


PROVINCE OF EAST JAVA



- 000000 Madun Regional Command (Korem 081)
- +++++ Surabaya, Bojonegoro, Madura Regional Command (Korem 082)
- ////// Matang-Besuki Regional Command (Korem 083)
- .-.-.- kabupaten boundaries

REPORT FROM EAST JAVA

TRANSLATORS' NOTE

Detailed eyewitness descriptions of the turmoil in town and countryside in the months following the "coup" of September 30, 1965, have been rare, particularly in those regions which experienced the worst violence. In subsequent accounts of the massacres of this period, writers coming from the right have tended to stress popular spontaneous rage, particularly from Muslim groups, while those from the left have emphasized systematic, centrally directed slaughter. Neither version has credibly accounted for why there was such a wide geographic variation in the level of the killings (for example, why in Hindu Bali and Muslim East Java, the numbers killed were very high, while in Muslim West Java they were relatively low, with Central Java falling in between).

The document translated below fills in a few of the pieces, showing how neither the version of the left nor that of the right is wholly true or wholly false, in describing the nature of the massacres. It is a report to his superiors from an Intelligence Officer in East Java at the end of November 1965, which describes the post-coup campaigns and purges in the officer's area of operations.

An important feature of the report--probably the first intelligence report of the period to be translated and published in English--is the "language of intelligence" used there, which is a curious mixture of Indonesian, English, and fractured Dutch (with most of the English words being military terms). As this language gives a fascinating insight into the mental culture of the members of the intelligence community of that and possibly later periods, we have attempted to retain its flavor in the translation. Thus, the Dutch words (with their mis-spellings) have been retained, with the English equivalent following in brackets, for example: *betrouwbaar* [D: trustworthy]. English words used in the original have been indicated by quotation marks in the translation, followed by [E], for example: "understanding" [E].

All translators' notes are in brackets [], and all parentheses () used are those of the original author. Abbreviations have been elucidated whenever possible. The erratic capitalization of the original has been retained in the translation. All the footnotes have been added by the translators.

REPORT FROM EAST JAVA

I. *People's Actions*¹

As is well known, actions to crush the GESTAPU² and its mastermind, the PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] began in the middle of October (whereas previously this campaign had only been in the form of statements). Due to the tardiness of the authorities in taking action, much of the initiative in the suppression was seized by the people, with the Religious groups taking the lead. At the outset these actions were unorganized and misguided [*ngawur*], as they hit neither "organic" [E] nor strategic PKI targets. It was only after the Akbar [mass] rally in Surabaya on October 16, 1965, that a Crushing Action Command was set up which endeavored to coordinate these actions and establish one, responsible command. The phase of people's spontaneity was followed by efforts at more organization, and by formation of a United Action Command. This Action Command was comprised of the parties and their Mass Organizations: the Nahdatul Ulama [NU], the Catholic Party, the PSII [Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union Party], Parkindo [Partai Keristen Indonesia, the Protestant Party], the IPKI [Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence, an army-affiliated party], and the PNI-Hardi. The PNI-Ali³ was also asked to join, and in fact at that time Basuki Rachmat⁴ wanted the group to participate. But the PNI-Ali's attitude was very indecisive; they said that they had to await instructions from their headquarters, and thus they were left out. It was not until after the above-mentioned mass meeting that the PNI-Ali was willing to join. Meanwhile, until now PERTI and PARTINDO have not been invited to participate since they are considered to be front organizations for the PKI.⁵

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1. Although translated as "actions" the meaning of the Indonesian "aksi-aksi" is really closer to a political or a mass campaign.
 2. "Gestapu" is derived from Gerakan Tigapuluh September, or "September 30th Movement," the action, led by Lt.-Col. Untung, which on the morning of October 1, 1965 assassinated six leading generals and briefly seized key installations in Jakarta, and which ultimately led to Sukarno's downfall and the birth of Suharto's New Order.
 3. During the early and mid-1960s there were two major competing factions within the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the more conservative of which was headed by Hardi and the more radical by Party Chairman (and former Prime Minister) Ali Sastroamidjojo and by Secretary General Ir. Surachman. In August 1965 the Ali faction asserted its ascendancy by suspending Hardi and other more conservative leaders from party membership. After September 30, the Ali faction continued to hold to the PNI's left-wing ideological formulations and to support Sukarno. In this report it appears as the PNI-Ali, and later as the PNI-Ali-Surachman (often abbreviated to PNI-ASU). At this time the more conservative elements of the PNI in other parts of Java were headed by Osa Maliki and Usep Ranuwidjaja, but in East Java the faction apparently continued to be known as the PNI-Hardi. This wing of the PNI was now making common cause with the ascendant military.
 4. Brig. Gen. Basuki Rachmat had been Territorial Commander of East Java (Kodam VIII) since late 1962. He was replaced on November 26, 1965.
 5. Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Islamic Education Union) was a small

The NU has been very *dominerend* [sic] [D: dominant] in these actions of the People, even to the point of "over-confidence" [E] and ignoring the other parties. On the other hand, the Action Command was very slow [to act]. The idea behind these Commands was to *doortreken* [D: extend] them from the Provincial Center through the Kabupaten [districts] and Kecamatan [subdistricts], right down to the villages. But the execution was exceedingly slow, to the extent that in outlying areas many established themselves without the knowledge of the top Command. And if the top Command did know about them it never contacted them, so that the goal of having a unified Command and Coordination was not achieved.

