PRESIDENTAS, POWER AND PRO-WOMEN CHANGE

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

Of Cornell University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

Catherine Reyes-Housholder

May 2017

PRESIDENTAS, POWER AND PRO-WOMEN CHANGE

Catherine Grace Reyes-Housholder, Ph.D.

Cornell University 2017

Under what conditions do women in office leverage their power on behalf of women? Despite Latin America's deep gender inequalities, women have democratically won the presidency more times here than in any other region in the world. *Presidentas* could have a major impact on these inequalities because Latin American presidents enjoy vast formal powers. Though similarly situated, Presidents Michelle Bachelet in Chile and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil dramatically diverged in their use of these prerogatives to advance pro-women change.

This dissertation solves the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle with a novel, constituency-centered theory. I argue that female politicians are most likely to deploy their power to promote change favoring women when they have (1) successfully mobilized women on the basis of gender identity (core constituency); and (2) extensively networked with elite feminists and other female politicians (personal constituency). The theory explains why female politicians overall are more likely than their male counterparts to use their power to advance pro-women change, articulates the conditions under which female politicians will make a difference and predicts the kinds of pro-women policies they are most likely to pursue. It therefore provides fresh insights on the benefits and limitations of women's presence in political office.

To illustrate and test this constituency theory, I employ newspaper archives to trace the formation of constituencies of all viable candidates in Chile's and Brazil's presidential races from 1999-2010. I then measure the use of legislative and delegative power to advance pro-women change by the winners of these elections with three original databases. Challenging existing theories of representation, the results of the qualitative and statistical analyses support my argument that gendered and sex-related characteristics of presidents' core and personal constituencies largely determine the extent to which and how they use of power to promote pro-women change.

final year of graduate school. She is teaching me how to become a mother. I thank the Lord for gently guiding me to, and through, graduate school and for giving me this family. I dedicate this dissertation to them.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to Diego, Priscilla, Grace and Terry.

Contents

CHAPTER I *Presidentas*, Power and Pro-Women Change

Under what conditions do women in office leverage their power on behalf of women? Latin America, marked by deep gender inequalities, has nevertheless elected more female presidents than any other region in the world. The potential impact of *presidentas* on change favoring women could be great since Latin American presidents dominate the legislative process and face virtually no restraints on their appointment powers.' A vast body of research shows that female legislators overall tend to promote policies benefiting women, but impact of politicians' sex on pro-women change varies. The recent emergence of *presidentas* in fact seems to repeat this familiar story, with some female presidents leveraging their power to help women more than other female presidents.

Though similarly situated, two *presidentas* dramatically diverged in their use of power to push for change favoring women. Presidents Michelle Bachelet and Dilma Rousseff emerged on the national political scene in Chile and Brazil, respectively, after pioneering women's presence in executive cabinets.[i] Once in office, Bachelet deployed her legislative and delegative power far more than Rousseff to improve women's status. Bachelet tried to push through a range of ambitious pro-women reforms, including state childcare for low-income mothers and social security reforms with gender equality provisions. She attempted and ultimately achieved far more pro-women change than her male predecessor and co-partisan, Ricardo Lagos. In contrast, Rousseff leveraged her legislative powers to promote far fewer, less transformative reforms benefiting women. She ultimately advanced pro-women policies to a comparable or even lesser degree than Lula. Furthermore, the policies she did pursue tended to either build on or complement his policy legacy and thus did little to significantly improve women's status.

These *presidentas'* delegative decision-making also varied in remarkable ways. Bachelet named women to half of her inaugural cabinet, and she ended her first term with 39% of ministries run by women—almost double the regional average. On the other hand, Rousseff appointed just 21% of her inaugural cabinet to women, and by the end of her first term only 11% of ministries were women-led.

Why did Bachelet aggressively and consistently deploy her power to help women while Roussseff did not? Dominant theories on representation and gender contend that party ideology, a critical mass of female legislators and feminist consciousness help determine whether female policymakers will promote policies favoring women. Bachelet's and Rousseff's use of power to advance pro-women change—a central focus of this dissertation—is puzzling because each of these factors at the time were similar in Chile and Brazil.

First, both *presidentas,* succeeded popular male co-partisans and managed ideologically diverse but generally center-left coalitions. The limited data on Latin American parties' positions on women's issues suggests a similar degrees of women-friendliness for Bachelet's Socialist Party (PS) and Rousseff's Workers Party (PT). The manifestos of the PS and PT have made a comparable number of gender equality mentions in recent years, and depending on the indicator, anywhere from 20-30% of the leaders within these parties are female (Morgan and Hinojosa 2015). Furthermore, both Bachelet and Rousseff as coalition leaders had to work with social conservatives from the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). The ideologies of these *presidentas'* parties and coalitions were too similar to account for the striking contrasts in their pro-women change decision-making.

Second, both *presidentas* faced low numbers of women in the legislature. In Chile from 2006-10, only 15% of the Chamber of Deputies and 5.3% of the Senate were comprised of women, an average of 10.2%. In Brazil from 2011-14, 8.6% of the Chamber and 16% of the Senate were women, an average of 12.3% (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). These percentages fall below the 30-40% the threshold critical mass theory stipulates for significant legislative change favoring women (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007).

Finally, according to feminist consciousness theory, women who challenge gender norms by leading non-traditional lifestyles, both personally and professionally, are more likely to benefit from feminism and to be exposed to feminist ideas. They therefore are more likely than women with traditional lifestyles to acquire a feminist consciousness and prefer pro-women change (Carroll 1989; Klein 1984).

Evidence from Bachelet's and Rousseff's biographies suggests that prior to running for president, both had developed this kind of deep awareness of structural causes of gender discrimination and maintained pro-women attitudes. As single mothers working in male-dominated fields, Bachelet and Rousseff defied traditional gender norms stipulating that women should marry, stay married, have children only with their legal husband, and if they dare to work outside the home, they should work in a traditionally "feminine" domain, such as in education.

Bachelet had two children from her first marriage, which ended in separation. She later became romantically involved with a leader of an extreme-left organization. After ending this relationship, she had a third child with a physician, with whom she later separated. Similarly, Rousseff married a Marxist revolutionary leader who she later divorced. She later initiated a relationship with another leftist. Both were arrested by the military government, and upon their release in the early 1970s, they had one daughter. They divorced years later.

In addition to defying traditional norms in their personal relationships, Bachelet and Rousseff also challenged gender norms not only by participating politically, but also by seeking power via traditionally masculine ministries, namely defense and energy (Krook and O'Brien 2012). Bachelet specialized in military affairs, a highly masculine domain, and in 2002, she became Latin America's first female Defense Minister.[ii] Rousseff studied economics and worked in state-level technical positions related to the traditionally masculine arenas of finance, mining and energy. Lula named her minister of Mines and Energy in 2003, and a few years later she became Brazil's first female Chief of Staff. Chile's and Brazil's first *presidentas* thus lived in non-traditional ways both personally and professionally, and thus according to socio-psychological theories, were more likely to have developed a feminist consciousness.

In sum, these women came from similar center-left parties, faced a reduced presence of women in Congress and made personal and professional decisions that likely fostered a feminist consciousness and pro-women preferences. The variation in Bachelet's and Rousseff's use of power thereby defies the conventional wisdom, which would predict that these *presidentas* would promote change favoring women to similar degrees. What explains the contrasting use of power between these female presidents? I argue

that the answer lies in their different constituencies. This dissertation's systematic exploration of the conditional links between forms of representation will illuminate the benefits and limitations of women's political presence.

1. Overarching Contributions

Motivated by the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle, this dissertation makes significant theoretical and empirical contributions to research on representation and gender. Scholars and practitioners have long debated women's impact in office and the conditions under which they leverage their power to help women. This dissertation's constituency theory provides novel insights on the probabilistic relationship between descriptive representation (the presence of women in office) and substantive representation (the use of power to effect change favoring women). I contend that female politicians are most likely to use their power more than their male counterparts to advance PWC when they (1) successfully mobilize women on the basis of gender identity; and (2) to network extensively with elite feminists and other female politicians. Because Bachelet achieved both conditions, she used her power to advance pro-women change in ways that profoundly differed from her co-partisan male predecessor. Conversely, because Rousseff failed to mobilize women and networked little with elite feminists, she did not do so in ways that significantly departed from those of her co-partisan male predecessor.

The constituency theory also offers a fresh explanation for why female presidents overall are more likely than their male counterparts to use their power to advance PWC. The dissertation will argue that women demanding PWC are more likely to figure prominently into *presidentas'*—rather than male presidents'—core and personal constituencies. Generalizing beyond chief executives in Latin America, the constituency argument could be applied to most other democratic nations in the world as well as to many legislative arenas and some sub-national levels.

In addition to these theoretical contributions, this dissertation offers the most systematic, empirical study of the consequences of *presidentas'* rise to date. I test my argument's observable implications with (1) national media archives during five presidential campaigns in Chile and Brazil from

1999-2010; (2) original databases of government archives capturing Chilean and Brazilian presidents' use of legislative power to promote PWC; and (3) cross-national, time-series data on Latin American presidents' use of delegative power from 1999-2015. Describing some context on the emergence of *presidentas*, the next section begins to lay the groundwork for the dissertation's analysis of gender, constituencies and the use of presidential power.

2. Background on *Presidentas'* Rise

　　Before examining the consequences of *presidentas'* rise, it is necessary to describe the dimensions and scope of this recent phenomenon as well as its potential causes. Bachelet and Rousseff are part of a region-wide trend of female presidential candidates increasingly contesting and winning the presidency via popular election. Two women captured the presidency between 1990 and 2000,[iii] and from 2001 to 2010, four more women won. Three successfully competed for a second term. By 2014, women had been elected nine times and in countries as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama. Today, Latin America stands out among world regions in terms of electing women presidents (Jalalzai 2016).

　　To better understand the emergence of female presidents, I coded the sex of presidential hopefuls using Baker and Greene's (2011) dataset of all candidates (751) in every presidential election in 18 Latin American countries since 1990. Of the 284 Latin American presidential candidates who obtained more than 10% of the first-round vote, 27 or about 9.5% were women. Despite their disproportionately small participation in presidential contests, female candidates are running more often for president and enjoying similar levels of success relative to their male competitors. Graph 1 shows the percent of candidates with more than 10% of the first-round vote who are female as well as the percent of presidential winners who were female. The percent of female candidates capturing more than 10% of the vote has risen from 3.9% during the 1990-94 election cycle to 20.3% during the 2010-14 cycle. The number of female winners has increased from one during the first election period (representing 2% of all the presidential winners) to five during the most recent election period (representing 7.8% of all the presidential winners).

Graph 1: Percent Female Candidates and Winners in Latin America

Female Candidates with more than 10% of the Vote

Female Candidates ▮ Female Winners ▮

Female presidential candidates also appear to be performing just as well as their male competitors. From 1990-2014, the 257 male and 27 female candidates who individually obtained more than 10% of the first-round vote in their elections on average obtained 32% of the total first-round vote. Graph 2 shows the mean percent vote by candidate gender and election cycle. During the first election cycle, female candidates outperformed their male counterparts. However, it is difficult to generalize with this observation because of the limited sample size: only two female candidates individually obtained more than 10% of the vote. During the next election cycle, male and female candidates performed equally well—on average candidates of both sexes captured 33% of votes. Male candidates outperformed their female competitors during the first election cycle (30.3% vs. 19.2%) while similar performances between the sexes characterized both the 2005-09 and 2010-14 election periods. During the 2005-09 cycle, both male and female candidates who obtained more than 10% of the vote captured on average 35% of the vote, and during the 2010-14 cycle both male and female candidates who obtained more than 10% of the

vote captured about 31% of the vote. In short, Graph 2 suggested that male and female presidential candidates demonstrate comparable performances at the polls.

Graph 2: Mean Percent Vote by Candidate Gender and Election Years

Candidates with more than 10% of the vote

Graphs 1 and 2 therefore depict female presidential candidates' increasing participation rates and similar electoral success between the sexes.[iv] What has driven these trends? Extremely little scholarship has advanced any explanation for the cause of *presidentas'* rise, or to employ statistical language, *presidentas'* data-generating process. Thomas and Reyes-Housholder (2016) argue that existing theories of female chief executives worldwide—namely crisis, family ties and the magnitude of executive power—fail to apply to the Latin American cases. The authors instead suggest that democratization, the "left turn" and increased opportunities for women in institutionalized parties and provide more plausible accounts for the emergence of competitive and successful female presidential candidates.

Given women's and feminist groups' success in organizing against the authoritarian governments of the 1980s (Alvarez 1990; Baldez 2002; Craske 1999), one might expect women's movements to have put forth their own candidates to run for executive office or to have played a fundamental part in propelling these female presidential candidates to victory. Yet, women's movements in Latin America

severely weakened and fractured after democratization. Jaquette (2009, 5) observes that: "In the post transition period groups that had been united in opposition to the military (and who were often recipients of material as well as moral support from foundations, foreign assistance agencies and transnational NGOs) were now divided by class, race and ethnic division, as well as by partisan differences." Feminist and women's groups simply are no longer the influential players they were during the fight against authoritarian regimes in Chile, Brazil and other states. Jaquette (2009, 6) even casts some doubt on the existence of women's movements in many of the region's countries since "they rarely achieve the level of coordination and consensus that the term *movement* implies."[v] She instead shows how Latin American feminists, many times from elite positions within the academy or the government, have pursued gender equality agendas, often in collaboration with international bodies such as the U.N.

This dissertation's analysis of presidential campaigns coheres with Jaquette's region-wide assessment. I find that feminist and women's groups played a minimal role in every election from 1999-2010 in Chile and Brazil. Some feminists and women's organization leaders individually supported Bachelet's and Rousseff's presidential bids in Chile and Brazil. Nevertheless, neither candidate-turned-*presidenta* enjoyed unified support from their country's women's movement.

3. Dependent Variable: Use of Power to Promote Pro-Women Change (PWC)

Having reviewed the extent and causes of *presidentas'* rise, I now turn to operationalizing my dependent variable. Pro-women change outcomes and their determinants are not the central object of study because myriad factors in each step of the legislative process can affect whether a bill promoted by a president eventually passes in Congress. I instead focus on presidential *decision-making*, or use of presidential power, which logically precedes policy outcomes. The dependent variable features two components: (1) presidential power; and (2) pro-women change. I discuss each in turn.

Presidential Power This dissertation analyzes Latin American presidents' deployment of delegative and legislative power to advance pro-women change. Concerning delegative power, presidents enjoy almost complete discretion since Latin American constitutions only impose nationality and age

requirements on selecting cabinet members (Payne 2007). These ministers, in turn, are responsible for drafting, promoting and executing legislation and therefore are extremely powerful in their own right. Delegation therefore is a key prerogative for Latin American presidents (Amorim Neto 2006; Martínez-Gallardo 2012).

I also explore two types of legislative power at presidents' disposal: bill initiation and agenda-setting powers. Both the chief executive and Congress can write bills in Latin America, unlike in the U.S. Furthermore, presidents can assign "urgencies" to bills, which automatically move them to the top of the legislative agenda. The two-pronged powers of bill initiation and urgency assignment enable Latin American presidents to dominate the legislative process (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Melo and Pereira 2013; Siavelis 2000).

Why not study other kinds of presidential prerogatives such as vetoes or referendums? Presidents rarely exercise the aforementioned powers to effect PWC. Since 2000, no president in Chile has vetoed legislation that hinders or favors PWC, and a Brazilian president has only partially vetoed a PWC bill once. No president in either country has called a referendum on a PWC issue. Therefore, the capacities to name ministers, initiate legislation and set the legislative agenda are the most relevant kinds of presidential power for this study of pro-women change.

Pro-Women Change The second component of my outcome of interest, pro-women change (PWC), requires a more extensive discussion. All countries in Latin America face significant gender inequalities. Women here—as in virtually all other regions of the world—constitute a historically disadvantaged group in terms of socio-economic and political status (Williams 1998). While women's marginalized status might be uncontroversial, a major challenge to measuring change favoring women is defining women's interests in a way that avoids essentialism, or the assumption that all women share exogenously-given interests based on their subordinate status (M. C. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2014; Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2011).

This dissertation subscribes to the argument that women's interests—and by extension, ideas about PWC—are constructed and contested through interactions among different social and political

actors (Beckwith 2000). In Latin America, actors located at the international, state and societal levels are viewed as legitimate authorities on PWC. These actors maintain overlapping, but frequently contested, ideas about which reforms advance women's interests, so fully operationalizing PWC requires considering each actor.[vi]

At the international level, the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) asserts that discrimination against women is recurrent and detrimental to society (Baldez 2011).[vii] The text, designed to be adaptable to policy agendas of diverse world leaders, addresses a broad range of issues such as health and law. All Latin American countries signed CEDAW in the 1970s and 1980s, thereby promising the international community to advance gender equality.[viii] Expert panels from around the world regularly evaluate signatory countries' progress and enumerate ways to better comply with CEDAW. This means that all Latin American presidents have access to hundreds of pages of expert recommendations on how to promote PWC according to international standards.

Women's governmental agencies, which enjoy full ministerial status in countries such as Chile and Brazil, act as the national authority that defines PWC within Latin American countries' respective contexts. Like national women's bureaus in other regions, these agencies strive to comply with CEDAW regardless of the ruling party's ideology (Towns 2010). To achieve this, they consider CEDAW's assessments and their own national studies on women's status. These agencies design programs to improve gender equality and mainstream gender policy throughout the executive branch (G. Thomas 2016; Macaulay 2006).[ix]

Finally, at the level of civil society, organizations of women have been debating and (re)defining PWC for decades (Alvarez 1990; Alvarez 1998; Baldez 2002; Franceschet 2005; Jaquette 2009; Htun 2003). Domestic women's groups in many Latin American countries lobbied for the creation of women's agencies, and upon their establishment, local activists often went to work for the government. Nevertheless, civil society's influence within these state institutions has fluctuated over time and across countries (Haas 2010; Macaulay 2006). Any conceptualization of PWC in Latin America therefore should

account for potential discrepancies between state agencies' and citizen organizations' understanding of women's interests and pro-women policies.

In light of this operationalization, how might Latin American presidents exercise their power to advance PWC? Chapter VIII explores presidents' use of delegative power to advance PWC, specifically in naming women to their cabinets. Ministerial appointees are relevant to study because they draft, promote and execute legislation, and cabinets are recruiting grounds for future presidential candidates. Women still comprise only about 20 percent of the region's ministerial posts. CEDAW, Latin American states and civil society groups that advocate in the name of women's interests generally converge on the idea that improving the number of women in politics tends to benefit women, and to my knowledge, none claim that increasing women's representation in the executive branch impedes PWC. Therefore, according to my three-tier criteria, improving women's presence in executive cabinets qualifies as a use of presidential power to advance PWC.

While the presidential use of delegative power to enhance PWC is relatively straightforward, evaluating presidents' deployment of legislative power to this end is more complicated. Specific bills promoting or hindering PWC vary by country in part because an enormous span of legislation could affect women's lives (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007). Chapter VII details how I gathered and evaluated bills in Chile and Brazil to measure presidents' use of legislative power to effect PWC over a 14-year period. Because different actors often disagree over which bills constitute PWC, I classify a bill as pro-women if two out of the three sets of actors did or would appear to support the legislation.[x] The wide range of PWC in my datasets—from international treaties to redistribution programs to the creation of institutions—demonstrates the importance of considering international, state and societal definitions of PWC.

This three-tier definition offers several advantages. First, the lack of issue pre-selection permits the "pro-women change" concept to encompass a broader range of policy areas than found in some of the most influential existing scholarship.[xi] Second, recognizing that women's interests are socially constructed by a variety of actors avoids essentialism. Third, this method of operationalization could be

applied to study contexts outside of Chile and Brazil—namely in any CEDAW signatory country that features some sort of women's agency and organized women's groups.[xii] My PWC concept thus has the potential to advance the comparative study of pro-women change.

4. The Argument in Brief: A Constituency Explanation for Women's Conditional Impact

Having operationalized my dependent variable, I now will preview this dissertation's argument, fully articulated in Chapter II. Given the inadequacy of existing theories, I draw on cases of Latin America's *presidentas* to advance an alternative, constituency-centered theory of variation in female politicians' use of power to promote PWC. This theory also offers a novel account for why female politicians overall are more likely to do so than their male counterparts, and therefore explains both intra-gender and inter-gender variation. Two concepts key to the argument are "core" constituencies, or groups that provide politicians strong support and could help secure re-election; and "personal" constituencies, or individuals who lend politicians political and technical expertise (R. Fenno 1978).

My argument begins with the well-established idea that the formation of core and personal constituencies during presidential campaigns exerts a significant impact on how presidents deploy their power once in office. Concerning core constituencies, campaigns are unique moments when candidates, through interacting with voters and analyzing poll numbers, come to understand which electoral groups support them and why. By the end of the election, candidates usually have a strong sense of their core constituencies' demands. I furthermore assume that once in office these candidates-turned-presidents seek to maintain their popularity and secure a possible re-election (consecutive or non-consecutive). They therefore possess bottom-up incentives to legislate and delegate in ways that please these groups.

Campaigns moreover are critical moments for the crystallization of candidates' personal constituencies, which also influence the exercise of both kinds of presidential power. Candidates rely on personal constituents who leverage their political and technical expertise to help write campaign platforms. Because personal constituents often participate directly or indirectly in designing electoral promises, they often influence the content of policy agendas of candidates-turned-presidents. Once in

office, presidents receive policy advice from these personal constituents, who therefore continue to influence the use of legislative power. Personal constituents' areas of expertise can affect presidential priorities because the more information presidents' have on an issue, the more likely that issue will rise to the top of their agendas. The crystallization of personal constituencies during campaigns also is relevant for how presidents' use their delegative power. The same campaign advisers who endured the intense yet successful electoral competition are often first-choice ministerial picks.

Political scientists have long known that constituencies affect politicians' decision-making. A major contribution of my theory is that candidates' gender identities shape gendered and sex-related aspects of core and personal constituencies, and as a result, female presidents tend to use their power more than their male counterparts to advance PWC. I start with core constituencies. I build on Fenno's (1978) observation that politicians and strategists tend to believe shared identities facilitate the transfer of trust, and ultimately political support. These actors, in turn, often assume that female candidates are more effective than male candidates at mobilizing women. Because of women's perceived advantage in energizing women voters, female candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to attempt to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. Male and female candidates can attempt to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity in at least two ways: (1) by evoking women's identities, or related identities such as motherhood; (2) by promising PWC on the campaign trail or in their official platforms. Assuming that increased attempts lead to higher success rates, female candidates also are more likely to successfully mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity. Candidates who have achieved this usually have obtained more female than male votes, and not all female candidates accomplish this. Female candidates may be more likely to attempt and succeed at mobilizing women on the basis of gender identity, but any president—female or male—who perceives this kind of core constituency is more likely to significantly deploy her or his power to advance PWC.

Turning to personal constituencies, I define elite feminists by their social position and by their efforts to reverse gender discrimination, including women's historic exclusion from the executive branch. Elite feminists generally possess political and technical expertise on PWC, and they have the potential to

serve on presidential candidates' (and future presidents') team of advisers. Because elite feminists by definition prefer to see more women elected to political office, they are more likely to actively support and participate in female rather than male candidates' personal constituencies. Candidates with strong ties to elite feminists are more likely to include PWC promises in their platforms, and once in power, these candidates-turned-presidents will have greater access to specialized PWC information. This is important because, as mentioned above, the more information presidents have on a particular issue, the more likely they are to legislate on that issue. Therefore, presidents whose personal constituents include more elite feminists are more likely to use their power effectively and frequently to advance PWC.

To summarize, female presidential candidates are more likely than their male competitors to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity and network with elite feminists, but they do not always accomplish this. Presidents who maintain these gendered constituencies are most likely to deploy their power to promote PWC. Conversely, presidents who do not successfully mobilize core constituencies of women on the basis of gender identity and/or who network comparatively little with elite feminists are less likely to use their power to promote PWC. Core and personal constituencies therefore function as probabilistic mechanisms linking presidents' gender to the use of power to advance PWC. The presence of these specific constituencies helps determine the conditions under which *presidentas* are most likely to leverage their power on behalf of women—the primary focus of this dissertation.

5. Multi-Method Research Design

Below I elaborate my case selection of presidents, which features similarly situated *presidentas* with divergent outcomes and their male, co-partisan predecessors. I then explain why and how I combine in-depth case studies with cross-national, time series statistics to illustrate and test the constituency theory.

5.1. President Case Selection

Existing scholarship on *presidentas'* impact on PWC has only examined single cases of female presidents (Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015; Staab and Waylen 2016; G. Thomas 2014). No study has

systematically compared across presidential gender or across countries (for a partial exception see Jalalzai 2016). This study innovates by selecting *presidentas* from different countries (intra-gender comparisons) as well as female and male presidents from the same country (inter-gender comparisons). The intra-gender comparisons explore the conditions under which female presidents are most likely to use their power to advance PWC. Inter-gender comparisons furnish a baseline from which to measure *presidentas'* use of power to advance change and allow additional testing of my constituency theory's explanation for why female politicians overall are more likely than their male counterparts to exercise their power to promote PWC.

I integrate quantitative and qualitative considerations to arrive at my selection of "most similar" *presidentas* who varied in the degree to which they used their prerogatives to advance PWC. I first follow Lieberman's (2005) and Gerring's (2007) recommendation to choose cases according to their relationship with cross-national trends over time. Doing so yields the full range of the dependent variable, thereby minimizing the potential for inferential errors associated with selection bias (Geddes 2003). It further allows the findings to more easily generalize to the population of democratically elected presidents in 21st century Latin America.

Divergent Outcomes Following Section 4, I argue here that cabinet appointments constitute the best available proxy to measure presidents' use of power to advance PWC throughout Latin America. Presidents across the region have virtually no constitutional restrictions in naming ministers who wield extensive policymaking influence (Amorim Neto 2006). Since 1999, women have been appointed to only about 20% of all ministries. In light of ministers' power and the reduced ministerial presence of women, female cabinet appointments unambiguously capture presidents' exercise of power to promote PWC (Krook and O'Brien 2012; Reynolds 1999).

To identify *presidentas* who varied in the degree to which they used their powers to promote PWC, I created an original dataset with all inaugural and end-of-term cabinet appointments (1,908 ministers) of all Latin American presidents democratically elected from 1999-2015 (54 presidents).[xiii] The database reveals that presidents varied greatly in the percentage of their cabinets occupied by women, and

the average percent female in cabinets was 19.5%. Bachelet named the region's only gender parity

cabinet (50%), and after shuffling her cabinet she ended her term with 40.1% female ministers. Bachelet

is included in the study because, according to this region-wide analysis of the appointments proxy, she

appears to have deployed her powers the most to advance PWC. Chile's *presidenta*, in other words,

represents a case with the highest possible value of my dependent variable.

I then sought to include in my study a *presidenta* who features the lowest possible value of my

dependent variable, that is, a *presidenta* who named the fewest female ministers. Table 1's first row

shows the mean percent female in *presidentas'* inaugural and end-of-term cabinets minus the regional

mean.[xiv] Rousseff and Moscoso are *presidentas* who, by this measure, exercised their powers the least to

promote PWC. Including one of these woman presidents would allow the study to obtain the full range of

the dependent variable according to the female ministerial proxy.

Table 1: Divergent Outcomes and "Most Similar" *Presidentas*

Presidenta	Bachelet	Chinchilla	Kirchner	Rousseff	Moscoso
% Ministras – Mean	26.0	9.0	3.6	-4.2	-3.9
Presidential Ideology	Center-left	Center	Center-left	Center-left	Center-Right
Party Institutions	Coalition	Two-party	Two-party	Coalition	Coalition
Pathway to Power	Minister	Minister	Congress, First lady	Minister	First lady

Most Similar Presidentas *and Male Predecessors* Given that comparing Bachelet with either

Rousseff or Moscoso would allow me to examine the full range the dependent variable, I then sought to

choose between these *presidentas* based on who were "most similar" to Bachelet on theoretically salient

co-variates: ideology, female legislators, formal power, party system and prior experience. As alluded to

previously, left-leaning women tend to promote more PWC than conservative women, and thus partisan

ideology, shown in Table 1's second row, could act as a confounder (Htun and Power 2006; Osborn 2012;

Swers 2002). Both Bachelet and Rousseff maintained center-left ideologies while Moscoso's ideology has

been coded as center-right (Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav 2010).

Critical mass theory, another prominent explanation cited above for variations in women's impact, argues that women are more likely to attempt PWC when they can coordinate with more female legislators. The theory focuses on female legislators collaborating with each other, but because presidents often must work with legislators to pursue their policy agenda, the number of female legislators could also determine *presidentas'* PWC decision-making. Female legislators seemed mere tokens during both Bachelet's and Rousseff's first administrations, with women's presence in the upper and lower chambers averaging 10.2% in Chile and 12.3% in Brazil (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016).[xv]

Examining similarities on other co-variates further justifies selecting Bachelet and Rousseff for this study on variation in *presidentas'* use of power. Women with more formal power are more likely to attempt PWC, and Bachelet and Rousseff appeared to manage comparable amounts of formal power. The third row indicates that Chile and Brazil score the highest (0.68 and 0.60 respectively) for presidents' legislative powers, with the next highest being Argentina (0.47) (Payne 2007). Party system type is a primary determinant of presidents' overall constraints as multi-party systems impose more transactional costs than two-party systems (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2010). Both Bachelet and Rousseff governed multi-party coalitions.

Finally, presidents' pathway to power could shape their PWC decision-making. Neither Bachelet nor Rousseff had won an election before running for president, but both pioneered women's presence in cabinets. Bachelet was named Health Minister, and then became Latin America's first female Defense Minister, a stereotypically masculine ministry. Rousseff was appointed Mines and Energy Minister and then became Brazil's first female Chief of Staff, another stereotypically masculine post (Krook and O'Brien 2012). I therefore selected these *presidentas* because they represent the full range of this study's dependent variable and yet they displayed key similarities in terms of their ideology, female legislators, formal power, party system and prior experience, each of which existing scholarship suggests could confound the relationship between gendered constituencies and the use of power to advance PWC.[xvi]

5.2. Advantages of In-Depth Case Studies

This dissertation is primarily based on case studies of presidential campaigns, candidates' constituencies and successful candidates' subsequent use of power. I draw heavily on case studies because *presidentas'* rise constitutes an empirically new phenomenon, of which there is little existing scholarship. Stated differently, researching the consequences of *presidentas'* rise presents more of a model-building than a model-testing opportunity. These case studies serve three purposes: (1) conducting plausibility probes; (2) identifying PWC legislation; and (3) testing mechanisms.

First, I probe the plausibility of the core and personal constituency hypotheses by examining the cases of all viable presidential candidates in Chile and Brazil from 1999-00. I qualitatively trace the formation of candidates' electoral bases, paying particular attention to whether candidates try to mobilize women, and if they do so on the basis of gender identity or some other way. More specifically, my campaign narratives draw on newspaper archives and polling data to detail how Bachelet attempted to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity and believed she had succeeded; and how Rousseff attempted but believed she had failed to achieve the same goal. Throughout the case studies, a secondary analysis of candidates' discourse yields potential hypotheses on which strategies are most effective.[xvii] The discursive analyses require qualitative methods (Wedeen 2002).[xviii]

The roughly chronological order of the campaign chapters preserves sequence as much as possible. Capturing the succession of events shines light on the process by which constituencies formed and rules out some endogeneity concerns (Bennett and Elman 2006). The qualitative case studies show, for example, that female presidential candidates made greater efforts than their male competitors to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, and in the case of Bachelet, her efforts, rather than other factors, largely explain why women came to support her. Case studies moreover provide circumstantial evidence that elite feminists, rather than other kinds of advisors, influenced some candidates' PWC proposals. Appreciating sequences helps connect the variables of candidate strategies with successful mobilization, and elite feminists with PWC campaign promises.

Case studies also enhance the internal validity of inferences about presidents' use of legislative power to advance PWC. While I can fruitfully study the use of delegative power with cross-national

datasets, the use of legislative power to promote PWC is far more difficult to observe across all 18 Latin American countries. This is because while the deployment of delegative power to enhance women's representation in the executive branch unambiguously constitutes PWC, definitions of PWC in terms of legislation and policy vary across space and time. There is a vast range of potential legislation that would require deeper analysis to determine what impact, if any, they might have on women, and thus no simple, easily accessible indicator, or even proxy, for the use of legislative power to advance PWC exists (see Section 3.2). As a result, the data collection and coding process of the use of this kind of power is more involved than for the use of delegative power. My measurements of the use of legislative power by presidents to advance PWC required interviews with actors on the ground and archival analysis. Case studies, rather than a large-N statistics, enable more accurate and precise identification of PWC legislation, thereby improving internal validity.

Finally, case studies in this dissertation permit additional tests of mechanisms. I argue that two mechanisms—gendered core and personal constituencies—could explain a positive relationship between presidents' sex and the use of power to advance PWC. Case studies of female- and male-headed administrations in Chapter VII allow exploration of the ways in which constituencies drive the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in the executive branch (Bennett and Checkel 2014; Gerring 2007). Serving a different purpose, explained later in this section, the cross-national time-series analysis in Chapter VIII is unable to detect which mechanisms, or both, are really at work.

5.3 Case Study Data

Existing studies on *presidentas'* impact of have employed qualitative—and primarily interview-based—methods (Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015; Jalalzai 2016; Staab and Waylen 2016). I instead triangulate archival, quantitative and interview-based data to probe my hypotheses and rule out alternative explanations throughout my case-centered analysis of presidential campaigns and the subsequent use of presidential power. More specifically, my campaign analyses in Chapters III-VI draw on newspaper and

magazine archives; and I evaluate presidents' legislative impact using government archives in Chapter VII.

Concerning campaigns, while interviews present their own set of advantages, such as the ability to pose research questions directly to influential actors, I rely more on media sources than interviews. This is because much time has passed since these elections were held, and interviews conducted today often are colored by events of the intervening years and distorted by memory failures. On the other hand, interviews conducted during the elections—and recorded in media archives—are less contaminated by election outcomes and positive/negative events during the administration, capturing fresher, more complete recollections of past events.

National newspapers serve as my main data source for the Chilean and Brazilian campaigns for several reasons. First, probing my argument's observable implications requires data capturing the process of core constituency formation and elite feminists' influence on presidential campaigns. Second, while Chileans and Brazilians tend to watch more television than read newspapers, newspapers are widely consumed and thus relevant in both countries. Third, newspaper archives in both countries feature rich empirical accounts of presidential campaigns. Political analysis, one-on-one interviews and special reports in newspapers are often more in-depth than those provided by television or radio stations.

Finally, public archives of newspapers are systematically organized and readily accessible while the same cannot be said for television or radio. Chile's Biblioteca Nacional in Santiago features complete collections of the nation's top newspapers. I spent November and December 2015 reading the campaign coverage from the microfilm and paper archives. I examined *La Tercera* and *El Mercurio* because they are the number one and three most read newspapers in Chile (Cordero 2005). I did not examine the sensationalist *La Cuarta*, which ranks number two, as it offers less reliable campaign.

One pitfall of employing *La Tercera* and *El Mercurio*, however, is their right-wing slant. Aiming to minimize this problem, I considered the possibility of sexist coverage and anti-government bias while examining the archives. For example, sexism could affect the amount and kind of coverage of women in campaigns, and would thereby affect my analysis of elite feminists' roles. Because many reporters likely

possess sexist bias, they may believe male actors are more powerful and thus may report on men disproportionately more than they report on women. I therefore paid attention to even the most minor references to female actors since it was unlikely that the newspapers would offer them equal coverage as to the male counterparts. Given that I used the same sources to compare across presidential candidates, it is likely that this kind of bias underestimates the presence and impact of elite feminists among the different candidates. Supplementing newspaper evidence with personal interviews, presidential biographies also helps mitigate this sexist slant, but my estimation of elite feminists' influence will still likely be a conservative estimate.

Turning to the Brazilian sources, I selected two of the most widely circulated newspapers—*O Globo* and *Folha de São Paulo*. These represent Brazil's largest cities (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) and offer the most comprehensive national coverage of presidential campaigns.[xix] Cornell University Library via Proquest features a complete online database of these newspapers. In examining the archives, I looked for evidence that addressed questions listed in Box 1. I weighed evidence in favor and against the constituency hypotheses' observable implications.[xx]

Box 1: Questions Guiding Data-Gathering Process from Newspaper Archives

Hypothesis Probed	Sample Questions Guiding Archival Data Collection
Core	What campaign issues and debates were the most salient? Did any of these relate to PWC?
Core	Did the candidate attempt to mobilize women?
Core	If so, to what extent? Was it on the basis of gender identity? Which particular groups of women? (organized, unorganized, low-income, black, religious, etc.) How successful were they and why?
Core	What reasons did women and men (analyzed separately) give for voting for particular candidates? Did female and male voters view the candidates differently?
Core/Personal	What promises did the candidates make? Did any relate to PWC?
Personal	Which advisors were particularly instrumental in creating platforms?
Personal	How were the presidential platforms created?
Personal	What role (if any) did elite feminists play in the campaigns?
Personal	What role (if any) did female politicians play in the campaigns?

