondents affiliated with organizations holding specific climate mandates expressed greater 

positivity but worried about what CNG would entail and how media hype could lead to 

unrealistic expectations.   

❖​ Government  

Government officials recognized the importance of CNG but rarely elaborated on their 

understanding, often viewing it through the lens of their professional roles. 

I don't have any special reaction to the CNG matter. I somewhat feel numb. It is like 

adding another thing, a combination (with past work concepts, such as low carbon). 

(No.11 GOV) 

❖​ NGOs 

NGO respondents offered rational critiques, acknowledging their limited understanding and 

capacity while expressing concerns about how CNG could impact social justice and the 

sustainability of their work.  

It didn't give me a strong feeling when I heard the announcement from the top leader. I 

still don't think it's something very special, given the way this country makes its policy 

announcements. (No. 01 NGO) 

32 



We have a group of people who have been doing this (ecological carbon sink) for more 

than ten years, cultivating and protecting it, but we are not sensitive to climate issues. 

(No. 06 NGO) 

This (CNG) is precisely one of the things I don't know the most about and am afraid to 

articulate. ...... I don't have the relevant scientific basis or literacy. This is really too big 

for me to understand. (No. 17 NGO) 

They also highlighted the goals' abstract nature, which created significant challenges in fostering 

public awareness and participation. 

It (CNG) is more like a computational goal (between emission and absorption), which 

(perhaps) is a way to make it easier to manage, but its relationship with ordinary people 

is very abstract. I think it also brings up a question of how to consider fairness and 

sustainability. (No. 13 NGO) 

❖​ Social Enterprises and Business  

SEB managers showed varied attitudes. Some admitted they had no reaction or struggled to 

comprehend CNG, while others questioned how the goals could be operationalized.  

I don’t have a special reaction after hearing about it (CNG).  It is referred to as a 

"buzzword" in English, meaning a term that’s been overhyped to the point of losing 

clarity, and I feel a bit like that about it. (No. 02 SEB) 

I don't feel much about it. I don’t have the ability to properly evaluate it. (No. 07 SEB) 

I think it’s too big—it’s a very broad concept. I don’t understand it and don’t really know 

what it is or what it specifically means. (No. 08 SEB) 

Despite limited understanding, a few expressed cautious optimism and were already expanding 

their work based on CNG-related concepts.  

33 



It won't have a significant impact on me, but if we align ourselves with it, there will be 

benefits and no drawbacks. (No. 16 SEB) 

2.2 A Vague Sense of Connection and Self-positioning 

Most respondents agreed that CNG was or should be connected to their work, but nearly all 

emphasized a lack of explicit content, actionable methods, and local leadership. 

❖​ Government 

While most government respondents acknowledged the theoretical connection between CNG and 

their work, they struggled to define specific strategies or pathways.  

“Now everyone in our unit wants to do research in this area (of CNG). At first I really felt 

it had nothing to do with me, but later I saw various projects doing this so-called 

zero-carbon (concept), which is a work guide related to low carbon or people (‘s project), 

and now they are all doing this kind of topic” (No. 15, GOV) 

Some noted that the absence of a higher-level climate management agency in Shenzhen limited 

their ability to align their work with CNG objectives, even when their responsibilities overlapped 

with urban environmental concerns. 

It has nothing to do with me. I want to ask if Shenzhen has an urban climate change 

office? If you don’t have (such leadership), why should our bureau be responsible for 

related work? (No. 03, GOV) 

❖​ NGOs 

NGO professionals acknowledged their roles in connecting to and supporting CNG and adopted 

a constructive attitude, despite admitting to understanding, capacity, and resource limitations.  

My first reaction was that this was a good thing. We had a hard time promoting 

low-carbon transformation before, so we had to keep advocating. After the country set 

34 



the target, the advocacy work was much easier. You mainly improved your ability and 

empowered this work. (No.12 NGO) 

I think this goal is quite ambitious. Actually, I was thinking about how to implement it. I 

don’t know what the whole set of implementation tasks is. But I think this goal is very 

good. It is specific, not just talking about climate change.  (No.10 NGO) 

They shared ideas for researching and adjusting strategies, exploring specific tasks tied to CNG, 

and pursuing learning opportunities to enhance their connection and contributions. 

We need to really understand its nature and its impact on us (No.06 NGO) 

We hired a strategic consultant for the climate change project. We don't have much 

association or judgment on the data (related to CNG), which is also a challenge to the 

logical statement that we need to focus on when we carry out the next five-year strategic 

planning. That is, what contribution will we make to the emission reduction goal? (No. 01 

NGO) 

I am quite interested in things like this (CNG), because I think I can make our current 

program more profound, but how can it match our program? I have been looking for an 

executable solution that we can implement, but I haven’t been able to figure it out. (No. 

05 NGO) 

❖​ Social Enterprises and Business  

Some SEB leaders viewed CNG as a potential opportunity worth exploring. While some 

described the goals as overly broad and abstract, they recognized growing enthusiasm within the 

business community. Others noted that their organizations already had environmental or 

climate-related initiatives that could align with CNG, and some began leveraging these goals to 

expand their projects.  

I will continue to follow it, but looking at a few business plans right now, I find them quite 

uninteresting. (No. 02 SEB) 

35 



It definitely requires attention because it represents a major national movement. 

However, the specific steps to be taken are still under evaluation, as there is still much 

work to be done in carbon inventory assessments. (No. 07 SEB) 

We haven’t actually formally discussed this topic (with the staff team), but we’ve recently 

started applying this approach in a few projects we’re pitching. (No. 16 SEB) 

2.3 Action Limited by Multiple Deficiencies 

At the implementation level, E-PEP professionals identified several obstacles to advancing CNG 

initiatives. The lack of adequate public communication and education about CNG and its 

relationship to climate change was the most significant challenge. Many respondents also cited 

constrained organizational capacity and insufficient administrative mechanisms and resources. 

Concerns about social equity and the need for localized approaches further underscore the 

complexity of implementing CNG at the urban level. 

❖​ Government 

Government respondents frequently discussed their responsibilities and potential work pathways. 

In Shenzhen, a lack of municipal administrative coordination for CNG initiatives hindered 

information sharing, resource allocation, and motivation across departments. Some officials 

superficially integrated CNG into their work, relying on research projects initiated by colleagues 

or leaders to deepen their understanding. There was broad consensus on the need for innovative 

collaboration with NGOs to enhance future efforts.  