While some of these actions were undertaken by the people alone, some were performed with the "understanding" [E] of the military, and some were carried out by the authorities themselves, particularly the Army. In *oeverwegend* [sic] [D: overwhelmingly] anti-Communist areas, the central role was taken by the People, as in Madura and parts of Besuki. Due to the resolve of the Military Regional Commander [Dan Rem] (Sumadhi) in the Malang area and Besuki, the crushing actions were undertaken on the initiative of the Commander and under his leadership. Because of the Regional Commander's intervention, victims among the anti-Communist forces could be avoided. In the regions where the PKI was strong, such as Madiun and Bojonegoro, actions by the people were rare, and only now are we beginning to see activity from the People. In this region, the military (Willy Sudjono) has been firm and has carried out arrests against GESTAPU and PKI elements.

Alongside this Action Command which organized the "open" [E] actions, there exists a committee consisting of the NU, IPKI, the Catholics, the Protestants, Muhammadiyah, and the PNI-Hardi, for the purpose of forming a "brain trust" [E] for the crushing of the PKI. Its aims are oriented more towards political operations, it has more planning and better organization, and it is focusing on the mental and organizational annihilation of the PKI and its mass organizations. The targeting also means *voorbereiding* [D: preparation] for a radical *verandering* [D: transformation] of the police and the leadership of the state, with the cooperation of the Armed Forces, especially the Army.

II. Banyuwangi

The Karang Asem Incident in Banyuwangi

[1] Karangasem lies between Genteng and Banyuwangi, and it is an experimental village. This village is a center for "gun-slingers" [E] and robbers. After September 30 it became a hideout for the PKI and PR [Pemuda Rakyat--People's Youth, the Communist youth organization]. This was discovered by the Pemuda Anzor [NU Youth], and, with spirits ablaze and insufficient calculations, they made an attack on Karangasem from Muncar and Banyuwangi with four trucks, three cars, and four motorcycles. The PKI got wind of their plan and made preparations.

When the Pemuda Anzor entered the village, the PKI was ready. As the trucks entered, trees were felled behind them. The Anzor burned several houses,

conservative though maverick Islamic party, originally based in West Sumatra. Its leadership at the Jakarta level, however, particularly party-head Siradjuddin Abbas, took a strongly Nasakom line. Partindo (Partai Indonesia) was a small leftist party headed by PKI-sympathizers, with a base in the Chinese *peranakan* community.

and after they had burned them and were preparing to leave, they were attacked, and their trucks were burned.

Gerwani [Indonesian Women's Movement, a PKI-affiliated organization] exploited this opportunity. They entered the houses disguised as Fatajat NU [NU Women's Organization]. Once they [i.e., Ansor] were inside, PKI executioners were ready there with their instruments of death, and the Ansor were *afgemakt* [D: murdered]. It was impossible to avoid Ansor suffering 64 victims. This was reported at once to the Regional Commander of Malang, who took immediate and direct action. Colonel Sumadhi himself led this operation to Banyuwangi. It was reported that the PKI also used *vuurwapens* [D: firearms]. They were then trapped by the military along the coast.

2. The Banyuwangi Military District Command (Kodim) of Colonel Supaat (former Commander of the "Raiders" [elite troops] unit in Jember) was very resolute and spirited in the annihilation of the PKI. The troops in Banyuwangi were from the 515th Battalion (one company) and Field Artillery ["Armed," Artillery Medan] troops from Malang. PKI strongholds in Banyuwangi are primarily in the kecamatan of Tegaldelimo, Banyurejo, and Pesanggerahan. A store of rice was also found in the area of the Mt. Argapura complex.

3. In the city of Banyuwangi, village strongholds of the PKI were the villages of Tumenggungan, Malayu, and Mandar. In these three villages inhabitants were forbidden to listen to the Radio or read the newspapers, and rumors were spread that the troops were Nekolim [Neo-colonialist-imperialist] troops. During a house-to-house search, an American flag was found in the home of a PR figure. When this man was captured by ABRI, he admitted that if G.30.S [the September 30th Movement] had succeeded, government figures and leaders of the other parties blacklisted by the PKI would have been forced to drive around the city flying the American flag.

In the area of Rogojampi, many PKI figures were kidnapped and murdered by religious groups. The Marhaenist groups were also active here.

Situbondo

Kodim [Military District] Commander Major Indun was active in the annihilation of G.30.S. The people are very anti-Chinese, as many of them are Arabs. There is a band here that calls itself the robber band [*barisan maling*]. Also in Situbondo there is a Religious leader, K. Asa'at (Asembagus) who is very influential throughout Besuki and all the way to Madura. He is also anti-"two-facedness" [*plintat-plintut*, a Sukarnoist term], and the Command is operated from here. Arrests and killings began four days after the September 30 incident.

As the Government was late in providing protection for the Panji sugar factory, it was burned down by SOBSI [All-Indonesian Labor Union Central]. In the Situbondo region the "dropping" [E] of 200 weapons has been *signaleerd* [D: detected]. When they [the perpetrators] were arrested, they admitted that these were police weapons. At Pasir Putih there were military exercises by the PR that were led by elements from the AL [Angkatan Laut, Navy].