I also use legislative archives in Chapter VII to measure presidents' use of power. This is a significant departure from extant studies of *presidentas'* legislative impact which, as previously

mentioned, rely on interviews to assess the extent to which *presidentas* have promoted PWC (Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015; Jalalzai 2016). Again, one of the pitfalls of the interview-based approach is its reliance on actors' fallible and questionable memories. Certain kinds of interviewees, for example, those who worked in the *presidenta's* administration have incentives to exaggerate her PWC efforts and present her legacy in the best light possible (a form of selection bias). Chapter VII largely avoids the aforementioned problem by relying on official archival data, offering a more complete and less biased picture of presidents' legislative decision-making.

5.4. Advantages of Statistical Analysis of the Region

While case studies motor much of this dissertation's analysis, I also leverage large-N statistics to make inferences about 18 Latin American countries. The two main advantages of this method as applied to this dissertation are (1) furnishing a logical basis for case selection; (2) strengthening external validity, or generalizability. First, the cross-national statistical data described above serve as an initial basis for my case selection. I classified each *presidenta* according to how she compares to regional averages (Gerring 2007; Lieberman 2005), and again using female cabinet nominations as a proxy, I identified two cases of *presidentas* who display the maximum variation in the pursuit of PWC, the dissertation's outcome of interest. This helps minimize problems associated with studying a truncated sample of the dependent variable (Geddes 2003). Without the cross-national statistical analysis, I would be unable to select cases that truly featured the full range of the dependent variable, and the analysis would be subjected to a host of selection issues.

The second strength of large-N statistics relates to generalizability. Quantitative cross-national studies that attempt to measure the impact of legislators' sex on PWC tend to examine female legislators' activities in just a handful of countries because of the requisite fieldwork. For example, in perhaps the most comprehensive study of female legislators' policy impact in Latin America, Schwindt-Bayer (2010) examines legislators' activities during four-year periods in three countries. I adopt a similar approach in studying presidents' use of legislative power in Chile and Brazil from 1999-2014 in Chapter VII.

I take a different methodological approach in Chapter VIII's study of the use of delegative power by including all 18 Latin American countries from 1999-2015. The statistical analysis of female ministerial appointments by all democratically elected presidents (54 in total), capturing regional trends, tests the prediction that *presidentas* will use their power more than their male counterparts to promote PWC. The cross-national, time-series approach affords greater external validity to my argument that, due to gendered differences in constituencies, presidents' sex matters for PWC decision-making.

6. Plan of the Dissertation

I conclude with an overview of the subsequent chapters. Chapter II further motivates the dissertation's research questions by describing the stakes in establishing a positive relationship between descriptive and substantive representation, the focus of a rich body of work on the impact of female legislators. I explain in greater detail the ways in which existing gender and representation theories fall short of accounting for the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle. I then draw on literature primarily from the U.S. to present an alternative constituency-based theory.

Subsequent empirical chapters make both intra-gender and inter-gender comparisons of presidential candidates and winners to test this theory's observable implications. Chapters III-VI feature in-depth case studies of the formation of core and personal constituencies during all major presidential candidates' campaigns from 1999-2010 in Chile and Brazil. The overarching intra-gender argument of these chapters is that both Bachelet and Rousseff attempted to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity, but only Bachelet succeeded. Furthermore, while Bachelet networked extensively with elite feminists, Rousseff did not.

These chapters also examine the extent to which and ways in which viable male candidates attempt to mobilize women and network with elite feminists. Chapter III examines the all-male race between Ricardo Lagos and Joaquín Lavín in 1999-00. I find that, consistent with the core constituency hypothesis, neither of these viable male candidates made consistent and early efforts to target women by evoking their gender identities or promising PWC. Lagos' personal constituency moreover included a

minimal number of female politicians and elite feminists, and Lavín's featured virtually no female politicians and absolutely zero elite feminists. I suggest in a secondary analysis that Lavín captured more female than male votes due to his conservative ideology, "depoliticized" campaign and public image characterized by stereotypically feminine traits. Lagos earned a male gap due to his progressive ideology and his public image, which featured stereotypically masculine traits. The final analysis of the candidates' strategic deployment of female surrogates to attract female voters in the second round further supports the constituency theory.

Chapter IV analyzes the 2005-06 Chilean presidential bids of two viable female contenders—Michelle Bachelet and Soledad Alvear—and two viable male contenders—Joaquín Lavín and Sebastián Piñera. I show that, consistent with the core constituency hypothesis, both Bachelet and Alvear tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity early in their campaigns by discussing the dual challenges of motherhood and gender discrimination. Bachelet campaigned on a pro-women platform, successfully mobilized a core constituency of women demanding PWC and networked extensively with elite feminists, many of whom influenced her campaign in a variety of ways. Statistical results from vote choice models are consistent with the argument that Bachelet in 2005 mobilized a core constituency of women, while Lagos in 1999 did not. Threatened by Bachelet's ability to attract women—one of the core constituencies he had mobilized in his first presidential bid—Lavín tried harder in his second presidential run to target women on the basis of gender identity, and he employed female surrogates to this end. Like Lavín, Piñera networked almost entirely with other male politicians. He also maintained a stereotypically masculine image which was believed to have attracted more male voters, particularly in the first round, than what conservative presidential candidates had in the past.

Chapter V next explores the campaigns of all viable male candidates in every presidential race from 2002-10 in Brazil. Further strengthening my constituency theory, male candidates in Brazil behave similarly to their Chilean counterparts in that they generally made little effort to target women, even less so on the basis of gender identity. My theory moreover predicts the conditions under which Brazilian

male candidates did make these efforts—namely when they were influenced by elite feminists or felt threatened by female candidates who were seeking to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity.

I specifically argue that Luiz Inácio da Silva did attempt to elicit women's support on the basis of gender identity by promising significant PWC when he ran in 2002 and 2006. These efforts were mainly due to the influence of elite feminists from his party. He nevertheless did not believe that he had captured an electorally significant, core constituency of women beyond those organized within the left. At one point in 2006, Lula, viewing a leftist female candidate rise in the polls and targeting women by evoking shared motherhood, seemed to tweak his strategy to appeal more widely to women. Lula's main 2006 competitor, Geraldo Alckmin, perceived no such female-led threat from the right and sensed no need to target female voters on the basis of gender identity. As a male candidate competing against other male candidates, he subsequently promised virtually no PWC. Variation in José Serra's strategy also coheres with my constituency theory's expectations for male candidates. Serra promised more PWC in his 2010 platform, when he competed against female candidates, than in his 2002 platform, when he competed in an all-male contest. This chapter finally shows that every male candidate, though to varying degrees, used women in their campaigns to mobilize women on their behalf. As my constituency theory would expect, Serra in 2010 employed this tool the most of all the male candidates, since he was competing against two female candidates, both of whom leveraged their shared identity with women voters to mobilize them as a bloc.

Chapter VI analyzes Dilma Rousseff's and Marina Silva's 2010 candidacies. I show that they tried to mobilized women on the basis of gender identity in overlapping ways: both framed their identities as potentially "first female" presidents. But while Rousseff relied heavily on a maternalist discourse, Silva focused on mobilizing groups on the basis of her multiple identities as a black, evangelical woman from an impoverished family. I also show that although Rousseff targeted women on the basis of gender identity to a greater extent than Lula, she and her campaign team worked indefatigably to link her candidacy to Lula's popularity and success. As a result, she promised to continue Lula's legislative agenda but mentioned little PWC, and she maintained few ties with elite feminists both inside and outside

her party. Statistical results from vote choice models show that Rousseff's core constituencies were virtually identical to Lula's 2006 electoral constituency. This supports my argument that as *presidenta* Rousseff possessed few incentives to cater to women as a constituency.

Chapters III-VI therefore provide preliminary case study evidence for the core and personal constituency hypotheses. My theory argues that gender and sex-related characteristics of core and personal constituencies function as mechanisms that link presidents' sex to their use of power to promote PWC. This leads to the expectation that *presidentas* are more likely than their male competitors to use their power to advance PWC, but only presidents who maintain a core constituency of women mobilized on the basis of gender identity and network with elite feminists are most likely to do so. Chapters VII and VIII examine how the winners the Chilean and Brazilian presidential contests subsequently deployed their legislative and delegative power to advance PWC.

Chapter VII looks legislative power. Having established in the previous chapters that only Bachelet successfully mobilized a constituency of women demanding PWC and maintained close ties to elite feminists, this chapter then shows that she pursued PWC to a greater degree than her male, co-partisan predecessor. Lula promoted some significant PWC, but one of his major PWC reforms, the Bolsa Família, does not fit the definition of many Brazilian elite feminists' ideas about PWC. Rousseff did not use her powers to pursue PWC in a way that significantly departed from Lula's use of power.

Qualitative assessments of these presidents' PWC legislation suggests both the core and personal constituency mechanisms are at work. Bachelet's legislation delivered material benefits to low-income mothers, one of her core constituencies, and appeared influenced by elite feminists from her personal constituency. Rousseff, on the other hand, exercised her prerogatives to cater to the same core constituencies as Lula and promoted maternal health in ways that enraged feminists from outside the government. Political missteps ultimately seemed to prevent her from continuing to legislate on this issue. Rousseff's lack of constituency incentives and elite feminist expertise helps explain why she did not use her legislative power more than Lula to advance PWC.

The final empirical chapter further explores the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in the executive branch. It specifically tests this "power" hypothesis by conducting a series of cross-national statistical tests on presidents' use of delegative power. If my constituency-centered argument is correct, then *presidentas* should deploy their delegative power to advance PWC more than their male counterparts by nominating more women to their cabinets. I argue that this should happen for two reasons. First, *presidentas* are more likely to interpret their mandates as calls for greater female presence in the executive branch (core constituency pressures). Second, because of gender homophily, *presidentas* are more likely to network with elite female politicians and thus view female ministerial candidates as loyal and like-minded (personal constituency hypothesis). Furthermore, *presidentas* are most likely to make a difference when they are least constrained by the supply of female ministerial candidates. Results of hierarchical models are consistent with my argument that *presidentas* tend to appoint more women to their cabinets than their male counterparts under two supply-related conditions: at the beginning of their term and to stereotypically "feminine" posts.

Chapter IX summarizes findings from Chapters III-VIII. I conclude that shared identities and affinities between female candidates, female voters, elite feminists and other female politicians are key to understanding female politicians' use of power to advance PWC. I further explore possible explanatory factors for why Bachelet but not Rousseff was able to mobilize a core constituency of women demanding PWC. I close by outlining the limitations of this study and avenues for future research.

---

[i] Bachelet was named Health Minister in 2000 and Latin America's first female Defense Minister in 2003. Rousseff became Brazil's first female Energy Minister in 2003 and then became Brazil's first female Chief of Staff in 2005.

[ii] Bachelet also studied pediatrics and served as Health Minister in 2000.

[iii] Janet Jagan served as the first woman prime minister in Guyana in 1997, and then was elected president by the legislature, and served as president from 1997-1999. Guyana is not a presidential regime, but instead a mixed parliamentary-presidential regime, and belongs to the political traditions of the Anglo-phone Caribbean, rather than Spanish or Portuguese Latin America.

[iv] This dissertation focuses on the post-1999 period because only one *presidenta* was elected before 1999.

[v] Jaquette further argues that after successfully promoting PWC issues such as gender quotas and domestic violence legislation, much work remains to reduce gender inequalities.

[vi] The term "pro-women" is employed rather than "feminist" because most Latin American women and many women activists do not identify as feminists, but all identify as women (Stephen 2010).

[vii] CEDAW defines discrimination as "...any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of

their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field" (United Nations 1979).

[viii] The U.N. General Assembly adopted CEDAW in 1979 with 130 votes in favor, zero against and 10 abstentions. 186 countries have ratified this treaty, which signals recognition of this conceptualization of pro-women change (United Nations 1979).

[ix] "Mainstreaming" refers to promoting gender sensitivity for public policies in all government ministries.

[x] As Chapter VII will show, this rule becomes particularly important in evaluating Brazil's Bolsa Familia, arguably one of the most important policy achievements of the last 15 years in Brazil. Redistributing resources to mothers, the program counts as a PWC policy because despite criticism from some Brazilian feminists, it accords with both CEDAW's and the Brazilian Women's Ministry's definition of PWC.

[xi] For example, Htun (2003) focuses exclusively on abortion, divorce and family issues, thereby leaving out the possibility of PWC in areas of social security, defense or even other areas of maternal health.

[xii] Two thirds of all U.N. member states have some kind of women's agency (Towns 2010).

[xiii] Violeta Chamarro of Nicaragua became Latin America's first democratically elected *presidenta* in 1990, but complete data on ministerial appointments only goes back to 1999 (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

[xiv] I use the regional mean here because predecessors' means are not available for all *presidentas*.

[xv] Critical mass theorists often argue that a 30-40% threshold is necessary for a significant shift in the agenda to favor women (Childs and Krook 2006).

[xvi] Chile and Brazil also feature similar campaign cultures. Boas (2010) argues that independent of ideology, candidates in both countries usually aim to establish direct connections with voters, rather than tapping into intermediary linkages. They also rarely employ "divisive appeals" and highlight their ability to understand and empathize with voters (637).

[xvii] These hypotheses on the effectiveness of certain campaign strategies are outlined in Chapter IX's conclusions.

[xviii] In contrast, content analysis employs quantitative methods. This dissertation conducts no content analysis.

[xix] Some evidence comes from *Valor Econômico*, another reputable national newspaper that focuses on economics and politics.

[xx] Chapters V and VI also draw on personal interviews and polling data. See Chapter V for more methodological detail.

CHAPTER II A Constituency Explanation for Women's Impact

Under what conditions do female politicians use their power more than male politicians to help women? This dissertation contributes to longstanding debates over descriptive and substantive representation by drawing on cases of female and male presidential candidates and winners in Latin America. Turning first to concepts of representation, the chapter acknowledges criticisms of descriptive representation, including debates over its lack of accountability and its tendency to essentialize identities and interests. The chapter then elaborates on the stakes at hand in establishing a conditional link between descriptive and substantive representation. Empirical research has shown that the presence of women in political office positively correlates with and even causes policy outcomes favoring women, but women's use of power to advance PWC is uneven. A theory of the probabilistic relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in the case of gender ideally would avoid essentialism and explain (1) why female politicians are more likely than their male counterparts to deploy their power to promote PWC (inter-gender variation); and (2) why some female politicians do so more than others (intra-gender variation).

Dominant accounts from political science argue that the number of female legislators, partisan ideologies, and formal powers determine divergences in women's use of power to advance PWC, and yet each of these factors varies little in the cases of Bachelet and Rousseff. These theories also assume that rather than explain why female politicians would use their power more than their male counterparts to advance PWC. Socio-psychological theories would attribute variation in women's use of power to advance PWC to the presence or absence of feminist consciousness. According to research from these fields, female politicians would be more likely than their male counterparts to benefit from feminism and be exposed to feminist ideas, but only women with nontraditional life experiences tend to develop feminist consciousness, preferences and attitudes. Bachelet and Rousseff's biographies suggest that both made a series of highly nontraditional choices in both their private and professional lives, providing strong circumstantial evidence of their feminist leanings. While socio-psychological could offer an

account of both inter- and intra-gender variation, it falls short of adequately explaining the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle.

The chapter then elaborates a novel, constituency-centered theory for the probabilistic link between descriptive and substantive representation. While the mainstream literature on the U.S. Congress emphasizes constituency influence on politicians' decision-making, most studies looking at representation and gender so far have underappreciated this factor. I will argue that gendered and sex-related characteristics of core and personal constituencies function as probabilistic mechanisms linking politicians' sex to the likelihood of using power to advance PWC. Compared to many existing theories, my constituency explanation better avoids the problem of essentialism and explains both inter-gender and intra-gender variation, providing new insights on the conditions under which descriptive improves substantive representation.

1. What Is at Stake? What Do We Know?

To many inside and outside of academia, the value of the mere presence of women in government is far from obvious. Further motivating the dissertation's research question, this section describes the importance of understanding the link between descriptive and substantive representation and then reviews the state of empirical knowledge. I begin with Pitkin (1967) because having first defined descriptive representation, she remains one of its major critics. To understand the true meaning of representation, she identifies four types—formal, symbolic, descriptive and substantive—offering unique conceptual advantages to understanding democracy. While formal and substantive forms require "acting for" constituents, symbolic and descriptive variants involve "standing for" them.

Formal representation refers to authorization and accountability through institutions such as elections. According to Pitkin, a downside to formal representation is that it does not specify what representatives *do*. A key theme for her is that if we know what representatives do, then we can figure out what representation is. Symbolic representation also falls short in the sense that it relates to *being* rather than *doing*. It largely depends on whether constituents "believe in" their representatives and how they

emotionally respond to them (102). Since these representatives create symbols, this variant moves from a static to a dynamic concept of representation.

Many proponents of descriptive representation cite Pitkin (1967) as the originator of the concept, but do not acknowledge her criticisms of it (Alexander 2012; Sanbonmatsu 2003; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Pitkin finds fault in the static nature of descriptive representation, as descriptive "representing means being like you, not acting for you" (89). Anyone who looks like a constituency group member could play the role of a descriptive representative. She further notes the absence of an accountability mechanism: nothing can ensure that descriptive representatives will make decisions in ways desired by constituents. A final problem is that descriptive representation diverts attention from the activities of the representative to the composition of the government body. In sum, descriptive representation, while still necessary to fully conceptualize representation, is less valuable to democracy because it is static, lacks accountability, and is unconcerned with representatives' activities. In light of these shortcomings, descriptive representation could gain value if empirically linked to the form which Pitkin appears to favor most, substantive representation, which requires acting on constituents' behalf (Dovi 2014).

Other scholars critique descriptive representation's essentialism, or the premise that all women are fundamentally similar because of their common experiences, and hence identities and interests. Phillips (1995, 53) argues that the idea that any woman could represent all women invites essentialism. Childs and Krook (2008a, 101) agree that women are too diverse to assume that they are essentially similar. "If women have multiple identities and experience the world in different ways, the basis upon which women can act for other women seems by necessity either to succumb to essentialism or be underpinned by a denial of women's differences." These arguments diminish descriptive representation's intrinsic value. Yet, defenders of descriptive representation—often those in favor of quotas for historically marginalized groups—insist that presence matters (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). Scholars have argued for a greater presence of women in politics for other reasons aside from enhanced substantive representation—namely on the basis of pure justice and greater democratic legitimacy (S. L.

Dovi 2007; Phillips 1995). Yet, the prospects of more action on behalf of women remains one of the most intuitive and compelling motivations behind greater descriptive representation for women.

These debates have motivated a line of research on the conditions under which descriptive representation of women and other historically marginalized groups "works." Given their diverse experiences and interests, when do descriptive representatives— to a greater extent than non-descriptive representatives—act on behalf of in-group constituents? Enhanced communication and trust are important, albeit contingent, benefits of descriptive representatives (Mansbridge 1999). "Good" descriptive representatives also are theorized to possess in-group ties, or relationships with disadvantaged sub-groups within the broader historically marginalized group (S. Dovi 2002; S. L. Dovi 2007). An example of this in the case of gender would be low-income women and organized groups that work to advance the interests of low-income women. Networks emerge as a conditional linkage between descriptive and substantive representation.

To sum up, while the value of substantive representation goes largely unquestioned, the advantage of descriptive without substantive representation remains more controversial. Although there may be other benefits intrinsic to women's political presence such as pure justice and democratic legitimacy, substantive representation remains one of the most commonly cited ones, intuitively appealing to much of the broader public. The stakes are high for empirically demonstrating this positive relationship and for specifying the conditions under which it is most likely to hold.

Given the stakes at hand, it is unsurprising that an enormous body of empirical research explores this topic. Both observational and experimental studies have established a strong, probabilistic link between descriptive and substantive representation but so far have focused almost entirely on legislatures. Vast research in the U.S. demonstrates that female legislators are more likely than their male counterparts to deploy their power for the advancement of explicitly feminist issues or those related to women's interests, such as social welfare (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Dodson 2006; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007; MacDonald and O'Brien 2010; Osborn 2012; Reingold 2000; Saint-Germain 1989; Swers 2002; Swers 2013; S. Thomas 1994; Wolbrecht 2000). Some of the most prominent works includes Sue

Thomas' (1994) and Michele Swers' (2002; 2005; 2013; 2014) studies of women in the U.S. Congress.[i] Influential works examining the impact of women in U.S. state legislatures include Reingold's (2000) study on the California and Arizona legislatures; Saint-Germain's (1989) examination of the Arizona legislature; and Bratton and Haynie's work on six U.S. state legislatures (1999). In short, the most influential research on the link between descriptive and substantive representation focuses on state or national congresswomen in the U.S.

Other works have examined European cases (Bratton and Ray 2002; Dahlerup 1988; Norris 1997; Wängnerud 2009), but far fewer studies outside of the developed world have explored the relationship between the presence of female leaders and women-friendly policy outcomes. The most frequently-cited comes from developmental economics.[ii] Chattopadhyay and Duflo's (2004) study, which leveraged randomized gender quotas in local councils in India, significantly advanced scholars' confidence in a causal relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. A limitation of this kind of experimental study is of course external validity. Strengthening scholars' confidence in the validity of these findings, other studies have examined the link between descriptive and substantive representation for legislatures in Latin America (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2010).

Virtually all of these studies produce positive results, but acknowledge that some female politicians use their power much more than others to advance PWC. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Dodson (2006, 8) has stressed variation in women's impact: "Although feminist empirical scholars' choice of words may have sometimes (unfortunately) conveyed an image of unity and consistency among women … feminist empirical researchers have long realized that…the relationship between gender and attitudes/behaviors is probabilistic rather than deterministic." She points out that this research also shows that the impact of politicians' sex changes over time and according to specific issues (e.g. social welfare vs. explicitly feminist policy, see for example, M. C. Escobar-Lemmon, Taylor-Robinson, and Schwindt-Bayer 2014)).

Scholars therefore have offered compelling observational and experimental evidence that women tend to, but do not always, use their power more than men to promote PWC. There are two main

conclusions to this review of the empirical knowledge. First, an important shortcoming in this literature is that it has yet to fully explore the link between descriptive and substantive representation in the executive branch, which in many countries is actually more powerful than the legislature. Second, any new theory on the probabilistic linkage between descriptive and substantive representation should not only explain variation in women's use of power to advance PWC (intra-gender differences), but also whether and why female politicians are more likely than their male counterparts to do so overall (inter-gender differences). I now will examine the contributions and shortcomings of existing theories on variation in women's impact from political science and socio-psychological research.

2. Political Science Theories for Variation Among Female Politicians

Dominant theories from political science tend to argue that factors such as women in the legislature, party ideology and formal powers either facilitate or curtail women's use of power to advance PWC. Examining these variables reveals that each is too similar in the cases of Bachelet and Rousseff to adequately explain their dramatic divergence. Exclusively focused on intra-gender variation, these theories *assume* rather than *explain* why female politicians would be more likely than their male counterparts to advance PWC in the first place. As mentioned above, a new theory of the probabilistic relationship between descriptive and substantive representation should be able to explain both intra- and inter-gender variation.

Women in the legislature The first factor that may enable or hinder women's pursuit of PWC derives from critical mass theory, one of the most cited and controversial accounts of women's varying impact. Proponents argue that a greater proportion of female legislators fosters a more pro-women legislative climate and enhances possibilities for supportive alliances (Childs and Krook 2008b; Dahlerup 1988). Female representatives may be more likely to push for PWC bills when they observe greater numbers of female legislators because they anticipate greater chances of success (Thomas 1994). Critical mass theory predicts that once the percentage of women in legislatures reaches a certain threshold, for example 30 or 40%, then policies improving women's status are more likely to be debated and passed.

Some empirical studies show that more women in U.S. state legislatures and European parliaments lead to different policy priorities (Gertzog 1995; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994).

Typically applied to legislatures, critical mass theory could be adapted to explain variations in female executives' use of power. The argument would acknowledge that male and female presidents decide which legislation to send to Congress after strategically considering the legislation's chance of success. Female presidents who observe a significant number of potential allies would anticipate a favorable reception for PWC bills and thus would send more of them to Congress. Female presidents would then be more likely to promote PWC when the number of women lawmakers achieves the critical mass threshold.

A major limitation of this theory is that it assumes rather than explains why female presidents—like female legislators—possess greater motivations than their male counterparts to pursue PWC. It therefore provides a theoretical account only of intra-gender but not inter-gender variation. Moreover, politics and gender scholars have repeatedly noted its conceptual flaws. Exactly what proportion constitutes a critical mass? Several studies have found results that contradict expectations (Carroll 2001; Crowley 2004; Reingold 2000). Difficulties in pinpointing a threshold combined with these empirical anomalies have prompted some scholars to abandon the theory (Childs and Krook 2008b).

Critical mass theory also would have problems explaining the Bachelet-Rousseff divergence. Both *presidentas* faced low numbers of women in the legislature during their first terms. In Chile from 2006-10, only 15% of the Chamber of Deputies and 5.3% of the Senate were comprised of women, averaging 10.2%. In Brazil from 2011-14, 8.6% of the Chamber and 16% of the Senate were women, averaging 12.3% (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). Bachelet's first administration coincided with more female legislators in the Chamber of Deputies than in the Senate while the opposite was true for Rousseff's first term. Yet it is unclear why this difference would matter because both chambers are needed to pass legislation. More relevant is the fact that these percentages fall significantly below the 30-40% mark required for expectations of a policy impact. The proportion of women in the legislature cannot fully account for the Bachelet-Rousseff divergence.

Party ideology Partisan ideology may act as a powerful determinant of the degree to which female politicians use their power to promote PWC. Women from the left are more likely to deploy their power to advance PWC than women on the right in part because women's movements in the U.S., Europe and Latin America historically have associated with the left (Beckwith 2000; Ríos Tobar, Godoy Catalán, and Guerrero Caviedes 2004; Jaquette 2009).[iii] Left-leaning female politicians will likely have more ties to feminist networks than female politicians who hold conservative ideologies. Relatedly, politicians with PWC preferences are more common in left-leaning parties in Latin America (Beckwith 2000; Morgan and Hinojosa 2015; Roza 2010; Schwindt-Bayer 2010).[iv]

Partisan ideology appears as a major predictor of variation in women's use of power to promote PWC, but both Bachelet and Rousseff's parties appear ideologically similar. The limited data available indicate that center-left parties, providing these *presidentas'* partisan base, featured similar degrees of women-friendliness (Morgan and Hinojosa 2015; Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav 2010). The manifestos of Bachelet's Socialist Party (PS) and Rousseff's Workers' Party (PT) have made a similar number of gender equality mentions, and depending on the indicator, anywhere from 20-30% of the leaders within these parties are female. Furthermore, evaluated on a 1-10 scale where higher numbers indicate greater progressiveness, the PS earned a score of 3.2 while the PT scored of 3.8 in terms of their stances on abortion issues; and they scored of 3.5 and 5.7 in terms of their stances on social issues (Morgan and Hinojosa 2015). Relevant characteristics of the PS and PT are more similar than different, and some of the differences that do exist suggest that Rousseff would advance more PWC than Bachelet. Party ideology therefore cannot easily account for Bachelet's and Rousseff's divergent use of power.

A comparison of Bachelet's and Rousseff's coalitions further suggests more similarities than differences in the pro-women positions of these parties. In 2006, Bachelet was backed by the PS and the Party for Democracy (PPD). She also sustained crucial support from the socially conservative Christian Democrat Party (DC). Similarly, in 2011, Rousseff was primarily backed by the PT, but allied with the more conservative (or at least, less ideologically-oriented) Party for the Democratic Brazilian Movement (PMDB). Without DC collaboration in Chile and PMDB collaboration in Brazil, probably neither

presidenta would have won their elections—much less pursued their policy agendas once in office. Other statistics on women's presence in parties reveal additional similarities in terms of their women-(un)friendliness. In recent years, just 18% and 17% of DC and PMDB leaders have been women, respectively, and only 11% of both parties' congressional candidates and 10% of their elected legislators have been women (Morgan and Hinojosa 2015). Bachelet and Rousseff therefore appear similarly constrained by their parties' and coalitions' ideologies.

Institutions and formal power Many political scientists argue that formal institutions shape politicians' decision-making. Institutions distribute power, and politicians with more power may pursue their a priori policy goals to a greater degree than those with less power. Again holding constant women's PWC motivations, institutional theories suggest that female policymakers with more formal power will push for more PWC than those with less power.

Some empirical evidence from the U.S. and Latin America helps confirm the institutional expectation. Swers (2005) finds that female congresswomen increase their activity on social welfare issues (deemed a PWC issue in the U.S. context) when their party gains majority status. Others have shown that the marginalization of women in Latin American legislatures curtails their powers, and by extension, their impact on PWC (Barnes and O'Brien 2014; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). In sum, stronger institutional powers seem to foster a greater pursuit of pro-women policies by female policymakers.

Although more formal power could augment female politicians' pursuit of PWC, this explanation has trouble accounting for the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle. Presidents in both countries not only draft legislation but also sets the legislative agenda. They also seem to use their legislative powers to comparable degrees—sending a similar number of bills to Congress (about 94 annually in Chile from 2000-10 and 96 annually in Brazil from 2003-14). They also enjoy similar success rates, ranging from 65% to 78%.[v] In short, while plausible, institutional explanations also fail to account for the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle. Like the critical mass and partisan ideology accounts, this explanation does not tell us

why we should expect female politicians to use their power more than their male counterparts to advance PWC.

3. A Feminist Consciousness Explanation for Variation among Female Politicians

Unlike these dominant theories from political science, theories of how individuals acquire feminist consciousness, preferences and attitudes may be able to explain both intra-gender and inter-gender variation in the use of power to advance PWC. No work from political science has fully articulated a feminist consciousness explanation for variation among female politicians, but many scholars have observed that some female politicians seem to possess a feminist consciousness while others do not. For example, Dodson (2006, 9) asserts that "We do know that…feminist women make the most difference." She then characterizes female politicians with a feminist consciousness according to their preferences and attitudes:

> Women with high levels of either feminist or minority consciousness support the goals of the contemporary women's movement, reject confining women to traditional roles, desire equality, feel equality has not been attained, see women as being treated as a disadvantaged minority and themselves as disadvantaged to benefit men and meet their needs, and resent inequality (9).

The intuition is that an awareness of gender inequality and a desire to reduce it would predict politicians' use of power to advance PWC. Empirical research shows that female politicians are more likely than their male counterparts to maintain feminist and/or pro-women preferences and attitudes. Analysis of roll-call data from the 103rd and 104th Congresses reveals that male and female legislators' preferences on social welfare issues indeed diverge (Swers 2005). Surveys of male and female legislators also reveal differences in feminist and pro-women preferences in the U.S. (Reingold 2000; Thomas 1994). Other surveys show that female legislators in Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica tend to prioritize and use their power to promote women's equality, children and family issues more than their male counterparts (Schwindt-Bayer 2006). In short, some political scientists might try to explain the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle by arguing that Bachelet possessed a feminist consciousness, but Rousseff did not.

A major weakness in this explanation is that it defines a feminist politician on the basis of her use of power to promote PWC, and it therefore is tautological. Preferences are assumed to affect behavior, but do preferences actually precede roll call votes or vice versa? It could be, for example, that politicians are simply acting on what they believe their constituents want rather than their own preferences. This version of the argument, in other words, cannot explain the origins of feminist consciousness, preferences and attitudes. For example, Schwindt-Bayer's (2006) statistical models suggest significant variation among women legislators' in Latin America, but she does not say why this occurs. Why are female politicians more likely than their male counterparts to be aware of gender inequality and desire to upend it? Why might some female politicians possess this awareness and preferences while others do not?

In addition to the problem of tautology, this version of the feminist consciousness theory would be difficult to apply to the case of female presidents. Because we cannot directly observe feminist consiousness, this version infers the presence of politicians' consciousness with survey question. These *presidentas*—who served their second terms during the research and writing of this dissertation—do not allow this kind of access. Even if I could administer this kind of survey to Bachelet and Rousseff, I would have had to have asked them these questions *before* they ran for president. Otherwise, the same tautology issues re-appear.

Socio-psychology research may remedy some of the theoretical deficiencies of political science research on politicians' feminist consciousness. I will show that a more sophisticated version of a feminist consciousness explanation adapted from socio-psychology could (1) explain why female politicians promote more PWC than their male counterparts; and (2) avoid tautology by establishing a priori criteria to identify a female politician who is feminist. I nevertheless argue that, while superior to the theories cited above, a socio-psychological theory of politicians' feminist consciousness cannot account for Bachelet and Rousseff's divergent use of power: both *presidentas* were most likely candidates for developing a feminist consciousness.

Socio-psychologists have demonstrated that women are more likely than men to develop a feminist consciousness, preferences and attitudes because women have more to gain from feminism and

they are more likely to be exposed to feminist ideas (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). Variation in women's feminist consciousness is due to diversity in women's experiences and personal choices. Numerous studies have shown that these factors are related to women either embracing or rejecting tradition, and according to this work, women who make "non-traditional" life choices challenge conventional gender roles (whether they intended to or not) are more likely to develop feminist consciousness.[vi] Variables related to women's experiences and personal choices include employment, education, divorce, children and religiosity.

While socio-psychologists have pointed to these factors as determinants of whether women will become feminists, these same factors also may be used to derive expectations specifically on which female politicians are most likely to possess feminist preferences and pro-women change attitudes. First, employment outside of the home emerges in this literature as one of the strongest predictors of feminist consciousness among women (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Plutzer 1988; Plutzer 1991; Banaszak and Leighley 1991; Klein 1984). Feminist or pro-women ideologies tend to favor working women's interests and thus employed women have more to gain from gender equality than unemployed women (Gerson 1986; Gerson 1987). In addition to the self-interest argument, exposure to feminist ideas is also important. Employment also increases exposure to feminism. Women who labor outside the home are more likely to interact with others who holding more gender equality views.

Female politicians overall would be more likely than other women to develop a feminist consciousness and PWC attitudes since they usually work outside the home and are more likely to view feminism as potentially benefiting them. Given women's historical exclusion from all politics, female politicians have more to gain from many pro-women policies, such as gender quotas for parties, than women who are not politicians. Networks also could be especially relevant for female politicians. Because feminist and women's activist groups seek political change, female politicians are more likely than the average female citizen to interact with these groups and thereby be exposed to these ideas.

Political expertise may help explain variation among female politicians. According to socio-psychological theories, women working in traditionally male-dominated arenas are more likely to

experience discrimination, which can foster an awareness of gender inequalities. Some female politicians specialize in fields that are more women-friendly, such as children's issues and education while others specialize in areas that are the most male-dominated, such as defense and finance. Female politicians falling into the latter group would be more likely to develop a feminist consciousness, preferences and attitudes because they would be more likely to personally experience sexism and hence become more intimately aware of gender inequalities.

In addition to employment, socio-psychology has shown that education levels predict the likelihood of women acquiring a feminist consciousness. Some of the reasons behind this relationship are linked to employment. Highly-educated women may perceive more gains from many feminist policies, for example equal pay for equal work, because they also are more likely to seek formal employment (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Plutzer 1988). Other reasons for this relationship relate to self-esteem. Highly-educated women also may believe in the principle of gender equality because they have experienced greater equality with men in universities and feel as competent and confidant as men (Tedin et al. 1977). Women with advanced degrees are more likely to be exposed to feminism since feminist ideas often originate from and circulate within academia. Some research suggests that mothers' education levels also predict likelihood of developing feminist views because mothers disproportionately influence their children during their most formative years.

Since many female politicians—but certainly not all—tend to have higher education levels, socio-psychology research would predict that they are more likely than the women who are not politicians to develop a feminist consciousness. Marital status, children and religiosity may better discriminate feminist and non-feminist politicians. Divorced women are often obligated to assume nontraditional roles of financially sustaining a family by themselves (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Klein 1984; Plutzer 1988). Some research from political science supports the idea that marital status helps determine the likelihood of developing a feminist consciousness. Female legislators in Latin America who are single are more likely to maintain pro-women preferences and attitudes than those who are married (Schwindt-Bayer 2010).

Children's sex could also matter, although it will be less important than employment, education and marital status. Parents of at least one daughter have been shown to maintain more feminist views than those who are parents of sons (Glynn and Sen 2015; Warner 1991; Warner and Steel 1999). These parents are more likely to empathize with feminist perspectives on issues such as reproductive rights and sexual violence. Although daughters are believed to more strongly shape fathers' rather than mothers' views, it is possible that female politicians with at least one daughter are also more likely to maintain a feminist consciousness than female politicians with no daughters.

