ANTHROPOMORPHIC REPRESENTATIONS: BLURRING ANIMAL-HUMAN BOUNDARIES IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY NOVEL

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This dissertation focuses on the concept of anthropomorphism in a series of nineteenth-century novels, arguing that these works index imperial values by blurring species boundaries between humans and non-human animals. Through readings of canonical fiction—Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights*, Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass*, and Wilkie Collins' *Heart and Science*—I argue that Victorian culture's pervasive anthropomorphism does not operate merely in a unidirectional motion from animal to human, moving animals to a higher position within what Mel Chen terms "animacy hierarchies." Instead, it draws attention to indeterminacy between humans and animals through a series of forms, which I theorize as hybridity, chiasmus, inversion, and metonymy. The project focuses on how animals in these works transcend human-animal hierarchies, at some points making space for liminal positions between humans and nonhuman animals, at some points totally reversing human-animal hierarchies by claiming positions of superiority, and at others, working in solidarity with human characters through relations of contiguity. At the same time, the project demonstrates that animal figures in literature have a long and violent history of oppression that animal studies must acknowledge and contend with. The language of animality has dragged marginalized human groups down species hierarchies in the service of racism

and misogyny. These forms demonstrate that zoomorphism, language used to describe human bodies in often racist and xenophobic ways, is intricately intertwined with anthropomorphic representations. This dissertation urges us to take seriously zoomorphism's (and by proximity, anthropomorphism's) role in perpetuating racism and the power of empire in the nineteenth century. Yet it also asks us to consider the implications of constructing the animal as a repository of negative stereotypes and a metaphor for inferiority. Though the violence against marginalized human communities and animals has often taken vastly differing forms, a dual examination of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism reveals how the British empire's oppression of marginalized communities and animals are entangled with one another. Though these novels sometimes rely on animalistic tropes that dehumanize people of color, they also pose a challenge to structures that oppress both animals and humans, alike.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Madeline Reynolds works on animal studies and ecocriticism in nineteenth-century fiction, examining how British writers categorized the status of the human in the age of British imperialism. She received her Ph.D. in Literatures in English from Cornell University in 2021 and her M.A. in that department in 2018. She holds a minor field concentration in Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. Madeline received her B.A. in English from Carleton College in 2014, where she also completed a concentration in French and Francophone Studies.

For Victor

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1. Introduction

Christina Rossetti's poem "Goblin Market" (1862), portrays the evil temptation that a band of goblin merchant men pose to the safety and virginity of a young woman customer. Though always described as "goblins," as evident in the poem's title, these creatures exist in a liminal space between human and animal. Often referred to as "goblin men" (42) or "little men" (55),[1] more in-depth descriptions of these merchants represent them as animals:

One had a cat's face
One whisked a tail,
One tramped at a rat's pace,
One crawled like a snail,
One like a wombat prowled obtuse and furry,
One like a ratel tumbled hurry skurry (71-76).[2]

This passage highlights the difference of their bodies from those of the two human protagonists, Lizzie and Laura and therefore casts them as other. Their evil nature stems largely from this animal difference, and when Lizzie overcomes their advances in her attempt to save Laura, they express their rage through animalistic behaviors:

No longer wagging, purring,
But visibly demurring,
Grunting and snarling.

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[1] Christina Georgina Rossetti, "Goblin Market, The Prince's Progress, and Other Poems," https://www.gutenberg.org/files/16950/16950-8.txt, accessed March 20, 2021, https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/16950/pg16950.html.
[2] Rossetti.

One called her proud,

Cross-grained, uncivil;

Their tones waxed loud,

Their looks were evil.

Lashing their tails

They trod and hustled her,

Elbowed and jostled her,

Clawed with their nails,

Barking, mewing, hissing, mocking,

Tore her gown and soiled her stocking (391-403).[3]

The goblins become frightening because they exhibit their anger in ways that appear subhuman, including "snarling," "clawing," "barking," and "hissing." Though they are men who engage in a human-coded profession (trade), they demonstrate that, if crossed, they will descend into animalistic forms of violence, as befitting their animal-like forms.

These zoomorphic descriptions of the goblin men are closely tied with the poem's xenophobic depiction of them, suggesting that they differ from Lizzie and Laura in terms of race as well as species. Near the beginning of the poem, Laura says, "'We must not look at goblin men,/ We must not buy their fruits:/ Who knows upon what soil they fed/ Their hungry, thirsty roots?'" (42-45).[4] Questioning the soil in which they have grown their wares calls into question where these goblins come from,

[3] Rossetti.
[4] Rossetti.

casting them as foreign. The dazzling array of exotic fruits—"pine-apples" (13), "pomegranates" (21), "rare pears" (23)—also serve to highlight this foreign soil and to demonstrate that so many fruits, "all ripe together" (15), would probably not appear for sale in British markets all at once.[5] The overabundance of fruits, as well as the girls' desire to "peep at goblin men" (49) positions the market as sexually charged. But the potential sin comes not just from the girls' sexual awakening, but from their desire for the goblin men specifically.[6] The goblins' racial difference and animality introduce the dual threat of miscegenation and bestiality, which ultimately cause Laura's ruin and sap her vitality. These goblin men demonstrate the racist association between foreign peoples—especially colonized peoples and people of color—and animals at the height of British empire and during the emergence of nineteenth-century race science. The language of animality and animal figurations were often used to portray people of color as less than human and inferior to white European readers. Nineteenth-century forms of anthropomorphism are deeply entangled with these forms of racist discourse. Yet, critical analysis of these animal figurations demonstrate that they harm both people of color and animals by casting both as inferior beings. British imperialism often subjugated colonized peoples and animals in similar ways, for example, so this association reveals how British colonial violence crossed species lines.

The goblins—sometimes described as men, sometimes described as animals—inhabit hybrid bodies that reveal species mixing. They are at times anthropomorphized

[5] Rossetti.
[6] Rossetti.

and at times zoomorphized, making their species designation confusing and amorphous. They exist within a liminal space in which species categories and species hierarchies were being worked out in the nineteenth century. I argue that this species indeterminacy becomes evident in nineteenth-century thinking, and in fiction more particularly through the figure of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphic representations imply upward hierarchical movement from nonhuman to human, according higher status (if only temporarily) to nonhuman beings. Yet, this figuration implies that humans see something of the nonhuman within themselves, not merely a form of raising up, but a likening or similarity. Anthropomorphism functions, not through elevation or extension, but through forms of mixing or blending, obscuring the boundaries between species categories.

The nineteenth-century novel provides a crucial site for an investigation of anthropomorphism because I see novelists of this time period resisting structures that promoted the entrenchment of the human-animal binary that persists today. First, the rise of industrialization in the early nineteenth century separated humans from animals by drastically altering their lifestyles and instilling them with an illusion of mastery over their environment. Secondly, the nineteenth century saw the rise of modern biology and evolutionary theory, casting doubt on age-old taxonomies that strictly separated humans from nonhuman animals. Thirdly, colonization and the expansion of the British Empire during the nineteenth century relied on a strict dichotomy between animals and colonized subjects as resources and labor and European colonizers as consumers. As with Rossetti's goblin men, texts often represent colonized peoples with animalistic language in the service of racism and xenophobia. Zoomorphism,

anthropomorphism's opposite and yet strangely proximate cousin, has a long history of racist representations in the nineteenth century, but may also serve to highlight the common roots of racism and animal cruelty. The work of this project will be to understand how anthropomorphism mediates species and racial boundaries and relations at the level of form in a series of nineteenth century novels. How do nineteenth-century novels think about the relationship between human populations and between humans and other species, particularly animals? Under emerging taxonomic forms, how did novels categorize beings? Did they enforce boundaries or did they explode them? Who did British writers characterize as human and how did they use the language of animality to force colonized peoples, people of color, and women into the status of nonhuman other? And how do novels critique the dual oppression of marginalized groups and animals?

The contribution of this project is threefold. First, it defines anthropomorphism as a mixing of human and animal traits that blur species boundaries. The project seeks to analyze nineteenth-century anthropomorphism to advance the field of literary animal studies and generate an understanding of how this trope functions in the nineteenth-century context of expanding industrialism and colonialism. Second, the project demonstrates how anthropomorphism challenges power relations and hierarchies between different types of beings in the nineteenth century. It not only shows how writers operate within but also critique hierarchical systems that place white European men at the apex, but also yokes together the interests of marginalized others—peoples, animals, and even objects. Thirdly, this dissertation proposes four

structures nineteenth-century novels employ that reveal their anthropomorphism as a form of blending: hybridity, chiasmus, inversion, and metonymy.

Anthropomorphism is a widely used, though loosely defined, concept within the field of literary animal studies and thus merits further study. Paul de Man's essay on anthropomorphism in the lyric claims that anthropomorphism as a trope takes the human as a given against which the nonhuman is measured, but never defines the human.[7] Barbara Johnson uses this idea to discuss how lyric poetry and legal documents in the form of a United States Supreme Court brief inform one another's definition of personhood.[8] Yet, in comparison to poetic studies of anthropomorphism, the novel remains relatively overlooked, generating questions about what constitutes the human in British nineteenth-century fiction. The novel offers what the poem cannot at the level of character: the development of novelistic characters, both human and animal, provides an in-depth look at how human and animal traits operate across a variety of bodies. In terms of historical framework, my study proceeds from Heather Keenleyside's book on personification in the eighteenth century, *Animals and Other People*. Keenleyside states that personification "register[s] the sort of quasi-natural, quasi-figurative creatures that all animate beings are."[9] My project draws from Keenleyside's work, extending her ideas into a nineteenth-century context and indexing who counts as human in the nineteenth-century novel. Though my analysis relies on the category of the human as a stable term, labeling certain behaviors,

[7] "DeMan_Anthropomorphism.Pdf," 241, accessed March 20, 2021, https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~cavitch/pdf-library/deMan_Anthropomorphism.pdf.
[8] Barbara Johnson, "Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law" 10 (1998): 550–51.
[9] Heather Keenleyside, *Animals and Other People: Literary Forms and Living Beings in the Long Eighteenth Century* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 6.

speech, and forms of relation as human characteristics, the novels in this study consistently showcase the instability of this term, often applying "human" and "nonhuman" characteristics to a variety of bodies indiscriminately and demonstrating these characters to be both material and rhetorical.

On the point of character, I am also indebted to Ivan Kreilkamp's recent book, *Minor Creatures*, which theorizes the domestic interconnections of the Victorian novel and the Victorian pet.[10] Drawing on the work of Alex Woloch, Kreilkamp posits animals as minor, and often precarious, characters. He reveals that the Victorian novel operates in a deeply anthropocentric vein, and as a result, criticism surrounding it also tends to be anthropocentric, a mode of critique his book attempts to resist.[11] My project exhibits some of the same overarching goals, in that I hope to examine the status and representation of nonhuman animals in nineteenth-century fiction in a way that poses a challenge to anthropocentrism. Yet the project also recognizes the entrenched human-dominated hierarchies that structured nineteenth-century thinking (as well as our own) and place animals in positions of inferiority and precarity. Kreilkamp's work often skirts questions of race, even when the animalistic language he analyzes directly references racist discourse. By explicitly investigating how the language of animality was used to construct racist associations between people of color and animals, my project demonstrates that we must read discourse on race and species together; failing to do so perpetuates ignorance of the longstanding racist history of animal figuration in Western thought. Lastly, my project takes direction

[10] Ivan Kreilkamp, *Minor Creatures: Persons, Animals, and the Victorian Novel* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018), 1.
[11] Kreilkamp, 1.

from Kreilkamp's reading of Darwin, namely that "we may think of Darwin primarily as arguing for a wildness or animality within the human, but he was also fascinated by a domestication or human influence within the animal."[12] Where Kreilkamp's book embarks on the latter point, investigating literary forms of domestication, my dissertation takes both terms of this chiastic crossing together. What does it mean when human and nonhuman traits float free of the bodies presupposed to house them?

This project contributes to the rapidly expanding field of literary animal studies by calling into question several of the binaries that structure the discipline. I question the dichotomy between human and animal, arguing that these novels make space for a state of indeterminacy. I also demonstrate that animal studies has relied heavily on rigid moral binaries that may become difficult to uphold in the nineteenth-century context and even in contemporary thought. Critics have been divided on whether it is more ethical to think of animals in terms of similarity or difference in their relationship to humans, and I argue that a space exists between these poles to blend aspects of both. Literary animal studies has struggled since its beginning with the fact that the representations it analyzes stem from human thought, so the humanistic lens still remains dominant. Moving beyond anthropocentric critique has been central to the discipline, as Kreilkamp has so recently demonstrated, yet most scholars struggle to get outside of human forms of representation. Derrida, caught by the gaze of his "little cat," notes that the cat instigates an inversion of the species power dynamic between them; yet he acknowledges that the cat still functions as a symbol within his

[12] Kreilkamp, 6.

own representation.[13] Similarly, Cary Wolfe seeks to challenge human exceptionalism, revealing that animal rights still rely heavily on humanist ethics. But although he seeks to highlight the animal as the preeminent form of difference in poststructuralism, he recognizes he can offer no form of posthuman ethics that engages fully with that difference, turning instead to how we can rethink our historical and contemporary definitions of the human.[14] Tobias Menely's work on eighteenth-century sensibility and animal voice focuses on communication between humans and animals, which nonetheless still highlights language, often theorized as anthropocentric.[15] All these theorists demonstrate the necessity, but also the difficulties, of understanding the animal beyond Eurocentric human terms. In literary studies, anthropomorphic representations become a crucial part of this dilemma. Anthropomorphism relies on a human-animal binary that generates ethical debates about whether we should talk about animals in terms of human projections.

Literary animal studies is particularly interested in the current ethical implications of historical texts, yet deep divides have recently emerged within the field over the ethics of using anthropomorphism to think about nonhuman animals. As a representational mode, anthropomorphism skirts ontological questions of the "real" animal; its claims are largely epistemological, demonstrating how humans perceive animals through artistic projects like literature. Aside from dichotomies of

[13] Jacques Derrida, "Heb30596.0001.001.Epub," fulcrum.org, 6–7, accessed December 2, 2020, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/fulcrum.m039k5382.
[14] Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 5,9.
[15] Tobias Menely, *The Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 13.

epistemology and ontology, the discipline also questions the practice of using human projections to characterize animals. Kari Weil details this debate by demonstrating how scholars have advocated for animal rights by proving their capacities for language, agency, and consciousness, the basis "necessary for [human] subjectivity"; yet she also shows that these ideas have caused controversy in making animals too similar to humans and erasing animal difference.[16] Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman also question anthropomorphism's tendency to measure animals in human terms, casting it as a reification of an anthropocentric worldview.[17] On the one hand, anthropomorphism can engender empathy in human readers by raising animals to a human level and creating common ground between species, but it can also become a dangerous projection of human values onto the animal, in turn becoming a project of assimilation. For example, in Anna Sewell's *Black Beauty*, the titular narrator describes the life of a horse in ways that appeal to readers' emotions. The chapter on Ginger, a fine mare who ultimately dies of exhaustion as a broken-down cab horse, draws reader pity, sadness, and anger against her abusive owners.[18] Yet to generate that empathy between the human reader and the horse character, the novel relies on Beauty's ability to express these emotions himself, when a real horse may feel nothing of the sort. *Black Beauty*, and other animal-as-narrator novels, project human values, emotions, and actions onto their characters in a way that may obscure their animal

[16] Kari Weil, *Thinking Animals: Why Animal Studies Now?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 4–5.
[17] Lorraine Daston and Gregg. Mitman, eds., *Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 4.
[18] Anna Sewell, *Black Beauty*, *Black Beauty* (London, United States: HarperCollins Publishers Inc, 2010), 184, https://search.proquest.com/docview/2407290394/citation/A0F5A7E609504314PQ/1.

difference. Through an analysis of the novels in this project, I critically examine how anthropomorphism can operate in both contexts—in the service of empathy and assimilation—as well as somewhere in between the two. In so doing, I assess how anthropomorphic literary devices function in the genre of the novel and how they might disrupt the ethical/unethical binary that pervades literary animal studies.

In order to examine the ethics of anthropomorphism, I investigate how anthropomorphism works on a conceptual level within my novels of focus. By definition, the term relies on the dichotomy between human and nonhuman, but by displacing human traits onto animal bodies, these novels separate traits from bodies, constructing the category of the human external to the human body and revealing that "humanness" is not tethered to biology. Although many theorists criticize anthropomorphism as a form of anthropocentric self-reflection, it also constructs the category of the animal through metonymic proximity. The animal body is deemed similar enough to the human body to bear human traits, thus blurring distinctions between human and animal and questioning which bodies are allowed to carry "human" status. *Frankenstein*, for example, asks whether a nonhuman being can enter the ranks of humanity through his acquisition of language and (human) learning. Likewise, the animals of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* establish their superior status over Alice (the "real" human) through their bossy manner and self-assured engagement in human-like behaviors. Anthropomorphism thus springs from a human-animal binary that it simultaneously reinforces and breaks down.

Because of the slippage between human and animal bodies, anthropomorphic depictions construct both humanness and animalness at the same time that such

depictions conflate these two constructions. All of the novels included in this project blur anthropomorphism and zoomorphism, making animals human-like and humans animal-like. Because anthropomorphism deconstructs the human-animal binary, zoomorphism, its supposed opposite, actually becomes a variant of anthropomorphism, or vice versa, with both devices questioning rigid distinctions between human and animal. In the first half of the project, I have identified two terms, hybridity and chiasmus (a conceptual term that draws from the literary rhetorical device), to theorize the relationship between anthropomorphism and zoomorphism and to describe the ways that each collapses species distinctions but also underscores the material consequences of the human-nonhuman binary in nineteenth-century fiction and life.

My dissertation takes seriously the threat that binary representations and the human-animal hierarchy they engender pose to nonhuman animals. Though I argue here that anthropomorphism can blur species boundaries, my analyses recognize that many of the species that inhabit these nineteenth-century novelistic worlds cannot escape the precarity that Kreilkamp describes. The novels in this project therefore demonstrate forms of heterarchy that New Materialist scholars, such as Donna Haraway, promote, yet they also expose the limits of this leveling gesture, revealing that even heterarchical ideals cannot evade hierarchical structures. Haraway promotes multiplicity as a way of being with her notion of "tentacular thinking," an idea that poses a radical challenge to hierarchy and human exceptionalism. Using the string figure and the tentacle as model forms, Haraway claims that systems of life on earth exist in a state of "sympoeisis," where each organism is interconnected with all others,

with the boundaries between them open and constantly shifting.[19] She pokes fun at notions of human distinction or superiority by reconfiguring "human as humus" and "humusities instead of humanities," hoping for a conference on the "Power of the Humusities for a Habitable Multispecies Muddle."[20] The conceit of humans as compost deflates human illusions of grandeur by reminding the reader that all organisms eventually become dirt and decomposers, the "lowest" forms of life. But Haraway also promotes a sense of harmonious living through her conference title, which suggests a tangle of organisms that cannot be separated from one another living in an equitable mass. The tentacular, therefore, is inherently heterarchical or rhizomatic in configuration.

Though Haraway offers an incisive regard to contemporary ecology and a reparative method for ruptures between humans and their environments in the age of the Anthropocene, her rejection of hierarchy is less helpful as a means of examining hierarchical systems in a historical context, whose boundaries are often strictly enforced. In the nineteenth-century novels I analyze, for example, Haraway's heterarchy cannot come into full existence due to human power structures' policing of species boundaries. The explosion of eighteenth-century taxonomies had begun to restructure how humans saw themselves in relation to the natural world at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The advent of the Industrial Revolution in this period widened the gap these taxonomies had opened between humans and other species. At this time, species boundaries and definitions of the human were still loose

[19] Donna Jeanne Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 33, http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/9780822373780.
[20] Haraway, 32.

and ambiguous but were being increasingly codified through both race science and the emerging discipline of biology. In this era, therefore, it is perhaps more useful to examine the structure of species hierarchies and to consider the liminal space between categories, which destabilized hierarchies from inside, rather than repudiating them altogether. For nineteenth-century animal studies, anthropomorphism becomes an important concept in the way it subtly calls into question taxonomic "truths" and clings to and disturbs a generation eager to shore up their superiority as human beings.

The blurring of species boundaries in the nineteenth century does not merely challenge notions of human superiority; anthropomorphic and zoomorphic representations also bolstered race science and colonialism. As I mentioned in my reading of Rossetti's *Goblin Market*, there can be no discussion of the animality of these novels' human characters without a discussion of race and racism. Using animalistic language to describe marginalized human groups cast them as the nonhuman, the ultimate other. The discipline of animal studies must reckon with the idea that animals in language, metaphor, and symbolism are often used to describe human populations and communities in dehumanizing ways. For this reason, animal studies scholars must strive to think intersectionally with critical race scholars and postcolonial theorists to consider not only how animal representations have been used to harm people of color, but also how they have justified the ill treatment of human communities and animals, alike. A critical study of zoomorphic representations exposes the racism of many of these portrayals, but may also reveal authors' awareness of this linguistic practice and their critique of how it harms both people and animals. Animal studies scholars have done much to promote animals as symbols of

alterity, connecting literary animal studies to critical race studies, postcolonial studies, and feminist and queer studies. As Weil states, "nonhuman animals have become a limit case for theories of difference, otherness, and power."[21] Haraway, for example, begins her book *The Companion Species Manifesto* by stating that she "consider[s] dog writing to be a branch of feminist theory, or the other way around."[22] This kind of intersectional work establishes an equitable relationship between dogs and women, in which one does not stand in for the other, but rather, both exhibit similar and entangled concerns that must be read together. Similarly, Benedicte Boisseron's book, *Afro-Dog*, "examines understandings of race in a way that brings together animal and black studies, while rejecting the instrumentalization of the comparison between racialized human beings and animals"; he attempts to "determine how the history of the animal and the black in the black Atlantic is *connected*, rather than simply comparable, in order to reorient the discussion on black-animal relations toward an empowering frame of reference."[23] Boisseron's intervention is crucial in that it points to the dangers of analogizing human and animal experiences, especially with relation to Black slavery. But it also reveals that we cannot ignore the long obsession with discussing Blackness and animality together as measures of existence, and thus we must interrogate instances in which Black folks and animals "have fought alongside, against, or with each other as they assert their dignity."[24]

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[21] Weil, *Thinking Animals*, 2012, 5.
[22] Donna Jeanne Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), 3.
[23] Bénédicte Boisseron, *Afro-Dog: Blackness and the Animal Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), xx.
[24] Boisseron, xx.

Mel Chen demonstrates the power of this type of intersectional thought, working closely at the crossroads of animality and racial othering to demonstrate that although animalistic depictions have been used to demean Black and Brown bodies, the conflation of human and animal has subversive potential. Chen celebrates transmogrification and liminality between species, through which the greatest degree of sentience does not always accord with the greatest degree of humanness.[25] I use this kind of thinking to examine how the experiences of marginalized human characters get intertwined with those of animals and animal characters, allowing for forms of coalition building that reveal how animal and human concerns illuminate one another. My reading of zoomorphism and animality relies foundationally on Chen's formulation of "animacy hierarchies." Chen states, "For linguists, animacy is the quality of liveness, sentience, or humanness of a noun or noun phrase that has grammatical, often syntactical, consequences."[26] Chen demonstrates that language equates the human with the animate, thereby denying animacy to nonhuman animals and thus establishing the human's place at the top of the hierarchy of beings. The "consquences" they allude to are not merely "grammatical" and "syntactical"; Chen states, "animacy is political, shaped by what or who counts as human, and what or who does not."[27] The language of "what" and "who" already restricts Chen's definitions: in order to subvert the hierarchy, the grammar of the sentence asserts that the nonhuman being must be accorded human pronouns. Yet, in asking "who counts as

[25] Mel Y. Chen, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 229.
[26] Chen, 24.
[27] Chen, 30.

human," it also demonstrates that not only animals have been denigrated by this system. Chen asserts that human groups in positions of power (most often white, European men) have used grammar and animacy hierarchies in order to deny humanity to marginalized human groups. In their study of nineteenth-century political cartoons and advertisements, Chen identifies the "racial politics of animality," through which white media portrayed people of color as animal-like or animalized in order to perpetuate ideas of white superiority or humanness.[28] Chen's examples focus on simianized Black and Asian caricatures, reminiscent of evolutionary theories that posit apes and other monkeys as less developed forms of humans.[29] Connecting Black and Asian people with these symbolic animals served to pull these racial groups down the animacy hierarchy and establish their inferiority in the eyes of a white readership. Chen therefore reveals that animacy hierarchies place not just humans, but particularly white European male humans, in positions of dominance over other human and animal groups.

However, Chen does not merely show how animacy hierarchies have been used to dehumanize human groups. Such an endeavor, while important in humanist discourses and significant for showing how humans can be forced downward into the realm of animals, still maintains notions of human superiority that keep humans in place at the top of these hierarchies. The work as a whole focuses not only on dehumanization, but on transmogrification, demonstrating that animacy hierarchies are inherently unstable and can be transgressed. We saw this emphasis on transgression in

[28] Chen, 34.
[29] Chen, 111.

Boisseron too, who refuses to dwell on subjugation, and instead, rewrites racial-animal politics in an "empowering frame of reference." In Chen's reading of Hayao Miyazaki's film, *Ponyo*, they demonstrate that the titular character experiences the most energy and excitement when she sprouts chicken legs during her transformation from fish to human.[30] It is this liminal status between a multitude of species that empowers Ponyo; her interstitial journey is perhaps more significant than her full transformation into a human girl. Thus anthropomorphism and zoomorphism, which create liminal spaces between humans and animals, can challenge animacy hierarchies, upending the racist and speciesist logics that place white male humans at their apex.

My emphasis on liminality necessitates a return to the early high theory phase of postcolonial theory, most prominently to Homi Bhabha's notion of "hybridity." Bhabha's work on hybridity has received heavy criticism and may seem an odd choice here—some may argue that *The Location of Culture* is, at this point, quite dated in the field of postcolonial studies and has little to offer contemporary questions surrounding the animal. It has suffered from longstanding critiques that charge Bhabha with privileging the theoretical too much over the historical. Antony Easthope, for example, questions whether the concept of hybridity is specific enough to colonial experience:

> If Bhabha's hybridity-seeking mission can be as easily applied to any text which affirms a truth, one has to ask in what sense does it apply specifically to

[30] Mel Y. Chen, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 229.

> colonialist texts? But substituting 'hybridity' for 'difference' Bhabha makes us think we are solidly on the ground of race, ethnicity, and colonial identity, but if the form of his argument is ubiquitous, what special purchase does it have on the particular content of colonialism?[31]

I agree with Easthope that hybridity is a capacious idea that extends beyond "race, ethnicity, and colonial identity," perhaps a weakness in postcolonial studies and in understanding the situated perspective of colonized bodies. Yet its capaciousness lends itself to describing conceptual forms of difference and how these forms interact and operate similarly under common Euro patriarchal forms of hegemony. By viewing a text like *Frankenstein* through this lens (as I do in the first chapter), Frankenstein's Creature can be read as multiple forms of bodies, both human and animal, which, though drawing upon different individual experiences, face discrimination as beings falling outside of European notions of humanity. It is therefore Bhabha's lack of specificity, for which he has received critique, that I hope to draw on in order to make connections and coalitions between beings, rather than to comment on situated experiences.

Here, I am particularly interested in positioning Frankenstein's Creature, and the figure of the animal more broadly, as Bhabha's colonial mimic. Bhabha writes:

> Produced through the strategy of disavowal, the *reference* of discrimination is always to a process of splitting as the condition of subjection: a discrimination between the mother culture and its bastards, the self and its doubles, where the

[31] Antony Easthope, "Bhabha, Hybridity, and Identity," *Textual Practice* 12, no. 2 (1998 Summer 1998): 344.

> trace of what is disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something *different* – a mutation, a hybrid…[Hybridity] unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power but reimplicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power.[32]

If discrimination by the colonial power reinforces the division between colonizer and colonized, then the act by which the colonized mimics the colonizer dispels this discriminatory logic. Bhabha defines mimicry as "the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, *as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite*."[33] This "mutation" or "hybrid" of the colonizer produces an iteration or double that undermines the established authority of the original. It is "ambivalent" in that "Mimicry is, thus the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which 'appropriates' the Other as it visualizes power," yet "it is also the sign of the inappropriate…a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an imminent threat to both 'normalized' knowledges and disciplinary powers."[34] That the colonized becomes "almost the same" challenges the discriminatory logic of the colonizer by questioning the strict hierarchy between colonizer and colonized. The "not quite" demonstrates that difference can infiltrate colonizer identity, granting agency to the colonized to appropriate and change colonizer culture. It exposes the

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[32] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 159–60.
[33] Bhabha, 122.
[34] Bhabha, 122.

fallacy that difference can be policed unidirectionally from the locus of power, creating something new from existing power hierarchies. Ultimately, "the paranoid threat from the hybrid is finally uncontainable because it breaks down the symmetry and duality of self/other, inside/outside."[35] Discrimination in the face of the hybrid becomes untenable as hybrid subjects challenge this discrimination from a position of similarity to the colonizer.

In the novels this project explores, both colonized peoples and animals (through anthropomorphic representations) take on the role of the colonial mimic. Colonial and species hierarchies become confused as marginalized characters (both human and animal) get conflated with characters in positions of dominance, weakening and sometimes overturning forms of hierarchy-based oppression. In the process, human and animal difference reveals the strangeness of humans in positions of power. Deviance from the white, European human reveals a multiplicity of ways of being, which in turn decenters this norm. Perhaps the best example of this logic appears in *Alice in Wonderland*, where Wonderland's inhabitants deem Alice's commonly held human conceptions (that a cat's value comes from catching mice, for example) ridiculous and offensive. By demonstrating the contingency of human thoughts and behaviors, these novels perform two important types of work. First, as I have mentioned, they disrupt human-animal and human-human hierarchies. Secondly, these novels create a space for animal agency, promoting animal actors as characters in their own right and positioning them in interdependence with human characters.

[35] Bhabha, 165.

Novel theory has traditionally credited the novel genre with emphasizing and constructing human subjectivity. Ian Watt claims that the eighteenth-century novel uses "individual experience to replace collective tradition as the ultimate arbiter of reality,"[36] and Nancy Armstrong argues, "the history of the novel and the history of the modern subject are, quite literally, one and the same."[37] If the novel exhibits a turn toward the (human) individual and the individual's experience, how does it treat the animal? Following on the work of Kreilkamp's book, this project investigates how nineteenth-century novels construct animal experience and agency through animals as anthropomorphized figures. It also investigates how the human characters' agency, quite surprisingly, increases through zoomorphic depictions that describe them in animal terms. I argue here that the trope of anthropomorphism and the form of the novel work together to trouble distinctions between human and animal by allowing animals narrative space that traditionally belongs to humans. By making animals characters, or significant aspects of plot or setting, novels disrupt the idea that only human stories are worth telling and that human and animal stories can be separated from one another. Fundamental to these claims is an examination of the value of agency as a determinant of status. The concept of agency is, itself, anthropomorphic in that it privileges human-associated traits such as action (implying mobility) and capacity.[38] In my focus on nonhuman agency, I explore how agency functions within

[36] Ian Watt, *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 14.
[37] Nancy Armstrong, *How Novels Think: The Limits of British Individualism from 1719-1900* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 3.
[38] See the *Oxford English Dictionary*'s definitions of "agency."

anthropomorphism, determining how it generates reader empathy and action in the novels I focus on.

Earlier, I mentioned that anthropomorphism, through a focus on animal-human similarity, has the capacity to generate empathy in the human reader, an event that can prompt unity between humans and animals, but can also assimilate animals into human values and norms. This idea of empathy, or more precisely, "sympathy" was a much talked-about concept among the Victorians and has a long critical history in Victorian studies. Audrey Jaffe's pathbreaking work on sympathy demonstrates that nineteenth-century sympathy was bound up with the identity of the middle class spectator and played a large role in self-identification and self-definition.[39] Sympathy becomes tied to economic interests as well through its association with charity: the middle class subject, for example, gives money to the deserving unfortunate, in exchange for moral superiority.[40] Similarly, Rob Boddice, looks specifically at Darwinian sympathy: he states that Darwin attributed to white men "a highly civilized sympathy, a compound of moral sense and intellect."[41] This scientific justification for racism and white supremacy positioned white men as superior beings whose altruism could be used for societal improvement and the common good.[42] Sympathy therefore became a tool for shoring up hierarchies and for constructing moral righteousness among groups in positions of dominance by race, class, and gender.

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[39] Audrey Jaffe, *Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fiction* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 7–8.
[40] Jaffe, 16.
[41] Rob Boddice, *The Science of Sympathy: Morality, Evolution, and Victorian Civilization* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016), 1.
[42] Boddice, 2.

But sympathy could also teach readers about the limits of their own social positions. Rebecca Mitchell demonstrates that a major project of Victorian realism was to show individuals how to appreciate difference, while simultaneously revealing that "alterity cannot be overcome."[43] Like Jaffe, Mitchell demonstrates that an encounter with difference leads to a reflection on the positionality of self and other. She draws from George Eliot's acknowledgment that fellow feeling does not obfuscate difference—people attempt to "imagine and feel" others' experiences but they can never truly know them.[44] And Rae Greiner, drawing on Adam Smith's rewriting of David Hume, shows that eighteenth-century thought set Victorians up to believe it impossible and undesirable to fully inhabit another's experience, demonstrating that "sympathetic identification can prove disastrous when one loses the capacity to distinguish self from other."[45] So the nineteenth-century novel demonstrated an incisive awareness of difference and the difficulty of understanding the other, even as it generated what Greiner calls "fellow feeling."[46] In terms of animal studies, then, it seems that nineteenth-century readers would have understood the impossible nature of comprehending animal experience, yet we must also remember that sympathy and charity have a role in building power differentials along hierarchies and bolstering the sympathizer's sense of superiority. Though all of the works in this project deal in

[43] Rebecca N Mitchell, *Victorian Lessons in Empathy and Difference* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2011), 10.
[44] Mitchell, 17.
[45] Rae Greiner, *Sympathetic Realism in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 8.
[46] Greiner, 9.

some way with ideas of sympathy, it becomes most prominent in the turn toward advocacy and activist thought in the final chapter.

Chapter 1 begins with Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* as a test case for hybridity, reading Frankenstein's Creature as a being who exists in the liminal space between human and animal. In his construction of the Creature, Victor Frankenstein claims to have taken his raw materials from "the dissecting room and the slaughter-house" (32), the second of which implies animal tissues, while the first suggests both human and animal cadavers. I draw upon literature that compares the Creature to the great apes through contemporary naturalist accounts, arguments I find compelling in terms of human-primate relations and nineteenth-century race science that categorized apes as "lower" human races. As a result, I argue that the Creature exists within a liminal racial and species status and that he conforms to Bhabha's notion of postcolonial hybridity. The Creature becomes a double for Safie, the Arabian woman who finds refuge with the De Lacey family, and both become colonial mimics through the family's program of Westernized education. However, their different subject positions lead to different forms of treatment from the family, with Safie gaining their acceptance and the creature meeting violence at their hands. The Creature's story highlights humans' stubborn enforcement of the human-animal binary—though his existence and education defy it and he receives the same socialization as Safie, his anthropomorphic qualities do not grant him acceptance, especially in the eyes of his creator. Yet, he also ironically becomes increasingly conflated with his creator once he leaves the De Lacey property. Human and non-quite-human get muddled as

Frankenstein and the creature become doubles in their cycle of revenge. Though the scientist attempts to distance himself from his creation, the creature's status as his offspring and their increasingly similar violent tactics draw them together to question the boundary between human agent and non-human experiment. His narrative and his resulting explosive violence thus condemn a hierarchy that shows promise of porosity but ultimately remains rigid in its treatment of nonhuman subjects.

Chapter 2 turns to Emily Brontë's novel, *Wuthering Heights*, in which she employs what I term "chiastic anthropomorphism." Chiastic anthropomorphism describes background animals in human terms and human characters in animal terms. This crossing structure causes humans and animals to converge, but also to cross and diverge, holding species similarity and difference in dynamic tension. This chiasmus introduces ambiguity over the relative value of human and animal lives and demonstrates that the narrative challenges species hierarchies. The narrative highlights nonhuman animals, rendering animals as characters while also bringing out animal qualities in its human protagonists. For example, in the opening pages of the novel, Heathcliff and the dogs of the estate get conflated in their antipathy toward guests. Lockwood at first erroneously anthropomorphizes the female dog as motherly, only to recast her as an opponent—a different form of humanizing—when she assaults him. Meanwhile, Heathcliff gets zoomorphized when he growls simultaneously with his dogs. Lockwood anthropomorphizes the dogs and zoomorphizes their master, yet their challenge to Lockwood's courtesy shows that their different forms of brutishness subvert human norms of decorum and therefore destabilizes animacy hierarchies within the bounds of the estate.

However, the novel acknowledges that human-animal hierarchies still structure the narrative world, and characters use the language of animality in demeaning ways. Many of the characters weaponize animal metaphors against Heathcliff and Cathy in displays of racism, xenophobia, and misogyny. The novel therefore links race and species: this white, British community's animalistic language reveals that they harbor similar prejudices against both animals and people of color. This bigotry and the violence it engenders places humans at the level of animals, raising up the animals that live among them by comparison. By insisting on animals' humanity and humans' beastly brutality, Brontë uses the novel to critique human superiority.

Chapter 3 proposes a reading of Lewis Carroll's children's stories, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass* as travel novels, in which Alice finds herself a foreigner among a variety of animals. Both stories operate as forms of inversion, not only at the level of setting as underground and mirror worlds, but also in their character dynamics. In both of these worlds, the animal and object characters establish themselves as superior to the human child. In the vein of *Gulliver's Travels*, Alice is confronted with a variety of strange customs as she navigates the bizarre logic of Wonderland. Though the journey appears fanciful, Alice ponders whether she will end up in Australia or New Zealand during her fall down the rabbit hole, likening Wonderland to another country. Through this lens, the nonhuman creatures' behaviors become more foreign than nonsensical – though Alice and ostensibly the reader find them odd, this belief comes from a human (and perhaps earthly) perspective. For example, when Alice confesses to the Caterpillar that "'three inches is such a wretched height to be,'" he reacts indignantly, "'It is a very good

height indeed!'", thereby questioning human notions of size and proportion.[47] As the animals continuously point out Alice's mistakes, they invert the power dynamic in the human-animal dichotomy, establishing the animal as the standard or norm and the human visitor as aberrant. Although the Caterpillar in this example is highly anthropomorphized – he speaks English and smokes a hookah, after all – these features actually highlight his difference from the human girl as he uses language to challenge her most commonplace convictions.

As a white, bourgeois subject, Alice acts as a form of colonizer in Wonderland and the Looking Glass worlds, always expecting the animals to conform to her own Victorian logic. However, the creatures of these worlds consistently thwart Alice's attempts to impose her own customs and beliefs on them. But although Alice often exhibits exasperation at what she sees as the animals' absurdity, but she also at times demonstrates open-mindedness in her persistent attempts at communication with them. When she first falls down the rabbit hole, for example, she tries speaking to a mouse near her in both English and French and then proposes to switch subjects of conversation when she finds she has offended it. Her attempts to establish communion and assimilate to Wonderland customs go hand in hand with her questioning of her own identity as she undergoes a myriad of physical and emotional changes. Alice, who emphasizes the importance of listening to animal voices, thus acts as a vehicle for human-animal exchange, encouraging the reader to reexamine their own assumptions about animal characters and about beliefs that differ markedly from their own.

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[47] Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: And, Through the Looking-Glass: And What Alice Found There*, ed. Hugh Haughton, Centenary ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 46.

Chapter 4 departs markedly from the other chapters in mode, tracing how Wilkie Collins' *Heart and Science* promotes key tenets of the contemporary nineteenth-century antivivisection movement as a work of novelistic advocacy. The chapter takes a historical approach, drawing extensively from the antivivisection pamphlet literature to focus more explicitly on nineteenth-century animal rights activism as a concrete manifestation of the challenge to species hierarchies I have traced throughout the project. The pamphlets demonstrate that the antivivisection movement yoked together the experiences of women and animals, betraying anxieties that women would become the next victims of vivisection. Indeed, this nightmare becomes reality in Collins' novel, in which the young heroine, Carmina, falls victim to the evil vivisector, Dr. Benjulia. I describe this relationship between women and animals in terms of metonymy: neither stands in for the other as a form of metaphor, rather, both inhabit proximate positions within animacy hierarchies that make them similarly precarious. Antivivisection activists portrayed the dual threat to women and animals as a foreign one—vivisection was widely practiced on the Continent and met with stiffer resistance from the British public than in Europe. The antivivisection movement therefore represented vivisection in xenophobic terms. Collins mirrors this fear of the foreign vivisector by portraying Benjulia as a "gipsy," an identity that casts him as monstrous in the eyes of a white, British readership. The novel connects Benjulia's race with his evil scientific practice, relying on racism to generate antivivisection sentiment. This chapter thus shows how anthropomorphism can pit animal and human groups against one another, working toward diverging political ends. *Heart and Science* and the antivivisection movement reveal that we must always

be aware of the othering anthropomorphism enacts on marginalized human communities, even as it blurs species boundaries and challenges animacy hierarchies.

