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# A TAPE RECORDER AND A WINK? TRANSCRIPT OF THE MAY 29, 1983, MEETING BETWEEN GOVERNOR CARRASCALÃO AND XANANA GUSMÃO

Introduction and translation  
by Douglas Kammen

On March 23, 1983, more than seven years after the Indonesian invasion of Portuguese Timor, the Indonesian sub-regional military commander in East Timor, Colonel Purwanto, met with the leader of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente, abbreviated Fretilin), José Alexandre “Kay Rala Xanana” Gusmão, and agreed to a temporary ceasefire. This was a truly extraordinary development. Indonesian officials had long insisted that the 1976 act of “integration” was final and irreversible. With the fall of the last Fretilin base areas in the eastern sector in October 1978 and in the western sector in early 1979, the Indonesian military (ABRI) believed that the resistance had been reduced to a mere one hundred rebels, who were now euphemistically referred to as a “band of security disturbers” (*gerombolan pengacau keamanan*). In 1981, ABRI mobilized at least 60,000 civilians to sweep across the territory to flush out those remaining individuals. And in mid-January 1983, Colonel Purwanto told journalists that “the band of [security] disturbers in East Timor, who are the remnants of Fretilin forces, have no more than one hundred weapons and five hundred members.”<sup>1</sup> And yet, the resistance not only

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<sup>1</sup> Paraphrased in “Gangguan Fretilin Sudah Tidak Berarti, Timor Timur Terbuka Untuk Dikunjungi,” *Sinar Harapan*, January 15, 1983.

survived but won tactical victories. None was more significant than the ceasefire negotiated in March 1983.

The origins of the ceasefire process can be traced to a peculiar convergence of events in September 1982. The first of these was the appointment of Mário Carrascalão as the new governor of the territory, on September 18. Born in Venilale in 1936, Carrascalão is the son of an anarchist political deportee from Portugal who married the daughter of the traditional ruler of Venilale and became one of the leading scions of the Portuguese colonial elite and owner of a vast coffee plantation. Mário attended primary school in Dili, but at age twelve was shipped off to Lisbon to continue his education, eventually graduating from university in 1968 with a degree in forestry. Returning to Timor in 1970, Mário served in the Agriculture and Forestry Service and was selected as one of the three Timorese representatives in the *Estado Novo* (New State) parliament in Lisbon. Following the April 1974 Armed Forces Movement seizure of power in Lisbon, Mário and his brother João were among the founding members of the pro-Portuguese Timorese Democratic Union (União Democrática Timorense, UDT). In August 1975, however, João led an unsuccessful “anti-communist movement,” and after Fretilin forces routed UDT, the brothers fled across the border into Indonesian West Timor. In early 1976, Mário was appointed to the East Timor Provisional Assembly and in June that year was part of the delegation that presented a “petition” to Indonesian President Suharto requesting “integration” into Indonesia. In 1978 Mário joined the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serving from 1980 until 1982 at the Consulate in New York and with the Indonesian delegation at the United Nations. After the disastrous governorships of Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo (1976–78) and Guilherme Gonçalves (1978–82), Indonesian officials hoped the intelligent and worldly Mário Carrascalão would provide greater international credibility and, perhaps, some practical leadership of the provincial administration, too.

The second key event in September 1982 was an impromptu meeting between Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmão and East Timor’s Apostolic Administrator, Martinho da Costa Lopes, in the village of Mehara, in Lautem District, directly under the nose of the Indonesian military. When word of this meeting got out, Indonesian officials were furious. However, military officers soon followed this example, putting out word that they would like to meet with resistance leaders. The first such meeting was with a local Falintil commander named José da Conceição, near the town of Lautem. Further meetings followed. It was in this environment that, in December 1982, Xanana Gusmão sent a letter to Governor Mário Carrascalão (though the letter did not reach him until early February 1983). In the letter, Gusmão explained that the Marxist-Leninist Fretilin Party (MLF) had been established “as a logical consequence of the revolutionary process,” dismissed calls that had emerged in émigré circles in Lisbon for a united Movement for the Liberation of Timor Dili, and boldly challenged “all nationalists” to join in “National Unity” under the leadership of MLF.<sup>2</sup>

As low-level contacts progressed in early 1983, ABRI proposed that Governor Mário Carrascalão represent Indonesia during the negotiations. Fretilin rejected this proposal. Instead, a series of meetings took place, gradually working up the respective

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<sup>2</sup> This letter is reproduced for the first time in Carrascalão’s autobiography; see Mário Viegas Carrascalão, *Timor: Antes do Futuro* (Dili: Livraria Mau Huran, 2006), pp. 167–74. Gusmão’s letter refers to both MNTD and MNLTD without explanation. Carrascalão dismisses MNTD as “a group of lunatics in Lisbon.”

chains of command. The turning point came at a meeting on March 20 between Xanana Gusmão and an ABRI delegation led by two majors, Willem da Costa and Estafanus.<sup>3</sup> At the meeting Xanana Gusmão laid out a four-point peace plan that included: (1) the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, (2) the involvement of a UN peace-keeping force, (3) plans for a popular consultation on the future, and (4) the maintenance of Fretilin's armed wing, Falintil,<sup>4</sup> to protect the population.<sup>5</sup> Three days later another meeting was held at Larigutu, near Mount Mundo Perdido, on the Baucau–Viqueque border. The Indonesian delegation at the meeting included Colonel Purwanto, seven members of the Secret Warfare Command (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha, abbreviated Kopassandha), Aleixo Ximenes (from Venilale), and Felipe Dias Quintas, the *liurai* (king) of Lospalos. The Fretilin contingent included Xanana Gusmão; sub-commanders José da Conceição, Falur Txai, and Okan; and a platoon of Falintil soldiers. After the two delegations agreed to the ceasefire, an Indonesian helicopter brought Governor Carrascalão to the site, where he spoke with Xanana Gusmão for approximately forty-five minutes.<sup>6</sup>

Both sides had reasons to want a ceasefire. For Indonesia, the agreement had less to do with the strength of the resistance than with domestic politics and international relations. On the one hand, the 1982 national legislative election marked the beginning of the end of one political cycle; March 1983 marked the start of the next cycle, with the inevitable reselection of Suharto to a fourth term as president and the appointment of a new cabinet. Knowing full well that his tenure as ABRI commander-in-chief would end shortly, General Yusuf had little to lose by experimenting with a new approach to the problem of East Timor. If the negotiations did bear fruit, he had much to gain. On the other hand, and of greater importance, Indonesia sought to defray international concern about the illegal occupation and massive human rights abuses in East Timor, and the ceasefire agreement provided a window of opportunity within which to host an Australian diplomatic visit and lobby for Canberra's recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over the territory.

For Fretilin, the ceasefire provided much-needed breathing room to reorganize, to widen its contacts with the civilian population, and, as the Fretilin external delegation proudly declared, to claim an international victory. The cessation of hostilities allowed resistance leaders to visit villages, towns, and even some of the urban centers. There were also a host of local meetings between ABRI and Fretilin/Falintil, including in Lore, Beaco, Waitame, Macadique, Ossu, Laissorlai, and Hatubuilico. These meetings involved volleyball games and replenishment of the guerrillas' provisions and supplies. Furthermore, during the ceasefire, Fretilin/Falintil commanders built up personal relations with East Timorese serving in the Indonesian military and its

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<sup>3</sup> Major Willem da Costa was born in Kupang in 1949 and graduated from the National Military Academy in 1971. No information is available about Major Estafanus.

<sup>4</sup> "Falintil" is the abbreviation of Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor.

<sup>5</sup> Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor* (London: Zed Books, 1984), pp. 72–73. A transcript of this meeting is available in Jill Jolliffe, *Timor: Terra Sangrenta* (Lisbon: O Jornal, 1989), pp. 163–70.

<sup>6</sup> Carrascalão has provided conflicting accounts of this encounter. See, for example, "Interview with Mário Carrascalão," *Indonesia* 76 (October 2003): 6; and Carrascalão, *Timor: Antes do Futuro*, pp. 181–90.

civilian auxiliary units and lobbied for them to defect.<sup>7</sup> As Apostolic Administrator Martinho da Costa Lopes noted, “as part of the ceasefire agreement, Indonesian helicopters were taking food and medicines to guerrillas in the mountains and bringing their sick and wounded into Dili hospital ... The people were very happy with the respite from the war and for the first time in years were able to plant decent crops.”<sup>8</sup>

On May 4, 1983, Xanana Gusmão wrote a second long letter to Governor Carrascalão calling for national unity.<sup>9</sup> Governor Carrascalão did not respond. On May 27, according to Carrascalão’s biography, Colonel Purwanto informed him that Gusmão had requested to meet with the governor the next day at a location called Ariana, five kilometers from Carrascalão’s place of birth, in Venilale, Baucau District.<sup>10</sup> It is not clear why General Benny Murdani allowed Xanana Gusmão to meet privately with Governor Mário Carrascalão.<sup>11</sup> In mid-April, General Murdani had said explicitly that he was giving Colonel Purwanto and Governor Carrascalão three months to make the ceasefire work, a deadline that wasn’t due until July 12, 1983. In any case, the May meeting went ahead. Father Locatelli, an Italian priest based at the Fatumaca minor seminary near Baucau, and Aleixo Ximenes, a prominent and highly controversial pro-integration figure from Venilale, served as intermediaries for this meeting, and they accompanied Governor Carrascalão to the meeting site. Once there, Governor Carrascalão and Xanana Gusmão had a private discussion. In his autobiography, Carrascalão writes: “There were no photographs or recordings.”<sup>12</sup>

But a recording was made. The following text is a translation from an Indonesian transcript of the May 1983 meeting between Governor Carrascalão and Xanana Gusmão, who was concurrently the Fretilin National Political Commissar, the commander-in-chief of Falintil, and a member of the Fretilin Central Committee. The transcript was found among Indonesian military documents recovered by activists in Dili after the August 30, 1999, referendum and ensuing violence.<sup>13</sup>

### The Transcript

There are a number of practical features of the document worth mentioning. The twenty-two-page typed transcript is cut off at the margins, indicating that it is a

<sup>7</sup> In early August, East Timorese serving in the Indonesian military staged a *levantamento* (uprising) in Viqueque and joined the resistance; plans for an uprising in Lautem did not materialize.