I still don’t really have (a chance for) a deep learning and discussion of this matter 

(CNG). But in last year, we had the theme for a public event to echo the national 

direction. (No. 11 GOV) 

36 



❖​ NGOs 

NGO managers expressed cautious views, noting insufficient government clarity on CNG 

initiatives and the resulting challenges for public cooperation and understanding. They also 

highlighted the need for in-depth research, stronger local connections, and stable macroeconomic 

conditions to support their work. 

No one opposes this initiative, but there needs to be clear guidance on what the public 

can effectively do to increase carbon storage and reduce carbon emissions. (No.10 NGO) 

I'm also pursuing (locally) what the phenomenon and causes of climate change are, and 

this is one thing in particular that I'm afraid to say much about. (No.17 NGO) 

❖​ Social Enterprises and Business 

SEB leaders acknowledged their limited knowledge of CNG but showed eagerness to explore 

related opportunities. They emphasized the importance of government leadership in this area and 

expressed interest in future collaboration with public agencies.  

I don't feel much about the (GNG) goals. I'm not competent enough to judge it. We all 

know about the 2030 and 2060 goals that the state is going to do, but when it's broken 

down, what does it represent? (No. 07 SEB) 

It depends on whether the government will allocate resources to educating the public, 

which I believe is crucial. If businesses lack motivation, they won’t put much effort into 

addressing these issues, and it will be even harder for grassroots organizations to speak 

up about them. (No. 08 SEB) 

We recently bid on several projects and have already used this approach (the CNG 

concept) in our proposals," said A. "We haven't formally discussed it as a proposition 

internally," said B. "We hope to have a more feasible project to present for internal 

discussions," said both A and B. (No. 16 SEB, A&B) 

37 



3. Innovative E-PEP for CNG 

To advance CNG through E-PEP, practitioners identified four key areas for innovation: 1) 

communication and societal expansion, 2) collaboration, 3) administration and management, and 

4) capacity building. 

Despite differing priorities and approaches, interviewees across sectors agreed that professional 

capacity, educational dissemination, and cross-boundary partnerships are essential for advancing 

E-PEP for CNG. Successful innovation will depend on dynamic cooperation: governments 

providing guidance and foundational support, NGOs and community organizations driving 

grassroots initiatives, and enterprises contributing technology and resources. However, key 

challenges persist, including rational resource allocation, sustainable engagement mechanisms, 

and ensuring long-term public engagement to transform these innovations into consistent, 

practical action. 

3.1 CNG Communication and Outreach 

Respondents across the GOV, NGO, and SEB sectors highlighted three priorities for making 

CNG widely understood and embraced by society: enhancing public engagement, simplifying 

knowledge dissemination, and leveraging digital innovation.  

❖​ Enhancing Public Engagement Through Education  

Interviewees unanimously emphasized improving the public’s experience with E-PEP by making 

content more relatable and interactive. They advocated for community events, innovative 

38 



education methods, and digital tools (e.g., visualization and interactive platforms) to increase 

participation and understanding. GOV and NGO respondents stressed the importance of 

grounding climate discussions in everyday life and local contexts. 

This is an educational issue that needs to be dealt with from a public perspective, 

because it is indeed not easy for everyone to understand (this issue).  (No. 11 GOV) 

We teach children critical thinking, give them a good science education, and then let them 

go. I think the most important thing is to enable more people to have the ability to think 

about and face these (climate related) problems. (No. 09 NGO) 

Climate is a global thing in terms of geography and hundreds of years in terms of time. 

As an individual, if you don’t have education, you will have no perception of it and won’t 

pay any attention to the climate or carbon emissions. (No. 08 SEB) 

❖​ Simplifying Knowledge for Efficient Engagement 

Respondents across sectors agreed that contextualizing and simplifying complex climate goals is 

key to effective societal engagement. They highlighted the need to use clear, accessible language 

and practical scenarios to translate knowledge into tangible actions, avoiding superficial 

communication. 

The most obvious challenge is the lack of basic understanding. Everyone knows the term 

"dual carbon", but few people can clearly explain how dual carbon relates to me, 

individuals, and communities. So far, it is still something that the government is doing. 

(No. 01 NGO) 

In fact, for the general public, life is nothing more than clothing, food, housing, 

transportation, and daily necessities. If they know what they can do in these situations 

that benefit the environment and give them relevant choices, they may feel that it is 

related to their lives. (No.04 SEB) 

❖​ Leveraging Digital and Technological Innovation 

39 



Digital platforms, visualization tools, and immersive experiences were cited as critical to future 

engagement efforts. Interviewees noted that interactive digital content and virtual experiences 

could make climate issues more tangible, fostering greater public awareness and action. 

(Regarding education) This is actually an inevitable trend in the future. We are moving 

more towards a new virtual environment. Is there a possibility to allow this kind of 

positive education to exist in the metaverse, a more immersive and interesting way of 

interaction? (No.11 GOV) 

Shenzhen also excels in other dimensions. In fact, we should encourage our city to do 

more cross-border linkages. We should use our expertise in organizing such public 

participation activities to connect with environmental issues. For example, in the fields of 

exhibitions and technological innovation in Shenzhen, we can organize a high-standard 

and influential product exhibition in the field of low carbon (to attract the public and 

raise their awareness). (No.04 SEB) 

3.2 Multifaceted Collaboration 

To advance E-PEP for CNG, respondents from GOV, NGO, and SEB sectors emphasized three 

interconnected areas: resource integration and sharing, strengthening the role of NGOs, and 

ensuring continuity and diversity in collaboration. 

❖​ Resource Integration and Collaboration 

Resource integration was a cross-sector priority for enhancing E-PEP effectiveness. Government 

respondents stressed leveraging schools, businesses, and NGOs to expand collaboration, 

ensuring resource matching and legitimacy. NGOs highlighted the importance of diverse 

partnerships for experimental projects. SEB respondents emphasized sponsorships and 

40 



diversified funding to scale city-wide collaborations, with CSR initiatives playing a crucial role 

in corporate involvement.  

Leveraging other people’s resources is very attractive to them (government departments). 