2. *Frankenstein*'s Creature as Hybrid Form

When Victor Frankenstein recounts the labor of his lab creation, he professes, "the dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of my materials."[48] What do these two stockpiles of cadavers indicate about Frankenstein's Creature's body? Though popular adaptations often fashion the Creature as a large, ugly man, these representations do not capture the novel's origin story for his bodily parts. The "dissecting room" is often associated with human cadavers, but the "slaughter-house"—less often considered as part of the Creature's genesis—would have provided only animal parts, meaning that the Creature is, at least in part, animal. Drawing attention to these dual points of origin, I read the Creature's body quite literally as an inter-species composite, somewhere in the space between human and nonhuman animal.

Although the Creature's form is described as a monstrous aberration, I argue that the materials that compose his body come from once-living organic matter that links him to a variety of known animal species. In the eighteenth century, slaughterhouses would have contained animal carcasses for human consumption, most likely cattle and sheep, whose meat value had increased over and above their wool and milk values.[49] The importation of pigs to Britain from China, beginning in 1770, also led to a rise in pork production in the early nineteenth century.[50] The sinews of the Creature could thus conceivably have derived from an international variety of animals

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[48] Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, *Frankenstein: The 1818 Text, Contexts, Nineteenth-Century Responses, Modern Criticism*, ed. J. Paul Hunter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 32.
[49] Derrick Rixson, *The History of Meat Trading* (Nottingham, U.K.: Nottingham University Press, 2000), 215.
[50] Rixson, 222.

that many Europeans would consider meat. The exact contents of a "dissecting room," on the other hand, are more difficult to trace. The medical establishment frequently used human cadavers for dissection, often the bodies of convicted criminals, or when procurement was scarce, through underground deals with grave robbers, but animal dissections were also commonly practiced in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, both in medical schools and amongst naturalists.[51] The latter dissected a wide variety of animals to better understand their anatomy. Edward Tyson, for example, one of the founders of comparative anatomy, dissected a chimpanzee as early as 1698, generating his comparative text on humans and apes, *The Anatomy of a Pygmie*. Yet naturalists did not confine themselves to primates or even mammals in their dissections. Denise Gigante's work on vitality and biological form in the Romantic Era details the popular obsession with the electric eel after John Hunter's dissection of the animal in 1775.[52] That the dissection of exotic animals, like the eel, would have taken place in Ingolstadt, the site of Victor's laboratory, is less likely, as the university there was renowned primarily as a medical school. However, by 1818, the practice of dissection had been extended to examine much of the animal kingdom, both geographically and taxonomically, associating Frankenstein's Creature with a global diversity of organisms. Although Victor most likely builds his Creature's frame from human cadavers and common lab animals, the culture of eighteenth-century dissection places him in the lineage of the dissection of animals as divergent as the

[51] Tim Marshall, *Murdering to Dissect: Grave-Robbing, Frankenstein and the Anatomy Literature* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 7.
[52] Denise Gigante, *Life: Organic Form and Romanticism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 230–31.

chimpanzee and the electric eel. By mixing such a variety of animal species, the Creature's very body thus questions assumptions about animal difference put forward by contemporary taxonomies. One physical frame merges a multiplicity of classes of animals, demonstrating inherent similarity between wildly differing and often geographically distant life forms.

Though Frankenstein visits places of death ("the grave," "the dissecting room," "the slaughter-house") to collect his materials, he also uses live animals to bring his Creature to life. In his confessional account, Victor asks, "Who shall conceive the horrors of my secret toil, as I dabbled among the unhallowed damps of the grave, or tortured the living animal to animate the lifeless clay?" (32).[53] Life here springs not only from the "grave" but also, through vivisection. Lester Friedman and Allison Kavey demonstrate that the Creature may contain fragments, not only of human and animal corpses, but also of living animals, whose "extreme pain" would have "cause[d] neurological excitement and a burst of energy from the living to the dead."[54] Thus, the Creature is literally sparked into being through animal pain, a form of suffering that goes on to define his life after animation. While it remains unclear whether contemporary vivisection was thought to spark animation, the Creature would have disturbed contemporary readers as a "physical and spiritual chimera," with a fearsome mixture of bodily parts, and possibly spirits, within him.[55] Although the novel often describes him in human terms and shape, the Creature's monstrosity

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[53] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 32.
[54] Lester D. Friedman, *Monstrous Progeny: A History of the Frankenstein Narratives* (New Brusnwick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2016), 56.
[55] Friedman, 56.

causes other characters to more often persecute him in the ways they might persecute a wild animal. When he reveals himself to the De Lacey family, Felix "dashed [him] to the ground, and struck him violently with a stick" (91); when he attempts to rescue a girl from a river, the girl's guardian "aimed a gun…at [the Creature's] body, and fired" (95); when he murders Elizabeth Lavenza out of revenge, Victor Frankenstein declares "he may be hunted like the chamois, and destroyed as a beast of prey" (139). In his subjection to beating, shooting, and hunting, the Creature inhabits an existence of animal suffering that mirrors the moment of torture that created him and the agony that may still exist within the living animal parts that compose him. The vivisected animal that created him (used, perhaps, because Victor deemed its life less valuable than a human's) pervades the Creature's body and experience, circumscribing him as nonhuman even as he inhabits a humanoid frame.

The Creaturely Hybrid

To read the Creature as a mixture of human and nonhuman animal parts, both dead and living, is to read him as a hybrid, a being that exists in the liminal space between categories who encompasses both and fulfills neither, simultaneously. Reading the Creature as a hybrid being anthropomorphizes him, highlighting his similarities with the humans he attempts to emulate, while at the same time, alienating him from these human communities. Humans persecute the Creature throughout the novel precisely because he possesses an uncanny level of similarity with them, yet his points of difference from them makes an acknowledgment of this similarity intolerable for the human characters. In this breach between anthropomorphism and alienation,

similarity and difference, Frankenstein's Creature calls into question rigid distinctions between human agent and nonhuman experiment through both the form of his hybrid human-animal body and Shelley's comparison of him with the humans in the novel. At the same time that he disrupts species categories and hierarchies between humans and animals, the violence the Creature faces at the hands of his human oppressors demonstrates that early nineteenth-century European society strictly polices his threat to categorical boundaries, revealing that the radical leveling he represents is untenable in the world of the novel.

The Creature's hybrid identity, and indeed, his very name, offer an important corrective to dichotomies of similarity and difference in the recent animal studies turn toward the "creaturely." The "creature" has become a site in which critics have attempted to define the status of the animal with regard to its proximity to the human, insisting on either similarity or radical difference. The Creature cannot escape his nonhuman status and remains segregated from the humans around him, thus demonstrating species difference in the novel. But the Creature's hybridity also places him in a liminal position that bridges human and animal experience and makes species distinctions ambiguous. The very term "creature" as used in the novel is indeterminate in its species markers and thus bolsters the idea that the Creature lies somewhere in between. In exhibiting both similarity and difference to humans, the Creature helps to disrupt the binary between the two that has become crucial to understanding the position of the animal in literary animal studies. Ivan Kreilkamp, for example, argues on the side of difference, demonstrating that animal characters in nineteenth century fiction may gain recognition or sympathy but they never cross over from animal to

human status, remaining "fundamentally minor."[56] In her reading of *The Tempest*'s Caliban, Julia Lupton also highlights the "creaturely" as a site of division or dichotomy—"between world and God; between all living things and those that are inert, inanimate, or elemental; between human beings and the 'other creatures' over which they have been given rule; between anyone and anything that is produced or controlled by an agent, author, master, or tyrant."[57] Though Lupton emphasizes difference in her definition of the creaturely, she also reads Caliban's existence as a state of "indeterminacy" between "man or fish," "creature or person," which demonstrates that she sees ambiguity in his position.[58] My analysis of the Creature follows Lupton's focus on indeterminacy and takes Anna West's work on Hardy as a model. West claims that the word "creature" is capable of "gesturing toward likeness, similarity, or kinship," but also "distinction and alterity."[59]

I claim that the idea of the "creaturely" is, in itself, hybrid, holding both similarity and difference within its liminal position. But though the figure of the "creature" has gained a lot of attention, the concept of hybridity is largely lacking in new materialist and animal studies scholarship and it remains relatively unexplored in terms of species relations. New materialism relies on a flat ontology that levels hierarchies and erases the idea of exceptionalism, human or otherwise. Hybridity only becomes important when categories exist within a hierarchy or when they gain value

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[56] Ivan Kreilkamp, *Minor Creatures: Persons, Animals, and the Victorian Novel* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018), 17.
[57] Julia Reinhard Lupton, "Creature Caliban," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 51, no. 1 (August 18, 2014): 1, https://doi.org/10.2307/2902320.

[59] Anna West, *Thomas Hardy and Animals* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2.

relative to one another. This notion of categorical difference undergirds Bruno Latour's concept of "hybrids" as a representation of the blending of science and society.[60] Such mixing leads to his hyphenated matrix, "nature-culture,"[61] exposing the artificial dichotomy between the two and challenging the separation of the manmade world from the natural world surrounding it. Yet Latour's scope is systemic and does not specifically address the level of the individual being or interactions between individuals of different species. Though Latour's model may describe society as a whole, it cannot give insight on the micro-level interactions between characters in a novel. Furthermore, *We Have Never Been Modern* is approaching its thirtieth anniversary and more recent work in new materialism has since moved away from the duality of "nature-culture" toward perspectives that privilege multiplicity. For example, Donna Haraway, in her most recent work, *Staying with the Trouble*, eschews the idea of hybridity altogether. She refuses to define cyborgs as "machine-organism hybrids," instead calling them "historically situated" parts, including machines, organisms, and humans, which "do not add up to any whole."[62] These beings, then, are always fragmented, never cohering into a unified self in the way that Frankenstein's Creature arguably does throughout the course of the novel.

Frankenstein's Creature lives within the bounds of Mel Chen's animacy hierarchies, rather than in a world that privileges the multiplicity and heterarchy that scholars like Haraway promote. Yet, though the Creature does not find empowerment

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[60] Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 2.
[61] Latour, 7.
[62] Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 2016, 104.

in his own hybridity, his hybrid nature nonetheless destabilizes the human-animal power structure he is trapped within. As he struggles against his creator, the Creature slides up and down the animacy hierarchy, sometimes appearing as an animal, sometimes as the Europeans he attempts to imitate, and sometimes as a more marginalized human colonial subject. Indeed, a variety of scholars have interpreted him variously as the symbolic representation of an African slave, an Indigenous American, and a great ape. Eighteenth and early nineteenth century thinkers often conflated racial and species delineations, categorizing people of color with animals. These zoomorphic representations were deeply racist in their foundations, ascribing less-than-human characteristics to people of color in an effort to establish white Europeans as superior. Yet the confusion over species boundaries also suggest that no hard line existed between the human species and all other animal species and even apes were sometimes considered a part of the human category. Indeed, the variety of interpretations of the Creature – some human, some animal – demonstrate that he makes species boundaries ambiguous. The Creature yokes together forms of discrimination that these groups encountered from white Europeans, revealing that they occupied similar positions within animacy hierarchies and that their resulting treatment was often similarly egregious.

I emphasize the Creature's hybridity because it provides a crucial link between animal studies and postcolonial theory. Because the Creature has been variously interpreted as both animal and person of color, analyzing him through Homi Bhabha's postcolonial notion of hybridity helps to explicate how his ambiguous positioning functions. By becoming a double for Safie, the Arabian woman the De Lacey family

welcomes into their home, the Creature becomes an example of Bhabha's concept of mimicry. Both Safie and the Creature are demeaned on the animacy hierarchy in relation to the European family, demonstrating ways in which the colonized human subject and the animal can be read together. Their attempts to imitate the family and ascend the hierarchy cause them to aspire to the standards of their oppressors, but their very acts of imitation subvert the power dynamic that holds the hierarchy in place. In order to understand how nineteenth century forms of colonial and species hierarchies functioned together, it is crucial to bring postcolonial theory into literary animal studies. An examination of how colonial hierarchies othered marginalized populations of humans also sheds light on how these hierarchies othered animals. This comparison reveals how nineteenth century limitations on the definition of the human did violence to both humans and animals, yet it also demonstrates the parallels in the instability of both racial and species categories.

Man or Ape?

Laura Brown's reading of the Creature through eighteenth-century accounts of the hominoid ape questions to what extent we can categorize the Creature as a human and to what extent we can categorize him as an animal, demonstrating that naturalists of the period were uncertain where to draw the bounds between primates. Through examinations of the figure of the "Ourang Outang" in both Edward Tyson's *Anatomy of a Pygmie* and James Burnet, Lord Monboddo's *Of the Origin and Progress of Language* Brown reveals that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers used the terms "orangutan" and "pygmie" to refer to all the great apes, conflating several

modern species such as orangutans, chimpanzees, gorillas, and gibbons.[63] Indeed, she asserts that the figure of the hominoid ape was a "'motley,' composite being" that united the ancients' descriptions of mythological creatures with contemporary accounts of various ape species.[64] Already, then, what we would today think of as species mixing was occurring within eighteenth-century naturalists' vision of hominoid apes, demonstrating that the figure of the ape contains within it an ambiguous species connotation that existed even at the moment that taxonomic systems were being established.

This species fluidity also extended to relations between apes and humans. Brown's chapter, entitled "Mirror Scene," draws attention to a recurring theme of self-recognition in the figure of the hominoid ape among eighteenth-century naturalists and philosophers.[65] Percy Bysshe Shelley was clearly influenced by this strain of thought, because in his vegetarian tract, *A Vindication of Natural Diet*, he argues that humans are naturally vegetarian through comparative anatomical studies with orangutans. Citing Georges Cuvier, he claims, "The orang-outang perfectly resembles man both in the order and number of his teeth. The orang-outang is the most anthropomorphous of the ape tribe, all of which are strictly frugivorous…The resemblance also of the human stomach to that of the orang-outang is greater than to that of any other animal."[66] Shelley locates similarity between orangutans and humans at the material

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[63] Laura Brown, *Homeless Dogs & Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010), 28, footnote 5.
[64] Brown, 35.
[65] Brown, 27.
[66] Percy Bysshe Shelley, *A Vindication of Natural Diet*, A new ed. (London: F. Pitman, 1884), 14.

level of the body in all its particularity – the "teeth," the "stomach." Though he attempts to show that humans resemble orangutans (and therefore should adopt their diet), by labeling orangutans "anthropomorphous," he also demonstrates that orangutans resemble humans, revealing that similarity moves both ways and neither species sets the standard for the other. By making Frankenstein's Creature a vegetarian, Mary Shelley references her husband's tract, drawing parallels between the Creature and the frugivorous orangutan. Yet, to make this comparison is also, according to Percy Shelley's ideas, to draw attention to the similarity between orangutans and humans, thus aligning the Creature with apes and humans simultaneously.

Despite Percy Shelley's insistence on the similarities between humans and orangutans, the boundary of species difference between the two was contentious among eighteenth-century thinkers, with some scholars arguing that the orangutan was an animal of a lower order than man, while others asserted that it should be inscribed within definitions of the human. Edward Tyson and James Burnet, Lord Monboddo, occupy opposite poles of this debate, demonstrating together the uncertainty of ontological differences between humans and hominoid apes. Tyson begins his treatise with the following statement: "That the Pygmies of the Antients were a sort of Apes, and not of Humane Race, I shall endeavor to prove in the following Essay."[67] His position on species difference is thus clear from the beginning and he goes on to label the "Pygmie" as a "Brute-Animal *sui generis*" and not "the Product of a mixt

[67] Edward Tyson, *Orang-Outang; Sive Homo Sylvestris, or, The Anatomy of a Pygmie: A Facsimile with an Introduction by Ashley Montagu* (London: Dawsons, 1966), 1.

Generation."[68] Brown points out here that "the pygmy is definitely not a hybrid being" – rather, it is a "Brute-Animal" as opposed to a human animal, denoting a species inferior to man. [69] Monboddo, on the other hand, asserts that the orangutan falls under the definition of man, though it does not have the capacity for human speech.[70] Because Monboddo argues that language is not inherent in humans, he makes the argument that human populations learn certain skills over time and thus inhabit different gradients of development.

> If, on this account [of language], the Orang Outang be not a man, then those philosophers of Europe, who, about the time of the discovery of America, maintained, that the inhabitants of that part of the world were not men, reasoned well; for, certainly, the Americans had not then, nor have they yet, learned all the arts of which their nature is capable. But I think the Pope, by his bull, decided the controversy well, when he gave it in favour of the humanity of the poor Americans: And, for the same reason, we ought to decide, that the Orang Outangs are men.[71]

In contrast to Tyson, Monboddo claims humanity for the orangutan through a comparison to Indigenous Americans. Though both position the hominoid ape as less capable than white European humans, Monboddo breaks the species barrier to create a more capacious human category. Taken together, these two works demonstrate that

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[68] Tyson, 2.
[69] Brown, *Homeless Dogs & Melancholy Apes*, 38.
[70] Monboddo, 298.
[71] Monboddo, 347.

eighteenth-century thinkers were not certain of which characteristics to include as a standard for humanity.

Monboddo's statement above forms part of an emerging scientific racism that takes monogenism as its central premise and asserts that humans evolve through a series of stages. By stating that the Americans "had not then, nor have they yet, learned all the arts of which their nature is capable," Monboddo categorizes them as a less developed variety of human. His assertion that apes, like the Americans, should be included within definitions of humanity, expresses a racist form of evolution that links humans and primates, positing the European subject as the standard of perfection. Monboddo insists on the Pope's power as a European Christian man to decide these categories and make them reality in the eyes of European Catholics. These taxonomies, then, are products of white European perception, serving to dehumanize Indigenous peoples as they simultaneously humanize orangutans.

Thus, reading the Creature as an ape means we must also read him as racially marked, an idea that contextualizes him outside the realm of the European within human racial hierarchies that scientific racism was beginning to construct. Chen's studies of nineteenth-century American newspapers and their siminanized caricatures of Chinese immigrants and Black slaves and freedmen show that white Americans use the cartoons to "secure the very status of 'the human' itself, since those deemed uncivilized or less civilized may simultaneously be thought in terms of primitivism, barbarism, and animality."[72] The Creature's rejection from society and most of the

[72] Chen, *Animacies*, 2012, 114.

humans he encounters can be read as a form of racism, in which physical difference gets labeled as monstrosity and social threat. Indeed, H.L. Malchow's historicist reading of the novel alongside contemporary accounts of slavery in the West Indies and anxieties regarding the Haitian Revolution draws parallels between the Creature and the figure of the Black man in discourse of the period.[73] The Creature's physical strength and monstrous features, as well as his violent acts and unchecked emotions, accord with racist descriptions of Black Africans, taken from both pro-slavery literature and abolitionist tracts.[74] To identify the Creature as a hominoid ape, therefore, is also to identify him with longstanding antiblack racism. Strangely, then, to think of the Creature as an ape anthropomorphizes him in racist ways, placing him in a status between human and ape in a taxonomy that denigrates those who fall outside the category of white European.

Frankenstein's Creature becomes trapped in this species gray area, because in addition to resembling contemporary accounts of the orangutan, he is also associated with Indigenous peoples by other characters in the novel. When Walton first glimpses Frankenstein on the ice, he compares him to the crew's earlier sighting of the Creature, stating, "he was not, as the other traveller seemed to be, a savage inhabitant of some undiscovered island, but an European" (13).[75] This introduction indicates indigeneity through the pejorative term, "savages," connoting European stereotypes of both uncivilized behavior and indistinctness from the natural environment. Here, for

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[73] Howard L Malchow, *Gothic Images of Race in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), 26.
[74] Malchow, 18,20.
[75] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 13.

example, the most important qualifier of the "savage inhabitant" is that he lives on "some undiscovered island," a place remote from Europe and thus undisturbed and "wild." As Shepard Krech traces in his work on the figure of the "Ecological Indian," the word "savage" derives from the Latin *sylvaticus*, denoting woodland or wooded, and thus gives rise to the idea that Indigenous peoples live in a state of nature.[76] Krech delineates two racist, European-held stereotypes of Indigenous people: the "Noble Savage," signifying childlike innocence and goodness and the "Ignoble Savage," symbolizing murderous rapaciousness, both of which Frankenstein's Creature exemplifies.[77] The label "savage" anthropomorphizes the Creature, associating him with human populations. In so doing, however, it simultaneously dehumanizes him as it dehumanizes these peoples, positioning him somewhere between the human and the nonhuman.

The Creature's racial status on the fringes of the human is supported by the creation scene, which indicates a close connection between the Creature's origin and colonial conquest more broadly. Reflecting back on his toils in the laboratory, Victor regrets his obsessive drive with the following warning:

> A human being in perfection ought always to preserve a calm and peaceful mind, and never to allow passion or a transitory desire to disturb his tranquillity…If this rule were always observed; if no man allowed any pursuit whatsoever to interfere with the tranquillity of his domestic affections, Greece

[76] Shepard Krech, *The Ecological Indian: Myth and History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 16–17.
[77] Krech, 16.

> had not been enslaved; Cæsar would have spared his country; America would have been discovered more gradually; and the empires of Mexico and Peru had not been destroyed (33).[78]

Victor identifies "passion" and the loss of "tranquillity" as the root cause for both the creation of his monster and political invasion and destruction. His anxieties about colonial violence, especially in the Americas, betray an anxiety about the invasive nature of his act of creation. By linking these events, his creation becomes, in some sense, a colonizing act. If, by violating natural laws, he has become a colonizer, then his Creature becomes its victim, the colonized subject. Anne Mellor goes so far as to characterize the event as a "rape of nature, a violent penetration and usurpation of the female's 'hiding places,' of the womb."[79] She yokes together Victor's sundering of reproduction and the female body, as well as an anthropomorphized female figure of Nature, whose "hiding places" he penetrates. Her gendered critique also has colonial overtones, as imperial powers often subjugated Indigenous populations and "raped" their lands and resources, turning them into commodities. The quest to conquer and control exercised by the Ottomans, Caesar, and Western European merchants emerges in Frankenstein's own scientific aspirations and his manipulation of Nature.

The Creature's position as colonized other becomes most apparent during his education in the De Lacey household. By watching the family teach Safie, in preparation for her marriage to Felix, he learns human language, history and culture.

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[78] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 33.

[79] Anne Kostelanetz. Mellor, ed., *Romanticism and Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 220–32.

In one of these lessons, he "heard of the discovery of the American hemisphere, and wept with Safie over the hapless fate of its original inhabitants" (80).[80] This learning about world empires highlights the "Noble Savage" status of the Creature, casting him as primitive in his knowledge and uncorrupted by the depravities of European imperial politics. In his nascent stage, the Creature's mind is a *tabula rasa*, though his weeping and sentiment over violence enacted on Indigenous Americans demonstrate that goodness is innate within him. As a Westernized student of history, the Creature attains a privileged position, at a remove from the violence that contact incited. Ironically, however, the Creature is not exempt from these forms of violence and experiences them as soon as he makes contact with the De Lacey family. The Creature exists within a liminal space between humans and animals that, in accordance with contemporary taxonomy, calls into question not only his species identity but his racial identity. This indeterminacy highlights the racist discourse of scientific practices that categorized people of color with or in close proximity to animals. His hybrid nature within these taxonomies subjects him to both racist violence and what we might think of as "speciesist" violence, revealing the ways the two are entangled in the acts of the European characters he encounters.

"Of Mimicry and 'Man'"

Frankenstein's Creature embodies Homi Bhabha's notion of hybridity by becoming the colonial mimic. This process occurs through his juxtaposition with

[80] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 80.

Safie, as both receive the same education simultaneously and are subjected to discrimination by the white European family. If both Safie and the Creature are "humanized" through their education according to racist Western logics, it becomes imperative to understand how they inhabit hybrid identities and how these identities both conform to and challenge the Western educational framework. By reading both the Creature and Safie as hybrids in Bhabha's terms, I demonstrate how early postcolonial theory can inform new materialism and animal studies, by interrogating boundaries between ethnicities and boundaries between species. If Safie's hybridity becomes recognizable through Bhabha's theory, then I argue that her hybridity helps to illuminate the Creature's and links postcolonial theory with literary animal studies. Through this reading, the animal becomes legible only through postcolonial notions of humanness and the denial of humanity colonialism enacts. Reading the Creature through Bhabha's theory reveals that animacy hierarchies subjugate human and animal populations in similar ways in the nineteenth century and postcolonial notions of othering are needed to understand animal othering, which lies at a further remove from European definitions of humanness. The fact that the Creature becomes a kind of double for Safie, calls into question the sharp distinction between him and the humans in the novel. This process of doubling begins with Safie, a woman of color, and goes on to juxtapose the Creature with Victor Frankenstein, who, as a white European man, enjoys a higher position of privilege in the animacy hierarchy. By moving up the hierarchy in this way, the narrative structure exposes the Creature's difference and monstrousness as a fallacious human projection.

When the Creature first makes his home in the hovel adjacent to the cottage, he discovers a window between the two, with a "small and almost imperceptible chink, through which the eye could just penetrate" (72).[81] However, sound proves more valuable than sight in this case, as this small crack allows the Creature to listen in on the conversations between the cottagers. Safie provides the missing link that helps him to understand these conversations: one night as he watches her through the crack, he finds "that she was endeavouring to learn their language; and the idea instantly occurred to me, that I should make use of the same instructions to the same end" (78-9).[82] Because Safie does not speak French and because she was denied education in Turkey, the De Lacey family treat her as a *tabula rasa*, as well, initiating her into European culture and life, while also, unbeknownst to them, enlightening the Creature. Though the De Laceys treat Safie as an ignorant foreigner, she is able to pass as Westernized in the novel, due to a variety of factors, including her gender, ethnicity, religion, and marriage status. In this sense, she too, is a hybrid subject, navigating between Eastern and Western cultures and codes, as the Creature must navigate between human and nonhuman existence. Safie and the Creature thus embark on the same program of education, first learning the De Laceys' native French, then discussing history, government, literature, and human development. Given the Creature's racial and animal status, both are, in different senses, victims of European colonialism and xenophobia. This project of intellectual and moral improvement is

[81] Shelley, 72.
[82] Shelley, 78–79.

one of assimilation, which serves to bring Safie and the Creature into the fold of the Western European human subject.

I begin here by demonstrating how Safie acts as a colonial mimic to then show how the Creature, as her double, does so in similar ways. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak reveals that

> In depicting Safie, Shelley uses some commonplaces of eighteenth-century liberalism that are shared by many today: Safie's Muslim father was a victim of (bad) Christian religious prejudice and yet was himself a wily and ungrateful man not as morally refined as her (good) Christian mother. Having tasted the emancipation of woman, Safie could not go home.[83]

Although at first the family shows tolerance toward Safie's father in the face of the xenophobic government, the narrative nonetheless forces him into evil Turk stereotypes. Safie, on the other hand, avoids these stereotypes altogether, as the De Lacey's welcome her joyously into their home. The Creature's narrative identifies Safie as her mother's child rather than her father's. According to Safie, her mother was "a Christian Arab, seized and made a slave by the Turks" who "instructed her daughter in the tenets of her religion, and taught her to aspire to higher powers of intellect, and an independence of spirit, forbidden to the female followers of Mahomet" (83).[84] If religion functions as the dominant form of difference between France and Turkey, Safie's Christianity makes her much less alien in the eyes of the De Lacey family and the European reader. The enslavement of Safie's mother

[83] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Three Women's Texts and a Critique of Imperialism," *Critical Inquiry* 12, no. 1 (1985): 257.
[84] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 83.

reaffirms European stereotypes of Turkish barbarity and stirs up European fears of female oppression in Islamic countries. Safie asserts that Muslim women must live in "harams" and entertain themselves with "puerile amusements," whereas Christianity promises women "independence," "intellect," and "virtue" (83).[85] Her devotion to Christianity plays into Western savior rhetoric that posits Christian nations as forces that protect Muslim women from the tyranny of Muslim men.

In this sense, Safie's gender and religion are closely intertwined with one another. If her Christian religion helps her to pass as a Westernized subject, so too, does her particular gendered position. Though Christianity, according to Safie, empowers women by developing their "intellect" and "virtue," her status as a Christian woman does not pose a threat to European patriarchal society. Were she a man, the European characters might mistrust her influence as an outsider in masculine realms such as politics and trade, and she may meet with the same prejudice in French society as her father. However, she is described as "lovely," "gentle," "generous," and "devoted," all adjectives that convey goodness and feminine docility, neutralizing the potential danger of her independence and her non-European ethnicity. Though Safie escapes from her father to remain in Europe, she does so to marry Felix, placing herself under the authority of a European man. Her otherness as both an Arab and a single woman get subsumed within heteronormative and masculine dominated structures of marriage and family. When Safie first arrives at the De Lacey cottage, the Creature recalls "her features of a regular proportion, and her complexion wondrously

[85] Shelley, 83.

fair" (78),[86] demonstrating that her feminine beauty links her to European beauty standards. "Fair" connotes pale skin and associates her with the French Agatha, who the Creature refers to as "fair creature" (72).[87] Safie's femininity makes her more European, lightening her skin and defusing the threat of miscegenation in her marriage with Felix.

Safie's identity as a Christian Arab woman exemplifies the "double articulation" of the hybrid subject. Her espousal of Western Christian values and repetition of European orientalist tropes makes her a mouthpiece of colonial racist ideologies. But although this education largely serves to "reform and discipline" the Turkish woman, Safie's very act of learning from the family helps to dismantle the discriminatory logic that builds boundaries between them and her. She tells the De Laceys that she finds the "prospect of marrying a Christian and remaining in a country where women were allowed to take a rank in society…enchanting" (83).[88] Although this sentiment bolsters Christian Europe against what she describes as the backwardness of Turkey, it also demonstrates three assumptions she makes about her immigration: 1) she will "remain" in Europe, thus opposing the bigotry that led to the expulsion of her father, 2) she will "take a rank," living openly and perhaps prominently and exercising her rights as a woman, and 3) she will "marry a Christian," viewing herself as a member of a European Christian family. By articulating the position she hopes to attain, Safie uses her education to advance herself in Europe,

[86] Shelley, 78.
[87] Shelley, 72.
[88] Shelley, 83.

challenging European ideas of her inferiority as a Turkish woman. Thus, through her education, Safie emulates European values, but she also simultaneously challenges them.

By accessing Safie's education, the Creature becomes doubly anthropomorphized, both by entering the realm of human knowledge through literature and history, and by becoming Safie's double, a move that casts him as human by association. Maureen Noelle McLane claims that because the novel conflates the European and the human, the Creature transforms himself into a student of European humanist traditions in order to gain membership in human communities.[89] For McLane, this demonstrates that humanity is more socially constructed than biologically inherent—she shows that species is less a scientific category than a "perceptual-social category which organizes the possibility of contact among beings."[90] Following the example of Safie, he begins his journey toward human status with language, which McLane describes as "the most basic medium of his humanization."[91] Linguistic cognition proves to be a point of pride for the Creature: he professes to have learned more quickly than his fellow pupil, declaring that she "understood very little…whilst I comprehended and could imitate almost every word that was spoken" (79).[92] By striving to "imitate" exactly the accents of the cottagers, the Creature becomes in essence Bhabha's mimic – his speech comes so close to that

[89] Maureen Noelle McLane, "Literate Species: Populations, 'Humanities,' and Frankenstein," *ELH* 63, no. 4 (1996): 972.
[90] McLane, 975.
[91] McLane, 973.
[92] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 79.

of his teachers that he uses it to convince the blind father that he is one of them and thus deserves their asylum and love. The fact that the Creature improves more rapidly than Safie is also telling: her physical form conforms more to European notions of humanity than that of the Creature, so his speedier progress demonstrates that his ability to master human concepts like language can surpass even those who possess a greater degree of "biological" humanness than himself. Of course, the Creature's superior ability may derive from other sources as well. His position as a "newborn," perhaps helps him benefit from some form of Universal Grammar that has already closed to the adult Safie. His success is also gendered and betrays misogynistic notions that women learn and progress less rapidly than men. In this sense, the Creature inserts himself, as a male being, above Safie in the animacy hierarchy, reinscribing the sexist power dynamics of the humans he attempts to imitate.

Language is crucial to the Creature's attempts to assimilate to human society, yet it is not his only means of understanding the world, indicating that he has access to other-than-human forms of knowledge. As Cary Wolfe points out, language has traditionally served as a barrier that distinguishes humans from animals and denies the latter subjectivity and ethical consideration.[93] Posthumanist thought has attempted to separate itself from the linguistic turn, expressing a "desire" as Kari Weil states, "to know that there are beings or objects with ways of knowing and being that resist our flawed systems of language and who may know us and themselves in ways we can

[93] Cary Wolfe, *Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), xvi.

never discern."[94] Though *Frankenstein* espouses the importance of language as a form of learning and later persuasion, it does suggest that other "ways of knowing" or alternative language systems exist. By holding up language as the basis for human learning and culture, the De Lacey section of the novel maintains this boundary, showing that language is the entryway to human life. But French is not the first "language" the Creature attempts to speak. During his first few days of life in the forest, he "tried to imitate the pleasant songs of the birds, but was unable" (69).[95] Whether the Creature actively attempts to communicate with the birds remains unclear, but he does say that he wishes to "express [his] sensations" (69),[96] suggesting that birdsong represents an outward manifestation of some form of interiority or subjective experience. In the absence of his human parent figure (Victor Frankenstein), the Creature turns to birds as a model for species behavior. This fact suggests that birds do have a sort of community outside that of human relations and that the Creature feels drawn to this community.

However, this inter-species imprinting is aborted because the Creature's act of imitation is unsuccessful. Though his body may or may not contain bird parts, Frankenstein has constructed his throat like a human's, so that he may speak human language. Despite the Creature's liminal position, he conforms best to a human frame and the novel completes this anthropomorphic picture of him by demonstrating that he aspires to humanness. When the Creature proposes to live with his mate in the wilds of

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[94] Kari Weil, *Thinking Animals: Why Animal Studies Now?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 12.
[95] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 69.
[96] Shelley, 69.

South America, Frankenstein scoffs at him, exclaiming, "How can you, who long for the love and sympathy of man, persevere in this exile?" (99).[97] Neither Frankenstein nor the Creature suggest that communion with South American animals (or with the humans living there, for that matter) might be possible. The Creature's response that he will live "in the most savage of places" (99)[98] indicates that he does not prefer to give up the fellowship of men, only that he must because men have refused to give him the "love and sympathy" he desires.

In this sense, the Creature's mimicry of human language and learning perpetuates human "reform, regulation and discipline" in Bhabha's terms. Through the De Laceys' education, the Creature comes to value what he sees as the "wonders" of human society. He begins to measure himself against these values, falling into a despair of inadequacy. When he reflects on his situation, he realizes, "Of my creation and creator I was absolutely ignorant; but I knew that I possessed no money, no friends, no kind of property. I was, besides, endowed with a figure hideously deformed and loathsome; I was not even of the same nature as man" (80).[99] In this rumination, the Creature begins by realizing that he has no origin story, but neither has he made anything of himself since his creation. He measures this success through the largely capitalistic metrics of "money," "friends," and "property," which privilege wealthy class status. Then he proceeds to his "deformed and loathsome" appearance, which falls short of human beauty standards, so much so that he concludes that his "nature"

[97] Shelley, 99.
[98] Shelley, 99.
[99] Shelley, 80.

must be completely other than human. In concluding that he is a "monster" (81)[100] the Creature sees himself as inferior to the humans around him, giving credence to human standards and bolstering human superiority. Although his differences – greater agility, the ability to eat "coarser diet," resistance to "extremes of heat and cold," and greater "stature" (80)[101] – seem like useful physical features, he can only see them as monstrous aberrations to human perfection.

The Creature's rejection by the humans around him, as well as his resulting internalization of this treatment, suggests that he has failed to successfully mimic humanness. Yet I propose this ostensible failure constitutes a key success in terms of Bhabha's theory, meaning that it poses a challenge to human norms and subverts the discrimination that polices the boundary between human and animal. Indeed, in the auditory realm, the Creature succeeds in his imitation, winning sympathy and a pledge of assistance from Mr. De Lacey during their brief conversation. It is only in the visual realm, due to his "deformed and loathsome" appearance, that the family rejects him. The close association established between the Creature and Safie through the De Laceys' education exposes the hypocrisy of this rejection. The fact that the De Laceys show tender compassion toward Safie and severe antagonism toward her double renders their actions cruelly ironic. Little do they realize that the Creature resembles so closely their beloved Safie in newly acquired linguistic ability, knowledge, and values. Their ignorance breeds prejudice and hostility against him – the family does not know the extent of the Creature's development and adoption of their own civilities

[100] Shelley, 81.
[101] Shelley, 80.

and can only see him for his rude physical form. This intolerance erects an arbitrary barrier between Safie and the Creature. Though both engage in mimicry, only Safie passes for one of the family; the Creature's status of "almost the same, but not quite" proves especially disturbing because he defies easy categorization. In mimicry, language alone does not provide a high enough threshold to pass as the colonizer; though it plays an important role, it must exist alongside the visual aspect of the physical form to grant access to the mimic.

Though popular images of Frankenstein insist on his monstrousness, I propose that the humans' fear in the novel comes less from the notion that the Creature is utterly different from them, but rather from the fact that he is not quite the same. This idea breeds confusion that is most evident in the language human characters use to name and categorize the Creature. First and foremost, the term "creature," as used in the novel, is highly ambiguous in its species designation, as I have mentioned in relation to animal studies work on the "creaturely." The Oxford English Dictionary gives two conflicting definitions for the word, both in use at the time of publication: 1) "a human being; a person, an individual" and 2) "a living or animate being; an animal, often as distinct from a person."[102] The novel agrees with this contradiction, as it uses the term generally and generously to refer to both human and nonhuman characters. In the sixty-nine usages throughout the text, it is employed to represent Victor Frankenstein, Elizabeth Lavenza, Justine Moritz, the De Lacey family, little William, humankind in general, and of course, the Creature, himself. When the latter seeks

[102] OED

acceptance from Mr. De Lacey, the old man assures him, "it will afford me true pleasure to be in any way serviceable to a human creature" (91).[103] The caveat in this case hinges desperately on the word "human," which the Creature does not sufficiently embody to gain the old man's service; however, little does De Lacey know that in using the word "creature" he has achieved an almost direct address, for this is the term the Creature most often uses to name himself. Similarly, when Frankenstein agrees to create a female mate, he does so because "the justice due both to [the Creature] and my fellow-creatures demanded of me that I should comply with his request" (100).[104] Though Victor sharply delineates between his creation and humankind (one of which he fears and the other he hopes to protect), the language he uses for them is largely the same, making this distinction seem fictitious.

The first conversation between Walton and Frankenstein also demonstrates uncertainty about the Creature's species status. Walton asks, "'And did the man whom you pursued travel in the same fashion?", to which Frankenstein replies with a "multitude of questions concerning the route which the dæmon, as he called him, had pursued" (14-5).[105] Walton calls the Creature a "man," while Frankenstein calls him a "dæmon," a label Walton clearly marks as Frankenstein's term and seems to find curious. The Creature thus appears man-like, especially to outsiders not acquainted with his origin or past deeds, yet his difference becomes evident at closer range.

[103] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 91.
[104] Shelley, 100.
[105] Shelley, 14–15.

Though Frankenstein's choice of the word "dæmon" reflects the evil of the crimes the Creature has committed, his perception of the Creature as an evil force begins with his creation, when he sees the Creature as a "demoniacal corpse" (35).[106] His impulsive fear comes from his own muddled intentions in creating a new being; in the midst of his ambitious aspirations, Frankenstein declares both "I began the creation of a human being" (31)[107] and "a new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve their's" (32).[108] Victor seems to believe that he has set out to create a "human being" but also "a new species," in effect, "an animal as complex and wonderful as man" (31).[109] In his very intention, then, he engineers the mimic – the Creature is almost a human being but not quite. He is "a new species" of "animal" that attempts to rise to standards of humanness, imitating it but always with a difference. This uncanny similarity ultimately renders him more frightening to Frankenstein and his human peers. The Creature, himself, remarks upon this fact, lamenting, "my form is a filthy type of your's, more horrid from its very resemblance" (88).[110]

The Creature's mimicry clearly functions in a regulatory way, instilling the Creature with human values and subjecting him to human violence on the basis of his not quite human form. But it also subverts the authority of the dominant group (in this

[106] Shelley, 35.
[107] Shelley, 31.
[108] Shelley, 32.
[109] Shelley, 31.
[110] Shelley, 88.

case, humans), "[turning] the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power." Despite the fact that the Creature never gains acceptance from human society or from his creator, I argue that just as the colonized mimic poses a threat to the colonizer, the Creature challenges the speciesism that perpetuates human exceptionalism and subjects him to exile and extermination. As McLane states, "the monster is not decisively human; nor, as his eventual fluency and rationality suggest, is he decisively not human. Victor inadvertently engineers not a human being but the monstrous critique of the very category."[111] Through his hybrid status, greatly developed through his education and association with Safie, the Creature challenges the policing of the human/nonhuman boundaries, which ultimately manifests in his close association with Frankenstein in Volume III of the novel. In essence, his doubling with Safie builds the foundation for his doubling with Frankenstein, a trajectory that moves up Chen's concept of animacy hierarchies, dismantling distinctions between different levels of sentience, and in the end, subverting the highest position in the hierarchy – the European man.