Finally, women who are not religious tend to more readily embrace gender equality (Hertel and Hughes 1987; Plutzer 1988). The Catholic and Protestant religions which dominate Latin America historically have pressured women to accept their subordinate status and to value traditional gender roles. These religions moreover tend to encourage pro-life rather than pro-choice views, and reproductive rights are one of the most controversial feminist issues in Latin America. Women who attend mass and religious services more frequently are believed to be more subjected to this anti-feminist influence.

This body of socio-psychological research would predict that due to their non-traditional employment, education levels, marital status, children and religious beliefs, Bachelet and Rousseff developed a strong feminist consciousness, preferences and attitudes long before they considered running for president. Although many scholars have acknowledged Bachelet's feminist consciousness (Staab and Waylen 2016), few have recognized the similarities between Bachelet's and Rousseff's personal and professional trajectories. I review both women's biographies in light of socio-psychological explanations for feminist consciousness.

To begin, Bachelet and Rousseff sought power via traditionally masculine ministries, which suggests both were more likely than the typical female politician to develop a feminist consciousness (Krook and O'Brien 2012). Although Bachelet specialized in pediatrics, a field of medicine generally associated with women, she also studied military affairs in Chile in the 1990s and then again for one year at the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C. (Guzmán Bravo and Rojas Donoso 2005).

She emerged as a national politician in 2000 when Lagos named her Health Minister, and two years later, she became Latin America's first female Defense Minister.

Rousseff's area of expertise also meant that she operated in traditionally masculine political sectors (Amaral 2011). She studied economics as an undergraduate in Minas Gerias. From 1985-88 she served as the Municipal Finance Secretary in Porto Alegre. She acted as President of the Economics and Statistics Foundation from 1991-93 and then State Secretary of Mines and Energy from 1993-94 and again from 1999-2002. Lula named her minister of Mines and Energy, another traditionally masculine arena, in 2003. Because Bachelet and Rousseff were female politicians operating in male-dominated fields such as defense, energy and finance, they likely experienced repeated, perhaps even daily instances of sexism. Feminist consciousness theories would predict that these experiences helped foster an awareness of and desire to upend gender inequalities.

Furthermore, both Bachelet and Rousseff had especially high levels of schooling. As mentioned above, Bachelet was a medical doctor, and Rousseff earned a master's degree and took doctoral classes. Both *presidentas'* mothers were well-educated compared to most women of their generation. Bachelet's mother, Angela Jeria, earned a college degree in archaeology from the Universidad de Chile (although she achieved this in her 40s (Montes 2014)), and Rousseff's mother was a teacher (Planalto 2017). Theories linking education levels to feminist consciousness would then expect both Bachelet and Rousseff to be more likely than the average female politician to maintain a feminist consciousness.

Both Bachelet and Rousseff divorced or separated early in their lives and had at least one daughter. While living in exile in Germany in the 1970s, Bachelet married Jorge Dávalos and had a son and a daughter (Torres Cautivo 2015). The couple wished to divorce but did not because it was not allowed in Chile until decades later. Bachelet later fell in love with Alex Vojkovic, a leader of the Marxist-Leninist Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) which advocated toppling the dictatorship with arms. She later had a third child with Aníbal Henríquez. Her personal life hardly conformed to traditional norms, particularly for Chile ruled by a socially conservative dictator in the 1970s and 80s.

At the age of 19, Rousseff married Claudio Galeno Linhares, and both participated in a Marxist revolutionary organization that sought the return to democracy through violent means (Rodrigues 2010). The couple separated and Rousseff initiated another relationship with fellow leftist, Carlos Araújo. Both were arrested by the military government, and upon their release in the early 1970s, they had a daughter. They divorced in 1994. A single mother like Bachelet, Rousseff's professional and personal choices challenged strong gender conventions which were especially salient during Brazil's authoritarian rule. The fact that both had daughters further bolsters the likelihood that they sympathized with feminist causes.

Finally, Bachelet and Rousseff are best described as non-religious. Bachelet's parents did not regularly attend mass. "I am a woman, socialist, divorced and agnostic," Bachelet reportedly claimed prior to winning the presidency ("Biografia de Michelle Bachelet" 2017). Although Rousseff's family was not religious either, she attended Colégio Sion, an all-girls school run by nuns in Belo Horizonte beginning in 1955 (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010). However, as a member of the Marxist Labor Revolutionary Organization (Polop), Rousseff's early political influence came from the extreme-left as she drew intellectual inspiration during her most formative years from communist and existentialist works by Marx and Sartre. All of this suggests that she was more likely to maintain atheistic or agnostic rather than Catholic beliefs. In a 2007 television interview with *Folha de São Paulo*, Rousseff was asked if she believed in God. She replied: "For a long time I was unbelieving. I believe that different religiosities are fundamental for people to live" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010). She then insinuated that she did not know if God existed. In short, there is little evidence that Bachelet or Rousseff held strong religious beliefs or regularly attended religious meetings—suggesting that they faced little pressure from a personal faith to accept traditional gender roles and reject feminism.

To sum up, socio-psychological theories would classify Bachelet and Rousseff as "most likely" candidates to develop a feminist consciousness and pro-women attitudes. Both had much to gain from feminism—and pro-women change more broadly—both were repeatedly exposed to feminist ideas; and

neither seemed pressured by religious worldviews to embrace gender tradition. Given the inadequacies of existing theories of intra-gender variation, what could explain the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle?

4. A Constituency Explanation

In light of these literatures' contributions and shortcomings, I present a constituency-centered theory as an alternative account of the conditional relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. My argument highlights a novel logic behind (1) why female politicians tend to use their power more than their male counterparts to promote PWC; and (2) why some of these women do so more than others. The argument best applies to contexts where presidents with legislative and delegative power are popularly elected, and in its most general form, the theory may also explain the use of power by politicians in legislative bodies and at subnational levels.

I first show that the representation and gender scholarship often conceptualizes "constituencies" as a congressional district and has largely overlooked constituencies as motivating politicians' PWC decision-making. I then turn to Fenno (1978) who disaggregated "constituency," specifically "core" and "personal" constituencies, terms employed throughout this dissertation. I next lay out my argument and derive the "core constituency," "personal constituency," "power" and "most likely" hypotheses. I finally summarize the chapter and review its theoretical contributions.

4.1. "Constituency" in Representation and Gender Research

The previous sections suggest that constituency variables are understudied in the representation and gender literatures, which have highlighted critical mass, ideologies and institutions. Yet, scholars writing in this vein have not entirely ignored constituencies' potential role in shaping politicians' use of power. In this literature, "constituency" is often synonymous with "the district," defined by all eligible voters within a state-determined, geographically-bound political territory. Rather than focusing on the power of constituencies to motivate PWC decision-making, this research contends that female legislators pursue PWC regardless of constituency incentives to do so.

Mansbridge's (1999) surrogate representation argument has inspired both major studies on female legislators' unique roles in representing women. Mansbridge first defines surrogate representatives as those who act on behalf of citizens outside their district. She then points out that these representatives reap no direct electoral benefits from serving citizens who cannot vote for them. Female politicians may act as surrogate representatives for all women—including those outside their district—when they pursue PWC policies. Following this, one body of qualitative work shows that female politicians are more likely to affirm that they represent women who cannot reward them electorally (Carroll 2001; Saint-Germain and Metoyer 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Reingold 2000).[vii] This surrogate representation research, resting on a district notion of "constituency," argues that female politicians who pursue PWC do not respond to constituency concerns.

The surrogate representation theory inspired a second body of statistical work, which also equates "constituency" with the district. These studies show that gender matters above and beyond constituency interests (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007). For example, Bratton and Haynie (1999) test whether black and female representatives advance their respective group interests after controlling for constituency and party variables. Their "constituency model…presumes that legislative behavior is conditioned primarily by factors such as district and party" while the "descriptive representation model…posits that group members represent group interests above and beyond the extent motivated by constituency and party pressures" (658-9).[viii] The main thrust of this work is that gender identity matters even after holding "constituency" (the district) constant. Constituency influence is not the variable of interest.

Influential research on representation and gender therefore deemphasizes bottom-up voter pressures as motivation to deploy power to effect PWC and instead point to women's feelings and sense of duty. An important exception is Reingold's (2000) exploration of women as a constituency group in California and Arizona.[ix] Following classic scholarship on legislators' behavior (Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 2004; Miller and Stokes 1963), Reingold builds on the notion that voter incentives drive female and male policymakers' decision-making. For her, female policymakers will have incentives to "act for" or on

behalf of women if they recognize that women's issues exist and if they believe that female policymakers are more effective in representing these issues.[x] This dissertation's concepts and theory build on the idea that female politicians—just like their male counterparts—respond to constituency-based incentives. Adopting a more complex notion of "constituency," I intervene in these representation and gender literatures by explaining how candidate sex helps determine gendered characteristics of these constituencies, which subsequently motivate and enable politicians' use of power to advance PWC.

4.2. "Core" and "Personal" Constituencies

While existing gender and representation research tends to equate constituencies with the district, I draw on Fenno's (1977) more nuanced conceptualization. Emphasizing perceptions, Fenno argues that politicians envision their constituencies in terms of four concentric circles. The first and largest of these is the congressional district. This "geographical" constituency corresponds to how the representation and gender scholars cited above operationalize constituencies. Of Fenno's four conceptualizations, this one is of least interest to this dissertation.

The second concentric circle is the "re-election constituency" or the supporters. According to Fenno, politicians identify a group of voters within the district who will deliver the necessary votes for another term in office. Politicians also differentiate between their strong and weak supporters. The third concentric circle is the "primary constituency" or the "strongest supporters." These groups are also known as the "nucleus," "loyalists," or "hard-core" supporters (pg. 18, 20). The final and smallest circle is the "personal" constituency, comprised of politicians' most trusted advisers. Personal constituents often know the politician intimately and have experienced major events in politicians' careers. Personal constituents can be politicians' friends, professional collaborators or even staff assistants. Unlike other constituency types, personal constituencies provide politicians with political and technical expertise and emotional rather than electoral support.

Drawing on all but the first of Fenno's constituency types, this dissertation explores "core" and "personal" constituencies. I conceptualize a "core" constituency as a blend of the second and third concentric circles in part because it is often difficult to empirically distinguish between the two. Core

constituencies in this dissertation help clinch another election and comprise some of politicians' strongest voter groups. My theory stresses how core constituencies provide politicians with incentives (in the form of higher approval ratings and potential re-election votes) to pursue policies that benefit these groups. Like Fenno, I conceptualize "personal" constituents as elite advisers. Rather than focusing on their role in providing emotional support, this dissertation highlights how personal constituents supply political and technical expertise to presidential candidates, shape their campaign promises and platforms and subsequently influence the content of presidential decision-making.[xi]

In this dissertation, therefore, core and personal constituencies diverge in three main ways. First, core constituents are located at the mass level while personal constituents are elites. Second, personal constituents directly interact with the politician while core constituents usually have never met the politician. Third, while the core provides electoral support, personal constituencies provide technical guidance and policy advice. Core constituencies create incentives for candidates to promise PWC that benefits these groups and for presidents to strategically use their power to this same end. Personal constituencies, on the other hand, supply the tools to enable candidates to draft attractive, feasible proposals to be pursued soon after inauguration day.

4.3. Why Examine Constituency Formation During Campaigns?

Core and personal constituencies crystallize during campaigns and subsequently work as mechanisms linking presidential sex and PWC decision-making. How presidents perceive their constituencies may fluctuate during the course of an administration, as some voter groups strengthen or withdraw support and as some personal constituents gain or lose influence. This ebb and flow of particular constituencies during a presidential term may help determine the use of presidential power. There are several reasons why I generally limit my study to the formation of core and personal constituencies during presidential campaigns and their influence on candidates' and presidents' decision-making.

First, a focus on constituency formation during campaigns, rather than during the presidential administration, allows my argument to minimize the potential for tautology. This is a relevant concern

because, as alluded to above, simplistic versions of the feminist consciousness argument explain variation in presidents' PWC decision-making by observing that feminist presidents promote PWC while non-feminist presidents do not. The criteria to identify presidents' "feminism" thus traces back to the presidents' use of power. (For example, this president must be a feminist because she promoted reproductive rights, and her feminism then must explain her promotion of PWC.) In contrast, my theory's focus on campaigns, events that happen *before* a president assumes office, avoids this logical fallacy. It does so by establishing clear *a priori* criteria from presidential campaigns to identify presidents with certain kinds of core and personal constituencies. Gendered and sex-related characteristics of these constituencies—specifically (1) whether core constituencies of women were mobilized on the basis of gender identity; and (2) the proportion of elite feminists and female politicians in personal constituencies—will augment or diminish their probabilities of presidents attempting PWC once in office.

Another reason to study campaigns relates to platforms and the subsequent use of legislative power. Campaigns are unique moments when candidates propose how they will deploy their power once in office. They may tailor their promises to specific groups of voters. Candidates also tend to rely on personal constituents with political and technical expertise to lead special committees that draft and refine attractive, feasible proposals (Gibson 1996). Candidates communicate their promises through speeches and interviews, but also usually formalize them in widely disseminated platforms. These documents, created during campaigns, help determine presidents' interpretation of their mandates, meaning how they believe their constituencies expect them to deploy their power. After their election, presidents often deploy their power to fulfill their campaign promises and live up to their mandates because they believe that doing so will positively affect their approval ratings and/or chances for a re-election.[xii] Platforms thus are often, but not always, the best available indicators of how presidents will exercise their legislative prerogatives once in office (for an exception, see Stokes 2001). It therefore is important to study personal constituents' influence over campaign promises.

Timing is also important to theorizing how constituencies that crystallize during campaigns influence the use of presidential power. Although this dissertation does examine the use of power during

the entire term, the period immediately after the election deserves special attention because presidents tend to exert their greatest impact during their first two years of office (Light 1999). Executives, particularly those who face term limits, tend to lose momentum later in their administration as they approach their "lame duck" period. Presidents post-election order their legislative priorities according to their campaign promises. To sum up, candidates and their personal constituents formalize their promises in platforms, which translate into mandates and legislative agendas that usually are pursued most energetically at the beginning rather than at the end of an administration.

A third reason to examine constituency formation during campaigns speaks to the subsequent use of delegative power. Presidents may fire and hire ministers during their term, particularly once the first major crisis hits, but the first cabinet configurations are the most consequential for the rest of the term. First-time presidents assemble their inaugural cabinets from scratch, and mandates are most influential in the construction of inaugural cabinets. Presidents-elect who believe their constituencies demand a greater presence of women in the executive branch are more likely to significantly use their delegative power to advance PWC. Finally, the gender composition of campaign teams can directly influence the use of delegative power to improve women's representation in the executive branch. Because presidents often name ministers who proved skillful leaders during the campaign (Boas 2016), candidates with more women in their campaign leadership teams are more likely to name more female ministers. In sum, platforms and networks created during the campaign end up exerting an enormous impact on presidents' use of legislative and delegative power during the most consequential moments for an administration—that is, immediately after an election.

Given the importance of examining campaigns in order to explain to use of presidential power, how might we empirically identify a core constituency? Perceptions are key, according to Fenno (1978). Media accounts and campaign teams' opinions on which groups function as the strongest supporters can help identify a core constituency. Interviews with presidential campaign advisers can contain relevant evidence. Finally, Latin American presidential candidates regularly rely on public opinion polls and

electoral data to infer which social, economic or identity groups express support for or intend to vote for them. Chapters III-VI employ all of these kinds of evidence.

Gender gaps in public opinion and electoral results serve as initial indicators of whether candidates believe they are mobilizing or have mobilized a core constituency of women. Following the Center for American Women in Politics, I define gender gaps as the "difference between the percentage of women and the percentage of men voting for a given candidate" ("Gender Gap in Voting" 2016). When candidates earn substantial male or female gender gaps, they often assume that their core constituency is comprised mostly of male or female voters, and hence gender gaps are a strong proxy for candidates' perceptions.

Gender gaps by themselves are insufficient indicators of politicians' perceptions of gendered aspects of their core constituencies. For example, as Chapter IV will show, Bachelet earned a virtually 0% gender gap the second round of the 2006 elections. Yet other evidence shows that she perceived women as one of her most important core constituencies. This evidence includes (1) earlier polls and first-round results showing that her strongest supporters were predominately female, (2) the history of Chilean women voting in conservative presidential candidates; (3) her pro-women campaign discourse; (4) media interviews with Bachelet; (5) political analysis in newspaper columns. Because gender gaps are a useful, but insufficient proxy to identify core constituencies or either men or women, I assess candidates' perceptions of their core constituencies by drawing on these other kinds of data.

How might we identify presidents' personal constituencies during a campaign? How do we know whether candidates network with other female politicians and/or elite feminists? Following candidates around and systematically recording the people with whom they interact and exchange information would be ideal, but unfeasible. I instead turn to three other sources: (1) interviews from national media with the candidate, president or close advisers; (2) in-depth media reports; and (3) my own one-on-one interviews with elite feminists. The evidence collected as a result of my fieldwork is uneven and often impressionistic, but still serves its main purpose of probing the constituency theory's plausibility.

4.4. Hypotheses

Having operationalized core and personal constituencies and defended my decision to examine their formation during campaigns, I now turn to my hypotheses. Chapter I argued that given my three-tier PWC definition, sending PWC bills to Congress and naming women to cabinets qualify as deploying presidents' legislative and delegative power to promote PWC. The following section specifies how candidate sex can influence gendered and sex-related characteristics of core and personal constituencies and how these kinds of constituencies influence presidents' use of legislative and delegative prerogatives to advance PWC.

Following much of the classic literature on constituency influence, my argument assumes that both female and male politicians behave strategically to achieve their objectives. Elected politicians' goals include maintaining their popularity and securing a possible re-election (whether consecutive or after waiting out a term). It follows that female politicians, just like their male counterparts, seek to represent the constituencies that elected them or may help boost their re-election efforts (Kriner and Reeves 2015).[xiii]

Candidate sex can influence gendered and sex-related characteristics of core and personal constituencies. Again following Fenno (1977), I suggest that political elites believe that shared identities create trust between candidates and voters, which ultimately can translate into political support. Because of this common belief, these actors view women as more effective than men at mobilizing female voters. Women running for the presidency therefore are more likely to discursively leverage their shared identity with women in an attempt to elicit their trust and support. To introduce the phrase employed throughout this dissertation, they are more likely to attempt to *mobilize women on the basis of gender identity*.

What does it mean to attempt to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity rather than another identity, such as class or religion? In this dissertation, both female and male candidates can do this in two ways. First, they can target female voters by evoking women's identities as women, or a related identity, such as motherhood, or victims of sexism.[xiv] Second, they can target female voters by promising PWC either in speeches on the campaign trail and/or in their widely-disseminated platforms.[xv] Candidates who make repeated attempts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity tend to do so

both by evoking women's identities and by promising PWC, and they do so early on in the campaign. Candidates who do not make significant attempts may promise little or no PWC and/or evoke women's identities inconsistently or not at all, and they make these efforts late in the campaign rather than early on. [xvi] I limit my argument to viable female presidential candidates because they are the most likely to attempt the most effective (rather than the most ideologically sound) strategies to win the presidency, but nonviable candidates may also use similar electoral techniques. This leads to the core constituency hypothesis:

$H_{coreonstituency}$ Viable female presidential candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to try to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity.

This hypothesis does not guarantee success, and viable female presidential candidates may fail to mobilize a core constituency of women. My theory does not stipulate that promising PWC and evoking women's gender identities are the most effective ways to build a core constituency of women or win an election although candidates themselves may believe this. My theory does assume that over time a higher probability of attempts monotonically increases the probability of success, and thus democratically elected *presidentas* are more likely to perceive a core constituency of women mobilized on the basis of gender identity.

The core constituency argument leads to a "female surrogate" corollary. Male candidates may target female voters when they believe that the women's vote can help clinch an election. Women may emerge as a lucrative demographic when polls or first-round results show women voting disproportionately for a candidate or candidates. Male candidates also target women voters when competing against female candidates (inter-gender contests). Viewing their female contenders as potentially more effective at courting female voters, male candidates in inter-gender contests may try to counter-attack by enlisting a female surrogate. This strategy may be referred to as "counter-balancing" against female candidates.

The female surrogate corollary emerges from my argument's premise that political elites tend to believe that women are more effective than men at mobilizing women. When they seek to expand their

support among women voters, these male candidates are more likely than their female counterparts to enlist their female spouses, female politicians, famous or anonymous women to appeal to women on their behalf. Although female candidates can also employ female surrogates, they are less likely to because female candidates can directly appeal to shared gender identities with female voters. The corollary states therefore states:

$C_{femalesurrogate}$: Viable male candidates are more likely than their female counterparts to use female surrogates to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity.

The core constituency hypothesis and its female surrogate corollary refer to how candidates try to win elections. While core constituencies refer to the mobilized masses, personal constituencies are networks of elite citizens who exert influence in politics and/or civil society. I define elite feminists by their social position and by their efforts to reverse historic gender discrimination, including women's exclusion from the political world. Because elite feminists—virtually by definition—seek the advancement of women in politics, they are more likely to seek to support and interact with viable female candidates than male candidates.

I further argue that the personal constituencies of female candidates are more likely to contain a greater proportion of female politicians. The reason for this relates to homophily, the tendency of individuals with similar characteristics to "flock together." Recurrent throughout societies, homophily exerts a powerful homogenizing effect on perceptions and worldviews (Marsden 1988; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986). Sociological research on gender homophily coupled with feminist institutionalist scholarship on gendered networks suggests that elite female politicians, compared to their male counterparts, tend to interact and exchange information more frequently with other women (Bjarnegård 2013; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Kenny 2013). However, because men continue to numerically dominate elite politics, it is likely that viable female candidates' networks will still contain a male majority. The difference is that these women's networks will have a higher percentage of women than those of their male counterparts. This leads to the "personal constituency" hypothesis.

$H_{personalconstituency}$ Viable female presidential candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to network with elite feminists and female politicians.

Having derived these hypotheses and corollary, I now will unpack how these kinds of constituencies affect the presidential deployment of legislative and delegative power to advance PWC. I first assume that presidents—male or female—seek to maintain their popularity and secure a possible (consecutive or nonconsecutive) re-election. They therefore legislate and delegate in ways to satisfy their core constituencies. As argued above, viable female candidates are more likely to attempt to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity, and assuming that increased efforts augment their chances of success, these female candidates also are more likely than their male counterparts to accomplish this.

Because they are more likely to perceive a core constituency of women mobilized on the basis of gender identity, female presidents also are more likely to interpret their mandate as a demand to use their legislative power to advance PWC policies. Core constituencies affect the degree to which presidents deploy their delegative power to promote PWC, that is, name women to their cabinets. Much research shows that presidents respond to popular demands for certain kinds of ministers (M. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005). And thus, because female presidents are more likely than their male counterparts to interpret their mandate as a call for a greater female presence in the executive branch, they are more likely to nominate women to their cabinets.

Personal constituencies also influence the likelihood of presidents leveraging their legislative power to promote PWC. As potential personal constituents, elite feminists possess two relevant characteristics. First, given their feminist preferences, they would like more women to win political office. This means that they are more likely to avidly support and network with female rather than male candidates. Second, elite feminists also possess technical and political expertise on PWC. Technical expertise relates to knowledge about which policies are feasible, efficient and effective. Political expertise on PWC bills refers to knowledge about which affected groups will support or oppose a bill and their reasons for doing so. Ties to elite feminists means that politicians have greater access to PWC expertise.

This is one reason why viable female candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to promise PWC on the campaign trail and in their platforms.

Elite feminists can exercise their influence throughout the presidential term, even as the relevance of campaign promises and platforms erode as political contexts shift. Those who have secured a formal or informal position within the administration can offer presidents technical and political knowledge on PWC. The more information presidents have about an issue, the more likely this issue will rise to the top of presidents' agendas (Light 1999), and thus the amount of PWC information available to presidents helps determine their frequency and efficacy in legislating on PWC. In short, ties to elite feminists enhances the likelihood of presidents deploying their legislative power to advance PWC.

Gendered characteristics of personal constituencies help determine the likelihood of presidents using their delegative power to promote PWC. Given the forces of gender homophily, viable female candidates are more likely to network with female politicians. This is important because scholars of cabinet selection tend to agree that executives look for "loyal" and "like-minded" ministers to faithfully pursue their policy agenda (Dewan and Myatt 2010; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Indridason and Kam 2008; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). Regarding loyalty, presidents seek direct or indirect evidence that the ministerial candidate will not betray them. Repeated personal interactions as well as references from trusted advisers create trust and reduce uncertainty, thereby fostering mutual perceptions of loyalty. Regarding like-mindedness, a *presidenta* also is more likely than a male president to regularly exchange political information with other elite female politicians. This gendered flow of information may help foster mutual perceptions of like-mindedness on a range of political issues.[xvii] All of this suggests that while homophily under a male president can work against women with ministerial ambitions, under a female president, homophilous forces can work against men's overrepresentation in cabinets. This discussion of the influence of constituencies on presidents' decision-making leads to the "power" hypothesis.

H_{power} *Presidentas* are more likely than their male counterparts to use their legislative and delegative power to promote PWC.

I now return to this dissertation's central question: Under what conditions do female presidents use their power more than male presidents to advance PWC? I have argued that viable female candidates are more likely than their male competitors to try and succeed at mobilizing a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity and are more likely to network extensively with elite feminists and female politicians. Yet the "core constituency," "personal constituency" and "power" hypotheses are probabilistic: candidates' and presidents' sex is not their destiny. Viable female candidates who fail to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity and network little with elite feminists and female politicians will have fewer bottom-up incentives and less capacity to use their powers to promote PWC. They therefore are less likely to deploy their powers to this end. On the other hand, viable male candidates who, although it is less likely, successfully mobilized a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity and won an election are more likely to, once in office, use their power to promote PWC than presidents (male or female) who did not. Finally, viable male candidates who networked with elite feminists during the campaign will likely deploy their power to promote PWC more than presidents who did not. This leads to the "most likely" hypothesis:

$H_{mostlikely}$ Presidents (male or female) with these core and personal constituencies are most likely to use their power to promote PWC.

5. Conclusions

This chapter laid out the stakes involved in establishing a probabilistic link between descriptive and substantive representation. Both the originator of the concept and its major critic, Pitkin (1967) was concerned that descriptive representation was static and implied no accountability mechanism. She preferred substantive representation because it involved "acting for" or on constituents' behalf. Connecting descriptive to substantive representation empirically would then add value to the former and thereby bolster arguments for a greater presence of women in politics. Theorists following Pitkin have explored the conditions under which descriptive representation is valuable and have criticized its essentialist underpinnings. The problem with essentialism lies in the notion that all women share common

experiences and interests, and thus, female politicians necessarily can and will represent women better than male politicians. Scholars have found compelling evidence that female policymakers do tend to promote PWC to a greater extent than male policymakers, but there is major variation in women's use of power to this end.

I concluded from this literature review that any new theory of the probabilistic relationship between descriptive and substantive representation should account for differences between female and male politicians (inter-gender variation) as well as differences among female politicians (intra-gender variation). And it should do this without essentializing women's identities and interests. Many existing theories for variations in women's impact are plausible, but almost all fail to explain both inter- and intra-gender variation. I have shown that none can account for Bachelet's and Rousseff's divergent use of legislative and delegative power to advance PWC.

In light of the limited explanatory power of extant theories, I advanced a novel, non-essentialist argument for why female politicians, specifically presidents, would promote more PWC than their male counterparts *and* why some of these women promote more PWC than other women. Departing from the bulk of representation and gender literature, my argument adopts a more nuanced conceptualization of constituencies, namely "core" and "personal" constituencies. I explained how gendered and sex-related characteristics of constituencies—crystallizing during campaigns—subsequently influence how presidents use their power to advance PWC.

This constituency theory yielded four hypotheses. Chapters III-VI conduct plausibility probes of the "core constituency" and "personal constituency" hypotheses; Chapter VIII formally tests the "power" hypothesis; Chapter VII explores the "most likely" hypothesis and evidence for the theoretical mechanisms.

$H_{coreonstituency}$ Viable female presidential candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to try to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity.

$H_{personalconstituency}$ Viable female presidential candidates are more likely to network with elite feminists and female politicians.

H_{power} *Presidentas* are more likely than their male counterparts to use their power to promote PWC.

$H_{mostlikely}$ Presidents with these core and personal constituencies are most likely to use their power to promote PWC.

I close this chapter by restating and further elaborating on the constituency theory's advantages over existing explanations for variation in women's impact on PWC. Unlike theories from political science that point to the number of female legislators, partisan ideologies and institutions, this constituency theory explains both intra-gender and inter-gender variation. Another major advantage is that it articulates specific conditions under which *presidentas* will promote PWC, *and* expectations for when male presidents are will do so. The "most likely" hypothesis states that presidents—male or female—who successfully mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity and network extensively with elite feminists are most likely to use their power to advance PWC. This dissertation will solve the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle by showing how Bachelet achieved both of these conditions while Rousseff achieved neither. Moreover, Lagos' and Lula's ties to elite feminists in their party—while much weaker than Bachelet's ties—help explain much of their efforts to advance PWC.

My constituency argument also avoids the problem of essentialism. I do not assume that female politicians share experiences or interests with female voters. The proceeding analysis of Chilean and Brazilian campaigns instead will show that viable female presidential candidates do employ essentialist discourse in order to court women voters on the basis of gender identity. This study will show how politicians, seeking to unite women behind their candidacy, often end up discursively essentializing women's identities and interests. Although I acknowledge politicians' strategic use of essential discourse in campaigns, my theory's logic does not rest on essentialism.

A final advantage of my argument is that it is exportable. Although inspired by variation in the use of presidential power in Latin America, a constituency perspective could be applied to contexts where politicians are democratically elected and possess the power to effect PWC. This would include legislatures and subnational levels. The three-tiered definition of PWC applies primarily to CEDAW signatory countries, which are most countries in the world, and so the constituency argument would work

best in areas of the world where government officials are aware of gender inequality and have access to

broad-based recommendations on how to ameliorate it.

[i] Thomas (1994) was one of the first to argue that female legislators' policy preferences on women's issues differed from those of men. Swers conducted the most thorough empirical study of the U.S. Congress and concluded that "the personal identity of our representatives does have tangible policy consequences" (126).

[ii] According to Google Scholar, this paper has been cited 1,204 times.

[iii] Swers' (2002) study finds that Democratic women tended to be more active on women's issues (112), and her (2013) study shows that in U.S. context of growing partisan polarization, Republican female senators are less likely to oppose Supreme court nominees based on their records on women's rights (5). Female senators of the Republican party hesitate to promote feminist issues such as reproductive rights when their party is in the majority (Swers 2014, 165). Studies of state legislatures conclude that it is primarily Democrats and *moderate* Republican who promote women's rights bill (Reingold 2000, 223). The Democratic party has attracted far more female political candidates than the Republican party, in part because women tend to be less conservative than men, and the Democratic party's platform proposes more PWC than the Republican platform (Thomsen 2014; Thomsen 2015).

[iv] Other research casts some doubt on the expectation that left-leaning female politicians will advance more PWC than their conservative female counterparts. This research shows that left and right parties in Latin America are similarly (un)likely to nominate or elect women (Roza 2010). Furthermore, the relationship between the leftist parties and female voters is not so straightforward in Latin America as in advanced Western democracies. Region-wide public opinion polls often show that Latin American women tend to place themselves in more conservative positions than men when given a 1-10 ideology scale ("AmericasBarometer" 2004; Morgan 2015).

[v] Chapter VII fully elaborates on how Chilean and Brazilian presidents exercise similar magnitudes albeit slightly different kinds of legislative power.

[vi] The literature often refers to feminist attitudes or progressive gender views.

[vii] Politics and gender scholars have often acknowledged that female politicians view female constituents differently than male politicians. Schwindt-Bayer's (2010) survey of legislators in Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica revealed that female legislators prioritized female constituents and women's groups more than male legislators. Dodson (2006, 7) sums up many of the studies on U.S. congresswomen. "Women officeholders have a greater connection to women constituents than their male colleagues do, more often seeing women as a component of their constituency, recognizing them as a group with specific political concerns, identifying with them as a group, and/or feeling a responsibility to speak out for them." This work, however, emphasizes the female legislators who view female constituents as important are more likely to *feel* that they *should* represent women. Rather than stressing psychological emotions and normative motivations, my constituency theory argues that female politicians rationally and strategically use their power to target women because female politicians, just like male politicians, are concerned with their approval ratings and chances for a potential re-election.

[viii] Gerrity et. al. (2007) also employ a district conceptualization of constituency. Rather than studying U.S. state legislatures, these authors examine the U.S. House of Representatives. They found that "female legislators who replace men in the same district introduce more women's issues bills in Congress" (179).

[ix] Citing Fenno (1978), Reingold investigates whether female and male legislators recognize the existence of "women's issues" and perceive women as a supportive constituency group. These are pre-requisites for having incentives to represent women. Reingold found that female legislators were more likely to believe that constituencies of women support them and were more likely to believe that female legislators were better at representing "women's issues" than male legislators.

[x] Many political scientists have suggested that "female legislators are more likely to view women as a distinct element of their constituency and to feel a responsibility to represent the interests of women as a group (Carroll 2002; Dodson 2005; Reingold 2000; Rosenthal 1998; Thomas 1992)" (Swers 2014, 164). These observations however, have yet to be systematically incorporated into a broader theory of the conditional relationship between descriptive and substantive representation.

[xi] This conceptualization of core constituency overlaps somewhat with Gibson (1996) who argues that core constituencies shape platforms and provide resources to parties.

[xii] It is worth emphasizing that even if some Latin American presidents cannot run for immediate re-election, most can run for another non-consecutive term. Even if presidents have no intention or cannot run for re-election, they still seek to enhance their approval ratings, which often shape later evaluations of their legacies.

[xiii] The literature on constituency influence focuses on legislators, but many scholars of the U.S. executive branch suggest that presidents are more motivated by pressures to secure the welfare of the whole country rather than the demands of specific constituencies (Hoffman 2001). Nevertheless, recent studies challenge this notion by showing how presidents target specific constituencies—that is, the people who they think will vote for them. At times, such targeted decision-making may seem to even undermine the interests of the broader nation (Kriner and Reeves 2015). Numerous empirical studies show that presidents—both in the U.S. and Latin America—deliver benefits to the groups who they believe voted for them and/or will vote for them (De La O 2013; Gibson 1996; González and Mamone 2015; Kriner and Reeves 2015; Melo and Pereira 2013; Zucco 2013). Some of these studies ascertain causal direction, thereby confirming that citizens react to material benefits from incumbent presidents by mobilizing and/or changing their vote in favor of the incumbent. For example, Zucco (2013) finds a positive relationship between conditional cash transfers (CCTs) during three presidential elections in Brazil to additional votes for the PT. De la O (2013) identified a causal connection between another CCT program and the presidential incumbent's electoral performance in the 2000 Mexican election. These studies suggest that targeting past and likely future voters works in terms of mobilizing re-election constituencies. Assuming presidents care about their approval ratings and/or re-election prospects, they face incentives to use their power to cater to these specific constituencies.

[xiv] Importantly, social conservatives and liberals can and sometimes do mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, but they usually emphasize different themes. In the Latin American context, for example, social conservatives may focus on women's traditional roles as mothers and wives while social liberals may prioritize gender equality. Both kinds of themes can include PWC promises. Partisan ideology may influence the content of gender appeals, but, ceteris paribus, should not necessarily influence their frequency or degree.

[xv] This means that just because candidates earn a female gap does not mean that they have mobilized women *on the basis of gender identity*. To make this inference, evidence must show that (1) the candidate made significant attempts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity (that is, by promising PWC and/or by evoking women's identities) and (2) political analysis of the time attributed the female gap to these gendered mobilization efforts rather than to other factors in the campaign.

[xvi] How might this work exactly? In his exploration of how U.S. Congressmen present themselves to their constituents, Fenno (1977) writes "the ultimate response members of Congress seek is political support; but the instrumental response they seek is trust" (899). Fenno lists three ways—qualification, identification and empathy—that politicians establish trust. Identification is most relevant for this dissertation's argument. "Contextually and verbally he gives the impression that 'I am one of you.' 'I think the way you do and I care about the same things you do.' 'You can trust me because we are like one another'" (899). Because female presidential candidates share the same gender identity as female voters, they will likely calculate that they are advantaged over their male competitors in cultivating the female vote and therefore future *presidentas* often make more PWC promises than their male counterparts and thus create expectations for pro-women change once they assume office. Once in office, then, the *presidenta* is more likely to face pressure to fulfill her campaign promises.

[xvii] Because these homophilous interactions foster mutual perceptions of both loyalty and like-mindedness, these characteristics are best conceived as intertwined rather than independent.