<sup>8</sup> J. Jolliffe, ed., *Timor Newsletter* II,3 (October 1983): 6, cited in Ernest Chamberlain, “The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in Rural East Timor,” unpublished manuscript, p. 23.

<sup>9</sup> The letter is reproduced in Carrascalão, *Timor: Antes do Futuro*, pp. 199–210.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>11</sup> Murdani replaced Yusuf as commander-in-chief of ABRI on March 28, 1983. Murdani may, in fact, have trusted Carrascalão. Even after the first low-level meetings between ABRI and Fretilin had taken place, Carrascalão told the press that “the integration of East Timor is complete. There is nothing that can change that.” Quoted in “Gubernur Carrascalao: Dukung Atau Tidak Integrasi Timor Timur Sudah Selesai,” *Sinar Harapan*, March 7, 1983.

<sup>12</sup> Carrascalão, *Timor: Antes do Futuro*, p. 217.

<sup>13</sup> Despite ABRI’s efforts to destroy all Indonesian records, a reasonably large number of documents were recovered. The transcript is in the collection of documents held by Yayasan Hak, a human rights NGO in Dili.

photocopy of the original. In the top right-hand corner of the cover page the notation "DAN.WIL 11.3" is written in marker, indicating that this copy was once held by the provincial police commander. The cover page indicates that the meeting took place on May 29, 1983. This may be incorrect. In his autobiography, Mário Carrascalão states that the meeting took place on May 28.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the document was recovered together with two other documents. The first is the text of a speech by Xanana Gusmão on March 27, 1983; the speech was delivered at a mass conducted by Pastor Locatelli at a place called St. Metacoa, and the document includes the Tetum and Indonesian versions of the hymns sung at the mass. The second document, which is typed, has the handwritten title "Letter of Response from the Sub-regional Commander to Xanana" (*Surat Jawaban Dan Rem Kepada Xanana*).<sup>15</sup>

The format of the meeting is odd. The transcript's first sixteen and a half pages record speeches: first by Mário Carrascalão, next by Xanana Gusmão, and then a very long response by Mário Carrascalão. Only in the final five pages is there back-and-forth dialogue between the two speakers. The reason for this may be quite simple. Despite Carrascalão's autobiographical claim that there were "no photographs or recordings," the evident presence of a tape recorder meant that both men knew they were performing as much for the Indonesian military as for each other. Governor Carrascalão even goes out of his way to say as much during the meeting: "I am a person who will say what I think even if I am in front of a tape recorder." One cannot help but imagine this line was delivered with a playful smile and a wink!

It is also important to highlight a number of problems with the transcript as an accurate record of what was said. Most obviously, Carrascalão and Gusmão conversed in Portuguese, a language that few if any Indonesian military officers or officials spoke, hence the need for an Indonesian-language translation. Unfortunately, no information is available about the translator, though one suspects that he or she must have been an East Timorese educated in Portuguese schools prior to 1975 and, perhaps, also someone who may have learned a fair amount of Indonesian prior to the invasion. Nevertheless, the Indonesian is awkward, often grammatically incorrect, and is riddled with strange word choices. Furthermore, the tone of the translation is bureaucratic "New Orderese," often clearly inappropriate for conveying the literary, even lyrical, Portuguese in which the two speakers were educated. Two specific, illustrative examples should be mentioned. While both men most certainly used "senhor" (sir, mister) to refer to the other, the translator has used the Indonesian "bapak" (father, sir). Elsewhere, however, both speakers refer to the Indonesian military as "bapak-bapak," which we know from interviews with Mário Carrascalão is, in fact, correct. The names used for East Timor (the translator employs the Indonesian name "Timor-Timur" throughout) are more problematic. There can be no doubt that Xanana Gusmão referred to the territory as "Timor-Leste." Governor Carrascalão may also have used the Portuguese name, though, given the tenor of his arguments, it is quite likely that he used the Indonesian "Timor Timur." To avoid erroneous distinctions and for the sake

<sup>14</sup> See Carrascalão, *Timor: Antes do Futuro*, p. 217. It is equally important to note that the Indonesian translation was completed on June 1, 1983. The following day, ABRI Commander-in-chief Murdani sent a letter to Gusmão warning that Indonesia would "destroy you if you are not willing to be cooperative." *The Age*, August 17, 1983, quoted in Budiardjo and Liong, *The War Against East Timor*, p. 139.

<sup>15</sup> A Portuguese translation of this document is included in Carrascalão, *Timor: Antes do Future*, pp. 213–14.

of simplicity, the English translation presented here employs “East Timor” throughout, except in instances where Governor Carrascalão is clearly referring to the Indonesian province “Timor Timur.” The following translation has been kept as close to the Indonesian transcript as possible.

### **Realist versus Revolutionary**

What, then, of the content of the discussion between Carrascalão and Gusmão? Governor Carrascalão’s speeches are those of a realist: this is how the world works; it isn’t pretty, but that’s how it goes and we have to make the best of it. He provides extended arguments in favor of integration and the development that, he says, Indonesia will bring to East Timor. “With Indonesia, East Timor can become something other than it is now.” At the same time, he attempts to explain to Gusmão, whom he treats as ignorant of *realpolitik*, why foreign governments and the United Nations will not come to the rescue of the resistance. “Don’t hope for anything from the Portuguese. Believe me!” He also displays his considerable knowledge of global events and discusses his experience while working with the Indonesian delegation at the United Nations. His examples range from the dilemmas in newly independent states in Africa and the Caribbean to Cold War manipulations in Namibia and Ethiopia, from the intricacies of the political left in Portugal and France to separatist movements elsewhere in Indonesia.

Gusmão, in contrast, plays the revolutionary. “I am a Marxist,” he states twice. Although there is little in his presentation that resembles class analysis, the role of dialectics (and, more specifically, Maoist analyses of war and guerrilla strategy) is apparent.<sup>16</sup> Of greater importance for the historical record, however, is his discussion of the formation of the Partido Marxista-Leninista Fretilin and his call for “National Unity.” These points deserve some elaboration.

With the fall of Fretilin’s bases in the east in late 1978 and in the west in early 1979, armed resistance to the Indonesian occupation was reduced to small, dispersed groups largely cutoff from the civilian population. Over the next two years, the surviving Fretilin leadership in the east slowly built up a network of contacts, reassessed the situation, and adjusted to the reality of prolonged guerrilla warfare. Scattered attacks were launched against the Indonesian military as well as the new “settlements” into which the populace had been forcibly relocated. In March 1981, Fretilin leaders met in Lacluta for a “National Reorganization Conference.” The conventional wisdom among East Timorese and most foreign authors is that the policy of national unity was initiated at this time. This view is based on repeated claims made by Gusmão. But one should note that Gusmão’s early writings are remarkably vague on this historic event. In a letter to the Fretilin Delegation of External Services dated October 13, 1982, for example, Gusmão simply writes: “Here the nation was reorganized, the liberation forces restructured, and a new leadership appointed.”<sup>17</sup> Any mention of “national

<sup>16</sup> In his English-language autobiography, which, unfortunately, ends in 1981, Gusmão describes how, in late 1976, “I managed to get hold of a copy of the ‘Thoughts of Chairman Mao’ and it was the only personal property I carried around with me.” See Xanana Gusmão, *To Resist Is to Win! The Autobiography of Xanana Gusmão*, ed. Sarah Niner (Richmond, Victoria: Aurora Books, 2000), p. 47.

<sup>17</sup> Xanana Gusmão, “The National Council of Revolutionary Resistance Salutes the Fretilin Delegation of External Services,” in *To Resist Is to Win*, p. 72.

unity” is conspicuously absent. Unfortunately, Gusmão’s subsequent version of events has been accepted uncritically by many authors. The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation report, *Chega!*, offers the following account:

The political military structure and leadership of the resistance was reorganized, and the Revolutionary Council of the National Resistance (CRRN) was formed to take overall charge of the Resistance. The CRRN was to be an umbrella forum for all pro-independence elements, not only Fretilin, and was a significant step away from the hard-line policies of 1977 when Fretilin had been declared a Marxist-Leninist Party (Partido Marxista-Leninista Fretilin, PMLF), and toward national unity.<sup>18</sup>

As the use of the word *revolucionário* in the name CRRN should alert the reader, this account could not be further from the truth. The party’s name and ideological principles were not changed in 1977, but rather at the Lacluta conference in 1981.<sup>19</sup> This conference, at which Gusmão served as “conference president” and was elected National Political Commissar and reconfirmed as commander-in-chief of Falintil, addressed three questions: (1) the necessity of reorganizing the nation, (2) the necessity of correcting past errors, and (3) the necessity of defining the party. And it was here that the name of the party was changed from Fretilin to Partido Marxista-Leninista Fretilin (abbreviated MLF).<sup>20</sup> This signified the need for a Marxist-Leninist party to play the leading role in a front that would “unite all nationalists.”<sup>21</sup> Nationalists were identified based on their class position (workers and peasants). However, neither UDT nor Apodeti is mentioned in the conference proceedings and no call is made for cooperation, let alone unity across party lines. This was an unabashed statement of position and solidarity under the party banner.

The decision in 1981 to base the party formally on Marxism-Leninism and to change the party name to MLF must be understood within the broader context. Having lost any pretense of maintaining a territorial base, without international borders behind which to hide, and with no hope of receiving outside assistance, the party leadership sought to come to a new understanding of the situation. Marxism-Leninism provided a theoretical basis from which such a reassessment could be carried out. With its emphasis on self-sufficiency, Maoism provided an answer to Timor’s isolation. But of greatest importance, the adoption of Marxism-Leninism ensured a common

<sup>18</sup> See Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor, *Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR)* (Dili: CAVR, 2005), esp. Chapter 3, “History of the Conflict,” p. 96, at [www.ictj.org](http://www.ictj.org), accessed February 9, 2009. Gusmão has alleged that Marxism was “acclaimed” at the Laline conference in 1977, but what this meant is not clear. See Gusmão, *To Resist Is to Win!*, p. 47.