Creature and Creator

Reading the Creature and creator as doubles in the novel has a long critical history. George Levine points out this fact, stating, "as they pursue their separate lives, they increasingly resemble and depend upon each other so that by the end Frankenstein pursues his own monster, their positions reversed, and the monster plants

[111] McLane, "Literate Species," 964.

clues to keep Frankenstein in pursuit. As Frankenstein's creation, the monster can be taken as an expression of an aspect of Frankenstein's self."[112] What does it mean to interpret the concept of the double literally, rather than in figurative or allegorical terms? If the Creature is "an aspect of Frankenstein's self," a part that "re-enact[s] in mildly disguised ways, his creator's feelings and experiences,"[113] does he, in some sense, embody the position of European man? Is he human in the sense that Victor is human? Or does Victor have an other-than-human aspect that manifests as the Creature? To argue that the two have a shared consciousness or shared feelings becomes a radical claim, given ongoing controversy over whether animals (and other nonhuman species) experience consciousness or feelings.

Even analyses that posit Creature and creator as doubles in terms of relationships, rather than a shared self, present substantial challenges to species boundaries. Victor likens himself to a father of the new species he plans to create ("No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve their's"), an aberration in which the father does not perpetuate his own species, but rather, produces another. Critics have found the parenting metaphor especially attractive, often choosing to read Frankenstein as the Creature's mother. Ellen Moers, for example, seeks to read the novel autobiographically, as an account of Shelley's own traumas surrounding motherhood, and Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar identify Victor with Eve, detailing his "fall into guilty knowledge and painful maternity."[114]

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[112] George Levine, "Frankenstein and the Tradition of Realism," *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 7, no. 1 (1973 Fall 1973): 17–23.
[113] Levine, 17–23.
[114] Gilbert and Gubar, 221-222, 232.

Others have interpreted the doubling romantically rather than generationally. James Holt McGavran interprets the relationship between Frankenstein and his Creature in terms of homoerotic desire, claiming that their cycle of violence demonstrates the destructive effects of the failure to recognize and value homosocial bonds between men.[115] This violence has also been read as a manifestation of Victor's deep-seated homophobia. Benjamin Daffron argues that the intense gaze with which the Creature scrutinizes his creator at the end of the novel represents both surveillance and a form of cruising.[116] Victor, like other early nineteenth-century men, reacts violently against the erotic pressure of this gaze, attempting to deny its accusation of sodomy.[117]

If we take these parental and homoerotic relationship readings seriously, they indicate that the novel throws into question taboos surrounding certain types of interspecies relations. The homoerotic desire evident in the violence between Creature and creator introduces fears of sexual similarity, through sodomy, as well as anxieties about sexual difference, on a spectrum from miscegenation to bestiality. In the Creature's position as person of color or non-European, his pursuit of Victor and his erotic gaze represent a form of miscegenation, one that destroys the white, heterosexual marriage Victor has planned to enjoy with his cousin, Elizabeth Lavenza. If we take the Creature as another species, the threat becomes bestiality, a capital crime in England under Henry VIII onward that, according to John M. Murrin, was

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[115] James Holt McGavran, "'Insurmountable Barriers to Our Union': Homosocial Male Bonding, Homosexual Panic, and Death on the Ice in Frankenstein," *European Romantic Review* 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 62, https://doi.org/10.1080/10509580008570098.
[116] Benjamin Eric Daffron, *Romantic Doubles: Sex and Sympathy in British Gothic Literature, 1790-1830* (New York: AMS Press, 2002), 87–88.
[117] Daffron, 88.

often prosecuted alongside witchcraft.[118] In a bestiality trial, both human and animal partners could face death as punishment for their sinful union. The fears surrounding bestiality had much to do with perceived filthiness of interspecies crossing: "bestiality lowered a man to the level of a beast, but also left something human in the animal," causing a threat of cannibalism in "tainted" livestock.[119] Some of Frankenstein's terror of the Creature may come from the threat their erotically charged relationship poses to his own humanity - acknowledgment of this relationship could "lower him to the level of the beast" or at least to the level of his deformed creation, and in turn, impart a greater share of humanness to the Creature, an act that would debase Victor in his ill treatment of it. Fittingly in this context, Murrin's book links early modern and eighteenth-century prosecutions of sodomy and bestiality, both considered deviant and sinful sex acts and punishable by death in the Old Testament (Leviticus 20).[120] For Victor, any form of eroticism with the Creature thus becomes a double crime, breaking both heteronormative and intraspecies sexual norms, which perhaps explains why, in Daffron's terms, he responds with such vehement homophobia. Although the cycle of revenge that ends in the death of both protagonists indicates the forbidden nature of such a queer, interspecies union, the very idea that the novel suggests such a relationship, or rather, that various scholars have argued for its interpretation, subverts the laws that police it. The very act of imagining an erotic relationship between Creature and creator constructs a space for this deviation to exist.

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[118] Angela N. H. Creager and William C. Jordan, eds., *The Animal-Human Boundary: Historical Perspectives* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 117.
[119] Creager and Jordan, 117.
[120] Creager and Jordan, 115.

Similarly, reading Frankenstein's act of creation as an act of fathering or mothering generates anxieties about monstrous birth, generally viewed as an abomination.[121] In seeing that his "child" is deformed, Frankenstein abandons it out of fear - he cannot abide the fact that he has created something so ghastly and other. Part of this fear comes from the grisly and corpse-like nature of the Creature, part of it from the fact that through the act of birthing it he has become tied to it in a strange sort of kinship. Donna Haraway champions this form of interspecies family, which she describes in terms of "significant otherness."[122] Haraway professes, "I always knew that if I turned up pregnant, I wanted the being in my womb to be a member of another species."[123] This circumstance plagues Frankenstein throughout the novel; unlike Haraway, who would rejoice at such an event and "tak[es] difference seriously," Frankenstein dismisses difference as dangerous, due to his rigid taxonomic hierarchy. Although Frankenstein ultimately rejects the Creature, refusing to recognize him as his offspring and thus sundering interspecies kinship ties, the novel does strongly imply that this relationship exists. Like the argument that Frankenstein and his Creature are locked in a form of erotic battle, this parenting argument has also been popularized by many critics, indicating that the novel sets forth the possibility of birthing another species, as Haraway envisions.

If taken metaphorically, this type of interspecies reproduction alludes to the proto-evolutionary thought of Erasmus Darwin. Victor's production of a hybrid

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[121] Creager and Jordan, 117.
[122] Donna Jeanne Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), 6–7.
[123] Haraway, 96.

offspring that promises to form a new species would seem to presage Charles Darwin's descent with modification, with multiple generations condensed into one, produced asexually. Though the younger Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* would not appear for another forty years after the publication of *Frankenstein*, the novel clearly draws on the older Darwin's works to demonstrate the relations among species that would form the basis of evolutionary theory. Philip Armstrong establishes that both Mary and Percy Shelley read the works of Erasmus Darwin,[124] and Joel Levy points to the novel's 1831 Preface and its mention of "Dr. Darwin" as evidence that the scientist's thought played a prominent role in inspiring the spontaneous generation at the center of Shelley's novel.[125] Though Shelley here specifically mentions galvanism in relation to Darwin's experiments, the scientist's ideas on the close relations between living beings also clearly inform the novel's blurring of human and nonhuman categories.

> As Darwin famously wrote in his anatomical work, *Zoonomia*,
>
> From this account of reproduction it appears, that all animals have a similar origin, viz. from a single living filament…And that from hence as Linnaeus has conjectured in respect to the vegetable world, it is not impossible, but the great variety of species of animals, which now tenant the earth, may have had their origin from the mixture of a few natural orders. And that those vegetable and animal mules, which could continue their species, have done so, and now constitute the numerous families of animals and vegetables which now exist;

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[124] Philip Armstrong, *What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2008), 68.
[125] Joel Levy, *Frankenstein and the Birth of Science* (London: Andre Deutsch, 2018), 76.

> and that those mules, which were produced with imperfect organs of generation, perished without reproduction, according to the observation of Aristotle; and are the animals, which we now call mules.[126]

If, as Darwin asserts, all animals come from a "single living filament," the Creature, composed of human and animal parts, ultimately comes from the same filament as Frankenstein and other European humans like him. This formulation thus reduces the difference between them. Darwin's term "mule" plays in the interstices between the specific animal definition (the sterile cross of horse and donkey) and the more general abstraction of a hybrid organism or state of being. The word foreshadows Charles Darwin's use of the term "hybrid" (never used by Erasmus, himself) as the sterile offspring of species, which he closely allies with "mongrels," the robust and fertile offspring of varieties.[127]

Frankenstein's anxiety about creating a female mate for the Creature hinges on the dichotomy that Erasmus Darwin proposes and that Charles Darwin refines and specifies: due to his hybrid form and the relative silence about his reproductive system, it seems likely that the Creature may be sterile, yet Frankenstein fears that he will produce a "race of devils" in South America that will "make the very existence of the species of man a condition precarious and full of terror" (114).[128] Frankenstein's fear of competition recalls Thomas Malthus' cautions against overpopulation, namely that it causes "waste of seed, sickness, and premature death" and "Among mankind,

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[126] Erasmus Darwin, *Zoonomia*, 367.
[127] Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, 224.
[128] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 114.

misery and vice."[129] Emily Steinlight claims that in a Malthusian biopolitical move, Frankenstein opts for "perpetual violence over procreation," viewing his creation as an "avatar of the multitude of which it is composed," capable of regenerating the masses within itself through the act of reproduction.[130] The fact that this competition could come from a "race of devils," masses of other-than-human creatures, threatens human superiority by suggesting that a new species could supplant human beings. In a turn toward the Foucauldian apparatus of security, Frankenstein imagines the probable outcomes of the creation of a female mate, weighs the cost for mankind, and eventually destroys the half-created mate as a method of population control.[131] Because the Creature derives partially from human components and could generate a new species of human, yet not human, beings, he poses a threat to human populations in the sense that his species could war with them and compete for resources.

If the Creature's hybridity is informed by Erasmus Darwin's theory of generation and natural relations, then his existence challenges not only the human as a category (in which a white, male human is implied) but also to the figure of the white, male scientist who attempted to keep this hierarchy in place. Some contemporary scientists advocated for this view: Sir Humphrey Davy, one of the most renowned chemists of the early nineteenth century, indicates in his *Introduction to a Course of Lectures on Chemistry* that the scientist places himself above other aspects of the

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[129] Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, 5.

[130] Emily Steinlight, *Populating the Novel: Literary Form and the Politics of Surplus Life* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2018), 48, 45.

[131] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*, ed. Michel. Senellart, François. Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana (New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 6.

physical world and environment and tries to master them, defying Darwin's heterarchical ethic. Many accounts demonstrate that Mary Shelley admired Davy's work – Levy claims that his writings are reflected closely in the novel's figure of M. Waldman, "the most positively portrayed scientist in the book,"[132] and Laura Crouch shows that Shelley read Davy's "Chemistry" during the composition of Frankenstein, probably relying heavily on his theories surrounding galvanism.[133]

Yet, Crouch also demonstrates that Shelley took more than scientific ideas and methods from Davy; she also drew upon his ambition to reveal the potential disastrous consequences engendered by "the nature of science and the scientist."[134] She concludes that science is a powerful medium but not necessarily a good or moral one.[135] Davy's interest in the authority of the scientist is evident in his *Introduction*, where he states,

> Not contented with what is found upon the surface of the earth, [the scientist] has penetrated into her bosom, and has even searched the bottom of the ocean for the purpose of allaying the restlessness of his desires, or of extending and increasing his power. He is to a certain extent ruler of all the elements that surround him, and he is capable of using not only common matter according to

[132] Levy, *Frankenstein and the Birth of Science*, 170.
[133] Laura E. Crouch and Davy, "Davy's 'A Discourse, Introductory to a Course of Lectures on Chemistry': A Possible Scientific Source of 'Frankenstein,'" *Keats-Shelley Journal* 27 (1978): 35–36.
[134] Crouch and Davy, 35.
[135] Crouch and Davy, 43.

> his will and inclinations, but likewise of subjecting to his purposes the ethereal principles of heat and light.[136]

Daffron reads this passage critically, calling the scientist a "megalomaniac" and linking the disturbing gendered implications of the male scientist's act of penetration with Frankenstein's pursuit of female nature.[137] This passage represents a sort of overreaching ambition that Shelley criticizes in the downfall and destruction of Frankenstein. Though Davy's description of the scientist's mining of the "surface of the earth," "her bosom," and "the bottom of the ocean" probably refers most directly to inanimate and inorganic compounds, these places all teem with the animate and the organic as well. Frankenstein has mined for organic tissues from a variety of beings to "subject them to his purposes" and "allay" his "desire" for renown. He wishes to be "ruler" of a new species and he strives to accomplish this goal by acting as though he is already ruler of all existing species.

But Frankenstein's megalomaniacal impulses clearly have a limit because in the aftermath of his creation, he worries about the pain his experiments have caused to other living beings. He finds his acts so repulsive that he can barely recount them to Walton. Later, just after he meets the Creature near Chamounix, he falls into a miserable lethargy, reflecting to Walton, "Can you wonder, that sometimes a kind of insanity possessed me, or that I saw continually about me a multitude of filthy animals inflicting on me incessant torture, that often extorted screams and bitter groans?"

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[136] "Davy, A Discourse Introductory to a Course of Lectures on Chemistry (1802)," accessed January 24, 2019, http://knarf.english.upenn.edu/Davy/davy2dis.html.
[137] Daffron, *Romantic Doubles*, 81.

(101).[138] Armstrong sees this moment as a sort of haunting, in which Victor's act of vivisection redounds upon him and plagues him in a waking dream.[139] Victor describes these images in terms of "insanity," both because of its hallucinatory effect and due to the absurdity of the human-animal reversal. An animal couldn't really vivisect him, could it? Such an idea upends notions of human superiority and the scientific mastery that Davy alludes to and Frankenstein embodies. Yet the entire ending of the novel indicates that the scientist is subjected to a slow torture – a rending of his physical frame – at the hands of his nonhuman experimental subject. The derogatory term "filthy" remains ambiguous in terms of its referent: Victor sees "filthy animals" about him, but it is unclear whether they represent his former self or his Creature. The Creature, who he describes in similar terms, such as "deformed" and "hideous," is the cause of his paranoia and agony. But Victor, himself, performed the original torture, creating his own tormentor – in this sense he is the original "filthy animal." This ambiguity serves to yet again draw Creature and creator together, but also casts judgment on Victor's scientific methods, especially with regard to his treatment of animals.

The face of the Creature becomes quite literal and prominent in the end of the novel, as he torments Frankenstein through a combative form of mutual, interspecies gazing, a sort of staring contest that cannot be broken. Of course, this gazing is metaphorical in that Frankenstein and his monster rarely actually see one another – even in their deadly chase at the end of the novel, they almost never inhabit the same

[138] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 101.
[139] Armstrong, *What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity*, 69.

frame. Yet, tellingly, all of their interactions occur through sight. Sight originally caused both Frankenstein and the De Lacey family to reject the Creature, but it also instigated the large-scale hunt for him that dominates the second half of the novel. Hunting is itself an act of looking, a search for a physically appalling form in order to eradicate it. But this form of looking is bi-directional: Frankenstein searches for traces of the Creature's passing, such as "the print of his huge step" (141) and the Creature, in turn, leaves written messages meant to pressure Frankenstein into following him. Frankenstein's Creature does not fulfill the role of prey that the non-human so often plays in relation to the human. Although he is hunted, he frequently looks back at his hunter, taunting him to catch up.

The structure of the novel supports this reading of the Creature's intense gaze, which he continuously directs toward both Frankenstein and the reader. The innermost frame narrative belongs to him and tells his story, with Frankenstein as his primary audience and the reader as his indirect one. The fact that the Creature inhabits this innermost dimension makes his narrative the most important – the heart of the novel, the ultimate discovery within the nested boxes. Yet the Creature cannot be contained within this smallest box; rather, he explodes through the layers of narrative, ultimately confronting Walton, the outermost narrator, face-to-face, as he defiantly claims his right to visit his creator's deathbed. In this moment, the novel grants its innermost narrator the final dialogue in its outermost frame:

> I shall ascend my funeral pile triumphantly, and exult in the agony of the torturing flames. The light of that conflagration will fade away; my ashes will

> be swept into the sea by the winds. My spirit will sleep in peace; or if it thinks, it will not surely think thus. Farewell (156).[140]

In this monologue, he gazes steadily at Walton and the reader, asserting his authority over his own narrative. More importantly, perhaps, this moment demonstrates that the novel upholds his hybridity through its final page. Formally, his movement between frames mirrors his movement between animal and human, object and subject, created and creator positions. He refuses to remain in the narrative space allotted to him, interrupting Walton's narration to announce his own destiny and make space for his own other-than-human voice. His announcement makes clear his embrace of his own liminal position. His decision to complete suicide, posited as a human choice involving premeditation, emotional struggle, and dramatic tradition,[141] returns him to the inanimate flesh from whence he came. His "ashes," the only remnants of his once living body, "will be swept into the sea by the winds," joining him to the wider environment, and ending the novel with an image of interconnection between the human and the nonhuman, the animate and the inanimate.

Conclusion

By considering the nexus of animal studies, postcolonial theory, and early nineteenth-century work in the life sciences, I have traced how Frankenstein's Creature exists between human and nonhuman categories and how this very existence challenges the strict delineation between them. Critics have read the Creature

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[140] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 156.

[141] Werther

variously as a person of color, a great ape, and a stand-in for the category of the animal more generally, demonstrating that nineteenth-century Western European thought about these groups overlapped and cast them beyond the realm of the limited definition of the human. Though I by no means suggest that these groups experienced the world in similar ways, I claim that they faced, at times, similar forms of discrimination, which we see enacted upon the body of the Creature throughout the novel. Due to the Creature's proximity to Safie and her position as a mimic in Bhabha's terms, I argue that the Creature, too, fills this role. As Safie's hybridity demonstrates the arbitrariness of racial and ethnic boundaries, so the Creature's hybridity demonstrates the arbitrariness of species boundaries. I apply Bhabha's theory to the Creature because I think the novel reveals that racial hierarchies and species hierarchies have been enforced in similar ways. Any attempt to upend these hierarchies results in paranoia from the dominant group, a paranoia that causes extreme acts of violence and a high body count at the end of the novel. *Frankenstein* does not necessarily put forth new taxonomies or new hierarchies; in fact, it shows that resisting current taxonomies and even existing between taxonomic categories only leads to social ostracism, pain, and death. But it does question the basis upon which these hierarchies are founded, not only through the struggles of its nonhuman character, but also through his similitude with his oppressors.

In her 1831 Introduction, Shelley posed the question that many critics and readers had asked, namely, how had she, as a "young girl, came to think of and to

dilate upon so very hideous an idea?" (192).[142] She revels in the otherness of her own novel, "[bidding her] hideous progeny go forth and prosper" and proclaiming her "affection for it" (197).[143] "Hideous progeny," though used to signify the novel as a whole, represents, through synechoche, the Creature, himself, revealing her embrace of his and his narrative's alterity. Her character's deviation from human norms also causes her work to deviate from the expectations of women's writing of the time. Yet, her "affection" demonstrates a recognition of the worth of the Creature's liminal existence and her own ability to create him, defying the disgust and shock expressed by her readers' original question. She reveals that people tend to make monsters wherever their categories fail.

[142] Shelley, *Frankenstein*, 192.
[143] Shelley, 197.

3. Chiastic Species Mixing in *Wuthering Heights*

The opening scene of *Wuthering Heights*, in which Mr Lockwood first meets his new landlord, Mr Heathcliff, is a famous example of misreading, a moment where the new tenant anthropomorphizes badly. In his introduction to the estate, Lockwood expects to find a dignified country house where animals submit to the control of their masters as pampered pets. Instead, he gets assaulted by watchdogs and incivilities, berated by both the pets and their master. Although Lockwood misinterprets his surroundings during his visit, his language in this first scene is key to the novel's representations of species and species difference as a whole. Whereas Lockwood expects Heathcliff to dominate over his dogs, he instead finds an alliance between pet and owner that introduces ambiguity between humans and animals, confusing hierarchical relations between them. In recognizing his missteps, Lockwood realizes that the master is more dog-like than he initially seemed, while the dogs possess a more human-like autonomy than he had originally accorded them.

Lockwood's misconceptions of the estate first become obvious when he follows Heathcliff inside the house and mistakes the dogs in the kitchen for friendly companion animals. In order to occupy himself during Heathcliff's silence, he "attempt[s] to caress the canine mother, who had left her nursery, and was sneaking wolfishly to the back of [his] legs, her lip curled up, and her white teeth watering for a snatch" (6).[144] The beginning of the sentence reveals that Lockwood presupposes the dog is motherly, caring for her pups in the "nursery," and assumes that she wants to be

[144] Emily Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, ed. Pauline. Nestor (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 6.

petted. The second half of the sentence divulges her true nature, however. She is "wolfish" and intends violence against Lockwood, as she eagerly bares her teeth to bite him. Heathcliff confirms her vicious nature when he cautions, "'She's not accustomed to be spoiled – not kept for a pet'" (6).[145] Unlike a lapdog, or even a hunting or working dog, the canine mother is not tame and shows no qualms about assaulting visitors. Though she sleeps in the kitchen, Heathcliff implies that she is a wild animal who does not respond to a human master.[146]

The dog's behavior incites a general canine assault against Lockwood. After the mother snaps at him, she "[breaks] into a fury" and "rouse[s] the whole hive" of other dogs, a description that likens them to hostile insects, working together to bring down a common foe (7).[147] The language Lockwood employs turns the hearth into a war zone: the dogs become his "combatants" and he calls out for aid in "re-establishing peace" (7).[148] This hyperbole places the situation in the realm of mock epic, yet it also reveals the very real threat these "fiends" (7) pose to Lockwood's safety.[149] Lockwood can still make light of this incident at this early point in the narrative because he does not understand the extent of the cruelty of Wuthering Heights, though he does start to show some real fears.

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[145] Brontë, 6.

[146] The novel's use of the term "wild" rarely refers directly to animals. Brontë often uses "wild" to describe the surrounding landscape and the often inclement weather of the setting. She also applies this term to human characters, most often to Cathy I and Heathcliff, which draws parallels between their stormy temperaments and their harsh environment.

[147] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 7.

[148] Brontë, 7.

[149] Brontë, 7.

At the center of Lockwood's perceptive failure is his anthropomorphic representation of his canine attackers. In labeling the first dog the "canine mother," Lockwood ascribes to her a human maternal aspect that implies a gentle and nurturing nature. But when he discovers her violence, he revises her title to "ruffianly bitch," a comic and stilted phrase that better accords with her behavior but is no less anthropomorphic in its connotations of roguery and bad intent. He subsequently extends this moral censure to the whole pack of dogs; though the term "fiends" emphasizes their less-than-human status, his portrayal of them as "combatants" engaged in battle against him attributes to them the human qualities of anger, social unification, and common cause. Even Heathcliff's warning to Lockwood about the canine mother characterizes her in human terms. By denying her status as a pet he disassociates her from humans and insists on her wildness, yet this very claim asserts her human-like autonomy and resistance to human control. Thus, although Lockwood initially projects the wrong anthropomorphic representations onto the dog – motherly, nurturing – he continues to anthropomorphize her when he discovers her violent intentions against him, and these new projections accord with Heathcliff's. Both Lockwood, as the outsider to the estate, and Heathcliff, as the insider, seem to believe the dog contains human-like properties. Her brutality and wildness do little to animalize her; rather, they perhaps humanize her all the more.

This introduction to the estate links the canine mother with Heathcliff. When she snarls, Heathcliff does the same: "'You'd better let the dog alone,' growled Mr

Heathcliff, in unison" (6).[150] Heathcliff shares the dog's animosity toward outsiders and expresses it in the same way, at the same moment. Like his dog, Heathcliff is not domesticated. He refuses to let other men control him and he does not allow social mores to dictate his behavior. He frankly confesses to Lockwood that "guests are so exceedingly rare in this house that I and my dogs, I am willing to own, hardly know how to receive them" (7-8).[151] In this curious syntactical structure, Heathcliff defies grammatical conventions by placing "I" before "my dogs," establishing himself as master and the dogs as minions. But the fact that he categorizes the dogs as hosts, receiving guests as inhospitably as himself, reveals a form of parity between them. Heathcliff, himself, acts as a sort of watchdog. Where Lockwood expects a reserved, yet courteous neighbor, he finds a "wolfish" and violent "fiend."

Lockwood presents both Heathcliff and his dogs as independent and untamable, a similarity that unites them but also reveals the stark difference in their subject positions. Though both pose a threat to outsiders like Lockwood, the mother dog's autonomy raises her in status to the level of an equal "combatant": where at first Lockwood had condescendingly attempted to pet her, he later finds he must take seriously her threat to his person. Heathcliff's dog-like status, on the other hand, morally sinks him. In identifying with his dogs, Heathcliff moves toward ideas of the primitive and the brutal, often associated with animals, and away from civilized society and humanity. At the end of the chapter, Lockwood reflects, "It is astonishing

[150] Brontë, 6.
[151] Brontë, 7–8.

how sociable I feel myself compared with him" (8).[152] The dramatic irony of this reflection is that unsociability is an understatement in describing Heathcliff's misanthropy. But it also reveals that Lockwood compares himself to Heathcliff and finds himself superior in breeding and manners, distinctly human qualities in the context of this encounter. Lockwood's narration anthropomorphizes or humanizes the dogs of the estate by portraying them as a threat to humans and human dominance, while it simultaneously dehumanizes Heathcliff by representing him as a brute at the level of his dogs.

I call this curious switch of species characteristics "chiastic anthropomorphism," in which animals are described in human terms and humans are described in animal terms. This claim departs from other major animal studies interpretations of the novel that portray the text as anti-anthropomorphic. Critics such as Lisa Surridge[153] and Ivan Kreilkamp[154] claim that *Wuthering Heights* eschews the Victorian propensity to clothe human control over animals in the sentimental and anthropomorphic terms of pet-keeping.[155] In order to undercut this sentimentality, it describes animals with denigrating ideas of brutality and wildness, even as it questions the hierarchies that privilege the "civilized" over the "brutal."[156] I agree with these claims, especially with regard to the way Brontë critiques sentimentality and upholds wildness, but I argue that chiastic anthropomorphism does not fall into the sentimental

[152] Brontë, 8.
[153] Lisa Surridge, "Animals and Violence in Wuthering Heights," *Brontë Society Transactions* 24, no. 2 (October 10, 1999): 165, https://doi.org/10.1179/030977699794126498.
[154] Kreilkamp, *Minor Creatures*, 2018, 59.
[155] Lisa Surridge, "Animals and Violence in *Wuthering Heights*." *Brontë Society Transactions* 24(2): 161–173, 165.
[156] Surridge, 165.

vein they describe; instead of representing animals as precious pets, it represents them as autonomous, and, in some cases, more moral than the human characters. Chiastic anthropomorphism encompasses both human and animal characters and undermines the traditional upward movement – from animal to human – that anthropomorphic rhetorical techniques typically employ. This crossing structure, entailing both anthropomorphism and zoomorphism, introduces ambiguity over whether human life or animal life is more valuable and thus demonstrates that the world of the narrative challenges species hierarchies. As animals are given value and often preferred over people by characters in the text, humans are often described in terms of animal metaphors, usually in denigrating ways. As a result, the narration demonstrates an ambivalence over the value of animality: though human characters use animal likeness as disparagement, they also value domestic animals, undercutting their use of animals as negative stereotypes.

Chiastic Anthropomorphism

If *Frankenstein* shows us a hybrid character that combines human and animal into one being, *Wuthering Heights* disperses this hybridity across the spectrum of its human and animal characters. The latter displays this human-animal blending in linguistic and metaphorical representations of discrete human and animal characters. Chiastic anthropomorphism demonstrates that all of the humans and animals in the novel are in effect hybrids: as the humans are cast in animal terms, the animals are cast in human terms, demonstrating that both contain elements of humanity and animality. Both humans and animals in the novel reside in the liminal space between species that

Frankenstein's Creature makes apparent through his hybrid body. Though their physical forms remain strictly delineated by species, their behaviors blend between the two and then diverge as each takes on the characteristics of the other. Chiasmus is therefore a variant of hybridity that also confounds ontological species hierarchies. Like hybridity, chiasmus demonstrates that hierarchy still governs the world of the nineteenth-century novel: although it calls into question distinctions between human and animal, it functions on the premise that to be animalistic is to be less than human. But chiasmus in *Wuthering Heights* goes further in its condemnation of humanity than hybridity in *Frankenstein*. Though the Creature's ill treatment due to his hybrid form highlights the inhumanity of humans, the chiastic movement in *Wuthering Heights* turns humanity and animality upside down: the human becomes beastly, and the animal becomes humane. As such, chiasmus brings species together but also shows that they diverge.

Chiasmus is a significant figure for literary animal studies because it privileges relationality and it positions similarity and difference in a structure of dynamic tension. In so doing, chiasmus holds within it a key dissonance within the animal studies field—like hybridity, it allows space for both animals' similarity to humans and their radical difference. Critiques of anthropomorphism have demonstrated that elevating animals to human status tends to privilege sameness over alterity: Kari Weil, for example, shows that scholars have advocated for animal rights by proving their capacities for language, agency, and consciousness, the basis "necessary for [human] subjectivity," but these ideas have caused controversy in their erasure of animal

difference.[157] Formal scholarship on chiasmus indicates that the rhetorical form itself does not fall into this type of erasure, but rather, holds within it both convergence and divergence. In her introduction to *Chiasmatic Encounters*, Kuisma Korhonen defines chiasmus as follows:

> The notion of chiasm comes from the Greek alphabet, χ (*chi*), referring to chiasma, cross. Two lines cross each other turning their hierarchy upside down: the one that was up goes down, the one that was down goes up. The center of chiasm is a meeting point of two diagonally opposed movements, an event that functions as a principle of reflection and reversal. It brings two lines together, but also separates them from each other.[158]

Chiasmus inverts hierarchy through its simultaneous crossing and departing motion, creating an unstable relationship between two things or ideas. Korhonen portrays such crossing as "a figure of *encounter*," a term that is etymologically chiastic in and of itself in that it "simultaneously brings different elements together and sets them in opposition to one another."[159] I want to think here about chiasmus as the point of encounter between animals and humans in the novel. As animals are anthropomorphized and humans are zoomorphized, they come into contact and blend or mix at the convergence point, yet they also switch positions and maintain their difference from one another. A chiastic anthropomorphism allows for both anthropomorphism and zoomorphism to exist simultaneously, revealing that

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[157] Kari Weil, *Thinking Animals: Why Animal Studies Now?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 4–5.
[158] Kuisma Korhonen et al., eds., *Chiasmatic Encounters: Art, Ethics, Politics* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2018), xiii.
[159] Korhonen et al., xxiii.

movement between species is not unidirectional in the traditional sense, but bi- or multidirectional.

Although chiasmus can have a leveling effect, its strict form acts as an acknowledgment that hierarchy does exist and structure the world. The chiasmus of *Wuthering Heights*, like the hybridity of *Frankenstein*, indicates movement and positioning within a hierarchical system. In the last chapter, I set *Frankenstein* against new materialist scholars such as Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour, claiming that the novel resists multiplicity and heterarchy in its policing of the Creature's hybrid body. Though his physical nature disrupts and challenges animacy hierarchies, humans still subject him to exile, violence, and death because he falls beyond stable categories, thus reimposing those hierarchies. Similarly, in *Wuthering Heights*, although humans and animals converge, the novel enforces the human-animal binary by placing the animal in a position inferior to the human. When characters describe one another, they use the language of animality as insults. Conversely, animals only rise above animality by their engagement in "civilized" and therefore, human, activities. Though the novel challenges human superiority, it does not go so far as Haraway, who claims that "human beings are with and of the Earth, and the biotic and abiotic powers of this Earth are the main story."[160] The novel is still largely anthropocentric and focuses on humans as the locus of power. Conceptually, it associates the humane with the human and the inhumane with the animal, though the actual physical human and animal bodies do not tend to match these associations.

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[160] Donna Jeanne Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).

To illustrate how the novel's chiastic anthropomorphism destabilizes hierarchies while simultaneously revealing the extent of their power, I turn to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's seminal work on chiasmus in *The Visible and the Invisible* and Luce Irigaray's direct response to Merleau-Ponty in *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*. Merleau-Ponty is mainly concerned with the relationship between the subject that perceives the world and the object in the world they perceive. He first demonstrates that the "visible" and the "tangible" converge within one system to complete one another without becoming one; as such, "there is double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and the tangible in the visible."[161] As seeing and touching overlap, subject and object both come to regard or touch one another. Merleau-Ponty describes this process as follows:

> Thus since the seer is caught up in what he sees, it is still himself he sees: there is a fundamental narcissism of all vision. And thus, for the same reason, the vision he exercises, he also undergoes from the things, such that, as many painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is equally passivity – which is the second and more profound sense of the narcissism: not to see in the outside, as the others see it, the contour of a body one inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, to exist within it, to emigrate into it, to be seduced, captivated, alienated by the phantom, so that the seer and the visible

[161] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes* (Evanston [Ill.]: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 134.

> reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen.[162]

This passage begins by describing vision as narcissism, indicating the seer as the site of power who projects images of himself onto the world and imagines that the world actively looks at him (masculine pronoun intentional). Yet, by the end of this passage, Merleau-Ponty indicates that this narcissism integrates the seer into the world of the visible. The "seer and the visible reciprocate one another" so that they become ontologically muddled and consequently, the agency between subject and object is evenly distributed. This reciprocity erases the power imbalance that narcissism would imply, revealing that both the seer and the visible engage in active looking (and are looked at). This passage from Merleau-Ponty reveals the dynamic between seer and seen that appears in *Frankenstein*'s interspecies gazing. Creature and creator become ontologically muddled in their reciprocal act of looking. In the opening of *Wuthering Heights*, Lockwood exhibits narcissistic vision by projecting his own values onto Heathcliff—"I bestow my own attributes over-liberally on him" (6)[163]—in his act of misreading. His revised interpretation, however, which conflates the master with his dogs, begins to demonstrate this form of chiasmus. When Heathcliff and his dogs growl in unison, they reciprocate one another, lessening the species distinction between them.

It is this erasure of subject and object that Luce Irigaray objects to in her response to Merleau-Ponty. Though *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* focuses on

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[162] Merleau-Ponty, 139.

[163] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 6.

gendered hierarchies, it proves crucial to understanding power differentials in animacy hierarchies as well. Irigaray writes, "If I cannot see the other in his alterity, and if he cannot see me, my body no longer sees anything in difference. I become blind as soon as it is a question of a differently sexed body."[164] She questions Merleau-Ponty's claim that the seer and the visible, the body and the world, converge, arguing that alterity leads to blindness and divergence. Though Merleau-Ponty claims that there is a reciprocity and reversibility of the seer and visible, Irigaray states that "traditionally, man claims to be the one who sees" in a "will for mastery" that "constitutes one of the most fundamental illusions of the flesh."[165] In his narcissism, "the seer is never alone, he dwells unceasingly in *his* world. Eventually he finds some accomplices there, but he never meets others."[166] Irigaray thus reinforces the idea that man is the locus of power who attempts to see and master the world through a solipsistic projection of himself onto the visible. Yet he and the visible do not reciprocate one another because this power of vision and projection is unidirectional. Despite the bi-directional movement of the chiasmus I describe, the novel form itself is a human projection onto animals – Ivan Kreilkamp shows it is an inherently anthropocentric genre.[167] The chiasmus is not really reversible because only humans see and ultimately animals maintain their difference from humans. Humans do not become animals in the novel, nor do animals become human. Both converge and take on some of the treatment accorded to the other, yet this movement does not totally reverse the hierarchy, nor

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[164] Luce Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 168.
[165] Irigaray, 171.
[166] Irigaray, 173.
[167] Kreilkamp, *Minor Creatures*, 2018, 1.

does it completely redeem animality from its inferior position, though it does call into question this inferiority.

Yet the fact that humans and animals do not switch bodies or inhabit a hybrid body, like Frankenstein's Creature, does not make their convergence and divergence any less real. Though chiasmus is a formal device, it has the potential to make ontological claims about species relations. Heather Keenleyside's work on personification in eighteenth-century literature demonstrates that there is no definite distinction between reality and figuration. She claims that humans "best apprehend the specificity of animal life – including, potentially, our own – by way of conspicuously figurative uses of language, generic literary forms, or recognizable rhetorical convention" and that "literary form [is] an engine for incorporating individuals into a species or community, and thus for composing the quasi-figurative, quasi-natural beings that both animals and people are."[168] Personification is a way of comprehending and making sense of animals and humans – each being is a physical self and also a bundle of representations that allows it to exist in discourse and in the world. Similarly, the chiastic anthropomorphism I am describing becomes a way to understand species and their relationality to one another. However, in line with Keenleyside, this form of chiasmus is not merely a means of thinking animals and humans, but also describes their very being and behavior.

The driver of this form of chiasmus in the novel is instinct: human characters continually act on instinctual impulses that associate them with animals. For example,

[168] Keenleyside, *Animals and Other People*, 2016, 2.

in the final meeting between Heathcliff and Cathy I, Nelly claims that Heathcliff jealously acts the "mad dog," and in bidding him to come to her, Nelly states that Cathy "made a spring" into his arms with the force of delirium (162).[169] Though Nelly does not explicitly describe Cathy in animal terms here, she says, "her countenance had a wild vindictiveness" (160), placing her outside the bounds of human civility. Cathy eschews propriety and loyalty to her husband, acting on a form of instinctual lust and love. Although Kathleen Frederickson's work on instinct relies mainly on late nineteenth-century examples, her discussion of species boundaries helps to illustrate how instinct structures the chiastic anthropomorphism of *Wuthering Heights*. She demonstrates that the end of the century saw a diversity of associations between instinct and reason: instinct was variously seen as "an alternative to, precondition for, or defining feature of civilized, self-conscious rationality.[170] This is surprising given classical ideas of instinct dating back to Aristotle, which posit "animals and 'savages'" as the "instinctive agents."[171] This link between animals and "savages" is key to my reading of Heathcliff and Cathy, both of whom are characterized in animalistic and savage terms, and who act instinctively throughout the novel. Yet the work of Darwin revealed that instinct was crucial for the survival of species and the progress of civilization more generally.[172] Though *Wuthering Heights* is proto-Darwinian, or at least predated *On the Origin of Species*, it places instinct in an ambiguous position

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169 Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 162.

170 Kathleen Frederickson, *The Ploy of Instinct: Victorian Sciences of Nature and Sexuality in Liberal Governance*, First edition. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 3.

171 Frederickson, 2.

172 Frederickson, 3.

between the animal world and human society. As Frederickson shows, "for 'beastly' behavior to be nameable in 'man,' the behavior of beasts has to be seen as recognizably human enough."[173] The very employment of zoomorphism shows a certain recognition of humanness in animals and animal representations. To show that human characters take on animal traits, often perceived as inferior, is to say that such traits are indeed suitable to human bodies, which in turn, destabilizes human superiority. Frederickson's notions of instinct thus already fall into a chiastic pattern.

Postcolonial Pastoral

The ideas of instinct and animality that associate animals with "savages," and thus with racist representations, still pervade the novel, however. I explore a postcolonial valence of chiastic anthropomorphism by reading Heathcliff as a colonized subject whose animalistic portrayal stems from the white British characters' racial prejudice and xenophobia. These characters mistrust Heathcliff due to his foreignness and racial difference: though the novel deliberately obscures his origins, Susan Meyer reveals that the other characters portray him variously as Romani, South Asian, African, Indigenous American, and Irish.[174] Their fear of Heathcliff clearly crosses both racial and species lines. The fear of animal difference, however, seems more obvious or comprehensible to the characters, so metaphors of animality help them to further distance Heathcliff from themselves and cast him as less than human. Nelly also portrays Heathcliff as a dangerous and polluting influence on Cathy,

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[173] Frederickson, 41.
[174] Susan Meyer, *Imperialism at Home: Race and Victorian Women's Fiction* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 97–98.

betraying anxieties about the miscegenation of their romance. Through sexual association then, Cathy also becomes animalistic and less than human in the eyes of the characters surrounding her.

The white, British characters in the novel associate Heathcliff and Cathy with animals to place them in a lower position on Chen's "animacy hierarchy," but Heathcliff, particularly, heightens their fears by revolting against this form of discrimination to claim a position of superiority. In so doing, he, like Frankenstein's Creature, becomes Bhabha's "colonial mimic." The inhabitants of Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange deny Heathcliff humanity and animacy because he is a person of color and a foreigner; but when he returns to the estate in adulthood, he takes revenge upon his oppressors by accumulating their property and lineage, becoming a Yorkshire landowner in his own right. Heathcliff mimics the white characters' behaviors and values, upholding their ways of living, yet he weaponizes these values in a revolt against their racism. Where once they made him suffer as a lowly animal, he turns their animalistic language against them in an attempt to upend the animacy hierarchy they established.