CHAPTER III Mobilizing Men and Women in Chile: The 1999-00 Elections

This chapter examines the 1999-00 Chilean presidential race, which featured two viable male candidates—Ricardo Lagos and Joaquín Lavín—and lays the groundwork for understanding Bachelet's rise and electoral success in 2005-06.[i] This chapter first will find support for the core constituency argument by revealing that neither Lavín nor Lagos made sustained efforts to mobilize women on the basis of gender. Lagos and Lavín made few PWC promises in their platforms and, particularly during the first round, rarely mentioned women's identities. The PWC promises they did make entailed minor changes to the status quo, were not top priorities in the platform, and were infrequently mentioned on the campaign trail. Turning to the personal constituency argument, the next section will show that female politicians and elite feminists were largely absent from both campaigns' leadership teams, but were more numerous in Lagos' campaign than Lavin's. The overall weak influence from elite feminists in both campaigns helps explain why Lagos and Lavin proposed little PWC.

I then examine more closely factors influencing Lavin's ability to attract more female than male votes. The Lavin case—as well as the cases of other male candidates in Brazil—suggests that when male candidates are successful, it is usually not because they attempted to court women on the basis of gender identity, but because of other factors, such as left-right ideology. The next section also lays the groundwork for Chapter IV's explanation of Bachelet's success in mobilizing a core constituency of women and winning the 2005-06 race. I show that in addition to his ideology, Lavin's "depoliticized" campaign and stereotypically feminine traits also were believed to aid his success in courting a significant constituency of women voters. This section does not directly test the hypotheses, but it suggests that female and male voters in Chile at the time sought candidates who were more "like them" (Pitkin 1967).

This chapter's final section analyzes interpretations of the December 1999 results and candidates' second-round strategies and yields evidence for female surrogate corollary. Rather than attempting to mobilize women from the beginning of the campaign and then consistently throughout, their efforts to court women occurred primarily during the second round. I show that because of a widespread belief that

women are more effective than men at mobilizing women, both male candidates in the second round used female figures in their campaigns to attract female voters. One of these women, Lavín's wife, tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. She did this not by promising significant PWC but by evoking shared identities of womanhood and motherhood.

1. Background

I now will introduce the 1999-00 candidates and then explain trends in ideology and gender voting patterns in Chile. Chile suffered a military coup in 1973 that toppled democratically-elected socialist President Salvador Allende and ushered in a military dictatorship. A center-left, multi-party coalition, called the Concertación,[ii] organized opposition to the regime. In 1988 Chile held a nation-wide plebiscite on whether Pinochet should remain in power (*Sí*) or whether the country should transition to democracy (*No*). The *No* vote won with 55%.

Upon the democratic transition in 1989 and through the 2000s, the Concertación united the Socialist Party (PS), Party for Democracy (PPD), Radical Social Democrats (PRSD), and Christian Democrats (DC). The Concertación has competed in every election against the conservative Alianza coalition, which had incorporated some leaders of the military regime. The Alianza is comprised of the National Renovation Party (RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI). Presidents from the DC governed Chile from 1989-2000.

Chile's third presidential competition since its transition to democracy intensified beginning in January 1999. The only viable competitors were the Alianza's Joaquín Lavín and the Concertación's Ricardo Lagos. Joaquín Lavín studied business at the Universidad Católica and worked for two years as an advisor in the Planning Ministry during the Pinochet dictatorship (Lavín 2014). He traveled to the U.S. to earn an M.A. in Economics from the University of Chicago in 1979. He returned to Chile as a "Chicago Boy" to help implement radical neoliberal policies that would characterize Pinochet's economic legacy. From 1981-89, he edited sections of the pro-Pinochet daily newspaper *El Mercurio*. Together with Ernesto Silva, Cristián Larroulet and Carlos Alberto Délano, each of whom eventually became part of his

71

personal constituency, Lavín helped found the private Universidad de Desarrollo in 1990. In 1992, he served as Secretary General of the Independent Democratic Union Party (UDI), the most pro-Pinochet party in Chile. He successfully governed as mayor of the wealthy Las Condes neighborhood from 1992-1999. Lavín, father of seven children, also is a member of the ultra-conservative Catholic group Opus Dei.[iii]

The Concertación also put forth a candidate who had earned a graduate degree in the U.S., Ricardo Lagos, in 1999. Lagos studied law at the Universidad de Chile and then earned a Ph.D. in Economics from Duke University. He returned to Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship to teach economics. A Socialist like ex-president Salvador Allende, Lagos emerged as a national opposition leader with expressed presidential ambitions. He decided against running for the presidency in 1989 and instead backed the Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin. Lagos subsequently served as Aylwin's Education Minister (1990-92). Again running for president, he was defeated by the DC's Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle in the 1993 primaries. He nevertheless proved himself a successful Public Works Minister (1994-1998), and then resigned to again run for president.

During the Concertación primaries, Lagos faced Andrés Zaldívar, a DC lawyer serving as President of the Senate at the time. Lagos was backed by the PS, PPD, PRSD and the Liberal Party (PL). He won the primaries at the end of May 1999 with 985,505 votes (71.34%) compared to the DC's Andrés Zaldívar's 395,821 (28.66%) (*El Mercurio* 1999k). Thus for the first time since 1958, the DC did not put forward its own presidential candidate.

Table 1 shows the results for both election rounds and each candidate's female gap.[iv] On December 12, 1999, Lagos barely secured first place with less than 0.5% more votes than Lavín. Chilean men and women voted in different precincts until 2010, so calculating gender gaps is straightforward. Lagos won 49% of the male vote and 44% of the female vote, which translated into a female gap of -5%. Lavín, on the other hand, captured 49% of the female vote and 43% of the male vote, a female gap of 6%.

Table 1: 1999-00 Election Results and Gender Gaps

	First Round 12/12/99	First Round Female Gap	Second Round 1/13/00	Second Round Female Gap
Ricardo Lagos	47.95%	-5%	51.31%	-5%
Joaquín Lavín	47.51%	6%	48.69%	5.5%

What explains Lavín's female gender gap? How was a male candidate who, as this chapter will show, promised little PWC and networked little with elite feminists able to mobilize a core constituency of female voters? Much of the answer lies in Chile's gendered voting patterns. Chilean women could vote in national elections beginning in 1949, and Lewis (2004) shows that since then Chilean women have voted for conservative or Christian Democratic candidates in every presidential election from the first presidential race they could vote in (1952) until the last election before the military coup (1970). In both post-transition elections (1989 and 1993), the center-right candidates earned female gaps of 6.5 and 3.4%, respectively.[v] Lavín's female gap thus fits this pre-existing pattern rather well. Later in this chapter, I will explore other possible contributing factors to Lavin's female gap, including his public image, which featured some stereotypically feminine characteristics.

2. Gender Issues Take a Backseat to Pinochet and the Economy

Rather than gender issues, Pinochet's detention in London and the dismal Chilean economy significantly impacted the 1999-00 campaigns. Pinochet was arrested in London in October 1998 on charges of crimes of genocide, international terrorism, torture and disappearances of people during the military dictatorship. His detention, which occupied headlines throughout 1999, contributed to a climate of polarization between pro- and anti-Pinochet forces, generally represented by the Alianza and Concertación coalitions.[vi]

The second salient campaign issue was the recent economic downturn which unsurprisingly hurt the incumbent party's candidate. Chile's GDP contracted about 1% in 1999, and unemployment levels hit 11% (Covarrubis 2002). An *El Mercurio* editorial, summing up Lagos' challenges, cited a handful of

these figures which were some of the worst since the 1983 recession (*El Mercurio* 1999j). Because of this crisis, much of the 1999 campaign debate focused on economic rather than gender issues.

The titles of both candidates' platforms further suggest the centrality of the economy. Both Lagos' "Growing with Equality" and Lavín's "Creating a Million New Jobs" spoke directly to the economy. Lagos' platform recalled the Concertación's successful creation of economic growth in the 1990s and its pursuit of social justice ("Programa de Gobierno de Ricardo Lagos: Para Crecer con Igualdad" 1999). Lavín's main campaign promises were (hence the title) to create one million new jobs, help small and medium businesses thrive and fight crime ("Programa de Gobierno Candidatura Presidencial de Joaquín Lavín: Crear Un Millón de Nuevos Empleos" 1999). Understanding that gender issues were not the center of the 1999 campaigns highlights how unusual it was for some gender issues to gain prominence in the 2005-06 campaigns described in Chapter IV.

2.1. Lavín appeals to low-income working mothers

A lack of focus on gender inequality is unsurprising in part because of the fact that both viable candidates in 1999 were male. The core constituency hypothesis predicts that viable male candidates will not tend to make significant efforts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. This suggests that they are unlikely to promise significant PWC. Following Chapter I's conceptualization of pro-women change (PWC), I examine each candidate's PWC promises from their platforms and also any evidence that they promoted PWC on the campaign trail in interviews, speeches or debates.

Exploring each candidate's PWC promises shine light on the limited extent to which they tried to mobilize women by pledging to use presidential power to promote change favoring women. Lavín did make a limited attempt to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity by making PWC promises centered on women's traditional roles as mothers. Yet these promises were not a top priority. His main pledge appeared about halfway through his platform (page 15 of 38) and coalesced around a single theme: helping women make work and caring for their children compatible (*compatibilizar*). Only one in three Chilean women worked outside the home at this time, and finding and maintaining

employment while raising a family was particularly challenging for low-income single mothers with limited resources.[vii]

Lavin's platform acknowledged these realities of many women's lives and enumerated seven promises. The first, most ambitious one was to extend a nation-wide child care system, which would include the option of preschools, to be handled at the municipal level. The document also proposed to promote women's part-time employment, but no specifics described how to do this. The third proposal was to support single mothers by facilitating child support payments and assisting mothers who seasonally worked in agriculture. The fourth was to allow women to decide how to use their state-guaranteed maternity leave, but it did not specify how to achieve this or propose to extend this benefit.

Fifth, the document pledged to augment family subsidies by 50% and to extend their coverage. The sixth proposal, to fight intrafamily violence, seemed largely unrelated to the broader theme of women's work outside the home. The platform promised to augment sanctions against offenders and to create Family Courts to prevent and resolve family conflict. The final proposal was to use educational programs implemented by these courts to prevent marital separations and thereby fit well with the Alianza's efforts to preserve traditional marriage.

Of these, the PWC promise that Lavín promoted most on the campaign trail was to expand state assistance in child care (*El Mercurio* 1999g; *El Mercurio* 1999s). Lavín said during the November 2 presidential debate that he favored creating a system for women, among them temporary female workers to improve childcare facilities, allowing them to work outside the home (*El Mercurio* 1999u). He then related this PWC promise to a broader commitment to the more dominant theme of the national economy. "Of course now they (women) are not going to find much work, but in my administration there will be reactivation!" he declared. The fact that Lavín immediately returned to economic themes after mentioning a PWC pledge suggests that economic rather than gender issues were far more important to the candidate.

An *El Mercurio* profile piece on Lavín's wife, María Estela de León, revealed her ideas on her husband's pro-women promises (*El Mercurio* 1999v). When asked "What measures do you consider most urgent in ending discrimination against women?", she replied:

> That she be able to choose if she wants to work or not and give her the possibility of doing it, through the municipality or the national government, leaving her children in a safe place. Also, that she has the possibility of having flexibility at work without losing her benefits that are today linked to a full day. Women are mothers and you have to give them all the facilities so that they can fulfill both kinds of work (*El Mercurio* 1999f).

This response evoked Lavín's programmatic focus on extending child care. In sum, Lavín recognized the economic realities of low-income working (or aspiring to be working) mothers and made some attempts to mobilize this subset of women.[viii] However, his PWC proposals narrowly defined women's interests and were far from his top priority.

2.2. Lagos proposes diverse gender equality measures

Representing the more socially liberal coalition, Lagos tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity by calling for more gender equality and a broader range of pro-women change than his conservative competitor. The Lagos platform nevertheless listed a similar number of PWC pledges—nine compared to Lavín's seven. It also similarly prioritized the PWC section, which also appeared about halfway through the document (page 12 of 31). Thus, although the content of Lavín's and Lagos' PWC proposals differed, the quantity and priority of these proposals were comparable.

Lagos' "Equality Plan" included discussion of gender equality at home, at work and in society. The document's first PWC promise was to recognize fathers' and mothers' common role in raising their children and a work environment that respected maternity, but no specifics were offered as to how to achieve this. The second item, to strengthen child care initiatives, overlapped with Lavín's platform. Targeting children ages 0-6 years old, the proposal was to extend the day care system and preschools. The third promise was to advance legislation that fought discrimination against women in the workplace, particularly on the issues of hiring, gender gaps in salaries, maternity leaves, sexual harassment and promotions. On this point the platform promised to advance an equal salary law that would be consistent with the international treaties Chile had signed (presumably CEDAW) (page 12).

The platform also vaguely promised to improve working conditions in all productive sectors, particularly in the female-dominated arenas of domestic and temporary work. A fifth pledge was to incentivize work hours that were compatible with family life for both men and women. Six, the document

promised to expand opportunities for low-income women to advance their education and find employment. In this way Lagos and Lavín both promised to promote women's employment.

The seventh proposal focused on a broad range of health concerns. Here the idea was to expand coverage of innovative mental and workplace health. It also called for greater attention to senior citizens who were women, to preventing adolescent pregnancies and intrafamily violence, to sexual and reproductive health programs and abortion prevention. Eight, the platform pledged to monitor and evaluate policies and programs related to women.

Finally, it promised to advance women's political participation through affirmative action policies for female candidacies.[ix] Lagos' platform offered no further details, but a more specific, yet seemingly off-the-cuff proposal emerged during the November 2 presidential debate. Lagos, in an response concerning how he would deal with crime, mentioned that he might name a woman to a "vice-ministerial position in citizen security" (*El Mercurio* 1999u). (In Chile, the Interior Minister serves as the de facto vice-president and manages the national police forces.) This PWC promise did not appear in writing. Lagos as president did not name a female Interior Minister but did appoint more female ministers than any of his predecessors.[x] Aside from this, the archives revealed no other instances of Lagos promoting his PWC promises during the campaign.

This review of Lavín's and Lagos' platforms and campaign discourse offers evidence consistent with the core constituency hypothesis that viable male candidates would tend to promote little PWC. While this may hardly seem surprising given men's historical domination in politics, this background helps show how the inter-gender contest in 2005-06 gave rise to gender related issues. Chilean presidential elections immediately prior to emergence of viable female presidential candidates were not characterized by significant mobilization efforts of women on the basis of gender identity.

3. Men Dominate Campaign Leadership on Both Sides

This section follows Chapter II in defining elite feminists by their social position and prior efforts to reverse women's exclusion from the public sphere. According to the personal constituency argument,

because elite feminists seek the advancement of women in politics, they are less likely to support and seek contact with viable male candidates than their female counterparts. To demonstrate the dominance and relative absence of elite feminists within Lavín's and Lagos' personal constituencies, I discuss the members of their campaign and the candidates' close confidants whose names appeared in the newspaper archives.

The press often referred to these male-dominated constituencies as "Lavín's men" or "Lagos' men" (*La Tercera* 1999d; *La Tercera* 1999i; *La Tercera* 1999f; *La Tercera* 1999e). Providing evidence for this dissertation's personal constituency argument, this section will show that many of these male personal constituents were the candidates' friends who they had met years before the campaign, both inside and outside of the political world, and with whom they shared common interests. Male candidates' personal constituencies included no (in the case of Lavín) or few (in the case of Lagos) elite feminists. Because elite feminists historically have associated with the left (Ríos Tobar 2009), it is unsurprising that the left candidate's personal constituency featured slightly more elite feminists than the right candidate's. Because personal constituents often shape the candidates' views and directly or indirectly influence their platforms, the almost complete dearth of elite feminist presence helps explain why the candidates promised little PWC during the campaign.

3.1. Lavín's Inner Circle of "Chicago Boys"

Overall, Lavín's campaign team was more stable and solidified than that of Lagos. The UDI candidate faced no competition within the Alianza, allowing him to launch his campaign before Lagos. His top advisers included several personal friends. Lavín had interacted with many of these individuals as "Chicago Boys," had collaborated with them in business deals, and/or shared their right-wing Catholic views. Like Lavín, virtually all had some ties to the Pinochet dictatorship.

Lavín appointed Francisco de la Maza his campaign manager in part because de la Maza was not part of the traditional party elite. Although he was an UDI member, he primarily worked in business, specifically construction, rather than politics. Lavín knew him well because de la Maza had served as one

of his advisers when he was mayor of Las Condes. De la Maza often defended the candidate and his ideas in the Chilean press (Arriagada and Navia 2005).

As the "second strong man in the campaign after de la Maza," Cristián Larroulet played an important role in writing Lavín's 1999 presidential platform (A. Silva 1999a; *El Mercurio* 2004a). Larroulet and Lavín were long-time friends. They met as undergraduates studying business at the Universidad Católica in the beginning of the 1970s. Their friendship at the time was "partial" because while Larroulet participated in *gremialismo*, Lavín associated with the now extinct National Party. Lavín and Larroulet became "true friends" in the Planning Office (Odeplán) during the military regime (A. Silva 1999a). They later left for the University of Chicago to study a masters in economics and served under Pinochet as "Chicago Boys."

Another prominent member of the Lavín's personal constituency was Carlos Alberto Délano who acted as the "creative brain" and the "marketing" man who managed the campaign's publicity (*El Mercurio* 1999d). *La Tercera* reported it was common knowledge within the UDI that "he knows how to sell a product" (Chapochnick and Silva 1999b). Délano invented the first round campaign slogan "Long Live Change" ("*Viva el Cambio*") and the second, supposedly less successful slogan "Wings for Everyone" ("*Alas Para Todos*") (*El Mercurio* 2004a). Délano reportedly had worked with Lavín in every one of his political campaigns. Like Lavín, he affiliated with the ultra-conservative Catholic sector Opus Dei.

Lavín's "inner group" also included Ernesto Silva, although his exact role was unclear (*El Mercurio* 1999d). Silva was one of Lavín's professors in the Universidad Católica and later was deemed part of his most loyal circle, the so-called "samurais" (*El Mercurio* 2004a). Deputy and party vice-president Juan Antonio Coloma served as Lavín's campaign spokesperson and head of communications (*El Mercurio* 1999d; Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.). Coloma had served on the military dictatorship's State Council from 1977-1989.

As coalition leader, Lavín also had to invite RN figures into his campaign, many of whom were not as personally close to him, but still may be considered personal constituents. RN president Alberto

Cardemil, former RN president Alberto Espina, former RN presidential candidate Sebastián Piñera, UDI president Pablo Longueira, as well as former UDI president Jovino Novoa and all joined Lavín's campaign by September 1999 (A. Silva 1999b). As party leaders, Longueira and Cardemil also wrote many of Lavín's campaign speeches (A. Silva 1999c).

The majority of Lavín's *franja* team were the same people he worked with on the design of *franjas* for the 1989 congressional elections (Chapochnick and Silva 1999b). Novoa spearheaded the 1999 *franja* efforts. Délano and journalist Manfredo Mayol supervised and implemented the *franja*. Mayol, who had helped direct the 1988 *Sí* campaign's *franja,* acted as Délano's right hand man. Pablo Longueira, Alberto Cardemil and Sebastián Piñera also contributed.

The only woman who was close to the campaign's top leadership was UDI deputy and loyal Pinochetista María Angélica Cristi (Chapochnick and Silva 1999a). As described later in this chapter, Lavín's wife, María Estela de León, maintained a low profile at the beginning of the campaign, but assumed a more visible role during the second round as she traveled the country campaigning for her husband.

Table 2 lists key figures of the Lavín campaign, their roles, special relationships with Lavín and their partisan affiliation. Many of these individuals enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the candidate: in particular, Larroulet, Délano, Silva and Fontaine. None of these key figures were elite feminists, and all but two, Cristi and Lavín's wife, were men. This section thus provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that viable male candidates' personal constituencies will likely feature few women and elite feminists.

Table 2: Key Figures and All Prominent Women in Lavín Campaign

Name	Role	Special Relationship?	Elite Feminist?	Party
Francisco de la Maza	Campaign manager	Advisor to Lavín as mayor	No	UDI
Cristián Larroulet	Platform advisor	Chicago boy, Universidad de Desarrollo founder, Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo,	No	None
Carlos Alberto Délano	Publicity, marketing	Universidad de Desarrollo founder	No	None
Ernesto Silva	Top advisor	Chicago boy, Universidad de Desarrollo founder	No	
Juan Andrés Fontaine	Top advisor	Chicago boy, Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo	No	None
Juan Antonio Coloma	Spokesperson	No	No	UDI
Alberto Cardemil	Speechwriter	Party president	No	RN
Alberto Espina	Top advisor	No		
Sebastián Piñera	worked on *franja*	No	No	UDI
Pablo Longueira	Speechwriter, worked on *franja*	Party president	No	UDI
Jovino Novoa	Top advisor	No	No	UDI
Manfredo Mayol	worked on *franja*	Worked with Lavín on *Sí* campaign	No	
María Angélica Cristi*	Top leadership	No	No	UDI
María Estela de León*	Emotional support, initiated "parallel campaign" in the second round	Wife	No	None

*Female

3.2. Lagos' Focus on Uniting the Coalition with DC (Male) Leadership

In contrast to Lavín, Lagos' personal constituency included slightly more women and at least some elite feminists. It is unsurprising that Lagos appointed a handful of women to the top of his leadership team, two of whom were elite feminists, because elite feminists in Chile tend to associate with the left (Ríos Tobar 2009). Women's and feminists' presence in the Lagos camp nevertheless was still relatively weak. This analysis will thereby provide additional evidence for the personal constituency's expectation that male presidential candidates are unlikely to incorporate a significant number of women to their campaigns and are unlikely to be influenced by elite feminists.

After Lagos won the Concertación nomination, socialist senator Carlos Ominami, served as campaign coordinator and was responsible for communications (*El Mercurio* 1999e). To unify the coalition behind his candidacy, Lagos created a committee made up of the presidents of the five member parties: the DC, PS, the Radicals, PPD and the Liberal Party. All these party presidents were men (*El Mercurio* 1999n).[xi]

Lagos announced in July that former DC president Patricio Aylwin and former DC minister Genaro Arriagada would steer his campaign. Viewing the decision in the context of Pinochet's detention in London, *El Mercurio* reported that Lagos intended to recreate the spirit of the successful 1988 *No* campaign. Aylwin had acted as this campaign's spokesperson, and Arriagada had served as the executive secretary (Arriagada and Navia 2006).

That month Arriagada stepped in as coordinator, the campaign's most senior post. *El Mercurio* noted that Arriagada and Lagos were friends thanks to their long history of operating side by side within the Concertación (*El Mercurio* 1999n). Both studied law at the Universidad de Chile at the beginning of the 1960s and affiliated with the Radical Party youth. They met again while opposing the military government, participating in the "No" campaign, and collaborating as ministers during subsequent Concertación administrations.

Lagos' team had mostly solidified by the time he launched his campaign in September 1999 (Quezada and Silva 1999). He incorporated other DC figures from President Frei's former "iron circle", which in addition to Arriagada, included Carlos Figueroa and Edmundo Pérez Yoma. He also invited Banco del Estado directors Marcos Colodro and Fernando Bustamente to join his team as these men provided contacts to the business world. Ominami, Nicolás Eyzaguierre, Jaime Estévez and Francisco Vidal also provided expertise on economic issues.

According to October 1999 reports, Lagos trusted three Frei ministers the most: Secretary General of the Presidency José Miguel Insulza (PS), Foreign Affairs Minister Juan Gabriel Valdés (PS) and Defense Minister Edmundo Pérez Yoma (DC) (*La Tercera* 1999h). Lagos coordinated with them on

handling Pinochet's detention. Insulza was known as the link between President Frei and candidate Lagos.

The analysis so far suggests Lagos' personal constituency featured an all-male crew. Lagos nevertheless seemed to invite slightly more women to work with him than Lavín, and in addition to his wife, at least three of these women qualify as elite feminists. The women in Lagos' campaign who the press mentioned were Adriana Delpiano, Carolina Tohá, Luisa Durán, Patricia Politzer, Mariana Aylwin and Soledad Alvear.

President Frei's National Goods Minister, Delpiano emerged as the most powerful woman on Lagos' team and served in the role as assistant director beginning in early 1999. Seen as a "new" leader, she was named campaign spokesperson on April 13 and later served as a coordinator of the executive committee (*La Tercera* 1999i; Quezada 1999c). Delpiano accompanied Lagos in all of his campaign tours and sometimes acted as a bridge between him and other team leaders.

Carolina Tohá also participated in the Executive Committee beginning in 1998 and managed the youth component of the campaign for a brief period (*La Tercera* 1999a; Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.). Tohá knew Lagos well, having helped found the PPD with him and Jorge Schaulsohn in 1987. Finally, Lagos' wife, Luisa Durán, did not play a major role in the campaign, but undoubtedly served as emotional support to Lagos. Delpiano, Tohá and Durán qualify as elite feminists since both were active in the women's pro-democracy movement of the 1980s. (See Chapter IV for more on elite feminists in Chile.)

Two other women, neither of whom qualify as elite feminists, also occupied notable positions. Journalist Patricia Politzer wrote a 1998 biography of Lagos entitled *El Libro de Lagos*, and during most of the campaign was in charge of press relations (*El Mercurio de Valparaíso* 2001). Lagos also reinforced the DC presence by incorporating President Aylwin's daughter, Maríana Aylwin, to his team (*El Mercurio* 1999n). She was described as serving an "important role" during the run-up to the second round when Lagos made special efforts to reach out to the DC (Quezada and Insunza 1999).

Other prominent Concertación women were mentioned as participating in the on-the-ground campaign, but did not seem particularly close to their candidate. In October 1999, Lagos sent out "duplas" to campaign for him in different parts of Chile (*La Tercera* 1999k). *La Tercera* listed 12 pairs of politicians, 18 men and 6 women. The women included Maríana Aylwin, María Antonieta Sáa, Carmen Frei, Isabel Allende and Fanny Pollarollo. Sáa also qualifies as an elite feminist, but not one of Lagos' personal constituents.

Lagos at times seemed to make an effort to include more women. The campaign sought a female to take the role of the youth section of the Lagos campaign (*La Tercera* 1999a). This opening was filled by the model and lawyer from the Universidad de Chile, Danitza Pavlovic. *La Tercera* said that one of her strengths was being a woman. Far more important was Soledad Alvear's role in the second round. As this chapter's final section will explain, Alvear resigned from her position as President Frei's prized Justice Minister and replaced Arriagada as the spokesperson and manager in December 1999.

Political scientist Patricio Navia offered his take on Lagos' personal constituency in an October *Capital* column. He divided Lagos' inner circles of advisers and collaborators into nine groups, including "The '80s Allies," "Fundación Chile 21," and "Personal Friends." Only 7 of the 65 names listed were female (Navia 1999). Thus, although Lagos seemed to network with more women than Lavín, they still constituted a relatively uninfluential minority.

As polls showed Lavín rising and Lagos stagnating in October 1999, Ominami was one of the first to detect and address problems in the campaign. Lagos responded by personally inviting "experts" or "men with experience" to his team (AIC and JAQ 1999). Ominami headed this group, which included PPD President and Deputy Jorge Schaulsohn, former director of the Communications and Culture Secretary Eugenio Tironi, and PS Vice President Ricardo Solari. *La Tercera* again noted that, in the context of Pinochet's detention and heightened anti- and pro-Pinochet cleavage, all three of these group members had worked on the 1988 *No* campaign.

This team gathered every morning at the campaign headquarters in Chile 21 Foundation (*Fundación Chile 21*) where they defined the communications strategy, put together political operations

and scheduled weekly issues (AIC and JAQ 1999). They also advised Lagos on how to better compete with Lavín's successful marketing campaign. Arriagada and Politzer also attended these meetings.[xii]

Finally, some family members appeared as Lagos' personal constituents, particularly his oldest son. Ricardo Lagos Weber, labeled a symbol of youth and the future, was charged with "recovering the street, putting issues (on the table) and moving away from politics" (*La Tercera* 1999j). Lagos Weber also participated in the morning meetings in the campaign headquarters. Lagos' wife's nephew, Matías de la Fuente, in February 1999 was put in charge of the campaign tours and events (*La Tercera* 1999i). De la Fuente was considered the "general manager" of the much of the on-the-ground campaign.

Although Lagos finished first in the first round in December, the results disappointed his team, which had hoped to avoid a second competition in January (Quezada 1999b). Campaign manager Arriagada was blamed for Lagos falling short of a first round majority. *La Tercera* observed that the campaign's assistant director, the PPD's Adriana Delpiano, had not fully stepped up in place of Arriagada, and furthermore, the PS and DC leadership did not see her as a campaign authority. Lagos eventually replaced Arriagada with Soledad Alvear.[xiii]

Summing up, Table 3 lists key figures and all prominent women of Lagos' personal constituency and campaign. Most individuals are male, but more women and elite feminists appear in Table 3 than in Table 2. Overall, both candidates' personal constituencies seemed dominated by men and featured few or no elite feminists, and this observation is consistent with the personal constituency argument.

Table 3: Key Figures and All Prominent Women in Lagos Campaign

Name	Role	Special Relationship?	Elite Feminist?	Party
Carlos Ominami	Campaign coordinator during primaries	--	No	PS
Genaro Arriagada	First-round campaign manager	Worked on "No" campaign, worked together as ministers	No	DC
Patricio Aylwin	Political chief	Worked on "No" campaign, Lagos served as minister	No	DC
Jaime Estévez	Territorial campaign leader; executive committee coordinator	No	No	PS
Francisco Vidal	Territorial campaign leader	--	--	PPD
José Miguel Insulza	Coordinated on response to Pinochet detention	Secretary General of the Presidency; Worked together as ministers; close confidants	No	PS
Juan Gabriel Valdés	Coordinated on response to Pinochet detention	Foreign Affairs Minister; worked together as ministers; close confidants	No	PS
Edmundo Pérez Yoma	Coordinated on response to Pinochet detention	Defense Minister; worked together as ministers; close confidants	No	DC
Adriana Delpiano*	Campaign subdirector; executive committee coordinator	No	Yes	PPD
Carolina Tohá*	Executive committee member, in charge of youth	Helped found PPD with Lagos	Yes	PPD
Luisa Durán*	Emotional support	Wife	Yes	None
Patricia Politzer*	Press relations, participated in strategic meetings	Wrote 1998 Lagos biography	No	None
Mariana Aylwin*	Participated in "dupla" effort	No	No	DC
Soledad Alvear*	Second-round campaign manager	No	No	DC
Jorge Schaulsohn	Top advisor	Worked on "No" campaign; founded PPD together	No	PPD
Eugenio Tironi	Worked on *franja*	Worked on "No" campaign together	No	None
Ricardo Solari	Top advisor	Worked on "No" campaign together; not part of his intimate circle	No	PS

Ricardo Lagos Weber	Worked on territorial campaign	Son	No	--
Matías de la Fuente	In charge of campaign tours and events	Step-nephew	No	--
Carlos Montes	Led on-the-ground campaign for second round	No	No	PS

* Female

4. How Lavín Mobilized Women: Gender and Candidates' Public Images

How did Lavín, a male candidate who promised little PWC and included few women in his campaign, mobilize a core constituency of female voters? The fact that conservative presidential candidates prior to this election had always won a female gap helps explain much of Lavín's success among women. I expound here upon another contributing factor, Lavín's gendered public image. My discussion here of Lavín's image lays to groundwork for Chapter IV's explanation of how Bachelet in the subsequent election not only mobilized a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity, but to captured the presidency.

I argue here that many political elites in Chile seemed to believe that certain qualities of Lavín's candidacy, which I point out are stereotypically feminine, attracted more women than men. Lagos, on the other hand, displayed stereotypically masculine characteristics that were thought to have helped him perform especially well among men but not women.[xiv] This dynamic of female voters disproportionately supporting the candidate with the feminine traits and male voters gravitating to the candidate with the masculine characteristics further underscores how political elites tend to believe individuals feel better represented by those who are "like them" (Fenno 1977; Pitkin 1967).

One reason why Lavín was able to mobilize a core constituency of women relates to sex differences in "politization" (*politización*), meaning levels of ideological and partisan attachments, engagement and participation. Results from the September/October 1999 CEP poll demonstrate these sex differences. While a substantial group of Chileans professed no political ideology, fewer women than men did. Furthermore, Chileans overall displayed low levels of political engagement and participation, but women showed lower rates than men of watching and reading political news, talking about politics with friends and persuading others to change their political views. Many political elites in Chile at the time interpreted poll results such as these as suggesting that women voters were less politicized than men.[xv]

Exploiting this generalized depolitization but not specifically targeting women on the basis of gender identity, Lavín sought distance himself from political parties.[xvi] Lavín's support from the UDI and

RN was so solid that he enjoyed ample latitude in assembling his campaign team and designing his own strategy.[xvii] He thus named business rather than political leaders, such as his campaign manager de la Maza. Lavín declared to the UDI faithful in March 1999 that even though the participation of parties was important, "the axis of my proposal is not in the parties" (*El Mercurio* 1999a). Lavin also created a *popular* campaign called the "March for Change" ("*Caminata por el Cambio*") in order to move away from party elites. His team organized few massive events with Alianza representatives and few meetings with *gremios* (*El Mercurio* 1999o). Lavín focused on visiting poor neighborhoods (*poblaciones*) and having his Polaroid photo taken with locals. Both Lavín and his campaign manager openly discussed these aspects of his strategy, but there is no evidence that they were specifically targeting women on the basis of gender identity.[xviii]

The flip side of being distant from the parties is being close to the people, and in the Chilean context of the time, this characteristic was more associated with the female sex. Empathy, caring and understanding—while often important political traits more generally—also were stereotypically feminine traits derived from the "close to the people" concept (Bem 1974). Lavín consistently emphasized all these qualities in his presidential bid. The UDI contender declared at the beginning of his January 1999 campaign tour that he cared about average citizens. "My desire is to listen to the problems of the people, especially the most neglected sector, and my goal is to help overcome extreme poverty" (*El Mercurio* 1999a). In this opening event, he flew to La Serena in a private airplane and immediately visited a shantytown. He breakfasted at the home of resident María Palma with the ostensible goal of understanding the plight of the neediest. He then unveiled his first campaign poster on Palma's patio.[xixxx]

Lavín's plan for collecting opinions and incorporating them into his presidential platform underscores his attempt to appear that he cared about everyday citizens' views. In April 1999, he announced the slogan "Your Opinion is Worth It" ("Tu Opinion Vale") (*El Mercurio* 1999b). In his speech, Lavín re-stated his solutions to people's "real" problems and promised to draft a platform based on the results of a *consulta popular*, or mass survey, of Chilean opinions. The results of his national survey would constitute a "strategic alliance" with citizens (*El Mercurio* 1999h).[xxi] Although no polling is

available to confirm this, Lavín did seem at least somewhat successful in transmitting this image as close to the people, empathetic and caring, two stereotypically feminine qualities. One member of the Lavín team said, "he seeks to put himself in the shoes of the other. The idea is that the candidate has a connection; that people see him as close..." (Ortega 1999).

A final component of the Lavín strategy was to appear non-confrontational. Lavín claimed to seek peace rather than conflict, and this aspect of his stereotypically feminine style was also thought to appeal to Chileans—particularly women who were repelled by political fighting. Lavin again did not seem to adapt this style in order to court women on the basis of gender identity: he did so because it was believed to be the most effective way to win the presidency (Boas 2016).

In his effort to appear non-confrontational, Lavín often dodged any controversy related to the Pinochet.[xxii] [xxiii] Lavín either downplayed or completely ignored his own history as a "Chicago Boy" and Pinochet collaborator because these aspects of his biographer were viewed as potential weaknesses, and any association with the former dictator would likely damage his peace-loving, future-oriented image.

In June 1999, Lavín tried to avoid a showdown with Lagos by declaring that his true opponent was not the Concertación candidate, but the problems of average citizens (*El Mercurio* 1999d). "I am not interested in beating Lagos just to beat Lagos. What I am really interested in is defeating unemployment, crime and poverty. Those are our real adversaries." Lavín thereby combined his close-to-the-people discourse with his peace rhetoric.

Lavín also claimed to bypass opportunities to counter-attack in October 1999, when he suffered accusations from Concertación deputies and members of the Frei administration (A. Silva 1999d).[xxiv] Lavín asked the UDI and RN to end their war with the current administration over corruption charges (A. Silva 1999e).[xxv] According to *La Tercera*, Lavín's closest advisers—including de la Maza, Silva, Coloma and Piñera—warned him that the confrontational atmosphere would not be good for his campaign.[xxvi] Lavín re-iterated in December that he never wished to injure or attack anyone because "people want peace and no more division" (*El Mercurio Online* 1999a).

Some polling evidence suggests Lavín was successful in presenting himself as the peaceful candidate. The CEP September-October 1999 poll showed that when asked which candidate would create in Chile a climate of peace and reconciliation, 36% said Lagos and 35% said Lavín. Among those who named Lavín, 57% were women and 43% were men. Thus, women seemed to believe disproportionately than Lavín's candidacy represented peace.