They are most interested in these two things: one is the participation of residents in my 

business, and the other is that I can, to be frank, raise resources… For example, I 

particularly like school projects, because that is what I mean by leveraging the school’s 

resources, and it sounds naturally correct. (No.03 GOV) 

My enterprise has technical capabilities. Growing to a more influential position, it also 

has some needs and demands to do things related to charity and corporate social 

responsibility. In this process, one is to do direct communication to the public, the second 

attempt is to work with charity organizations, and now the third path is to work with 

government departments. In these attempts, it really takes the collaboration of multiple 

parties to make this thing go on. (No. 07 SEB) 

❖​ Strengthening the Role of Non-Governmental Actors 

All three sectors acknowledged NGOs as critical in bridging gaps between government 

initiatives and public engagement. Government respondents recognized NGOs as effective 

intermediaries in community mobilization and service delivery. NGO respondents emphasized 

their role in grassroots project implementation, particularly in waste separation and park 

management. SEB respondents noted that E-PEP activities benefited from NGO expertise, strong 

work ethics, and close ties to the public.  

It (e.g., recycling) is not commercially viable, so social organizations need to be involved. 

Through social fundraising, some positive guidance to enterprises, and targeted subsidies 

from the government, it is possible to make it work more appropriately. (No. 14 GOV) 

41 



Shenzhen's model of collaboration (e.g., park management) between the government and 

NGOs, which can also then mobilize citizens, is very good. I think it is very innovative 

and progressive. (No. 12 NGO) 

Most NGOs tend to work for targeted clients, higher quality, and not so much for 

numbers and superficial forms, because they need some honest and practical feedback to 

promote this matter, and it must come from their real targeted clients. NGOs are more 

down-to-earth, that is, many event organizers themselves are not far from the public. It 

feels like everyone is discussing some issues on an equal footing, and then there will be 

more things to share, and they will accompany the public throughout the process, which 

makes them feel good. (No.04 SEB) 

❖​ Ensuring Continuity and Diversity in Collaboration 

Respondents emphasized stable networks, sustained funding, and long-term partnerships as key 

to expanding E-PEP for CNG. Government respondents stressed financial support to maintain 

project viability. NGOs highlighted the challenge of balancing resource constraints with 

innovation, underscoring the need for scalable, locally grounded models. SEB respondents 

emphasized that multi-party collaboration drives public engagement and aligns business growth 

with climate objectives, amplifying impact.  

To be frank, (innovation) requires money and resources, and who will provide the money 

and resources? Either a government department or a public welfare organization. And 

this money should not be mixed with the basic expenses of the department. (No.3 GOV) 

In fact, we are facing a big constraint in doing these (E-PEP )things. The government 

only allows some people to do these things, while others are not allowed to speak out, do 

things, or think independently, or there is no support. So I think we need to open more 

interfaces and provide more resources to allow those who do ecological protection 

42 



spontaneously to do these things. They each have their own strengths and their own 

people to be influenced. (No. 13 NGO) 

As a small private enterprise, we would be happy to participate in this and work together 

with multiple parties. We will do our best to plan and operate, and hope that we can 

achieve certain results in E-PEP, or make certain positive things happen. (No. 16 SEB) 

3.3 Administration & Management Innovation 

Respondents from the GOV, NGO, and SEB sectors highlighted key areas for E-PEP innovation 

in administrative management, including leadership support and openness, resource management 

and independence, performance evaluation, and incentive mechanisms. Challenges such as 

formalism, lack of flexibility, and fragmented management hinder effective implementation. 

Strengthening interdepartmental collaboration and developing adaptive, transparent systems are 

seen as crucial to advancing CNG efforts. 

❖​ Leadership Support and Openness 

Leadership backing was identified as a key driver of innovation, yet formalism and a lack of 

clear long-term strategies remain obstacles. Government respondents emphasized that 

low-carbon initiatives gain momentum with internal leadership recognition, even in previously 

unrelated sectors. However, they raised concerns about bureaucratic rigidity and the need for 

sustained leadership commitment. NGO and SEB respondents echoed this, stressing that open 

leadership backing fosters trust and facilitates transparent decision-making, NGO registration, 

and resource access. 

43 



At present, the government is still a government, still with an old mentality of Yamen (an 

official in the Chinese Empire). Although everyone says that we need to improve services, 

it is still an administrative function, not a service function. This means a huge change. 

(No. 11 GOV) 

Our registration was affected. We needed a business supervisory unit (for registration), 

but it was not approved quickly. We spent two years trying to get it approved. Although 

we were given a business supervisory unit after announcing the dual carbon goals, they 

later had some hesitations. Then the leadership team changed, and we had to reapply. 

(No. 12 NGO) 

I don’t know what the government needs exactly, and what carbon neutrality requires, but 

they quickly wrote carbon neutrality and biodiversity into the government work report, 

each of which is just half a sentence. Many district governments did the same thing. (No. 

02 SEB) 

❖​ Resource Management and Independence 

Efficient resource allocation was a shared concern across sectors, with respondents emphasizing 

multi-level administrative support and flexible investment strategies. Government respondents 

highlighted leadership coordination in optimizing resources such as venues and infrastructure. 

NGOs stressed challenges in securing funding and navigating bureaucratic barriers with 

independence. SEB respondents advocated for diversified funding models, including 

government-backed infrastructure investment and small seed funds to stimulate cross-sector 

collaboration (Interviewee No.07, No.08 SEB). 

Now we all want to do research in this area (CNG). At the beginning, I really felt that we 

had nothing to do with it. Now there are also so-called zero-carbon directions for 

infrastructure projects. Actually, it should be a low-carbon construction guide. How can 

new projects achieve low-carbon construction guides as much as possible? In the past 

44 



two years, this topic has been among the topics that leaders have focused on. (No. 15 

GOV) 

There is relatively little funding for public welfare. Without sufficient funds, participation 

is low. In cities like Shenzhen, there are very few environmental protection organizations 

that can independently participate in environmental issues. The government's attitude is 

still very cautious, because you (NGO) must maintain independence. (No. 06 NGO) 

In terms of resources, if you allocate half of the funds invested by the government, one 

part of it is used for training, and the other part is used for small grants in a scattered 

manner, I think it is very good and feasible to allocate resources in this way. (No. 08 

SEB) 

❖​ Performance Evaluation and Incentive Mechanisms 

Evaluation systems were considered ineffective in measuring progress and incentivizing genuine 

innovation. Government respondents noted that current frameworks fail to distinguish between 

formalism and tangible impact, discouraging meaningful participation. SEB respondents 

criticized rigid evaluation criteria prioritizing short-term, surface-level actions (e.g., 

beautification projects) over substantive long-term change. Respondents across sectors called for 

more adaptive, well-defined evaluation metrics to sustain engagement and ensure accountability. 