The novel's colonialist underpinnings, along with its chiastic anthropomorphism, rewrite the pastoral genre, which Wuthering Heights, in its refusal to adhere to standards of the estate, continually defies. Terry Gifford describes the pastoral as a genre that "describes the country with an implicit or explicit contrast to the urban"[175] and claims that "retreat and return is the essential pastoral

[175] Terry Gifford, *Pastoral* (London: Routledge, 1999), 2, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cornell/detail.action?docID=165191.

momentum."[176] By the eighteenth century, under the influence of Virgil's *Georgics*, Gifford shows that pastoral "gave emphasis to the practices of a human relationship with nature through the detail of husbandry."[177] The pastoral estate is therefore a place that ensures the proprietor a calm and comfortable refuge, as well as dominion over his land, livestock, and laborers. The dogs' animosity toward Lockwood in the opening scene is one of the first indications that Wuthering Heights is an anti-pastoral setting. It is a retreat from society, but not a refuge. Gifford demonstrates that the anti-pastoral tradition critiques idealized representations of nature, historical social inequality in rural areas, and the escapism of the wealthy landed classes, attempting to evade both the city and modern life.[178] [179] Heathcliff and his dogs defy the idealized image of the aristocratic estate, turning the hierarchical relationship implied in "husbandry" upside down and providing its guests not with an escape, but with an attack.

This lack of domestication and its resulting lawlessness demonstrate that Wuthering Heights falls outside of what Michel Foucault calls "pastoral power." Foucault claims that the pastorate is the fundamental governing model for the Christian West, constituted by a king who acts as God's designated shepherd over a flock of men.[180] Pastoral power is a "beneficent power" that seeks to provide the flock

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[176] Louise Hutchings Westling, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Environment* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 18.
[177] Westling, 20.
[178] Gifford, *Pastoral*, 7–8.
[179] Westling, *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Environment*, 21.
[180] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*, ed. Michel. Senellart, François. Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana (New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 124.

with food and medical care and, importantly, works toward the salvation of each individual and the community as a whole.[181] The metaphor of sheep for men is not merely allegorical: though the shepherd provides care for the flock, he can only do this because they are tamed and subject to him. Foucault describes this as "pure obedience," in which the flock pledges blind loyalty to their shepherd, his word and actions, rather than to laws or abstract principles.[182] The Christian pastor, then, becomes the precursor to "governmentality" and the formation of the modern European state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through the creation of a subject "subjected in continuous networks of obedience."[183] Though Lockwood enters what he assumes to be a pastoral environment, he does not encounter an instantiation of Foucault's pastoral power. Both Heathcliff and his dogs reveal a wild nature entirely different from the domestication and dependence attributed to sheep. The dogs show no real obedience to Heathcliff, the ostensible pastor in this situation, nor does he obey them. Neither cares for the other in any significant way and both act as an outright menace to Lockwood's wellbeing. Instead of moving toward "governmentality," the world of the estate departs from it, creating a space that extinguishes civilities and social mores and threatens personal safety in displays of vigilante violence.

As an anti-pastoral novel, *Wuthering Heights* does not totally renounce the pastoral genre, but it does reframe and rewrite it. Gifford demonstrates that the anti-

[181] Foucault, 126, 154.
[182] Foucault, 174.
[183] Foucault, 184–85.

pastoral and the pastoral often exist within the same works; even in the *Idylls*, the ur-text of pastoralism, Theocritus proclaims, "You shouldn't go barefoot on the hillside, Battus./ Wherever you tread, the ground's one thorny ambush."[184] The estate of Wuthering Heights literally ambushes its visitor as well. This hostile natural environment upends hierarchies of husbandry and shepherding, in which the landowner or the human tenant holds sway over his fellow nonhuman inhabitants. At the same time, the estate's proprietor overturns colonial hierarchies, systematically wresting property and authority from his white adopted family. This postcolonial anti-pastoral setting upsets both species hierarchies and racial hierarchies within the realm of the estate.

The *Belgian Essays*

The chiastic anthropomorphism of *Wuthering Heights* has a precedent in Emily Brontë's *Belgian Essays*, which she wrote as a student at the Pensionnat Heger in Brussels at the age of 23 (xii).[185] Her composition, "Le Chat," shows both the convergence of humans and animals and the crossing reversal that reveals animals' humanity and humans' inhumanity. She begins the essay, "A cat is an animal who has more human feelings than almost any other being. We cannot sustain a comparison with the dog, it is infinitely too good; but the cat, although it differs in some physical points, is extremely like us in disposition" (56).[186] Brontë anthropomorphizes the cat

[184] Westling, *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Environment*, 22.
[185] Charlotte Brontë, *The Belgian Essays* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), xii.
[186] Brontë, 56.

by stating that it has "human feelings" and is "extremely like us in disposition." However, the comparison works both ways. Whereas Brontë describes cats in human terms by giving them "human feelings," in claiming that "we cannot sustain a comparison with the dog," Brontë describes humans in dog terms, using the dog as the moral standard. In this sentence she emphasizes similarity between species but also difference; while the cat is like us (and we are like them), the dog is above us. It is "too good," implying a morally superior and more humane being.

Brontë goes on in the essay to demonstrate the similarities in the brutal natures of both humans and cats. She censures a mother's approval of her child's violence as follows:

> But I have seen you embrace your child in transports, when he came to show you a beautiful butterfly crushed between his cruel little fingers; and at that moment, I really wanted to have a cat, with the tail of a half-devoured rat hanging from its mouth, to present as the image, the true copy, of your angel. You could not refuse to kiss him, and if he scratched us both in revenge, so much the better. Little boys are rather liable to acknowledge their friends' caresses in that way, and the resemblance would be more perfect (58).[187]

This passage offers a scathing critique of humans' cruelty toward other species by lowering the human to the level of the animal. Brontë creates the analogy between a boy killing a butterfly and the cat killing a rat to demonstrate the brutality of both species. Both cat and boy act on instinct, capturing creatures less powerful than

[187] Brontë, 58.

themselves to satisfy their hunger and their curiosity, respectively. Yet, even here, the cat's action seems more moral than the boy's – while the cat "devours" the rat, using its body for sustenance, the boy needlessly kills the butterfly. The second person address makes the reader complicit in the boy's act of murder. By placing the reader in the position of the loving mother, Brontë disparages the mother's (and thus the reader's) loving "embrace" of the boy's heinous act. In so doing, she critiques the feminine weakness of the mother and her use of love to paper over violence. But she simultaneously critiques the "friends' caresses" by comparing them to the cat's scratching, demonstrating that the masculine violence that characterizes the interactions of little boys raises them no further than beasts. Brontë thus links bestial violence with masculinity, but demonstrates that feminine forms of love and mothering also condone and perpetuate these forms of violence. To raise ourselves above an animal like the cat, then, is nonsensical and hubristic, since our own human social interactions are less than civilized. In her edition of the *Belgian Essays*, Sue Lonoff claims that "Le Chat" draws heavily on Buffon's distasteful portrait of cats as aloof and self-interested, but where Buffon's anthropomorphism "confirms the chain of being that sets people above animals," Brontë's "challenges the primacy of humans" and "exposes their beastliness and folly" (63).[188] In so doing, Brontë calls into question species hierarchies implicit within eighteenth-century systems of taxonomy, revealing that humans do not rise above their fellow animals.

[188] Brontë, 63.

This leveling gesture is especially apparent in another of Brontë's compositions, entitled "Le Papillon." Upon walking through a forest, the narrator of the essay exhibits despair over the food chain that causes species to continuously kill one another. As she watches the swallows and the fish eat flies, she reflects, "These will become, in their turn, the prey of some tyrant of the air or water; and man for his amusement or his needs will kill their murderers" (176).[189] By calling these animals "tyrants" and "murderers," the narrator moralizes and anthropomorphizes them, much in the way that Lockwood does when he labels the Wuthering Heights dogs as "combatants" and "rogues." This anthropomorphism implies that the animals kill out of calculation, rather than on instinct. As the narrator accuses the animals of human vice, she simultaneously inserts humans into animal systems of predator and prey, using a bi-directional form of comparison. Brontë anticipates Charles Darwin's "struggle for existence" in the first half of the essay, in which humans too take part in the system of murder. Although she suggests that humans do kill instinctually, based on their "needs," they also kill for mere "amusement," like the boy in "Le Chat." Lonoff argues that Brontë saw the animal kingdom as fallen, cast out of Paradise along with Adam and Eve, but points out that her essay generally follows the thought of John Wesley in more harshly criticizing humans because they kill other animals by choice (189).[190] I would argue, however, that the end of the essay is equalizing. In spite of "every grief that [God] inflicts on his creatures, be they human or animal, rational or irrational," God will ensure that Sin and Death "both will perish on the pyre

[189] Brontë, 176.
[190] Brontë, 189.

of a universe in flames and leave their ancient victims to an eternal empire of happiness and glory" (178).[191] By including creatures "human or animal, rational or irrational" Brontë suggests that all these "ancient victims," no matter their species, will experience Heaven. So although Brontë holds humans to a higher moral standard than other animals by more harshly condemning their depravity, she demonstrates that humans and animals participate in the same earthly sins and have access to the same eternal life after death.

Both the move to equate human and animal behavior and the portrayal of the natural world as a place of violence and destruction position "Le Papillon" in the anti-pastoral mode. The forest becomes not a retreat or a place of refuge, but a dangerous death trap for all species. The animals she represents – swallows, fish, and flies – are not charming or bucolic; they are "murderers" and "tyrants." The problems of human society, particularly urban human society – high crime rates, tyrannical government – instead pervade the natural landscape, which the pastoral genre posits as far beyond their range of influence. By anthropomorphizing animals with the cruelty of humans, therefore, Brontë demonstrates that the natural world is closer to the human one than readers may assume and no place lies in a pure state of nature.

Similarly, in *Wuthering Heights*, Brontë brings animals and humans closer together, but she also exposes the depraved nature of humans, lowering them as she raises animals up. But her critique of human nature is complex: in the essays (especially in "Le Papillon") her discussion of the "human" is often universal, whereas

[191] Brontë, 178.

in the novel, the human characters are situated in both the particular location where they live and the identities they inhabit. The human characters act largely on instinct and as a result, the narrators cast them as beastly to vilify them. However, the leveling of characters and animals calls into question the devaluation of beastliness in this particularized place. By upholding animal instinct and a mixing of human and animal status at Wuthering Heights, Brontë rewrites pastoral conventions by demonstrating that the estate defies definitions as a place of human control and mastery.

Wuthering Heights

Humans are zoomorphized in the novel largely through the first-person narration of Lockwood and Nelly, both of whom exoticize and otherize the relationships they witness. They do so by describing Heathcliff and Catherine, as well as others, in animalistic terms that cast them as primitive or barbaric. Their treatment of the animals too serves to otherize this small society. By demonstrating ways in which the human characters elevate or humanize the animals on the estate, they show that the value they place on various non-human life forms defies conventional species hierarchies in Britain in the nineteenth century and makes them uncivilized. But the very idea that Nelly and Lockwood present this alternative world of species hierarchies to the reader demonstrates that they grant narrative space and value to this world and allow it to exist. In effect, they naturalize this aberrant society within the space of the Wuthering Heights property, tying it to the small corner of Yorkshire it inhabits.

Though the opening scene I have described represents Lockwood's perspective directly, much of the novel is told through Nelly's recounting of past events to Lockwood. Building on James Buzard's account of the British Victorian novel as autoethnography, I argue that both Lockwood and Nelly act as autoethnographic narrators in their presentation of Wuthering Heights as a place that blurs species boundaries. This position allows them to present the strangeness of chiastic anthropomorphism to the reader, but also to naturalize it within the estate. Buzard describes the autoethnographic narrative as one in which an outside ethnographer attempts to report on the inner workings of a society without becoming wholly a participant in the society. Unlike traditional forms of ethnography, autoethnography contains a reflective component, in which colonized subjects report on their own colonial societies or metropolitan/colonizer subjects report on societies on the British mainland.[192] Such accounts depend on an "outsider's insideness," meaning that the narrator looks in on the culture from the outside, enters the community to learn its customs, but then has the ability to exit the culture and position it in wider sociological systems.[193] In so doing, the narrator avoids the problems of "going native," in which their ostensibly objective view as an observer gets obscured by their own participation in their culture of study.[194]

Lockwood represents an autoethnographic narrator in the sense that he is British but he does not come from Yorkshire and most certainly does not belong to

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[192] James Buzard, *Disorienting Fiction: The Autoethnographic Work of Nineteenth-Century British Novels* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 15.
[193] Buzard, 10, 33.
[194] Buzard, 33.

Wuthering Heights. He is, in a sense, an insider on a national scale but an outsider on a local one. Lockwood uses ethnographic language to characterize the estate. When searching for a topic to discuss with Nelly, he thinks, "Oh, I'll turn the talk on my landlord's family!...and that pretty girl-widow, I should like to know her history; whether she be a native of the country or, as is more probable, an exotic that the surly indigenae will not recognize for kin" (33-34).[195] His use of the words "native" and "indigenae" associate the Earnshaw family with native peoples outside of Europe, populations who often became the object of nineteenth-century colonialist anthropological research. In so doing, Lockwood sets up the family as separate and different from him, a newcomer to this isolated region of Yorkshire. By presuming that the "girl-widow" (Cathy) is an "exotic" he aligns her with himself and implies that her status and manners surpass those of the "surly indigenae" surrounding her. But the term "exotic" also alienates her from him, suggesting something of the foreign or the mysterious, perhaps because of her gender and his immediate attraction to her. Taken together, the words "native," "indigenae," and "exotic" serve to objectify and dehumanize the family, to examine them according to categories in a study, rather than as distinct individuals. This language is anthropological in that it describes types of people to be classified by the European researcher, but it could just as easily refer to plants in a botanical study. In this reading, the "pretty girl-widow" becomes an "exotic" flower among the harsh "indigenae," a description that links the weathered and gruff nature of the people with the uncultivated environment. Both botanical and

[195] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 33–34.

anthropological valences create a similar effect in the narration: they attempt to systematize and categorize living beings according to an outsider logic that does not derive from the objects of study themselves. As a result, Lockwood's account is both scientific and colonizing in style and positions the family outside of civilization and humanity.

When Lockwood fails to sufficiently infiltrate the estate and its secrets himself, his narration gives way to Nelly's, who, in Buzard's terms possesses an "outsider's insideness." In other words, Nelly is an insider to the estate who goes outside in her act of telling its stories to Lockwood, a true outsider. As Talia Schaffer states, the novel "can be read as an anthropological document, a contact zone where the ethnographer Lockwood discovers a tribe and finds a native interpreter, Nelly, to explain its ways."[196] As the "native interpreter," Nelly also embodies the position of the autoethnographic narrator. She is an insider from the beginning, yet her relation to the family and her class status allow her to move outside the space of the Heights as an observer. The labor she performs at Wuthering Heights shows that she knows the inner workings of the estate but it also separates her from the family. Her lower class status makes her strangely less situated within the Wuthering Heights milieu, and as a result, she appears more generally "English" and less tied to a specific culture.

Reading *Wuthering Heights* as autoethnography ties it to the backward-looking genre of the pastoral. Ethnographic accounts generally portrayed non-Western cultures as static, tradition-bound in a primitive past, and sequestered from forces operating in

[196] Talia Schaffer, "Reading on the Contrary: Cousin Marriage, Mansfield Park, and Wuthering Heights," in *Queer Victorian Families: Curious Relations in Literature*, n.d., 168.

Western societies. Buzard writes that in the discipline of anthropology, "*Genuine* cultures were not everywhere; indeed, they appeared to be characterized by nothing so much as their disposition to turn away from the everywhere-encroaching forces of capitalist modernity."[197] If the pastoral focuses on a refuge and retreat from Western urban centers, including the forces of "capitalist modernity," then ethnography and autoethnography operate in a pastoral vein. For Buzard, the ethnographic and autoethnographic account use the pastoral mode to draw a sharp distinction between Western "modernity" and colonized societies. Nelly's narration effectively freezes the characters of Wuthering Heights in time and space, otherizing them and cutting them off from the greater British society. Yet Nelly does not idealize this culture as "untouched" as Buzard describes.[198] Rather than adhering to a pastoral ethnographic tradition, where the figure of the "noble savage" blends into the pristine landscape of an earlier time, Nelly portrays this culture as fallen to the level of beasts, echoing the language of "Le Chat" and "Le Papillon." In Shepard Krech's terms, she portrays the human characters as "ignoble savages" – violent, animalistic, and vindictive. Her narration thus rewrites the pastoral genre in a way that exposes the dark effects of colonial racism.

I. Humans animalized

Nelly's autoethnographic narration describes Heathcliff, more than any other character, in racist terms as the "ignoble savage" through the language of animality.

[197] Buzard, *Disorienting Fiction*, 20.
[198] Buzard, 20.

As I endeavored to show in the introduction to this chapter, Lockwood's initial impressions depict Heathcliff as a dog and connect him to the dogs of the estate. The tradition of interpreting him as canine is widespread among critics of the novel. Deborah Denenholz Morse connects his foundling origins in Liverpool with those of a stray dog, demonstrating that he cannot be tamed within his adoptive family.[199] Indeed, when Mr Earnshaw first brings the foundling home, none of the children allow him into their rooms, so Nelly "put[s] it [Heathcliff] on the landing of the stairs, hoping it might be gone on the morrow" (37).[200] Though the pronoun "it" was often used to refer to small children in the period, its usage here, in combination with the children's rejection of the orphan and Nelly's failure to provide him a proper bed, all contribute to his depiction as a contaminated and unwanted stray animal. Philip Howell demonstrates that stray dogs in particular became a social problem in Victorian Britain, often drawing comparisons with indigent human vagrants.[201] To clean them from the London streets, the police would deliver them to the Battersea Dogs' Home, where all but the best-looking breeds would be quickly euthanized to rid the city of a public nuisance and financial burden.[202] In wishing that Heathcliff "might be gone on the morrow," Nelly hopes for the out-of-sight purging that took place in the Dogs' Home, in order to divest herself of responsibility for what she sees as a worthless life.

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[199] Deborah Denenholz Morse, "'The Mark of the Beast': Animals as Sites of Imperial Encounter," in *Victorian Animal Dreams: Representations of Animals in Victorian Literature and Culture*, ed. Deborah Denenholz Morse and Martin A. Danahay, n.d., 182.
[200] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 37.
[201] Philip Howell, *At Home and Astray: The Domestic Dog in Victorian Britain* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015), 83.
[202] Howell, 96.

As Heathcliff's relationship with the Earnshaw family develops over time, the canine metaphor morphs into one of devotion to Catherine. Nelly fears his wolfish nature and portrays his love as wild: during the lovers' passionate last meeting, Nelly says Heathcliff jealously "foamed like a mad dog," such that she "did not feel as if [she] were in the company of a creature of [her] own species" (162).[203] Likewise, when she informs him of Catherine's death, he, "lifting up his eyes, howled, not like a man, but like a savage beast" (169).[204] Heathcliff's dog-like reactions portray him as rabid and deranged – his grief cannot be contained or recognized within a human frame or human mannerisms. He acts on a sort of instinctual emotion, rather than any form of human reason. After this feral outburst, Heathcliff's emotion becomes more domesticated, though no less canine. Ivan Kreilkamp details how Heathcliff's unbridled mourning over Catherine mirrors mourning dog figures in popular Victorian-era magazines read by the Brontë sisters, such as *Chambers's Edinburgh Review*.[205] Like these dogs who diligently remained by their masters' graves, Heathcliff keeps vigil over Catherine's body and even digs into her coffin.[206] Isabella weaponizes this sentiment against him, jeering, "Heathcliff, if I were you, I'd go stretch myself over her grave, and die like a faithful dog" (178).[207] This metaphorical insult includes within it both positive and negative stereotypes of the figure of the dog. Though the adjective "faithful" implies loyalty, devotion, and unconditional love, it

[203] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 162.
[204] Brontë, 169.
[205] Kreilkamp, *Minor Creatures*, 2018, 62–63.
[206] Kreilkamp, 63.
[207] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 178.

also suggests a slavish adoration and submission that has a racist tenor in the situation of a man of color serving a white woman. The imperative "die" indicates that Isabella sees the dog's life as having low intrinsic worth in that its purpose ends with the death of its master. Her strong language here connects the figure of the dog with the historical use of the word as an insult, meaning "a worthless or contemptible person; a wretch; a cur" (OED). Isabella invokes both the metaphor and the slur to reinforce the idea that he is unwanted in the house, a recurrent theme since his childhood. Her low valuation of the figure of the dog accords with Nelly's use of the word dog to indicate Heathcliff's wildness, debasement, and contamination.

Metaphors that compare Heathcliff to dogs ultimately dehumanize him and become associated with the inhuman terms that characters use to refer to him throughout the novel. These include "imp," "fiend," and "monster," all supernatural words that indicate evil. They may seem a far cry from the cuddly image of a pet dog, but as the opening chapter of the novel indicates, none of the Wuthering Heights dogs are pets – indeed, Lockwood determines, they, too, are "fiends." At the end of the novel, when Heathcliff acts most fiendish and unnatural in his anorexic fit of madness, Nelly asks herself, "'Is he a ghoul, or a vampire?'" and then, "'But where did he come from, the little dark thing, harboured by a good man to his bane?" (330).[208] Though Nelly tries to reason with herself that she raised Heathcliff and watched him mature throughout his life, she still fears a nonhuman presence in him that she can only explain through the language of horror. The proximity of Nelly's two questions in the

[208] Brontë, 330.

text reveals that she views Heathcliff's "darkness" as monstrous, a quality that transforms him into a "ghoul" or a "vampire." Nelly aligns both his dark origins and his dark skin with the devil, an association that she and other native characters thrust upon him, but also become internalized in his acts of violence and manipulation.

Nelly's characterizations of Heathcliff as an animal or an other-than-human monster position him similarly to Frankenstein's Creature. Although the Creature is neither fully human nor fully animal and therefore occupies a hybrid middle ground, whereas Heathcliff is ontologically human, Nelly's zoomorphic representations of him thrust him into this hybrid liminal space as well. Because Nelly cannot recognize the humanity within Heathcliff, she places him outside of the human category, casting him as monstrous or aberrant. When she asks, "Is he a ghoul, or a vampire?" she reveals her deep-seated fear of his alterity, the same fear that causes humans in Frankenstein to reject the Creature and violently attack him. Like the Creature, Heathcliff reacts violently in response to his mistreatment; but I argue that where the Creature merely witnesses the death of his creator, Heathcliff poses a challenge to the very structures of white landowning power that have oppressed him.

Heathcliff, in ways similar to both the Creature and Safie, embodies the position of Bhabha's colonial mimic. When he first encounters the Lintons with Catherine, they attempt to guess his racial origins, calling him a "gypsy," a "lascar," or a "castaway," the latter probably in reference to the African slave trade in Liverpool, where Mr Earnshaw found him.[209] Nelly, too, distrusts Heathcliff's foreignness but

[209] Meyer, *Imperialism at Home*, 97–98.

also realizes that his animosity comes from his subjection to xenophobia and abuse – she ultimately blames Hindley, whose treatment of Heathcliff "was enough to make a fiend of a saint" (66).[210] But when Heathcliff returns to Wuthering Heights as a grown man, Nelly notes with astonishment his transformation: "his countenance…looked intelligent, and retained no marks of his former degradation" and "his manner was even dignified" (96).[211] When she first sees him at the door, she asks herself, "'Who can it be?...Mr Earnshaw?'" (93).[212] Despite his "dark face and dark hair" (93),[213] Nelly mistakes Heathcliff for the old master, his adoptive father. Despite his racial difference from Earnshaw, the mistaken resemblance makes Heathcliff more akin to a biological son than an adopted one; only his voice – not his physical appearance – gives Nelly pause. Heathcliff accurately mimics Earnshaw, the original landowner and the only one on the estate (besides Cathy) to show him love.

Although Heathcliff has molded himself in his father's image and Nelly's description casts him as a gentleman, in Bhabha's words, he is "almost the same, but not quite."[214] When Nelly finds out his true identity, she mistrusts him, as does Mr Linton, especially in the face of Cathy's appeals to let him in to the parlor. Though he objects to Heathcliff as a "runaway servant" (96),[215] he also sees him as a rival for Cathy's affection. Like Safie, Heathcliff's status as a colonial mimic creates the potential for him to infiltrate the British colonizer family and system of

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[210] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 66.
[211] Brontë, 96.
[212] Brontë, 93.
[213] Brontë, 93.
[214] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 122.
[215] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 96.

landownership, which he does quite effectively. Susan Meyer claims that Heathcliff's power-hungry domestic abuse represents a form of reverse imperialism in reaction to the racism he continually experiences from the other characters in the novel.[216] In a fit of vengeance against Linton and Hindley, he forcibly marries Isabella and gains possession of the Earnshaw estate, hoping to perpetuate his own legitimate line in the longstanding home of his persecutors. What Victor Frankenstein fears most – the multiplication of his Creature's progeny – almost becomes a reality for Heathcliff. Only Linton Heathcliff's sickly health and Heathcliff's own abusive behavior prevent him from bequeathing his authority to the next generation.

What does this postcolonial reading say about the zoomorphism of Heathcliff? Though Kreilkamp's reading of Heathcliff as animalized, rather than racialized, acknowledges Meyer's claims, he argues that Heathcliff's animality cannot be merely "reduced to or considered *only* as a subcategory of race," claiming that "species" is just as significant of a classification for interpreting the character.[217] Kreilkamp channels Derrida's notion that the figure of the animal represents "absolute alterity" to demonstrate that Heathcliff, completely lacking in origins or family, exists in the realm of the nonhuman animal throughout the novel.[218] I want to take Kreilkamp's claims seriously in thinking through the implications of species difference and I agree that metaphors of animality cannot always be categorized as aspects of racialization or racism. But I do not think race and species can be separated as easily as Kreilkamp

[216] Meyer, *Imperialism at Home*, 97–98.
[217] Kreilkamp, *Minor Creatures*, 2018, 55.
[218] Kreilkamp, 56–57.

claims here. Nelly and other characters portray Heathcliff as an animal largely because of his race – the other characters mistreat him because they see him as foreign, alien, and other and because they fear his difference. Treating him as an animal using human-animal hierarchies is an easy way for them to label him as nonhuman and therefore, inferior, forcing him down the animacy hierarchy. Heathcliff therefore demonstrates the prejudice harbored by this British community toward both animals and people of color.

Indeed, the novel reveals that animality serves as the ultimate insult and generator of inferior status. Meyer shows that once Heathcliff returns to Wuthering Heights in adulthood, he embarks on a project of imperial domination and vengeance to make the other characters suffer the miseries they subjected him to in his childhood.[219] Heathcliff's vengeance is particularly evident in his marriage to Isabella: Meyer demonstrates that in calling her "slavish" and an animal, Heathcliff's "imperial power over her is complete."[220] In fact, when he first hears of her affection for him, Nelly says he "stared hard at the object of discourse, as one might do at a strange repulsive animal, a centipede from the Indies, for instance" (106).[221] Heathcliff's aversion toward Isabella and his belief in his own superiority over her is clear – enough so that Nelly describes it in metaphors of animality and colonialism. She portrays his disgust as one for "a centipede from the Indies," a lowly, yet frightening animal whose tropical environment is associated with exotic danger and disease. This

[219] Meyer, *Imperialism at Home*, 118.
[220] Meyer, 118.
[221] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 106.

metaphor is Nelly's creation and betrays her feelings about tropical centipedes more so than it does Heathcliff's, but it also extends to him the power of the colonizer to judge the repugnance of both insects and tropical regions. Nelly recognizes that Heathcliff has weaponized the treatment used against him – as he was dehumanized through the language of animality, so he turns the language of animality against others. As Kreilkamp states, Heathcliff, the once tortured stray pet of the family, himself becomes a "vivisector."[222] Like Frankenstein's Creature, his own formative experience with abuse causes him to become the abuser. Once regarded as the "strange repulsive animal," possibly from the "Indies" (east or west, no one knows) speaking "gibberish" and abandoned on the landing, Heathcliff turns this treatment back on the British family themselves, treating Isabella with abhorrence and hanging her pet spaniel. As he faced discrimination in both human and animal terms, he reverses this treatment, showing no mercy to human or animal life he perceives to have crossed him.

The other character Nelly zoomorphizes is, of course, Cathy I, largely due to her alliance with Heathcliff. Nelly characterizes the relationship between Cathy and Heathcliff as animalistic – so passionate, irrational, and physical that it drives Cathy to her death. Nelly denounces Heathcliff for his reappearance because of the danger he causes to Cathy's health and her marriage with Edgar Linton, a critique colored by the threat of miscegenation that is also strangely incestuous. The love between Cathy, a white woman, and Heathcliff, a man of color, resists and exceeds the decorum

[222] Kreilkamp, *Minor Creatures*, 2018, 57.

exhibited by Cathy's marriage to Linton. Nelly links Cathy's racial status and femininity with animality beginning in Cathy's girlhood. When Hindley consigns Heathcliff to hard labor, Nelly states, "[Cathy] worked or played with him in the fields. They both promised fair to grow up rude as savages, the young master being entirely negligent how they behaved, and what they did, so they kept clear of him" (46).[223] Due to the neglect of her brother, Cathy is not confined to the house or to women's work; she is not expected to learn the woman's role in the household, and instead, spends her time outside in the "fields" with her male companion, experiencing an especially wild and uncultivated childhood. Nelly's use of the pejorative slur for Indigenous peoples, "savage," castigates Heathcliff's dark-skinned racial otherness and makes Cathy less white by association. By comparing Heathcliff and Catherine to Indigenous populations, Nelly draws on racist stereotypes about these peoples to portray them as uncivilized and integrated into the natural environment. This representation has striking resonances with Frankenstein's Creature, whose close association with wild places brand him with both noble savage and ignoble savage stereotypes.

If Cathy's "savage" lifestyle with Heathcliff makes her less white, it also masculinizes her. The primitive behavior associated with the phrase "rude savage" departs radically from the refined behavior expected from a woman, especially one from an ancient land-owning family. Both Susan Meyer and Beverly Taylor demonstrate that Cathy's visit to Thrushcross Grange and resulting separation from

[223] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 46.

Heathcliff establishes her whiteness and femininity.[224][225] When she returns to the Heights, Nelly claims that she has become "a dignified person, with brown ringlets falling from the cover of a feathered beaver, and a long cloth habit which she was obliged to hold up with both hands that she might sail in" (53).[226] The style of her clothing restricts her movement, symbolizing her new, more restricted feminine role. Her "feathered beaver" hat symbolizes a triumph over the environment she was formerly a part of; rather than running wild like an animal, she bedecks her person with them. For Nelly, the hat delineates a clear human-animal hierarchy where none existed before. Likewise, upon entering the house, "while her eyes sparkled joyfully when the dogs came bounding up to welcome her, she dare hardly touch them lest they should fawn upon her splendid garments" (53).[227] Although Cathy clearly views the dogs as friends and companions who "fawn upon" and adore her, her womanly position dictates that she must not let them soil her clothes. The verb "fawn" ties the dogs to wild animals, reminding readers of their animal status, and places them in a position of subservience that establishes Cathy's human superiority. The word has a class connotation as well, likening the dogs to subjects who must bow before Cathy's royalty. Cathy's stay with the Lintons makes her more "refined" in the British imagination in multiple facets of her identity: it grants her higher class status, imbues her with feminine beauty and manners in the face of the boorish behavior of the

[224] Meyer, *Imperialism at Home*, 104.
[225] Beverly Taylor, "Race, Slavery, and the Slave Trade," in *A Companion to the Brontës*, ed. Diane Long Hoeveler and Deborah Denenholz Morse, n.d., 348.
[226] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 53.
[227] Brontë, 53.

Wuthering Heights men, makes her less tanned and dirty (and therefore whitens her skin), and instills her with values of cleanliness and decorum, both of which cause her to maintain her distance from animals on the estate.

Nelly demonstrates that though Thrushcross Grange civilizes Cathy, the reappearance of Heathcliff reinstates her instinctual and animal behavior, which ultimately leads her to hysteria. In a fit of madness, Catherine violently rips open her pillow with her teeth one moment and the next she docilely sorts the bird feathers she finds inside according to species. She rapidly transforms from carnivorous hunter to avian sympathizer, from predator to prey in her recognition of and association with the birds whose feathers she discovers.

> " 'That's a turkey's,' she murmured to herself; 'and this is a wildduck's; and this is a pigeon's. Ah they put pigeon's feathers in the pillows – no wonder I couldn't die! Let me take care to throw it on the floor when I lie down. And here is a moorcock's; and this – I should know it among a thousand – it's a lapwing's. Bonny bird; wheeling over our heads in the middle of the moor. It wanted to get to its nest, for the clouds touched the swells, and it felt rain coming. This feather was picked up from the heath, the bird was not shot – we saw its nest in the winter, full of little skeletons. Heathcliff set a trap over it, and the old ones dare not come. I made him promise he'd never shoot a lapwing, after that, and he didn't" (122-123).[228]

[228] Brontë, 122–23.

Nelly critiques this monologue as nonsensical "baby-work" and "wandering" (123).[229] Though Nelly's inclusion of the speech in its ostensibly meaningless entirety reveals an intricate connection between Cathy and the birds on the moor. Pauline Nestor's footnote on pigeons, quotes Richard Blakeborough's book on Yorkshire folklore, which states, "the soul cannot free itself if the dying person has been laid on a bed containing pigeon feathers" (355).[230] Cathy's comment on pigeons shows that she subscribes to superstitions or folk stories of the region and reveal that her babble is not empty but contains real cultural references. These folk stories give animals authority over the fates of humans, reversing human-animal hierarchies. Pigeon feathers give life to humans even after the pigeons have died, allowing the life force of one species to cross over into another. Cathy, however, in professing a wish for death, seeks the same fate as the pigeon whose feathers line the pillow. Ironically, though she sees the feathers as a hindrance to her aims, her rejection of the feathers creates an alliance between her and the bird.

Cathy's specific focus on the lapwing at the end of the anecdote demonstrates that she holds a special affinity for this species. Her remembrance of the lapwing symbolizes her attachment to Heathcliff through their shared ventures on the moor and their discovery of the lapwing's nest. According to the *History of British Birds*, written by Ralph Beilby and illustrated by Thomas Bewick at the turn of the nineteenth century, the lapwing shows signs of both loyalty and domesticity. When a hunter approaches their nest, the birds "flutter round his head with cries of the greatest

[229] Brontë, 123.
[230] Brontë, 355.

inquietude" and "as a last resource, they run along the ground, as if lame, in order to draw off the attention of the fowler from any further pursuit."[231] The bird therefore demonstrates an instinctual form of familial devotion, sacrificing itself in the attempt to save its brood. It is fitting, then, that Cathy refers to the lapwing in order to express her loyalty to Heathcliff, particularly in the context of his pledge to her to never again hunt lapwings. Yet Beilby's and Bewick's account of the lapwing also includes an extended anecdote about a particular garden lapwing that eventually becomes a sort of indoor-outdoor family pet. As soon as the winter came on, a servant remarked that the bird would "[utter] his cry of '*pee-wit*' to obtain admittance" to the house.[232] Though the lapwing initially feared the dog and the cat, he eventually became so familiar with them "that it was his regular custom to resort to the fireside as soon as it grew dark, and spend the evening and night with his two associates, sitting close by them, partaking of the comforts of a warm fireside" (327).[233] Through the bird's domestication in this scene, the lapwing is anthropomorphized, enjoying the fireside scene in the same way as the domestic pets (and presumably their human master) would. Yet this domestication is not complete – upon the arrival of spring, "he left off coming to the house, and betook himself to the garden,"[234] demonstrating that he occupies a liminal space between wild and domesticated animal and defying the

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[231] Ralph Beilby, *History of British Birds: The Figures Engraved on Wood by T. Bewick. Vol. I. Containing the History and Description of Land Birds* (Newcastle: printed by Sol. Hodgson, for Beilby & Bewick, 1797), 326, http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO?c=1&stp=Author&ste=11&af=BN&ae=N033392&tiPG=1&dd=0&dc=flc&docNum=CW109920955&vrsn=1.0&srchtp=a&d4=0.33&n=10&SU=0LRM&locID=cornell.

[232] Beilby, 327.

[233] Beilby, 327.

[234] Beilby, 327.

teleological upward movement from the former to the latter. The lapwing therefore becomes symbolic of Cathy's own trajectory throughout the first half of the novel: though her marriage to Linton both civilizes and domesticates her, she desires the freedom to move between wild and domestic spaces, as emblematized by her ongoing relationship with Heathcliff. Her relations with Heathcliff allow her to move outside the domestic bounds of her marriage and the authority it accords to Linton.

Cathy demonstrates this solidarity with the lapwing by empathizing with the bird as she imagines its experience in returning to its nest before the rain. She both imparts this empathy to Heathcliff by making him promise not to harm the species and she internalizes it, self-identifying with the dead little birds. During her final meeting with Heathcliff, Cathy proclaims that she hates the "shattered prison" and she's "tired of being enclosed here," dreaming to be "beyond and above you all" (162).[235] In this instant, she characterizes herself as a bird in a cage, trapped in life and longing to fly to heaven. Maggie Berg states that this scene demonstrates that Cathy feels like a caged lapwing at the time of her death and that she prefers to die than to be owned through her marriage to one man.[236] Her rambles on the moors acquaint her with the freedom of wild birds but also the threat that human violence poses to their lives and her own.

Heathcliff and Catherine are the characters Nelly most often compares to animals in the novel because of the identities they inhabit. Heathcliff, as a person of

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[235] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 162.

[236] Maggie Berg, *Wuthering Heights: The Writing in the Margin* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 86.

color, foreigner, and outsider to the family prompts fear and distrust in the other characters, and as a result, they define him through animal metaphors in order to dehumanize him. These animal metaphors therefore become symbolic of racist fear, but they also demonstrate Heathcliff's alterity and the way animacy hierarchies are weaponized. Catherine, through her association with Heathcliff, receives the same treatment. Her gender also figures prominently in her animality in that she becomes subhuman when she does not conform to feminine ideals. Her masculine childhood and the hysteria she undergoes at the end of her life both associate her with animals, since both states resist the civilizing impulses of bourgeois femininity.

But though Nelly associates Heathcliff and Catherine most often with animals, she does not limit her zoomorphism to them, revealing that the world of Wuthering Heights is animalistic as a whole. As before mentioned, Nelly shows that Heathcliff looks at Isabella as though she were a "centipede." His revenge also extends to Edgar Linton when he tells Catherine, "this lamb of yours threatens like a bull…It is in danger of splitting its skull against my knuckles" (114).[237] With this animal insult, Heathcliff attacks Linton's effeminacy, calling him mild and weak like a "lamb" and thus no match in a fight. Yet he does so in a fit of jealousy, recognizing Linton as his masculine rival for Catherine's affection. At the same time that he dismisses Linton's masculinity, he also takes it seriously, jostling for position as Catherine's male lover. This type of jealousy and courting behavior is animalistic in itself, recalling species whose males fight each other for access to females. Catherine engages in the same

[237] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 114.

comportment toward Isabella. When she attempts to detain Isabella and force her to admit her love for Heathcliff, Isabella scratches her to get free, causing Catherine to exclaim, "'There's a tigress!...Begone for God's sake and hide your vixen face!" (106).[238] The words "tigress" and "vixen," as well as the action of scratching, are associated with feminine ferocity and spite, demonstrating that feminine jealousy in the novel manifests in the same physical and bestial ways as masculine jealousy. The complex romantic relations that occur between these characters play out in instinctual animal shows of intimidation, posturing, and physical strength, revealing that despite the civilizing impulse of Thrushcross Grange, characters from both Thrushcross Grange and Wuthering Heights engage in animalistic behavior.

Though Heathcliff and Cathy I are most often described in terms of instinctual behavior, the word "instinct" is never used to refer to them directly. The term appears only six times throughout the novel and usually refers to characters often regarded as voices of reason or civilization: Lockwood, Nelly, Isabella, and Cathy II. Most of these instances occur in reaction to Heathcliff's or Cathy I's behavior. For example, just after Cathy I's death, Nelly "instinctively echoed the words she [Cathy] had uttered a few hours before" (166-167),[239] revealing the emotional power Cathy's yearning for death enacts on Nelly. Instinct also appears in characters' reactions to Heathcliff's violence. After Heathcliff imprisons Cathy II and slaps her face, she fears him. When he reappears, she "instinctively raised a hand to her face: his neighborhood revived a painful sensation" (273).[240] And after Isabella's doomed marriage to

[238] Brontë, 106.
[239] Brontë, 166–67.
[240] Brontë, 273.