The non-confrontational aspect of Lavín's strategy was deemed successful at least by those favorable to his campaign. An October 1999 *El Mercurio* editorial argued that Lavín had been able to maintain a "positive and non-confrontational attitude" and that this had helped him obtain a broad appeal (*El Mercurio* 1999t). The editorial claimed that the electorate did not appreciate the increasingly negative atmosphere. "Maintaining an open and tolerant spirit, without disqualifying the adversary, could constitute a primordial element to win citizens' trust. … it could be an advantage for Lavín … that his rivals, more than proposing solutions to citizens' worries, dedicate a good part of their public speeches to discrediting him" (*El Mercurio* 1999t).

The flip side of Lavín trying, and apparently succeeding, in coming off as non-confrontational was that Lagos appeared aggressive, a typically masculine trait (A. Lagos 1999). Lagos' national image as an aggressive politician dates back at least to the fight for the return to democracy. In a 1988 interview, Lagos spoke directly to the television camera and pointed his finger at Pinochet. He demanded that the dictator respect the upcoming plebiscite results. Given this long-standing reputation, the right did not hesitate to accuse Lagos of aggression,[xxvii] and the Lagos campaign responded by toning down their discourse (A. Lagos 1999). According to former Minister of the General Secretary Enrique Correa, the right had exploited Lagos' supposed antipathy. Lavín's character, according to Correa, made Lagos seem like a "hard" leader, another stereotypically masculine characteristic.[xxviii]

Furthermore, as a "traditional leader," Lagos maintained a conventionally hierarchical and, hence, masculine, style of governing.[xxix] Some thought Lagos' conventionally masculine style was an advantage. Political scientist Patricio Navia remarked in a *Capital* column that, ironically, Lagos' rather than Lavín's leadership style approximated more Pinochet's authoritarianism (Navia 1999).

Chile is a conservative country. It likes order, authority, although with Pinochet, we ended up tired. Aylwin was a compassionate president; Frei, an administrator worried with the business management. 10 years after Pinochet, Chileans are ready for authority to return to La Moneda. In that sense, Lagos will be much more like Pinochet than like Aylwin or Frei. Democratic and liberal, he concentrates authority and likes discipline. He is more military than what he recognizes. Pinochet said that Chile would not move a leaf without him knowing. Lagos could say the same and we would believe him. Respectful of hierarchy, Lagos is the type of president that the right likes. He is also the kind of rebel that the left needs (Navia 1999).

Navia pulls out additional masculine elements of Lagos' public image by likening his preference for hierarchy and order to Pinochet. Although no polling evidence can confirm or disconfirm the argument, Lagos' solid performance among male voters may have been at least partially due to his gendered public persona.[xxx]

To sum up, although Lavin did not try to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity—either by promising significant PWC or consistently evoking women's identities—he seemed to end up attracting a particularly important female following by displaying stereotypically feminine characteristics and traits (i.e. depolitization) that disproportionately appealed to women. On the other hand, Lagos' image was more traditional and masculine, and this, according to the conventional wisdom of the time, seemed to help him perform particularly well among men.

5. Female Surrogates: Deploying Women to Court Women

Lavín's solid, first-round performance among women was deemed a "surprise" (*La Tercera* 1999p). As a result, women's electoral preferences unexpectedly emerged as a newsworthy topic in the second round. *La Tercera* declared on December 18 that "women have become a coveted vote for both candidates" (*La Tercera* 1999s). "While Lavín will look to maintain this advantage, Lagos will especially focus on offsetting it" *La Tercera* predicted (*La Tercera* 1999p).

La Tercera was correct. Although Lagos finished first, the results disappointed his team which had hoped to bypass another round of voting. They scrambled to adopt a fresh approach to obtain votes from Lagos' first-round weakness: women. Meanwhile, Lavín's camp interpreted his hairline loss as a relative victory, and decided to play on their strengths by expanding their core constituency of women.

This final section will reveal strong evidence for the female surrogate corollary of the core constituency hypothesis. I show that leaders in both campaigns believed women were better than men at attracting female voters. Both candidates therefore raised the visibility of key women to court women voters. Lavín deployed his wife, María Estela de León, on the campaign trail to further build his core constituency of female voters. Also operating on the premise that women were better at mobilizing women, Lagos named Minister Soledad Alvear his spokesperson to attract women voters (Arriagada and Navia 2005). Campaigning on behalf of her husband, León leveraged her identity as a woman, mother and wife to appeal to women *as women*, that is, by evoking shared gender identities.

5.1. Lavín Employs León

Galvanized by his exceptional performance among women, Lavín publicly asked them to convince their husbands to vote for him (*La Tercera* 1999s). This demonstrates that such gendered appeals are hardly specific to the left: the right can also evoke women's identities. Conservative candidates may however be more likely to appeal to women's traditional roles rather women's collective status as victims of sexism. Yet, Lavín did not rely on his own efforts to expand on his female core constituency in this way, but he instead enlisted his wife, María Estela de León, to the task.

During much of the campaign León had played a low-profile role in attending many events, but rarely speaking. Lavín's advisers believed in her potential to appeal to female voters during the second round (*El Mercurio* 1999aa). According to one leader in the Lavín camp, "María Estela is the typical Chilean woman. She is a housewife; she has lots of kids; she is strong-willed (*tiene empuje*), and her physical appearance is typically Chilean. According to our studies, the female sex feels very identified with her" (*La Tercera* 1999q). It was not merely León's identity as a woman that was important, but also the fact that she was a stay-at-home mother, a particularly important demographic for the right, and this underscores political elite's belief that shared identity can create trust, and ultimately political support. *La Tercera* reported that Lavín's advisers began to create more opportunities for León in the campaign in order to win an even greater margin of women, thereby expanding on Lavín's core constituency.

In December 1999, León made her first official campaign speech to over 4,000 women at the Cultural House of Santiago's Ñuñoa neighborhood. She called for all Chilean women to embark on a national "your vote plus a vote" ("tu voto más un voto") crusade (*El Mercurio* 1999aa). León evoked stereotypically feminine qualities such as "peace" as she vouched for her husband. According to her, Lavín's large share of female votes in the first round favored her husband not only because women were represented by his "change" message, but also because women "value peace" (*El Mercurio* 1999aa).

León, a mother of seven, also tried to appeal to women on the basis of their identity as mothers by using family metaphors and similes. "We know that in our families, there is no possibility of achieving happiness if there is no harmony, if no there is respect, if there is no understanding. For us women, our family is a kind of small country, that is why we want for our Chile the same atmosphere of harmony and respect that we cultivate in our homes (*El Mercurio* 1999aa)." She added that just like the family, which is destroyed without love, the country also is destroyed when rancor dominates, when one is unable to forgive or one remains trapped in the bad things of the past. Thanks to "feminine intuition," Lavín received so many female votes on December 12 (*El Mercurio* 1999aa). In another appeal to women's perceived desire for new leadership, she declared, "there is no doubt that you understand better than anyone the change message" (*El Mercurio* 1999aa). The message was clear: trust Estela, who is just like us women, and vote Lavín.

These women-mobilization activities were not confined to the Santiago area. León initiated a "parallel campaign" with her children as a way to broaden Lavín's core constituency of female voters (*El Mercurio Online* 1999b). These efforts also were described as a way to counter-balance against the potential effect of Alvear on Lagos' performance among female voters.

When León even marginally deviated from her role as a stereotypically peace-seeking wife, the press noticed. A *La Tercera* reporter in a one-on-one interview brought up the way León had apparently criticized a Concertación mayor in her recent speech. León replied. "It's not something that I like, but I felt very good because what I said in "La Negra" came from the heart. I was speaking to the mothers, and with them I have much to share and contribute. I am prepared for that. I am not a politician. What I am

going to transmit is something that I feel as a woman and mother (*El Mercurio Online* 1999b)." Thus in her attempts to rally female voters behind her husband, León evoked shared identities of womanhood and motherhood. Like her husband, she then was careful to avoid confrontation with her counterpart, Alvear. The reporter asked whether the competition with Alvear was a kind of challenge for her. León avoided confrontation, replying that she did not feel that she was competing with the former minister. "I want to help Joaquín in his campaign, to make known his government's policies and to submit a message of change. ... I am not going to look at what other people are doing" (*El Mercurio* 1999aa).

The reporter asked her to explain Lavín's superior performance among women. León responded accordingly:

> I believe that women always think about their children. They are always concerned about their 'puppies' and what they want is work for their husband, or for themselves to maintain their children, so that they are raised well and have the possibility to go to the doctor. They look over the well-being of their family and they have seen in Joaquín a person that has done many concrete things. Women are not guided by ideologies, but more by the feelings of who gives them the most security (*El Mercurio* 1999aa).

León's response evokes essentialist claims concerning women's identities and interests. She first defined women according to their roles as mothers and wives and then implied that women were concerned with "concrete" everyday issues, a focal point of her husband's campaign. She also characterized women's decision-making as intuitive and guided by their emotions rather than political ideas. Given her own identity as a woman, mother and wife, León seemed to believe she possessed the authority to speak on behalf of female voters.

5.2. Lagos Enlists Alvear

Two days after the first round, the Lagos camp publicly recognized its need for more female support (*El Mercurio* 1999x). Operating as Lavín did on the belief that women are more effective at mobilizing women, Lagos promoted a key female figure to court female voters and thereby clinch the presidency (Editorial 1999; *El Mercurio* 1999y). Alvear resigned from her ministerial post to lead Lagos' second round campaign. She replaced Arriagada, who stepped down as campaign manager after failing to achieve a first-round victory.[xxxi]

In negotiating her arrival, the "highly prized" minister reportedly demanded broad powers in the handling of the campaign. She also insisted on bringing members her ministerial team, and consistent with the personal constituency argument, many of them were women (De la Maza and Vega 1999; *El Mercurio* 1999z). Alvear's press chief Ana María Ojeda, cabinet sub-chief María Ariadna Hornkhol and secretary Ximena Vargas also boarded the Lagos campaign (*La Tercera* 1999r).[xxxii]

Lagos sought to raise Alvear's visibility as much as possible. *La Tercera* reported that he was imitating the U.S. and Argentine presidential candidates who select a running mate with whom they campaign during the rest of the race (Insunza 1999). Lagos reportedly considered announcing that he would name Alvear Interior Minister, the approximate equivalent of a vice-presidential position, thereby making her the "strong woman" in the future Lagos administration (Insunza 1999). [xxxiii]

But Alvear was not just named campaign spokesperson because she was a woman with outstanding favorability ratings. She also was from the DC, the only Concertación party that tended to attract more women than men. Jaime Ravinet called Lagos' decision to name Alvear "spectacular" (*El Mercurio Online* 1999c). *La Tercera* noted that the Socialist Party tended to perform better among Chilean men than women. DC Senator Alejandro Foxley also pointed out that his party included an important part of the female electorate. He deemed Lagos' second-round strategy "logical." "The DC has the trust of the middle sectors and traditionally has had a very strong female vote and thus it is logical that my party have a larger public presence in this last campaign phase than in the previous one," he remarked (*El Mercurio Online* 1999c). A woman from the DC thus offered a double potential for attracting women voters. Alvear ascended to the role of campaign manager primarily because Lagos and his advisers believed she could ameliorate his performance among women voters (Insunza 1999).

In sum, elites in both the Lavín and Lagos camps believed that employing prominent women would boost their support among women. This is consistent with the female surrogate corollary derived from the core constituency hypothesis.

6. Chapter Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed the gendered dynamics of core and personal constituency formation during an all-male presidential contest. With no viable female candidates competing, to what extent, how and when do these male candidates target women voters and incorporate women and elite feminists into their campaigns? Consistent with the core constituency hypothesis, Lavín and Lagos made little effort to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity in the first round of the elections. Both candidates' personal constituencies were characterized by male dominance and a dearth of elite feminists. After the first round, both candidates, believing that women were better than men at courting female voters, raised the profiles of key women in their campaigns. Lavín's wife in particular tried to mobilize women by evoking shared gender identities of womanhood and motherhood.

The second round in January 2000 was slightly more decisive than the first. Lagos defeated Lavín by 51.3% to 48.7%. Yet, the deployment of Alvear as a spokesperson did not seem to significantly help Lagos earn female support. As indicated in Table 1, his gender gap favored male voters by 5.61%, and Lavín's gap favored women by almost exactly the same percent. Thus, although political elites tend to believe that women are more effective than men at mobilizing women, such tactics, for a variety of reasons, may not always work, particularly if the opponent adopts the same strategy. Thanks largely to the male vote, Lagos was inaugurated Chile's first socialist president since Allende in March 2000.

The next chapter will continue to probe the core and personal constituency hypotheses with an exploration of the 2005-06 Chilean presidential race, in which two viable female and two viable male candidates competed. I will show that unlike Lagos, Bachelet made significant and early attempts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity and was successful. In contrast to Lagos, Bachelet's personal constituency also featured numerous elite feminists and female politicians. Thus, despite the fact that both President Lagos and President Bachelet hailed from the same party, only she perceived a core constituency of women demanding PWC and possessed the political and technical expertise to eventually use her power to fulfill many of these demands.

---

[i]Other candidates ran for president in 1999, and two female candidates ran for the first time in Chilean history: Gladys Marín of the Communist Party and Independent Sara Larraín. Tomás Hirsch of the Humanist Party and

97

Independent Arturo Frei also competed. They are excluded from the analysis since none of them were viable contenders.

[ii] The Concertación is today called the New Majority coalition.

[iii] RN Senator Sebastián Piñera also considered challenging Lavín for the Alianza nomination at the beginning in 1998. Piñera later dropped out after failing to rise in public opinion polls, and Lavín thus easily secured the Alianza presidential nomination early on. Chapter IV will nevertheless show that Piñera made an impressive comeback the next presidential context and won more votes than Lavín in 2005.

[iv] Four non-viable candidates also competed, but they are excluded from the analysis because none had a serious chance of winning and exercising presidential power.

[v] Sex differences also cut across class. "In every social class they (women are more favorable to candidates of the right than are men" (Lewis 2004, 720).

[vi] This polarization helped shape the candidates' political strategies. Commentators noted that, if elected, Lagos would become Chile's first socialist president since Salvador Allende. This produced fear among some voters who believed Allende had contributed to the political and economic crises precipitating the 1973 coup. For example, an *El Mercurio* editorial criticized Lagos for his past arguing that prior to 1973, his socialist party called to destroy the political institutions (*El Mercurio* 1999j). Many perceived Lagos' party affiliation as a threat (Arriagada and Navia 2005). To avoid being seen as another Allende, Lagos aimed to assure the public that, should he win the presidency, he would not usher in radical economic change.

      Conversely, some believed Lavín's ties to the Pinochet regime were his Achilles heel (Arriagada and Navia 2005; Zuñiga and Gutiérrez Moya 2000). Pinochet's human rights violations were widely (though not universally) acknowledged at the time. Lavín's historical collaboration with Pinochet constituted a liability, and he tried to side-step any issues related to the military regime. Lagos sought to exploit his opponent's weakness. For example, Lagos after the Concertación primaries that Lavín's campaign was "*puro pinochetismo*" (*El Mercurio* 1999j).

      Pinochet's detention nevertheless was particularly difficult for Lagos because the Concertación split over how to handle the situation (*El Mercurio* 1999j). On one hand, the DC wanted Pinochet handed over to the Chilean courts and argued that Pinochet's arrest was a national sovereignty issue. The PS and PC preferred Pinochet to face trial even if it meant he would be tried outside of Chile. Both Alianza parties, on the other hand, agreed Pinochet should be given over to the Chilean authorities.

[vii] "… in many cases, their (low-income women's) work is key to maintaining their families. In Chile, there are many women who are the main providers of their family groups. They must work and, at the same time, take care of their children" ("Programa de Gobierno Candidatura Presidencial de Joaquín Lavín: Crear Un Millón de Nuevos Empleos" 1999, 15).

[viii] Although not an explicit pro-women promise, Lavín's emphasis on crime may have appealed particularly to women (*El Mercurio* 1999f). A survey conducted by the Citizen Peace Foundation (*Fundación Paz Ciudadana*) indicated that crime hurt especially the poorest sectors. One in six Santiaguinos and one in ten outside of Santiago said they always feared being assaulted. The demographic group that expressed the most fear was women over 40 years old. Lavín's emphasis on crime was evident during his "March for Change" (*Caminata para el Cambio*) trip to the north of Chile in July 1999. True to his populist style, Lavín ate breakfast with workers and visited a mine. "The party will be over for the criminals (when he becomes president)" he declared (*El Mercurio* 1999p).

[ix] What was omitted in this platform? In an effort to appease the DC forces in his coalition and Catholic authorities, Lagos decided to exclude "value" issues such as divorce and abortion from his campaign's debate on his presidential platform (*El Mercurio* 1999r). In a meeting with representatives of the Catholic Church, Lagos discussed poverty, unemployment and inequality, and he also told the priests he would not promote abortion legislation, even legislation on "therapeutic" abortion. "This issue is not in my administration's or the Concertación's priorities; so I am not going to do it," Lagos said (*El Mercurio* 1999w). He reassured them that his candidacy was inspired by traditional Chilean values and Christian Humanism. Lagos said his campaign slogan—Growing with Equality— focused on social justice, equal opportunities, and respect for ethnic and minorities' rights. Lagos later told reporters that he and Church officials did not talk about divorce laws during this meeting.

[x] A *La Tercera* analysis argued that Lagos and Lavín's stances on women's issues were not that different since both recognized that women suffer from discrimination (*La Tercera* 1999n). In some events, the candidates' PWC discourse seemed to somewhat converge, but differences were still apparent. For example, in a presidential debate in Concepción, a woman asked the candidates to speak on the situation of working women. Both candidates commented on temporary female workers. Lavín reiterated his ideas on creating a child care system for low-income women. Lagos responded that he hoped the right would approve legislation on women's working situation, and he

also mentioned discrimination in the private health care (called Isapres), especially discrimination against women of child-bearing age.

xi Intent on achieving representation in the campaign, the DC had drafted its own list of suggested names for Lagos' political committee: DC president Gutenberg Martínez, Senate President Andrés Zaldívar, former DC president and deputy Enrique Krauss, and former president of the DC Youth Yerko Ljubetic (*El Mercurio* 1999m).

xii President Aylwin's nephew and former secretary Marcelo Trivelli created another group whose mission was to prepare and produce political facts (AIC and JAQ 1999).The idea is that this group would generate happenings that would permit the PS candidate to position himself at the forefront of the major issues of the campaign.

xiii There were other post first-round changes. PS deputy Carlos Montes took charge of the on-the-ground campaign and sociologist Eugenio Tironi, a communications expert, assumed the role as head of the next *franja electoral* (*El Mercurio* 1999y).

xiv Because so little polling was conducted during these campaigns, this section's evidence is derived from the September/October 1999 CEP survey, analysis of political observers and the conventional wisdom at the time.

xv Twenty-eight percent of Chileans presented with a 1-5 right-left ideology scale said they identify with no political ideology. Of this group, 55% were women and 45% were men, and this difference is statistically significant (T-stat=-1.9). Concerning political engagement and activities, 36% of men and 45% of women said they never watched political programs on television. While 58% of women said they "never" read political news, 45% of men said the same, and these differences are statistically significant (T-stat=-4.7). While 66% of women said they "never" talked about politics with friends, just 51% of men said the same. While 87% of women said they "never" try to persuade someone politically, 80% of men said the same (T-stat=-3.7). Women also seemed to have more malleable political opinions. When asked if they were sure about their vote, 23% of Chilean said they were not sure who they would vote for president. Within this group, there were statistically significant sex differences with 25% of women saying they were not sure and 20% of men.

xvi Because of men's historical domination of the presidency and parties, these institutions were tightly associated with the male sex. As Chapter IV will show, Bachelet leveraged her gender identity as a woman to portray herself as a political outsider, despite her long history in the PS.

xvii For example, in August 1999, the UDI declared Lavín its presidential candidate in the Diego Portales building in Santiago (*El Mercurio* 1999q). The proclamation included statements that the UDI would offer Lavín complete freedom and independence in organizing his administration and appointing the "best men" who would loyally serve the country.

xviii De la Maza argued in October that the axis of Lavín's campaign had successfully maintained distance from the parties and traditional discourse (*La Tercera* 1999g). *La Tercera* asked Lavín in an interview: "You say that you represent change, but your support base is in the parties and figures from the traditional right. How do you then explain your change?" He elaborated:

> …change means to move away from the traditional political style and to make substantial reforms in areas where the country has problems: unemployment, crime, health, poverty and education….What I want is to be as far as possible from the traditional political scheme, which is putting first the political priorities ahead of those of the people….When I see that the president of (Lagos') political campaign is Patricio Aylwin and that the campaign manager is Genaro Arriagada or that the same candidate (Lagos) has been minister in both Concertación administrations, it is clear where change is… (*La Tercera* 1999b)xviii

xix The poster, featuring Lavín's face, read "President of All Chileans."

xx Another way Lavín tried to come off as close to the people was to stress that he shared their concerns. He repeatedly emphasized solutions to "concrete problems" rather than "political" issues that were unimportant to everyday Chileans. *El Mercurio*, the right, and the Lavín campaign all argued that Lagos' focus on "institutional" reforms, such as those related to the constitution and electoral system, were not people's priorities. According to this argument, Lagos was out of touch with Chileans' concerns.

xxi The survey consisted of 1,415,000 pamphlets handed out and 1,034,000 telephone calls. At the end of May 1999, the Lavín campaign re-iterated that the national survey would work as the basis of his presidential platform (*El Mercurio* 1999d). The survey was set to end on June 6, after which Lavín would convene with party leaders to draft his proposals for the nation. Lavín announced in June 1999 that he understood the results of the survey as a mandate from the more than 1,800,000 participants. The results showed that crime was a top complaint, with 180,000 pamphlets referring to that (*El Mercurio* 1999h). He said that the themes of crime, health, drugs, youth, women and education—in that order—would be the priorities (*El Mercurio* 1999l).

[xxii] He emphasized that his proposal, focusing on the future, rose above the divisions of the 1988 *Sí vs. No* plebiscite campaigns, that he claimed to have characterized Chilean politics.

[xxiii] An August 1999 report from Concertación think tank Corporación Tiempo 2000 said that one axis of Lavín campaign was "the attempt to avoid the polarization with Ricardo Lagos around a replay of the *Sí* and *No* and the antiomy between the UP-Military Government, and not to have to take responsibility for the consequences of the human rights violations and with the figure of Pinochet himself" (Quezada 1999a). According to the document, Lavín "leaves to the UDI and the RN the ideological role of confronting the Concertación and taking responsibility for the feelings of the traditional right and *pinochetismo*," leaving for himself the task of winning votes from the center. It added that Lavín presented himself as the candidate "whose only past was as the mayor from Las Condes" (Quezada 1999a).

[xxiv] DC deputies Andrés Palma and Tomás Jocelyn-Holt criticized Lavín for the sale of 20,000 copies of his book *Chile, Sociedad Emergente* to Codelco in October 1989, two months before a congressional election in which competed. According to conservative strategists, refusing to retaliate helped create an image of "a modern candidate, capable of solving problems and far from the disputes of the past" (A. Silva 1999d).

[xxv] While Lavín was accused of receiving indirect financing from Codelco for his 1989 campaign, the right accused the Concertación of illegally hiring consulting services.

[xxvi] Asked about the accusations from Minister José Miguel Insulza, Lavín declared "I will not enter into that language, but yes, I am very sorry that 49 days from the election, the debate is centered on personal attacks I have said that I am never going to fall into that" (*La Tercera* 1999l).

[xxvii] In the November 2 presidential debate, Lavín said that Lagos represented the traditional political world that is involved in "political fights" while he, Lavín, represented change (*La Tercera* 1999m). According to de la Maza, "Lagos has hurt himself with his own errors with his aggressive style of hate and accusations. Zaldívar fell into this same style in the primaries and at the time Lagos …did not respond. We are going to demonstrate that we are not enemies, but political adversaries." An independent communications expert of the Concertación explained "Lagos was not confrontational in the primaries, and even less so as Minister of Public Works. But in this campaign high levels of confrontation appear that go completely against the atmosphere that voters want in the current circumstances" (A. Lagos 1999). In other words, Lagos himself did not want to appear that he liked to fight either, but the present context made it unavoidable.

[xxviii] Lagos also was viewed as representing the political establishment. Lagos was the candidate of the incumbent coalition and a former Education and Public Works minister. Furthermore, the Concertación candidate—perhaps unintentionally—reinforced this aspect of his image by surrounding himself with party leaders during the primaries and general election. For example, in April 1999, Lagos registered his candidacy while standing next to PS, PPD and PRSD representatives ("Primarias de La Concertación: Lagos Y Zaldívar Se Inscribieron" 1999). Many observers argued that Lagos failed to change this part of image after appointing "historical" establishment figures, such as Genaro Arriagada and Carlos Figueroa, to his campaign leadership team. A *La Tercera* article pointed out that unlike Lavín – who, according to polls was perceived as distant from the political parties – Lagos reinforced his political establishment image when he appeared with traditional Concertación figures during his campaign events (Quezada 1999b).Why did Lagos associate with the parties so much when they were discredited by the public? As explained above, Lagos had to get all parties, especially the DC, on board. During the first week of June 1999, several prominent DC leaders received Lagos at the DC headquarters (*El Mercurio* 1999i). After an hour long conversation, Lagos told the press that, in light of the primary results, the DC had confirmed its support for his candidacy.

[xxix] There was much debate over whether his traditional leader image hurt or helped him. The right believed it hurt him. For example, *La Tercera* concluded that Lagos' weaknesses included the economic crisis, the confrontational discourse and being perceived as a member of the "traditional politicians' club" (A. Lagos 1999).

[xxx] Because Lagos began 1999 as the clear presidential frontrunner, the story of much of the 1999 campaigns is one of Lavín's rise and Lagos' stagnation. A report from a Concertación think tank, Corporación Tiempo 2000, suggested that the left feared Lavín's emergence. The report read "for the first time since the 1988 plebiscite, the right appears politically united behind the possibility of an electoral success with a risky, but consistent strategy" (Quezada 1999a).

To counteract his diminishing poll numbers, Lagos imitated Lavín by striving to inject more emotion into his campaign and appear closer to the people. One example of this was his first speech after winning the Concertación primary in which he promised to represent all the coalition's forces (*El Mercurio* 1999c). Addressing women, young people and the poor, he also said that he would work on issues that were salient in Chileans' daily

lives. Lagos promised to lead a government that was close to the people and their needs. "I will not lock myself in my offices," he said (*El Mercurio* 1999c). He promised to maintain daily contact with the people and to return to see again the people he visited during the primary campaign.

Lavín at times tried to distance himself and his campaign from the political parties. In September 1999, the Lagos team, worried because of the results of a Gemines poll, sought to name a campaign leader in charge of the Metropolitan Region, which includes the capital city of Santiago (*La Tercera* 1999d). One of the goals was to raise the profile of independents who were working with Lagos in order to target voters who did not identify with the political parties.

In August a Fundación Futuro poll showed a virtual tie between Lagos and Lavín at 32%, again prompting the Lagos campaign to rethink its strategy (Quezada 1999a). In an attempt to appear "close to the people," Lagos met with young people, pregnant adolescents and working mothers. Members of Lagos' own campaign reportedly spoke of "*Lavínización de Lagos*," or of Lagos turning into Lavín. In another attempt to distance himself from the political class during his campaign stops, Lagos would speak with neighborhood leaders first, and then to the regional leaders, the local mayor and deputy. He also avoided getting his picture taken with politicians. One campaign source said that the idea was to "have (us politicians) feel part of the family, but when visitors come, we hide" (Quezada 1999a).

[xxxi] The task of incorporating Soledad Alvear to his campaign, however, was not simple. Although the Chilean press often referred to her as the DC President's Gutenberg Martínez's wife, an *El Mercurio* editorial pointed out she was a "star" in Frei's cabinet, having led major judicial reform in the 1990s and enjoying the highest popularity levels of all Frei's ministers (*La Tercera* 1999c; *El Mercurio* 1999t). According to *La Tercera*, Lagos asked Alvear, President Frei and DC leaders to include the Justice Minister in his campaign (De la Maza and Vega 1999). Alvear accepted the invitation only after conversing with President Frei.

[xxxii] Hornkhol took charge of media relations and Lagos' interview schedule (*La Tercera* 1999r).

[xxxiii] Journalists later reported that Alvear did not want the Interior Ministry post, but preferred the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which, upon Lagos' victory, she later obtained. *El Mercurio* also reported in December 1999 that Alvear could become Interior Minister if Lagos became president (*El Mercurio Online* 1999c).

CHAPTER IV Female Candidates and PWC Issues Emerge in the 2005-06 Chilean Elections

This chapter continues to probe the core and personal constituency hypotheses by exploring the inter-gender 2005-06 Chilean race. Two women—Michelle Bachelet and Soledad Alvear—and two men—Sebastián Piñera and Joaquín Lavín—made viable runs for the presidency.[i] Table 1 shows each candidate's electoral performance and their female gaps. With almost 46% of the vote, Bachelet of the center-left won the first round, but failed to obtain a majority of votes, forcing a second round. Earning far fewer votes than in the 1999-00 elections, Lavín barely lost to another conservative competitor, Piñera who captured about 25%. Bachelet handily defeated Piñera by a 7-point margin in the second round.

Table 1: Viable Candidates' Results and Female Gaps in 2005-06

	First Round Result	Second Round Result	First Round Female Gap	First Round Female Gap
Michelle Bachelet	45.96%	53.50%	2%	-0.002%
Soledad Alvear	*Dropped out*	--	--	--
Joaquín Lavín	23.23%	--	9.4%	--
Sebastián Piñera	25.41%	46.50%	-2.8%	0.42%

The gender gaps of this election in some ways defied and in other ways reinforced historical trends of conservative candidates in Chile performing comparatively better among women and progressive candidates performing better among men. First-round voting serves as a better indicator of candidates' strongest supporters, or core constituencies, than second-round voting because voters have a broader menu of options. Bachelet earned a 2% female gap in the first round. She thereby became the first Concertación presidential candidate ever to obtain more female than male votes. Although small in magnitude, the lack of historical precedence of the gap suggests (but does not provide definitive evidence) that Bachelet successfully mobilized a significant core constituency of women. This chapter will also show that Bachelet's early supporters were majority female, but she made late efforts to try to attract male voters.

Some of the conservative male candidates' results also broke with previous gender patterns in voting. Lavín captured a sizeable female gap, suggesting that although he performed far worse in 2005

than he had in the previous election, he still maintained a comparative advantage among women. Piñera, on the other hand, attracted more male voters and thus defied historical trends in women's and men's presidential preferences. In the second round—with just two candidates competing—coalition left/right ideologies seemed to counteract Bachelet's comparative advantage with women and Piñera's advantage with men. Bachelet essentially performed evenly among men and women, suggesting that courting undecided men was a more important goal for her in the second round than the first. Piñera only attracted a very minimal female gap.

In addition to advancing explanations for these election results, this chapter examines the evidence for and against my constituency argument. First, if the core constituency hypothesis is correct, female presidential contenders should devote more effort than their male counterparts in trying to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. This means they should evoke women's identities and/or promise PWC early in the campaign rather than at the end.

The first section "Constructing Core Constituencies" argues that both Bachelet and Alvear tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity by publicly sharing their experiences *as women*. These experiences include operating in sexist, male-dominated worlds and balancing career and family responsibilities. I further explore how Bachelet discursively deployed her single motherhood and strategically crafted a stereotypically feminine image. These tactics seemed to help her build more support, especially in the first round and particularly among women. According to the conventional wisdom of the time, her electoral success was in part due to her skill in attracting female supporters, many of whom were believed to have voted for Lavín in 1999. Lavín even complained that Bachelet was "beating me because she is a woman" and reacted to this perceived threat to his 1999-00 core constituency by trying to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. Consistent with the female surrogate corollary, one way he did this was to name a female campaign manager. I finally describe how Piñera, who maintained a stereotypically masculine public image, was more successful at capturing male and female voters.

According to my argument, female presidential contenders should make a greater number of and more ambitious PWC promises than their male contenders. The next section "Promises to Women" describes how Bachelet radically vowed to assemble a gender parity cabinet, extend a national preschool network and enhance gender equality through pension reform.[ii] She made these promises to attract female elites, lower-income mothers and female retirees. The male candidates, on the other hand, promised less PWC in their platforms and mainly promoted their pension plans for stay-at-home mothers. In addition to making a higher number of and more ambitious PWC promises, Bachelet emphasized these PWC commitments on the campaign trail earlier and to a greater extent than the male contenders emphasized theirs. In sum, male candidates at times tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, but they did so less often, later in the campaign and seemingly less successfully than the female candidates.

Finally, given men's historical monopoly on political, especially presidential, power, my argument also predicts that female candidates' personal constituencies and presidential campaign teams will not be majority female, but they should be less male-dominated than those of male candidates. The closing section "Campaign Networks and Personal Constituencies" explores how Bachelet's personal constituency featured powerful male Concertación leaders, but also included numerous elite feminists who played prominent roles in her campaign. It is likely that elite feminists connected to Bachelet influenced her PWC platform promises.

Bachelet's campaign opened an unprecedented number of spaces to women, and with a few exceptions, men monopolized Lavín's and Piñera's personal constituencies and their campaign teams. Virtually no evidence suggests the presence of elite feminists in Lavín's or Piñera's personal constituencies. The UDI candidate did name a female campaign manager largely with the goal of attracting female voters, and this specific decision helps confirm the female surrogate corollary. The female manager seemed to wield less de facto power than her male colleagues.

1. The Candidates

Bachelet Michelle Bachelet is the daughter of Alberto Bachelet Martínez, a general who died under torture during the Pinochet dictatorship. After beginning her university education in Chile, she and her mother lived as exiles in Australia and then East Germany during the military regime. She returned to Chile in 1979, finished studying medicine and worked as a pediatrician. She also completed coursework in military affairs in Chile in the 1990s and then studied for one year at the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C. Like her predecessor President Ricardo Lagos, Bachelet served in powerful ministerial positions before winning the presidency. She emerged as a national politician in 2000 when Lagos named her Health Minister, and two years later, she became Latin America's first female Defense Minister.

Alvear Bachelet and Soledad Alvear attended the same all-girls high school, Liceo 1, in Santiago and studied law at the Universidad de Chile. Their political ideologies nevertheless diverged. While Bachelet was a socialist, Alvear pledged allegiance to the more socially conservative Christian Democrats Party (DC) when she was a teenager. Alvear pioneered women's presence in the executive branch throughout her career. Patricio Aylwin named her Chile's first National Women's Service (SERNAM) minister in 1991. She served in that role until 1994 when President Eduardo Frei named her Minister of Justice. Alvear rose to political stardom in part thanks to her leadership on major judicial reforms. As described in Chapter III, Alvear left this ministerial post in 1999 to serve as Ricardo Lagos' campaign manager. Upon his election, she became Chile's first female Secretary of State.

Lavín The one repeat candidate from the 1999-00 election was the UDI's Joaquín Lavín (See Chapter III for more on his political trajectory). After losing the presidency in 2000, Lavín became mayor of Santiago. He left that position in 2004 to launch another presidential candidacy. Lavín's loyal collaborators from 2000-2005, called "samuráis" for their dedication and hard work, included members of both the UDI and the RN.

Piñera The other competitive male candidate during the 2005 election was billionaire Sebastián Piñera who studied business at the Universidad Católica in Chile and later earned a Harvard PhD in Economics. He returned to Chile and amassed a fortune through a variety of businesses, including Chile's

largest airline LAN. Piñera voted "No" during the 1988 plebiscite and affiliated with the National

Renovation Party (RN), a center-right party. He served as senator from 1990-1998 and left the post to run

for president in 1999. He dropped out after failing to earn a popular following. Piñera entered the

presidential race in May 2005 once he realized that Lavín no longer was able to defeat the Concertación's

female candidate.

2. Constructing Core Constituencies

This section will first argue that Bachelet and Alvear strategically deployed their gender identity

and experiences as women in an attempt to establish trust and gain support from women voters (Ríos

Tobar 2008; Morales Quiroga 2008; Valdés 2010). The fact that both women targeted female voters early

on suggests that both perceived this demographic as a potential core constituency. Given that Alvear

dropped out early in the race, the chapter moves on to more deeply explore Bachelet's strategy and

success. Bachelet discursively highlighted her status as a single mother to relate directly to female voters,

gain their trust and ultimately their political support. I further contend that the PS candidate strategically

sought to portray herself as a stereotypically feminine leader, that is, distant from the parties, empathetic

and warm.