There are many requirements in the project assessment standards (such as ecological and 

social), but in reality they are all just for compliance. For a small project, you impose too 

much hope on it, and at the same time, provide so few resources, and most of the 

execution team is so unprofessional. (No. 03 GOV) 

The assessment indicators should not be so mechanical and rigid. After the government 

department's project is completed, there are a lot of requirements for the assessment. 

They often make up for it (better looking) before the leader comes to inspect. Later, we 

are unwilling to do this kind of job. (No. 08 SEB) 

45 



3.4 Capacity Building 

Respondents across the GOV, NGO, and SEB sectors identified three key areas for strengthening 

capacity building: enhancing specialized capabilities and technical support, strengthening 

learning and training mechanisms, and cultivating talent for E-PEP. While each sector 

emphasized different challenges, all agreed that systematic training, resource-sharing, and talent 

development are crucial for advancing E-PEP and CNG initiatives.  

❖​ Enhancing Specialized Capabilities and Technical Support 

Gaps in professional expertise were a shared concern across sectors, particularly in project 

implementation, research, and technical knowledge. GOV respondents highlighted the lack of 

methods and skills among street-level officials and community leaders, hindering effective 

execution. NGOs pointed to deficiencies in strategic planning, carbon reduction research, and 

business collaboration, stressing the need for stronger partnerships to document and share 

grassroots knowledge. SEB respondents emphasized the need for technical education, cost 

assessment tools, and emergency management integration to improve enterprise-level climate 

initiatives. 

Capacity building at the community level is quite important. The central government's 

policies can certainly be transmitted to the local level, but the understanding of local 

cadres is another matter. I think everyone may know the word CNG, but how do you do 

it? How to make this thing more interesting? How to effectively publicize and promote it? 

Without these practical methods, how can the public participate? (No. 11 GOV) 

46 



How do you find this point to start? For example, for the mangrove project you have been 

working on, you need to summarize its significance and effectiveness. Combined with the 

theoretical tide prevention and carbon sink, what do you feel in your experience? The 

team should now summarize, integrate with external professional forces, and then 

communicate and cooperate with the government, and then influence more people to 

participate. (No. 06 NGO) 

❖​ Strengthening Learning and Training Mechanisms 

A systematic learning framework was widely seen as essential for professionalizing E-PEP. GOV 

respondents advocated structured training programs for subdistrict or street-level (Jiedao) 

governments and community NGOs to improve efficiency and support bottom-up participation. 

NGOs emphasized training for volunteers and social organizations, including waste sorting, 

climate literacy, and media oversight. SEB respondents stressed the role of government-backed 

institutions in organizing professional training to strengthen social organizations and attract 

future talent. 

We will invite professional consultants to discuss the relevance of current work to climate 

change with each colleague, look at current work from the perspective of climate change, 

conduct one-on-one discussions, and broaden their horizons (for climate work). (No. 01 

NGO) 

In the future, it will also include other industry resources, including think tanks, 

information bases, talent pools, and exhibition venues etc. It is actually a complete 

system that aims to make more stakeholders pay attention to climate change and dual 

carbon, and the overall relationship between them. (No. 04 SEB) 

❖​ Talent Cultivation for E-PEP 

47 



Developing long-term talent was seen as critical for sustaining engagement in E-PEP and CNG 

initiatives. GOV respondents noted a shortage of skilled personnel, limited decision-making 

opportunities for public sector professionals, and limited civic education in society. NGOs 

emphasized the difficulty of attracting and nurturing climate professionals, calling for targeted 

training and case-based learning to align community educators with CNG strategies. SEB 

respondents stressed the need to engage younger generations, proposing storytelling techniques 

and enterprise-led training to cultivate climate advocates.  

This is a question of the overall maturity of society. It is not about hardware, but about 

soft construction. We should use continuous civic education to cultivate the next 

generation's awareness of participation and understanding of various scientific issues, so 

that E-PEP will become a habit for everyone. (No.11 GOV) 

I hope there will be a similar training, or a leading organization, such as a government 

department, or people and organizations who can fully understand such projects, can be 

entrusted to do the training, and then recruit like-minded people to work together to build 

this project little by little. (No. 05, NGO) 

Related talents are relatively scarce. Shenzhen's environment for making money is too 

strong, and many people who pay attention to carbon are also for the purpose of making 

money in the future. The number of people with real environmental backgrounds may be 

very limited. In terms of environmental education, there are many things that need to be 

equipped in the future, such as giving college students more options, including related 

majors, and more social activities. We still need to do more training from the perspective 

of the next generation. Shenzhen also attaches great importance to higher education, and 

new university projects are constantly being launched. In the direction that these 

countries attach great importance to, it is necessary to set up relevant content in 

universities. (No. 04 SEB) 

48 



Discussion 

Given that the national government has imposed Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG) top down, it is 

not surprising that local governments are facing challenges. Even a municipal government 

well-regarded for its work in Environmental Public Engagement and Participation (E-PEP) may 

not yet be fully equipped to implement the in-depth innovations needed to address this critical 

global climate challenge. The complexity of climate governance exceeds the traditional 

environmental management approaches commonly used by local governments in China (Gupta, 

2010; Sarzynski, 2015), which often rely on short-term, resource-intensive strategies to achieve 

visible results. To maintain social stability, the government has imposed strict and sweeping 

controls over NGOs (Spires, 2020), including those in the environmental sector, limiting civil 

society’s ability to contribute innovatively and sustainably to climate governance. As a result, 

government-led E-PEP initiatives often remain superficial, focusing more on publicity than on 

meaningful, community-driven projects that offer substantive value. This raises a crucial 

question: What kind of E-PEP strategy should an open city government adopt in China‘s climate 

governance? 