Heathcliff, she comes to Thrushcross Grange to tell Nelly of her plight, saying his rage "woke my instinct of self-preservation, so I fairly broke free" (174).[241] In this conversation, Isabella asserts that Heathcliff "is not a human being" (174).[242] His fiendish and inhuman violence causes an animalistic flight response in her. Thus, through their own animal natures, both Cathy and Heathcliff engender animalistic behavior in the characters around them, even those who condemn these sorts of subhuman acts.

Nelly does not use zoomorphism to only represent racial and gendered otherness. She also casts Hindley and Hareton, both white British men from the aristocratic Earnshaw family as animals. She protects the son from his father's "wild-beast's fondness" and his "madman's rage" (74), characterizing Hindley's happiness and his anger in the same brutal and uncouth ways.[243] Due to the neglect and abuse Hareton experiences first at the hand of Hindley and then of Heathcliff, he too becomes vulgar and uncivilized. Nelly notes that Heathcliff "appeared to have bent his malevolence on making [Hareton] a brute: he was never taught to read or write; never rebuked for any bad habit which did not annoy his keeper; never led a single step toward virtue, or guarded by a single precept against vice" (197).[244] In this passage, Nelly establishes a human-animal hierarchy between Heathcliff and Hareton, designating the former as the latter's "keeper," a relationship that categorizes Hareton as livestock or a zoo animal. In his "keeper" role, Heathcliff polices the human-animal

[241] Brontë, 174.
[242] Brontë, 174.
[243] Brontë, 74.
[244] Brontë, 197.

boundary between them, never allowing Hareton to become human through activities associated with humanness, including using written language, learning social decorum, or developing a sense of morality. Nelly remarks that Hareton's good qualities have been "lost amid a wilderness of weeds, to be sure, whose rankness far over-topped their neglected growth; yet notwithstanding, evidence of a wealthy soil that might yield luxuriant crops, under other and favorable circumstances" (196).[245] Heathcliff thus creates an environment for brutishness that encourages the growth of rank "weeds," undesirable wild plants that take the place of "luxuriant crops," carefully cultivated and tamed by humans. Wild animal and wild plant metaphors spring up in Hareton to demonstrate that Heathcliff has controlled him by keeping him wild and thereby preventing him from climbing the ranks of the animacy hierarchy, even though his status as a white man would usually privilege him in this system.

The fact that most of the prominent characters in the narrative are portrayed in animal terms shows that the outsider narrators construct the properties of Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange as a space of animalistic culture. Though Nelly represents the exoticism of characters like Heathcliff and Catherine, who do not conform to certain societal norms, through animal metaphors, she also demonstrates that some of these same forms of exoticism pervade the entire setting of the novel. In so doing, she reveals the brutish nature of the two estates and the region of Yorkshire they inhabit. This idea accords with Adelene Buckland's claim that *Wuthering Heights*, as presented by Charlotte Brontë and Elizabeth Gaskell, symbolizes both the

[245] Brontë, 196.

heart of the British nation and the radically foreign. Buckland writes that the Yorkshire landscape becomes "a remote, wild, and desolate region culturally and geographically isolated from the nation in which it sits" and yet in media such as the *Westminster Review*, it is evident that "the Yorkshireman here is a synecdoche for the Englishman, just as 'Yorkshire is the epitome of England.'"[246] In this historical context, Buckland suggests that Heathcliff, as the novel's Yorkshire landowner, is representative of an earlier historical age, or acts as a symbol of domestic British "barbarism" that lives within British inhabitants, themselves (150).[247] Either way, these ideas demonstrate that Heathcliff, despite his race and background, passes as the epitome of Britishness so long as he is within Yorkshire, a space that blurs the foreign-domestic dichotomy.

Reading Heathcliff's foreignness alongside Buckland, however, gives the sense that the environment of the West Riding allows for and even normalizes this foreignness. The geological proto-anthropology of the *Westminster Review* characterizes the people there as "'bold, active, and laborious'" of "'an unhewn roughness, almost picturesque in its hideous abnegation of grace or feeling.'"[248] Describing these people in terms of their "picturesque hideousness" exoticizes them, but labeling them as "active and laborious" endows them with the most esteemed qualities of British Protestant work ethic. Nelly's descriptions of Hindley and Hareton accord with the "unhewn roughness" and "abnegation of grace or feeling" of the

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[246] Adelene Buckland, *Novel Science: Fiction and the Invention of Nineteenth-Century Geology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 150, 139.
[247] Buckland, 150.
[248] Buckland, 139.

Westminster Review. So although Heathcliff's own brutish manners seem to color the characters surrounding him, particularly Cathy, these manners are already inherent within the male lineage of Wuthering Heights and fit more broadly within the culture of Yorkshire. Though Nelly links Heathcliff's behavior with both the devil and his foreign origins, she simultaneously reveals ways in which it is homegrown and socialized within him during his childhood at the Heights. Only Nelly's inside perspective and her close connections with all the Wuthering Heights men throughout their lives – Hindley, Hareton, and Heathcliff – allow her to express to both Lockwood and the reader how Heathcliff inherits the culture of the estate, along with its land. The wildness of Wuthering Heights breaks down barriers between the foreign and the domestic, naturalizing Heathcliff and enabling him, in his position as foreigner, to become the English proprietor and successor to the Earnshaw family. At the same time that Nelly's account isolates and makes foreign the wildness of the estate, it also shows its inhabitants, in all their animal nature, to be "a synecdoche for the Englishman," making the uncivilized rural region familiar and common.

II. Animals humanized

As the narrators zoomorphize human characters in the novel, they anthropomorphize animal characters, creating a figure of crossing that reduces the status of humans and raises the status of animals. This figure leads to a convergence between species – in this case, anthropomorphism increases the value of animals, often by bringing them into closer living quarters with humans. This proximity, in turn, increases the animality of the human characters, as it breaks down strict

separation between humans and animals, which defines humanness against animality. Thus, the anthropomorphism plays a key role in the exoticism of the narration by making Wuthering Heights into a place where species hierarchies are less pronounced, yet it also shows that the estate imparts value to animal lives in ways that other places may not.

The way Wuthering Heights characters prioritize animals over humans raises animals to a higher status within the bounds of the estate. Susan Mary Pyke claims that Brontë depicts nonhuman animals as subjects and questions species inequalities by critiquing violence leveled against both human and animal characters.[249] Oppressions committed against animals in the novel do not have less weight than those committed against humans. Indeed, characters who mistreat animals also have the tendency to mistreat other humans. Although the Wuthering Heights men preference their horses and dogs over Lockwood, they do not always treat animals well. For example, Heathcliff hangs Isabella's dog, Fanny, upon their elopement from Thrushcross Grange. He presumably does so as an act of violence and control against Isabella, but also out of disdain for the dog as a pampered pet. In this case, Heathcliff treats the woman and the dog with similar acts of cruelty. Though he does not attempt Isabella's outright murder, he neglects and abuses her, promising to make her "Edgar's proxy in suffering" (144) as vengeance for Catherine's death.[250] As Pyke demonstrates, humans, in both their treatment of other humans and animals, often fail

[249] Susan Mary Pyke, "Cathy's Whip and Heathcliff's Snarl: Control, Violence, Care, and Rights in *Wuthering Heights*," in *Animals in Victorian Literature and Culture: Contexts for Criticism*, ed. Laurence W. Mazzeno and Ronald D. Morrison, n.d., 167.
[250] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 144.

to rise to the level of superior beings.[251] Indeed, the animals of the estate prove themselves to be generally less violent and brutish than their human masters. This idea establishes a connection between Brontë's *Belgian Essays* and the novel. In "Le Chat," Brontë shows that the cat's violent actions are less morally suspect than the human boy's because the cat kills to sustain itself; similarly, in *Wuthering Heights*, it is the humans who are the perpetrators of violence, while the animals are largely innocent bystanders.

To return to Lockwood's first encounter with Wuthering Heights, it becomes clear from his narration that the people of the estate esteem the lives of their animals over his own. When he finally decides to leave and requests a guide, no one pays him any mind: Heathcliff tells Hareton, "'drive those dozen sheep into the barn porch. They'll be covered if left in the fold all night,'" and meanwhile, Lockwood sees "Joseph bringing in a pail of porridge for the dogs" (14-15).[252] Heathcliff, Hareton, and Joseph are all preoccupied with ensuring the well-being of the animals that live on the estate, protecting the sheep from the snow and feeding the dogs. These activities of animal husbandry are pastoral in mode and they reveal a bucolic ethics of care between humans and their animals. Yet this scene exceeds the pastoral when it becomes clear that animal husbandry takes precedence over human hospitality. When Lockwood attempts to force the topic of his departure again, he quickly discovers that the animals do take priority over him. Hareton volunteers to walk through part of the

[251] Pyke, "Cathy's Whip and Heathcliff's Snarl: Control, Violence, Care, and Rights in *Wuthering Heights*," 168.
[252] Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*, 14–15.

property with him but Heathcliff angrily retorts, " 'You'll go with him to hell!...And who is to look after the horses, eh?" Cathy II counters, "'A man's life is of more consequence than one evening's neglect of the horses; somebody must go," an unpopular idea that Hareton refuses at once (17).[253] In their inhospitable stance, both Heathcliff and Hareton deem the horses' welfare more important than Lockwood's safety. Though Cathy disagrees, the very fact that she must voice the sentiment that a man might take precedence over a horse demonstrates the extent to which life on the estate transgresses this form of hierarchy. Here, too, she does not even establish parity between Lockwood and the horses – rather than insisting on the importance of the human visitor's life over the lives of the horses, she merely shows that the man's life is worth more than one night's discomfort or lack of attention for the animals. The human characters subordinate Lockwood to the estate's nonhuman inhabitants, which he finds preposterous and threatening.

This example with the horses reveals that the daily lives of the human and nonhuman characters of Wuthering Heights are entangled with one another, which prohibits strict separation between them. This relationship is as apparent with the indoor animals as with the horses outside. When Lockwood enters the kitchen after his rough overnight stay, he sees "Mrs Heathcliff, kneeling on the hearth, reading a book by the aid of the blaze" and "desisting from it only to chide the servant for covering her with sparks, or to push away a dog, now and then, that snoozled its nose over-forwardly into her face" (30).[254] In "kneeling on the hearth," rather than sitting on

[253] Brontë, 17.
[254] Brontë, 30.

some form of furniture, this scene places Catherine at the level of the house's dogs. Yet she has ostensibly chosen this position because she needs the light from the hearth to read her book, a human-coded activity. Thus, since Catherine sits on the floor, it is unsurprising that the dogs should attempt to bother her, but in so doing, they make clear that they desire involvement in the human experience of her reading. The characterization of the dog "snoozling its nose over-forwardly" is decidedly canine but the adverb places the action in the realm of human behavior. To be forward, according to the OED, is to be bold and immodest; to be over-forward is to push these boundaries to their limit. Lockwood therefore frames the dog's usual comportment in terms of the restrictions of human decorum. Snoozle, according to the OED, means to "thrust affectionately," infusing the scene with a sexual overtone and anthropomorphizing the dog as a competitor for Catherine's affection. The species barrier ultimately prevents the dog's advances from becoming a sexual threat and Catherine clearly rejects these advances by pushing the dog away unconcernedly, but Lockwood's characterization of the dog's behavior reveals his frustrations in failing to woo Catherine. The dog has access to Catherine's face and person in a way that she utterly denies Lockwood. Although she does not show the dog favorable treatment, she remains unfazed, as though she encounters this physical intrusion often. The dog, therefore, inhabits Catherine's inner daily experience, reminding Lockwood that this space exists but, unlike the dog, he cannot enter it through the wall of contempt Catherine has erected against him. As a result, Lockwood's narration of the scene casts the relationship between Catherine and the dog as vulgar and improper, especially for an aristocratic woman. His disgust reveals his perception of the

backwardness of the Heights while also demonstrating that this "backwardness" allows for unusually close connections between humans and animals.

Perhaps the best example of this contrast is the instance in which Lockwood attempts to run away from Wuthering Heights after his inhospitable treatment. To prevent Lockwood from stealing the lantern, Joseph sets two of the estate dogs on him, eagerly impelling them with "'Hey Gnasher! Hey, dog! Hey, Wolf, holld him, holld him!'" (17).[255] The unfortunate thief claims that the "two hairy monsters flew at my throat, bearing me down and extinguishing the light" but subsequently realizes that "the beasts seemed more bent on stretching their paws, and yawning, and flourishing their tails, than devouring me alive" (17).[256] Though Joseph intends violence against Lockwood, and Heathcliff's and Hareton's "guffaw" expresses their approval and unconcern for their tenant's safety, the dogs do nothing to harm Lockwood. Though they do "holld him" and "suffer no resurrection" (17), they refuse to threaten him, instead engaging in playful canine gestures, such as wagging their tails and stretching.[257] The dogs are thus less malignant than their masters and their treatment of Lockwood more humane. This scene reverses Lockwood's impressions of the dogs when he first enters the estate. Where initially he expects a motherly pet and receives an attack, now he anticipates a lunge for the jugular but instead is met by tail wagging.

Lockwood's outsider narration reveals his condemnation of a family that privileges animal life over human life, but this condemnation also shows the reader

[255] Brontë, 17.
[256] Brontë, 17.
[257] Brontë, 17.

that animals have intrinsic worth within the bounds of this physical space. Nelly's insider perspective demonstrates the animal-human closeness of the estate to an even greater extent. Like Lockwood, her small portraits of dogs demonstrate that they treat their human companions with love and happiness, even when those emotions are largely lacking from the estate's human population. When Heathcliff returns to Thrushcross Grange, for example, Nelly states,

> I observed a large dog lying on the sunny grass beneath, raise its ears, as if about to bark, and then smoothing them back, announce by a wag of the tail that some one approached whom it did not consider a stranger (159).[258]

Nelly reads the dog's behavior as a form of communication, an "announcement," to both Heathcliff and other people in the house. Again, the dog in this situation proves more welcoming than the human characters – it wags its tail to greet Heathcliff, while Edgar Linton threatens physical violence against him and Nelly betrays her anxieties about Heathcliff's effect on Cathy. The dog acts this way because it does not "consider [Heathcliff] a stranger," while many of the other characters do. Nelly proves herself half in accordance with her fellow humans and half with the dog: though Heathcliff poses a strange and frightening enigma to her throughout the novel, she cannot regard him totally as a "stranger," since she looked after him throughout his childhood. As a longstanding domestic at Wuthering Heights, Nelly possesses both an inner understanding of the dog's feeling about Heathcliff and an inner understanding of how the dog expresses it. Her act of reading demonstrates that she, too, like the Wuthering

[258] Brontë, 159.

Heights characters she describes, shares a close life with animals and participates in a form of inter-species communication.

Conclusion

The difference between the dogs' behaviors I describe here and those in the anecdote at the beginning of the chapter – the friendly companion animals vs. the combative watchdogs – indicate the tension of the convergence and divergence of the chiasmus I am attempting to show. The initial combat scene, in which dogs and master growl in unison, reveals the similarity between the dogs and Heathcliff, in a way raising them to his level and lowering him to theirs. This represents a convergence of species. But in the latter examples, the dogs and the humans have crossed and diverged. The Wuthering Heights men continue to debase themselves by forcing Lockwood to return home in unsafe conditions, denying him aid, and ultimately imprisoning him at Wuthering Heights. The dogs, on the other hand, when called upon to detain and punish him for his thievery only hold him – they are instruments in his imprisonment but they are not perpetrators of violence against him.

In *Wuthering Heights*, Emily Brontë establishes and respects human-animal difference; however, she does so not by insisting on animal alterity, but on demonstrating that beastly brutality exists in humans but not in animals. Like in "Le Chat" and "Le Papillon," she shows that humans and other animals all engage in violent acts, yet she shows that only humans choose to engage in such acts and thus deserve a harsher moral judgment. This brutality shows up in Heathcliff's rude treatment of Lockwood, as well as his far graver crimes: his imprisonment of Nelly,

his violence toward Isabella and young Catherine, and his neglect and abuse of his own son, Linton. But this beastliness also rears its head in Lockwood, who views Heathcliff through a lens of bigotry, denounces him as one of his own curs, and casts him as his social inferior. The species chiasmus at play here always involves a point of species similarity, in which humans and animals reflect one another and merge categories. Yet this similarity is always attended by divergence and difference, reminding readers that the categories ultimately remain separate. Though the human remains the standard of species superiority, Brontë shows that many humans fall into the realm of animalistic violence, far more so than most nonhuman animals. She reveals how species cross and uncross in her novel of human bigotry and brutality.

4. Species Inversion in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass*

In her adventures in *Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass*, Alice is constantly being told off by animals. In the famous scene where she meets the Caterpillar smoking a hookah on a mushroom, he interrogates, challenges, and confuses her:

"'What size do you want to be?' [the Caterpillar] asked.

'Oh, I'm not particular to size,' Alice hastily replied; 'only one doesn't like changing so often, you know.'

'I *don't* know,' said the Caterpillar.

Alice said nothing; she had never been so much contradicted in all her life before, and she felt that she was losing her temper.

"Are you content now?" said the Caterpillar.

"Well, I should like to be a little larger, Sir, if you wouldn't mind,' said Alice: 'three inches is such a wretched height to be.'

'It is a very good height indeed!' said the Caterpillar angrily, rearing itself upright as it spoke (it was exactly three inches high).

'But I'm not used to it!' pleaded poor Alice in a piteous tone. And she thought to herself 'I wish the creatures wouldn't be so easily offended!'" (45-46)[259]

The scene introduces an unusual power dynamic between girl and creature: that Alice "had never been so much contradicted in all her life before" demonstrates that the

[259] Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: And, Through the Looking-Glass: And What Alice Found There*, ed. Hugh Haughton, Centenary ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 45–46.

Caterpillar succeeds in his arguments against her. Alice consistently makes points commonsensical to most humans – she finds changing sizes strange and uncomfortable and declares three inches "a wretched height to be." The Caterpillar's rebuttal, "It is a very good height indeed!" reveals the limitations of Alice's perspective. Though she may find such smallness "wretched," the Caterpillar finds it natural and thus, "very good." Their disagreement shows that Alice adheres to a human standard in height (or at least a little girl's standard), while the Caterpillar adheres to an insect standard. Alice makes a misstep in applying the human standard to everyone, a statement that offends her interlocutor.

This conversation befuddles Alice so because, in her everyday life outside of Wonderland, she is not accustomed to being ordered about by insects and, much less, being forced to adopt their norms as her own. The scene therefore demonstrates that Wonderland operates according to a hierarchical inversion that turns species interactions in Alice's world upside-down. The Wonderland creatures become the judges of whether Alice's views, actions and behaviors are right or wrong. The characters with the most sway over Alice's fate – the monarchy with its domineering Queen of Hearts, for example – are humanoid, yet they collaborate with less humanoid characters, such as the animals of the jurybox. Nonhuman beings thus become the standard for perspective and experience and the book becomes a sort of obstacle course in which Alice must navigate these expectations and fit herself into the mold of the creatures she encounters in order to pass through the world.

In this sense, both *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and its companion story, *Through the Looking-Glass*, function as travel narratives in which Alice plays the role

of the human visitor in a world of largely animal, plant, and object characters. As a British traveler, Alice often acts in ways that are ethnocentrist, expecting the creatures to conform to her cultural behaviors and making statements that offend them, as the end of the scene with the Caterpillar reveals. Yet, although Alice often tries to establish her own form of logic in these worlds, the creatures' resistance to these efforts does much to change her way of thinking. When she says at last to the Caterpillar, "But I'm not used to it!" Alice shows that the Caterpillar has challenged her beliefs and she accordingly revises her general statement ("three inches is such a wretched height to be") to reflect her own experience and personal opinion. In fact, she makes this move throughout the chapter. Earlier, when Alice tries to explain to the Caterpillar why she finds changing heights so confusing, she says, "'Well, perhaps you haven't found it so yet…but when you have to turn into a chrysalis – you will some day, you know – and then after that into a butterfly, I should think you'll feel it a little queer, wo'n't you?'" (41).[260] The Caterpillar replies, "'Not a bit,'" indicating that such a metamorphosis is perfectly natural to him. Alice ends by remarking, "'Well, perhaps *your* feelings may be different…all I know is, it would feel very queer to *me*'" (41).[261] While the italics serve to display Alice's irritation and underscore the difference between herself and the Caterpillar, the statement nevertheless reveals a change in Alice's thinking. Where at first she tries to tell the Caterpillar what he must feel upon becoming a butterfly, their conversation shows her that she only knows what she knows: "it would feel very queer to *me*," but not necessarily for others whose

[260] Carroll, 41.
[261] Carroll, 41.

bodies and experiences are different. This conversation plays out along both affective and somatic axes—Alice describes her experience with reference to her body and her feelings, only to realize that other beings may differ from her in both. Through the course of her travels, Alice finds that her human norms and customs are not universal; in fact, they make up only a small part of a wider whole and she must work to understand the other parts.

Alice's conversation with the Caterpillar introduces a form of chiasmus that recalls but differs from the chiastic species relations of *Wuthering Heights*. In that novel, animals become humanized and people become animalized, merging at some point in the middle and then diverging from one another. By contrast, the *Alice* books maintain separation between Alice and the creatures she encounters. Alterity is key to an understanding of the otherworldliness of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass world. As the scene with the Caterpillar reveals, the Wonderland creature becomes the standard while Alice is made strange. The fantastical genre of the story plays with the reader's perceptions of normalcy – in general, the reader would expect a little girl to be ordinary and commonplace, while a caterpillar (especially a talking one) would be cast as "other," different, and even bizarre. By flipping this binary, alterity (in the form of the animal) becomes normalized and the "normal" (in the form of the human) becomes different and "other." This chiasmus functions through inversion – the *Alice* stories place animals and other sorts of creatures above humans in the species hierarchies of their worlds.

The Alice books, therefore, uphold alterity by inverting species hierarchies so that animals, plants, and objects occupy positions of dominance over humans. They

challenge forms of Western taxonomy that establish science as a political ideology that shores up human superiority and domination. Language and naming prove central to the constitution of the Wonderland creatures' bodies and the creatures advocate for naming themselves and controlling their own names. In so doing, they propose alternative taxonomies that mock human scientists' need to control other species through classification and definition. This reordering of taxonomies and species relations is decidedly anti-imperialistic, showing that Alice, as the human, British invader cannot assert dominance over the creatures she meets and must submit to the creatures' worldviews by rewriting her own assumptions about hierarchy and difference.

Wonderland's radical politics of inversion

The Wonderland and the Looking-Glass worlds invert species hierarchies by emphasizing the creatures' consistent labeling of Alice as inferior to them, due to her status as a human child. They do not level species hierarchies, but rather, upend them. This concept of inversion departs from recent New Materialist scholarship on *Alice* that focuses on entanglement. Gillian Beer's work, *Alice in Space: The Sideways Victorian World of Lewis Carroll*, posits the books as "sideways on" because they construct "an egalitarian zone in which everything becomes possible and nothing is unlikely because all forms of being have presence and can argue: doors, time, eggs, queens, caterpillars, cats and hatters, oysters, gnats, and little girls – all have their

say."[262] She claims that *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, more aptly shown through its original title, *Alice's Adventures Underground*, achieves a sort of heterarchy by turning everything upside down through Alice's fall down the rabbit hole; *Through the Looking-Glass*, on the other hand, achieves this through a lateral motion, much in the way that Alice slides through the mirror. I agree with Beer's claim that the worlds Alice enters are more heterarchical than the one from which she comes because they give voice to all manner of creatures beyond the human child. But I want to take her metaphors of turning upside down and sliding through a mirror quite literally. Alice moves not merely into two "sideways" worlds, but into two inverted worlds: one that exists upside down underground and the other that exists as a mirror image.

Inversion demonstrates that not all voices in Wonderland and beyond the Looking-Glass are created equal. Beer's leveling claim overlooks the challenge the Wonderland and Looking-Glass creatures pose to nineteenth-century, British, anthropocentric belief systems. Through puns and wordplay, the creatures Alice encounters dissolve human systems of hierarchy and taxonomy by ridiculing them, but in so doing, they create a new type of hierarchy in which they are always right, baffling Alice and playing with the reader's preconceived sense of meaning. This new hierarchy is radical in and of itself: it places animals, plants, and objects above humans in a way that inverts nineteenth-century forms of species classification. As I mentioned, Beer gestures at the inverted form of the two stories – one upside down, one as a mirror image. I, in turn, ask what Beer's formal analysis entails, investigating

[262] Gillian Beer, *Alice in Space: The Sideways Victorian World of Lewis Carroll* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), 4.

how an inverted setting or world creates inverted power relations. Beer's spatial logic does not necessarily imply "sideways on"; rather, it indicates reversal, an overturning of classifications and relations.

Carroll's works do not perform the leveling gesture that Beer describes and thus cannot be fully characterized according to definitions of Donna Haraway's notion of entanglement. "The tentacular," Haraway writes, "are also nets and networks, it critters, in and out of clouds. Tentacularity is about life lived along lines – and such a wealth of lines – not at points, not in spheres."[263] Haraway's work focuses on the interlaced networks between creatures, how each touches and influences the other. I claim that Alice does not fully become entangled with the creatures she meets in Wonderland and in the Looking-Glass world because they often reject her. Instead of including her within their network, they mock and belittle her, labeling her as inferior to themselves. Alice, in effect, travels through both worlds in her own sphere, attempting to forge connections but often unable to do so due to her own alterity.

Though the Alice books do not exhibit a fully heterarchical ethic, neither do they uphold anthropocentric species hierarchies. I take issue here with Laura Mooneyham White's largely biographical study of *Wonderland*, which claims that Carroll uses anthropomorphism in his books to establish humans' superiority over animals. For example, though White shows that Charles Dodgson, the real man behind the literary figure of Lewis Carroll, was an anti-vivisectionist, she reveals that his anti-

[263] "Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene," accessed June 23, 2020, https://www.e-flux.com/journal/75/67125/tentacular-thinking-anthropocene-capitalocene-chthulucene/.

vivisection text advocates for humans' right to kill animals humanely.[264] Through scenes such as the Walrus and the Carpenter, where eating oysters is framed as an act of murder, Carroll satirizes fears about eating animals, using his work to assure children that eating meat does not constitute an inhumane act.[265] Not only does Carroll assert humans' right to kill and eat animals, but he also posits humans as separate and above animals. White describes the *Alice* books as works of "Darwinian satire," stating that Carroll could not accept that humans were no more than beasts.[266] She points out that the caucus-race at the bottom of the rabbit hole pokes fun at Herbert Spencer's "survival of the fittest" – the Dodo announces that "*Everybody* has won, and *all* must have prizes," but ironically, the Dodo has "lost" in the evolutionary struggle, having gone extinct.[267] White also demonstrates that the hybrid animals of Wonderland - the Mock Turtle and the Gryphon, for example - satirize Darwinian ideas of speciation. Anti-evolutionists often looked to sterile hybrids to disprove speciation and to reject the evolution of humans from other animal species.[268] This idea recalls Frankenstein's Creature as a potentially sterile hybrid, who, as a cross between species, may not be able to reproduce as Frankenstein assumes he will. I grant here that White's arguments are historically and biographically compelling; as she proves throughout her book, Charles Dodgson was consistently ambivalent about

[264] Laura Mooneyham White, *The Alice Books and the Contested Ground of the Natural World* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 109–10.
[265] White, 112.
[266] White, 71.
[267] White, 26, 75.
[268] White, 80.

his feelings toward animals and politically and socially conservative, a position that would put him at odds with both animal rights rhetoric and evolutionary theory.[269]

However, taking this biographical approach at face value ignores the way that Wonderland opens up a radical new politics about difference, embodiment, and imagination that may contradict some of Dodgson's socially conservative positions. Through these stories, Dodgson, as Carroll, creates new possibilities through talking animals, wacky logic, and nonsense. So though Dodgson may uphold animacy hierarchies and human superiority in his personal beliefs and other writings, his stories have the latitude to turn these hierarchies on their head. Many scenes of the Alice books consistently defy stable categorization, inviting interpretation that opens a multiplicity of worlds. For example, Kent Puckett's article claims that the caucus-race acts as a critique of problems plaguing democratic process by using animals as figures of stupidity. Puckett claims that Christ Church was riddled with procedural paradoxes under Dean Henry George Liddell, leading Dodgson to seek solutions to the Condorcet paradox.[270] Dodgson uses the silliness of animal characters to mock candidate preferencing and Liddell's leadership, suggesting that this form of politics does not rise above the level of animals. According to Puckett, animals play a major role in Carroll's tactic of debasement here. However, at the very end of the essay, Puckett gestures toward the animal as an important political figure. In Tenniel's illustration, Puckett identifies the Dodo as a contemporary symbol of species

[269] White, 114, 116.

[270] K. Puckett, "Caucus-Racing," *NOVEL A Forum on Fiction* 47, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 16, https://doi.org/10.1215/00295132-2414039.

extinction, as well as the monkey in the background as a symbol of evolution.[271] Afterward, Puckett says the Dodo is a "breakable, hybrid creature" who "encourages us to imagine a different, a future, a fragile, a stammering subject of the political," like Carroll himself.[272] I suggest we as readers pay attention to the hybrid body of this creature, in order to understand who becomes a political subject in Carroll's works.

Like Puckett, Anna Kornbluh is also interested in the political, arguing that Carroll's symbolic logic structures *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, revealing that "math is politics" and both open new worlds and possibilities.[273] Kornbluh states that "making and remaking the signifier" was integral to the writing of the book and "the text is aestheticized in innovative ways that highlight the availability of the signifier for new formalizations."[274] Constant play with the relationship between signifier and signified allows for the imaginative nonsense that Carroll uses to explore different modes of thinking. Kornbluh's argument about new possibilities and rewritings is relevant to my attention to hierarchy. If Carroll untethers the signifier from the signified, then he creates an imaginative new world that upends the world of sense and replaces it with nonsense. This devotion to nonsense is an inversion of sense and thus an inversion of certain rules and expectations that structure society. Talking animals who chastise little girls, for example, run contrary to sense, but they may also run contrary to the "sensical" idea that humans are superior to animals.

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[271] Puckett, 21.
[272] Puckett, 21–22.
[273] Anna Kornbluh, *The Order of Forms: Realism, Formalism, and Social Space* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019), 106.
[274] Kornbluh, 115.

Carroll's reliance on nonsense and imagination allows both him and his readers to envision themselves in new ways and to view their own experiences differently. Kornbluh shows that Carroll helped to "reorient mathematical knowledge from a description of the world to a projection of possible worlds."[275] Just as his logic treatises do this, so does his fiction. The form is important here. Extending from Kornbluh's argument, if the nonsensical nature of his stories acted as exercises for his own mathematical thinking, they also opened up new worlds that enabled children to escape the bounds of sense that the drudgery of lessons imprisoned them within. Indeed, something about Wonderland makes all of Alice's lessons go wrong – when she attempts to repeat poetry she has memorized, such as "How doth the little busy bee" (19)[276] and "You are old, Father William" (42),[277] they come out as entirely new stories. Although the Alice books have been analyzed as works for adults as well as children, it is crucial to understand how their children's audience adds to their radical potential. Nonsense teaches children inventiveness and innovation, a deviation from that which is known, set, or memorized. It generates possibility - an opening of new ideas and new worlds.

Animal bodies become vectors of this imagination for children, as Tess Cosslett shows in her work on animals in British children's literature. Cosslett states that because children in nineteenth-century Britain were viewed as primitive, they were cast as closer to the natural world and to animals than adults, so that "children's

[275] Kornbluh, 105.
[276] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 19.
[277] Carroll, 42.

stories [could] explore the animal-human divide with more freedom and playfulness than literature directed at adults."[278] These works often overturned social and taxonomic hierarchies, positing "suffering or noble" animals over the cruelty of humans, and the innocence of children over the pretension of adult scientists.[279] Relationships between animals, however, tended to uphold taxonomic hierarchies, with different animal species often representing human social strata.[280] Most relevant to my investigation here, Cosslett illustrates these ideas through the example of Charles Kingsley's 1863 novel, *The Water-Babies: A Fairy Tale for a Land-Baby*, a contemporary of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. The young protagonist of Kingsley's novel, Tom, gets transformed into a "water-baby," an amphibious hybrid creature between animal and human. Cosslett states that Tom's hybridity blurs species boundaries leading to fluidity between species but not a total inversion of hierarchies: "by accepting the principles of evolution and degeneration, on both a social and biological level, the hierarchy becomes permeable – something to be travelled, up or down."[281] Yet animals also maintain a social order among themselves. In Tom's conversation with the salmon, the salmon tells him that he dislikes the trout because "they are relations of ours who do us no credit" in that they are "lazy and cowardly, and greedy" (115). Cosslett shows that Kingsley's world develops distrust between species that resemble each other too closely – salmon and trout, human and ape[282] –

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[278] Tess Cosslett, *Talking Animals in British Children's Fiction, 1786–1914* (Routledge, 2017), 2, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315241852.
[279] Cosslett, 2.
[280] Cosslett, 2.
[281] Cosslett, 114.
[282] Cosslett, 116.

revealing that though species boundaries are fluid, too much resemblance can lead to animosity and bigotry. This idea recalls the fear of similarity in *Frankenstein* that engenders both racism and speciesism against the Creature.

Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, through its young protagonist and young audience, also has playful leeway to investigate human-animal species boundaries. Yet unlike *The Water-Babies*, *Alice* establishes difference, rather than similarity, between species. Rather than creating species permeability, it inverts human-animal hierarchies, not because the creatures are "suffering or noble" but because they see themselves as superior. The creatures look down on Alice not because she is too similar to them, but instead, because she is too different. Human cruelty, however, may in fact be at the root of the creatures' disdain. Alice often behaves like an invader when she enters Wonderland and the Looking-Glass worlds. The creatures seek to defend themselves from this threat in a way that critiques British imperialism in the travel narrative genre.

Alice's Imperialism

Alice's invasion of Wonderland resembles the British imperial adventure children's genre that Cosslett shows gained prominence toward the end of the nineteenth century. Cosslett analyzes works from Rudyard Kipling and Ernest Thompson Seton, characterizing them as stories that "[move] into colonial spaces that offer scope for masculine adventure and violence."[283] On the surface, the *Alice* books

[283] Cosslett, 123.

do not seem to fit this genre: Alice is a little girl and she travels to fantastical lands, rather than to British colonies. Beer shows that unlike other masculine-dominated children's stories, such as Kingsley's *Water-Babies*, Alice "is not taking part in that struggle to become an adult gentleman."[284] Yet, she does bring British girlhood and aspirations (however maladroit) toward femininity with her on her travels. And though these travels take place in otherworldly places, Alice still asserts a level of control that posits her as a force of British empire in Wonderland and the Looking-Glass world.

There is a sizable body of criticism that reads Alice as a force of imperial aggression, though many critics agree that the books criticize her for her behavior and espouse an anti-colonial ethic. Postcolonial readings of the books demonstrate that Carroll uses Alice to satirize British imperialism and the colonial will to domination. I extend these arguments to show that Carroll not only disparages Alice's actions throughout the stories, but he also gives agency to the nonhuman characters to frustrate her power and, on some occasions, to neutralize it. The creatures exhibit this agency by constantly contradicting Alice and insistently pointing out what they claim as her ignorance. Though Alice often argues against the creatures' claims and becomes offended by their derision, she also experiences moments where she revises her own way of thinking. The creatures deem her norms and customs strange, which often enlarges her worldview, even against her will. I do not go so far as to claim that Alice grows as a person over time—she acts more as a satirical figure than a fully formed character in a *bildungsroman*—but the creatures' external force on her demonstrates

[284] Beer, *Alice in Space*, 19.

her follies and causes her to reflect on them for the benefit of the reader. Instead of developing toward a desired telos, Alice displays inconsistent behavior, often getting checked for her preconceived ideas and occasionally rethinking and rewriting them in a way that causes the reader, in turn, to revisit their own assumptions.

The creatures' rudeness toward Alice and their propensity to assert their dominance over her act as a form of pushback against Alice's attempts to establish her own cultural norms and worldviews. Laura Ciolkowski reads Wonderland as a colonial realm where Alice asserts her bourgeois and domestic Englishness.[285] Similarly, Mark Gabriele interprets Alice's curtseying in her fall down the rabbit hole as an example of her sense of decorum and her reliance on her self-perceived identity as a "proper young lady."[286] And Daniel Bivona argues that Alice operates under "the imperial assumption that all discourses are self-evidently commensurable."[287] Alice not only brings her own English identity, but she also brings her English expectations and applies them constantly to Wonderland. Gabriele states that "Alice's faith that Wonderland abides by the same rules of conduct that her above-ground Victorian world did is evident throughout the book," despite the fact that "social formality and the rules of etiquette are absolutely meaningless in Wonderland."[288] As in the example with the Caterpillar, Alice often makes the mistake of applying her standards – those

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[285] Ciolkowski, Laura, "Visions of Life on the Border: Wonderland Women, Imperial Travelers, and Bourgeois Womanhood in the Nineteenth Century," *Genders* 27 (1998): 18.
[286] Mark Gabriele, "'Alice in Wonderland': Problem of Identity—Aggressive Content and Form Control," *American Imago* 39, no. 4 (1982): 369.
[287] Daniel Bivona, "Alice the Child-Imperialist and the Games of Wonderland," *Nineteenth-Century Literature* 41, no. 2 (1986): 144, https://doi.org/10.2307/3045136.
[288] Gabriele, "Alice in Wonderland," 382.

of Victorian Britain – universally, thereby misinterpreting her interactions with a variety of creatures and becoming frustrated with their behavior.

Not only is Alice culturally insensitive, but she also becomes aggressive in her exploration of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass worlds. Gabriele demonstrates that Alice has a propensity for oral aggression, especially in her delight with discussing Dinah's eating habits, as well as her own, in front of the creatures.[289] *Through the Looking-Glass*, particularly, with its chessboard spatial and narrative structure, highlights Alice's power-hungry tendencies. As James Kincaid shows, the teleology of the chess game reveals Alice's deep-seated desire to become queen and gain power in the Looking-Glass world.[290] This desire for control over the country is evident as early as the beginning of the chapter, "Looking-Glass Insects," when Alice finds that "the first thing to do was to make a grand survey of the country she was going to travel through" (145).[291] The fact that the first thing she surveys is a herd of elephants likens this world to India, positioning Alice as a Victorian traveler in the British colony. That Alice becomes single-mindedly bent on becoming queen throughout the story reveals that she is driven by a British imperial greed for governmental control over foreign lands. Emma Graner demonstrates that Alice's imperial dominance "poses a greater threat to Wonderland than Wonderland ultimately poses to her, and she makes good on this threat in the end."[292] Indeed, Alice tries to destroy or void both worlds at the

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[289] Gabriele, 375.

[290] James R. Kincaid, "Alice's Invasion of Wonderland," *PMLA* 88, no. 1 (1973): 94, https://doi.org/10.2307/461329.

[291] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 145.

[292] Emma D. Graner, "Dangerous Alice: Travel Narrative, Empire, and 'Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,'" *CEA Critic* 76, no. 3 (2014): 257.

end of each story: after the trial in *Alice in Wonderland*, she declares, "'Who cares for you?…You're nothing but a pack of cards!'" (108)[293] and after the feast in *Through the Looking-Glass*, she yells, "'I can't stand this any longer!'" and "jumped up and seized the tablecloth with both hands," pulling the "plates, dishes, guests, and candles…together in a heap on the floor" (233-234).[294] She then declares to the Red Queen (one of the native rulers), "'I will shake you into a kitten, that I will!'" (234).[295] As Graner shows, Alice acts as a dangerous force of invasion in both *Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass*, demonstrating that she has the power to end each society and its world through both her words and her actions. This aggression comes not only from her identity as a bourgeois British subject, but also from her position as a girl-child in the patriarchal adult world of nineteenth-century Britain—her weakness here breeds a tyrant as she exhibits control over beings she perceives as "lower" than herself in the animacy hierarchy.

Though Alice acts as a menace to the fantasy worlds she explores, many of these same critics show that Lewis Carroll espouses an anti-imperial ethic in both stories. Graner ultimately argues that the *Alice* books set up a colonial world with a dangerous colonizing force to "undermine the ideology of Victorian imperialism, revealing that it is the British colonizer, not the colonial subject, who poses the greatest danger to himself and others."[296] In other words, the books critique Alice for her aggression and her impulse to gain authority over other lands and beings.

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[293] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 108.
[294] Carroll, 233–34.
[295] Carroll, 234.
[296] Graner, "Dangerous Alice," 252.

Kincaid's account accords with this idea when he states that the contradictions and insolence that Alice receives from the creatures in Wonderland are "so witty or richly deserved that…it gains the secret approval of both the reader and the narrator,"[297] allying them with these subaltern animal figures. Alice's rigid interpretation of the world and the rules by which it functions, as well as her stalwart literal-mindedness, causes the reader to find a perverse pleasure in her distress. As a foreigner in this world who proves time and again that she has little grasp of its customs, yet attempts to prove her own knowledge and superiority over it, Alice becomes a laughingstock. By inviting us to laugh along with him, Carroll uses the nonsense of his fictional worlds, not to bolster the colonial realities of his era and place, but to oppose them and expose their dangerous folly.