I then argue that Lavín and especially Piñera made fewer efforts to mobilize women on the basis

of gender identity and were less successful at maintaining their support. Much of the conventional

wisdom at the time suggests that thanks to her feminine public image, Bachelet attracted women who may

have been part of Lavín's core constituency, which he had amassed during the 1999 elections (although

not on the basis of gender identity, see Chapter III). Finally, Piñera cultivated a stereotypically masculine

image and towards the end of the campaign he made a few apparently unsuccessful attempts at

galvanizing women on the basis of gender identity. The observation that political elites believed Piñera's

stereotypically masculine image attracted male voters provides auxiliary evidence for the core

constituency argument.

2.1. Alvear and Bachelet Seek to Mobilize Women

By the end of 2002, Alvear—followed by Bachelet—topped the rankings of most popular Chilean politicians (Centro de Estudios Públicos 1999), and anecdotal evidence suggests that both were particularly popular among women early on. They tested their presidential viability while meeting Chilean citizens during the government's 2004 celebration of International Women's Day (Salinas 2004). The slogan for the celebrations was "And why not? Chile needs women's power (*fuerza de la mujer*)". Thus, the context was primed to draw attention to these women's achievements in breaking barriers for women in politics, and possibly, shattering Chile's highest glass ceiling: the presidency. In this sense, both women targeted female voters early on, months before the campaign season.

Bachelet on this occasion walked through downtown Valparaíso where she stopped to talk with children and voters. She evoked her motherhood by speaking about her own daughter (Salinas 2004). *El Mercurio* wrote that "it is not easy to approach her. The people do not leave her for one minute. They greet her, they take photos and they even ask for autographs, as if she were an elite athlete" (Salinas 2004). Bachelet's popularity, particularly among women, thus seemed to be building.

At another government-sponsored event to celebrate International Women's Day, both Bachelet and Alvear received warm ovations, but it was the socialist who reportedly won the "applause-meter" (*aplausómetro*) (Gálvez 2004). Women shouted out support for Bachelet, and there is no mention of men shouting out similarly. One DC leader, attempting to explain Bachelet's greater popularity, commented: "It seems that there were more women from the left." Yet, Alvear also generated vocal support from Chilean women. In the Plaza de la Constitución, dozens of female Liceo 1 alumni shouted "Feel it! Feel it! Sole President!" (*¡Se siente, se siente, la Sole Presidente!*) (Gálvez 2004). Thus, in the context of International Women's Day, both politicians attempted to shore up (particularly female) support by reminding Chileans of their status as women serving in the male-dominated arena of elite politics.

Alvear took advantage of other opportunities to enhance her approval among women. The following month, she visited a school in Santiago to participate in a program for low-income families (Marré V 2004). The smiling secretary of state was received by about a hundred boys and girls, who she kissed and had photos taken with. *El Mercurio* reported that this helped showcase her empathy and was

reminiscent of her time as SERNAM and later Justice Minister. Alvear then showed up at the school's gym where hundreds of women were waiting to see her. Newspaper accounts did not mention men in attendance, but emphasized the presence of Alvear's female supporters.

The press reported that Alvear was particularly skilled when interacting with women (Lagos V. 2004). This suggests that, at least in 2004, she not only was targeting women but also that she was successfully attracting more female than male support. In July of that year, she visited the town of Doñihue to meet with female artisans. *El Mercurio* journalist María Paz Lagos captured the sense of excitement among women upon Alvear's arrival. "At least in this town, we perceived 'feminine strength' (*fuerza femenina*). Almost spontaneously there emerged among those present a kind of pride for having a woman occupy a ministerial position and moreover for the possibility of having a *presidenta*," she wrote. "We are going to vote for a woman, that is clear," one of the female town-dwellers said (Lagos V. 2004). Alvear tried to directly relate to these female voters by speaking candidly about her children.

> I am always connected. I know exactly the day that one has a test or a job interview...Gutenberg (her son) is very well, in the fourth year of civil engineering at the Universidad Católica. He is a spectacular son, supportive and a very good brother. Maybe one of the strengths that is generated with a working mother is the link among the siblings (Lagos V. 2004).

Further highlighting her status as a mother, Alvear added that she would not become a grandmother soon because her oldest married daughter, Claudia, was finishing her PhD in economics in the U.S. "There are so many hours of studying and maternity is not yet in her plans. Thanks to email we are in contact various times a day" (Lagos V. 2004). Alvear therefore seemed to strategically discuss her private life as a working mother in order to better relate to and generate trust from the female artisans in attendance, and potentially, women readers of the *El Mercurio* article.

Yet despite these strategic attempts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity and the fact that she previously had led in the polls, Alvear could not stop Bachelet's growing electoral advantage. The DC candidate launched her campaign on January 15, 2005 and at the time was far behind her socialist counterpart (Reed 2005). The first poll conducted by Germines showed Bachelet at 71% compared to Alvear's 29%. Her DC campaign manager, Marcelo Trivelli, advised her to adopt a more

confrontational, and hence masculine approach, so she began to aggressively criticize Bachelet. One example of this occurred during the May 4 debate when Alvear accused Lavín of populism and Bachelet of indecision. This hardly helped. *El Mercurio* reported that by May 2005 Bachelet still outpaced her by similar numbers.

In sum, both Bachelet and Alvear sought votes from women by interacting with them and sharing their experiences as women. While both appeared relatively successful among female voters, Bachelet was more popular overall. She earned Concertación nomination by May 2005 when Alvear bowed out of the race.[iii]

Polling evidence supports the conventional wisdom that Bachelet performed better among women than among men early on in the campaign. The national June-July Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) poll, with a 2.7% margin of error, showed that 51% of Chilean women said they would vote for Bachelet while 45% of Chilean men said the same. Lavín enjoyed support from 23% of women and 21% of men—he therefore performed statistically even between the sexes. Piñera, however, earned the support of 13% of the women and 18% of the men and therefore performed comparatively better among men (Centro de Estudios Públicos 1999). The fact that Bachelet enjoyed a significant female gap this early in the campaign suggests that she perceived that women rather than men comprised some of her strongest supporters, in effect, her core constituency.

More evidence that women were believed to be Bachelet's strongest supporters comes from her campaign's organizational structure. Bachelet created "citizen networks," "a series of semi-autonomous support groups organized into a loosely coordinated structure that could provide logistical support" (Boas 2009, 132). Women for Bachelet (*Mujeres por Bachelet*) was the first of these networks to be created, and according to coordinator Nany Galleguillos, it also attracted the greatest membership, with 8,000 subscribing and anywhere from 3-4,000 in the capital region (2009, 132). Thus, female campaigners, organized around their identity as women, outnumbered other groups of Bachelet supporters, thereby contributing to Bachelet's perception that she was successfully mobilizing women on the basis of gender identity.

Yet in order to win an election, candidates need to perform well among both sexes, and Bachelet's team realized that their candidate's relative weakness was the male vote. At the end of November 2005, they considered giving Finance Minister Nicolás Ezyaguirre a more visible role in the campaign in order to draw more male voters (Faúndez and Canales 2005c). The specific motivation behind this move was that Ezyaguirre could potentially neutralize or counterbalance Piñera's economist businessman image, which was popular among male voters. *La Tercera* reported that Ezyaguirre had a similar background as Piñera since both studied at the Verbo Divino high school and were Harvard PhDs in economics. Those close to Ezyaguirre saw him as a potentially "attractive reference" for middle class men ages 30-45, which was the demographic from which Bachelet apparently had been losing votes (Faúndez and Canales 2005c). The idea that Ezyguirre could attract more men with relatively similar characteristics suggests a belief held among political elites that shared identity generates trust and hence political support. This is observation is consistent with the core constituency hypothesis.

Advice from another *concertacionista* further suggests worries about Bachelet's performance among men. Communications expert Eugenio Tironi reportedly told the Bachelet camp that she should soften the tone of her gender equality discourse and try to capture the male C2 (lower class) vote (*La Tercera* 2005n). These anecdotes underscore concern within Bachelet's team that her pro-women campaign was targeting and attracting so many women that it was alienating men, particularly those with more conservative gender ideologies.[iv]

Bachelet's female support was palpable on the first round election day. When she arrived to vote at the Colegio Verbo Divino, a group of women began to shout in her favor in front of voters and several media outlets (*La Tercera* 2005s). Looking back at Table 1, Bachelet, with 45.96% of the vote fell short of a majority. Lavín earned 23.23% and Piñera captured 25.41%. Bachelet nevertheless enjoyed key votes from women.[v] As described in Chapter III, conservative presidential candidates had enjoyed a female gap in every election in which women have been allowed to vote. Yet, in 2005, Bachelet enjoyed a small, but widely-noted female gap of 2.23%, and thereby became the Concertación's first presidential candidate in history to obtain more votes from women than from men. Piñera's gender gap favored men by 2.79%.

Lavín, earning about as many votes among women as among men, did not perform as well with the opposite sex as he had in the 1999-00 election.

An interview with Bachelet suggests that she interpreted the first-round results as an indication of her success in mobilizing a core constituency of women. *El Mercurio's* Raquel Correa asked her whether being a woman helped or hurt. "It was a factor that favored me," Bachelet replied. "I won all the women's precincts and I lost in all the men's precincts" (Correa 2005). She seemed to imply that being a woman can be an advantage in Chile where female voters outnumber the male voters: 479,190 more women than men voted in the first round of the presidential election. The premise of her comment rests on the belief prevalent among political elites that shared identity can generate votes.

Yet, the obvious downside was her relative lack of traction with male voters, and the media again picked up on this. About a week before the second round, a reporter asked her to comment on polls showing that Piñera was more popular with male voters. Male Bachelet supporters who heard the question began to shout "It's not like that. It's not like that" (Peña y Lillo and Gómez 2006).

Despite the good-hearted intentions from this group of men, it *was* like that: The conventional wisdom in Chile was that Bachelet tended to perform relatively worse among those of the opposite sex. But this did not stop her from capturing male votes in the end and decisively winning the second round, when partisan and ideological factors seemed more at work. As shown in Table 1 at the beginning of this chapter, Bachelet garnered 53.5% of the vote compared to Piñera's 46.5%, and in this second round, the gender gaps that traditionally characterized the division in the Chilean coalitions virtually vanished. Representing the left, Bachelet won 0.002% more male than female voters while Piñera, representing the right, won 0.42% more female voters than male. According to feminist political scientist Ríos Tobar's (2008) calculations, more than 100,000 women that previously had supported other candidates voted for Bachelet in the second round. Ríos Tobar describes how particular segments of the female population were particularly important to sealing Bachelet's victory.

> The difference resulted primarily from the support of two segments of the population that had previously not voted for the Concertación: women (especially from sectors traditionally leaning toward the right, such as rural and lower-middle class urban women) and voters from the traditional left who had remained

outside the governing coalition. Given the numerical power of the female vote, the support of women ultimately proved decisive…The massive street demonstrations following her triumph demonstrate that Bachelet's candidacy and victory resonated strongly with women. For an important percentage of women, gender identification took priority over traditional ideological preferences. '¡Vota Mujer! ("Vote woman!) took hold of the Chilean female imagination. (Ríos Tobar 2009, 35)

Bachelet campaign strategist, Francisco Javier Díaz described how her female constituency

helped secure an electoral victory. "We saw that we could continue growing among women, something

that we had believed would be impossible" (Gerber 2005, 46). National Renovation (RN) Deputy and

member of the Piñera campaign, Lily Pérez acknowledged Bachelet's strong female base and remarked

that, "Bachelet has the advantage of conquering the women's vote because it is very easy for many

women to identify with her because of the gender issue" (Estrada 2006). Shared gender identity was

thought to have played an unusually important role in this inter-gender campaign.

Complementing this qualitative analysis, results from modeling public opinion further bolsters

my argument that Bachelet, but not Lagos, perceived a core constituency of women. I used data from the

September/October and the June/July 2005 CEP surveys to model intention to vote in the first round for

Lagos in 1999 and Bachelet in 2005. Dependent variables are coded 1 if the respondent said he/she

intends to vote for the candidate, and 0 if the respondent said she or he intended to vote for another

candidate, did not intend to vote or intended to vote blank/null. Respondent *sex* is coded 1 for female and

0 for male. I included control variables *ideology*, *age*, *education* and *income* since they appear as major

voting determinants in the secondary literature and both surveys included questions capturing these

factors. Because the dependent variable is binary, I used logistic regression.

Table 2 displays the results. Respondent sex exerts a significant impact in both the models. Being

female decreased the likelihood of voting for Lagos, after controlling for ideology, age, education and

income. On the other hand, being female increased the likelihood of voting for Bachelet. Since the models

use logistic regression, the magnitude of coefficients cannot be directly interpreted from the table. I used

the margins commands in Stata to calculate marginal effects. Being female decreased the probability of

voting for Lagos by 5% while being female increased the probability of voting for Bachelet by 10%.

Table 2: Voter Sex and First-Round Vote Intention in Chile

	Lagos 1999	Bachelet 2005
Sex	**-0.28***	**0.56***
	(0.17)	**(0.16)**
Ideology	0.67***	0.94***
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Age	0.03***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Income	-0.01	-0.002
	(0.03)	(0.002)
N	812	933

***P<0.01 **P<0.05 *P<0.10

Notes: *Ideology* is coded on a 1 to 5 scale with lower numbers indicating more conservative ideologies and higher numbers indicating more progressive ideologies. *Age* captures the respondent's exact age (ranging from 18 to 98 years old). *Education* corresponds to the total number of years the respondent has studied. *Income* in 1999 is measured on a 1-14 scale where 1 corresponds to earning less than 90,000 Chilean pesos a month and 14 corresponds to earning more than 3,000,000 Chilean pesos a month; *income* in 2005 is measured on the same scale, but 1 corresponds to earning less than 35,000 Chilean pesos a month.

In sum, the fact that Bachelet, compared to her male predecessors, did well among women and worse among men suggests that women, particularly early in her campaign, were perceived to be her electoral base. The second round strategy was then to capture the centrist male vote, which, given her clear victory, she seemed to achieve. All of this leads to the conclusion that Bachelet viewed women (particularly low-income women as the rest of the chapter will show) as a core constituency. This analysis of Alvear's and Bachelet's mobilization of women voters therefore yields evidence in support of the core constituency hypothesis.

2.2. Bachelet's Strategy to Court Women and Win the Election

How was Bachelet able to mobilize women so effectively? One possible way was simply talking about them more. Her discourse during the campaign consistently evoked women. For example, *La Tercera* pointed out in its post-debate analysis that the concept "woman" was the one Bachelet employed the most during the debate (8 times), followed by inequality (7 times) (*La Tercera* 1999). For Lavín the most frequently used terms were "work/jobs" (*trabajo*) (6 times) and then "God" (4 times), and for Piñera, they were "center" (11 times) and "employment/jobs" (*empleo*) (4 times).

Incorporating "women" more in her discourse was only one aspect of a much grander strategy to cultivate a female following. I make two central arguments here. First, Bachelet repeatedly evoked her status as a single mother in order to established shared identities, trust and support from Chilean mothers. Second, she and her campaign team aimed to secure female votes by crafting a nuanced, gendered public image, also believed to have helped Bachelet solidify her core constituency of female voters.[vi] Bachelet strategically displayed a series of stereotypically feminine traits, each of which was unusual for a Chilean politician. In particular, she strove to appear distant from the parties, which given men's historical dominance of the political parties, is more associated with women than with men. She was also viewed as empathetic and warm, two stereotypically feminine traits, and she highlighted her experiences as a single mother in speeches, debates and campaign advertisements. I further contend that this gendered image was believed to be key to her successful mobilization of women as a historically marginalized group.[vii]

To begin, Bachelet's gendered image centered on her status as a single mother. I argue here that she purposefully deployed her single motherhood to paint herself as a political outsider, connect with Chileans and elicit trust and support primarily from women. Although her single motherhood seemed to appeal to a broad range of Chileans, discussing her own struggles in managing this role was seen as a strategy particularly to mobilize single, often low-income mothers who could directly identify with her.

In accordance with the core constituency hypothesis, Bachelet sought votes from single mothers early on. In April 2004, over a year before the official campaign season, she visited the El Arenal sector, home of many *Puente de Chile Solidario* program beneficiaries who happened to be single mothers. During this outing, Bachelet talked about how a friend had recently recalled an example of gender discrimination: for some political leaders the fact that she and Alvear were doing well was considered "a traffic accident," something unexpected that the women did not know how to handle (Marré V 2004). In this context, sharing a personal story of sexism was a way for her to personally identify with her targeted female constituents who may have also experienced *machismo* in their daily lives.

In addition to meeting with low-income single mothers and discussing sexism, Bachelet openly related challenges derived from her own experiences as a separated mother of three. Reporters assumed

114

Bachelet should feel culpable for not spending enough time with her children, or even neglecting them. "How do you handle the guilt involved in spending so little time with your 11-year-old daughter?" Bachelet responded in a way that allowed her to identify with other working mothers:

> I spend very little time with her and with my two older children, who are 20 and 25. I suppose I'm calm about it, because I feel that they've been educated on solid bases. With my youngest girl it hurts when she gets angry with me for how little we see each other, and when I get the impression that she doesn't need me, that she's learned to live without me. That's something I hate. The help that my mother's provided has been fundamental. When one works and is separated, the presence of another adult is crucial. … I will try to protect my loved ones, so that they aren't hurt because their mother is a public figure. (Staff 2004)

Like thousands of other separated or divorced mothers, Bachelet claimed to try to balance the enormous demands of work and family life. She again referred to her single motherhood in a 2002 *El Mercurio* interview. When asked about some of her past health problems, she replied "it could have been a serious problem within an undetermined amount of time. Since I have government responsibilities, and especially, because I am a single mother with three kids, I decided to not ignore it" (Correa 2002). She implied that she bore extra responsibility for her children because of her marital status.

Bachelet highlighted her single motherhood not only during interviews but also during some of the campaign's most high-profile moments. In her closing comments of the November 16 presidential debate, she declared:

> The first thing is that I am a woman of the middle class. I am a woman and moreover now I am a single mother and I have worked my whole life. … I go shopping at the supermarket, I go to leave my daughter at school, that is to say, effectively, I am a professional, I had opportunities to study and that is why I have been able to be a female doctor and have a dignified life…I know that as a woman people are going to be looking at me through a magnifying glass to see if I am doing it well or not, and I have a tremendous responsibility, not just with the people who vote for me, with those who believe in me, but also with the women of this country, to demonstrate also that women can do it… (Archivo Chile 2005)

This appeal to voters during one of the campaign's most watched events clearly centered on the candidate's identity as a woman. In addressing the Chilean public, Bachelet began with her identity as a woman and then layered on other gendered identities. She talked about her everyday activities as a middle class mother and about her profession as a female doctor. She also acknowledged that as a female politician, she faces double standards, a kind of gender discrimination. Thus, Bachelet sold herself to the Chilean public during this uniquely important moment by evoking multiple gendered identities: working mother, female doctor and potential victim of sexism.[viii]

115

Some candidates tried to spin Bachelet's maternal image as a vulnerability rather than an asset. After the October presidential debate, Piñera said that Bachelet behaved like a mother "who wanted to be very cozy (*acogedora*), and I felt like a father, that had to unite the family and propose solutions" (*La Tercera* 2005h). Here Piñera suggests that fathers, rather than mothers, are most capable of leading not only families but also entire nations (Thomas 2011).

Despite this criticism from the right, Bachelet's motherhood seemed an advantage that she more often tried to exploit rather than hide. The candidate presented an image of a typical single mother the day of the election's first round. She was seen food shopping at *Líder* supermarket dressed in "jeans and no makeup" (*La Tercera* 2005q). She reportedly loaded her groceries, drove herself home, and then made shrimp and salads for family and friends. Bachelet explained how her family influenced her policy priorities at the end of December 2005.

> For me, family is central. And I am going to make all the effort to support it strongly with better housing, a more dignified life. To have a good family you need bigger housing, transportation that allows people to spend more time at home, to construct community. But, also, the Chilean family today is not one kind of family. I have a nice family. I am a single mother with three children, with my mother being very close. There are traditional families, others that are monoparental. I bet on the family, but on all kinds of families, and hopefully they stay together (Correa 2005).

I so far have argued that in evoking her status as a single mother in public speeches, national interviews and presidential debates, Bachelet discursively used this aspect of her public persona to connect with other Chilean single mothers, generate their trust and secure their votes. Another of the most salient aspects of Bachelet's public image was the notion that she emerged from the people, rather than from the elites. I argue here that as a "citizen candidate," she appeared "close to the people" and "distant from the political parties" thereby breaking the mold of the typical male politician who rose to power via the political parties.[ix] Her strategy thus overlapped with that of Lavín in 1999-00 (see Chapter III), but the fact that she was female may have helped make her self-marketing more credible, thereby solidifying this gendered component of her public persona.

Scholarly accounts of Alvear's and then Bachelet's emergence as 2005 presidential candidates emphasize bottom-up dynamics and the role of public surveys beginning in 2002 (Morales Quiroga 2008;

Ríos Tobar 2008).[x] Bachelet insinuated her presidential ambitions in a September 2002 interview when she suggested that Chile was ready to elect its first *presidenta*. "I imagine a woman in any place. Also in La Moneda (Chile's presidential palace). Why not?" (Correa 2002). When asked about the origins of the "Bachelet phenomenon," the candidate replied:

> I believe that I appear in the rankings because to many people the possibility (of a woman president) seems novel to them. This surged in August, with the CEP survey…but what is ignored is a substantive fact and I don't know if I am very innocent in saying this…but this 'phenomenon that irrupted' because in that survey, for the first time, they included me in the options. Go see what would have happened if they had put me (on the list) before. (Correa 2002)

This excerpt reveals how Bachelet tried to paint herself not only as a citizen candidate but also as a first *woman* president. The fact that she had been omitted from the surveys underscores the notion that she emerged from the people rather than from the elite who allegedly sought to exclude her. She also seemed to allude to yet another instance of sexism on the part of the political establishment. She therefore strategically described herself as a citizen candidate and as a woman who had defied the political establishment. She further expounded on the origins of her popularity by pointing to her stereotypically feminine characteristics:

> I believe that the phenomenon (so-called 'Bachelet phenomenon') that exists is that the population wants people who are close, kind, non-confrontational, who only confront when necessary....The people in the street have called me: hard-working, responsible, and I believe that it has to do with as well an underestimation of politics: that in some way, they do not see us as very political (Correa 2002).

"Political" in this context holds a negative connotation as it relates to political parties which were facing high rejection rates.[xi] These polls suggest that Bachelet's attempt to appear as a "citizen candidate" and distant from the parties and their leaders—much like Lavín in 1999 (see Chapter III)—was highly strategic and calculated.[xii]

Aside from discourse about her political emergence, Bachelet set out to build this component of her image through "citizen dialogs," which began a few months before the primary season (Bachelet 2005). In December 2004, Bachelet said in a radio interview that she would create a platform by listening to people (Garrido 2004). The implication was that unlike the political parties, Bachelet cared about citizens' demands.[xiii xiv]

117

In August 2005, Bachelet unveiled her "I am with You" (*Estoy Contigo*) slogan (*La Tercera* 2005d). "If I am elected *presidenta* I want to be a governor on the side of the people who do not have power," she announced.[xv] Her *franja electoral* furthered her goal to portray herself as an unconventional politician: that is, a female who was distant from the parties (Riquelme 2005). Kicking off on October 11, 2005,[xvi] Bachelet's *franja* was designed to highlight her "citizen profile" and her presidential capabilities. According to news reports, the Bachelet camp aimed to show their candidate on the ground interacting with citizens.

Bachelet's efforts at crafting an image as a "citizen candidate" who was "close to the people" and "distant from the parties" seemed to work. A Timesearch poll conducted in April 2005 showed that 77% of voters believed Bachelet was the candidate who was "closest to the people" (Trujillo 2005). A CEP June-July 2005 poll, with a margin of error of 2.7%, found that 53% of women and 50% of men believed Bachelet was "closest to the people." Thus slightly more women believed Bachelet possessed this quality.[xvii]

Political analysts in 2005 also identified gendered elements in Bachelet's persona. Describing her popular appeal, Robert Mur observed that she "sells a political image of close to the people, charismatic, which is based more on her femininity…" (Mur 2005). Public opinion expert Marta Lagos wrote that Bachelet "symbolized" alternance among the political elite (Lagos 2005). New elites, according to Lagos, emerged from the "popular" way, or via public opinion, and these new elites included leaders with unconventional social identities, such as indigenous presidents (Morales in Bolivia) and presidents from the working class (Lula in Brazil). According to Lagos, being a woman was another unconventional social identity reinforcing Bachelet's status as a political outsider (Faúndez and Canales 2005b). [xviii] [xix]

In short, Bachelet crafted a multi-faceted, gendered image of an atypical female presidential candidate who cared about ordinary citizens' struggles. Although "close to the people" is not a "feminine" trait according to the mainstream research on gender stereotypes, in the context of Chilean politics at the time, it did have a gendered connotation because men had historically dominated politics—particularly

presidential and party politics. Being a woman was an unusual social identity for a politician, thereby allowing her to credibly distance herself from the political parties.

In addition to appearing "close to the people," Chilean political analysts believed Bachelet broke the mold of conventional male leadership by emphasizing her empathy and warmth. Many analysts and politicians commented on Bachelet's empathy. *El Mercurio* ascribed her rise in the polls by April 2004 to her ability to transmit this trait through the mass media (*El Mercurio* 2004b). In an August 2005 interview, former President Aylwin applauded the socialist candidate for her empathetic demonstrations. "She has an empathy that has generated a very strong hook" (Alamo 2005a). These traits, while stereotypically feminine, are hardly exclusive to females. As shown in Chapter III, Lavín was deemed the most empathetic and warm candidate during the all-male presidential competition in 1999. However, Bachelet, claiming this title for herself, was believed to siphon off some of Lavín's female core constituency during the 2005-06 race.

Polling evidence backs the argument that Bachelet outperformed her competitors as the most empathetic candidate. An August 2005 La Tercera-Feedback poll showed that she surpassed Piñera and Lavín on virtually all positive attributes. Empathy was the most remarkable characteristic voters attributed to her (*La Tercera* 2005c). This trait was tightly connected to her "close to the people" image, and analysts believed her empathy enabled her to understand and channel Chileans' demands.[xx] Thus, while empathy was believed to especially attract women voters, it also appealed to some men.[xxi xxii]

2.3. Women as Change Agents: "Me gana porque es mujer"

Building on the preceding analysis of Bachelet's gendered public image, I argue in her that her emergence as a female agent of political change contributed to Lavín's failure to advance past the first round, and consequently helped her reach La Moneda. Lavín and Bachelet battled for the title of the "change" candidate during the 2005 campaigns.[xxiii] According to much of the conventional wisdom of the time, Bachelet siphoned off some of Lavín's female core constituency by outperforming him as a female "change" candidate with an empathetic, warm and non-confrontational—that is, stereotypically

feminine—leadership style. Thus, Bachelet's strategy may not have only helped her successfully mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, but also win the presidency.

To begin, many analysts noted years before the race that Lavín's and Bachelet's styles overlapped: both aimed to portray themselves as close to the people, distant from the parties, empathetic, warm and nonconfrontational. *El Mercurio's* Raquel Correa asked Bachelet in a 2002 interview: "And to compete with an atypical male candidate such as Lavín is a good idea for an atypical female candidate, as it would be a woman?" (Correa 2002). Correa implied that Lavín and Bachelet shared qualities that were unconventional for Chilean politicians, and they therefore were competing for the same political turf. In early 2004 as Bachelet surpassed Alvear and Lavín in the polls, *El Mercurio* wrote that the "Bachelet phenomenon" represented a "lavinization" (*lavínización*) of the Concertación (*El Mercurio* 2004b).

What did a "lavínization" mean? For one, Bachelet soon became the "change agent" that Lavín had been during the 1999 campaigns. Despite her status as the incumbent party's candidate, she was a female in the male-dominated political world with an unconventionally feminine leadership style and thus represented change. Lavín was fighting "against change that implies electing a woman" by May 2004 (Errázuriz L 2004).[xxiv] The "Lavínization" of the Concertación also referred to the fact that women had historically voted for more conservative candidates, but come 2005, both Lavín and Bachelet seemed to maintain a core constituency of female voters. In June 2005, Pepe Auth of Fundación Chile 21 declared that the entrance of young people and women favored Bachelet (*El Mercurio* 2005a). However, Andrés Tagle, an electoral expert linked to the Lavín campaign, recalled that in the 1999 presidential race the UDI contender performed better among young people and women as well. "They voted for Lavín, not for Lagos," he said. The female vote thus was a point of contention between the candidates.

Lavín's reaction to Bachelet accords with my constituency theory. Perceiving her as a threat, he made greater attempts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, in particular, by enlisting female surrogates.[xxv] Lavín's most important response to the Bachelet threat was to make female leaders more visible in his campaign (Errázuriz L 2004). This decision was again based on the premise that female politicians attract women, and one of Lavín's advisers said that naming a woman as his campaign

120

manager would "break with the axis of the 2005 presidential election that it is a matter of gender, that is to say, that they will have to choose between a man and a woman" (Errázuriz L 2004).[xxvi]

Lavín tapped Cristina Bitar as his *generalísima* at the end of February 2005.[xxvii] "She is a great woman...and she is going to give a new, innovative and participative style to this presidential campaign," he announced (Aránguiz 2005). RN Deputy Alberto Cardemil and political scientist Patricio Navia remarked that one of Bitar's obvious assets was that at the age of 35, she was a "young woman," suggesting that she could help capture two key demographics: youth and women. Yet Bitar, the niece of Lagos' Education Minister, was believed to be a daring choice given her dearth not only of ties to the conservative parties, but also her overall lack of political experience (*El Mostrador* 2016).[xxviii]

Despite his efforts, Lavín seemed to fear he was not as popular with women as he had been before.[xxix] One example of his diminished appeal among politically interested women took place during a public discussion on gender in October 2005. The women's organization Comunidad Mujer organized a *seminario* entitled "Women's Voice" in which all major candidates participated. The main headline of the event was that women shouted protests against Lavín as he spoke. When it was her turn at the microphone, Bachelet, who reportedly enjoyed the most support from the attendees, remarked "Joaquín Lavín has been very brave because it has not been easy for him to stand up here with so many impetuous women, full of desire to say what they think. I want to ask for an applause for him, because he has been very brave among so many women" (P. Durán, Diaz, and Olavarría 2005).

Although Bachelet's remarks may have appeared cordial, they actually helped demarcate an "us vs. them" dynamic that reinforced her own connection to the women in attendance. Her comments drew attention to the fact that Lavín was male and—by assumption—likely to be uncomfortable speaking in front of so many of the opposite sex. Bachelet thus implied that since she was a woman, she would be more at ease in front of the women-dominated audience. *La Tercera* pointed out in its coverage of the event that Lavín had obtained the majority of support from women in 1999 and thus it was essential for him to grow in this demographic, which Bachelet reportedly had conquered.[xxx]

121

Many political analysts believed that Bachelet outperformed Lavín as the change agent. In August 2005, pollster Martín Rodríguez was asked how she was able to capture much of Lavín's political support.[xxxi] According to Rodríguez, Bachelet had "the most valued good in the political market, trust. Just as shown in the polls, the other candidates do not compete with her on integrity and empathy. Her political purpose and her values are clear and are not questioned. That is central for understanding her current positioning" (De la Maza 2005). Bachelet, as the new change agent, thus demonstrated stereotypically feminine qualities of "coziness" and empathy. Political opinion makers began to believe that Chileans trusted this new change candidate more than Lavín.[xxxii]

2.4. Piñera: Masculine Candidate Attracting Men

In contrast to Bachelet and Lavín, billionaire businessman Piñera honed a highly masculine public image (*La Tercera* 2005r).[xxxiii] Masculine aspects of Piñera's public image were believed to have earned him more male than female support.

Political communications expert Eugenio Tironi elaborated on Piñera's gendered image. Tironi wrote that his personality fit best with the model that people usually have in mind when they envision a president: "strong, energetic, audacious, a winner and of course, a man" (Tironi 2005). He argued that Piñera's new slogan "Chile Wants More. Piñera, More President" (*Chile Quiere Más. Piñera, Más Presidente*) reflected the campaign's awareness that Piñera's masculine image was deemed presidential. Tironi further pointed out that his stereotypically masculine public persona contrasted with Bachelet's "feminine" image, which her critics portrayed negatively as "passive, modest and weak" (Tironi 2005).

Yet, other observers pointed out that Piñera's "masculine" persona and business background also hurt him. Some viewed him as always calculating how to maximize not only his economic utilities but also his political utilities, and he therefore could come off as ambitious, cold and unemotional.[xxxiv] Analysts from the right believed that Piñera needed to soften his masculine image to seem more humane.

Given Piñera's masculine public image, political elites seemed to expect him to perform better among males. The logic behind this was that shared traits among men would allow them to better relate to

the RN candidate. Polls helped confirm this interpretation: Bachelet and Lavín tended to do well among female voters while Piñera performed better among men (Donoso 2005).[xxxv]

The first- and second-round election results also support the argument that Piñera energized more men than women. We might expect Piñera, like all previous conservative presidential candidates in Chile, to obtain a female gap. Yet, according to Table 1 at the beginning of the chapter, the RN candidate in the first round won 2.78% more of the male vote than of the female vote. In the second round, voters were only given two choices—a conservative and a left-leaning option— and thus partisan and ideological factors seemed more powerful. Yet, going against strong historic trends, Piñera's gender gap was virtually nil. He captured 0.42% more of the female vote than the male vote.

To conclude, this section provided additional evidence that female contenders are more likely than their male counterparts to go after women's votes. While male candidates from both parties also courted female voters, they made it a secondary strategic consideration rather than central campaign focus. Lavín feared Bachelet was siphoning off his core constituency, so he responded by deploying a female surrogate to court women. His new female campaign manager, surrounded by male campaign leaders, nevertheless ending up losing much of her de facto power.

Bachelet, on the other hand, appeared to calculate that women could serve as a core constituency and she therefore targeted them early on. She pursued voters—particularly women—by strategically leveraging her gender in three ways: 1) connecting directly with female voters on the basis of her experiences as a woman operating in a male-dominated, *machista* environment; 2) emphasizing her identity as a single mother to directly connect with other single mothers and deepen perceptions of her political outsider status; 3) shaping perceptions of what it meant to be a "change" candidate by linking it to her feminine leadership style and the historic nature of her candidacy as a woman.

Extensive evidence from newspaper archives, public opinion polls and analysis by political observers and scholars at the time demonstrate that both female candidates—Bachelet and Alvear— targeted women early and consistently during the 2005-06 presidential race. Alvear then bowed out of the

race after falling in the polls. Bachelet's feminine leadership style subsequently was believed to especially attract female voters.

I then built on Chapter III's argument that Lavín's image as a depoliticized politician with stereotypically feminine attributes contributed to his female gap. I contended that according to the conventional wisdom of the time, Bachelet was able to match Lavín on his characteristic strengths—close to the people and empathetic—but she also was a single mother. This aspect of her image allowed her to speak of her own experiences as a single mother and thus directly relate to this voter demographic; and solidify her status as a political outsider. Positioned to become Chile's first *presidenta,* Bachelet thus was thought to have become 2005's new change candidate.

Due to Lavín's first round loss, Bachelet went on to compete head-to-head against Piñera who cultivated a stereotypically masculine public image. Bachelet performed better among women than Lagos had while Piñera performed far better among men than Lavín had in 1999. This suggested that a significant subset of female voters was disproportionately attracted to the female candidate with stereotypically feminine traits. Conversely, a significant subset of male voters was disproportionately attracted to the male candidate with stereotypically masculine traits.

3. Promises to Women

The kinds of promises candidates make provides clues of audience they are targeting (core constituency) and the policy expertise to which they have access (personal constituency). This section evaluates the extent to which presidential candidates tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity by promising PWC.[xxxvi] A review of each candidate's platform as well as newspaper accounts of their PWC pledges in speeches and interviews reveals that Bachelet make a greater number of and more ambitious PWC promises than Lavín and Piñera during the 2005-06 race. This suggests she not only targeted women more than her male counterparts on the basis of gender identity, but also that elite feminists held greater influence in her campaign.

Bachelet Bachelet laid out 40 PWC pledges throughout her 100-page "Estoy Contigo" platform (Bachelet 2005). Due to the large quantity of PWC proposals, I highlight the most ambitious ones that garnered the most attention during the 2005-06 campaign: parity, preschools and pensions. Bachelet promised early on to appoint an equal number of female and male ministers to her cabinet. Some analysts have interpreted this pledge as radically feminist and as evidence of her feminist consciousness. It is true that the promise was a radical one in the sense that no Latin American president had yet named a gender parity cabinet, and Bachelet likely did possess a feminist consciousness. I nevertheless argue that her gender parity promise was a calculated move motivated by the prospect of electoral gain.