<sup>19</sup> Oddly, in one place *Chega!* claims that Marxism-Leninism was adopted in August 1977, but elsewhere it is suggested that this took place on October 16, 1977, when Nicolau Lobato was declared president (*Chega!*, paragraph 302, page 78). CAVR was fully aware that the name change did not take place until 1981, but this was only mentioned six paragraphs after the initial claim. The only sources provided are Xanana Gusmão’s autobiography and an interview he gave with CAVR.

<sup>20</sup> República Democrática de Timor Leste/Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente, “Acta da 1ª Conferência Nacional,” pp. 32–33 (mimeograph in author’s possession).

<sup>21</sup> República Democrática de Timor Leste/Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente, “Discurso de Abertura de 1ª Conferência Nacional decorrida de 1 a 8 de Março de 1981 na região Nakroma,” pp. 24, 29–30.

language and set of analytical tools with which, it was hoped, the resistance could overcome the internal divisions that had fractured the resistance during the late 1970s.

### **"Opportunists will Emerge"**

The transcript of the meeting between Governor Carrascalão and Xanana Gusmão is not only important because it enriches our understanding of the 1983 ceasefire; it also sheds light on the relationship between these two men from 1999 until the present. The historic 1983 meeting was the basis for a long-term "understanding," as Mário Carrascalão put it, between the two. Under the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (1999–2002), Gusmão was the favorite interlocutor of international actors, including the UN, but he came out openly in opposition to Fretilin. Carrascalão backed him throughout. In October 2002, as Gusmão's attacks on the new Fretilin government escalated, Carrascalão stated: "I know that President Xanana, in his entire soul, heart, and mind, is a true democrat. Compassion is the dominant value in his politics. And Xanana's performance is not his political specialty alone, but it is the performance of the entire people of East Timor. The people truly understand what freedom is, what independence means, what oppression means."<sup>22</sup> Five years later, having forced Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri from office, Gusmão could count on Carrascalão's Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata) to join his new Parliamentary Majority Alliance government. But it was not all to be smooth sailing. In July 2007, when Gusmão's government was facing widespread charges of corruption and abuse of power, Mário Carrascalão stood up in parliament and angrily declared "if the ministers cannot answer questions from members of parliament, then we are just a bunch of *yes-men!*"<sup>23</sup>

Today, however, perhaps the single most relevant lesson from the conversation between Carrascalão and Gusmão under the trying circumstances of 1983 is to be found in their thoughts about a future that lay ahead and that now, post-independence, has finally arrived. Gusmão explains that, "as the leader of the struggle I have told my boys that after the war [is over] the problems we will face will be even more difficult. 'Don't think that after the war is over everything will be easy and we can sit back. No!'" More poignant still, at the beginning of his first exposition, Governor Carrascalão notes that if national unity cannot be achieved, "opportunists will emerge who will exploit the situation for their own benefit, but those benefits will not be enjoyed for long, as is the case for many of us 'down here' [in Dili] for whom the benefits will not be eternal."

<sup>22</sup> See "Wawancara khusus dengan Mario Carrascalao (1): Rakyat jangan dikembalikan ke tahun 1975," *Suara Timor Lorosae*, October 21, 2002.

<sup>23</sup> He used the English expression "yes-men." Personal communication with a member of the UN responsible for monitoring the parliamentary debates, Dili, last week of July 2008.

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## TRANSCRIPT OF THE RECORDING OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND XANANA ON MAY 29, 1983

Before the governor entered the meeting room, Xanana and Father Locatelli<sup>24</sup> discussed the weather, the seasons, rice paddies, and so forth, which the translator considers to be unimportant to include here.

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### [Cassette I, Side A]

**Governor:** Alright, Senhor Gusmão,<sup>25</sup> we meet again. I received your letter and I read it with great interest. I did not answer your letter because I prefer to meet with you face to face so that we can discuss the contents of the letter. That is my position because I am not a cynical person; that doesn't mean that you are cynical because you sent a letter to me. I am a person who wants to speak clearly so that the person listening to me doesn't misunderstand what I mean.

As in our earlier meeting, the reason I have come is to show you that I am someone who struggles so that the people can feel free from the undesirable actions of certain rogue elements (there is no need to mention their names here) who hold the view that East Timor is a stolen territory [*wilayah rampasan*], where people do not have any rights and are not able to claim their rights, except for those that are granted to them. I don't agree with that view, of course. What I mean is that no one knows what East Timor will be like in the future. I am not someone who changes his mind and goals easily, but if I cannot reach my goals, I am also someone who works so that those goals may be realized by our children or grandchildren. However, I will not allow anyone to lead the people into a fatal situation or lead them like sheep, because nothing positive can come from a people being led like a herd of sheep. People treated like that, whatever the circumstances, will always be ruled without real freedom.

In this matter, I think that the people of East Timor must be prepared with real awareness and intelligence so that they can take advantage of the opportunities that history will present for them to determine their own fate.

Concerning your appeal for National Unity, I think that unity needs to be created because if the East Timorese people are divided they will "devour" [*makan-memakan*] one another. And if they devour one another, a people will not progress, but rather will permit the emergence of "Partisanship" [*Partidarisme*], which will prevent them from reaching a desired goal, and in such circumstances opportunists will emerge who will

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<sup>24</sup> As noted in the introduction, Father Locatelli is an Italian priest who was head of the minor seminary at Fatumaca, in Baucau District.

<sup>25</sup> Throughout the transcript, "Gusmão" is misspelled "Gusmau."

exploit the situation for their own benefit, but those benefits will not be enjoyed for long, as is the case for many of us “down there” for whom the benefits will not be eternal.<sup>26</sup>

Even though I have not practiced my real profession for years, I could leave East Timor [p. 2]. Wherever I am, I will not have any trouble living a decent life free from psychological pressures or political deceptions. But [I am] not like that! I believed that I must return to East Timor to contribute to the resistance [*perlawanan*] as well, but the resistance must be based on the various [points] I made above.<sup>27</sup> That is my attitude because I know there is much injustice, much reprehensible behavior, many people who have been destroyed because a number of people born in this land want to put their own interests first without paying any attention to the interests of others.

It is clear that fundamentally the call for my return to East Timor was determined by internal factors, but it must also be acknowledged that my return to East Timor was also influenced by the misdeeds of Timorese leaders at the time ..... I could just as well live ..... (unclear) ..... not in Jakarta or in the United States. I put my children in school in East Timor. They may learn whatever languages they can, but they must go to school in East Timor so that they know the reality in this land, the reality of the people, so they too live in this reality. I don't have words to describe how I see the future of East Timor, but I think that my actions will speak for themselves on this matter.

If I fight for the honor of each and every Timorese, it is my hope that returning dignity to the East Timorese people will be the basic capital [*modal dasar*] for the East Timorese people to fulfill their ideals. But I can also say that the basic capital for that—dignity, honesty, unity—must not be misused.

The road we must travel is a long one!!! Our way might be blocked and difficult to pass, but with necessary pauses we will be able to continue to our desired goal. Many things will make this possible; but it is not the United Nations that will determine this.

When I was at the UN, I never responded to the UN decisions about the East Timor case. I didn't respond because what goes on at the UN is a complete “charade.” This year at the UN Forum, the majority of votes will be for Indonesia. So don't pin your hopes on the UN. But that doesn't mean that the aims of the East Timorese people will not be fulfilled. The development of East Timor within Indonesia is one step. Indonesia itself is a country undergoing constant/unstopping development.

We must analyze the Indonesian Constitution, we must analyze all of its structures and all of the laws.

Within Indonesia, East Timor can become something other than it is now. But for me, East Timor must become what the people want it to become [p. 3]. East Timor cannot just become what Mário Carrascalão (mentions his own name) wants it to be or what is wanted by people with radical views. East Timor must become what the people want it to be. Many people have misunderstood this.

<sup>26</sup> There are quotation marks around the words “bawah sana.” This appears to refer to Dili. In this passage, Governor Carrascalão eerily prophesies the current situation in Timor-Leste.

<sup>27</sup> In light of Governor Carrascalão's arguments, his use of the word “resistance” twice in this sentence is odd; this is most likely a poor translation from the original Portuguese to the Indonesian.

Because of that they reject opportunities that exist for dialogue and negotiation. I don't want a settlement to be reached only for an instant. Fundamentally, what I want is for the people of East Timor to be prepared for the future. I am certain that after achieving certain minimal goals the Government of Indonesia will ..... and East Timor will become what the people want it to be, because the Government of Indonesia surely will not want resistance to continue forever, so long as unity can be achieved between the component parts, that is the Government of Indonesia in Dili and the Government of Indonesia in Jakarta.<sup>28</sup> I've seen from personal observation that Dili does not reflect Jakarta, and so I can imagine where Jakarta wants to proceed and also where Dili wants to go ..... (unclear) .....

Actually, what the Government of Indonesia wants for Timor Timur is for this territory not to be in a situation in which the laws .....

Of course, if we pay attention to developments in Indonesia, the situation in Timor Timur will not be this way forever. I am convinced that several factors will lead to improvement; these factors stem from the firm determination of the leaders and also have to be brought into being by local conditions. Of course, if we look at conditions in one country in economic terms, and this is what I want to focus on here, things aren't so bad! Indonesia is a country that is developing faster and faster year by year. Last year the World Bank published a development index of Third World countries. Economic growth in Western European countries was only 2 percent [per year], while in Indonesia growth was 5 percent and we are very satisfied with this. Clearly that rate is only one small part of everything that must be accomplished.

Nevertheless, compared to other Third World countries, Indonesia has greater economic potential. And clearly that must be considered within the context of the current global recession, of which no country is free. But it must be admitted that the recession has not fully hit Indonesia, or in other words Indonesia has been late to feel the impact of the recession. I always follow developments and the efforts of the Indonesian Government regarding this matter, and I am of the opinion that the recession in Indonesia will soon end. Consider, for example, last year decisions were made that the implementation of certain projects would be cancelled, but this year decisions have been made that these cancelled projects can now be implemented. It is true that oil prices have fallen, but think about one thing: Indonesia does not produce the same kind of oil as countries in the Middle East; Indonesian oil has low sulfur content, the country has not lost buyers for its oil [p. 4]. It is also clear that although Indonesia has already compromised with other countries to reduce oil exports, its high-quality oil will fetch high prices.