Achieving long-term climate governance goals requires systematic and sustained collaboration 

between governmental and civil forces. Effective climate governance does not rely solely on 

government directives but requires professionalized, motivated, and collaborative engagement 

across different sectors. E-PEP initiatives with direct environmental governance relevance, such 

as civic river monitoring and community waste sorting, lack professional evaluation (Liu et al., 

2016) and sufficient institutional support in Shenzhen (Chen & Han, 2018). This study revealed 

that E-PEP for climate governance faces limited local enthusiasm and capacity compared to 

more tangible and conventional environmental issues. Greater encouragement and structured 

49 



support from local governments are essential to align E-PEP efforts with the nation’s long-term 

CNG objectives. However, this pathway must also address practical governance challenges, such 

as the short tenures of local government leaders and the limited effectiveness of evaluation 

systems in China (Liu et al., 2016; Qi et al., 2024), which complicate long-term planning and 

implementation. How can E-PEP be innovated to substantiate and advance the CNG agenda? 

By analyzing insights from experienced professionals involved in E-PEP, this study provides an 

in-depth understanding of the barriers and potential of E-PEP in advancing CNG in Shenzhen, 

China. A “Yes-but” attitude emerged from the findings, highlighting the openness and limitations 

of Shenzhen’s approach to E-PEP. Respondents recognized Shenzhen’s proactive governance, 

achievements in environmental policy, and the growing role of civil society, but also pointed to 

significant weaknesses in its E-PEP’s scope, depth, and impact. Regarding CNG, professionals 

acknowledged E-PEP’s potential but raised concerns about the clarity of specific initiatives and 

the conditions required for meaningful participation. The findings echo previous research that 

emphasizes China’s active support for environmental governance and local government’s ability 

to adapt in response to regional needs (Fu & Geng, 2019; Zhou et al., 2019; Owen, 2020; Ge et 

al., 2021; Gao & Teets, 2023). However, respondents also pointed out critical obstacles, 

including the formalism inherent in government processes, the limited scope and impact of 

existing E-PEP initiatives, and a lack of trust and support for NGOs and community-led efforts. 

These structural barriers reflect broader challenges in leveraging E-PEP for urban environmental 

governance (Li et al., 2018). Even in developed cities like Shenzhen, where political constraints 

are less restrictive, and national policies favor public participation, E-PEP remains significantly 

constrained (Xie, 2016; Li et al., 2018; Teng & Wang, 2021; Ding, 2022; Gao & Teets, 2023). 

50 



Building capacity for effective E-PEP is a shared priority across GOV, NGO, and SEB sectors. 

Given climate governance's highly technical and long-term nature, respondents stressed the 

necessity of continuous learning to enhance cross-sectoral collaboration. Despite the high-profile 

status of CNG in national policy, respondents expressed a lukewarm attitude, citing a significant 

gap between national discourse and local implementation. Many practitioners feel discouraged 

by the lack of appropriate communication and educational investment, which has left them 

struggling to bridge macro-level policies with localized action. NGO respondents remained 

uncertain about their specific role in achieving CNG goals, while concerns about bureaucratic 

inefficiencies, departmental silos, and resource inequities were widely shared across sectors. 

Nevertheless, respondents did not dispute the value of E-PEP in advancing Shenzhen’s CNG 

efforts, reinforcing previous research that underscores E-PEP as a foundational mechanism in 

urban climate governance (Jodoin et al., 2015; Sarzynski, 2015; Spiegel-Feld et al., 2023). 

To address the challenges of implementing E-PEP in a Chinese urban context, and based on the 

results of this and related studies, I propose a systemic model for E-PEP innovation tailored to 

Shenzhen’s CNG efforts. Based on interview insights, the model comprises four interconnected 

strategies: 1) administration and management, 2) collaboration, 3) societal dissemination, and 4) 

capacity building (Figure 2). By integrating these elements and innovating their current status, 

local governments can transition from symbolic E-PEP efforts to substantive, action-oriented 

engagement that effectively supports long-term climate goals. 

51 



 

Figure 2. A systemic model of innovating E-PEP suggested for Shenzhen’s CNG work. The 

transition from the current situation on the left to desired situation on the right entails building 

capacity, which in turn expands the role of the public. 

1.​ Administration and Management. This strategy, represented as the outermost layer of 

the model, focuses on fostering a leadership-oriented, low-entry-barrier, yet accountable 

environment provided by the government for E-PEP. In this framework, government 

agencies and social actors, including NGOs and business organizations, can contribute 

professionally with information disclosure (Yang et al., 2023), evaluations, and incentives 

(Zhang et al., 2022). Strong leadership is crucial for achieving consensus on CNG, 

fostering trust, and addressing uncertainties in performance. Additionally, minimizing 

vulnerabilities in relationships between the government and social actors is essential for 

effective collaboration (Nooteboom, 2022).  

52 



2.​ Collaboration. Collaboration serves as a crucial link between government and society, 

fostering opportunities to tackle shared challenges through collective decision-making 

(Ansell & Gash, 2008). This strategy advocates for a culture of collaboration where the 

government actively engages diverse social forces and resources. Inclusive and 

transparent partnerships with NGOs and communities can build trust, strengthen local 

actors’ sense of ownership, and enhance their capacities (Huang et al., 2020; Yu, 2024; 

Sarzynski, 2015). 

3.​ Societal Dissemination At the center of E-PEP strategies, societal dissemination 

emphasizes expanding public support to achieve CNG goals. Promising approaches 

include encouraging individual and collective behavioral changes (Flynn et al., 2016; Liu 

et al., 2022), promoting green innovation in services and industry (Zhang et al., 2023a; 

Fu et al., 2022), and advancing progressive climate policies (Teng & Wang, 2021). 

Achieving meaningful results requires active involvement from individuals, communities, 

NGOs, and businesses (Sarzynski, 2015). Effective dissemination methods include 

education and communication (Sasse et al., 2021), introducing creative life experiences 

through services and production (Huang et al., 2020), and encouraging participatory 

policymaking with NGO professionals and local communities (Wang et al., 2018; Lima et 

al., 2023).  

4.​ Capacity Building Underlying all other strategies, capacity building provides critical 

support for implementing and enhancing innovative practices. Urban actors, including 

government officials, business leaders, community organizations, and citizens (Hügel & 

Davis, 2020), require knowledge, skills, and collaboration opportunities to drive 

meaningful change. If the municipality is serious about implementing governance 

53 



innovations in response to national CNG, its leadership should support diverse learning 

approaches, such as meta-learning (understanding urban climate governance) (Wolfram et 

al., 2019), social learning (sharing and exchanging knowledge), and learning from local 

communities (Jodoin et al., 2015; Sarzynski, 2015). These efforts collectively contribute 

to a sustainable capacity-building process that strengthens urban society’s ability to 

achieve CNG. 