Bondowoso

The Kodim Commander is Lieutenant Colonel Budian. He is a Saptamargais [army loyalist--from Saptamarga, the Army Oath of Loyalty]. The extermination was carried out very violently. The community, especially the Religious groups, were very active in reporting PKI elements to those in authority, who would then take action. Only in ODM [Onder Distrik Militer, Military Sub-Districts] and

BODM [Badan Onder Distrik Militer, Military Sub-District Bodies] were many PKI elements found, who were also often able to hamper the KODIM's activities. However, actions were able to be taken thanks to the cooperation of the people. The PKI attempted to provoke a split between ABRI and the people, but thanks to good cooperation, this foul tactic of the PKI was defeated.

Jember

As in Bondowoso, things began with posters and were continued with a public meeting. The People's actions were the same as in Bondowoso. Just as in Bondowoso, several elements of Armet (Artilleri Medan Tempur [Battlefield Artillery]) were found here protecting with their weapons members of the PKI. BODM was also greatly *geïnfiltreerd* [sic] [D: infiltrated]. The Kodim Commander, Winoto, has been firm, but he *stuit moeilijkheden* [D: ran into difficulties] with a *Puterpra*⁶ that is *sterk* [D: strongly] infiltrated by the PKI. The Brigif [Infantry Brigade] Commander is Col. Djamal. The PKI bases are in the Ambulu area, the plantations at Bandialit, Sukamade, and Sarungan in the direction of Banyuwangi (Karangasem, within the Osing quarter of the city). The PKI sabotaged many Trains. In the Jatiroto Randu Agung incident, a freight train was derailed by them.

In re troops there was in Jember (Sukorejo) a "training centre" [E], however, which was transferred from the area several days after September 30th. All that remained was Armet and part of the 515th Battalion.

In response to the PKI actions, after the posters and general meeting, the Religious groups that were present wanted to burn down the HQ of the PKI, but they got help and protection from the Armet. And the PKI engaged in counter activities, erasing the [anti-PKI] graffiti. *Disband the PKI* was replaced with *Disband the NU*. *Kill Aidit* was replaced with *Kill the Generals*. The PKI used children (from elementary and junior high schools) to carry this out. The mass of the people became angry, but they could do nothing, because of the protection provided by the Armet [to the PKI]. In order to prevent conflict, the local government used [ordinary] prisoners to erase the graffiti, but by the next morning they were there again.

At a mass rally of the Religious groups, resolutions were passed demanding the banning of the PKI, the resignation of Bandrio [Subandrio, the Foreign Minister] and the severing of relations with the RRT [People's Republic of China].

It was after this that the Kodim became very active and, together with the people, took actions to crush the PKI. In recent days, conditions here have been the same as the other areas, with killings and kidnappings of members of the PKI and of its Mass organizations.

III. The Madura Residency

Actions in this area have been more gruesome than those in other areas. At the start, in Pamekasan there was no response from the Kodim, but the people began to take actions on their own. Arrests of PKI leaders and cadres were undertaken, and in several places (tobacco storage) Warehouses were burned down,

6. Perwira Urusan Territorial dan Perlawanan Rakyat, Officer for Territorial Affairs and People's Resistance. These officially replaced the BODM in the early 1960s.

most of them owned by Chinese considered to be financiers of the PKI. Also the contents of several Chinese-owned stores were brought out on the street and burned. Most of the leaders were arrested, and the top leadership fled to Java. But later, two men (Djauhari and Danafia) who also belonged to the East Java leadership were captured.

The Kodim in Pamekasan was replaced, and there is now close cooperation with the people. The same happened with the Kodim in Sampang, Bangkalan, and Sumenep.

In Sampang, as is known, the Police chief, Sutarjo, was murdered at a large rally. The murder took place on the Platform in the town square of Sampang at about four o'clock, but the body was not removed until six o'clock. This policeman had indeed participated in the suppression of the PKI during the Madiun affair [1948]. But his activities in Sampang indicate that he was affiliated with the PKI. His entire family from Magetan was PKI, and the Magetan PKI proposed Sutarjo as a candidate for Bupati of that district. So he was oriented toward the PKI. And before all of this, during the suppression, he was less than responsive, and as it were hampered these efforts. Even before the September 30th Movement, he once arrested a *kiai* [venerated teacher of Islam] who was very influential in Sampang, and this, of course, earned him antipathy from the people.

In Sampang and Bangkalan the situation has been the same as above. Recently anti-Javanese sentiment has arisen, because people think that it was Javanese who brought the PKI into Madura. But the NU leadership took action quickly in order to prevent [anti-Javanese] excesses. Because the NU and Ansor are dominant in Madura and because their leaders were firm, there was a tendency towards "over-confidence" [E]. Also, the leaders of the police and military had close connections with them, and periodically asked help from Ansor and Banser [Barisan Serba Guna, All-Purpose Unit]. The leaders of the NU and Ansor in Pamekasan were K. Sja'rani and Karim, the former Mobrig [Mobile Brigade of the Police] Inspector.

Bangkalan being closest to Surabaya has been a source of manpower for actions in Surabaya. If there are actions that require a show of counterforce, this is brought in from Bangkalan.