I don't have much to say about the strength of the Indonesian Armed Forces.<sup>29</sup> But I can relay some of the ideas/opinions that I have found in articles I have read. According to these articles, Indonesia is the only country that can dominate this region militarily. Of course, in the military field, Indonesia's advantage is not only determined by its population (150 million people), [but] what counts here is the quality

<sup>28</sup> The Indonesian translation is badly garbled. Carrascalão seems to be suggesting that differences between the Indonesian state/military in Jakarta and Dili are preventing a resolution to the conflict.

<sup>29</sup> In the Indonesian transcript, this sentence is part of the previous paragraph.

of its weapons, so that in military matters Indonesia can be rated number one [in Southeast Asia].

Therefore, one may conclude that Indonesia's military advantage is both quantitative and qualitative. Its factories produce what it needs, so that Indonesia is self-sufficient in this regard. I don't mean that this will determine the future of Indonesia. As you know, Indonesia consists of 3,000 islands, and the peoples living on those islands do not have the same culture, the same customs, the same way of life, or the same aspirations. Therefore, to create a spirit of National Unity in Indonesia you have to take into account the factors I mentioned earlier, because if there isn't a balance between these factors the outcome will be the disintegration of the country. Another problem that could result in the disintegration of Indonesia is if Muslims declare an Islamic Government, [in which case] Indonesia will fall apart. If that happens, there will be an opportunity for everyone to become master of his own house. Ah, but for that to happen the conditions would have to be right, because the Indonesian government is very prudently organized. Working within the Government itself is an opportunity to create those conditions. But one has to take into account the fact that the Indonesian Government has adopted an intelligent attitude toward those Provinces which are backward in terms of technology [*tehnilogis*] and education, and will [ensure] the equal distribution of production facilities and education.

Furthermore, it would not be fair to measure the Indonesian system of Governance in terms of conditions in Timor Timur. One might say that Timor Timur was not included in the original blueprint for Indonesia. The Indonesian system of governance has what are called vertical agencies and horizontal agencies.<sup>30</sup> These are as follows: vertical agencies are agencies in a certain Province/Region which, because of insufficient capacity to develop certain sectors, are directly under the Central Government [p. 5]. Once a Province/Region has the capacity to develop those sectors on its own, the vertical authorities are abolished, meaning the Central Government will no longer exercise absolute control over the Province. At this stage, the Central Government only has absolute authority in the areas of Military and Security affairs. Today this is what is being regulated by laws.

Ah! We (Timor Timur) are among a number of Provinces with very few autonomous government agencies. At present in our area the autonomous government agencies are as follows:

- Department of Agriculture: — 50 percent comes from the Center;  
— 50 percent we raise ourselves.
- Department of Education & Culture: — 50 percent comes from Jakarta;  
— 50 percent we raise ourselves.
- Taxes and Customs: — Entirely under our control.

Why are we in a situation like this?

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<sup>30</sup> The original says: "Instansi-instansi vertical dan instansi-instansi horizontal."

Because we do not have the ability to pay for our own budget. Imagine, this year we need 57 billion rupiah for development, administration, and so on. How can we obtain that much money when our revenue is so little? Last year our revenue was only about 250 million rupiah; wah, like a drop of water in the ocean. Converted into [US] Dollars, that is only 250 thousand dollars. If, at present, we became Independent/stand on our own, how could we manage to develop with so small a sum of money? For small countries like Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, or the Dominican Republic, the annual budget for four or five representatives at the UN requires 250 or 300 thousand dollars. Indonesia needs two million dollars per year for its Ambassador and staff. And, there are also countries such as The Republic of Solomon Islands that do not have permanent representatives at the UN. They only come to attend sessions of the General Assembly, and afterward they go straight home because they cannot afford to stay there for long. There are also African countries like the Central African Republic, Gambia, and others that do not have a permanent representative at the UN. They only come to the UN when there is a session of the General Assembly. The strange thing is that, just before a session of the General Assembly, one vote can be bought with a plane ticket, so the resolutions made at the UN do not succeed. As for the big powers, they only make a fuss when their interests are threatened. Their politics are Pragmatic [*Praktis*], i.e. pushing for what benefits them without a care for the fate of the people in little Countries. For example: Western Sahara, which is recognized by most African countries, cannot make any progress [at the UN] because, behind the scenes, there are other stronger countries that oppose the wishes of Western Sahara [p. 6]. This is also true in the case of Namibia, which already has a government outside of the country which is made up of UN member states. In the case of the Namibia Forum—of which Indonesia is a part and for which I myself was the representative from Indonesia—which could be said to have a government, headed by an African country, and with members consisting of Soviet Union, countries from Northern Europe, Latin America, and Africa, and Australia, all of which supported Namibia's right to immediate independence.

But in this context, other factors were in play: The United States wished to exploit Namibia's uranium, and because of that the United States wanted a Namibian Government that would favor the interests of the United States, whereas there was no certainty that the Namibian Government would accede to US aims. That would make Namibia dependent on the wishes of the United States. Looked at from another angle, Namibia is not a signatory to the International Maritime Convention. And so, without having to worry about legal claims, ships from the Soviet Union were free to exploit Namibia's maritime riches. And when, during a meeting in Tanzania, the delegation from the Soviet Union suggested that the Namibia Forum sign the International Maritime Convention in the name of the Namibian people, I refused [to vote in favor]. The representative from SWAPO<sup>31</sup> diplomatically suggested to me that the issue be settled 'among friends.' I asked him: "*Lho!*"<sup>32</sup> why don't you take a stand?"

This cannot be condoned [just] because there are accusations that the exploitation of South Africa is Colonial exploitation. How can one speak of the Soviet Union's exploitation of Namibia's maritime riches when the United States, West Germany,

<sup>31</sup> SWAPO is the South West Africa People's Organization in Namibia.

<sup>32</sup> "*Lho*" is a Javanese/Indonesian exclamation of surprise or emphasis.

France, England, and others are not allowed to exploit South Africa?<sup>33</sup> The SWAPO representative responded: "There isn't anything I can do. The Soviet Union is the only country that gives us weapons." Because this issue [concerning Namibia and the International Maritime Convention] required debate, finally it was decided to hold a vote. But because it was already known that the Soviet Union would lose—and it is very unpleasant when one has to reject a motion from a strong Country—eventually the proposal was withdrawn. Up until I had to return home, one didn't hear another word about the matter of exploiting Namibia's maritime riches. On another occasion, I wanted to raise this issue, [but] I was advised by an Arab Country not to speak about this again.

And so in my opinion, whatever any country in the world might say, the words are simply instruments for the pursuit of its own interests. What Australia says needs to be examined thoroughly. Australia is trying to create the optimal conditions to reject the Liberal Party convention that will be held this coming June or July. This June the Australian Prime Minister will visit Indonesia. When a Prime Minister visits another Country he must have concrete proposals which will promote relations between his own Country and the Country he is visiting [p. 7]. Last week the Australian ambassador to Indonesia began the necessary preparations so that the Australian Prime Minister can successfully meet the Government of Indonesia. The Australian diplomat who has been given this assignment once met with me. When we were saying goodbye, the Australian diplomat wished me success. He did not say that, in the coming meetings, at which it is very likely East Timor will be discussed, he will provide information that is either favorable or detrimental to Indonesia. In returning his regards, I only said that nothing important has happened yet, but he held to his position because, he said, it is based on what he saw first-hand in Dili.

I hope that this will allow Gusmão to take a realistic view of the situation. With New Zealand, this is how it is: no matter what position the Government of Australia takes, New Zealand will not change its attitude toward Indonesia since there are groups working to ensure good relations between Indonesia and New Zealand.

That stance is a result of New Zealand's dependence on Indonesia, because New Zealand needs oil from Indonesia, but its major [trade commodity] is sugar [which Indonesia does not need]. As is well known, Japan is a Country that has few natural resources, while Indonesia is among the top countries when it comes to natural resources. Because of that, Japan continually has to make approaches to Indonesia, especially to obtain fuel from Indonesia to keep its factories running. For that reason, Japan is the largest purchaser of oil and natural gas from Indonesia.

In Europe, a change in France could result in changes in the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, it is necessary to pay close attention to relations between these Countries. Let's take a look at the case of Libya.<sup>34</sup> Libya, which in Africa is known as Revolutionary Libya, at one point was forced to support Indonesia because it needed Indonesia's support in order to become a member of the

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<sup>33</sup> The Indonesian translation is not clear. Carrascalão probably meant to say: "How can one object to western exploitation of South Africa, but remain silent about Soviet exploitation of Namibia?"

<sup>34</sup> The name given in the transcript is Liberia, but this is almost certainly a mistake on the part of the person who transcribed or translated the Portuguese language tape. In 1969, Muammar al-Gaddafi overthrew Libya's King Idris and established a Revolutionary Command Council.

International Monetary Fund, and by becoming a member of the IMF it was able to carry out certain maneuvers in such a way that the IMF's policies were in Libya's interests.

That is a picture of the intrigues that go on in international politics.

..... [recording is interrupted] .....

**[Cassette I, Side B]**

**Xanana:** So, then, what have we seen? If there is UDT and there is Fretilin, if there is a possibility of a Coalition, then why can't there be an understanding between us? Even if our side has made some mistakes, why can't there be an understanding between us on certain points?

All of this has made me think. As a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, which is responsible for the struggle, it is my obligation to answer the points above. Is there no possibility of ending our war by way of a course of National Unity [p. 8]?