Recommendations 

Based on interviews with professionals from government, business, and nonprofit sectors, a 

literature review, and my experience working with civic engagement initiatives focused on the 

environment in China, I recommend that Shenzhen government actors undertake the following 

E-PEP initiatives to advance toward achieving CNG:  

I.​ Institutional Frameworks 

The   Shenzhen government should take the following actions to establish strong 

leadership and foster an accessible, professional, and accountable environment for 

government agencies and social actors engaged in CNG efforts. 

1)​ Establish Municipal CNG E-PEP Committee ​

The Shenzhen government should establish a Municipal CNG E-PEP Committee to 

provide innovative leadership in public engagement for CNG. This committee, chaired by 

the mayor, would operate under the “Municipal Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality 

Leading Group (深圳市碳达峰碳中和工作领导小组)7” (Shenzhen Municipal People's 

7 There is no detailed information of the members of the local leading group available before this thesis concludes. 
The previous Shenzhen Addressing Climate Change and Emission Reduction Leading Group (Shenzhen 
Municipality, 2011) of 28 official departments provided an example of the diversity of composition. 

54 



Government, 2023, p.24), which mirrors the national-level Carbon Peaking and Carbon 

Neutrality Leading Group but currently lacks public visibility. The committee would 

oversee planning, coordination, and resource management for local CNG initiatives. It is 

critical to involve representatives from professional NGOs, businesses, and the general 

public in the committee’s executive meetings on a rotating basis. This mechanism could 

be modeled partially on the Shenzhen City Planning Committee’s Non-official Members 

(深圳市城市规划委员会非公务委员) initiative (Shenzhen Planning and Natural 

Resources Bureau, 2022) to encourage non-official engagement in urban governance. 

2)​ Facilitate Community Organization Registration​

The municipal government should streamline the registration process for 

community-based organizations to enhance social actors’ capacity to participate in CNG 

initiatives. The current requirement for “review and approval by the competent 

authority8” as the first step often creates barriers for E-PEP initiatives due to limited 

communication channels and unclear approval processes. To align with national policies 

encouraging the development of community organizations (Chinese Communist Party 

Central Committee and State Council, 2016) and volunteer services for environmental 

protection (Ministry of Ecology and Environment of People’s Republic of China, 2021), 

district-level and street-level authorities, including People’s Governments and Ecology & 

Environment bureaus, should provide innovative regulatory support. Simplifying the 

review process for CNG-related NGOs is crucial to strengthening social involvement in 

achieving CNG. 

8 业务主管单位审查同意. 

55 



3)​ Create Professional CNG E-PEP Alliance ​

A professional network dedicated to implementing CNG-related E-PEP initiatives should 

be established under the leadership of the Municipal CNG E-PEP Committee. This 

professional alliance should lower entry requirements for participation and offer 

resources and opportunities for professional growth. By leveraging its quasi-official 

status, the alliance could collaborate with government agencies, businesses, and NGOs to 

enhance coordination and broaden its impact. A successful example of such collaboration 

is the Shenzhen Shanhai Liancheng Natural Education Alliance, which effectively 

partners with various stakeholders to promote environmental education (Shenzhen 

Planning and Natural Resources Bureau, 2020). 

4)​ Conduct Participatory Research and Develop Local Regulations ​

To ensure E-PEP's effective, equitable, and sustainable implementation for CNG, 

Shenzhen municipality should leverage its special zone legislative authority to enact local 

regulations. This legislation could cover institutional innovations, including leadership, 

public funding, resource management, and accountability to community-based 

organizations. Participatory legislative processes involving municipal legislators and 

citizens could serve as a meaningful E-PEP mechanism to enhance public awareness of 

CNG and foster trust between the government and civil society. Such participatory 

processes would align with the city’s consensus-building goals and support innovative 

forms of public engagement as “ensuring people’s participation in legislative activities 

through multiple channels” (Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress, 2024 article no.5). 

56 



II.​ Funding  

To sustain the impact of E-PEP initiatives and unlock their potential, Shenzhen 

Municipality should establish a dedicated city fund and supporting mechanisms. 

5)​ Small Grants ​

The city fund should allocate financial support to community-driven and experimental 

E-PEP projects. Unlike the typical focus on large-scale urban development projects in 

China, small grants can encourage grassroots initiatives tailored to local conditions. 

These grants would enable innovative approaches and foster experimentation. A 

successful example is the “residential small grant project” initiated by the Shenzhen Civil 

Affairs Bureau, which has effectively utilized limited funding to drive impactful changes 

regarding “community inclusiveness, infrastructure, helping disadvantaged groups, 

community cultural construction, and service quality at the community-level” (Shenzhen 

Civil Affairs Bureau, 2023, par.35). 

6)​ Collaborative Models ​

The fund should prioritize collaborative initiatives that promote inter-organizational 

cooperation among community-based organizations and other social actors. Such 

collaboration can harness external expertise to address the challenges of implementing 

E-PEP for CNG. For instance, community organizations could partner with professionals 

in education, gardening, landscape design, cultural arts, tourism, and sports to encourage 

lifestyle changes through innovative strategies. 

7)​ Accountability and Sustainability in Operations ​

To ensure transparency and professionalism, the city fund’s operations should involve 

57 



collaboration with donors, observers, and professionals. This includes rigorous project 

budgeting, regular evaluations, audits, and public access to information. Long-term 

funding stability can be achieved through diversified sources, including compensation for 

ecological damages and greenhouse gas taxes. A model for this approach is the Shenzhen 

Ecological and Environmental Public Welfare Fund, managed by a third party, Shenzhen 

Charity Federation; the fund draws resources from court-mandated environmental 

compensation and public donations (Shenzhen Charity Federation, 2023). Another is the 

Park Nature Education Special Fund, established by the official Shenzhen Park 

Management Center and operated by the non-profit Shenzhen Mangrove Conservation 

Foundation, financially supported by Tencent’s corporate foundation (Shenzhen 

Municipal Bureau of Urban Management, 2024).  