Rewriting Alice's Assumptions

The Wonderland creatures clearly resist Alice's presence and counter her assumptions at every move. In so doing, these creatures invert animacy hierarchies by preventing Alice from asserting her dominance within these fantasy worlds and insisting on their own superiority. Though Alice denounces the creatures for their incivility, her conversations with them often confuse her, inciting her to begin rethinking her own ideas. These moments of self-reflection cause Alice to rethink her assumptions about species difference. The creatures' influence not only confounds Alice's colonizing propensities—it also revises and rewrites them. Though Alice does

[297] Kincaid, "Alice's Invasion of Wonderland," 94.

not necessarily grow over time from these incidents (she is always bound to have another contradictory conversation as soon as she emerges from her last), she does learn and reflect in the moment, which allows the reader to do the same. As such, she becomes a figure on whom a decolonizing ethic is written.

Despite her controlling nature, Alice demonstrates from the beginning of her fall down the rabbit hole some glimmers of sensitivity to cultural difference:

> 'I wonder if I shall fall right *through* the earth! How funny it'll seem to come out among people that walk with their heads downwards! The antipathies, I think – ' (she was rather glad there was no one listening, this time, as it didn't sound at all the right word) ' – but I shall have to ask them what the name of the country is, you know. Please, Ma'am, is this New Zealand? Or Australia?' (and she tried to curtsey as she spoke – fancy, curtseying as you're falling through the air! Do you think you could manage it?) 'And what an ignorant little girl she'll think me for asking! No, it'll never do to ask: perhaps I shall see it written up somewhere' (11).[298]

When Alice wonders whether she will end up on the other side of the earth, she mistakes "Antipodes" for "antipathies." "Antipodes," of course, refers to diametrically opposite points on the globe and, in Britain, generally means New Zealand and Australia, as Alice correctly identifies. "Antipodes" differs only slightly from "antipathies" at a phonemic level, though this metonymic slip introduces the valence of aversion and antagonism, suggesting tensions between countries. Published in

[298] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 11.

1865, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* came into being just after a period of intense British colonial warfare and expansion in both Australia and New Zealand; hence "antipathies" seems an apt term for both colonies. Yet "antipathies" also has an othering quality, suggesting somewhere hostile and potentially barbaric. Alice seems to realize that there is something wrong and offensive about this word, as "she was rather glad there was no one listening" and she attempts to cover over her "ignorance" by "curtseying" to the imagined inhabitants. Alice's anxiety about being perceived as an "ignorant little girl" could allude to her habitual fear (which resurfaces throughout the text) of forgetting what she has been taught, in this case her geography lesson. But it could also hint at a deep-seated worry about cultural insensitivity: she does not want to give offense and decides to look for the name of the country "written up somewhere" rather than betraying her lack of knowledge through conversation.

Most of Alice's reflection comes as a result of the creatures she encounters, however. They attempt to thwart her power throughout the narrative, constantly scorning her and her plans. Gabriele, Graner, and Kincaid all discuss the danger Alice poses to the worlds she visits and I agree she enacts a sort of violence there: her statements often offend the creatures and even present them with the possibility of their deaths and being eaten. Moreover, she occasionally does physical harm to the creatures, in the case of Bill the Lizard, whom she expels from the White Rabbit's chimney with a kick, and the jurymen in the jurybox, which she overturns with her skirt (and she is not sorry). Yet, for the most part, Alice's interactions with the creatures seem to try her more than the creatures. Most arguments end with the creatures getting the final word, satisfied that they have proven their point and gained

the upper hand over a befuddled Alice. This is perhaps best illustrated through Alice's final exchange with Humpty Dumpty. Though Humpty Dumpty is not technically an animal, he is an egg, an animal product, and one with a different bodily experience from Alice. After finishing reciting his poem, Humpty Dumpty says with finality, "'That's all…Good bye'" (192).[299] Taken aback, Alice attempts to end their meeting with a pleasantry, to which Humpty Dumpty says that he likely won't remember her face because she is "'so exactly like other people'" and has all the same facial features as everyone else (192).[300] When Alice tries to express how strange it would be to have an irregular face, he replies "'Wait till you've tried'" and refuses to speak more (192).[301] Though Alice argues for the human face as a universal standard (any other configuration of eyes, nose, and mouth "'wouldn't look nice'"), Humpty Dumpty quashes her argument immediately by pointing out that she has no experience with any other sort of face and therefore cannot speak on the matter. He will not accept her anthropocentric reasoning and ends the conversation immediately, leaving Alice flustered and sputtering, "of all the unsatisfactory people I *ever* met – '" (193).[302] Alice tries to import a human form of logic and a British form of politeness into the conversation that Humpty Dumpty ultimately rejects, demonstrating that Alice's intrusion and projection of Victorian values onto this fantasy world falls flat.

Although Graner argues that Alice puts an end to Wonderland, I think we can read both stories' conclusions in the opposite way: as Wonderland putting an end to

[299] Carroll, 192.
[300] Carroll, 192.
[301] Carroll, 192.
[302] Carroll, 193.

Alice. In both *Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass*, Alice becomes overwhelmed by the madness of the trial and the feast, respectively, and in both cases, she makes an interjection that discounts or invalidates the world. But these outbursts serve merely to expel Alice from both worlds: at the end of *Wonderland*, Alice awakens in the lap of her sister, and at the end of *Looking-Glass* she finds herself shaking the black kitten. There is nothing to suggest that these worlds cease to exist – merely that Alice has left them. They are dream-worlds with sentimental endings that Alice cannot remain within long term. In fact, I claim that the inhabitants of each actively push Alice out. At the trial, "the whole pack [of cards] rose up in the air, and came flying down upon her" (108)[303] and at the feast, "several of the guests were lying down in the dishes, and the soup-ladle was walking up the table towards Alice's chair, and beckoning her impatiently to get out of its way" (233).[304] The trial ends with an outright attack and the feast, though less combative, clearly show that both the guests and the cutlery have no interest in Alice's speech or, more generally, her reign over them as queen. The creatures of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass world band together to reject and oust the colonizer from their land, sending her back to the English landscape from which she has come.

Of course, this argument presents a very literal interpretation of Alice's traveling; the ending of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* suggests that Alice dreamed up the world, rather than literally falling down a rabbit hole. Yet *Through the Looking-Glass* posits the possibility that the Looking-Glass world is merely a creation

[303] Carroll, 108.
[304] Carroll, 233.

of the Red King's dream, not Alice's. Kincaid states that this idea contains the darkest death joke in a story rife with death: Tweedledum tells Alice that her whole existence resides only within the Red King's dream and "'If that there King was to wake…you'd go out – bang! – just like a candle!'" (165).[305] When Alice worries about waking him, Tweedledum responds, "'Well there's no use *your* talking about waking him…when you're only one of the things in his dream. You know very well you're not real'" (165).[306] This remark immediately causes Alice to start to cry – she clearly fears the idea of being merely a figment of someone else's imagination. If, as Tweedledum says, Alice is "only one of the things in [the King's] dream," she has no control over herself or anyone else. She becomes, not an imperial invader, but an imagined entity, or even a pawn of a masculine power, putting her in a subjugated role in terms of gender, age, and control within this world.

This question haunts Alice to the very end of the story, when, back in the manor house, she asks the kitten, "'Now Kitty, let's consider who dreamed it all. This is a serious question…it must have been either me or the Red King. He was part of my dream, of course – but then I was part of his dream, too!'" (240).[307] Unlike in the scene with Tweedledum and Tweedledee, where Alice defends her realness, she is willing to admit the possibility that the Red King dreamed her at the end of the adventure. When she says "he was part of my dream" and "I was part of his dream too," she envisions a sort of mutual dreaming in which both she and the Red King co-

[305] Kincaid, "Alice's Invasion of Wonderland," 94.
[306] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 165.
[307] Carroll, 240.

created one another. But her admission that the King dreamed her also accords with her expulsion from the world beyond the Looking-Glass. Perhaps Tweedledum's prediction that she would "go out – bang! – like a candle!" proves true; the Red King's waking may have caused the pandemonium at the end of story which led to Alice finding herself back in the manor house. She continues to exist but not in the Looking-Glass world. She ultimately has no power over the inhabitants there because she has no lasting or real presence. Rather than a colonist, she is merely a transient wanderer who must eventually return to her home in the "reality" of Victorian Britain.

Although Alice brings her British system of values with her to Wonderland and the Looking-Glass world, these values are in and of themselves not always human. Kincaid labels Alice's descriptions of Dinah to the mouse and birds during the Caucus Race as an act of "unconscious brutality."[308] Alice's fondness for Dinah and in particular, Dinah's eating habits, constitutes much of her aggression toward the creatures she meets and makes her presence violent and imperial. In a postcolonial reading of this interaction, Dinah, too, is a force of British imperialism, though she acts on the creatures as a threatening idea, rather than in the flesh. In my animal studies reading, this notion becomes more complicated, however. Alice's continuous mention of Dinah allies human and animal in a way that undercuts species barriers. Michael Parish Lee argues that

> there is an entanglement of identity between Alice and Dinah, [but] the text avoids reducing Dinah to a personification. Rather than making this animal

[308] Kincaid, "Alice's Invasion of Wonderland," 97.

> stand in for this human, Carroll explores the interspecies model of identity in which humans and animals are each other's co-creators and mediators, borrowing from, translating, feeding, and feeding off each other.[309]

When Alice talks about Dinah, therefore, she terrorizes and intimidates, but she also takes on some aspects of Dinah's identity. She shifts the species hierarchy from a model of human superiority to one in which multiple species inhabit positions of power. This does not mean, of course, that Alice does away with hierarchy. Like in *Frankenstein* and *Wuthering Heights*, animacy hierarchies and species value or worth still exist – indeed, Alice uses them to attempt to structure this world, though she generally fails. But the fear the creatures experience from Alice's talk of Dinah come from predator/prey relationships rather than an assertion of human dominance. By constantly mentioning what both she and Dinah like to eat, Alice establishes an affiliation with her cat, constructing a hierarchy that places the two of them, as carnivores, at the top.

Alice's association with Dinah makes her open to talking with other creatures and thus, with according them sentience and intelligence. Given the way that she carries on a conversation with the kittens in the outer frame narrative of *Through the Looking-Glass*, we can infer that she speaks to Dinah in similar ways. So when she sees the Mouse swimming in her pool of tears, it is not much of a leap for her to speak to it – she even believes that it will respond back. Though her constant thoughts of Dinah cause her to offend the Mouse, even going so far as to threaten it with violence,

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[309] Michael Parrish Lee, "Food, Animals, and Other Life Forms in Lewis Carroll's Alice Books: Food, Animals, and Other Life Forms in Lewis Carroll’s Alice</Em> Books," *Nineteenth-Century Literature* 68, no. 4 (2014): 502, https://doi.org/10.1525/ncl.2014.68.4.484.

Alice shows a desire for communication and connection with the creature. When the phrase from her brother's Latin grammar book, "O Mouse!" fails to garner any response, Alice reflects, "'Perhaps it doesn't understand English…I daresay it's a French mouse, come over with William the Conqueror'" (21).[310] She therefore decides to ask it the first question in her French textbook, " 'Où est ma chatte?'" (21).[311] Alice clearly has lesson books on the brain, which serve her rather poorly in this encounter, but "ma chatte" also alludes to Dinah, who seems to be an absent presence throughout the scene. The fact that Alice mentions a cat and then goes on to talk about Dinah and her mouse-catching abilities shows Alice's insensitivity to her audience. However, her regular communion with Dinah makes her open to communing with the Mouse, which reveals her willingness to reach out and establish modes of understanding. In surmising the Mouse may be a "French Mouse," Alice recognizes the Mouse's difference and tries to speak to it in (what she assumes to be) its own language. Although Alice makes all the wrong assumptions in this conversation, from speaking French, to discussing cats, to changing the conversation only to land on dogs (another offensive topic), she still shows an interest in engaging with a being who differs from herself. Her closeness with Dinah, through what Lee calls an "interspecies model of identity," makes interspecies communication normative for Alice.

Indeed, although Alice generally fails to find common ground with the creatures she meets, she consistently uses language to attempt to do so. Linguist Patrice Salsa shows that Alice "prefers peaceable interactions to antagonistic

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[310] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 21.
[311] Carroll, 21.

ones…[and] wants to stay in the neutral ground of conversation, [rather than] the antagonistic ground of polemics."[312] Salsa claims that conversation is "a non-antagonistic speech event, but also an 'egalitarian' one."[313] Even when the creatures attempt to enter into arguments with Alice – "polemics" in Salsa's definition – Alice tries to diffuse these exchanges to conversations. Alice is interested in "egalitarian" relations with those around her, even though they may differ greatly from her, both in their material bodies but also in their beliefs and values. Of course, many of the creatures do not want to establish heterarchical relations with Alice – often, they wish to show their superiority over her and effect a reversal of species hierarchies. But it is worth noting that Alice does not always approach Wonderland with a desire to control; though she has limited knowledge outside her own British Victorian experience and often cannot understand things beyond its ken, her persistent attempts at conversation reveal parts of her that do respect difference. Alice therefore has competing interests—she wants to be queen and to have "egalitarian" conversations; she threatens the Wonderland creatures with death and tries to speak their language. She becomes the colonizer under siege, at times attempting domination only find herself foiled and at others attempting to understand the creatures' and their bodily experiences, hence conforming to their situated positions.

Anthropomorphic oddities

[312] Rachel. Fordyce and Carla. Marello, eds., *Semiotics and Linguistics in Alice's World* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1994), 163.
[313] Fordyce and Marello, 163.

These postcolonial readings are important in establishing Alice's adventures as a manifestation of British imperialism at the height of British empire. In her role as colonizer, Alice tries to control these characters, both humanoid and other-than-human, in the way that British colonists subjugated natives; as a result, these characters resist Alice's attempts at domination and baffle her colonial worldview. I claim that imperialism and species difference are bound up together here. Animals and other creatures become vehicles for imperial critique because racist and imperialist ideologies use human-animal hierarchies to represent colonized peoples as animals. As I have shown in previous chapters, Frankenstein's Creature and Heathcliff are described with the language of animality and treated as animals due to their racial difference. But the fact that many of these characters inhabit wholly other-than-human bodies magnifies the difference between themselves and Alice. To read these texts only as a symbol of empire ignores the nonhuman bodies of the creatures that Alice encounters. It is crucial to understand how these characters are anthropomorphized in order to think about how they resist both imperial control and species hierarchy.

I am particularly interested here in how the alterity of the Wonderland creatures' bodies allows them to resist Alice's colonizing logic and invert animacy hierarchies. I claim that embodiment and figuration are intricately interwoven in Carroll's texts, an idea I develop from Gilles Deleuze's seminal work on *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, *The Logic of Sense*. Deleuze begins the book with the idea of Plato's dualism, encompassing things and "pure becoming."[314] He also points to the

[314] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 2.

Stoics' distinction between things and their effects, which he terms "corporeal things and incorporeal events."[315] To this "first duality," he adds the "second duality," which he describes as "body/language, to eat/to speak."[316] Though he states that sense divides these two categories, it also merges them, reflecting one into the other.[317] Bodies and language thus achieve an intermingling, which Deleuze, through chiastic example, illustrates in Carroll's book. He shows that "to speak of food" comes into opposition with "to eat words."[318] Speaking of food often gets Alice in trouble when she speaks in front of beings who could become food, such as the Mouse or the Pudding. The surface of words reflects the depth of the body, whereas "to eat words" brings bodies to the surface of language.[319] Carroll's esoteric and portmanteau words demonstrate intermingling of bodies and language. They are both word and thing and bring two series together; in the case of the portmanteau word, "each virtual part of such a word denotes the sense of the other or expresses the other part which in turn denotes it. Under the same form, the entire word says its own sense and is, for this reason, nonsense."[320]

For Deleuze, then, embodiment is central to Carroll's logic and the formal underpinnings of his stories. Though things and language occupy different categories, Deleuze shows that words and bodies cannot be separated. Carroll's creatures are both word and thing – their anthropomorphized beings bring together these two categories

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[315] Deleuze, 4, 23.
[316] Deleuze, 24.
[317] Deleuze, 24.
[318] Deleuze, 23.
[319] Deleuze, 23–24.
[320] Deleuze, 67.

to create nonsense, or, as Deleuze states, their own form of sense. In the following section, I explore Carroll's anthropomorphism to understand its alterity and how it creates sense that defies British Victorian logic but fits within the Wonderland world. My analysis of the creatures' physical forms is crucial to this understanding, as their bodies largely determine how they interact with the world and with Alice.

In the inverted realms of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass world, it would make sense that animals would talk, wear clothes, drink tea, live in houses, and serve on juries. But although the Wonderland and Looking-Glass creatures are anthropomorphized to do all sorts of human activities, they remain stubbornly nonhuman. Anthropomorphism usually entails a human standard; these creatures, however, defy human standards in that they challenge human ideas, retain physical features of animal (or other-than-human) bodies, and perhaps most importantly, many have never seen or heard of a human before. I will turn to the text to examine all three of these modes to demonstrate how the Wonderland creatures reinvent anthropomorphism by retaining and insisting upon an other-than-human corporeality.

The conversation between Alice and the Caterpillar that I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter demonstrates the first point—the challenge to human ideas. The Caterpillar speaks perfectly coherent English and smokes a hookah, both human-coded activities, yet he also espouses "odd" ideas for a human, such as advocating for being three inches tall. Not only does he defend his own height, but he forces Alice to rethink her preconceived notions of "normal" proportions. Similarly, when Alice meets the Gnat in the train car in *Through the Looking-Glass*, he asks her, "'What

sorts of insects do you rejoice in, where *you* come from?'" (149).[321] The verb "rejoice in" indicates that the Gnat expects others to find joy in insects – his question goes beyond Alice's mere interest and attempts to probe her emotional attachment. Alice responds, "'I don't *rejoice* in insects at all…because I'm rather afraid of them – at least the large kinds" (149).[322] Alice's repetition of the word "rejoice" and her emphasis of it through the use of italics reinforces the oddity of the Gnat's statement. Alice, like many humans, fears insects and would never think to even like them, let alone "rejoice in" them. The Gnat's assumption displays a total ignorance of humans' insect phobias and establishes joy as the natural response to insects. Like the Caterpillar, the Gnat upends both Alice's and the reader's preconceived notions about insects, generating a new way of perceiving them.

In addition to challenging human beliefs, the creatures' bodies, though often configured to do human activities, remain decidedly nonhuman. For example, when Alice happens upon the Duchess' house, she sees a footman, whom she introduces with this parenthetical: "(she considered him to be a footman because he was in livery: otherwise, judging by his face only, she would have called him a fish)" (50).[323] Though the creature's body and dress resemble that of a human footman, he has the face of a fish, making Alice unsure how to categorize him. When she sees another footman with the face of a frog, she settles on calling them by hybrid terms: Fish-Footman and Frog-Footman. Like Frankenstein's Creature, these footmen fall in

[321] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 149.
[322] Carroll, 149.
[323] Carroll, 50.

between human and animal categories, thrusting the human characters who encounter them into ontological confusion. Though traditional definitions of anthropomorphism would argue that the frog and the fish take on human characteristics by dressing in livery, the scene could present human footmen who have taken on animal faces. This two-way movement is evident in Alice's later conversation with the Frog-Footman: "He was looking up into the sky all the time he was speaking, and this Alice thought decidedly uncivil. 'But perhaps he ca'n't help it,' she said to herself; 'his eyes are so *very* nearly at the top of his head.'" (51).[324] The Frog-Footman's physiognomy alters his behavior in conversation. Alice finds him rude because he does not look directly at her while he is speaking; but unlike a human being, whose eyes are located on the front of the head, the Footman's frog eyes rest on top of his head, prohibiting eye contact. The animal face of the Footman not only alters his appearance from the human, but it also alters his behavior and interactions with humans around him.

Similarly, the Cheshire Cat, perhaps one of the most famous anthropomorphic figures, also retains animal qualities. Though its well-known grin likens the Cat to a human, Alice still feels timid in its presence: "It looked good-natured, she thought: still, it had very long claws and a great many teeth, so she felt that it ought to be treated with respect" (56).[325] The Cat's human-like grin reveals its cat-like "teeth"; its "very long claws," too, show that it is still very much a feline creature. Yet these features instill Alice with "respect," rather than fear. Though fear clearly drives Alice's deference to the Cat, the word "respect" is often reserved for people, generally

[324] Carroll, 51.
[325] Carroll, 56.

those in positions of authority. Alice respects the authority of the Cat, not because it grins and talks like a human, but because it has claws and teeth like a cat. This feeling elevates the status of the cat as an animal. White claims that Carroll represents the Cheshire Cat in this respectable way because he saw cats as creatures who were distanced from human concerns – indeed, the Cat controls his own body through magic, outside the realm of human authority.[326] When the Queen of Hearts calls for his beheading, searching out the Duchess (who Alice identifies as the Cat's owner), he all but disappears, flouting the control of Queen and Duchess alike.

Though many of the Wonderland and Looking-Glass creatures display human-like features, perhaps the most compelling evidence of their other-than-human nature is the fact that many of them fail to recognize the human. Recognition plays a crucial role in categorization: by recognizing animals as members of a species, humans place them in taxonomies and use such classification systems as methods of mastery. Anthropomorphism traditionally springs from these hierarchies—in recognizing traits of humans and animals, we attribute human traits to animals to elevate them. But when recognition fails, the validity of these hierarchies becomes suspect. As Beer states, "The creatures in Wonderland and Looking-Glass are quite as puzzled by Alice as she is by them. In these worlds she is a taxonomic anomaly."[327] When the Pigeon calls Alice a serpent because her neck has grown so long that her head can wander among the trees, Alice gets her "first taste of the subjectivity of taxonomic

[326] White, *The Alice Books and the Contested Ground of the Natural World*, 127.
[327] Beer, *Alice in Space*, 143.

systems."[328] The Pigeon argues that because Alice eats eggs and claims that she is a little girl, then little girls must be a "kind of serpent" (48).[329] This line of reasoning rewrites human systems of classification, redrawing lines between existing species categories that uphold human superiority. Similarly, Beer points out that the flowers in the Looking-Glass garden have never seen a human child and "imagine themselves as the universal and special case of the taxonomic system."[330] They can only describe Alice in flower terms, using their own bodies as the standard for describing and classifying her. The Rose tells Alice, "Said I to myself, 'Her face has got *some* sense in it, though it's not a clever one!' Still you're the right colour, and that goes a long way" (136).[331] The Tiger-Lily replies, "I don't care about the colour…if only her petals curled a little more, she'd be all right" (137).[332] The flowers mistake Alice's hair for petals and critique it according to their own beauty standards – the Rose finds color most important, while the Tiger-Lily insists on shape. The Rose's judgment of Alice's face demonstrates that Alice's status as a human child does not make her more "clever" than the flowers. They are the central creatures in their world and she represents an aberration that is necessarily less perfect than they are in both appearance and understanding.

This taxonomic inversion is perhaps most evident when Alice meets the Lion and the Unicorn after their fight. The Unicorn has no idea what to make of Alice:

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[328] Beer, 144.
[329] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 48.
[330] Beer, *Alice in Space*, 146.
[331] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 136.
[332] Carroll, 137.

> ‘It didn’t hurt him,’ the Unicorn said carelessly, and he was going on, when his eye happened to fall upon Alice: he turned round instantly, and stood for some time looking at her with an air of the deepest disgust.
>
> ‘What – is – this?’ he said at last.
>
> ‘This is a child!’ Haigha replied eagerly, coming in front of Alice to introduce her, and spreading out both his hands towards her in an Anglo-Saxon attitude. ‘We only found it to-day. It’s as large as life, and twice as natural!
>
> ‘I always thought they were fabulous monsters!’ said the Unicorn. ‘Is it alive?’
>
> ‘It can talk,’ said Haigha solemnly.
>
> The Unicorn looked dreamily at Alice, and said ‘Talk, child.’
>
> Alice could not help her lips curling up into a smile as she began: ‘Do you know, I always thought Unicorns were fabulous monsters, too? I never saw one alive before!’
>
> ‘Well, now that we have seen each other,’ said the Unicorn, ‘if you’ll believe in me, I’ll believe in you. Is that a bargain?’” (200-201)[333]

The Unicorn fails to recognize Alice, which immediately produces “deepest disgust,” a reaction that many humans display toward species that are different or unknown to them. The Unicorn’s response therefore mirrors Alice’s earlier conversation with the Gnat, when she confesses that she does not like insects at all and is “rather afraid of them.” It remains unclear whether the Unicorn has never seen a human before – Haigha introduces Alice as a “child” and perhaps her age and small size are the

[333] Carroll, 200–201.

foreign factors. But "child" implies human child, and the fact that the Unicorn makes no association between Alice and other more humanoid characters – the Mad Hatter, for example – indicates a fundamental difference between humans from Alice's native Britain and the Looking-Glass creatures. Similarly, the Lion's later question, "Are you animal – or vegetable – or mineral?" reveals that the creatures cannot even begin to classify Alice, even according to the broadest typologies (201).[334] The Lion's thought that Alice might be a "mineral" accords with the Unicorn's question, "Is it alive?" The creatures probe the baselines needed for sentience here: to assure the Unicorn that Alice is indeed a living organism, Haigha goes one further, answering, "It can talk." In a twist of irony, therefore, the other-than-human creatures debate Alice's plane in the hierarchy of beings, just as humans might do when examining a species of plant or animal.

The irony continues when the Unicorn calls Alice a "fabulous monster." "Fabulous" implies fantasy or unreality while "monster" implies otherness and difference, something to be feared. Both decenter the human as a being that is little understood and possibly not real. Generally, of course, humans name the fabulous and the monsters, classifying things in varying degrees of strangeness from themselves. Alice points this out when she tells the Unicorn that *she* "always thought Unicorns were fabulous monsters, too." The Unicorn's proposition at the end, therefore, is a looking-glass inversion. When he says, "if you believe in me, I'll believe in you," he extends an offer of reciprocal belief and recognition, but it is he, the Unicorn, who

[334] Carroll, 201.

broaches the topic and sets the terms. Alice is left only to answer yes or no (she responds, "Yes, if you like"), demonstrating that the Unicorn, thought only to reside as a figment of the human imagination, conversely has a stake in making human children real. The Unicorn thus upends humans' prerogative to classify organisms and even to determine reality.

Taxonomic Naming in Wonderland

Wonderland and Looking-Glass animals exist in an alternative form of taxonomy in which they recognize no human master and see themselves as the top of the hierarchy. Carroll's language, often in the form of puns, rhymes, and other forms of wordplay, serves as the vehicle for this alternative taxonomy. In these worlds, as Deleuze suggests, language has the power to constitute bodies. Names and naming become central to many of the creatures' identities and behaviors, and even comprise and determine their physical bodily structure. When Alice meets Humpty Dumpty, he asks her name and what it means:

> " '*Must* a name mean something?' Alice asked doubtfully.
>
> 'Of course it must,' Humpty Dumpty said with a short laugh. 'my name means the shape I am – and a good handsome shape it is, too. With a name like yours, you might be any shape, almost' (182).[335]

Humpty Dumpty's name expresses the shape of his body and subsequently implies his category or type (an egg). In general, Wonderland and Looking-Glass names tie

[335] Carroll, 182.

individuals to types or species and thus to larger systems of taxonomy – the Caterpillar, the White Rabbit, the Red Queen. Alice, on the other hand, is accustomed to arbitrary names that are meant to differentiate individuals – Alice, Mabel, even Dinah. Naming in Wonderland differs from naming in Victorian Britain in that it indicates species and privileges classification. However, in so doing, it pokes fun at European natural history and its taxonomic systems.

Through the naming of Wonderland and Looking-Glass creatures, Carroll plays with the strict differentiation between species. This is perhaps most evident during Alice's conversation with the Gnat. When Alice shows off her entomological knowledge by listing off the horsefly, the dragonfly, and the butterfly, the Gnat shows her their Looking-Glass counterparts in the "Rocking-horse-fly," the "Snap-dragon-fly," and the "Bread-and-butter-fly" (149-151).[336] Carroll creates these new species by combining compounds so that the first word of each insect's name creates a new association. Horsefly and rocking horse thereby become "Rocking-horse-fly," for example. True to Humpty Dumpty's belief that a name must mean something, the Looking-Glass species fit their compound names. The Rocking-horse-fly resembles a rocking horse; the Bread-and-butter-fly's "wings are thin slices of bread-and-butter, its body is a crust, and its head is a lump of sugar" (151).[337] Tenniel's illustrations of each insect underscore these descriptions. The Looking-Glass insects physically match their names much more closely than do their British counterparts: a horsefly looks little like a horse, a dragonfly only marginally resembles a dragon, and a butterfly has

[336] Carroll, 149–51.
[337] Carroll, 151.

almost no relation to butter, but the Looking-Glass insects' names mean the shape that they are, quite literally.

Carroll's Looking-Glass insects are both physical and figurative, which brings me back to Heather Keenleyside's work on eighteenth-century personification. If, as Keenleyside states, both animals and people are "quasi-figurative, quasi-natural beings," Carroll pushes this idea to its limit. Keenleyside states that "some types of activities, and so some types of beings, are apprehended as and by way of figuration."[338] Carroll's own creation of these new insect species mirrors the way a child might perceive and make associations about household insects. The physical difference between a rocking horse and a horsefly seems large, but the difference in language is small. The power of language to multiply and generate connotations brings life forms together, creating a form of short cut between objects and between beings. As Keenleyside shows, figuration becomes a way of seeing and representing animals beyond the Looking-Glass - here "animals are made, much as persons are – or better, that animals, like persons, are at once given and made, both living beings and rhetorical figures."[339] Carroll goes so far to represent creatures through language that the language actually begins to create them. Figuration becomes not only a way to represent, but also to generate, bodies. As Deleuze shows, bodies and language are intricately related; to separate the name from the body becomes impossible, as the body enters the world of discourse through its name.

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[338] Heather Keenleyside, *Animals and Other People: Literary Forms and Living Beings in the Long Eighteenth Century* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 15.
[339] Keenleyside, 16.

Carroll brings bodies and species together not only through compounds and word associations, but also through changes in phonemes, revealing that in language, beings are much more closely related than they may appear to be in material life. When Alice tells the Cheshire Cat that the baby has transformed into a pig, the Cat asks, "'Did you say 'pig', or 'fig'?'" (59).[340] In this case, the signifiers have a much closer relation than their signifieds do, a phenomenon that leads to mistakes in hearing, as the Cat demonstrates. Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio claim that "word play in the Alice books and in general are exchange games, or rather, games which make fun of equal exchange between signifier and signified in the single sign, or among different signs."[341] A simple change in signifier can lead to a large leap in signified, but to treat these changes equally reveals that language can draw objects in the material world together in strange and unaccustomed ways that change our views of categorization. The wacky logic of Wonderland makes either "pig" or "fig" feasible: in a place where a baby can turn into a pig, it might just as easily become a fig. This equation of the two introduces commonality where the reader may assume there to be none. A linguistic mistake, in which two words sound the same, generates similarity between the two ideas. Pigs and figs are both living beings and they are also both foods that people eat.

A similar linguistic mistake occurs during Alice's initial fall down the rabbit hole, opening up an inversion of predator/ prey relations. During her descent, Alice addresses Dinah as a way to pass the time:

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[340] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 59.

[341] Fordyce and Marello, *Semiotics and Linguistics in Alice's World*, 76.

> "'Dinah, my dear! I wish you were down here with me! There are no mice in the air, I'm afraid, but you might catch a bat, and that's very like a mouse, you know. But do cats eat bats, I wonder?' And here Alice began to get rather sleepy, and went on saying to herself, in a dreamy sort of way, 'Do cats eat bats? Do cats eat bats?' and sometimes "Do bats eat cats?', for, you see, as she couldn't answer either question, it didn't much matter which way she put it" (11).[342]

Like "pig" and "fig," "cat and "bat" are rhyming words that only differ by one phoneme. Though Alice arrives at the association through a logical thought process (Dinah eats mice – mice are like bats – Does Dinah eat bats?), her sleepiness and long fall cause her to reverse the question. Both "Do cats eat bats?" and "Do bats eat cats?" seem viable because "she couldn't answer either question." The linguistic similarity of the words "cat" and "bat," as well as Alice's general lack of knowledge about them, bring the two species together. Again, the linguistic reversal has to do with eating; by reversing the question, Alice reverses the predator/prey hierarchy between the two animals. The question "Do bats eat cats?" therefore represents a hierarchy inversion that foreshadows the inverted world of Wonderland. As Keenleyside shows, Alice, in a sense, remakes the relationship between cats and bats, turning them into figural signifiers that nonetheless cause both Alice and the reader to question the ontological distinctions between both categories of animals. The idea that bats could eat cats

[342] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 11.

demonstrates that the Wonderland world opens a space for the inversion of hierarchies that the reader views as normative.

To understand how Carroll links classification and language, and to put his thought in the context of nineteenth-century forms of biological taxonomy, I turn now to an analysis of Dodgson's mathematical treatise, *Symbolic Logic*. As Kornbluh claims, the form of Alice in Wonderland is symbolic logic.[343] In Book I, "Things and their Attributes," Dodgson sets up the terms of classification: the "Genus" is a class of "Things," while the "Species" is a class within the "Genus," whose members share a particular "Attribute" or "Adjunct" called a "Differentia."[344] After establishing the relations between groups, Dodgson claims, "As this Process is entirely *Mental*, we can perform it whether there *is*, or *is not*, an *existing* Thing which possesses that Adjunct. If there *is*, the Class is said to be 'Real'; if not it is said to be 'Unreal,' or 'Imaginary.'"[345] As an example of the "Real," Dodgson often uses the class "towns lit with gas" and as an example of the "Unreal," he uses the class "towns paved with gold."[346] By describing this process of differentiation as "Mental," Dodgson accords the Imaginary the same logical status as the Real. He continues this fascination with the Real and the Imaginary in his definition of Names: "Such a word (or phrase) is called a *Name*; and, if there be an existing Thing which it represents, it is said to be a Name of that Thing…Just as a Class is said to be *Real*, or *Unreal*, according as there

[343] Kornbluh, *The Order of Forms*, 114.
[344] Dodgson, Charles Lutwidge, *Symbolic Logic* (Project Gutenberg, n.d.), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/28696/28696-h/28696-h.htm.
[345] Dodgson, Charles Lutwidge.
[346] Dodgson, Charles Lutwidge.

is, or is *not*, an existing Thing in it, so also a Name is said to be *Real*, or *Unreal*, according as there is, or is not, an existing Thing represented by it."[347] As Hugh Haughton states in his notes on "Looking-Glass Insects," Carroll "sets real and unreal names side by side" and "uses hyphenated compounds…to create new species" (337, footnote 10).[348] The Insects play with the distinction between the Real and the Unreal, suggesting that language makes the Unreal into Real things.

The *Alice* books also experiment with *Symbolic Logic*'s idea of "Dichotomy" to question our preconceived notions of the relations between things. Dodgson defines a "Dichotomy" as a certain type of "Division" into two classes with contradictory Differentiae. He states that dichotomies are not always easily created; in fact "we may sometimes find that the Attributes we have chosen are used so loosely, in ordinary conversation, that it is not easy to decide *which* of the things belong to one class and *which* to the other. In such a case, it would be necessary to lay down some arbitrary *rule*, as to where the one Class should end and the other begin."[349] When *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* questions the differentiation between "pig" and "fig" and "bat" and "cat" – so close in language, so far in ontology - it highlights the arbitrariness of the rule used to create the dichotomy between the two terms. The first case challenges the distinction between animal and vegetable, the second between predator and prey. In a world of nonsense, dichotomies get inverted because, in many situations, any term is equally as absurd as any other. Nonsense, then, emphasizes the

[347] Dodgson, Charles Lutwidge.
[348] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 337.
[349] Dodgson, Charles Lutwidge, *Symbolic Logic*.

gap between the logical rules of grammar and real, material things, but it simultaneously demonstrates that the logic systems of language nonetheless have ontological effects. Carroll, therefore, ontologizes logic, demonstrating that a relationship exists between formal systems and the world of the real. Whether a baby becomes an animal or a vegetable is equally ludicrous. Yet it also opens up new possibilities and alliances that Victorian systems of classification might otherwise preclude. Bats and cats are both animals, and both mammals, after all. The *Alice* books both participate in and undermine forms of taxonomy dominant in nineteenth-century Europe, adhering to conventional naming structures but also exposing the violence that such structures can impose on animate beings.

In both the *Alice* books and *Symbolic Logic*, classification is a tool for thinking and grouping things together, not necessarily a method for finding fundamental differences between things. In this line of thinking, these works are clearly indebted to Carl Linnaeus' system of taxonomy, but they depart from Linneaus' essentialism and move toward notions of species put forth in Charles Darwin's contemporaneously published, *On the Origin of Species*. Though the Alice books rely on what we might call common names, rather than Linnaeus' Latinate binomial nomenclature, it still insists on the difference between types and individuals. As Humpty Dumpty claims in his conversation with Alice, his name is superior to hers because it implies his shape, and thus, his classification. His argument demonstrates that a connection to species or genus is important in disseminating knowledge about an individual. Dodgson's section on Naming in *Symbolic Logic* makes this even more abundantly clear. In his discussion of Classes and Names, Dodgson relies heavily on terms that were hallmarks

of Linnaeus' system, including "Genus," "Species," and "Differentia." These terms originate from the Aristotelian system of classification, revealing that Dodgson was drawing on a long line of Western systematics. Through both Aristotle and Linnaeus, Dodgson shows a focused interest in Genus and Species as the key levels of classification. Marc Ereshefsky shows that for Linnaeus, genera were the most important taxa because he believed that both "genera and species had real essential characteristics whereas [higher levels of classification, such as] classes and orders did not."[350] *Symbolic Logic*, too, puts the highest importance on Genus and Species; though Dodgson begins with the term Class, this group can be infinitely large – in his first example, he says a Class of Things may "[contain] the whole universe."[351] Dodgson's language is therefore heavily influenced by Linnaeus and this language affects how both thinkers understand and order the world.

Dodgson shares with Linnaeus, not only a common vocabulary, but also a similar belief that language is integral in shaping human knowledge about physical bodies. As Linnaeus wrote in the *Philosophia Botanica*, "If you do not know the names of things, the knowledge of them is lost too."[352] For Linnaeus, naming becomes crucial to epistemology, though not ontology; without names, things disappear from the record. Dodgson's focus on names, in both *Symbolic Logic* and *Through the Looking-Glass*, seems to agree. Naming, in both works, becomes a way of ordering and classifying bodies. If *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* demonstrates that, as

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[350] Marc Ereshefsky, *The Poverty of Linnaean Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study of Biological Taxonomy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 210.
[351] Dodgson, Charles Lutwidge, *Symbolic Logic*.
[352] Carl von Linné, *Linnaeus' Philosophia Botanica* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Keenleyside reveals, beings are rhetorically constructed, it seems to take its cue from Linnaeus' binomial nomenclature. Though Linnaeus does not claim that names create beings in any ontological way he does insist that names create our knowledge of them. In the taxonomic system then, any being is both a physical and rhetorical entity, a material bodily presence that is nevertheless "lost" without its linguistic component, its name.

In *Symbolic Logic* and the *Alice* books, Dodgson pays homage to Linnaean systematics, but his own definitional system deviates from that of Linnaeus, which allows for a simultaneous critique of eighteenth-century taxonomy. Both Aristotle and Linnaeus adhere to an essentialist form of thinking, in which, as Ereshefsky explains, "each entity has an essential feature that makes it the type of entity that it is."[353] As I mentioned above, Linnaeus believed that genera and species contain real essences, fundamental differences that determine what these groups are and how they behave. By contrast, the examples Dodgson uses in *Symbolic Logic* do not appear to exhibit essentialism to the same degree. He defines "Man" as an "Animal having two hands and two feet," a definition easily applicable to other species of apes.[354] Dodgson also categorizes inanimate things according to non-essential traits – for instance, in the example, "Town lit with gas," "lit with gas" is clearly not a real essence: most towns would only have had gas lighting for about half a century before the publication of Dodgson's treatise. Change over time and new Attributes, as Dodgson calls them, are clearly acknowledged and permissible. Indeed, Attributes are not essences – as

[353] Ereshefsky, *The Poverty of Linnaean Hierarchy*, 17.
[354] Dodgson, Charles Lutwidge, *Symbolic Logic*.