If there has been a lack of clarity when it comes to definitions, particularly with regard to ideology—I have never hidden my political identity from anyone, and even now I claim that I am a Marxist—the matter can be cleared up. If during this war Fretilin has directed certain individuals toward a particular ideology, that does not mean that all followers of Fretilin are Marxists. This misunderstanding led all of us to make major mistakes. However, recently I have become aware of this. The party we have established (MLF) is intended for the purpose of definitions, that is, to define certain problems. Because I am an adherent of this ideology (meaning: Marxism-Leninism), fine, I can step aside. But Fretilin must mobilize people who think that East Timor can become an Independent Country [*Negara Merdeka*]. This definition is used so that we do not conflate one thing with something else, so that we do not go down the wrong road. I can explain that at its beginning a process is never clear, but those who are engaged in that process are forced to learn lessons from the mistakes they have made. Those who are left behind by the process while it is underway may have special characteristics, for example, those who are adherents of a religion, whether it be Catholicism or Protestantism or even Islam. They must be categorized by the religious organizations to which they belong, so as not to give rise to confusion. That is the only way to make progress. With regard to this idea, let me say that, based on each person's position, a Government that is intelligent in all regards will not give unconditional participation [to a particular party/position] with regard to the resolution of this war or this process in East Timor.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup> The referent in this sentence is unclear. Gusmão is most likely referring to the predominant position of the Indonesian military within Indonesian policy circles. It is, however, also possible that he is criticizing the Indonesian government for favoring certain East Timorese actors (Apodeti and UDT) above others or is criticizing foreign governments for allowing Indonesia an "unconditional" role in how the war is resolved.

I see in you someone who is of value to our homeland and also someone who is of use to us insofar as we can take stands that will direct our people and our land in the right direction. From this standpoint, I have set out several issues for you to consider.

So, my comrades and I think that if we cannot discuss these issues—both those relating to ourselves as well as those relating to everyone [all East Timorese]—we will not be able to achieve our aims. And the result of this: We [in the resistance] are always radical, both in our thinking and in our actions. And I can even say this: the last letter [I sent] was like a car's muffler [*kanal-spoat*] because we are determined to reduce the suffering of our people, but without betraying the dignity of the people. We [in the resistance] are not entitled—Senhor Mário has mentioned a people who are given orders without any freedom—to arrest or to repress our people. Our people will determine what they themselves want.

Because of that, throughout this process, I have always made an effort to understand the attitude of the Government in Jakarta toward this process. If the Indonesian government insists on "integration," I cannot accept it. I cannot accept it because I hold the principle that we can become Independent, we have the right to Independence [p. 9].

If such is the case, we will not waste our time negotiating. When my request was greeted with a threatening tone I thought: What must we do? Break off negotiation or .... Isn't the aim of our efforts to reduce the suffering of our people through a fitting and just settlement of this situation?

We [in the resistance] also want to end this situation. But we know and we are aware that we are also capable of continuing [in] this situation, and we know that the prolongation of this war will have tragic consequences for the people. So, as the person responsible for the struggle, what I have said is like [the noise from] a car's muffler [*kanal-spoat*]. I speak as the person responsible for the struggle. I am not talking about myself.

Just now I wanted to know if there is still a possibility, and better yet, in fact, ways for us to end this situation. If there are not, then—I can say—we [the resistance] will carry on to the death. That is the only way Indonesia will end this war. Frankly, at present we are capable of continuing the war. Our fighters have a more offensive spirit [*jiwa ofensif*], better technical abilities—I don't mean better than the Commando troops<sup>36</sup>—but better in the circumstances [*konsensus*] of this war. Elements who never received any basic training, now have, thanks to our endeavors, the minimal qualifications for us to continue the war. We are certain of this, because we know that the war will not end, but we also know that continuing the war will result in the sacrifice of even more of our people. As for the settlements that we attacked, we can explain that we did not intend to set them ablaze because we like to set [houses] ablaze. In 1979 we strenuously opposed the destruction of people's property. But the

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<sup>36</sup> "Pasukan Komando" refers to the Secret Warfare Command (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha (abbreviated "Kopassandha"). In 1986, three years after the meeting between Gusmão and Carrascalão, Kopassandha was renamed Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus).

politics of resettlement<sup>37</sup> meant death and forced us to take action. This was what guaranteed that we could continue the war up to the present.

Because of all this, I took the initiative to send a letter to you, thinking that it was our responsibility to share our ideas, to see what might happen or whether there were any guarantees of a good resolution of the situation, and if so we would move forward. That was not our attitude towards previous Governors, for example Guilherme Gonçalves.<sup>38</sup> I know them [the Apodeti people] well. I have a different view of you. I told my boys: He [Mário Carrascalão] is someone who is of value to our homeland and people.<sup>39</sup> If we reach a common vision, that is, a desire to resolve this situation in a good way, then this can be used as a bridge to cross into new territory. That was my position even before I met with Mayor Gatot and the others.<sup>40</sup> At times when they [my boys] were afraid, I told them: If you are afraid to take this letter to him [Governor Carrascalão], just put the letter in the mail [p. 10]. So even though there are people who say that these meetings have taken place on their initiative, I can say that I was already leaning in that direction. But the difficulty of communication prevented [us from] achieving the desired aim.

So, believe me, Senhor Mário, we [the resistance] have no aim other than the one we have stated. We are conscious of realities, we are aware of our mistakes (I myself have often made mistakes).

So, if we continue to be stubborn—like wood against stones—we will never achieve anything.<sup>41</sup>

**Governor:** Yes, right. But what about the practicalities?

**Xanana:** It's like this: Senhor Mário's presentation seems to offer a very gloomy picture in every respect. Perhaps I can put it this way. If we coordinate our efforts, at some point we will say: We have the power in our own land, meaning that our people are sovereign. As for the minimal conditions that Senhor Mário touched on, it is as though our people are not conscious of what they want. I want to problematize this: If the people have supported us [the resistance] all this time, that means that the people know what they want. During [the meeting] at Larigutu<sup>42</sup> I said that we are of no use if we do not give substance to the people's desires. At the very least, as is the case in

<sup>37</sup> The translation provides both the Portuguese and Indonesian terms: "repovoasi/ pemukiman-pemukiman." In the desperate circumstances after the fall of the last base areas in the eastern sector, Fretilin/Falintil resorted to direct attacks on Indonesia's "resettlement" camps.

<sup>38</sup> Guilherme Gonçalves, the *liurai* (little king) of Atsabe, was a founding member of Apodeti. He served as governor from 1978 until 1982.

<sup>39</sup> The transcription uses the Indonesian term "*tanah air*" (land and water); Gusmão presumably used the Portuguese word "*Patria*."

<sup>40</sup> A series of low-level meetings between Indonesian officers and Fretilin/Falintil commanders eventually led to meetings between Major Gatot and Xanana Gusmão. See the East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation's final report, *Chega!*, for a partial chronology.

<sup>41</sup> The original says: "Makanya, kalau kita tetap keras kepala, kayu! kayu! dan batu-batu maka kita tidak akan menyelesaikan sesuatu."

<sup>42</sup> The meeting on March 23, 1983, at which ABRI and Fretilin agreed to the temporary ceasefire.

other parts of the world, [our] guerrilla [fighters] would not be able to survive [without the support of the people]. So I can say that our people do know what they want. For those of us responsible<sup>43</sup> for the people, it is our duty to direct the people so that they develop an awareness of what they want and how to achieve those aspirations.

It will be difficult to find a way for us to say:<sup>44</sup> "Alright! Whether they accept it or not, I have no intention to get involved in these tangled intrigues.["] But in the present conditions of war, we must address these difficulties. My letter also explains that a person's abilities will not go unrecognized. Those of us here in the jungle are aware of this principle. Furthermore, as the leader of the struggle I have told my boys that after the war the problems we will face will be even more difficult. "Don't think that after the war is over everything will be easy and we can sit back and relax. No!["]

The problem of National reconstruction is very complex [*komplet, sic*]. Senhor Mário Carrascalão has just touched on the minimum conditions. If [by mentioning] these minimal conditions you mean to imply our lack of technical and technological ability and, moreover, our economic incapacity, alright, I agree that in the short-term we will not be able to develop our territory. With Indonesia or within Indonesia, it also won't be easy considering the population of 150 million. As Almeida Santos put it, [Indonesia is like] "a Transatlantic [liner] that has broken down in mid-ocean."<sup>45</sup> I think there are minimal conditions for developing our territory without reducing the honor of our people, which make me proud. I think Senhor Mário is also proud to be a son of this people. As Senhor Mário just said, there are students of ours who do not want to return to East Timor because they want [to live] somewhere better. I was in Australia, where I worked as a manual laborer [p. 11]. I was one of the semi-employed. Every day we read in the papers about the rising unemployment rate. So if there was a call or announcement for laborers and only a few people were needed, thousands of people would come to apply. So I imagine how those [Timorese] who leave will be able to live there [abroad]. I am afraid of dozing off at this stage [of the struggle], when we need to be preparing the conditions for giving substance to our Independence, bearing in mind that we are a small, poor, and backward people.

I think the people of East Timor will be put in the hands of those who are most able, that is, those who are willing to give, those who say: "That which is mine I give to the people." That will guarantee our values and identity. I am prepared to work as best I can. Concerning National Unity, don't misunderstand this idea, or accept the distortions circulated by *bapak-bapak* [the Indonesian military].<sup>46</sup> "Fretilin is deceiving you. They will throw you all in jail." National Unity is not intended as a "Maneuver" by one [group] against another. National Unity is [a way] for us to prepare for the circumstances that will arise. Because in East Timor, in order for us to realize our

<sup>43</sup> The Indonesian transcript uses the word "*penanggung-jawab*," presumably where Gusmão used the Fretilin-term "*responsivel*."

<sup>44</sup> The placement of the quotation marks is problematic. Rather than following the highly questionable punctuation in the Indonesian language, whereby there is a single long quote, it is far more likely that Gusmão intended for only the first and last sentences to be what he said to his troops.

<sup>45</sup> In the Indonesian transcript, this is part of the previous sentence. Gusmão likely intended this to be a separate sentence. The quotation reads: "*sebuah Transatlantik yang macet didalam lautan*."