III.​ Interactive Learning and Capacity Building 

To enhance the overall capacity and information access for stakeholders involved in 

CNG-related E-PEP efforts, the Shenzhen Municipal CNG Working Committee should 

establish: 

8)​ An Information Hub for Social Actors ​

Develop a user-friendly digital platform that provides ongoing access to specialized 

knowledge, including climate change data, CNG policies, and best practices. This 

platform should enable two-way communication, allowing users to share their local 

knowledge and interests, creating a dynamic and collaborative resource (Reed et al., 

2018). 

58 



9)​ Skill Training Co-designed with & for Professional Groups ​

The Municipal CNG E-PEP Committee should partner with selected organizations to 

provide tailored training programs for professionals, including educators, community 

organizers, and communication specialists. Training should address the unique needs of 

these groups while aligning with CNG objectives:  

-​ K-12 Educators: Equip educators to integrate climate change and CNG topics 

into curricula, fostering student awareness and engagement. This requires 

collaboration with the Education Bureau and the Institute of Education Science. 

-​ Community-based Organizers: Train community-based NGOs and social work 

organizations to enhance their understanding of CNG, address community needs, 

and strengthen connections with residents. 

-​ Media and Communication Professionals: Collaborate with media, technology, 

and social media companies to develop innovative communication strategies, 

laying the groundwork for a stronger E-PEP framework. 

10)​Talent Cultivation System for Long-term Development ​

Partner with higher education institutions in Shenzhen to develop courses and degree 

programs focusing on E-PEP for CNG. A systematic and innovative talent training 

system (Jin et al., 2024) should address challenges in climate governance. Suggested 

focus areas include renewable energy, circular economy, carbon finance, community 

engagement, sustainable planning, environmental governance, and sustainability 

leadership. Interdisciplinary curricula should combine theory with practical applications, 

supported by partnerships with government agencies, industry leaders, and NGOs. 

59 



Limitations 

This study has several limitations. It focuses on a single Special Economic Zone, Shenzhen, and 

emphasizes the perspectives of professionals from the government, NGOs, and businesses. Of 

the eighteen interviewees, only four were affiliated with government institutions, and none were 

direct representatives of climate governance authorities. Furthermore, most business 

interviewees were social entrepreneurs, which may have narrowed the perspective from the 

business sector. Additionally, the interviews were conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, 

which may have influenced responses due to disruptions in public activities. Future research on 

climate governance and E-PEP in China should explore broader geographic contexts and engage 

a more diverse range of stakeholders to better understand their challenges and opportunities in 

practice. 

60 



Conclusion (the paper) 

This study highlights the untapped potential of E-PEP in advancing China’s CNG work. While 

Shenzhen, as an open and innovative city, has made strides in environmental governance, E-PEP 

remains constrained by formalism, limited institutional support, and gaps in public understanding 

and participation. To address these challenges, the Shenzhen stakeholders interviewed in this 

research proposed four interconnected areas of innovation—administration, collaboration, 

societal dissemination, and capacity building—and offered practical recommendations to 

strengthen institutional frameworks, funding mechanisms, and capacity-building systems. 

Among these, capacity building is a common deficit across all sectors. While technical expertise 

and institutional coordination are often emphasized, this study finds that civic 

capacity—ordinary citizens’ ability to engage in climate governance collectively—deserves 

greater attention. In China’s current policy landscape, public engagement is often framed in 

terms of compliance and dissemination rather than co-creation and problem-solving. However, 

fostering bottom-up, constructive, and robust E-PEP requires investments in civic skills, 

deliberative mechanisms, and localized leadership development. Without an active, informed, 

capable citizenry, even well-designed policies may fail to generate meaningful societal change. 

Furthermore, while innovation is often viewed as a top-down policy tool, this study suggests that 

adaptive, grassroots-driven innovation—rooted in real community needs and emergent social 

practices—may be as critical in sustaining long-term climate governance. The evolving role of 

digital technology, the intersection of E-PEP with behavioral change, and the potential of 

decentralized participation models (such as community-driven carbon credit systems) remain 

underexplored in China’s CNG efforts. Future research should consider how these factors can 

61 



further transform E-PEP, moving beyond symbolic participation toward more profound, 

sustained public engagement and participation in climate action. 

Ultimately, achieving CNG is not solely a technological or policy challenge; it is also a societal 

challenge that requires rethinking governance, participation, and public agency. If China is to 

lead in global climate action, fostering a new paradigm of E-PEP—where citizens, NGOs, 

businesses, and governments collaborate in meaningful, sustained ways—will be essential. As a 

pioneer in governance innovation, Shenzhen has the potential to serve as a testing ground for 

these new models, offering insights that could shape urban climate governance in China and 

beyond.  

62 



Conclusion: The Role of E-PEP in Achieving Carbon Neutrality in China 

In exploring how E-PEP (Environmental Public Engagement and Participation) might be 

innovatively deployed to support China’s carbon neutrality goals (CNG), a prior and more 

critical question must be addressed: within China’s top-down governance structure, can E-PEP 

truly play a significant role in achieving CNG? Is carbon neutrality expected to mainly occur at 

higher levels of the system—through clean energy transitions, industrial reforms, and 

administrative directives—and not through the work of local environmental groups? 

First, we must acknowledge the institutional context of China’s political system. Characterized 

by centralized and hierarchical governance—sometimes referred to as environmental 

authoritarianism—the state has the capacity to implement sweeping reforms rapidly and at scale. 

The central government can directly regulate industrial emissions, mandate clean energy shifts, 

and influence consumption patterns, often without needing public engagement at the grassroots 

level. Emissions reductions through mechanisms like upgrading power plants, electrifying 

transportation, or restructuring agriculture can technically be achieved without substantial civic 

participation. This reality challenges the basic assumption that E-PEP is indispensable for 

China’s CNG efforts. 

However, such a narrow, technocratic interpretation fails to capture the complex social nature of 

climate governance. First, governments cannot easily secure public support for 

emissions-reduction measures without social buy-in. While China’s centralized system can 

swiftly target energy sectors or state-owned enterprises, widespread adoption of new energy 

technologies requires behavioral shifts and public cooperation, precisely where E-PEP holds 

transformative potential (Huang et al., 2020). Even in a relatively developed city like Shenzhen, 

63 



the adoption of low-carbon products such as solar water heating systems in residential 

communities faces local resistance due to limited awareness and perceived inconvenience, often 

resulting in defensive participation (ibid.). 