IV. The Residency of Surabaya

The movements outside Surabaya have been more intensive than those within the City proper. In the City of Surabaya itself, the movements began on October 16 with a large rally and organized acts of destruction (and the burning of the PKI's CDB [Comite Daerah Besar, Province-level leadership (office)] on Pahlawan Street). In comparison with other Cities, Surabaya was the most "smooth" [E]. Actions were carried out continuously. At first, indeed, the sparsity of actions in Surabaya was largely the result of the influence of Territorial Commander Basuki Rachmat, even to the point where in several Kabupaten political parties issued joint statements with the PKI. These meetings were *diaranggeer* [sic] [arranged] by the Governor. Then outside the City of Surabaya activities began--burnings and arrests as in Jombang, Mojokerto, and Sidoarjo. In addition, the contents of several Chinese stores were taken out onto the streets and burned.

After the large rally in Surabaya, purges were finally organized against Gestapu and PKI elements, as well as against workers who had taken over the enterprises (the Ngagel Complex and State Trading Enterprises) on October 1,

1965, but who were not arrested until October 18, 1965. By now much has changed, and the "caretaker" [E] Mayor, Colonel Sukotjo, has already organized purges in the Municipal Bureaucracy and in Neighborhood Associations [RT] and Kampung Associations [RK] which before had almost been controlled by the PKI. Removals [of PKI people from posts] have been carried out in Government Offices. Continuous purges have been performed in an effective and systematic manner, foiling the PKI's contingency plans. Efforts at smashing PKI morale to real political effect are still in the process of being organized. The mass concentration of the PKI in Surabaya is in the southern part of the City (primarily in Gubeng-trowongan, Patemen, and Pakis). There have already been purges in these areas. Earlier the PKI had established its own regulations there. The people were forbidden to listen to the radio or read the newspaper. The PKI enforced a curfew. The residents of the poorer neighborhoods [Kampung] had to be home by 4.00 PM and could not leave until 5.00 the following morning. We are now taking measures against this. At this time secret kidnappings and killings are being carried out by the Religious groups.

Mojokerto

Of this area it can be said that things began in the first days, both from Krian to Mojokerto, and all the way to the Jombang area. Recently many headless corpses have lain sprawling in the rivers and along the river banks. The people and also the authorities have been afraid to remove them. At the initiative of several leaders of the People, the Indonesian Red Cross [PMI] took them away. On Sunday there were approximately 162 corpses, and on Monday, 105.

In Mojokerto almost all the PKI leaders, activists, and executioners have been finished off. (PKI) prisoners held at Kodim or Police Headquarters, against whom there was enough evidence from *proses verbal* [D: interrogation reports] have been taken away (the term used is "dibon"⁷) and every night from four to ten people are killed. According to [those who take them away] legal proceedings take too long.

It has also often happened that PKI leaders have been attacked and beaten by their own followers, who blame them for dragging them into this situation, this having occurred in Madura (Zubir and Rasoel).

In Jombang, as the center of *pesantren* [Islamic schools], actions were carried out against the PKI from the very beginning. And frequently these Operations have been extended to the surrounding areas of Kertosono and Mojokerto.

The Kediri Area

The Kediri area has had the most PKI victims, partly as *revance* [sic] [D: revenge] for previous "affairs" (at Jengkol and the Lodoyo Pesantren).⁸ The Kodim and the Brigif [Infantry Brigade] Commander, Col. Sampurno, have been very firm. And the actions here have been in the form of "joint action" [E] between the people and the army. Lieut. Col. Sampurno has said, "We have to

7. This was one of the strangest euphemisms of the period. "Dibon" means "used as security against a loan," and so could be translated perhaps as "pawned."

8. These were among the so-called "unilateral actions" [*aksi sepihak*], by pro-communist peasant organizations in 1964-65 to try to put into effect the PKI's land reform policies.

obey the orders of the President, which say that if we want to catch the rats we shouldn't burn down the house, but kill the rats." After that began the killings of the rats (PKI). This occurred throughout the Residency of Kediri, from Blitar, Tulungagung, Trenggalek, and Kediri, as far as Ngandjuk. Prisoner-"pawning" has happened here as well. Prisoners are at some point moved from their original place of detention to another place, and during the journey they are intercepted by the People and finished off. If the killings were at first carried out by crowds (of about 20-30 people), they are now done by only four or five, in order to be careful not to frighten the people.

The Madiun Area

As reported above. Detentions and arrests have been executed by Willy Sudjono and also in the districts, as in Ngawi, where the Battalion Commander (Martak) has taken resolute action such as arresting the Bupati [regent] (PKI), and where actions by the People were begun. The situation in re Madiun has been reported on above.

Bojonegoro

In this area the suppression campaign has been very feeble, except in the areas which border Central Java. There have been insufficient military units, for example, in the Tuban area. Apart from this, the [strength of the] PKI has indeed been *overwegend* [D: predominant]. But more recently the suppression has begun. In the city of Bojonegoro, and in the areas bordering Mojokerto, Madiun, and Kediri, killings of PKI elements have also already spread.

The Malang Area

As indicated above, thanks to the "understanding" [E] between the Regional Commander and the Crushing Action Committee [Panitia Aksi Pengganjangan] (in Malang its Action Command is the Youth Front [Front Pemuda]), the people's actions and arrests have been numerous and very intensive. And the purges have gone forward continuously. This has occurred in all the Districts [kabupaten] (Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Lumajang, and Malang itself). And the repressive actions have been rather well organized, as, for example, in Dampit. PKI members were arrested by the people, and ordered to speak at a public meeting to denounce the PKI, and afterwards they were taken to point out and arrest their own leaders.