<sup>46</sup> Throughout the text, both Carrascalão and Gusmão use the Indonesian "*bapak-bapak*" to refer to the Indonesian military (ABRI).

identity as a nation, we need to adjust to the circumstances that will arise and not be limited by the thinking that accumulated before those conditions arose. I am a Marxist. When I speak with Father Locatelli, I say this: “Father, I don’t want to lie to anyone. I profess an ideology, I am a Marxist but I know what has to be done in East Timor. Just as you, Father [Locatelli], left your family to come here to help this people, the same [is true of] my ideology. I fight to lessen the suffering of the people, but I know that my ideology will not be accepted here, and I will not plant seeds that are not appropriate to this land.” It would not be realistic—or as Senhor [Carrascalão] said, it would be to behave like sheep<sup>47</sup>—were I to force myself, to impose my ideology on everyone else.

In this regard, I do not want to act simply because of our needs, and I do not accept the way of acting that Senhor Mário has suggested, because in our bodies flows a blood that forces us to become what in reality we must be. As for language, I can say that I only know Portuguese—it isn’t that I reject other languages—but yes! I have studied Portuguese and local languages, although I am not a polyglot who has mastered many languages.

What I know is that because of this situation, Indonesian—of which I once knew a little—makes my mouth hurt. So when Senhor Gonçalves told José Conceição<sup>48</sup> that many [Indonesian-language] schools have been opened, I asked where I [at age 37] could go to learn *bahasa*.<sup>49</sup> I can’t swallow it.

I was somewhat disappointed when I heard Dr. Gonçalves’s statement that [the ceasefire] negotiations are not important. We must treat these negotiations as a process that is long, complex, and difficult.

So we need to be in contact with people who enlighten us, people who can help us so that we achieve a satisfactory outcome [p. 12]. Attitudes such as those of Dr. Gonçalves make me think: How do these people view ..... ?<sup>50</sup> That’s why I wrote to you saying: “If you want to listen to me, fine! If you don’t, no problem.” I plead that our position not be treated as an attempted maneuver, because I know a bit about what people are thinking.

**Governor:** This situation must be addressed seriously because Indonesia wants to legalize Timor Timur as a province. Of course this will lead to a number of changes, and I am certain the Government will not overlook these.

Timor Timur is a Province of Indonesia based on a decision by the highest Legislative Body, which is the MPR. It is also essential to be aware that if possible [*sic*, necessary] Indonesia will withdraw from the United Nations in order to maintain its rights over Timor Timur. The Timor Timur process [of integration], which at first was only the business of the government of Indonesia, is now understood by the entire

<sup>47</sup> Earlier in the discussion, Carrascalão used the phrase “like sheep” (*bertindak seperti biri-biri*).

<sup>48</sup> José da Conceição survived the 1978 assault on Mount Matebian and then found refuge in Lautem District, at the eastern tip of the island. In early 1983, he was the first Falintil commander contacted by ABRI officers.

<sup>49</sup> “Bahasa” refers to the Indonesian language.

<sup>50</sup> The end of the sentence is not legible. It may have been erased or written over. The first letter may be “p” and a final “i” is visible, suggesting that it says “*proses ini*,” or “this process.”

population of Indonesia, which feels that the best road for the people of Timor Timur is integration with Indonesia. If there were to emerge rogue elements [*oknum-oknum*] who sought to change the Indonesian Government's consensus on Timor Timur, achieving that goal would be out of the question because it would be the same as killing off the MPR, which is the People's Consultative [Assembly]. Quite frankly, internally [within Indonesia] the problem of Timor Timur is already resolved, but in the external arena Indonesia is still carrying out diplomatic efforts so that there, too, the problem can also be laid to rest.

So, I think that the Timor Timur problem is like other cases that can occur in history, either because of our own acts or because of what others did. Take the case of Portugal as an example. Portugal, a small country with a small population and a feeble economy, succeeded in maintaining its rule over various [Overseas] Provinces for such a long time. If there hadn't been a domestic rebellion, there is no certainty that the [Overseas] Provinces would have obtained independence. Although the liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau had all sorts of facilities, such as bases in neighboring countries, they were not always successful.

Now let's look at the problem of Timor Timur, where there isn't an [operational] base that can't be reached by enemy attacks.

Is it possible to avoid the black scenario that I described?

Can the armed struggle avoid the black scenario that I spoke of in my [opening] presentation?

At one point in New York, I asked Mari Alkatiri the following question: "Have you prepared backup weapons to support the people on the front lines?["

Mari Alkatiri responded: ["The Government of Mozambique has already provided a ship and Vietnam has given weapons left over by the American military. But we haven't found a way to unload the ship in East Timor.[" Then I asked: ["So are you going to wait until you run out of facilities [weapons], and only then report this to the United Nations?["

Mari Alkatiri gave the same answer as [you], Gusmão: "We will hold out with weapons from the enemy" [p. 13]. Then I responded: ["Alright! Don't forget this. Strategy is determined by both parties to the conflict. In warfare, intelligence plays a role, it doesn't cease. For me, waging war under these conditions ..... I don't mean that you have already been defeated. The real defeat should have happened in 1976 or 1977. In fact, I respect you because you have been able to make sacrifices to a point that was unimaginable. But based on the conditions I just explained, Timor Timur is recognized as a Province of Indonesia and all sorts of laws will be passed. And I am certain that the current "status quo" will be overcome, but rogues will emerge who want the "status quo" to be maintained.<sup>51</sup>

Militarily, recalling that the minimum required conditions are not present, open warfare will not bring victory, particularly when you recall that the minimum

<sup>51</sup> The transcript uses the spelling "status Guo." Here, Carrascalão seems to be referring to the possibility that factions within the Indonesian military would seek to continue the conflict either to justify the military's political position or as a useful testing ground for officers seeking promotion.

conditions are not present. In light of the geographic conditions and situation of Timor Timur, I think there is no point for all of you to sacrifice your lives, because under these conditions I can't imagine how long all of you will be able to hold out, but I don't yet know what your military conditions are.

I also see that the conditions of the Indonesian consolidation here [mean that] children study the Indonesian language in school. Every day they more and more feel that they are Indonesian citizens. In these conditions it will be more difficult for all of you to receive the help and support that you currently receive to carry out a long-term struggle, but that won't last forever.<sup>52</sup>

Because of that, I want to say that exercise of our brains [*olahraga mental*] will be required in order to find a practical solution. By that I mean a way to achieve an appropriate outcome, an outcome that is not mistaken. Of course, for all of you who have struggled for eight years in the forest it is [probably] rather difficult to accept opinions like this. I just hope that the situation does not become even worse, though from another angle I can also say that the people in the Timor Timur [Military] Command<sup>53</sup> are magnanimous [*berjiwa besar*], they have a more rational attitude.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, I simply hope that the situation in the future is not painted in black and white, and I also hope that I will not be accused of being one of the people responsible for that imagined scenario. You must understand that your struggle is isolated. Some time ago the Indonesian media still mentioned the Timor Timur problem. Not anymore, and you need to know that there is now greater press freedom in Indonesia than there once was. Based on conversations I've had with a number of people, I've come to the conclusion that in practical terms these people are not even aware of the resistance in Timor Timur, unless [of course] the son of a big-shot or an officer is killed in combat. In light of the black picture I've described, you must always bear this in mind so that further approaches can be more productive.

Sometimes a war can be won or lost because of historical accidents. For example, the Portuguese Colonies in Africa or the initial defeat experienced by the liberation movement in Ethiopia. If Cuban troops had not come to help, the liberation movement in Ethiopia would surely have suffered total defeat [p. 14].

I touch on this in order to remind you that a war can end in defeat because of small accidents. More fortunate were the forces in Belize,<sup>55</sup> who, without great sacrifices, achieved Independence because the diplomatic conflict over that country by Guatemala and England created the necessary conditions. Even though Guatemala continued to have diplomatic control over Belize, in relative terms the people of Belize

<sup>52</sup> This sentence is vague and includes the word "bln," presumably a typographical error of the word "bukan," meaning "not."

<sup>53</sup> From early 1976 until late 1978, Indonesian military operations in East Timor were conducted by the Regional Defense and Security Command (Komando Daerah Pertahanan Keamanan, abbreviated Kodahankam). In late 1978, Kodahankam was abolished and replaced by a new Security Operations Command (Komando Operasi Keamanan, abbreviated Koopskam).

<sup>54</sup> Carrascalão presumably is referring to the replacement of the brutal Sub-Regional Military Commander Adolf Sahala Radjagukguk, who served from March 26, 1979 to sometime in 1982 and who had been directly responsible for the implementation of the "fence-of-legs" operation in 1981.

<sup>55</sup> The transcript says Bolivia, which is clearly incorrect. Carrascalão is referring to Belize, which obtained independence from Great Britain in 1981. Following independence, 1,500 British troops defended Belize from Guatemalan aggression.

felt that they were free; and, of course, the future of Belize will always depend on Guatemalan policy. I know another story. The Prime Minister of the Dominican Republic once showed up at the UN. The appearance of a Prime Minister at the UN is usually occasion for all sorts of strange and mocking stories. That Prime Minister failed in his role, and in a speech he ... [narrative is interrupted when tape runs out] ...

[Cassette II, Side A]

**Governor:** I think it would be good for someone trustworthy [from the resistance] to come to Jakarta to explain directly to the Indonesian Government what you all want. I cannot fill that role, not because I think of myself as a militant or a victor in war (I do not consider myself to be a victor in this war), but because if I am given the task of intermediary I always want to give perfect expression to what one party has to say to the other party. As evidence, I can tell you that private parties<sup>56</sup> once asked me not to tell Government elements about less laudable aspects of the situation in Timor Timur. Of course, I did not fulfill those requests because in principle I am not someone who plays those kinds of games. Even so, if I were entrusted to forward what you all want to the Jakarta government, I would carry out that task to the best of my ability.

Returning to the international chessboard,<sup>57</sup> don't hope that Portugal will do much about the case of East Timor. I am reminded of the repatriation process to Portugal for East Timorese who wanted to be Portuguese citizens. While the repatriation process was being carried out, the Portuguese Ambassador in New York said to me: "Senhor, don't get involved, it's the Government's political problem. If you want to bring Ramos-Horta's mother to Portugal, you must be very careful."<sup>58</sup> I can also say that most of the information conveyed by the Indonesian delegation to the UN came from Portuguese diplomats. Don't hope for anything from the Portuguese. Believe me!