Dodgson states in the opening chapter, "One Thing may have many Attributes; and one Attribute may belong to many Things."[355]

By avoiding the essentialism of Linnaeus, Dodgson aligns himself more with Darwin's theory on the indistinct nature of species. I return, as I did in my analysis of Frankenstein's Creature, to Darwin's chapter "Hybridism," in which he states that two species, when crossed, produce no offspring or sterile hybrids.[356] Yet, he also demonstrates that two varieties, when crossed, produce particularly vigorous offspring ("mongrels"). Darwin finds little difference between these sterile hybrid and fertile mongrel offspring, causing him to conclude, "there is no fundamental distinction between species and varieties" (225).[357] Darwin shows that the boundaries between species are not impermeable; these boundaries are a tool for categorization, but they do not describe real essences. Similarly, Dodgson shows that categories can change over time and can include different things depending on how we draw the lines delineating them. He exposes these forms of categorization as human-made systems, giving him critical distance from Linnaean taxonomy. Not only does he parody its rhetorical description of essences, but he also calls into question the ethical dilemmas surrounding its tendency toward control and mastery. Through the voice of the Gnat in "Looking-Glass Insects," Carroll reveals that naming establishes a form of anthropocentric hierarchy that does violence to those who have no power over their own identification.

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[355] Dodgson, Charles Lutwidge.

[356] Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, *The Origin of Species* (London, United States: HarperCollins Publishers Inc, 2012), 135, https://search.proquest.com/docview/2407289751/citation/98C2E09C6B0F40BDPQ/1.

[357] Darwin, 152.

The Gnat's conversation with Alice makes both Alice and the reader question who has the right to name beings and categorize them. When Alice says she can name some insects, the Gnat replies:

> "'Of course they answer to their names?' the Gnat remarked carelessly.
>
> 'I've never knew them do it.'
>
> 'What's the use of their having names,' the Gnat said, 'if they wo'n't answer to them?'
>
> 'No use to *them*,' said Alice; 'but it's useful to the people that name them, I suppose. If not, why do things have names at all?'
>
> 'I ca'n't say,' the Gnat replied. 'Further on, in the wood down there, they've got no names – however, go on with your list of insects: you're wasting time'" (149).[358]

Here the Gnat continues his unorthodox assumptions. Just as he assumes that people will rejoice in insects, he also assumes that naming is a reciprocal act. His insistence that insects "answer to their names" reveals a belief that they recognize themselves when they are called – that is, they identify with and call themselves by their name. But Alice demonstrates that naming and the creation of taxonomies in her world, Victorian Britain, is unidirectional, rather than reciprocal. Naming only benefits those who confer the names (in this case, "people"), not those that receive them. The use of italics in her response, "No use to *them*" displays how ingrained in the British psyche this idea is; Alice does not seem to care about "*them*" because the system is not

[358] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, 149.

designed by or for them. But her question, "If not, why do things have names at all?" shows that the Gnat's question has challenged her ideas. The conversation prompts both Alice and the reader to ask who does the naming, who benefits, and what for.

The Gnat therefore puts forth a more harmonious sense of species relations, which he hints at in his final statement, "Further on, in the wood down there, they've got no names." Alice experiences this almost directly after their conversation ends and she continues on into the wood. When she tries to remember the word for tree she has no recollection: "'What *does* it call itself, I wonder? I do believe it's got no name – why, to be sure it hasn't!'" (153).[359] This act of forgetting continues the thought experiment that began with Alice's conversation with the Gnat, upending Alice's notion that names "are no use to *them*." Alice's question demonstrates that a place without names is already more egalitarian: she asks "What does it call itself?" not "What is it called?" This active construction grants agency to the tree and shows Alice's interest in how trees refer to themselves, rather than in the names that people have imposed upon them. Losing this human-imposed knowledge does not mean the trees no longer exist; rather the categories used to control them have been erased.

This taxonomic reversal leads to inter-species intimacy when Alice meets the Fawn. Neither recognize the other, yet they become companionable right away: "So they walked on together through the wood, Alice with her arms clasped lovingly round the neck of the Fawn, till they came out into another open field, and here the Fawn gave a sudden bound into the air, and shook itself free from Alice's arm" (154).[360]

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[359] Carroll, 153.
[360] Carroll, 154.

Recognition of species difference immediately ruptures this moment of harmony: "'I'm a Fawn!' it cried out in a voice of delight. 'And, dear me! you're a human child!' A sudden look of alarm came into its beautiful brown eyes, and in another moment it had darted away at full speed" (154).[361] Because they are nameless and cannot determine their identities – and therefore their relationship – in the wood, Alice and the Fawn develop an easy intimacy and physical closeness. Alice's embrace of the Fawn suggests that the default relation between beings, and even between species is love. Although there is a certain "delight" in recognizing oneself and one's identity – in this case, literally coming out of the woods – this knowledge and resolution reinstills relations that are antagonistic. Again, Carroll points to the hierarchy between predator and prey to show that a human child and a fawn cannot love one another.

This scene in the woods takes Linneaus' assertion, "If you do not know the names of things, the knowledge of them is lost too," quite literally. In a nameless world, Alice has no knowledge of herself, the Fawn, or even the trees. But though she cannot identify any of these things, she still retains a form of affective knowledge. The Fawn and Alice feel a natural affinity for one another, as the Fawn invites Alice to walk further with it and Alice "clasps" her arms "lovingly around its neck." Beer identifies this moment as prelapsarian: "the moment of paradise *before* Adam named the animals and kinds."[362] But a prelapsarian vision perhaps does not go far enough to describe the forms of hierarchical inversion that occur in Wonderland. Though this embrace between Alice and the Fawn is leveling in nature, it is a fantasy within a

[361] Carroll, 154.
[362] Beer, *Alice in Space*, 166.

fantasy world. It exists only for a moment before species relations reassert themselves and the Fawn flees. Although the Fawn fears Alice as a predator, it is Alice who stands to suffer most from this sudden separation, "almost ready to cry with vexation at having lost her dear little fellow-traveler" (154).[363] Though she is the predator, she has no power over her traveling companion's actions.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the Wonderland creatures' strange form of anthropomorphism and their assuredness of their own norms causes Alice to question her own ontological existence, demonstrating that these creatures can change human systems of taxonomy and the notion of the human, itself. Although, as I mentioned previously, Gabriele shows that Alice refuses to admit any "variability in her 'self,'" I argue that Alice's journey constitutes Alice's constant negotiation of changes within herself and how they affect her identity. After her conversation with the Caterpillar, Alice's neck suddenly grows to a great height, thrusting her head up among the trees and frightening a Pigeon, who takes her for a serpent. When Alice denies it, the following exchange occurs:

> "Well! *What* are you?" said the Pigeon. "I can see you're trying to invent something!
>
> "I – I'm a little girl," said Alice, rather doubtfully, as she remembered the number of changes she had gone through, that day.

[363] Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,* 154.

> "A likely story indeed!" said the Pigeon, in a tone of the deepest contempt. "I've seen a good many little girls in my time, but never *one* with such a neck as that! No, no! You're a serpent; and there's no use denying it. I suppose you'll be telling me next that you never tasted an egg!"
>
> "I *have* tasted eggs, certainly," said Alice, who was a very truthful child; "but little girls eat eggs quite as much as serpents do, you know."
>
> "I don't believe it, " said the Pigeon; "but if they do, why, then they're a kind of serpent: that's all I can say."
>
> This was such a new idea to Alice, that she was quite silent for a minute or two, which gave the Pigeon the opportunity of adding "You're looking for eggs, I know that well enough; and what does it matter to me whether you're a little girl or a serpent?" (48)[364]

The Pigeon engages in defining Wonderland's alternative taxonomy. In a place where eating holds a lot of weight, serpents are no different from little girls because they both eat eggs, posing a predatory threat to the Pigeon. Though Alice argues that a shared food source does not group individuals into a species, she remains unresolved. The fact that she is "doubtful" shows that the changes she has experienced have made her uncertain about who she is and what sorts of ontological category she inhabits. That the Pigeon gives her such a "new idea" that she remains "quite silent for a minute or two," demonstrates that Alice has never thought this way before; though she may

[364] Carroll, 48.

not know how to process this idea, she clearly takes the Pigeon's taxonomy seriously as she ponders through it.

The exchange between the Pigeon and Alice is antagonistic in nature because the Pigeon argues that Alice has the wrong notion of classification. This antagonism shows an inversion of species in the vein of the examples I have given before. As Beer states, "It's Alice's first taste of the subjectivity of taxonomic systems. She is used to ones that place humans at the apex and make of little girls a favored category, but in the world she has entered that hierarchy does not hold sway" (144). Alice seems appalled by the fact that the Pigeon would class her as a serpent, a "lower" animal that has vile connotations and symbolic meaning in Western Christian contexts. However, Alice also shows an openness to learning from the Pigeon. Because so little of Wonderland conforms to her expectations, including her own body as it moves through this world, Alice becomes open to new possibilities this world offers. Although, in many situations, Alice tries to maintain her Victorian sense of logic, she also finds that Wonderland actively changes her, both physically and mentally, causing her to question her own species category. Experiencing a position of submission makes Alice aware of the sort of privilege she holds in the human world from which she has come. As Beer states, the hierarchy "that place[s] humans at the apex…does not hold sway" in these worlds. This is not pleasant for Alice. Indeed, Wonderland does not envision a heterarchical world – it places its own denizens above Alice, as having more common sense and better values. It is just as hierarchical a world as Alice's Victorian England; yet, it presents the possibility of other species and other beings holding the "apex" position that humans are accustomed to occupying.

Sometimes Alice reacts to this reordering through argument and threats of violence – and sometimes her threats provoke her interlocutors before their exchange has even begun. But sometimes Alice begins to rethink her own assumptions about the hierarchies that she has always taken for granted.

Wonderland and *Through the Looking Glass* turn species hierarchies upside-down, submitting Alice to an alternative universe where a multitude of possibilities exist. Through puns and wordplay, Carroll creates creatures who approach the human but never quite become it because they do not recognize it. In effect, he does not raise animals up; instead, he flips the power differential so that animals themselves occupy the top position. In so doing, they do not aspire to be human in their actions, but rather, show the importance of animal alterity, in all its forms and figurations.

5. *Heart and Science* and the Antivisection Movement: Metonymic Species Relations

Near the end of *Heart and Science* (1884), Wilkie Collins' protagonist, Carmina, is transformed from patient to experiment. As Dr. Benjulia performs his daily house call to check on her declining condition, he refuses to prescribe treatment, continuing only to observe her. His rejection of medical duty draws surprise from even the simple and incompetent family physician, Dr. Null, and deep suspicion from Teresa, Carmina's maidservant. "'Are you sure he's a great doctor?'" Teresa asks Null of Benjulia. "'Is he a good man?'"[365] The narrator has already answered these questions following Benjulia's medical observation: "From that day, Carmina was destined to receive unknown honour: she was to take her place, along with the other animals, in his note-book of experiments."[366] Benjulia is a scientist who builds his work on the vivisection of animals, so by definition the novel posits that he cannot be a "good man." Yet the passage also implies that his gruesome practice prevents him from becoming a "great doctor," as well. Not only does his vivisection work harm his animal test subjects, but it also does nothing to cure his human patient; instead, the drive for scientific knowledge, regardless of the means, causes him to "vivisect" the woman as well. The passage constructs a tragic parity between Carmina and the animals—they both become "experiments" in his "note-book" at great cost to their bodies and their lives. These experiments are secret and therefore "unknown"; patriarchal structures and animacy hierarchies allow the male scientist to continue his

[365] Wilkie Collins, *Heart and Science: A Story of the Present Time*, ed. Steve Farmer (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1996), 281.
[366] Collins, 280.

atrocities unchecked. Even when Teresa attempts to question his methods, Null defends Benjulia and the male-dominated medical profession more broadly. Collins aligns women and animals in their victimization and the material bodily harm they experience.

Collins wrote *Heart and Science* at the close of his career and the height of the nineteenth-century antivivisection movement. The novel functions as a work of antivivisection advocacy, revealing that vivisection breeds the mad scientist and sows destruction, of both people and animals, in his wake. Dr. Benjulia not only performs unspeakable experiments on animals behind the closed doors of his laboratory, but he simultaneously "experiments" on the novel's heroine, Carmina, eagerly observing her decline in the clutches of an acute brain disease. Collins takes his cues here from the antivivisection movement's founding organization, the Victoria Street Society, which, under the leadership of Frances Power Cobbe, arose from the broader women's movement of the late nineteenth century. Cobbe and other antivivisectionists aligned animal cruelty with misogyny and sexual violence, alleging that men, and particularly male doctors, use women and animals in similarly abhorrent ways. Collins' novel amplifies Cobbe's message, establishing a connection between Carmina and the lab animals as Benjulia's helpless victims.

However, Carmina is not merely a stand-in for the animals, nor are they for her; their relationship within the novel is not metaphorical. Rather, it is metonymic: their situations and the treatment of their bodies by the vivisector are proximate, reducing the species barrier between them. Collins uses metonymy to simultaneously champion the cause of the women's movement and the antivivisection movement,

already intricately bound up with one another. In so doing, he demonstrates that drawing human and animal interests together through the vehicle of anthropomorphism was a powerful tool of the antivivisection movement and that anthropomorphic thought was highly gendered in the late nineteenth century. Like *Frankenstein*, *Heart and Science* features an egotistical scientist who puts his practice ahead of all other aspects of his life with an ends justify the means mentality. Both Benjulia and Victor Frankenstein become vivisectors with little regard for animal life and both suffer the consequences of their crimes through destruction and death at the end of each novel. In its treatment of gender, *Heart and Science* departs from *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*: while Collins' novel establishes a contiguous relationship between women and animals, Carroll's story establishes difference as the primary mode between Alice and the creatures she meets.

As he binds women's and animals' interests together, Collins portrays the vivisector, the perpetrator of violence against them, in racist and xenophobic terms. To make his crimes more legible, Collins finds it necessary to turn Benjulia into a monster, both morally and physically. Collins others Benjulia by making him hideous and corpse-like but also by giving him a "gipsy-brown" complexion. The novel draws a parallel between these two descriptions: "Those enemies that called him 'the living skeleton' said it revealed his gipsy origin."[367] Although little more is said about Benjulia's identity, this passage clearly demarcates him as racially different and perhaps of foreign origin. By aligning Benjulia's background with the horrors of his scientific practice, Collins reflects the xenophobia of the antivivisection movement,

[367] Collins, 95.

which sought to portray vivisection as a foreign threat to English morality. The most notorious early vivisectionists worked in France, though the practice was widespread on the Continent, with many practitioners in Italy and Germany, as well.[368] Benjulia represents a form of invasion from the Continent, a failure of English law to contain the spread of torturous methods from beyond its borders. Yet Collins is not content to portray him as French or Italian, which would put him in too close of proximity with his Italian victim. Like Heathcliff, Benjulia's "gipsy origin" casts him in racist and derogatory terms, making him suspect and violent in the eyes of many of the white, British characters and the white, British reader.

Thus, *Heart and Science* makes the case that foreigners, especially foreign doctors, pose a grave threat to the bodies of women and animals. Though Carmina is a foreigner herself, I claim that she becomes naturalized through her relationship with Ovid Vere, the figure of the upstanding English doctor. In her anticipation of their life together, she represents domesticity and the love that undergirds marriage and family. In the same sense, the animals in Benjulia's laboratory also belong to the domestic realm; though we rarely see these creatures, dogs—perhaps the most beloved Victorian pet—figure prominently among them. Vivisection, therefore, threatens love and family, the nineteenth-century traditional sphere of women and animals, and throughout the novel, "Science" menaces over "Heart," only to be defeated with the self-destruction of evil vivisector in the final pages.

[368] Theodore G Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate: Frances Power Cobbe, Experimental Science and the "Claims of Brutes"* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2012), 47.

Very little extant criticism exists on this rather obscure novel. Perhaps the most prominent study to date comes from Jessica Straley, who notes that vivisection and sensation fiction received similar late nineteenth-century critiques for their violent effects, but that Collins' novel does more than make each a metaphor for the other.[369] She demonstrates that the narrative creates a connection between Carmina and Benjulia's lab animals, ultimately revealing that the novel analogizes two fixtures of the Victorian home: "wife and pet."[370] In order to spare his readers from the violent shocks of sensation fiction—and thus to save them from the vivisection his novel describes—Straley claims that Collins makes the romance plot between Ovid and Carmina easily legible, superficial, and bland.[371] He avoids falling into the trap of advocating for violence in the form of his novel while advocating against it in the content. Yet, Straley claims, the physiological relationship between Benjulia and Zo—established through tickling and touching—reinstates this bodily sensationalism that is lacking in the main romance plot.[372] My argument here extends from Straley's claim that Collins conflates women and animals in the novel and that he does so to mirror the gendered activism of the larger antivivisection movement. I trace how this connection between women and animals came to dominate the movement and how the novel negotiates this species boundary without analogizing one group for the other. But I also demonstrate that Benjulia's fondling of Zo plays into his violence toward

[369] Jessica Straley, "Love and Vivisection: Wilkie Collins's Experiment in Heart and Science," *Nineteenth-Century Literature* 65, no. 3 (2010): 352, https://doi.org/10.1525/ncl.2010.65.3.348.
[370] Straley, 362.
[371] Straley, 367.
[372] Straley, 368.

both women and animals, revealing the movement's depiction of the perversity of the vivisector.

This chapter departs in mode from the others before it in that it takes a largely historical approach by situating the novel in relation to the pamphlet literature of contemporary antivivisection advocacy organizations. *Heart and Science* engages much more explicitly with animal rights discourse and activism than do any of the previous texts, so it is necessary to place it within its political context. Though animal rights does not form the core of this project, my discussion of species boundaries and species hierarchy in the nineteenth century would not be complete without a deliberate turn to animal rights rhetoric that emerged in the nineteenth century, as well as institutions such as Royal Society for the Protection of Animals (RSPCA) that began to campaign in the service of this rhetoric. This final chapter asks what the consequences of species indeterminacy were in the nineteenth century and reveals that people began to work seriously toward animal rights legislation, using their own marginalized identities and their capacity for sympathy as fuel for their advocacy. This chapter also takes seriously the history of animal activism and compares how a novel, working in tandem with more readily available and distributable pamphlet literature, mobilizes readers politically.

The Victorian Antivivisection Movement

Lewis Carroll, whose *Alice* books, as we saw in the last chapter, proposed inversions of species hierarchies through topsy-turvy fantasy worlds and their outspoken animal inhabitants, unsurprisingly became a strong advocate for the

antivivisection cause. In an article for the *Fortnightly Review*, entitled "Some Popular Fallacies about Vivisection," Carroll argues against what he sees as fallacious claims about the practice. In response to the idea that humans are superior to animals and animal suffering is justified if it ameliorates human suffering, Carroll writes:

> For does [this idea] not presuppose the axiom that human and animal suffering differ *in kind?* A strange assertion this, from the lips of people who tell us that man is twin-brother to the monkey! Let them be at least consistent, and when they have proved that the lessening of *human* suffering is an end so great and glorious as to justify any means that will secure it, let them give the anthropomorphoid ape the benefit of the argument.[373]

Carroll makes the point that through the theory of evolution, scientists have shown a close evolutionary relationship between humans and apes; hence, humans and apes must experience pain in similar ways, a fact the scientists turn a blind eye to when they engage in vivisection. In troubling the boundary between humans and apes, Carroll also troubles the hierarchy between them. Responding to notions of human superiority, Carroll suggests that the lessening of human suffering should apply to apes as well, since they suffer in the same way. Carroll thus continues the questioning of species hierarchy that we see in his fiction in the form of advocacy in popular magazines.

Unlike Carroll, Collins did not write antivivisection tracts for the popular press, preferring to explore the topic through one lengthy novel. Though several twentieth-century critics, including Dougald MacEachen and William Marshall, have

[373] Collins, *Heart and Science*, 343.

written patronizingly of Collins that he was "moved more by sentiment than understanding" in writing *Heart and Science*, Coral Lansbury argues that he closely followed the vivisection debates.[374] She shows that he had several doctors read the manuscript and he was in close correspondence with Frances Power Cobbe, a foundational figure and powerful leader of the antivivisection movement. In this opening section, I give a general overview of the historical arc of the antivivisection movement in Britain in the 1860s and 1870s in order to give a sense of what Collins knew about the movement as he wrote his novel in the early 1880s. I begin here with Cobbe's early philosophical views on animals as the foundation for the movement she helped to create, then trace her campaign to lobby for parliamentary antivivisection legislation. Perhaps the single most important historical influence on Collins' novel was the convening of a Royal Commission of Enquiry on the practice of vivisection and the subsequent passage of the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876. The controversy surrounding the commission and the legislation focused closely on questions of utility and necessity, which I trace as preparation for an analysis of Benjulia's motives for practicing vivisection.

Frances Power Cobbe was a key figure in the antivivisection movement starting from its roots in the 1860s and thus an important source of information for Collins.[375] In 1863, she published her manifesto on vivisection and animal cruelty, entitled *The Rights of Man and the Claims of Brutes*. In it, she put forth her view that animals are inherently inferior to humans because they are "sentient," but not "moral"

[374] Coral Lansbury, *The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardiand England* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 134–35.
[375] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 22.

creatures, so humans may use animals for their "wants" but not their "wantonness."[376] She attempts to determine whether science constitutes "wants" or "wantonness," concluding, "We may take animal life…for the interests of science; but we must take it with 'no needless infliction of pain.' Now, unhappily, until lately, nearly all experiments of science were inevitably accompanied by the infliction of torture."[377] Though Cobbe believed staunchly in a hierarchy of species that necessitated animal death for human needs and pleasures, she advocated against needless animal suffering.

From this early tract, Cobbe began to study and critique scientific experimentation on animals on the Continent, becoming an outspoken advocate against vivisection. By 1874, Cobbe saw an opportunity to gather public support in England for the regulation of the practice.[378] At the British Medical Association's annual meeting that year, four scientists were charged with violating the Martin Act of 1822 when they injected dogs with absinthe during a public demonstration.[379] After the defendants' acquittal at the trial, Cobbe called on the Royal Society for the Protection of Animals (RSPCA) to introduce a bill into Parliament that would prohibit cruel experiments and require scientists to obtain a license to practice vivisection.[380] The RSPCA, however, did nothing in response to Cobbe's call. Only when the *Morning Post* published a letter in early 1875 by Dr. George Hoggan about the cruelty he witnessed working in Claude Bernard's laboratory, did the public and the

[376] Susan Hamilton, ed., *Animal Welfare & Anti-Vivisection 1870-1910: Nineteenth Century Woman's Mission* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 17, 22.
[377] Hamilton, 25.
[378] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 78.
[379] Obenchain, 76.
[380] Obenchain, 78.

Parliament take notice.[381] Hoggan's letter stated, "In that laboratory we sacrificed daily from one to three dogs, besides rabbits and other animals, and after four months' experience, I am of opinion that not one of those experiments on animals was justified or necessary."[382] Hoggan's use of the word "sacrificed" portrays animals as victims on the altar of Science, anthropomorphizing them by implying that their lives have intrinsic worth. Yet he finds the "sacrifice" not worth the cost: in the name of Science, these animals' deaths are neither "justified" or "necessary."

This incendiary letter prompted the formation of a Royal Commission of Enquiry "on the practice of subjecting live animals to experiment for scientific purposes."[383] The Royal Commission interviewed fifty-three veterinarians, physicians, and physiologists about the practice of vivisection, asking whether they deemed it necessary and how to minimize the suffering of lab animals.[384] With public opinion ramped up over the government investigation by November 1875, Cobbe wrote in her pamphlet, "The Fallacy of Restriction Applied to Vivisection," that she had joined forces with Hoggan to establish the "awkwardly but most carefully named,[] 'Society for the Protection of Animals *liable to* Vivisection,' in order 'to obtain the utmost possible protection for' such animals.'"[385] The name of the society was later shortened to the Victoria Street Society. They disseminated their advocacy through a regularly

[381] Obenchain, 80.
[382] Collins, *Heart and Science*, 340.
[383] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 83.
[384] Obenchain, 83.
[385] Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection, *Twelfth Annual Report of the Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection: United with the International Association for the Total Suppression of Vivisection* ([London: The Society], 1887), 3.

published journal, the *Zoophilist*, which published Cobbe's pamphlet among many other forms of antivivisection propaganda.

By the following year, the nation had arrived at a point of reckoning on vivisection that would take the form of legislation. The Cruelty to Animals Act was passed into law on August 15, 1876. It stated that physiologists and physicians seeking to practice vivisection must be licensed by the Home Secretary and their laboratories were subject to inspection. It also ordered that experiments on higher vertebrates must use anesthesia and public demonstrations of vivisection were prohibited.[386] The polarized positions of the physiologists and the antivivisectionists ensured that the law satisfied no one.[387] Physiologists balked at having their research rights trampled on, while antivivisectionists complained that the law did not go far enough to regulate or even outright ban the practice. Even before the bill passed, total prohibitionists had published an analysis of how the Royal Commission's recommendations fell short. These prohibitionists argue against the reliance on anesthetics, drawing from Hoggan's letter the idea that anesthetics move the public to put trust in the vivisectors.[388] Indeed, Frances Power Cobbe's pamphlet "Light in Dark Places," which contains detailed drawings of many of the tools and contraptions used to vivisect animals also exposes physiologists' reliance on drugs that did not, in fact, anesthetize animals. Quoting from Claude Bernard, the eminent French physiologist

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[386] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 90.
[387] Obenchain, 91.
[388] *Vivisection: Analysis of the Report of the Royal Commission with Observations Thereon, and Extracts from the Evidence* (London: John F. Shaw, 1876), 9, http://find.galegroup.com/openurl/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&res_id=info:sid/gale:NCCO&ctx_enc=info:ofi:enc:UTF-8&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:unknown&rft.artnum=CIPMSG938283351&req_dat=info:sid/gale:ugnid:cornell.

and prolific vivisector, Cobbe shows that both narcotics and curare, both often used as anesthetics, did not have anesthetic qualities. Bernard says of narcotics that, when used on a dog, "he no longer notices his master. Nevertheless, sensibility persists, for, if we pinch the animal, he moves and cries." Of curare, he says, "Curare acting on the nervous system only suppresses the action of the motor nerves, leaving sensation intact."[389] When physicians demonstrated that they use narcotics and curare to operate more humanely on an animal, in essence they duped the public into believing that their procedures were painless, when, in fact, the animal test subjects still felt pain.

Vivisection prohibitionists point out that the public's trust in vivisectors is dangerous because the Commission has openly stated that "The practice is from its very nature liable to great abuse. That inhumanity may be found in persons of very high position as physiologists: and that in many instances there is a perfect callousness to animal suffering."[390] Collins centers this anxiety about scientific overreach in Benjulia's total indifference and cruelty toward living creatures, both human and animal. The analysis also reports that one commissioner suggests that "household animals" such as dogs and cats should not be subject to vivisection at all because "from the very nature of our relations with them there is something of the nature of treachery in allowing them to be subjected to severe pain."[391] The commissioner anthropomorphizes the household pets by describing vivisection in terms of "treachery": their relationship with people in the household raises them to a level

[389] Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection, *Twelfth Annual Report of the Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection*, 6.
[390] *Vivisection*, 7.
[391] *Vivisection*, 12.

above other nonhuman animals. Indeed, as Ellen Stockstill demonstrates, the dog became a rallying figure for the antivivisection movement, as a cherished pet that enjoyed a prestigious position in the household and garnered love and sympathy.[392] The prohibitionists, however, take issue with the commissioner's willingness to privilege some animals over others. They write that they believe that we must "treat with consideration all classes of animals and condemn, in the strongest terms, anything at all approaching torture in respect of all God's sentient creatures."[393] The prohibitionists' statement is equalizing: they see all creatures as God's creations and thus worthy of "consideration." They imply that animals, like people, experience pain and harm from "torture" and should therefore have the same protections from it.

This radical view opposed the idea that undergirded medical experimentation, namely that animal life had inherently less worth than human life, so animals could stand in for human test subjects. Indeed, when the Bill for the Total Suppression of Scientific Experiments on Animals entered the House of Commons in 1883, Sir Lyon Playfair issued a speech opposing the bill, arguing, "The justification is that man's duty to man is greater than man's duty to beasts."[394] Within scientific communities, the debate centered less on the ethics of using animal bodies and more on utility and necessity. When was it necessary to perform vivisection on an animal? Some physicians interviewed by the Royal Commission argued that the bodies and systems

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[392] Louise Penner and Tabitha Sparks, eds., *Victorian Medicine and Popular Culture* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press (Bibliovault), 2016), 126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1dwst2h.
[393] *Vivisection*, 13.
[394] Lyon Playfair Playfair, *Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on the Second Reading of Mr. Reid's Bill for the Total Suppression of Scientific Experiments upon Animals: April 4, 1883* (London: J.W. Kolckmann, 1883), 9, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiuo.ark:/13960/t5bc4b43z.

of animals and humans were too dissimilar to justify using animals as test subjects.[395] Rather than anthropomorphizing the animals and stating their similarity to humans as the prohibitionists did, these physicians relied on arguments of radical alterity to demonstrate that animals could not stand in for humans in medical testing. Though these physicians highlight difference for scientific reasons, rather than unity for moralistic ones, they still pose a challenge to the practice of vivisection, showing that animal testing generated little gain.

Albert Leffingwell, a renowned American physician and reformer, took up the question of utility seriously in the 1880s, around the same time Collins was writing his novel. Leffingwell's article in an 1880 issue of Scribler's Monthly, entitled "The Vivisection Question," claims that vivisection demonstrations in classrooms do help students learn anatomy, but they merely prove points that are already known in the medical field at a high cost to animal life.[396] The article also demonstrates that some physiologists believe that vivisection has never imparted direct medical knowledge.[397] Leffingwell's 1884 article in Lippincott's Magazine discusses this idea in greater detail, arguing that there has been an exaggeration of the utility of vivisection.[398] The article quotes a German vivisector, Dr. Herman, in saying, "The advancement of our knowledge, and not practical utility to medicine, is the true and straightforward object of all vivisection."[399] This focus on abstract knowledge drove the divide between pro-

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[395] *Vivisection*.
[396] Albert Leffingwell, *The Vivisection Question* (New Haven: The Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor Company, 1901), 4, https://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.animal/vvsctnqstn0001&id=1&size=2&collection=animal&index=animal.
[397] Leffingwell, 32.
[398] Leffingwell, 31.
[399] Leffingwell, 32.

vivisectionists and antivivisectionists, with many scientists and physiologists arguing for the right to use animals for scientific exploration regardless of outcomes for the medical field, and many physicians arguing that vivisection did not provide ready cures or medical treatment options. The idea of utility pervades Collins' novel at every mention of vivisection. Benjulia and Mrs. Galilee embody the figure of the cold, calculating scientist, devoted to abstract knowledge for knowledge's sake, in hyperbolic proportions. The character of Benjulia, especially, and his explicit rejection of utility, forthrightly delivers Collins' critique of vivisection in the service of abstract knowledge, revealing his stance—so similar to Cobbe's and Hoggan's— that abstract ends do not justify violent means.

i. Vivisection as Foreign Threat

Embedded in this political turmoil surrounding vivisection was the idea that it threatened from beyond Britain's borders, causing antivivisection advocates to condemn the practice through xenophobic rhetoric. Scientists and physicians from the Continent were already viewed as other due to their nationality. Antivivisectionists used this perception to label them as monsters who operated outside of British values and forms of sympathy. Collins incorporates the figure of the foreign scientist into his novel by making Benjulia "of gipsy origin," and therefore racially (and perhaps nationally) distinct from the other characters. Benjulia most closely resembles François Magendie, the infamously cruel French vivisector, but his racial difference, through racist discourse, makes him stranger and even more monstrous than Magendie. The figure of Benjulia reveals the fear of difference within the

antivivisection movement and the way that fear was instrumentalized to build animosity against foreign scientists.

Indeed, the antivivisection movement emerged as a fearful reaction to pioneering vivisection practices that had arisen on the Continent in the early half of the nineteenth century. France took the lead in this more experimental form of physiology, through the work of Magendie and his acolyte, Claude Bernard. Magendie, known as the "French Butcher," was infamous for his cruelty, often refusing to anesthetize lab animals and delighting in their pain.[400] Albert Leffingwell, in Lippicott's Magazine, quotes Magendie with saying of his vivisected animals, "it is droll to see them skip and jump about."[401] The Baron Ernst von Weber, in his address to the Dresden Society entitled, "The Torture Chamber of Science," says of Magendie, "I seriously count him among the worst criminals that have ever lived."[402] The Baron recounts how Magendie nailed dogs to a table without the use of anesthetics for public demonstrations, "so that he might show his pupils more conveniently and uninterruptedly the separating of the nerves of the eyes, the sawing of the skull, the cutting of the spine, and the laying open of the different sets of nerves. Then he kept the poor animal, still alive, for the experiments of the next day."[403] Magendie clearly took pleasure in animal pain as public spectacle. His collaborator and successor, Claude Bernard, showed indifference to his animal test subjects, treating them as cogs in his highly systematic form of research.[404] Bernard devoutly pursued vivisection,

[400] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 38.
[401] Leffingwell, *The Vivisection Question*, 26.
[402] *[Vivisection Pamphlets]*, 1870, 6.
[403] *[Vivisection Pamphlets]*, 6.
[404] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 41.

having no outside interests to distract him from his extensive work on fistulas to study the digestive and endocrine systems.[405] Baron von Weber states that Bernard developed a stove "to study the slow death by heat of warm-blooded animals," which claimed the lives of seventeen dogs and twenty-two rabbits.[406] Under Magendie and Bernard, French physiology greatly increased scientific knowledge about how internal organs and systems function, but their experimental methods disturbed British physicians and antivivisection advocates, many of whom lobbied to keep vivisection out of Britain.

Literature of the time period demonstrates that the British people had a noted antipathy to vivisection in comparison with their European counterparts and viewed it as a foreign invasion of their values. In a pamphlet written by the Lord Chief Justice Coleridge of England on vivisection, he states that French scientists hoped that "we may be brought up to the foreign standard; that our insular prejudice may be purged away by degrees, and that in time we may feel the beauty and enter into the nobility of M. de Cyon's description of 'the true vivisector.'"[407] The Lord Chief Justice reacts with aversion, stating that he does not want England to mold itself in "the true vivisector" image. Baron von Weber holds up the English suspicion toward and regulation of vivisection as a sign that his native Germany is less civilized than England. He cites four reasons, "wanting among us," for England's humane treatment of animals:

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[405] Obenchain, 42.
[406] *[Vivisection Pamphlets]*, 6.
[407] Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection, *Twelfth Annual Report of the Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection*, 5.

1. By the religious tendency of the English nation;
2. By the warm sympathy of the aristocracy and the clergy in general;
3. By the influence of cultivated women, which is greater than with us;
4. By the great powers of the press and of public opinion.[408]

As I demonstrated above, antivisectionists often used religious language to equate the existence of all living creatures in the eyes of God. Religious arguments thus held great sway in the British antivivisection movement. Below I explore, in greater depth, the influence of "cultivated women" and "public opinion" of shoring up an image of English superiority over the controversy of vivisection.

Perhaps the leader of England's "cultivated women" against vivisection, Frances Power Cobbe made it her main objective in the early years of the antivivisection movement to prevent the practice from migrating from the Continent into England.[409] While in Italy, Cobbe had written against famous vivisector Professor Maurice Schiff in *La Nazione*, arguing against his methods with anthropomorphic tactics.[410] However, this emphasis on anthropomorphism was ethnocentric—Cobbe espoused a British form of sentimentality toward animals that the Italian public rejected.[411] Antivivisectionists therefore imposed English values onto the treatment of animals on the Continent while also representing scientists in these countries as barbaric and in need of reform. The antivivisection movement exhibited xenophobia

[408] *[Vivisection Pamphlets]*, 11.
[409] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 47.
[410] Obenchain, 25.
[411] Obenchain, 25.

toward physiologists outside England and made part of their agenda a civilizing mission.

But in reality, although English physiology lagged behind the Continent, vivisection in its most cruel forms already existed there—it just occurred behind the closed doors of laboratories where it was not exposed to the outrage of public opinion. In the Extracts from the Royal Commission, testimony from Sir William Fergusson, the Sergeant-Surgeon to the Queen, reveals the English repulsion to practices of vivisection that foreground cruelty. When asked whether he has seen animals crucified for multiple days, as in the case of Magendie's demonstration, he confirms it.[412] The commissioner then asks:

> Do you believe that to be done, not only on the continent of Europe but also in this country?—I believe it to be done in this country, from what I have heard.
>
> You think that if the public really knew what was actually going on in this country at this time they would expect an interference on the part of the Crown and Parliament?—I do think so, just as much as with reference to the disinterring of dead bodies years ago.[413]

The first question shows that these cruel demonstrations are known to occur on the Continent but not widely discussed in England. Fergusson confirms that such experiments do occur in England, which prompts the subsequent question about public outrage. The commissioner makes clear that these sorts of experiments occur in secret

[412] *Vivisection*, 18.
[413] *Vivisection*, 18.

without public knowledge; though the public may know of Magendie and the French physiologists, they would not allow such abuses to occur in England and would thus appeal to their government to restrict these practices. Fergusson also puts animal cruelty on par with the "disinterring of dead [human] bodies," in a sense equating animal life with human life.

The fact that the debate over vivisection became so heated in England did draw attention to so-called British sympathy. Antivivisection advocates in other nations, such as the United States, took note of British public outrage against vivisection and held Britain up as an antivivisection model. For example, Leffingwell's article in Lippincott's Magazine appeals to its American readers:

> There can be little doubt, I think, that the sentiment of compassion and of sympathy with suffering is more generally diffused among all classes of Great Britain than elsewhere in Europe; and one cannot help wondering what our place might be, were it possible to institute any reliable comparison of national humanity. Should we be found in all respects as sensitive as the English people? Would indignation and protest be as quickly and spontaneously evoked among us by a cruel act?[414]

Leffingwell distinguishes England from Europe in terms of "compassion" and "sympathy," which he identifies as inherent character traits of the English people. He builds up a notion of English exceptionalism in which he upholds England as a paradigm for other countries, America especially. When he speaks of "indignation and protest," he gestures to the history of the antivivisection movement and its various

[414] Leffingwell, *The Vivisection Question*, 27.

attempts at legislation in England in the late nineteenth century, urging America to follow the English example.

In his fictional reflection on the antivivisection movement, Collins draws on Victorian British forms of sympathy that Rae Greiner describes in her book on nineteenth-century realism. Greiner states that "sympathetic thinking leads to fellow-feeling, an affective, social mode of understanding central to reality as the nineteenth-century novelists sought to depict it."[415] This may seem strange because Collins wrote sensation novels, rather than realist novels. Yet to categorize *Heart and Science* as antithetical to realism fails to show its realist impact. Collins' his close attention to the details and debates of the vivisection question positions his family melodrama against a backdrop of realism and it urges readers to engage with the vivisection debates taking place in their own reality. By holding a mirror up to the real events of the 1880s, he attempts to incite readers to take a stance in the antivivisection movement. The novel works to invoke "fellow-feeling" for Carmina most particularly, as an orphan, recent immigrant, and unprotected ward of an abusive guardian. Like Frankenstein's Creature, Carmina lacks a loving parental figure, exposing her to the dangers of the wider world. Like Heathcliff, Carmina must integrate into violent and cruel family that loathes her foreignness but fears her ability to inherit the family money. Yet he also generates the reader's sympathy for the animals Carmina becomes associated with, demonstrating that sympathy can cross the species boundary and must do so in the antivivisection cause. I argue that Collins uses sympathy, especially sympathy for animals, to create a realistic work of advocacy, a novel-length equivalent

[415] Greiner, *Sympathetic Realism in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction*, 4.

to the pamphlet press that distributed the antivivisection message. In doing so, however, he relies on the contemporary rhetoric of the antivivisection movement to portray sympathy toward animals in a way that was bound up with British nationalism.

The British antivivisection movement promoted the idea of British humanity and sensitivity against what they saw as the barbarity of foreign physiologists. This rhetoric was xenophobic even as it attempted to grapple with vivisection practices among England's own medical establishment. Collins characterizes Benjulia as a foreign other as a reflection of the xenophobia of the antivivisection movement. He creates Benjulia in the image of Magendie and Bernard—at times indifferent, at times diabolical toward human and animal life. Though Benjulia is not explicitly foreign in terms of nationality, the novel's portrayal of him as racially distinct, with a little developed backstory and a mysterious house and laboratory outside of town, serve to separate him from the other characters and from British forms of sympathy. The xenophobia of the antivivisection movement makes it politically complex. The anthropomorphism used in the antivivisection movement was conservative and intolerant with regard to race and nationality, even as it was progressive with regard to gender, as I will demonstrate in the following section. The political consequences of the anthropomorphism used in the antivivisection movement are therefore inconsistent and serve divergent ends: though it harms foreigners and (in the case of Collins' novel) people of color, it serves to benefit white, British women.

ii. Antivivisection as Feminist Movement

As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Carmina becomes metonymically linked to Benjulia's lab animals, exposing the fear that vivisection would migrate from animal bodies to women's bodies. This anxiety about the connection between animals and women existed in the earliest days of the antivivisection movement: though it arose out of concerns over animal cruelty that had emerged earlier in the nineteenth century, it also developed largely from the nineteenth-century women's movement. Frances Power Cobbe dominated the antivivisection movement for the latter part of the century and her early reform activities focused on the feminist cause. Cobbe advocated for expanded rights for women in many sectors, including granting women the right to vote and to enter the ministry.[416] She also railed against the patriarchal constraints marriage imposed on women and the domestic violence those constraints often engendered.[417] To evade heterosexual marriage herself, Cobbe visited a women's enclave in Florence in 1863, where she met Mary Lloyd, who was to become her life partner.[418]

In addition to opposing the controlling presence of husbands, Cobbe also criticized the influence of male doctors over their women patients. An ankle injury in 1862 and the resulting incompetence of her physicians caused Cobbe to deride medical professionals throughout her life.[419] But on a wider societal scale, doctors proved highly inept and often manipulative when treating women patients. Physicians often diagnosed women with fragility of mind and body, a condition that Dr. Charles

[416] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 18.
[417] Obenchain, 18.
[418] Obenchain, 23.
[419] Obenchain, 17.