V. Concerning the Political Parties

The NU forms the vanguard of the movement to crush the PKI and its mass organizations. Within the NU forces there are two groups, one of which used to cooperate with the PKI. This group has been *geïsoleerd* [D: isolated]. The second is the anti-PKI group, which is now *domineerend* [D: dominant] in the NU itself. It is now led by Abdullah Sidik from Jember, who is indeed descended from a Kiai and has his own pesantren. Before Abdullah Sidik, the NU leadership was always headed by what they called the "Gersikan group" (the business and money-making group), but with Abdullah Sidik this tradition has been *gebroken* [D: broken]. The NU's power in general derives from its legal and formal organizations, but its *reële potentie* [D: latent, potential power] in fact lies in its Pesantren, which are under the leadership of seven large Pesantren. The *geestelijke vader* [D: spiritual father] of these pesantren is Kiai Bisri of the Den Anyar Pesantren, Jombang (he is the younger brother of Kiai Hasjim Asari,

Jombang). There are four Pesantren in Jombang. The first is the Den Anyar pesantren, the second is Kiai Hasjim's, which is now officially led by Jusuf Hasjim (the Deputy Head of Ansor for all of Indonesia, the son of Kiai Hasjim Asari and the younger brother of Wahid Hasjim), while the third is the Tremas pesantren which is led by Wahab Hasbullah (the brother-in-law of Wahid Hasjim). And one *formeele* [D: formal] pesantren.⁹ Aside from these Jombang pesantren, other pesantren include: the one at Pasuruan, led by Kiai Djupri; Gengong Kraksaan, led by Kiai Nun Achsan; the one at Paiton led by Kiai Zaini; and that at Asembagus, led by Kiai Asa'at. The Pesantren Kiai Sidik is led by Kiai H. Achmad Siddik (now head of the Department of Religion for East Java). Kiai Achmad Siddik is now coordinator for all these Kiai. These Kiai have always opposed the central NU leadership. This opposition was an issue of principle, because they did not agree with the line taken by Idham Chalid and the Rais Aam, Wahab Hasbullah, who cooperated with the PKI. They consider the PKI to be a *Majusis* [i.e., Parsi] group (*goddelozen* [D: atheists]), something forbidden by Islamic law. On the other hand, the Central NU were impelled by their personal interests to accept this cooperation, and also for their own safety. (Recall the incident involving the former Minister of Religion Wahib Wahab, the son of Wahab Hasbullah.¹⁰) This anti-PKI group is the one that is very *domineerend* [D: dominant]. (In the Kediri area Kiai Machroes is a member of this group.) Some of these Kiai belong to the "Suriyah NU"¹¹ which determines Islamic law. Recently they held a meeting which declared *uf* [sic: off] with Bung Karno and his followers. When they heard of efforts to bribe the leadership of NU at the Center (an offer of the Deputy Prime Ministership), they were very angry indeed. This group is in fact the powerful one in East Java, and they can also provide a stimulus for politics at the Center within NU circles. Their representatives at the Center are Kiai Dahlan and Jusuf Hasjim.

The NU party and its mass following, which are strong in certain respects, have several weaknesses [E: "lacks"] including the lack of a *conseptionele operasis* [sic] [D: operational conception]. And with their large mass following they often show "over-confidence" [E], *negering* [D: looking down on] the other political parties, and even, in several regions, the Armed Forces.

The Catholic Party

Two groups can also be found in the Catholic Party, and, as in the case of NU, the *domineerend* [D: dominant] one is now anti-PKI. Their mass following is more *gedisplineerd* [sic] [D: disciplined] and organized, and their key strength lies in their youth, especially college students. Their leader is Rusmo, a member of the Kasimo group.

The Protestant Party

The Protestant Party is very "confused" [E] to the extent that its leadership (Rasjid) is not only under suspicion by the other parties, but even by *hun eigen gelederen* [D: its own members]. His history is one not only of material manipu-

9. A traditional pesantren where instruction was given individually by the kiai.

10. In October 1962 Minister of Religion Wahib Wahab (son of the NU Rais Aam, Wahab Hasbullah) was tried for violating foreign exchange regulations and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and a Rp. 15 million fine. (*Duta Masjara-kat*, October 24, 1962.)

11. The legislative council of the NU.

lations, but also of political corruption through his close cooperation with the PKI.

PSII [Indonesian Islamic Union Party]

The leadership is very *verdeel* [sic] [D: divided] indeed, many of them having become leaders or members of Baperki [Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship, a largely Chinese *peranakan* association, with ties to the PKI and other left-wing parties], a group which naturally is very much disliked by the Muslim masses now. But it [PSII] has very many followers in the Jember area because of one Kiai, Kiai Bakir, who is a PSII figure deeply respected by the people.

His influence is very widespread, reaching all the way to Madura (he also originates from Madura). There is *wrijving* [D: friction] with NU because of *rivaliteit* [D: rivalry] and because they [the PSII] attract NU people to be *gelederen* [D: members] of their group. ([This is] the former AKUI,¹² which at the time of the general elections split off from NU, but after its defeat 70 percent of its membership returned to NU, with the remaining 30 percent joining Kiai Bakir's PSII.) Kiai Bakir also tried to attract the 70 percent that went to the NU to enter the PSII, and this has brought *complicaties* [D: complications] to many districts. Kiai Bakir has direct contact with Anwar Tjokroaminoto.