During the rule of Sá Carneiro<sup>59</sup> (of the Social Democratic Party) a tragedy almost occurred, that is, Portugal [almost] acknowledged the Integration of Timor Timur into the Republic of Indonesia. With Sá Carneiro's death, the candidate from the Social Democratic Party, Soares Carneiro, failed to defeat his rival, Ramalho Eanes [p. 15]. If Sá Carneiro hadn't died and [Soares Carneiro] had been elected President, Portugal would most certainly have recognized the integration of Timor Timur into Indonesia. In fact, during discussions about the East Timor problem at the time, the Social Democratic Party received support from the majority in Parliament, but because Ramalho Eanes as President did not support the Social Democratic Party's proposal, things that would have benefited Indonesia were not discussed. The Socialist Party is now in power.

<sup>56</sup> The transcript reads "*pihak-pihak partikuler.*"

<sup>57</sup> The transcript uses the grammatically incorrect "*penyaturan,*" conveying a sense of both a chess board and intrigues.

<sup>58</sup> The meaning is not clear, though it is worth noting that Mário Carrascalão's younger brother João Carrascalão was married to one of José Ramos-Horta's sisters.

<sup>59</sup> Francisco Sá Carneiro was a member of the misleadingly named Social Democratic Party that, founded after the April 1974 Carnation Revolution, represented liberal elements within the Salazar-Caetano regime. Sá Carneiro died in an airplane crash.

When this Party was still in opposition, it did in fact try to approach groups that supported Fretilin. But what did the Socialist Party do? The top figure was not Mário Soares, but Almeida Santos, who had tremendous influence within the Socialist Party. Once in power, the Socialist Party was more Pro-West, that is more Pro-American, than Pro-East.<sup>60</sup> The same was the case in France, [where] Mitterrand from the Conservative Party [*sic*] was friendlier with the Soviet Union than was Giscard d'Estaing, who was a socialist.<sup>61</sup>

Under Mário Soares, Portugal will be the same. The Portuguese economy is in dire straits, and those who can reach out to help Portugal are the United States and perhaps also Germany and France. Whatever aid Portugal receives will come with strings. And finally, there are unreliable elements in the Socialist Party led by Mário Soares. Portugal will do [even] less than previous governments regarding East Timor. Furthermore, it is also important to note this: it was Portugal that originally took the East Timor problem to the UN. At the time the East Timor problem was brought up in the UN, the Portuguese Government [headed by General Eanes] took more "leftist" positions than later [civilian] governments. However, when [Eanes's] Government was asked to sign the Resolution prepared by Fretilin and several countries that supported it, Portugal always refused and gave the reason/excuse [*alasan*] that Portugal should take a neutral position so that it would be free to intervene when need be. Of course Fretilin's elements outside<sup>62</sup> did not accept that reason/excuse. Promise after promise, but in fact none was kept. The one Government that did something in accordance with Fretilin's views was the Government that fell last year. That Government sent representatives to thirty-eight Countries, if I'm not mistaken, to seek their support in the UN General Session in October 1982.

But one must understand that East Timor is not really important to the Portuguese Government. At the time the Social Democratic Party was losing support [*kewibawaan*, literally "authority"] in Parliament and there were serious threats to its rule. So in order to regain popular sympathy, the Party increased its support for East Timor. Even so, perhaps because this took place too late, the Social Democratic Party was still defeated by Mário Soares. On the flip side, Mário Soares did not depend on the East Timor problem to win the General Election. For that reason, in my analysis, Mário Soares, who is now in power in Portugal, will try with all his strength to achieve political stability in his country without paying too much attention to the East Timor question. For many Portuguese people I contacted in New York, the East Timor problem is only manipulated by politicians to obtain votes. That is our fate, that is East Timor's fate [p. 16].

If there are African countries that still support the resolution put forward by Fretilin (perhaps they support Fretilin because they have shared principles), that is because of respect for colonial borders[.] As we know, Africans were colonized by England, Belgium, France, Portugal, and others. Before they were colonized, they were

<sup>60</sup> Or "*Pro Timur*," meaning pro-communist.

<sup>61</sup> The political positions depicted here are reversed: whereas the conservative Giscard d'Estaing engaged Moscow, his successor, François Mitterand, of the Socialist Party, was on far more cordial terms with Germany than with the USSR.

<sup>62</sup> Carrascalão is referring to the Fretilin External Delegation, but by using the plural he is highlighting the fact that there were serious internal divisions within this delegation.

a united nation. Nah! Now each of them is Independent because they were separated by the colonizers. So if these African nations recognize the Integration of Timor Timur within Indonesia, that opens the possibility that one day they will demand the integration of those that are weaker, so that their unity, which was lost because of the colonizers, can be regained. For them, the background to supporting and demanding Decolonization is respect for Colonial boundaries. But there are differences between the countries in West Africa and the countries in East Africa. The countries in West Africa—including Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, Morocco, Guinea-Conakry—which are wealthy and have better defensive integrity, have not taken a strong stand on the East Timor problem. That's why many of them don't need to cast votes in debates about the case of East Timor. The case of Cameroon is pretty strange too. That country always abstains [in UN votes] about East Timor because internally the people are not united, and that is because the country arose out of the merger of two former colonies—one colonized by England and the other colonized by France. Of course, the Government of Cameroon always promotes its efforts to unite the population within a new consensus. But on the other hand, Nigeria demands the return of its people who now live in Cameroon and are considered to be citizens of Cameroon. Under these circumstances, Cameroon cannot take a stand on the East Timor case.

By going through my analysis, I want to give you a realistic picture of the international chessboard. The promises made by countries are only useful as material for daily interactions. Their real positions come into view when they press the buttons in the [UN] sessions: the red button means opposed and the green button means in favor. At that moment their real wishes become known. Other than that, everything is just rhetoric.<sup>63</sup> When Indonesia nominated itself to become a member of EKOSOK<sup>64</sup> (Economic, Social, .....), an international body in the field of Coordinating Economic, Social, and other [issues], it was Portugal that provided support. That same year, when Portugal nominated itself to become a member of the Security Council, support from Asian countries was obtained via Indonesia. In New York, I often said to Indonesian diplomats that I am not a good person for this kind of work. "You all can [do this] because you have been educated for this profession. But me, ahh! It is difficult for me to adjust to this work because I was educated in a more positive discipline, where white must be white and black must be black." That's what I told them. As a silviculturalist (agriculture and forestry engineer), I am not cut out for this sort of work. For me taking care of plants and trees is an art, and if a tree does not grow perhaps it needs more fertilizer or something. But to deal with people who laugh in front of us but then when they are behind us have no qualms about killing us, that kind of work is incompatible with my character [p. 17]. So at the UN each country just struggles for its own interests, sometimes by sacrificing the interests of the small nations. That is my brief analysis of problems in international politics.

I am an Absolute Partisan [*Partidaris Obsolut*] of those who seek something better for East Timor! Absolute! I say this everywhere and to anyone. I support with the necessary sacrifice [any] efforts that aim for something better for East Timor.

<sup>63</sup> The transcript says: "*pembuka kata api dari mata.*" This may be a typographical mistake, meant to translate "taking off one's glasses," or a clumsy literal translation of a Portuguese proverb that the Portuguese-to-Indonesian translator did not understand.

<sup>64</sup> EKOSOK is the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

I hold this principle because I am a Technocrat. A politician would not speak the way I do. Really and truly, I am opposed to anything that smells of politics, anything that is not practical. As for the political parties in Indonesia, I don't take sides, except for Golkar because it is not a party.<sup>65</sup>

**Xanana:** Your last intervention includes several points that I can accept because they are intended to elucidate. But there are other aspects of your intervention that require clarification.

**Governor:** Of course! Of course!

**Xanana:** As far as hoping for outside intervention, I need to explain that at present we are not too worried about whether or not foreign assistance will arrive. At the beginning of this, because of a lack of experience, we did always think about the possibility or hope of foreign assistance. The first contact [experience] with the situation of war led to thinking that was not objective (it is not necessary to touch on the coup d'état carried out by UDT—that was simply about killing each other<sup>66</sup>). After we had come to terms with the reality, which differed from our earlier thinking, we eventually came to be oriented by the principle "count on our own strengths."<sup>67</sup> For us it is [most] appropriate to see the situation as it is and to act in accordance. So, it is neither [what happens] today nor what happens tomorrow that will make us lose authority ....

**Governor:** Of course! But Senhor Gusmão, please listen. Perhaps—I say perhaps—you all can take advantage of the present atmosphere and make an effort to find out through direct observation, whatever it takes, to understand from up close the structures in Indonesia so that you all can take a more appropriate stance towards Indonesia.

Also, with the opportunity opened by the local Government, you should (if possible, I don't know if this is possible) try to contact some of the people so that you all know what they think about the current situation. Not just with one or two people, not just with Dr. Gonçalves. Because there is something you need to see: For example, I am a person who will say what I think even if I am in front of a tape recorder. But there are others who are startled when they are in front of a tape recorder [p. 18]. When faced with a tape recorder, they are insufficiently flexible in discussing their problems. Because of that they are not well prepared to consider matters that need to be

<sup>65</sup> In 1967, the Indonesian military declared that its corporatist umbrella and electoral vehicle, Golongan Karya (Golkar), was not a political party, thus circumventing its own ban on political activity at the grassroots level.

<sup>66</sup> On August 11, 1975, the Timorese Democratic Union (União Democrática Timorense) seized power in Dili. This was led by Mário Carrascalão's younger brother, João Carrascalão. A week after the UDT coup, Fretilin counterattacked and eventually forced UDT leaders to flee across the border into Indonesian West Timor.

<sup>67</sup> Gusmão presumably used Fretilin's Tetum slogan "*ukun rasik an.*"

considered. To take advantage of the current situation and recalling the difficult communications you all face, I think that all of you can obtain concrete data that can form the basis for more appropriate considerations concerning the problem.