Focus groups revealed that Chileans disliked the fact that Concertación presidents had always appointed people with the "same names" (*La Tercera* 2005a). Chileans sought new leadership, not only from their next president, but also from their ministers who she or he would appoint. As a response to this generalized sentiment, one of Bachelet's signature promises was that "no one go for seconds" (*nadie se repite el plato*).[xxxvii] She echoed versions of the "new faces" pledge in multiple high-profile events (*La Tercera* 2005f).[xxxviii]

The now famous gender parity pledge was strategically embedded within this "new faces" promise (Franceschet 2015; For more on Bachelet's parity promise, see Chapter VII's case study). Gender parity in her cabinet did not appear in her "36 Measures for the First 100 Days" document, but it was a promise that she planned to implement in the first 100 days, that she highlighted throughout her campaign and that generated substantial media commentary. The socialist candidate reportedly believed that gender parity responded to Chileans' desire for "new faces." As this dissertation's constituency argument would expect, the gender parity pledge was not derived solely from Bachelet's own feminist preferences. Bachelet in an interview emphasized that the promise was not intended as a feminist challenge.

> I am very realistic. That's why, when I spoke of having a parity administration, it is not to raise a flag of women's fight. I am betting on giving space to new people. Tradition is very good. This is not a total change, but there are things we can do differently … before it was unthinkable to have a woman candidate...I want to deconcentrate power. Not just in the economic realm, but also in the political (Alamo 2005b).

"New faces" and gender parity may be a reaction to the general public's desire for political renewal. However, the direct beneficiaries would not be lower or middle class women, but elite women with ministerial ambitions. The gender parity pledge thus also helped Bachelet win the loyalty of elite feminists, some of whom served as personal constituents.[xxxix] Bachelet's other major PWC promises— preschools and pensions—did directly target this other subset of women.

Other prominent PWC promises formalized in Bachelet's platform centered on early childhood education, especially preschools. "We will implement a system of childhood protection destined to equal opportunities for the development of Chilean children in their first eight years of life…" (pg. 13). She specifically pledged to "guarantee kindergarten access to all children." She proposed building preschools as a way to fight crime, consistently a top public concern in Chile (*El Mercurio* 2005b).[xl] More importantly, preschools would enable mothers with small children to work outside them home and thus would directly benefit this subset of women voters.

Another centerpiece of *Estoy Contigo* (Staab 2016), social security reform was promised to "be the principal social reform that we will push forward in the next administration" (29). In an interview with *La Tercera,* former President Frei also confirmed Bachelet's commitment to social security: "Michelle Bachelet has said that one of her principal tasks is pension reform" (Alamo 2005c). Her platform called for eliminating discrimination against women in the pension system and for rectifying the system's gaps for independent workers and "especially women and young people" (pg. 28). Her platform offered few specifics because her plan was to create a presidential commission, which in turn would propose concrete ways to revamp the system.[xli]

Yet, it is also important to mention PWC promises that Bachelet refused to make. Chile in 2005 was still one of the few countries in the world with a complete abortion ban. Due to pressure from the powerful Catholic Church, Bachelet, like Lagos, opted out of promising to send Congress abortion bills (Waldo Diaz 2005b).[xlii] Those in her campaign said her "values agenda" would be limited to teen pregnancy, artificial fertilization and health campaigns conducted via Catholic channels.[xliii] Assuming Bachelet possessed a feminist consciousness and given her medical expertise (see Chapter II), it is most

likely that she personally preferred to legislate on these issues. Indeed, a feminist consciousness explanation, this dissertation's primary counter-argument, would predict that she would legislate on women's reproductive rights. However, consistent with my argument's emphasis on strategic calculation and constituency incentives to pursue PWC, she avoided these issues. Promising to alter the status quo on abortion could have jeopardized her electoral chances by upsetting key sources of support, namely socially conservative center-left voters from the DC.

Bachelet nevertheless calculated that she could promote access to the morning after pill, despite the fact that many Catholic leaders believed using this drug constituted abortion.

> In my platform abortion is not there to solve problems of undesired pregnancies, and in my administration I'll do everything I can for the education of responsible maternity and paternity. I find the increase in pregnancies among girls between 12 and 14 years old tremendously worrying. We must have public policies to take care of these issues. As a doctor, I support anticonception programs, among those is the morning after pill because I am convinced that it is not abortive. In my administration, I will emphasize prevention, not just anticonceptive but also natural methods (Correa 2005).

In sum, Bachelet designed three of her primary PWC pledges to target diverse groups of women voters. She pledged to name a gender parity cabinet, which could directly benefit women in politics and please organized women; to advance pension reform, which would assist low-income women; and to promote access to the morning after pill, which could particularly help low-income women avoid an unwanted pregnancy.

Unlike Bachelet, the male candidates on the right promised little PWC during the 2005-06 campaigns. This suggests not only that they did not make significant efforts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, but it also suggests a relative lack of elite feminist influence within their campaigns. Although Lavín's and Piñera's platforms included eight and nine PWC pledges, respectively, newspaper archives do not reveal evidence that the candidates explicitly promoted more than two of these on the campaign trail. Both male candidates emphasized a similar PWC promise: pensions for stay-at-home mothers. Lavín also resurrected his 1999 pledge to expand childcare so that low-income mothers could more easily work outside the home. In this sense, Lavín's PWC promises echoed Bachelet's, but as shown in the previous section, the Concertación candidate promised a far broader range of PWC pledges.

127

I show here that instead of promoting the few PWC promises recorded in their platforms, the male candidates appealed to women's alleged conservative values and roles as wives and mothers in traditional, nuclear families in order to mobilize female voters.

Lavín The UDI contender reportedly realized that he had to incorporate attractive PWC proposals in order to maintain the female support that he had captured in the 1999-00 elections (Errázuriz L 2004). His 51-page platform, described as a "summary" of his intentions, included eight PWC pledges, many of which sounded similar to his 1999 proposals as well as Bachelet's 2005 platform: to promote women's employment by facilitating part-time and at-home work (pg. 20); to create the program "Women Work Calmly" (*Mujer Trabaja Tranquila*) to allocate municipal resources to finance childcare workers to go to the homes of low-income, working mothers to take care of their children during the day (pg. 31); to expand the pre-existing pension system to include 32,000 more women over the age of 60 (pg. 32); to offer pensions to stay-at-home mothers (pg. 37); to create subsidies for after-school programs which could assist working mothers (pg. 44); to make maternity leave more flexible (pg. 44); to enforce child support laws (pg. 44); and to prevent intrafamily violence (pg. 44).

Lavín seemed to pedal only two of these PWC promises on the campaign trail. Targeting one of his core constituencies of low-income women, leftover from his 1999 campaign, his main promise to women was a pension for stay-at-home mothers (*La Tercera* 2005m).[xliv] Lavín's broader plan to "re-enchant" Chilean women was partly based on the (perhaps misconstrued) idea that women tend to be more socially conservative than Bachelet (Phillip Durán 2005). Lavín thus emphasized his opposition to gay marriage and abortion toward the end of the campaign.

Piñera The National Renovation (RN) candidate's 147 page platform included nine PWC promises: to create a Childcare Workers Program in which municipalities would choose qualified women to take care of working mothers' children during the day (pg. 20-21); allow women to distribute their maternity leave weeks before and after birth as they choose (pg. 21); to give women the option of extending their maternity leaves (pg. 21); offer pensions for stay-at-home mothers (pg. 21); give women one more year of retirement benefits for every child (pg. 22); allow mothers more control over their

retirement benefits (pg. 22); create a Local Shelter Group (*Grupo de Acogida Local*) to prevent and attend to intrafamily violence (pg. 22); protect girls and boys from sexual abuse (pg. 23); help women finish their education (pg. 23).[xlv]

Consistent with the argument that Piñera did not perceive women as a potential core constituency, he did not try to mobilize them on the basis of gender identity early on in the campaign. Piñera instead waited until the second round to promote his PWC promises on the campaign trail to capture more female support. Speaking directly to women at an event during the final campaign weeks, he touted his retirement proposal for housewives and highlighted his Christian humanistic values (Peña y Lillo and Gómez 2006). "Who is going to give more jobs to your husbands, to you yourselves, to your children? Who will give you more tranquility and security by attacking crime? Who will give retirement to stay-at-home mothers?" Piñera thereby evoked women's traditional roles as wives and mothers concerned with their family's employment, physical safety as well as the preservation of traditional values. This is the only archival evidence I found that suggests that Piñera in any way tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity.

This section reveals. that Bachelet promises more PWC than her male competitors. This general finding not only suggests that Bachelet made greater attempts than their male counterparts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity (core constituency)—it also speaks to the strong influence of elite feminists within the Bachelet campaign and a weak or even nonexistent influence within the male candidates' campaigns (personal constituency). The next section will systematically probe the personal constituency hypothesis: given elite feminists' desire to promote women in politics and the recurrent phenomenon of gender homophily, female candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to network with elite feminists and other female politicians.

4. Personal Constituencies and Campaign Teams

Chapter II defined "personal constituents" as elite advisers and/or confidants who may provide emotional support, political or technical expertise. These constituents may be bona fide friends.[xlvi] I

129

argued that the personal constituencies of female presidential candidates will feature a greater proportion of elite feminists. Furthermore, in light of men's historical political domination, female's campaign networks will feature more—but not necessarily a majority of—women.[xlvii]

I argue that there are two reasons why men acted prominently in Bachelet's campaign team. First, her intimate friends, who seemed to influence her political views and career, included several powerful socialist male leaders. Second, like Lagos in the 1999-00 election, Bachelet had to manage a coalition of parties in order to secure the presidency, and men controlled these parties—particularly the socially conservative Christian Democratic Party (DC).

Bachelet's personal constituency included numerous elite feminists who seemed to shape her political views, campaign strategy and policy proposals in diverse ways. Moreover, Bachelet, in opening up spaces for women, incorporated an unprecedented number of them in her campaign team. In contrast, both men almost completely dominated Lavín's and Piñera's personal networks and campaign teams and neither male campaign included elite feminists.

4.1. Bachelet's Task: Incorporate (Male-Dominated) Coalition Parties

One of the most prominent members of Bachelet's personal constituency and her campaign was former Labor Minister Ricardo Solari, a socialist who she had known since adolescence (*La Tercera* 2005a). "I lived during the period of Socialist Youth, which Carlos Lorca led. That is where I met Michelle Bachelet. We were always very critical of the left" (*Capital* 2014). Solari, described as the "campaign brain", led Bachelet's campaign until the first round (Canales and Salaberry 2005). The press described Solari as one of her "closest" advisers (Waldo Diaz 2005a).

Another key member of Bachelet's personal constituency was Socialist Deputy Camilo Escalona. They also met in the Socialist Youth where she gave him classes on Marxist economics and philosophy. In 1996, Escalona convinced her to run against Lavín for the mayorship of Las Condes and then campaigned with her. He and Bachelet met "secretly" in an office in Morandé Street in downtown Santiago during her run for president (Faúndez and Canales 2005a). They also frequently spoke on the phone and she asked him for political advice on a regular basis.

Bachelet held daily meetings with a "*petit comité*" group that made strategic decisions. Men constituted the majority of participants, but at least one woman was also present (Waldo Diaz 2005a). Members included Solari, Socialist Carlos Montes and Party for Democracy (PPD) Carolina Tohá, an elite feminist who served along with Montes as a spokesperson.

Ricardo Lagos Weber later joined the *petit comité* meetings. His relative youth earned him the label of a "new face" despite the fact that he was male and President Lagos' son (Faúndez 2005). He demonstrated significant political potential, but decided against running for deputy and instead joined the Bachelet campaign in August 2005.[xlviii][xlix] Solari and Lagos Weber—who also were personal friends that celebrated birthdays together and held common tastes in music—shared an office positioned directly in front of Bachelet's at the campaign headquarters in Providencia (Faúndez 2005). Thus Bachelet's campaign leadership at times appeared male dominated because her personal constituency included powerful male Concertación leaders who tended to attract substantial media attention.

Another reason why men appeared numerous in the Bachelet camp was her imperative to manage a coalition of parties in which men constituted the overwhelming majority of leaders. Bachelet had to name men to her campaign leadership team in order to secure the parties' backing of her candidacy. An *El Mercurio* interview with PPD Vice President Jorge Schaulsohn expounds on the necessity and demands of coalition rule. The journalist asked whether Bachelet needed the political parties to participate in her campaign. Schaulsohn's answer was unequivocal:

> Yes. That idea that the candidates don't need parties in a democracy is not true. Now Bachelet as a candidate is much more than the parties—let's not forget that the PS, PPD and the PRSD together do not arrive at 15% and she is between 45 and 50%—but the issue of an election is not just winning, it is also governing. A candidate can win without needing the parties, but will never be able to govern without them (Salinas 2005).

Bachelet, like Lagos in the 1999-00 race had to cultivate a solid relationship with the DC, still the Concertación's largest party. To this end, she named several DC members to top campaign posts (Waldo Diaz 2005a). After negotiating with DC leader Adolfo Zaldívar in August 2005, Bachelet named about a dozen new campaign members, the majority of whom were male Christian Democrats (Navia 2005a). DC Deputy Jaime Mulet was placed in charge of operations and deemed one of the most powerful members

of the campaign. Furthermore, when Bachelet reconfigured her campaign team after the first round, all the

leaders cited by *El Mercurio* were men: Adolfo Zaldívar, Mariano Ruiz-Esquide, Eduardo Frei, Andrés

Zaldívar, Jorge Pizarro and Rafael Moreno (Campusano S. 2005).

4.2. The Presence and Influence of Elite Feminists

Even though much of Bachelet's personal constituency and campaign leadership was male,

another influential component of her personal constituency was made up of elite feminists. Moreover, she

opened doors for politically ambitious women by establishing near parity in her campaign team.

Following Chapter II, I define elite feminists by their social position and efforts to reverse women's

exclusion from the public sphere.[1] When they participate in candidates' personal constituencies, they

increase the likelihood that candidates will promise significant PWC. Because elite feminists by

implication seek the advancement of women in politics, they are more likely to support and seek contact

with viable female rather than male candidates.

To begin, who are the elite feminists in Chile? Many participated in women's groups who fought

for democracy during the military dictatorship in the 1980s, and thus many, but not all, are linked to the

left (Ríos Tobar, Godoy Catalán, and Guerrero Caviedes 2004). These organizations staged protests

against the military regime and negotiated the creation of Chile's National Women's Service (SERNAM)

with the Patricio Aylwin government in 1991. One of the most important of these organizations that

promoted human rights along with concerns particular to women is "Women for Life" (*Mujeres por la

Vida*).

Some of Chile's elite feminists—all of whom happened to be women—met Bachelet at different

moments of her life. These women appeared to influence the socialist candidate, her presidential

campaign and her policy proposals in diverse and powerful ways. Archives from the Museo de la

Memoria show that among the leaders of the pro-democracy women's movement were Bachelet's mother,

Angela Jeria de Bachelet, along with María Estela Ortiz de Parada, Graciela Borquez, Ricardo Lagos'

wife Luisa Durán, and Teresa Valdés (Acevedo 1986, 44; Montaner 2006, 40). Given their experiences as

social leaders during the 1980s women's movement, each of these figures fits this dissertation's definition of an elite feminist.

Bachelet's purported "best" friend, María Estela Ortiz de Parada is well-known in Chile for denouncing the death of her husband, José Manuel Parada, by Pinochet police (DICOMAR) members in the famous "Beheaded Case" (*Caso Degollados*) in 1985 (Guzmán Bravo and Rojas Donoso 2005; Politzer 2010; Navia 2013; Quiroga 2013; Valdés 2013)**.** Parada was working for the Vicaria de Solidaridad in Chile, which provided assistance to Pinochet victims. Like Bachelet whose father died under torture in the 1970s, Ortiz suffered the disappearance of her father during the same time period and thus shared similarly traumatic life experiences. Ortiz and Borquez were both leaders of "Women for Life."

First lady Luisa Durán also enjoyed a very close relationship with Bachelet beginning when Bachelet was named Health Minister in 2000 (*La Tercera* 2005l). Teresa Valdés, director of the Observatorio de Género y Equidad and sociologist at the Universidad Católica, is one of Chile's most respected and prolific feminist scholars.

Some activists from the 1980s became politicians who Bachelet knew through the political parties. For example, Deputy Carolina Tohá also participated in the pro-democracy women's movement, having signed the 1988 document "The Democratic Demands of Women" (*Las demandas de las mujeres a la democracia*), a proposal presented to political parties to create a government body tasked with promoting gender equality.

Elite feminists in Chile are not limited to this relatively small group of pro-democracy women's movement leaders documented in archives from the 1980s. María Angélica Alvarez, called la "Jupi," reportedly had a history of opposing the dictatorship and defending human rights, but does not appear in the 1980s archives. Alvarez was linked to the DC and not the Socialist Party like Bachelet, and they met in the Health Ministry in 1994 (Canales and Faúndez 2005). Bachelet was an adviser in primary care and Jupi was in charge of communications. Accounts from 2005 deem Álvarez one of Bachelet's most intimate friends. Finally, Bachelet met María Soledad Barria (PS) when they were adolescents, and Barria

is an "avowed feminist" (Waylen 2016, 8). Bachelet later named her Health Minister and Barria helped

advance Bachelet's policy goal of making emergency contraception more readily available to young low-

income women. Table 3 lists key elite feminists who were Bachelet's personal constituents.

Table 3: Key Elite Feminists in Bachelet's Personal Constituency

Name	Why an Elite Feminist?	Relationship/Influence
Angela Jeria de Bachelet	Participated in women's movement of 1980s	Mother
María Estela Ortiz de Parada	"Women for Life" leader	"Best" friend; campaign participator
Graciela Borquez	"Women for Life" leader	Campaign participator
Luisa Durán	Participated in women's movement of 1980s; first lady	Campaign participator; publicly defended her feminine leadership and against machista attacks
Teresa Valdés	Participated in women's movement of 1980s; public feminist intellectual	"Bachemelena"
Carolina Tohá	Participated in women's movement of 1980s; deputy who promoted PWC in Congress	Campaign spokesperson; publicly defended Bachelet's PWC proposals
María Angélica Alvarez	Participated in women's movement of 1980s	Top adviser; managed Bachelet's agenda; helped organized female support
María Soledad Barria	"avowed feminist" (Waylen 2016 pg. 8); national level politician	Bachelet supported her political campaign; promoted emergency contraception

The elite feminists described above influenced Bachelet and her campaign in diverse ways. Each

served one or more of five different roles: top campaign advisers, public advocates of PWC proposals,

defenders against *machismo*, emotional supporters and campaign participators.

Top Campaign Advisers At least two feminists served as Bachelet's top political advisers during

the 2005 campaign. Tohá served along with Carlos Montes as Bachelet's spokesperson, and therefore was

one of the most visible feminists (Quezada 2005). Alvarez played a less visible, but a perhaps even more

influential role (Canales and Faúndez 2005). "Jupi," one of Bachelet's closest advisers, had organized a

network of female supporters to back Bachelet's candidacy before she officially became a presidential

contender. She managed Bachelet's agenda during the campaign and, along with Tohá, attended the

exclusive "*petit comité*" meetings. Alvarez also became a bridge between Bachelet and other campaign

leaders—including campaign manager Solari. These leaders were "conscious" of her exceptional

relationship with Bachelet and went through Alvarez when they wanted to approach the candidate on

sensitive issues. Bachelet also apparently trusted Alvarez more than she trusted the other men in her inner

134

circle. Given their expertise in PWC issues, elite feminists are well-equipped and usually enthusiastic about defending PWC proposals made by a viable female presidential candidate, in this case, Bachelet.

Public Advocates of PWC Proposals As Bachelet's campaign spokesperson, Tohá was probably one of the best positioned elite feminist to sell the candidate's PWC proposals to the public. One example of this is when political leaders from inside and outside her coalition severely criticized her gender parity pledge. According to UDI mayor Jacqueline van Rysselberghe, the most important women's issues were not their presence in the government—but unemployment and domestic violence (Tohá 2005). Van Rysselberghe added that Chile should not copy Zapatero's policy of gender parity in the cabinet because the Chilean experience differed from the Spanish experience.

Tohá replied to these critiques in a *La Tercera* column. She pointed out that prominent female politicians in Chile were responsible for advancing issues of domestic violence, equality of children before the law (regardless of their parents' marital status), sexual harassment and emergency birth control. "Parity between men and women in public offices is not the main problem of women, but it has shown to be the most effective way to put women's issues on the national agenda" (Tohá 2005).

> Having parity is, furthermore, a way of recognizing that the capacities and talents in men and women are equal. In reality, parity should be normal, and not exceptional, and this is valid as much in Chile as in Spain. But the pro-women agenda cannot end here, and it should include many other issues. Actually, the Bachelet proposal is much broader and includes universal access to day care and preschools…(Tohá 2005).

Tohá went on to underscore the value of learning from other countries. She said that President Lagos had learned from other countries when he committed to allocating more ministerial positions to women than any other Chilean president in history—and in fact, two of the *ministras* that he named turned out to be viable presidential candidates: Bachelet and Alvear.

Public Defenders against Sexism Elite feminists are well-equipped to detect sexism, a task which often requires some knowledge of the multiple kinds of gender oppression. One machista attack launched by the Piñera campaign was that Bachelet was incompetent and unable to lead Chile. A December interview with Durán exemplifies how she played the elite feminist role of defending her candidate against sexism. When asked "What ghosts does Bachelet face now?", the first lady replied:

135

> That she is a woman. That is the most important issue, and not because that is really a fear, if not that because other candidates have installed the idea that she can't do it, that she doesn't have the competency (*da el ancho*). In addition to being false, it is a super machista prejudice to which women should stand up and not accept (Alamo 2005d).

The reporter then asked whether Bachelet should craft a candidacy "more from femininity or more from masculinity, like Margaret Thatcher?" Durán passionately backed Bachelet's decision to hone an unconventional, more feminine leadership style (Thomas 2011a). "She has to do it from her women's condition. The example that you gave me was like a man in a dress. But currently there are other women who are occupying top positions and they are not like that." The reporter pressed on with the idea that Bachelet should become an "iron woman" to counter the attacks from her critics on the right.

> I know that she is not going to do it. The other candidates want to make us believe that only men have character because they talk loudly. They want to establish that women cannot be efficient because we talk very softly and we have another attitude to approach things. That is an absolutely machista attitude. But what has happened with Michelle uplifts women…Michelle marks a positive difference. She shows that there is a different way of doing things. And that is good. There is not a single way of being or a way of governing forever. This way turned out to be very successful in this administration. Ricardo placed this rhythm, but it is very healthy and good that in the next administration there be a different way of governing that can be as good or better than this one (Alamo 2005d).

Durán went on to argue that Bachelet possessed more experience and qualifications to be president than Lavín and Piñera. "Michelle has a background in public service and she has always had a preoccupation with social issues" (Alamo 2005d). She further suggested that Bachelet's experiences as a woman made her even more capable of being president than her male competitors. "Moreover, all women, we know what it is to work, to be efficient, to have three kids, to graduate and do graduate studies" (Alamo 2005d).

Emotional Supporters Many of these elite feminists provided Bachelet with emotional support, a role characteristic of some personal constituents (1977). An obvious place to look for this kind of personal constituent is within politicians' families. Although Bachelet's mother, Angela Jeria de Bachelet, did not appear to hold an official position in her campaign, she was undoubtedly one of Bachelet's major sources of support.[li] After the death of Bachelet's father, Bachelet and her mother lived in exile for years. Angela Jeria also helped her daughter, a separated mother, raise her children.

Álvarez also played a role that reportedly included "a more affectionate component since she is the candidate's emotional support" (Canales and Faúndez 2005). One example of this was that Bachelet reportedly cried on Jupi's shoulder during the tragically fatal bus accident involving young Bachelet campaign workers days before the first round of voting. Jupi also helped Bachelet with her responsibilities as a single mother, having taken care of Bachelet's younger daughter, Sofia.

Many members of Bachelet's circle of friends, dubbed by the press "Bachelemenas," vacation together every summer at Lake Caburgua in the south of Chile. At least some of these friends attended Bachelet's birthday party two months before the first round of elections (*La Tercera* 2005e). This group of women and men, which include Ortiz and her sister, were known for sticking with Bachelet in good times and bad. One difficult moment during the campaign was when the opposition accused Bachelet of ties to the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front, an anti-Pinochet terrorist group that had assassinated conservative intellectual Jaime Guzmán. Bachelet admitted a romance with Álex Vojkovic who was one of the organization's spokespersons, but she denied any terrorist activity.[lii] Bachelet and many of her personal constituents viewed the accusations as sexist and irrelevant to the campaign. "I have a group of very close friends from the time during which we worked together in an NGO, and with whom we spend the summer in the Caburga (sic). When all this about my love relationship appeared in the press, another big group threw a relief party. They are very supportive" (A. Lagos 2003)**.** This component of Bachelet's personal constituency therefore offered her friendship and solidarity particularly when she felt like a victim of *machismo*.

Campaign Participators Several elite feminists who participated in the Bachelet campaign often appeared in the media coverage, but their exact activities were not detailed. I refer to their role generically as "campaign participators". One example of this is that *La Tercera* described how in December, days before the first round of elections, Bachelet asked Ortiz and Bórquez to join her on the campaign trail in Santiago, but did not specify their tasks or responsibilities (*La Tercera* 2005o).

The press coined the term "Bachemelenas" to describe elite, avid supporters of the Bachelet candidacy. Valdés, Ortiz and Carmen Andrade, who Bachelet later named SERNAM minister,

137

participated in the 2005 campaign and were "Bachemelenas" according to newspaper accounts (*La Segunda* 2013).[liii] Durán also campaigned with Bachelet at the beginning of November 2005 (Alamo 2005d). As first lady, her role as a campaign participator was more visible and she appeared in newspaper photos right next to Bachelet.

Finally, one central role in the Bachelet campaign was coordinating the citizen networks (Boas 2009), and a notable elite feminist, Maria Eugenia Hirmas, led these efforts. Hirmas qualifies as an elite feminist, having worked in SERNAM's communications department for years in the 1990s and then also as a director of the women's group Comunidad Mujer.

4.3. Women Gain Ground on Bachelet Team

Bachelet incorporated a seemingly unprecedented number of women—who were not necessarily elite feminists—into her team by employing the parity principle in her appointment decision-making. Political analyst Patricio Navia nevertheless criticized her in August 2005 for failing to reach parity despite the fact that she had promised this for her future cabinet (Navia 2005a). Navia observed that 17 men and 14 women appeared in the photo featuring her new leadership, but that PPD deputy Carolina Tohá was unable to attend the photo session. He wrote that at least 7 of the 14 women worked in communications and women were largely absent from the platform creation and administrative decision-making.

Navia partially blamed the DC for the lack of perfect parity. Of the 10 Christian Democrat members, only three were women, and one of them, Ana María Zaldívar, was Adolfo Zaldívar's daughter. "When one of the parties that comprises the official conglomerate is not capable of offering equal space to women, it becomes difficult for the other collectivities to correct that distortion," Navia wrote. He added that neither Piñera nor Lavín had included as many women into their campaigns as Bachelet. "Furthermore, both candidates (from the right) have permitted various women who initially occupied important places in the leadership to be displaced" (Navia 2005a).[liv]

Bachelet highlighted her decision to incorporate more women in her in an *El Mercurio* interview. "There are many women. There are women in the political section (of the team). In each area there is a

boss and a sub-boss. When the boss is a man, the sub-boss is a woman. Now Soledad Alvear is the principle spokesperson" (Correa 2005). Bachelet implied that inviting more men to her lineup was actually a concession to conservatism. "Since there is an important *machismo* problem, it was good to also incorporate male faces," she explained (Correa 2005). In addition to Bachelet's own statements, other evidence speaks to the strong presence of women in Bachelet's campaign. The press observed that her female assistants were "a clear majority" during her final campaign even in Region VIII (Peña y Lillo and Gómez 2006).

High-profile women in the Bachelet campaign who later were named ministers include Ingrid Antonijevic and Vivianne Blanlot. Antonijevic headed a group of business people who raised campaign funds and met periodically with Bachelet to discuss policy (Olivares C 2005). She was subsequently named Minister of Economy. Blanlot helped lead the group that wrote Bachelet's energy proposals for her platform. She outlined Bachelet's energy plan to the Chilean press in November 2005 (*La Tercera* 2005i). Upon Bachelet's inauguration, Blanlot was appointed Defense Minister. Other prominent women in Bachelet's campaign included the *consejala* Carolina Leitao, who assisted with citizen networks, María Teresa Cortés, a head of communications and Verónica Barahona, Lagos' former superintendent of electricity (W. Diaz, Donoso, and Saldivia 2005; Yáñez 2005) .

While elite feminists played a major role in Bachelet's presidential bid, organized women's and feminist groups formally played a minimal role. Rios Tobar (2009) argues that even though individual elite feminists actively campaigned for Bachelet, the Chilean women's movement failed to unite behind her. In June 2005, feminists from across the country gathered for the first *encuentro* since 1995. During the meeting, an influential contingency of participants opposed Bachelet while another group supported her, and in the end, Chilean feminists decided that given these disagreements, the movement could not endorse Bachelet's candidacy. While elite feminists powerfully influenced Bachelet's campaign and subsequent presidency, Bachelet did not maintain a formal relationship the Chilean women's movement before or after her election.

In sum, this section provides additional evidence in favor of the personal constituency hypothesis. I showed evidence that in addition to powerful male figures from the Concertación, elite feminists also comprised an influential part of Bachelet's personal constituency. Bachelet met many of these feminists at different moments in her political career, and they served myriad roles during the 2005-06 campaigns. The Concertación candidate also appeared to have invited more women to join her campaign than any other major presidential candidate in Chilean history.

4.4. Male Candidates' Personal Constituencies: Same Male Party Leaders

Both Lavín's and Piñera's personal networks and campaign teams appeared far more male dominated than those of Bachelet, and the Chilean press and even conservative politicians made notice of this. In an interview with *El Mercurio*, UDI mayor Van Rysselberghe was asked why there were so few women in Lavín's close circle. "If you look, in all the political parties, women's participation in politics and in the leadership is not very big, so it is not the UDI's own characteristic. What is true is that that happens because the cost is high. You have to fulfill a series of requirements of family support…" (Errázuriz L 2004). She added that she was surprised that the UDI recently wanted so much for her to participate in the Lavín campaign.[lv]

Chapter III describes Lavín's male-dominated personal constituency during the 1999-00 campaigns, and this group of advisers generally remained active during the 2005 campaigns. According to 2004 news reports, Lavín's "iron circle" included many of his loyalists from the previous campaign: Cristián Larroulet, Francisco de la Maza, Carlos Alberto Délano, Gonzalo Cordero, Patricio Cordero and Ernesto Silva (*El Mercurio* 2004a). Having studied at the University of Chicago during the 1980s with Lavín, Cristián Larroulet and Juan Andrés Fontaine were influential personal constituents during both races. Other powerful members of the campaign team included some of the highest UDI party leaders such as party President Jovino Novoa, former party President Pablo Longueira, UDI secretary Patricio Melero, UDI Senators Hernán Larraín and Juan Antonio Coloma (*La Tercera* 2005b).

Yet, Lavín's personal constituency in 2005 had somewhat evolved since the 1999-00 election. First, some of the RN figures that supported his 1999 candidacy moved to the Piñera camp when Lavín

sank in the polls. Thus, his campaign's top leadership was comprised almost entirely of UDI or independent males. A second modification was that, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Lavín named a female campaign manager, Cristina Bitar, in February 2005 in order to attract female voters. Although she remained his official manager, Bitar lost much of her power and influence in the following months (*El Mostrador* 2005). The UDI mayor of Las Condes Francisco de la Maza, who helped lead Lavín's 1999 presidential run, again became the "campaign's visible and executive face." Bitar claimed that she retained the title of campaign manager, but conceded that "I never have had protagonism and I do not try to have it."

Table 4 lists key figures in Lavín's and Piñera's personal constituency. Almost all are male, and none qualify as elite feminists. Like Lavín, Piñera depended on his wife for emotional support. She nevertheless does not qualify as an elite feminist since she does not appear to have participated in the women's movements in the 1980s, and interviews reveal that she expressed traditional views of the home and family.

Table 4: Key Figures in Lavín's and Piñera's Personal Constituencies 2005-06 Elections

	Name	Relationship/ Influence on Candidate	Elite Feminist?	Party
Lavín	Maria Estela de León	Wife, emotional support	No	UDI
	Cristina Bitar	Campaign manager	No, but Comunidad Mujer participant	None
	Francisco de la Maza	Chicago boy with Lavín, top adviser, Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo?	No	UDI
	Cristián Larroulet	Chicago boy with Lavín, top adviser, Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo	No	None
	Juan Andrés Fontaine	Chicago boy with Lavín, Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo	No	None
	Pablo Longueira	Campaign leader	No	UDI
	Patricio Melero	Campaign leader	No	UDI
	Hernán Larraín	Campaign leader	No	UDI
	Juan Antonio Coloma	Campaign leader	No	UDI
Piñera	Cecilia Morel	Wife, emotional support	No	None
	Rodrigo Hinzpeter	Campaign manager, met Piñera in the RN "patrulla juvenil"	No	RN
	Alberto Espina	Political chief	No	RN
	Andrés Chadwick	Childhood friend	No	UDI
	Ignacio Rivadeneira	"like a son" to Piñera, chief of staff	No	RN
	Andrés Allamand	Worked together in the Senate in the 1990s	No	RN
	Maria Luisa Brahm	Campaign participator; worked "shoulder to shoulder" with Piñera	No	RN

Many of Piñera's long-term friends and acquaintances held top-level positions in his campaign; most were from the RN and none qualify as elite feminists. One of the RN founders, Rodrigo Hinzpeter served as the general coordinator of the campaign. Hinzpeter met Piñera in 1989 when he acted as Evelyn Matthei's campaign chief. "They immediately got along well," (Del Solar Vera and Daza N. 2011).

Alberto Espina served as Piñera's "political chief," which suggests that he oversaw the formation of the political platform (*La Tercera* 2005b). Ignacio Rivadeneira of the RN, serving as Piñera's chief of staff, was later described by Piñera as "another one of my sons." Finally, María Luisa Brahm was one of Piñera's closest advisers during his 2005 campaign, but maintained a low profile and was hardly mentioned by the Chilean press. Brahm reportedly wrote Piñera's presidential platform with the candidate in about a week (Del Solar Vera and Daza N. 2011). There is no evidence of her maintaining ties to feminist or women's organizations in Chile, and like other women in the male candidates' campaigns, she does not qualify as an elite feminist.

5. Summary and Conclusions

Chapter IV has used a wealth of observational data from the 2005-06 Chilean presidential race to probe this dissertation's core and personal constituencies hypotheses. I first argued that Bachelet attempted—and was believed to have succeeded—in mobilizing a core constituency of female voters on the basis of shared gender identity. She was believed to have achieved this by 1) sharing her personal experiences of sexism with female voters; 2) relating her challenges as a single mother of three; 3) crafting a stereotypically feminine public image; 4) replacing Lavín as the election's "change" candidate.

I then argued that Bachelet, targeting female voters with whom she was believed to have enjoyed a comparative advantage, promised more PWC than her male competitors. Chapter VIII will show that her PWC decision-making as *presidenta* closely reflected her campaign promises. I finally demonstrated that compared to her male competitors, her personal constituency included several elite feminists who played diverse and influential roles during her 2005-06 campaign. Furthermore, Bachelet opened doors for politically ambitious women by incorporating an unprecedented number of them into her campaign.

The male candidates' personal constituencies and campaign team lacked the presence of elite feminists

and continued to feature an overwhelming majority of men.

---

[i] Tomás Hirsch of Juntos Podemos Más also ran and earned 5.4% of the vote in the first round. I exclude Tomás Hirsch from most of the analysis since he received little media attention and was never considered a viable candidate.

[ii] This section excludes Alvear from the analysis since she dropped out of the race before disseminating a platform.

[iii] Why was Bachelet more successful? One possible explanation is that Bachelet had a prior history of generating strong support among women. In an interview with *El Mercurio,* Bachelet recalled a time when she was Health Minister and President Lagos ordered her to end the waiting lines in the clinics within three months (A. Lagos 2003). A group of women from the *gremios de salud* went to Bachelet and declared that they would not tolerate such treatment from the president. Bachelet appreciated their solidarity, but told them to remain calm and that she would be able to handle the situation. Another possible reason why the female socialist outperformed her female DC competitor was that Bachelet maintained a nonconfrontational discourse and style. The decision to adopt a stereotypically masculine, confrontational strategy—suggested by her male campaign manager—seemed to fail Alvear. This is especially notable in light of the next section's exploration of how Bachelet crafted a stereotypically feminine leadership style to secure the election.

[iv] In the end, there is no evidence that Bachelet promoted Ezyaguirre to a more visible role, and it is not clear the extent to which she backed off her pro-women discourse, if at all.

[v] As mentioned in Chapter III, exit polls are not allowed in Chile, but until 2010 men and women voted at different precincts. Calculating gender gaps for this election therefore is straightforward.