IPKI [League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence]

This organization is more compact, but in its *gelederen* [D: membership] soldiers and veterans are very few. Its contacts with the military have decreased substantially, primarily because leaders such as Nuch and Jakoub are no longer in East Java, and Jakoub is not active any more.

PNI-Hardi [Indonesian Nationalist Party--Hardi]

Only recently internally consolidated, and already *gekonfronteerd* [sic] [D: confronted] by external activities. They are trying to consolidate themselves, and they are generally *betrouwbaar* [D: trustworthy] and very anti-Communist.

PNI-Ali-Surachman [Indonesian Nationalist Party--Ali-Surachman]

Their strength still lies mostly in the GMNI [Movement of Indonesian Nationalist Students] and Youth, and it seems that they want to be the *tegenpool* [D: direct opposite] of the *anti komunistische groeperingen* [sic] [D: anti-Communist groups]. They have not participated at all in the actions--they want to go their own way. There are also some who act as refuges for *potenties van de PKI* [D: latent PKI forces]. Incidents may arise between them and the anti-Communist groups, especially Ansor.

Aside from these parties, there is also the HMI [Islamic Student Organization of Indonesia], which has better organization, complete with "planning" [E] and has many *exponenten* [D: exponents] in the ranks of the Army (formerly Hizbullah) and the Navy.

12. AKUI (Angkatan Ummat Islam) was a minor Muslim party centered in East Java, which in 1955 drew most of its candidates from the Madurese. (See Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* [Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957], p. 59.)

Activities can also be seen from the banned parties (Masyumi), PSI [Indonesian Socialist Party], and Murba [Proletarian], but generally they are holding themselves back in order not to complicate the situation. Many of them have surrendered leadership to the NU, it's only that the NU's "over-confidence" [E] is sometimes *vervelend* [D: irritating].

VI. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)

Whereas in Jakarta, where the "shock-attack" [E] was defeated and its leadership scattered, so much so that its leadership disappeared and it was difficult to carry out further actions, in East Java the authorities were so slow and miserably *lamlendigheid* [D: ineffective] that the PKI still has the opportunity to consolidate. So far, not many of their leaders have been arrested. It appears that their preparations have been concentrated in the areas of the Mt. Argapura Complex and the Mt. Arjuna Complex. The places they have fled to are in the south, (*Zuid* [D: South] Besuki, Zuid Malang, Zuid Madiun, all the way to Central Java). Their leadership have been able to escape, except in the Kediri area (Nganjuk, Blitar, Kediri, and Tulungagung, where the leadership was either killed or apprehended).

Many of their leaders are still active in Government Agencies and in basic enterprises. But in certain areas, particularly the Residencies of Kediri, Jombang, Mojokerto, Malang, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, and the Besuki Region, many leaders have been killed, and even many people who were not leaders. These killings have been carried on continuously and have now also spread to the areas of Madiun, Bojonegoro, and the outskirts of Surabaya.

In Kediri some of the killings were "joint action"s [E] with the military (sometimes in *civiele* [D: civilian dress], sometimes officially as military). Killings of this kind may have a boomerang effect, in that they can also be utilized by the PKI itself. The effect upon economic life will also be felt. Small traders are now afraid to sell their wares. Peasant farmers are afraid to go to the rice fields. And many do not want to work on the Plantations, for example on the tea and sugar plantations, because corpses are spread everywhere.

By way of clarification, several events are explained below: In the Paree (Kediri) area there is a village in which the *lurah* [village headman] and Ansor together took the initiative to protect the [PKI] peasant farmers--who were only taggers-on--by giving them badges as members of Ansor or NU. They were gathered together, and coincidentally, there happened to be an operation by the military and Ansor going on. Seeing many people gathered together, the soldiers and Ansor asked the *lurah* who all these people were. The *lurah*, nervous and panicked, responded that they were PKI.

Before he had finished speaking, every one of the approximately 300 people was killed, and their families were not permitted to remove their bodies so that they were buried where they lay. This shocked the people, and within Ansor itself mutual mistrust arose.

Another event occurred in Wates, where approximately 10,000 members of the PKI and its Mass Organizations gathered together. They were going to make a "long-march" [E] to Madiun, destroying factories along the way. This was discovered by the military, which initiated a "joint-action" [E] together with Ansor. When they were *sommeer* [*sic*] [D: called upon] to surrender they refused, and so they were crushed. The victims totaled 1,200.

In an incident in Ponggok, a soldier who was disseminating information was killed by the Pemuda Rakyat [People's Youth]. In *represaille* [D: reprisal] the military attacked, killing about 300 people.

The wave of killings is still continuing, and many of those who are being killed are followers who did not know much. Many excesses have emerged, and it could happen that the PKI will join in so that they can attract "public opinion" [E] to their side. There has also been conflict between different Islamic groups, as in Kediri between the Ansor of Kiai Machrus and the Darul Hadish group. The PKI surely benefits from this.

The economic effects are very alarming, because they will surely be exploited by the PKI.