As for the support that you just mentioned, I admit that there is [such support].<sup>68</sup> There have in fact been several cases related to that. But the people who support you have ways of behaving that are at cross purposes. Some are prepared to take risks but others not, and yet I think they are working for the same goal. Usually those who talk the loudest are those who want to leave Timor Timur as fast as possible. They are useless. One person who used to be pretty trustworthy was Domingos de Oliveira.<sup>69</sup> But he left Timor Timur and now works in Australia. It wouldn't be a bad thing for you all to contact people who have influence so that you can find out what Indonesia is now and also what Indonesia will become in the future. You should contact lots of people so that you can form a concrete picture of Indonesia. I once spoke to an influential Muslim. He said that their goal was to form an Islamic Government [of Indonesia]. I told him that if they achieved their goal Indonesia would disintegrate. He responded as follows: "That's our goal. If the others join, okay! If you all don't want to join then form your own Government."

I have also spoken with several of the people involved in the movement that tried to do something on June 10, 1980,<sup>70</sup> which resulted in some of them being detained and some murdered. But that was because they were influenced by others; they didn't think with "cool heads" and so the conclusions they reached were immature. Others among them have been fired from their jobs. Speaking of people from other islands [in Indonesia], plenty among them also have aspirations [of separatism]. But they have their own aspirations. Some of them even said: "While we are on our way out, you guys [the East Timorese] are intent on getting in." I told them: "Ha, you are leaving like sheep!"

It is clear that there is still a little armed resistance in Irian Jaya; Armed struggle! But they will be wiped off the map. And yet they have conditions that don't exist in Timor Timur, which is to say that they have Papua New Guinea behind them[.] Each time a [foreign] Government approaches Indonesia, this always results in a bilateral agreement, and so the people in Irian Jaya will suffer. I just went to Jakarta; I told the government, "I met the Fretilin leader." At the time I went to the Minister of Internal Affairs.<sup>71</sup> After reporting to him about this, he said excitedly, "That means there's progress! And we'll resolve this problem in an integral way, so that what happened in Irian Jaya doesn't happen again" [p. 19]. I don't know what he means by "in an integral way."<sup>72</sup> I have also focused on this with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,<sup>73</sup> but

<sup>68</sup> It is not clear whether Carrascalão means foreign support for the resistance or Gusmão's appeal for "national unity" (i.e., Governor Mário Carrascalão doing what he can to assist the struggle against Indonesian rule).

<sup>69</sup> Domingos de Oliveira was a founding member of UDT. He left East Timor in the late 1970s.

<sup>70</sup> On June 10, 1980, Fretilin/Falintil staged a daring attack on Indonesian military facilities on the outskirts of Dili. For the history of this attack, see CAVR, *Chega! Final Report of the East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation*.

<sup>71</sup> The Minister of Internal Affairs was Lieutenant General Soepardjo Rustam.

<sup>72</sup> In Indonesian political thinking, the idea of an "integralistic" state originated with Supomo during constitutional debates in 1945. In this context, "integral" means "among ourselves."

<sup>73</sup> The Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs was Mochtar Kusumaatmadja.

he said: [“]That problem is no longer important because it has been settled at the International level.[“] So I said .....

**Xanana:** Senhor Mário Carrascalão, I never said that when I had the idea of contacts [between the resistance and the Indonesian military] I thought that this would be ongoing. I can tell you now that my views at the time still apply .....

**Governor:** I understand your analysis .....

**Xanana:** I will try harder to understand what you have explained. I can't say now what the result will be. As for your idea, I'll make efforts to contact more people. Contacts are also a difficult issue. One thing I want to highlight is that our contacts should be carried out in a freer atmosphere. I have indeed brought armed elements with me, but there are no bad intentions or aims behind that. We can now speak with the Army that we once killed and that killed us, and moreover [speak] with Senhor [Carrascalão] who we also consider to be a Son of this land. What would we achieve by torturing or killing you?

“If I bring troops, that's because, yes, that's the way it is! What's clear is that if I have the ability to fight I also have the ability to engage in dialogue”—that's what I said to my troops who were initially nervous. If you want to meet with us, all you have to do is get in a helicopter, but we have to walk for kilometers. The weapons I carry are not a threat.

**Governor:** Oh! No! I'm prepared to speak anywhere at all. If you all want to propose something, I won't have objections and, moreover, I will not place any conditions on the desired meetings. Never!! It just so happens that today Pastor Locatelli asked me to present diplomas to the kids in the Fatumaka [seminary], and it also just so happens that there was this opportunity. As for security conditions ... I am one who fully believes that we only die once.

**Xanana:** The other thing I want to bring up concerns the others—what I mean by others are our clandestine members. We don't have a problem because we can retreat into the forest and ... we're safe! What I'm worried about is what might happen to them (meaning the clandestine members!) as a consequence ... whatever good intentions they [the Indonesian military] may have ... (?). This is what we're afraid of .....

**Governor:** No! Look! I can guarantee that as far as I know there are no preparations for what you refer to.

**Xanana:** Concerning that ... I suggest that contacts (meaning clandestine members) not be used again, because two of the people we sent as emissaries have said things that are inappropriate ... like the example Senhor Mário gave earlier about "when facing a tape recorder they lose control" and so on [p. 20].

**Governor:** One more example: several days ago someone came to my office and suggested that I cancel this meeting with you. I responded, nothing special is going on and then I asked how did he hear about this (because I never told anyone about our meeting).

The person said: ["Ah! We know that in several [days] bapak [Carrascalão] will meet with Xanana. But we suggest that you shouldn't go ..."]

There are also a number of people in Dili who are on guard, they think the reason I haven't invited you to come down [to Dili] is that I am [secretly] giving you some hope .... They won't even speak with me now. But my principle is that I will not influence others to make decisions about their own fate because each person is responsible for himself. And I say what I think.

**Xanana:** Right! Right!

**Governor:** I'm someone who wants to sleep well at night. I don't want surprises. I want to work in peace, and I want to relax in peace. I don't want psychological problems to bother me. And there are some who say: "So ..., if they [Fretilin] want to talk, why don't they come here?"

**Xanana:** Yes! We would also think that way. Some say: "If the Governor comes to the forest and is safe, why doesn't Senhor Xanana come here?" But they don't see the conditions of war.

**Governor:** But I guarantee [your safety]. If you want to come to Dili some day, come!

**Xanana:** The problem isn't that I need witnesses. But there's no psychological advantage for me.

**Governor:** I can arrange so that secrecy is kept. For example: when José Conceição came to Dili to deliver your letter to me, no one knew. The first anyone knew of it was the next day when I gave him my letter for you. But the person who learned of it was only my driver, and that was because I wasn't prepared to prevent it. But I can say that, in general, people's reactions to our meetings has been very positive, even though this has been expressed in various ways. Some consider these approaches to be a

starting point of a calmer life—and they might be the majority; some say, “You know, we’re all Timorese, so why should one have to surrender to the other?”; and there are others who, perhaps thinking far ahead, view this process as the “End of Fretilin.” But in general, the population has a positive view of this process and there are also those who remain silent but have something that can be considered as starting capital [*modal dasar*] for the future.

**Xanana:** For us, we’re willing to continue this process [p. 21].

**Governor:** Okay. But I hope that nothing will happen like what happened in Lospalos.

More than anything, I don’t want this to be psychologically difficult for people, because in these circumstances there are rogue elements [*oknum-oknum*] who unconsciously spread threats by saying: “Now that we’ve won the war, whoever refuses to obey us will be punished [*diadili*].” That’s why the people of Lospalos are always confused and suffer. It is well known that Lospalos is an area that has suffered the most. Because of the situation before this [ceasefire] process, some people have been transferred, some have been punished, and so forth because they support Fretilin. When I visited Atauro [island], I once spoke with an old person who was there because she/he had given food to his/her son who was in the forest. This is a real case. But there are also cases in which the background is a desire to steal property from others. This usually happens in unstable situations like Lospalos now. But believe me, by the end of this year there will be no more prisoners still on Atauro.

**Xanana:** I can guarantee that we will not cause problems in the future, but recently we’ve heard threats against us. We are prepared to find a solution, and we are also prepared for this [ceasefire] process not to continue indefinitely. But you also need to realize that unwanted things have happened in some places because we didn’t have the technical ability to prevent them; the problem is that communication among ourselves [the resistance] is not guaranteed. That’s why we request that Senhor Mário suggest to *bapak-bapak* [ABRI] a cessation [of activities].

**Governor:** As far as I know, the Sub-Regional Military Commander has ordered his troops to retreat from areas where you are. The Commander adopted this policy in order to guarantee that the contacts can take place smoothly .....

**Xanana:** In one sense, one can say that is true, but in another sense it is not true. As you know, we live off the land. Support from the people isn’t logistical support. The places we camp are based on the seasons. For example, where *kombili* (a wild tuber) grows, that is where we go, where *koang* (another kind of wild tuber) grows, that is where we camp at a certain time. But recently it seems that they [ABRI] are trying to prevent our survival. This might force us to take action to guarantee our own survival.

**Governor:** The [Military] Command has withdrawn troops so that those people who are still in the forests are not reluctant to make contact with people living in settlements.

**Xanana:** We appeal for National Unity in order to achieve independence, with the proviso that in the future we will oppose all those who seek revenge. That is the real direction of our efforts. But recently the enemy has sent instructions to the regions that state: "If they [Fretilin] come, they are to be arrested and their weapons are to be seized and ....." We really want to add perspectives in order to reach a good understanding ..... [text cut off at bottom of page 22].

Finally, we decided that contact with the settlements should be reduced. Because we don't have much control over what happens, sometimes things happen that are not based on our initiatives. On the one hand, we are trying to increase mutual understanding, but on the other hand they [ABRI] are preventing it. If things like that happen and armed confrontations occur, we're afraid that we will be accused [of instigating it]. Our aim is to negotiate ... as Senhor Mário wrote, "it would be a mistake to view Indonesia's position as one of weakness[.]" And we say: It is a mistake to view our position as one of weakness.

**Governor:** What I meant earlier wasn't intended to be deprecating, but incorrect definitions like that can cause new conflicts. I wrote that to (?) because at the time he (?) had raised several questions. If I knew where he was, of course, I would have taken a different position, and I might have tried to contact him (?).<sup>74</sup> But .....

**Xanana:** Let's try to avoid too many contacts. Everywhere, everyone wants to take photographs and .....

..... [the end] .....

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<sup>74</sup> The identity of this person is not known.