Second, sustainable emissions reduction must balance long-term climate goals with social 

stability. In 2021, several provinces experienced electricity shortages attributed in part to carbon 

reduction mandates (Yang et al., 2024). These abrupt and poorly coordinated measures disrupted 

daily life and economic activity, prompting central authorities to instruct local governments to 

safeguard livelihoods while pursuing environmental targets. A CNG strategy that compromises 

basic social functioning or generates dissatisfaction toward the government is not politically 

viable. Thus, avoiding governance crises requires more participatory, co-productive 

models—precisely what E-PEP aims to support. 

At present, however, local governments’ stance toward E-PEP remains ambivalent. Even 

Shenzhen, a city known for its pragmatism and innovation, has largely confined E-PEP to 

environmental education and small-scale community greening projects. Its local CPCN 

implementation plans omit references to social organizations or NGOs as key actors. Interviews 

for this study reveal a pervasive lack of trust and operational pathways for involving civil 

society. If local authorities view civic groups as potential threats rather than partners, then, 

indeed, environmental organizations will have little role to play in shaping or advancing CNG. 

Is there a “but” after this bleak “yes”? Possibly—if civil society is recognized and empowered. 

In Shenzhen, civic groups such as NGOs have gained recognition and operational experience in 

urban planning, environmental monitoring, and participatory governance (this thesis, p. 21; p. 

23; p. 25). In principle, climate governance—being less confrontational and more future-oriented 

64 



than traditional environmental conflicts—should offer even greater room for collaboration and 

joint innovation. Building trust, however, is a necessary precondition. 

How much can E-PEP ultimately contribute to China’s CNG? Recent studies offer strong 

empirical support. Zhang et al. (2023) find online environmental concern contributes to reduced 

carbon emissions significantly in developed regions; Feng et al. (2023) show NGO-driven 

environmental regulation inhibits carbon intensity based on official statistical data; Wu et al. 

(2025) indicate through a study of environmental policy documents of 278 Chinese cities that 

public participation including engaging the public in environmental governance and supervision 

and empowering them to monitor and report violations, as distinct from command-and-control 

and market-incentive environmental regulations, played a clear and significant role in reducing 

China's carbon intensity. These findings speak to E-PEP’s institutional impact on policy 

effectiveness. Meanwhile, household consumption accounts for over one-third of China’s total 

carbon emissions, with urban areas contributing 73%, and high-income groups responsible for a 

disproportionately high share (Zhang et al., 2020; Wang & Yuan, 2022). Promoting low-carbon 

lifestyles has already been incorporated into national policy agendas, yet guidance on 

operationalizing this goal fairly and effectively remains vague. 

Official definitions of E-PEP in China include “formulation of policies and regulations” and 

“implementation of publicity and education”—categories that align directly with the question of 

E-PEP’s overall contribution to China’s CNG. Yet within CPCN policy documents, the subject of 

these verbs (“citizens, legal persons, and other organizations”) remains conspicuously absent. 

Instead, vague terms like “the public” or “the people” have been used, suggesting passive 

recipients. This subtle linguistic choice signals that E-PEP remains conceptualized as a top-down 

mechanism for dissemination, not an empowered domain of civic initiative. Local innovations 

65 



and future reforms in how E-PEP actors are positioned—legally and politically—will therefore 

be critical to realizing its full potential for CPCN. 

In sum, the role of E-PEP in advancing China’s carbon neutrality goals (CNG) cannot be 

assessed merely by its presence or absence in formal policy documents. While China's top-down 

governance model enables rapid, large-scale shifts—especially in sectors like power generation 

and industrial restructuring—it also reveals structural blind spots where public engagement is 

dismissed as ancillary. Yet, as this study argues, the realization of CNG is not solely a 

technocratic endeavor but one deeply embedded in social systems, political trust, and behavioral 

change. The governance crises triggered by forced emission reductions, and the limited policy 

traction of energy transitions at the community level, demonstrate that public participation is not 

just desirable but strategically necessary for ensuring the legitimacy, feasibility, and adaptability 

of climate policies. However, in current practice, E-PEP remains under-institutionalized, 

under-trusted, and underutilized—especially at the local level. The absence of empowered 

societal actors in Shenzhen’s CPCN framework, despite its pioneering reputation, is symptomatic 

of a broader hesitation to share agency in climate governance. That said, the empirical and 

theoretical evidence reviewed here suggests E-PEP can meaningfully reduce emissions and help 

close equity gaps in carbon-intensive consumption, particularly in affluent urban settings. For 

this potential to be realized, a fundamental shift is needed: from treating E-PEP as a one-way 

instrument of policy transmission to recognizing it as a co-productive process involving citizens, 

organizations, and institutions. Doing so will not only make CNG more just and socially resilient 

but also more durable in the long run. 

 

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	INNOVATING ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION ​FOR URBAN CARBON NEUTRALITY IN CHINA: THE CASE OF SHENZHEN 
	ABSTRACT  
	BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
	TABLE OF CONTENTS 
	LIST OF FIGURES 
	LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
	PREFACE 
	Introduction 
	Literature Review 
	E-PEP as part of official environmental governance 
	E-PEP and global environmental governance  
	Challenges and development of E-PEP 
	E-PEP and China’s urban environmental governance  

	Methodology & Methods 
	Methodology 
	Methods 
	Interviewees 
	Interviews 
	Analysis 


	Findings 
	1. Prominent Experiences of E-PEP in Shenzhen 
	2. Perspectives on the Carbon Neutrality Goals (CNG) 
	2.1 Lukewarm or Worried Reaction to CNG  
	2.2 A Vague Sense of Connection and Self-positioning 
	2.3 Action Limited by Multiple Deficiencies 

	3. Innovative E-PEP for CNG 
	3.1 CNG Communication and Outreach 
	3.2 Multifaceted Collaboration 
	3.3 Administration & Management Innovation 
	3.4 Capacity Building 


	Discussion 
	Recommendations 
	I.​Institutional Frameworks 
	II.​Funding  
	III.​Interactive Learning and Capacity Building 

	Limitations 

	Conclusion (the paper) 
	Conclusion: The Role of E-PEP in Achieving Carbon Neutrality in China 
	REFERENCES