VII. The Armed Forces

Basuki Rachmat's attitude has greatly influenced developments in East Java. Because of his calmness and his slowness in taking actions which should have been taken quickly, many have had little faith in his *beleid* [D: policy], and many of the people particularly in the parties are suspicious, especially because of the inclusion of his name in the Revolutionary Council.¹³ During a "briefing" [E] with his subordinates, they urged him to take action so that the initiative would not be taken by someone else. He answered, "*Ik heb mijn eigen instruksis*" [sic] [D: I have my own instructions]. His answer raised many questions about the person from whom he has been receiving his instructions; it is definitely not from the Pangad [Army Commander in Chief] or from Suad [Army General Staff] whose instructions are already clear. After this briefing, the Staff met with Surachman,¹⁴ whom they asked to speak with Basuki Rachmat. Surachman met with him, but with no *resultaten* [D: results]. *Bij de Tweede* [D: at the second] "briefing" [E] it was requested again that he be more firm; he practically had to be forced to freeze the activities of the PKI and its Mass Organizations, including the Neighborhood Associations [RT] and Kampung Associations [RK] which in Surabaya were almost all PKI.

It was understandable that at first the Army did not take action, since not only did they not have enough *troepen* [D: troops], but it is estimated that as many as 30 percent were "involved" [E] [in the coup]. Owing to the lack of action on the part of the Kodam [Territorial Command] it was mainly the Regional Commanders in East Java who took actions and initiatives, leading the extermination. The Regional Commander of Malang-Besuki, Sumadi, was the most firm. He arrested many PKI leaders and cadres, and he has been able to work together with the *anti komunistische groeperingen* [sic] [D: anti-Communist groups] in establishing an "understanding" [E] that a "joint operation" [E] be conducted with the Youth Front [Front Pemuda--youth section of the National Front].

13. In their broadcasts on October 1, 1965, the Untung group announced formation of a 45-member Revolutionary Council, which was apparently to assume a dominant governing role. The Council was made up of a strange assortment of people ranging from left to right of the political spectrum, many of whom had no connection whatever with the coup group.

14. Brig. Gen. Surachman had preceded Basuki Rachmat as Commander of the East Java Territorial Military Command. He had been suspected of being part of an anti-Sukarno movement and had been eased out of his position in 1962.

Secondly, the Madiun Regional Commander, WILLY SOEDJONO, who because there were initially few "actions" by the people in his area, carried out arrests (about 200 in the city of Madiun alone) of PKI cadres.

The feeblest has been the Regional Commander of Surabaya, Bojonegoro, and Madura, Sunjoto. Within his Kodim there are still many followers of Soekardano, ¹⁵ especially in the Bojonegoro area, where many within the Kodim and its Staff are PKI.

Even more difficult are the Puterpra, where there are many PKI within the BODM, so that sometimes many plans for arrests are leaked or obstructed. This is especially so in Jember and Bondowoso. In these areas there are some Field Artillery ["Armed"] elements which protect the PKI.

Concerning the various Units we have learned the following:

Battalions which are *kwalificeer sterk geïnfilteer* [sic] [D: considered to be strongly infiltrated] are Battalions 511, 512, and 513. Most of these units have already been transferred, including 512, which has been moved to Medan; and 511, part of which was sent to Kalimantan, and part to a strongly anti-Communist area. This is also the case with Unit 513, part of which is in Besuki, with the remainder sent outside.

Battalion 514: Its Commander Soedjangkung has already been removed; its troops are generally *betrouwbaar* [D: reliable], consisting of men from Madura and former members of Hizbullah.

Battalion 515: Assigned to the SKI [Sekolah Kader Infanteri, Infantry Cadre School]. The East Java SKI is a center for PKI operations to infiltrate units of all kinds.

"Raiders" [E] Battalion 531: The Battalion Commander (Major Trijogo) deserted on October 2 and has not yet returned. He is a former TRIP [Student Army in East Java] member.

The Battalions presently in Madiun are generally *betrouwbaar*. They have now been augmented by an Arsu [Artilleri Sasaran Udara, Anti-aircraft] unit under Colonel Ardjito, which occupies the Mantingan-Cepu line.

Aside from these, Battalions 517 and 518 have been brought in from the border areas.¹⁶ Also, there is assistance from two Pattimura battalions, one Hasanudin Battalion¹⁷ and one Kujang Siliwangi battalion, as well as a task-force from the RPKAD [army paratroop regiment].

The other Armed Forces units are those from the KKO [Marines] within which there are some Pemuda Rakyat elements. The *officieren* [D: officers] are loyal. Only among their subordinates, on the other hand, even though they were *gekonsigneerd* [sic] [D: confined] to their barracks, there were those who insisted on

15. Col. Soekardano Widjaja had held a number of top positions in the East Java command, including Fifth Assistant (for social and political affairs) to the Kodam Chief of Staff. He was regarded as a strong Sukarnoist.

16. These are the border areas between Indonesian Kalimantan and the East Malaysia States of Sarawak and Sabah where Confrontation with the newly formed Malaysia was going on.

17. The Pattimura were Ambonese battalions from Kodam 15 (Moluccas) and the Hasanuddin Bugis battalion was from Kodam 14 (South and Southeast Sulawesi).

returning to their villages--most of which were PKI Centers (such as Gubeng-trowongan).