Beard named "Nervous Exhaustion" in 1880.[420] Symptoms included depression, lack of energy, and phobias, and could escalate to hysteria.[421] Many doctors prescribed rest and isolation from friends and activities, which generally worsened the condition, causing a perpetual spiral that made these upper-class women forever dependent on their physicians.[422] Cobbe castigated doctors for this misogynistic manipulation in her essay "The Little Health of Ladies." She critiques society's treatment of women as invalids by complaining, "That the Creator should have planned a whole sex of Patients…this to me is simply incredible."[423] Here she argues that women are not naturally feeble and ill—society deems them so for the financial profit of male doctors.

The antivivisection movement portrayed physicians as men who preyed on women as well as animals. Ellen Stockstill demonstrates that antivivisectionists not only accused doctors of "promoting female invalidism," but they also likened invasive medical practices with rape (128).[424] Animals were subject to the same types of invasive procedures, but the results were not sexual violation, but torture and death. As Stockstill shows, "For Cobbe, and for many of her followers, the desire to protect animals aligned with the desire to protect female bodies."[425] Coral Lansbury reveals that these connections between women and animals and between rape and torture emerged from popular genres of pornography prevalent in late nineteenth-century

[420] Obenchain, 19.
[421] Obenchain, 19.
[422] Obenchain, 19–20.
[423] Obenchain, 20.
[424] Penner and Sparks, *Victorian Medicine and Popular Culture*, 128.
[425] Penner and Sparks, 128.

Britain which featured non-consensual sex between Jack the riding master and his female pupil.[426] In this genre, Jack would break his victim like a young horse, strapping down his victim and beating her with a riding whip and a switch before raping her. At the moment of violation however, the woman's terror would turn to pleasure, and finally "broken," she would take up the whip as one of Jack's minions.[427] Accounts of vivisected animals mirrored these pornographic novels, with the male doctor strapping his animal victim down and subjecting the creature to torment. Unlike the women in the novels, though, animals continued to struggle against their tormentor until their deaths.[428] Lansbury claims that many women were moved to sympathy for these animals out of outrage for the atrocities that men committed against women, and that "continually animals were seen as surrogates for women who read their own misery into the vivisector's victims."[429]

As a result, the antivivisection movement became highly gendered, with many women supporting the antivivisection cause against a largely male medical field. The split became so acute by the 1880s that the International Medical Congress of 1881 banned 43 practicing female physicians from attending.[430] They hoped to pass a resolution stating the importance of animal test subjects in scientific research and worried that the attendance of women delegates would compromise the vote.[431] Accounts from doctors who practiced vivisection also linked women with

[426] Lansbury, *The Old Brown Dog*, 123.
[427] Lansbury, 125.
[428] Lansbury, 127.
[429] Lansbury, 128.
[430] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 127.
[431] Obenchain, 127.

antivivisection and anti-cruelty more generally. An 1879 pamphlet written by surgeon Edward Ward, entitled "Vivisection Necessary to Physiological Discovery," portrays women as impediments to scientific experimentation. Ward states that human subjects from "the British criminal class" would be preferable to animals in studying traits unique to man: "There could be no harm in utilising for the public good such as have been sentenced to death; but with a woman on the throne we must not expect this."[432] Indeed, Queen Victoria opposed the vivisection of animals, so criminals would have been out of the question.[433] Ward blames not only the queen, but also his wife for too sentimental an attachment to living beings. When he and his colleagues find a dog that has saved seven people from drowning, they decide to perform tests to discover the material cause of its benevolence, leading to outrage from his wife:

> Mrs. Ward said, 'Edward, let that dog go; it's got the ghost of somebody in it; it has quite the look of your grandfather's picture in its eyes.' We had to turn Mrs. Ward out; the dog was evidently begging hard of her to be let off. We couldn't, though even to please her; it was so fine a subject. I believe that dog had great benevolence in its brain; it showed signs of it when probed fully

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[432] Edward Ward, *Vivisection Necessary to Physiological Discovery: In Which Is Related Researches on the Localisation of the Functions of the Brain, Verifying Phrenology, and the Result of the Action of Various Chemical Solvents on Living Animal Tissues, Embracing the Results of More than a Hundred Unlicensed Experiments on Live Animals in Bayswater: To Which Is Added an Account of the Vain and Futile Attempts of the Right Honourable R.A. Cross, the Home Secretary, to Discover Our Operations, the Letters of Mr. George Busk, F.R.S., the Home Office Inspector of Vivisection, the Earl of Shaftesbury's Comments on the Case, the Ridiculous Conduct of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, in Jermyn Street; with a Complete Proof of the Bona Fide Character of the Authors, and a Full Vindication of the Accuracy and Credibility of C.O. Groom Napier, Esq., F.G.S., and of His Statements in the New Quarterly Magazine, "Burlington House," and of Various Other Witnesses* (London: James Burns, 1879), 5, http://find.galegroup.com/openurl/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&res_id=info:sid/gale:NCCO&ctx_enc=info:ofi:enc:UTF-8&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:unknown&rft.artnum=CIPNSB478193822&req_dat=info:sid/gale:ugnid:cornell.

[433] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 82.

> more than some human beings. Mrs. Ward scolded us about that dog for a week, and before we were done with it, gave it the prussic. We men have sometimes a good deal to suffer from our wives.[434]

Mrs. Ward stands in the way of the experiment throughout: she attempts to prevent it beforehand, cuts it short by putting the dog out of its misery, and remonstrates the doctors for a week afterward. Her appeal relies on anthropomorphism, likening the dog to Ward's grandfather and thereby increasing its standing and worth. Such a mystical argument does not seem to sway the rational mind of the scientist, yet he also anthropomorphizes the dog by attributing to it more benevolence than some humans. Mrs. Ward's anthropomorphism increases the worth of the dog's life, while Dr. Ward's does not—or rather, his anthropomorphism makes the dog worth more dead than alive. The irony of the anecdote is that the surgeon recognizes that the dog shows more benevolence than some humans, but he does not seem to recognize that he fits within that category by using up the dog's life and thoughtlessly discarding it. Mrs. Ward shows benevolence by attempting to spare the dog but for this she receives her husband's scorn. Dr. Ward casts himself as the victim of both Mrs. Ward's nagging and the dog's death before the end of the experiments, when the dog is the real victim of torture and death at his hands. Ward's misogynistic disdain for women and his lack of empathy for the animal are bound up together in this passage. He sees Mrs. Ward's concern for animal life as feminine sentimentality, causing him to condescendingly criticize her actions. In searching for the root cause of benevolence, he tramples on

[434] Ward, *Vivisection Necessary to Physiological Discovery*, 7.

and stamps out the benevolent acts of woman and dog, life forms he sees as mere fodder for scientific advancement.

This passage reveals a metonymic relationship between the dog and the woman. Both occupy positions of inferiority in the eyes of the male doctor and receive ill treatment from him. The woman attempts to defend the dog, acting as a symbol for the wider antivivisection movement and its base of women activists. As I mentioned earlier, Lansbury argues that women saw themselves within the vivisected animal: "when these women wept for tortured animals, they were crying for themselves."[435] Though many women probably did see these lab animals in a symbolic or allegorical way, I argue that the relationship between them is more than metaphorical. The connection here does not unite totally dissimilar experiences, nor are women merely using animals as a vehicle for their own storytelling. I claim that the relationship between women and animals in Collins' novel, and indeed, in the wider antivivisection movement exhibits metonymy rather than metaphor because women and animals experienced similar forms of abuse and disregard from men in nineteenth-century England. Their societal positions, though somewhat different because of the species barrier, are proximate and entangled.

Classic linguistic studies on metaphor and metonymy establish polarity or opposition between these two terms, though more recent cognitive linguistic investigations nuance this view by locating them on a continuum; for this study on the relationship between women and animals in the antivivisection movement, I find the difference between metaphor and metonymy useful for describing how activists

[435] Lansbury, *The Old Brown Dog*, 129.

portrayed this relationship. Roman Jakobsen famously structured metaphor and metonymy as two poles, aligning metaphor with similarity and metonymy with contiguity.[436] William Croft further developed this line of argumentation by defining these figures in relation to linguistic domains, noting that the terms of a metaphor cross domains and the terms of a metonymy exist within a single domain because the terms are contiguous.[437] Linguists have taken issue with "contiguity" as a vague concept; Charles Denroche, for example, has put forth the word "relatedness" instead to better describe the relationship between the two terms.[438] Contiguity and relatedness both describe well what I mean when I say the antivivisection movement described a metonymic relationship between women and animals: the two groups occupy adjacent positions within species hierarchies. Denroche also asserts that while metaphor is unidirectional in terms of its comparison, metonymy can operate in multiple directions.[439] Antivivisection women activists likened themselves to the animals on the torture table (thus "crying for themselves"), but they also likened the animals to themselves, arguing that the animals deserved the right to live free of pain and suffering.

Metonymy is a particularly useful figure here due to its close association with embodiment. Kathryn Allan argues that both metaphor and metonymy are embodied

[436] René Dirven, *Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast* (De Gruyter Mouton, 2009), 42, https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?custid=s9001366&groupid=main&profid=pfi&authtype=ip,guest&direct=true&db=edspub&AN=edp943900&site=eds-live&scope=site.
[437] René Dirven, 178.
[438] Charles Denroche, *Metonymy and Language: A New Theory of Linguistic Processing* (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 73.
[439] Denroche, 72.

and cannot be disentangled from everyday life.[440] She writes of metonymy involving animals specifically that people have a "compulsion to see humans as animals, and animals as humans" and that "language itself is anthropomorphic, since it is designed by and for humans."[441] Allan's claim dovetails with the type of chiasmus I describe in the second chapter, through *Wuthering Heights*' tendency to humanize animals and animalize humans. As I described in that chapter, and as Allan confirms, people have a need to describe animals in human terms, though associating groups of humans with animals tends to be derogatory according to the Great Chain of Being, emphasizing "subhumanity rather than actual animality."[442] Antivivisectionist women bewail seeing themselves in the animal because animal status means subhumanity and victimization. Yet they also want to defend animals to defend themselves, a form of advocacy that argues for women's rights and animal rights simultaneously.

The antivivisection movement's fears that vivisection would move from animals to women came to a head around the turn of the century, when news reports claimed that physicians in Austria were routinely practicing vivisection on human patients. The controversy became especially heated in America, where the Senate launched an investigation of these practices of human vivisection. Senate document 78 reports, "It has been discovered that the physicians in the free hospitals of Vienna systematically experiment upon their patients, especially new-born children, women

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[440] Kathryn Allan, *Metaphor and Metonymy: A Diachronic Approach* (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 3, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015080827333?urlappend=%3Bsignon=swle:https://shibidp.cit.cornell.edu/idp/shibboleth.
[441] Allan, 127–28.
[442] Allan, 139.

who are enceinte, and persons who are dying."[443] The report reveals that the physicians preyed upon people who had few rights already, including terminally ill patients, women, and children. The antivivisectionist women activists' greatest fear had been realized: vivisection had made a leap from animals to women. Their vulnerabilities matched the vulnerabilities of animals, making them easy targets in a society that privileged male scientists and doctors and granted women few protections.

The American response to this sensational news story from Vienna was predictably xenophobic, demonstrating that vivisection still retained its image as a barbaric Continental practice. The Senate document castigates the Vienna vivisector thus:

> Such a man rivals the unspeakable Turk in his depravity, and puts an indelible stain upon the fair fame of medicine. If words can shock, and sear, and blister his mind into a consciousness of the awful nature of his crime, then it is the duty of Anglo-Saxon physicians to unceasingly speak those words.[444]

The passage contains not merely xenophobic sentiment but overtly racist language. It draws upon stereotypes of the "Turk" as "unspeakable" and depraved, much in the same way that *Frankenstein* describes Safie's father, the Turkish merchant, as malicious and dishonest. Though the document refers to doctors in Vienna, it increases the urgency of its propagandist message by othering them still further—if Austrian does not cause alarm amongst the American public, Turk surely does through its racist connotations. In calling on "Anglo-Saxon physicians to unceasingly speak those words

[443] *[Vivisection Pamphlets]*, 3.
[444] *[Vivisection Pamphlets]*, 20.

[against the vivisection in Vienna], the document assumes a white, Anglo-Saxon readership who view themselves on a higher moral plane than Austrians and Turks. The document therefore relies on savior rhetoric: the "Anglo-Saxon physicians" must continuously point out the evil of human vivisection until the foreign physicians see the error of their ways. The Anglo-Saxon doctors must save women from becoming the victims of foreign doctors, which undergirds the premise of the plot of Collins' novel, published twenty years earlier. Though several American doctors, including Dr. W.W. Keen questioned the validity of the human vivisection scandal, calling the reports "vague and indefinite," the real issue I want to highlight here has to do with activists' fears over what they believed *could* happen surrounding the practice of vivisection. The early antivivisection pamphlets, as well as Collins' novel, demonstrate an acute anxiety that women could succumb to experimentation in the same way animals had at the hands of foreign scientists and doctors. Regardless of the accuracy of the Austrian human vivisection reports, the resulting frenzy exposes the reality of that fear in the early decades of the antivivisection movement.

Taking a Stance on Vivisection: *Heart and Science*

Heart and Science demonstrates throughout that Collins had a firm grasp of the vivisection question; his narrative closely follows the tactics the antivivisection pamphlet literature, casting its vivisector as other and foreign and drawing a parallel between his animal test subjects and the young woman protagonist. The core tenets of the vivisection debate—the comparative value of human and animal lives, the utility of the practice, and the scientist's devotion to abstract knowledge— surface most

prominently in the conversation between Benjulia and his brother, Lemuel, in the middle of the novel. Lemuel has lately joined a society for the suppression of vivisection and he visits Benjulia to argue his case against him. Steve Farmer's footnote states that Lemuel's arguments reflect popular antivivisection attitudes during the 1870s and the early 1880s, when the novel was published.[445] Lemuel begins with the question of justice, asking why the law permits the killing of animals when it does not permit the killing of man. When Benjulia has no rejoinder, Lemuel postulates:

> Suppose he said, Because a dog is an animal? Could he, as a physiologist, deny that man is an animal too?
>
> Suppose he said, Because a dog is the inferior creature in intellect? The obvious answer to this would be, But the lower order of savage, or the lower order of lunatic, compared with the dog, is the inferior creature in intellect; and, in these cases, the dog has, on your own showing, the better right to protection of the two.
>
> Suppose he said, Because a man is a creature with a soul, and a dog is a creature without a soul? This would be simply inviting another unanswerable question: How do you know?[446]

Lemuel's argument rests on the indeterminate boundary between humans and animals. Like Carroll, he points out that the scientists have classified humans as animals evolutionarily, so the dog cannot receive worse treatment on the grounds of classification as an animal. Though Cobbe described nonhuman animals as sentient

[445] Collins, *Heart and Science*, 187, footnote 2.
[446] Collins, 188.

but not moral beings, Lemuel does not seem so sure. When he hypothesizes that a dog does not deserve protection because it does not have a soul, he responds, "How do you know?" His argumentation moves from biological distinctions into race science when he asserts that a dog has a higher level of intellect than "the lower order of savage" and a sounder mind than "the lower order of lunatic." This racist ideology places the familiar—the household pet—in a position of superiority over foreign and racially different peoples, as well as the disabled, placing the British household as the apex of civilization regardless of the species of its occupants.

To bolster his argument, Lemuel hands Benjulia the letter from Mr. Morphew, Benjulia's acquaintance in Montreal to whom he had introduced Ovid. Morphew states in his letter that he intends to publish a book about the "false pretences" under which physiologists practice vivisection.[447] His knowledge here is less legalistic and philosophical than Lemuel's and more medical. Unlike Lemuel, who draws attention to the close similarity between humans and animals, Morphew highlights the radical alterity between them. He cites instances in which poisons affect animals and humans differently; in which surgeries effective on dogs prove dangerous for human patients. His views echo the Royal Commission testimony of physicians who found vivisection useless because experiments on animals could not translate to experiments on humans. By highlighting the inassimilable difference between human and nonhuman animal bodies, Morphew speaks to issues of utility so prevalent in the discourse of the antivivisection movement. By demonstrating that the experiments serve no purpose in

[447] Collins, 189.

the advancement of medical science for human patients, he argues that such experiments have no place in medical practice.

When Benjulia finally responds to Lemuel and Morphew's letter, his outburst betrays signs of his megalomania. He denounces public opinion of his work, exclaiming, "'Knowledge is its own justification and its own reward. The roaring mob follows us with its cry of Cruelty. We pity their ignorance. Knowledge sanctifies cruelty."[448] Benjulia's invoking of the necessity of "Cruelty" and his "ends justify the means" mentality place him in the class of scientific men who defy moral bounds. He exhibits the "inhumanity" and "callousness to animal suffering" that the Royal Commission's report had warned could inhabit "persons of very high position as physiologists." Benjulia's worship of knowledge despite its costs likens him to Victor Frankenstein, who possibly forges his Creature through an act of vivisection. Frankenstein strives toward knowledge but refuses to attend to the monstrous consequences, forever haunted by dreams of animals vivisecting him and hunted by his own hybrid progeny.

In this moment, Benjulia, unlike Frankenstein, does not anticipate his own hubristic downfall, completed by his act of suicide at the end of the novel, but Lemuel does threaten him with the vengeance of his dog. Lemuel tells Benjulia that his dog "'doesn't take kindly to scientific gentlemen in your line of business…If he smelt *that* [the blood on Benjulia's hands], he might try his teeth at vivisecting You."[449] Like the animals in Frankenstein's dreams who inflict "incessant torture" on him, Lemuel

[448] Collins, 190.
[449] Collins, 185.

envisions an act of vengeance in which his dog vivisects the vivisector. By speaking for his dog, Lemuel anthropomorphizes him, giving him voice and agency over Benjulia. Benjulia tells him that by "'interpret[ing] the language of your dog just now…I naturally supposed your brain must be softening."[450] But even Benjulia admits that he finds Lemuel sound of mind. His translation of his dog's language and his assumption of his dog's distress with vivisection rings not with absurdity but with a close consideration of species hierarchies. By suggesting that his dog might want to vivisect his brother, Lemuel flips animacy hierarchies, giving power to the dog over the man and prophesying vivisection's defeat at the end of the novel.

i. Benjulia's Vivisection as Foreign Threat

As I have mentioned, Collins represents Benjulia as a person of color to make him monstrous in the eyes of a white readership, but also to connect him to the foreign vivisectors that these readers would likely have othered and abhorred. He has a "gipsy-brown" complexion, and "his straight black hair hung as gracelessly on either side of his hollow face as the hair of an American Indian."[451] His appearance draws stares—Teresa "reviled him…as an ugly beast!"—and "even his name startled people by the outlandish sound of it."[452] This representation connects him to two racial groups (Romani and American Indian) with the racist intention of casting him as bizarre and less than human. His physical appearance is meant to frighten the reader as a manifestation of his horrifying inner nature. Benjulia's racial identity is significant

[450] Collins, 189.
[451] Collins, 95.
[452] Collins, 95.

here because it is bound up with the racialized portrayal of vivisection throughout the novel. Ovid Vere, the Anglo antivivisectionist physician, calls vivisection "the Savage Science."[453] "Savage" imparts the idea of violence and barbarity; it implies foreign countries and peoples, particularly Indigenous peoples, whom the English viewed as more primitive and less civilized than themselves. The novel makes Benjulia a savage in physical appearance in order to match "the Savage Science" he performs in his laboratory.

During the confrontation between Benjulia and his brother, Lemuel gives Benjulia a copy of Mr. Morphew's letter, which demonstrates that "the Savage Science" has originated outside of England but now threatens to overcome English scientists.

> Briefly stated, you now have the method by which I propose to drag the scientific English Savage from his shelter behind the medical interests of humanity, and to show him in his true character,—as plainly as the scientific Foreign Savage shows himself of his own accord. He doesn't shrink behind false pretences. He doesn't add cant to cruelty. He boldly proclaims the truth:—I do it, because I like it![454]

By "scientific Foreign Savage," Morphew implies physiologists from the Continent, who have had no shame in admitting their vivisection practices and demonstrating them in public. He indicts English physiologists with the same violence, calling them "the scientific English Savage," but charges them with hiding their actions behind the

[453] Collins, 136.
[454] Collins, 189.

"medical interests of humanity." The hidden agenda reveals a fundamental English fear about vivisection, as evidenced in some of the Royal Commission testimonies, namely, that the public would not stand for vivisection if they knew what was happening behind closed laboratory doors. This type of "savagery," he suggests, though expected in other countries, could never endure the scrutiny of the civilized standards of the English people. Yet Morphew claims that this savagery does exist in England and that many physiologists perform their experiments out of desire and pleasure—"I do it because I like it!" Benjulia, defensive but in accord, throws down the letter and says, "'*I* proclaim the truth…*I* do it because I like it.'"[455] Benjulia in effect proclaims himself a "scientific English savage." Unlike Albert Leffingwell and other American antivivisectionists who see English regulations against vivisection as the ideal model, Benjulia takes the foreign (presumably European) physiologists as his standard. In his following extended monologue to Lemuel, he asserts, "'I stand with my foreign brethren—Knowledge for its own sake, is the one god I worship.'"[456] Benjulia identifies himself in solidarity with the "scientific Foreign Savages" through interior values that the novel manifests in his "foreign" outward appearance.

Collins clearly creates Benjulia in the image of François Magendie, the symbol of French scientific brutality. By many accounts Magendie was disagreeable toward both his animal test subjects and other scientists. He often made light of animals' pain and seemed to enjoy mutilating animals, as Leffingwell describes. He also had a confrontational personality and often belittled other scientists.[457] Benjulia exhibits

[455] Collins, 190.
[456] Collins, 190.
[457] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 38.

similarly psychopathic tendencies through his cruel indifference toward humans and animals alike. When he sees Teresa for the first time at the Zoological Gardens, "his gloomy gray eyes rested on her, as they might have rested on any inanimate object near him—on the railing that imprisoned the birds, or on the pipes that kept the monkey-house warm."[458] Benjulia appears to have no concept of animacy—he sees people in the same way as he sees objects, especially in terms of their use value. In this passage, he only views the "railing" in terms of its function as a prison for the birds and the "pipes" in their capacity to heat the building, both of which contribute to the purpose of detaining living animals. Where Magendie is hot-headed, Benjulia is cold and systematic like his successor, Bernard—yet both Magendie and Benjulia show a lack of regard toward living beings.

It is perhaps the final scene of Benjulia's laboratory at the end of the novel that identifies him with European vivisectors and Magendie more particularly. Just before Benjulia destroys his laboratory and takes his own life, he frees all the animals. First all the cats and rabbits escape, then "in a moment more, the last of the liberated creatures came out—a large dog, limping as if one of its legs was injured. It stopped as it passed the master, and tried to fawn on him. He threatened it with his hand."[459] The fawning dog is a prominent figure in antivivisection propaganda, used to demonstrate the dog's loyalty even in the face of torture and to gain sympathy from pet owners. One of the most oft reprinted anecdotes of the fawning dog comes from Magendie's

[458] Collins, *Heart and Science*, 96.
[459] Collins, 323.

laboratory. The London Anti-Vivisection Society's pamphlet, "A Noble Tribute to Man's Best Friend" contains this anecdote:

> "I recall to mind," says Dr. Latour, who was present at the time a poor dog, the roots of whose vertebral nerves Majendie desired to lay bare to demonstrate Bell's theory which he claimed as his own, 'the dog mutilated and bleeding, *twice* escaped from under the implacable knife, and threw its front paws around Majendie's neck, licking, as if to soften its murderer and ask for mercy."[460]

The passage implies that the dog's prostrations are in vain and that Magendie does become a "murderer," incapable of sympathy toward the creature. Though Benjulia frees the dog in the passage from the novel, he does so as a gesture of his final defeat. He has clearly injured the dog in one of his experiments, but the dog still appeals to him for mercy and even affection. But even in this moment of emancipation, Benjulia cannot show mercy and acts violently toward the dog by "threatening it with his hand."

Collins associates Benjulia with Magendie to represent vivisection as a foreign threat, yet he also ties him to David Ferrier, the Scottish neurologist, to demonstrate how vivisection has migrated from the Continent into British physiology. Frances Power Cobbe brought the first lawsuit under the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 against Ferrier in 1881 for practicing without a license, though the charges were soon afterward dismissed.[461] The timing and result of the trial likely had a strong influence

[460] *[Vivisection Pamphlets]*.
[461] Obenchain, *The Victorian Vivisection Debate*, 146–47.

on the writing of *Heart and Science*, which Collins published in 1884. According to Dr. J.H. Clarke's, "Monkeys' Brains Once More," printed in the *Zoophilist* in 1888, "The name of Professor Ferrier is indissolubly connected with the vivisection of monkeys" and "the most distressing feature in these experiments is this, there is no finality in them; the offering up of one victim on the altar of science necessarily entails the offering up of many more," leading to "the indefinite multiplication of vivisected monkeys."[462] Ferrier experimented extensively and publicly on monkeys' brains; Collins portrays Benjulia with a monkey test subject early in the novel in a move that condemns Benjulia in the same way that the Victoria Street Society condemned Ferrier at Bow Street. When we are first introduced to Benjulia at the Zoological Gardens, Zo tells Carmina that "there's a sick monkey in the gardens" and that the "big doctor" (Benjulia) "says he'll see the poor monkey, as soon as he's done with Ovid" and "perhaps he'd take the monkey home with him.'"[463] When Carmina inquires about the creature, Miss Minerva responds, "'Doctor Benjulia wouldn't be interested in the monkey unless it had a disease of the brain.'"[464] Like Ferrier, Benjulia plans to take the monkey for his own scientific practice and to dissect its brain. His unwavering interest in the monkey exposes his animal experimentation, but also establishes his antisocial demeanor and lack of feeling toward living things from the beginning. When Ovid attempts to introduce him to Carmina, he replies, "'No, thank you…I'd rather see the monkey.'"[465] Benjulia's shows a greater investment in

[462] *[Vivisection Pamphlets]*, 2–3.
[463] Collins, *Heart and Science*, 99.
[464] Collins, 99.
[465] Collins, 104.

scientific knowledge than in social interaction and a greater interest in animals than in people—so long as they serve his scientific ends. The irony here is that he soon becomes as interested in seeing Carmina as he was in the monkey, and for the same reason. As soon as Carmina falls victim to a "disease of the brain," she becomes a fascinating experimental subject for him, no different from the monkey. Dr. Clarke writes, "We suppose that if the conditions were reversed—if monkeys had the right-conferring might to vivisect man—the physiologists would raise no objection, provided they were not themselves the victims."[466] Indeed, Benjulia has no qualms about using a human subject; as long as he stands to gain knowledge from his experiment and not fall victim to it, he finds it justifiable.

The character of Benjulia therefore encapsulates the antivivisection movement's xenophobic fears of Continental physiologists and the anxieties surrounding vivisection's growing prominence in England, as shown by the Ferrier trial in the early 1880s. The horrors of his work must match the horrors of his person and his personality: in order to turn the reader against vivisection, Collins makes Benjulia a monster. Yet Collins' depiction of the foreign threat of vivisection is more nuanced than many of his activist contemporaries'. Throughout the novel, Ovid, the British physician, serves as the voice of sentiment and sensitivity against Benjulia's vivisection. But the ultimate statement against vivisection appears in the book written by the mixed-race doctor Ovid nursed in Montreal. In his letter to Carmina, Ovid says the doctor is "a mulatto from the Southern States of America, by birth."[467] Thus, this

[466] *[Vivisection Pamphlets]*, 1.
[467] Collins, *Heart and Science*, 159.

doctor and Benjulia represent the only people of color in the novel. But while Collins uses Benjulia's race as a marker of evil, he does not use this form of racism in his portrayal of the mixed-race doctor. When Ovid finds the papers the doctor has left to him after his death, Ovid writes, "he, and he alone, has solved a problem in the treatment of disease, which has thus far been the despair of medical men throughout the whole civilised world."[468] Ovid places the doctor at the apex of the "civilised world" of the medical field, in direct contrast to Benjulia and his "Savage Science," demonstrating that vivisection cannot always be tied to race or nationality.

Indeed, the doctor vehemently opposes the "Savage Science," beginning his papers with a condemnation of vivisection in the research and treatment of brain disease:

> Whatever faults and failings I may have been guilty of as a man, I am innocent, in my professional capacity of ever having perpetrated the useless and detestable cruelties which go by the name of Vivisection. Without entering into any of the disputes on either side, which this practice has provoked, I declare my conviction that no asserted usefulness in the end, can justify deliberate cruelty in the means.[469]

The doctor reiterates antivivisection arguments about the use value of vivisection, proclaiming it "useless" and asserting that even in instances where it may advance knowledge or treatment, the good that may come of it does not "justify deliberate

[468] Collins, 160.
[469] Collins, 307.

cruelty in the means." He then goes on to criticize a famous vivisector, identified by Collins as David Ferrier in the Preface, stating,

> A celebrated physiologist, plainly avowing the ignorance of doctors in the matter of the brain and its diseases, and alluding to appearances presented by post-mortem examination, concludes his confession thus: 'We cannot even be sure whether many of the changes discovered are the cause or the result of the disease, or whether the two are the conjoint results of a common cause.' So this man writes, after experience in Vivisection.[470]

Given the connections drawn between Ferrier and Benjulia, the passage serves to show the inefficacy of Benjulia's use of vivisection in his investigation of brain disease and foreshadows Benjulia's imminent self-destruction. But though Collins makes the mixed-race doctor the mouthpiece of the antivivisection movement at the end of the novel, his writing relies on Ovid for publication and distribution to a wider public. It is only due to the sympathy of the Anglo doctor, acting as a savior figure in his capacity as a physician and an antivivisection advocate, that the words of the mixed-race doctor live beyond his death. Ovid also materially benefits from this doctor's discoveries—in his letter to Carmina, Ovid tells her, "My future career is an object of interest to my future wife. This poor fellow's gratitude has opened new prospects to me."[471] His act of charity earns him profit and prestige that the mixed-race doctor never receives. The novel, therefore, still relies on nativist notions of British sentiment and moral superiority in its challenge to animal experimentation.

[470] Collins, 308.
[471] Collins, 160.

ii. Metonymy Between Women and Animals in Heart and Science

In addition to portraying Benjulia's vivisection as a foreign threat, *Heart and Science* also portrays it as a sexual threat, demonstrating that the violence of vivisection crosses the species boundary and terrorizes the bodies of women as well as animals. Following writers such as Cobbe, who cast doctors as sexual predators and vivisectors as rapists, Collins represents Benjulia as sexually perverse in his interactions with women and animals. Lansbury argues that Benjulia "is a sadist whose sexual drive manifests itself in the calculated ferocities of torture."[472] The long stick he always carries, sometimes bloodied from his experiments, is both phallic and violent. Zo particularly, is fascinated by Benjulia and his stick and often requests that he tickle her when he arrives at the Gallilee household. When we first meet him at the Zoological Gardens, he beckons Zo over:

> He put two of his soft big finger-tips on her spine, just below the back of her neck, and pressed on the place. Zo started and wriggled under his touch. He observed her with as serious an intent as if he had been conducting a medical experiment. "That's how you make our dog kick with his leg," said Zo, recalling her experience of the doctor in the society of the dog.[473]

Lansbury states that "tickling" in the riding master pornographic novels alludes to sexual intercourse and flogging.[474] Benjulia's relationship to Zo is therefore highly sexualized and pedophilic, even as he treats her as a "medical experiment." The

[472] Collins, 139.
[473] Collins, 96.
[474] Lansbury, *The Old Brown Dog*, 140.

experiment becomes a form of bodily invasion and sexual violence. Zo reveals that Benjulia also tickles the household dog, demonstrating that he sees animals and little girls as worthy objects for his own scientific study and sadistic pleasure. Both girl and dog fall victim to his quest for knowledge, subjected to what Lansbury describes as "the illicit sexual gratification that the vivisector derived from his work."[475]

Benjulia clearly has a special preference for Zo, as he leaves the entirety of his property and possessions to her before he completes suicide; yet the novel shows that he does not choose her as his only human subject for experimentation. As the beginning of this chapter reveals, the climax of the novel revolves around his observation of Carmina's brain disease and his refusal to care for her out of his fascination with her as an object of medical study. Benjulia's animal experimentation extends to children, but also to women, as many antivivisection activists feared. As I mentioned, Carmina "take[s] her place, along with the other animals, in his note-book of experiments."[476] Though he does not actually vivisect Carmina, his inaction and refusal to alter Mr. Null's incompetent prescription of treatment causes her suffering to increase and her condition to worsen, a type of slow torture. The fates of the animals in his laboratory and Carmina are interconnected: both fall into vulnerable categories of identity that make it easy to abuse them without consequence. The animals have little legal protection—though the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 sought to regulate the practice and mitigate animal pain, licensed practitioners retained almost full discretion on how they treated their animals. Carmina, as a young single

[475] Lansbury, 141.
[476] Collins, *Heart and Science*, 280.

woman, a recent immigrant to England, and an orphan, also has few legal protections—she falls under the legal guardianship of the abusive Mrs. Gallilee, who causes the onset of her brain disease in the first place, and exists outside the protection of her affianced Ovid while he is abroad. This precarious position demonstrates that women in the 1880s were still subject to the authority of their father (in this case the legal guardian, in the absence of the father) until they married and became the charge of their husbands.

However, Collins creates nuance in the association between gender and vivisection in the novel, just as he does in the condemnation of foreign physicians and scientists. Dr. Benjulia's chief ally in the novel is a woman—Carmina's aunt and legal guardian, Mrs. Gallilee. Mrs. Gallilee's main character flaw derives from her total devotion to science and her subsequent lack of feeling and sympathy. She keeps company with eminent scientific men, locating her on the side of the physiologists and the vivisectors. Though Mrs. Gallilee does not deliver an explicit speech of her views on vivisection, her views on living things as material for scientific progress imply that she would support Benjulia's work. In a conversation with her lawyer, Mr. Mool, Mrs. Galilee notices his nosegay and declares it "'Quite perfect…especially the Pansy'" and remarks, "'I long to dissect it.'"[477] In response, "Mr. Mool politely resigned the Pansy to dissection (murderous mutilation, he would have called it, in the case of one of his own flowers)."[478] Mrs. Gallilee reacts to beauty with the desire to destroy it to learn how it functions. Mr. Mool's response frames this impulse as "murderous," especially

[477] Collins, 192.
[478] Collins, 192.

to "one of his own flowers," which he has singled out as individuals he holds dear. Mrs. Gallilee's indifference to living beings applies to animals as well. When she urges Ovid to travel abroad immediately to recover his health, she considers his cat, thinking "the easiest way to provide for the creature would be of course to have her poisoned."[479] This view of pets as expendable makes Mrs. Gallilee cold and cruel in the same scientific and calculating way as Benjulia. She upholds use and practicality over love and compassion. As a woman, she does not see herself as vulnerable to the practices of vivisection as many antivivisection women activists did. Indeed, she behaves in much more masculine ways than many of the men in the novel, including her husband and Mr. Mool in the passage above. Collins therefore uses Mrs. Gallilee to demonstrate that though the antivivisection movement was highly gendered and dominated by women activists, not all women agreed with its precepts.

Mrs. Gallilee demonstrates that the threat of vivisection and scientific practices that use ends to justify means also threatens domestic family life. Not only does Mrs. Gallilee think of poisoning Ovid's cat, but she becomes the main instigator of Carmina's brain disease, actively hastening her demise to thwart her marriage to Ovid and to keep Carmina's inheritance for herself. Mrs. Gallilee begins the "vivisection" of Carmina that Benjulia intensifies, not for the sake of scientific knowledge, but for her own enrichment. Collins makes clear from the beginning of the novel that Mrs. Gallilee cares little for her marriage or her family, busying herself with scientific salons and promoting her own social status. When she realizes the attraction between Ovid and Carmina, she does not feel content in allowing her son to come into

[479] Collins, 127.

Carmina's money—her own selfishness prevents her from providing for her own children.

Similarly, Collins portrays Benjulia as hostile to domesticity. When his cook fancies that he has fallen in love with her after her quixotic reading of *Pamela*, he "[looks] (experimentally) at the inferior creature seated before him in the chair, as he looked (experimentally) at the other inferior creatures stretched under him on the table."[480] Like Carmina, who takes her place among the animals, the cook, too, becomes an object of Benjulia's vivisection. He sees both her and the animals as "inferior creatures," which gives license to his cruelty. Benjulia proceeds to tell the story of *Pamela*, giving the cook reason to believe that he has fallen in love with her, only to end by calling her an "impudent hussy" and dismissing her from his service (216).[481] He tortures her not only because he feels a sense of power over her, but also because he feels threatened by the cook's marriage plot and the idea of committing himself to a domestic life in addition to his professional one.

The evidence for this fear comes from a pivotal moment in the novel, when he visits the Gallilee household and, with the encouragement of Zo and Carmina, looks up the word "Love" in the dictionary. After finding that the dictionary cannot do "Love" justice but that such a thing does exist, "for the first time, a doubt about himself forced its way into his mind. Might he have looked higher than his torture-table and his knife?"[482] Collins couches this revelation in language and reading to reveal the power that the written word has to create sympathy and sway even the

[480] Collins, 215.
[481] Collins, 216.
[482] Collins, 247.

hardest of hearts. This focus on language acknowledges the power of the antitivivisection pamphlet literature to affectively move a broad audience, but also gives credence to his own novel for its part in the cause. Carmina tells Benjulia that love makes everyone better off but him and he experiences a twinge of regret at having devoted himself to a passion so devoid of feeling. In his work, he has not seen the animals he operates on as living creatures, but has rather seen only the implements of their destruction—"his torture-table and his knife." His practice has prevented him from enjoying the comforts of a domestic family life or even from finding intimacy with other people, particularly women and children in this case. Only Zo's hand on his knee "touched, ignorantly touched, the one tender place in his nature, unprofaned by the infernal cruelties which made his life acceptable to him."[483] Though this moment in the room with Zo and Carmina is discomfitingly sexual and pedophilic, it also demonstrates that only a child can make him aware of the tenderness that exists underneath his unceasing drive for knowledge. Vivisection buries this tenderness, which Collins shows can only be unearthed by the love found in the domestic sphere.

The love and domesticity exhibited by the relationship between Ovid and Carmina ultimately vanquishes Benjulia and his violent practice of vivisection in the novel, saving Carmina from the fate of the vivisector's animal test subjects. The novel advocates for the domestic in several distinct, but interrelated ways. First, the domestic realm becomes one of safety for Carmina through her marriage to Ovid. Though marriage would not promise safety for many nineteenth-century women, the novel portrays Ovid as an antivivisection advocate and the voice of British sympathy—he

[483] Collins, 246.

thereby has the values of a good and kind husband who will protect Carmina from the threat of other medical men. The domestic sphere also becomes the safe and proper place of the animal. When Benjulia frees his victims at the end of the novel, the reader can only hope that they will transition from lab animals to household pets to achieve a position of safety and security. And finally, domestic British men save women from foreign, evil doctors, showcasing a form of nativism that argues for British superiority on the grounds that Britain treats its women and animals better than other nations. The novel, therefore, puts forth a strange mixture of politics: it relies on patriarchal norms and structures to protect and uphold the rights of women and animals, all while it espouses a xenophobic and racist rhetoric about those who would seek to harm women and animals.

The use of anthropomorphism in *Heart and Science*, as well as in the broader antivivisection movement, blurs species boundaries, not through the language of animality, but through similarities in the forms of violence directed toward both animals and women. Their positions are proximate within animacy hierarchies, meaning that they experienced similar forms of subjugation, but also that they could work together through advocacy to resist this victimization. Still, we must be careful and vigilant as always about anthropomorphism's capacity for species mixing. Throughout this project, I have shown that anthropomorphism disrupts species hierarchies, yet it is never free of its racist undertones. Though anthropomorphism does not rely on racist rhetoric here, it gestures to a foreign threat defined by racist representations. The advocacy work of the antivivisection movement sought to simultaneously elevate women and animals within animacy hierarchies, but it did so to

the detriment of foreigners and people of color. The advocacy work of this project seeks to demonstrate the danger of using any one of these groups to drag the others down animacy hierarchies. Animalistic language already demeans humans and animals alike—to work toward true resistance, we must recognize the history of this language and its material effects in nineteenth-century fiction in order to better understand and rewrite it in our own contemporary societies.

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