In addition to these, in Surabaya there are also two small battalions from Brimob [Mobile Brigade] at Sambongan and at Gresik Street. The men at Sambongan are loyal, but some of those on Gresik Street are *geinfiltrereerd* [D: infiltrated, here infiltrators]. When there was a demonstration to burn down the PKI's CDB [HQ] on Penghela Street, they protected the Pemuda Rakyat. A total of 133 people were saved by the pretense that they were being arrested, but later were released.

With regard to the police, there are many rumors that East Java Pangdak [Regional Police Commander] Drs. Soemarsono was involved [in G.30.S]. His actions have been very obstructive. Before the PKI was dissolved, he proposed dissolving all the parties and established a curfew. The next day the activities of the PKI were frozen by the Kodam [Territorial Command]. *Very sterk-geaffileerd* [D: strongly affiliated] with the PNI [Nationalists].

VIII. The Civil Service

The actions of the civil service, especially its leader, Brigadier General Wijono [Governor of East Java], have been very irresolute. Purges, which should have provided stimulus to other Agencies, have been only minimally carried out. "Briefing"s [E] *aan zijn* [D: to his] staffs, even to those directly under him--such as the Governor's representatives in the Residencies--have still not been carried out. The military *klachten* [D: complain] much about him, and there is no visible assistance from his corps, due to the fact that Wijono issues no clear *directieven* [D: directives]. The parties already greatly mistrust him. In filling vacant positions, he plays footsie with PNI-ASU people.

At the initiative of Col. Sumadi, the Regional Commander of Besuki-Malang, a meeting was organized last November 14 with several local Heads, Bupatis, Residents, and former Governors and Residents, both active and retired (among them, [ex-] governors Samadikun and Suwondo, Residents Bambang Suparto, Marwoso Suhardjo, Moh. Noer, and others), for the purposes of:

1. Finding a way to make the provincial government more dynamic (including Wijono and his people).
2. Finding a policy which would achieve more intensive cooperation between military and civilian authorities.
3. Solving problems which have arisen as a result of the extermination of the Gestapu/PKI.
4. Solving economic problems, which can be exploited by the PKI.

At the meeting it was decided to send a delegation to Wijono and the Military Commander [Panglima].

IX. Conclusion

In general, firm actions are needed by the authorities, with regard both to the suppression of the PKI and to excesses which can be damaging in this suppression struggle. Controlling excesses is very important. It is to be hoped that the new Territorial Commander [Pangdam, i.e., Brig. Gen. R. Sunarijadi],

together with a firmer and more militant staff, can provide *political leadership* to the *Anti Koministische [sic] groeperingen* [D: Anti-Communist groups].

The PKI still has the opportunity to consolidate itself, and it can launch attacks and create enclaves like the Viet-Cong, using "hit and run" [E] tactics and sabotage, which could paralyze *ekonomisch leven* [D: economic life].

Bearing in mind that East Java is their *bolwerk* [D: stronghold], even though they can now be counterbalanced by the anti-Communist forces, and even though they are not strong *militaire warde [sic]* [D: militarily], and can be handled militarily, still they can instigate anarchy, using "protracted-war" [E] tactics à la Mao Tse Tung while awaiting further opportunities in the international arena, which they can exploit. A frontal explosion is, of course, far from being a possibility.

This is the broad outline of the situation in the regions. A further report will follow.

Several things requiring attention

The first concerns the provincial government of East Java. Up to now [problems regarding] the working environment and order within the Governor's Office itself have still not been overcome. (As is known, a PKI (SOBSI) demonstration on September 28 damaged the Governor's Office.) The incident was caused to a large extent by the attitude of the Governor himself. Even now in his *beleid personalia [sic]* [D: personnel policy] he flirts [politically, *main mata*] with PNI-Ali-Surachman people. It is true that prior to GESTAPU, the Governor had much backing from NU, but he then began to compromise a great deal with the PKI and PNI. And he was very slow to carry out the suppression and purge, which should have been a stimulus for other Agencies of government. There have not even been *directieven* [D: directives] to the corps of the civil service. He has yet to brief *zelfs de naaste medewerkers* [D: even his closest co-workers] such as the Governor's representatives in the Residencies. There has been insufficient cooperation with the military, so that much *spanningen* [D: tension] has arisen. These matters have caused Col. Sumadi, the Regional Commander of Malang-Besuki, to take the initiative in finding a way to make provincial government more dynamic. In fact, the parties are already *ontevreden* [D: discontented], and want to urge the center to replace him [i.e., Governor Wijono], ideally with someone from the military, which makes "sense" [E] in terms of *administratief-beheer* [D: administration-management] and *staats-beleid* [D: state policy].

There is a need to appoint a representative from the Center (from both KOTI [Komando Operasi Tertinggi, Supreme Operational Command] and from MBAD [Markas Besar Angkatan Darat, Army Headquarters]) as a "political commissar" [E] who will be better able to understand the situation and carry out further "follow-up" [E] measures in the social, political--and most importantly--economic sphere. Such a Commissar would be able to communicate easily with the community, including the *politik partijen [sic]* [D: political parties] and other public figures.

As in the case of the Governor, as discussed above, almost all sectors have endeavored through every forum or institution possible to *mendoorbraak [sic]* [D: *doorbraak* = break through] the slowness, indeed the impotence in the ranks of officialdom.

Krachtig [D: strong] words indeed, but action has been extremely slow.

Jakarta, November 29, 1965