[vi] This section builds on Chapter III's analysis of Lavín's gendered political image, which relied on an understanding that sex (female or male) is a biological trait while gender roles and feminine vs. masculine identification are socially learned and psychologically internalized. Feminine personality traits include sympathetic, sensitive to others' needs, understanding, compassionate, eager to soothe hurt feelings, warm, and love of children. Masculine personality traits include assertive, leadership ability, dominant, aggressive, acting as leaders, ambitious and competitive (Bem 1974). Because femininity is distinct from being female, men can demonstrate feminine qualities and vice versa. Chapter III showed that Lavín, for example, exhibited a public image that featured some stereotypically feminine traits and this arguably helped him mobilize a core constituency of women (although not entirely on the basis of gender identity).

[vii] Bachelet and her team strategically branded her candidacy as promoting continuity and change. The continuity element derived from her status as an incumbent who promised similar center-left economic policies as her predecessor. The change element related to her unconventionally "feminine" leadership style and the often discussed fact that she was a single mother. Her feminine public image was meant to evoke more change than continuity.

[viii] The press noticed Bachelet's discursive use of her gender identity, and this suggests she was effectively communicating her message. *La Tercera* observed that, in the November presidential debate, she highlighted her personal characteristics as being a woman, head of a household and mother (*La Tercera* 2005j; *La Tercera* 2005k).

[ix] One could argue that Bachelet actually was part of the Concertación elite, a political insider rather than outsider. She networked with Concertación elites; she served on the Socialist Party Central Committee for years and then served in two powerful ministries under Lagos. This chapter is more interested in how politicians' craft their public images and how the public perceives candidates, rather than who they really were.

[x] In December 2002, when asked "Who would you like to be the next president of Chile?" (open question), 5% named Bachelet; in June-July 2003 that number rose to 9%; in December 2003 14% and in June-July 2004 it hit 23% (Centro de Estudios Públicos 1999). Her rise in public opinion largely occurred prior to a generalized acceptance of her candidacy by the Concertación establishment.

In June 2002, many believed that male leaders such as Interior Minister José Miguel Insulza and Senator Carlos Ominami would probably clinch the Socialist Party nomination. The 2005 contest was predicted to be a fight "among heavy weight males" (Yáñez 2005). Nevertheless, an increasing number of leaders soon began to see Bachelet as a possible presidential contender. For example, Socialist Senator José Antonio Viera-Gallo commented that Bachelet was considered a potential Socialist Party nominee, but Insulza was ahead of her on the list.

[xi] CEP polls showed that political parties were the least trusted institution in Chile. Just 9% of Chileans in December 2002 and 8% in June-July 2003 said that they had "a lot" or "some" trust in parties, behind Congress with 16% and 20% respectively (Centro de Estudios Públicos 1999). An August 2005 Icso-UDP poll also found that just 7% of

Chileans had "a lot" or "some" trust in parties. The public also distrusted political leaders in general. In December 2002, 60% of Chilean respondents said they had "little or no trust" in political leaders. The Icso-UDP poll also found that in August 2005, when asked "Which of the following political parties best represents your interests, beliefs and values?", 48.1% of Chileans answered "none" (Cordero 2005).

xii Concertación leaders worried about these public opinion trends. By January 2003, some believed that the coalition had lost contact with voters. DC Deputy Jorge Burgos declared that the coalition was experiencing "its worst moment" (Correa 2003). He pointed to poll numbers showing the Concertación's lagging popularity and declared that it had "lost contact with the citizenry. Distrust has been generated at all levels" (Correa 2003). The implication was that Bachelet, who appeared closer to the people and distant from the parties, could help remedy this problem.

xiii In this interview, Bachelet again seemed to attribute her popularity to the fact that Chileans were looking for new kinds of leadership and a politician that is closer to the people. She believed that Chileans sought a politician who did things in a different, nontraditional way (Garrido 2004) .

xiv On December 13, the PPD Political Committee formed five sub-committees to work on Bachelet's presidential campaign (*El Mercurio* 2004c). The editorial noted that "citizen dialogs" would begin in January. These events would gather civic groups from shantytowns to voice their concerns, and Bachelet would then incorporate their proposals in her presidential platform (Salinas 2005).

xv "Estoy Contigo," emphasizing the power of citizens, replaced the "Bachelet More for Chile" slogan, which had underscored continuity with the Lagos administration. "Estoy Contigo" posters featured photos of different kinds of Chileans, such a little girl violinist and a woman with cancer. At the bottom of the posters read phrases such as "I have a goal" and "I have strength."

xvi The *franja* allotted candidates five minutes of daily television advertising.

xvii For this question, Lavín did not enjoy such an advantage among women: Just 27% of women and 26% of men said Lavín was "closest" to the people. Piñera polled comparatively better among men: 9% of women and 13% of men believed this about him.

xviii Running a campaign that was "close to the people" and "distant from political parties" nevertheless had its shortcomings. In November 2005, *La Tercera* reported that the Bachelet camp was concerned that she would not win a majority in the first round, and some began to question the campaign's strategy (Faúndez and Canales 2005c). "It is probable that there was a lack of electoral experience in the campaign leadership," Socialist Party leader Ricardo Núñez commented. "But as it was going to be a different campaign it was good that there was not people from the parties. However, the circumstances demonstrated that maybe it was necessary to mix both worlds." Moreover, as the first round voting approached, Bachelet began to campaign with deputy candidates, and that prompted *La Tercera* to observe that her "citizen candidacy" was becoming more "politicized," or linked to the party elites. Patricio Navia predicted that Bachelet would do well in the presidential debate because she had learned to transmit via television the closeness to people that she demonstrates in person. "She should not lose the capacity to speak to the Chileans of the street. … They wait with … enthusiasm for that day when Chileans vote for the first time for a woman to occupy La Moneda" (Navia 2005b).

xx In an October 2005 column, Eolo Díaz-Tendero, executive director of the Concertación think tank Corporación Tiempo 2000 argued that Bachelet's "capacity of empathizing with citizens' subjectivity, to naturally collect the demands of actors and order political processes is evident…She needs to give clear signals of how her empathy, her cozy (*acogedor*) character and her will to citizenize (sic) political management will be translated institutionally" (Díaz-Tendero 2005).

xxi In a *La Tercera* interview, President Frei argued that Bachelet's pediatrician background helped her come off as empathetic and close to ordinary citizens. "Maybe the same fact that Michelle is a doctor, makes it that she has a more human approach to the issues of precarity among some of our society's sector" (Alamo 2005a). Bachelet's medical background thus helped reinforce these candidate characteristics. She discursively linked her pediatric skills to her empathetic capacities in her presidential platform. "I studied medicine because I marveled at the possibility of curing a sick person, of relieving pain, of erasing anguish and bringing back happiness to the home of a sick child." As a pediatrician then, Bachelet seemed in touch with everyday people's—especially children's—physical pains. But not everyone was a fan of Bachelet's empathetic and warm public image. Historian Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt suggested that Bachelet's stereotypically feminine qualities were a leadership weakness rather than a strength (Alamo 2005a). "As a politician, she doesn't have enough coldness," he remarked. Jocelyn-Holt also contrasted Bachelet with former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, the "Iron Lady" known for her masculine leadership style.

[xxii] A tragedy at the end of the first round campaigns served to further highlight Bachelet's empathetic and warm qualities (*La Tercera* 2005p). A bus full of young Bachelet campaign workers crashed and several died. Bachelet traveled to the site of the accident dressed in a doctor's uniform. Some of those involved recalled to the press how Bachelet met and cried with them (Donoso 2005). The right worried that the tragedy would further bolster her approval ratings since it offered an opportunity to remind the public of her empathy.

[xxiii] Chapter III showed that during the 1999-00 race Lavín cultivated an image of an atypical candidate, who was distant from the parties and featured the stereotypically feminine attributes of empathy, warmth and nonconfrontation. Given his relative success in the previous elections, the UDI candidate aimed to sustained a similar public image and promised the same kind of change during most of the 2005 race.

In 2003, Lavín tried to reinforce his previously-established nonconfrontational image by claiming he disliked conflict. "People have known me for a long time, and I am not a fighting person, so that I am not going to enter into a personal dispute, especially not as far in advance of the (presidential) elections," he said (*El Mercurio* 2003b). The UDI candidate also aimed to come off as an unaggressive, nice candidate in April 2003 when Bachelet was accused of connections with the terrorist organization Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (*El Mercurio* 2003a). Instead of agreeing with Bachelet's critics, Lavín said that he believed Bachelet's version of the story. As Lavín fell behind Bachelet and Piñera in the polls, Lavín's attempt to reprise his 1999 success in these ways did not seem to be working well, and in 2005 he shifted course. The UDI candidate attacked his competitors during the October presidential debate and was labelled the most pugnacious (*La Tercera* 2005h). Piñera after the debate called Lavín a "very aggressive boy." Lavín defended this approach by arguing that President Lagos also was confrontational with young people who had protested in Valdivia earlier that week.

[xxiv] The Lavín camp acknowledged Bachelet's perceived advantage. A member of his close circle commented that voters were accepting the idea of electing Chile's first *presidenta* as a way to generate change in the country's management. According to *El Mercurio's* analysis, Bachelet captured territory in areas of public opinion where Lavín previously had enjoyed an edge. The newspaper concluded that Bachelet's personal story as the daughter of a brigadier tortured under Pinochet and as a single mother of three seemed to enhance her popular appeal.

[xxv] Lavín designed a couple other moves to regain female votes from Bachelet. First, he began to participate more in events that would allow him to once again appear in touch with ordinary citizens. For example, he sang, danced and discussed taboo topics such as transvestites on the evening program "Acoso Nocturno." One adviser commented "Lavín had lost (that closeness) and from there (on the television program) he displayed his charisma to the maximum and showed that he has leadership in the feminine world" (Errázuriz L 2004). Lavín moreover sought to erode Bachelet's advantage by suggesting that she was, in effect, playing the female card. Lavín commented that "she beats me because she is a woman" (Phillip Durán 2005). His advisers believed these statements helped "make explicit that Bachelet's support is artificial and that women back her because of gender" (Phillip Durán 2005). *La Tercera* recalled that in the second round in 1999, Lavín defeated Lagos among women, in obtaining 51.35% of the female vote. Now, even though Lavín was outperforming Piñera among women, he was underperforming compared to Bachelet.

[xxvi] *El Mercurio* drew parallels between Lavín's move to name a female campaign manager with Lagos' decision to invite Alvear to lead his campaign in 1999. The logic was that such a decision helped Lagos win the presidency, and thus a similar move could boost Lavín's appeal. These examples of male candidates deploying women to mobilize women support the female surrogate corollary of the core constituency hypothesis.

[xxvii] In May 2004, Concepción's mayor Jacqueline Van Rysselberghe was thought to be a potentially good pick since she was recently named vice president of the UDI (Errázuriz L 2004). Van Rysselberghe was described as an "athlete, psychiatrist, wife, mother and mayor. She is the woman that the UDI elected to take protagonism in the coming campaigns. She has much of Lavín's style" (Lagos 2004).

[xxviii] *El Mostrador* added that since she was twice married, she did not seem to represent the right in terms of "values."

[xxix] He was the strongest presidential candidate in Chile in December 2002 with 40% of Chileans saying they would like him to be the next president of Chile. In June-July 2005, 36% said the same; in December 2004, this number dropped to 27%; in June-July 2005 it hit 21%; in August-September 2005 17%.

[xxx] The newspaper observed that in 1999, Lavín won 50.58% of the female vote while Lagos captured just 45.36%.

[xxxi] According to Rodriguez, Lavín's main strength in 1999 was being able to personify what was happening in the country. "We are talking about a country that in the end has expectations of …greater closeness and a much cozier politics, that is to defend the interests of the people and not those of the elite."

xxxii Patricio Navia summed up how Bachelet, who had replaced Lavín as the "change" agent, had attracted some of his voters and captured the Concertación nomination. "She knew how to personify the desire for renovation that exists in an electorate that is thankful but tired of the same cares forever in these 16 years of the Concertación. Her popularity is due to the fact that she has been capable of representing change mixed with healthy continuity, as the correct perception that she is a woman…" (Navia 2005b). Navia predicted "Bachelet will be the first figure of the left to obtain more votes among women than among men." According to this analysis, Bachelet's skillful management of her gendered public persona not only helped her mobilize women, but also help her eventually secure the election. Navia's prediction that Bachelet would attract more female voters was correct.

xxxiii Research on gender stereotypes argues that femininity and masculinity are often defined in opposition to each other. While empathetic and warm are "feminine," unemotional and cold are "masculine." Stereotypically "masculine" qualities also include assertive, able leader, dominant, aggressive, ambitious and competitive (Bem 1974). Polls showed that one of his primary strengths was his leadership capacity. For example, a CEP poll from June-July 2005 asked "From the following list, please tell me which of these attributes, according to you, best characterize Sebastián Piñera." Twenty-four percent of respondents said "leadership" and 20 percent said "capacity to assemble good teams."

xxxiv Pollster Martín Rodríguez argued that Piñera's weakness was his inability to connect emotionally with voters. Rodríguez said this was why Piñera's support had not risen as much as expected. "I see Piñera as very anchored in support related to all this business stuff about him, but it is a very rational decision. His problem is the low emotional adhesion, since people look to be inspired in the electoral campaigns" (De la Maza 2005). A biography of Piñera described him as "awkward emotionally, and for years he was seen as uncomfortable in massive activities, shy when kissing children" and largely incapable of "affectively relating to the population" (Del Solar Vera and Daza N. 2011). The opinion of an RN analyst concerning Piñera's presidential debate strategy reflects these traits of his masculine image. The candidate "should avoid the technical background and reinforce his capacity to communicate, showing himself as more empathetic with the people" (*La Tercera* 2005g).

xxxv For example, a CEP poll from June-July 2005 asked "Thinking of the following candidates for president, Michelle Bachelet, Joaquín Lavín and Sebastián Piñera, which of the following candidates appears to you most trustworthy?" Piñera enjoyed a 7% gap in favor of men, while Bachelet had a 6% gender gap in favor of women and Lavín had a 1% gap in favor of women. Because the margin of error was 2.7%, Piñera's and Bachelet's gender gaps were statistically significant while Lavín's was not. When asked who they would vote for the same poll showed Piñera had a 5% gender gap in favor of men; Bachelet had a 6% gap in favor of women and Lavín a 2% (insignificant) in favor of women.

xxxvi See Chapters I for a discussion of this dissertation's PWC operationalization.

xxxvii To some, this phrase meant that Bachelet would not name anyone who had already served in past Concertación administrations. Her intention nevertheless seemed broader than that. A *La Tercera* reporter once asked her to clarify what she meant by "no one will go for seconds" (Alamo 2005b). "I said that to give a clear signal of my decision to integrate new faces and ideas into my cabinet," Bachelet replied.

xxxviii For example, surrounded by supporters, she walked from Bellas Artes Metro to the Registro Electoral to officially register her presidential candidacy in September. She declared in a speech in front of about 500 people "in my administration many women and young people will participate with people with more experience" (Waldo Diaz 2005a). Bachelet's commitment to invite "new faces" to the executive branch seemed generally popular, even though it may have worried some men with ministerial ambitions. Former president Eduardo Frei backed her decision. "It seems normal to me that Michelle Bachelet wants to have new faces," he commented. "18 years have passed since we won the plebiscite. It is logical to make a change. We are not going to continue with the same people. …. To try to have the same little team of friends forever to be handling and running everything, that would be crazy" (Alamo 2005c).

xxxix Despite the loyalty of many elite feminists, Bachelet could never count on support from the weak and divided Chilean women's movement (Ríos Tobar 2009).

xl The logic was that children in preschools learn respect and how to solve conflict peacefully.

xli Social security turned out to be an important and divisive policy issue during the campaign. In a public discussion over pensions hosted by the Chile's largest workers' union (CUT), Lavín and Piñera proposed a retirement plan for stay-at-home mothers based on a payment from them or their husbands plus a state subsidy (Duvares 2005). Bachelet criticized the proposal by pointing out that it was already difficult for male workers to contribute to their retirements, much less contribute for their wives. She proposed eliminating the fixed commissions for the

Administrators' of Pension Funds (AFP) costs. She added that women's pensions are smaller because they have longer life expectancies, and she proposed to reduce this inequality by adjusting men's pensions.

[xlii] Like other viable presidential candidates, Bachelet met with religious leaders, in particular the President of the Episcopal Conference Bishop Alejandro Goic in October 2005 to discuss her proposals on select issues. She reportedly felt obligated to reassure him that she would not use her presidential power to pursue abortion or gay marriage legislation.

[xliii] Bachelet had delivered the same message at a breakfast with about 100 evangelical bishops at the Sheraton Hotel in Santiago a few days prior.

[xliv] Lagos' budget director Mario Marcel criticized the proposal, calling it populist, a common complaint about Lavín's promises both during the 1999-00 and 2005-06 races.

[xlv] Some of these proposals appear more specific than those of Lavín. For example, while Lavín promised to generally "prevent intrafamily violence," Piñera proposed to create Local Shelter Groups. This difference is understandable given their contrasting styles. While Lavín is often characterized as a populist, Piñera's approach is more technocratic.

[xlvi] Since they are elites, personal constituents could be linked to the government, but not always.

[xlvii] This section analyzes evidence from the Chilean print media, archives from Chile's Museo de la Memoria and Archivos Chile as well as personal interviews.

[xlviii] *La Tercera* wrote that although he and Bachelet had few ties prior to her candidacy, they had forged a close relationship during the previous three months. Lagos Weber, "a new face, academically prepared and competent," fit the profile of the kind of people Bachelet wanted to name to her future cabinet. He nevertheless at that time was still not considered one of Bachelet's "circle of trusted men" but he was moving towards that status. Both reportedly shared the same sense of humor, which helped strengthen their relationship

[xlix] She eventually named him to one of the most powerful ministerial posts: Minister of the Secretary General of Government.

[l] Elite feminists do not have to be women by this definition, but they often are. This could be because, following dominant socio-psychological theories of feminist consciousness, women tend to have the most to gain from feminism and because they are more likely than men to be exposed to feminist ideas.

[li] Jeria de Bachelet seemed to maintain an especially strong relationship with her daughter in part because her husband died during the Pinochet dictatorship and because her daughter was a single mother, she helped her raise her children.

[lii] She did in fact participate in group discussions, but never was directly involved with the Frente's actions.

[liii] Ortiz was later named vice president of the Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles (Junji). As I will show in Chapter VII, she seemed to play a highly influential role in inspiring and fulfilling Bachelet's promise to expand child care.

[liv] Navia may have been referring to Cristina Bitar, Lavín's campaign manager who reportedly exercised less power than other male UDI leaders in the Lavín campaign.

[lv] Van Rysselberghe's observation that all Chilean parties are male dominated is backed by academic research (Morgan and Hinojosa 2015). Party in itself cannot explain the differences in the male candidates' and female candidate's networks and teams.

CHAPTER V Male Candidates Mobilizing Men and Women in Brazil

Chapters V and VI continue to probe the plausibility of the core and personal constituency hypotheses by traveling from Chile to Brazil. Chapter V will examine the viable male candidates' efforts to target female voters and the role of elite feminists during the 2002-2010 campaigns, and Chapter VI will analyze viable female candidates' campaigns in the 2010 presidential race. As in Chile, all viable female candidates in Brazil made significant efforts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity early on in the race. Unlike in Chile, no viable candidate—female or male—successfully mobilized a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity in any presidential election from 2002-2010. Elite feminists only seemed to significantly influence one candidate's campaign, and contrary to expectations, this was a male candidate: Luiz Inácio da Silva.

Chapter V's analysis of viable male candidates shows that the threat of a female candidate can inspire male candidates to attempt to mobilize women, often by employing female surrogates. This chapter first analyzes Lula's 2002 and 2006 presidential bids and then turns to Geraldo Alckmin's 2002 and José Serra's 2006 and 2010 runs. The first section shows that due to the influence of elite feminists within the PT, Lula in 2002 and 2006 promised the most PWC of all the male candidates, but he did not seem to perceive a broader constituency of women beyond organized PT loyalists. At one point in his 2006 campaign, Lula viewed a female candidate as a potential threat. This female candidate was actively trying to court women voters on the basis of gender identity, particularly by evoking maternalism and framing her identity as a "first female."[i] As my argument would expect, Lula reacted to this possible electoral danger by temporarily adjusting his communication strategy to attract more female voters.

The second section shows that the PSDB male candidates competing against Lula received significantly more female than male votes. By this indicator, they appeared to perceive a core constituency of women rather than men. However, these male candidates did not promise significant

PWC or evoke women's identities in their platforms or discourse, so even though these male candidates attracted more women than men, they did not mobilize this demographic on the basis of gender identity.

The final section reveals evidence from Brazil for the female surrogate corollary of the core constituency hypothesis. As we saw in Chile, male candidates often used their wives and high-profile female politicians to capture female votes on their behalf, particularly when they felt threatened by female candidates. The observation suggests that these Brazilian candidates—just like their Chilean counterparts—believed that women are more effective than men at mobilizing female supporters.

Before defending these arguments, I provide background on Brazilian politics, justify my candidate selection, briefly profile the candidates and explain my data sources and analytical method for both chapters.

1. Background

Political Context Like Chile, Brazil endured a bureaucratic authoritarian regime during a similar time period (1964-1985) ((O'Donnell 1973)) with the military initially outlawing all existing political parties. The Brazilian military, however, then created a party, the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) and allowed the opposition its own party, the Democratic Brazilian Movement (MDB) in 1966. Brazilian generals here allowed some party competition, but instead of elections, military generals rotated presidential power among themselves (Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro forthcoming).

In the early 1980s, the Direct Now (*Diretas Já*) movement called for direct presidential elections. Similar to their Chilean counterparts, Brazilian women organized behind a pro-democracy agenda that featured many PWC proposals (Alvarez 1990), and elite feminists in Brazil often have participated to this dynamic mobilization period (Pereira 2015; Pitanguy 2015; Soares 2015). Direct Now leader, Tancredo Neves was elected president by an Electoral College in 1985, but died before assuming power. His vice-president, José Sarney then became president.

This same year, the precursor to Brazil's women's ministry, the National Council of Women's Rights (Conselho Nacional de Direitos das Mulheres), was established. Directly elected members ran a National Constituent Assembly from 1987-88, which was in charge of writing a new constitution. A group of female representatives organized the "lipstick lobby" (*lobby do batom*) which helped channel feminist demands into this constitution. Brazil held direct presidential elections in 1989, which Fernando Collor de Melo won in a second round against Lula.

Candidate Selection Since 1994 two parties have dominated presidential elections within an otherwise highly fragmented party system (Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro forthcoming; Samuels and Zucco 2014). The Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) controlled the executive branch under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso from 1995-2002, after which the Workers Party (PT) won every presidential election. The PMDB, created from the MDB mentioned above, is the other significant party, but during the post-transition period has always allied with either the PT or the PSDB rather than presenting its own candidate (Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro forthcoming).

I consider "viable" candidates as those who received at least 20% of the first round vote.[ii] By this definition, all viable presidential candidates from 2002-10 consist of two PT contenders—Lula (2002 and 2006) and Dilma Rousseff (2010)—and two PSDB contenders—José Serra (2002, 2010) Geraldo Alckmin (2006). Each of these competitors qualified for the second round in at least one of the elections from 2002-10. In an effort to balance out the analysis, I include one borderline viable candidate who happened to be female: Marina Silva (2010) of the Green Party (PV). Silva was considered a nonviable candidate during much of 2010, but ended up surging late in the campaign and captured over 19% of the vote. The 2002 and 2006 elections thus qualify as intra-gender—specifically all-male—contests while the 2010 race was inter-gender, featuring viable male and female candidates.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva Lula's political experience is characterized first by his union membership and then his PT leadership. Lula was born into poverty in the northeastern state of Pernambuco and moved with his family to São Paulo when he was seven. During the military dictatorship

he joined the Metalworkers Union (Sindicato de Metalúrgicos) of São Bernardo do Campo e Diadema in São Paulo. He was elected in 1969 to lead his city's union, and three years later, he was elected the union's first secretary. Lula was arrested in 1980 during a strike in São Paulo and jailed for about a month. In 1981 the military regime sentenced him to three and a half years in prison, but did not end up serving this long of a sentence.

In 1980, he helped found the PT along with union leaders, intellectuals, representatives of social movements and Catholic believers of Liberation Theology. As the PT's first president. Lula ran for governor of São Paulo in 1982. Along with leaders such as future presidents Tancredo Neves and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, he participated in the Direct Now campaign. Lula was elected federal deputy for São Paulo in 1986 and participated in the writing of the 1988 Federal Constitution. He finished second to Fernando Collor in Brazil's 1989 elections. He again competed for the presidency against former Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994, but lost in the first round. Lula then teamed up with Leonel Brizola, his former leftist rival, to run in 1998, but lost again to the incumbent candidate Cardoso. The PT leader thus ran for president three times before winning in 2002.

José Serra Unlike Lula who learned to read and write at the age of 10 and dropped out of school after the second grade, Serra's background was primarily academic ("José Serra Biografía" 2016). The son of Italian immigrants, Serra studied civil engineering at the Universidade de São Paulo, and served as president of the National Student Union. After the 1964 military coup, he was persecuted by the military government and forced into exile. He studied economics in Paris and then moved to Santiago, Chile. He obtained a masters in economics and became an economics professor at the Universidad de Chile.

After Chile's 1973 coup, Serra was taken prisoner in the National Stadium. He managed to escape to the Italian Embassy and then traveled to the U.S where he earned a PhD in economics at Cornell University. He worked as a professor at the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton before returning to Brazil in 1978. Upon his return, he became a professor at the São Paulo university UNICAMP until 1983. Helping transform the MDB into the PMDB, he contributed to writing the party's first platform. The

governor of São Paulo then named him Planning Secretary. Serra was elected federal deputy for the 1988 Constitutional Assembly and won re-election in 1990.

In 1988, he also helped found the PSDB and in 1995, he won a São Paulo senatorial race. President Cardoso named him Minister of Planning, Budget and Management in 1995. He then was named Health Minister in 1998. Two years after losing to Lula in 2002, Serra was elected mayor of São Paulo. He considered running for president again in 2006, but instead ran for governor of São Paulo and won. Serra thus was well-positioned to seek the presidency in 2010 (Power 2014).

Geraldo Alckmin Like Serra, Alckmin was a PSDB insider with roots in the state of São Paulo ("Geraldo Alckmin" 2016). Alckmin studied medicine at the Universidade de Taubaté, and at the age of 19, he was elected a municipal councilman (*vereador*) representing the MDB. He became president of the municipal council (Câmara dos Vereadores) and then the youngest mayor ever of Pindamonhangaba. He won federal deputy elections in 1982, 1986 and 1990.

In 1988 Alckmin helped found the PSDB. Between 1991 and 1994 he presided over the party's São Paulo organization. Alckmin was elected vice-governor with Mário Covas in 1994, and then vied for the mayorship of São Paulo in 2000. He assumed the governorship upon the death of Covas in 2001 and was re-elected in 2002. Alckmin decided to compete for the 2006 presidency in part because he was ineligible to run for re-election for the governorship.

Dilma Rousseff Dilma Rousseff was born to a middle class family in Belo Horizonte of the state of Minas Gerais. She joined the armed fight against the military regime as a teenager and became a member of the National Liberation Command (COLINA) and then the Armed Revolutionary Vanguard (VAR-Palmares). She was arrested, tortured for three weeks and spent three years in prison (1970-72). Upon her release, she moved to the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul where her partner Carlos Araújo was imprisoned. Importantly, Rousseff's partisan roots are not in the PT but in the Democratic Worker's Party (PDT), which Leonel Brizola, she and others founded in 1979.

Prior to entering national politics, Rousseff mainly held technocratic rather than political posts. From 1985-88 she served as the Municipal Finance Secretary under Alceu Collares in Rio Grande do Sul's capital city of Porto Alegre. She acted as President of the Economy and Statistics Foundation from 1991-93 and then State Secretary of Mines and Energy from 1993-94 and again from 1999-2002. She joined the Workers Party PT in 2001, a relatively late moment in her political career. Upon his 2003 inauguration, Lula named her Brazil's first female Mines and Energy Minister. Rousseff then became the country's first female chief of staff, replacing José Dirceu in June 2005, who was directly involved in the *mensalão* scandal. Rousseff soon became Lula's choice to succeed him. Like Bachelet, Rousseff had never been elected to public office before running for president.

Marina Silva Like Lula, Marina Silva came from an extremely humble background ("Marina Silva Biografía" 2016). She was born in the northern state of Acre, near the Brazilian Amazon, and her parents had 11 children of whom three died at an early age. Silva's mother died when Silva was 15. Hoping to become a nun, she moved to a convent in the capital of Acre, Rio Branco, to work as a maid and learn to read and write. Silva became involved in an Ecclesiastical Base Community (CEB) linked to Liberation Theology. During this period Silva also met environmentalist Chico Mendes and abandoned the idea of becoming a nun to dedicate her career to politics and social movements.

Unlike Rousseff, Silva had strong roots in the PT and had won several elections before running for president in 2010. In 1984, Silva helped found the Unified Workers' Central (CUT) in the state of Acre and served as vice-coordinator. She joined the PT in 1985, and a year later unsuccessfully ran for deputy. She was elected to public office for the first time in 1988 as a municipal councilwoman. She won a state congressional post in 1990, and four years later, became the youngest senator in Brazilian history. She won re-election in 2002 but left her senatorial post when President Lula named her Environment Minister in 2003. Silva thus served in the Lula cabinet at the same time as Rousseff and disagreed with her over many environmental and energy issues. When push came to shove, Lula seemed to ultimately back Rousseff instead of Silva. Frustrated from her inability to effect environmental change, she resigned

153

from the ministry in 2008. She also left the PT after citing disagreements over the party's goal to develop the country to the detriment of the environment. She subsequently joined the Green Party (PV) in 2009.

2. Data Sources

This section explains my selection of Brazilian data sources for Chapters V and VI. The chapters integrate findings from personal interviews, polling data and newspaper archives.

Personal Interviews I began by conducting 28 one-on-one interviews with elite feminists in Brasília, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo from January to November 2015, one year after Rousseff's re-election. Each interview lasted anywhere from one to two hours. I recruited interviewees via the snowball method such that feminists would recommend other feminists for me to contact. The interviews illuminate elite feminists' conceptions of PWC in Brazil, their roles in Brazilian policymaking and their views of some of the presidential candidates. The data thus allowed me to more effectively analyze presidential platforms, which these chapters employ to evaluate and compare candidates' PWC proposals.[iii]

Polling Data Brazil has far richer polling data than Chile, and Brazilian political elites often evaluate electoral bases according to surveys, many of which are available to the public (Boas 2016).[ivv] These data revealed insights about perceptions of candidates' core constituencies As in Chapters III and IV, gender gaps initially indicate whether a particular candidate perceives a significant constituency of men or women. I use Datafolha data made available via UNICAMP to calculate gender gaps ("Gender Gap in Voting" 2016; Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública – CESOP 2002). I also use these data in Chapter VI to argue that Lula's 2006 and Rousseff's 2010 core constituencies were seen as virtually identical.

Newspapers Political analysis of the time found in national newspapers further helps illuminate candidates' perceptions of their own constituencies and their efforts to rally women. There are several reasons why I only examined archives for the 2006 and 2010 elections, thereby excluding 2002. First, the two viable contenders in 2002 (Lula and Serra) also competed in either the 2006 (Lula) or the 2010

154

(Serra) campaigns. Thus by examining the 2006 and 2010 campaigns, I am able to include all five of the viable and borderline viable candidates (three men and two women). Second, Lula's core constituencies dramatically transformed from 2002 to 2006, and one Chapter VI's main arguments is that Rousseff's core constituencies overlapped with those of Lula in 2006. Thus an analysis of the 2002 campaigns is less germane to this dissertation than an analysis of 2006. Finally, the database employed only holds archives beginning in 2005, so a comparable 2002 database is unavailable.

Cornell University Library provides an online database of *O Globo* and *Folha de São Paulo,* Rio de Janeiro's and São Paulo's most prominent newspapers.[vi] I conducted keyword searches for the period from January to November of 2006 and 2010. Keywords included "mulher*" (woman/women), "campanha," (campaign) "presiden*" (president/presidential) and "eleitorado feminino" (female electorate) as well as the candidates' names. I chronologically ordered the results, which amounted to several hundred articles, before reviewing them in this order to understand the sequence of events. I looked for any evidence that could help answer questions similar to those described in Chapter I. After systematically re-organizing the archival data related to these questions, I then weighed the evidence in favor and against the constituencies hypotheses.

3 Lula's Female Constituency? Energizing Organized (Rather than Unorganized) Women

Chapters V and VI together argue that female candidates made greater efforts than the male candidates to mobilize a significant core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity. Nevertheless, no candidate in any election from 2002-2010 achieved this and won the election. I begin the analysis with Table 1, which shows that all viable candidates earned significant gender gaps, which initially suggests that each competitor constructed a core constituency of either male or female voters. Both Lula and Rousseff earned male gaps range from 6.3 to 8.5%. In contrast, Serra, Alckmin and Silva earned female gaps ranging between 3.3 and 6.8%. Since both male and female candidates earned female gaps, voter sex differences do not correspond to candidates' sex differences. The gender gaps instead

track the candidates' partisan identification, with PT candidates courting more male voters and non-PT

candidates courting more female voters. Did the PSDB candidates therefore successfully mobilize women

on the basis of gender identity?[vii]

Table 1: Viable Presidential Candidates' Female Gaps

	Party	2002	2006	2010
Lula	PT	-8.5	-6.3	--
Serra	PSDB	4.9	--	4.4
Alckmin	PSDB	--	6.8	--
Rousseff	PT	--	--	-6.4
Silva	PV	--	--	3.3

Source: Datafolha October 2002, 2006 and 2010.
Note: Responses to the question "Who did you vote for in the first round?"
All gaps are statistically significant at the p<0.05 level.

Before exploring that question, I show that Lula at times and in specific ways tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. As argued throughout this dissertation, candidates can try to achieve this in at least two ways: by evoking women's identities and/or by promising significant PWC. Lula tended to more heavily use the latter rather than the former tactic in incorporating a long list of PWC proposals in his platform. Yet, as Table 1 suggests, he was not successful in mobilizing a core constituency of *un*organized women, who far outnumber organized women. In short, he did not seem to perceive a significant constituency of women beyond his party faithful.

To sustain this argument, I first draw on secondary literature to trace the origins and evolution of Lula's electoral base. Two groups consistently comprised his core constituencies: identity-based organizations and men. Interviews and platforms reveal that, as a result of the influence of organized women within the PT, Lula signed off on a long list of "Commitment to Women" proposals in 2002 and 2006. This document provides clues to elite feminists' influence within the PT and subsequently, within the Lula campaign.[viii]

I then use Brazilian newspapers to track Lula's efforts to mobilize women on the campaign trail. I show that although he did make some efforts to mobilize women in this way, they were not a top priority for him. He at times met with women's organizations, but the moment when he considered targeting unorganized women was when he perceived a threat from a female contender. Therefore, although his platform was influenced by elite feminists, Lula did not view women, broadly speaking, as a significant core constituency. The analysis largely supports the core constituency hypothesis.

157

3.1. The Origins and Evolution of Lula's Core Constituencies

A rich scholarly literature details the formation and evolution of Lula's multiple core constituencies from his first presidential bid in 1989 to his re-election in 2006. Groups supporting Lula historically have overlapped with those supporting the PT.[ix] The party was founded in 1980 in São Paulo by intellectuals, artists, feminists, Afro-Brazilian organizations, the Landless Movement (MST), the Unified Workers' Central (CUT), Liberation Theology Catholics and the middle classes (Hunter 2010; Power 2014; Samuels 2004; Zucco 2008). Hunter (2010) argues that although the PT began as a socialist party, Lula strategically softened his radical discourse and adopted more moderate positions in order to win the 2002 elections. One example of this movement toward the center was his 2002 "Letter to the Brazilian People" in which he pledged gradual rather than radical economic reforms.

Although the PT's platforms have promised change favoring the poor from the beginning, polling evidence shows that the poor did *not* comprise a core constituency for Lula from 1989-2002. According to Brazilian surveys, his electoral base instead featured wealthier, more educated, urban dwellers from the South and Southeast (Hunter 2010, 114–15; Hunter and Power 2007, 4). It also continued to enjoy support from organized labor and civil society organizations. However, by 2006, his core constituencies had undergone a now widely-acknowledged transformation. Most survey analyses show that the poor did not vote for Lula in 2002 but did in 2006 (Hunter and Power 2007; Singer 2012, 20; Zucco 2008; Samuels and Zucco 2014) (for contrary arguments, see Braga and Pimentel, Jr. 2011; Bohn 2011.) Two main factors seem to have driven this change: the *mensalão* scandal and the Bolsa Família.[x] To sum up, Lula's core constituency transformed from the wealthier, educated, urban dwellers of the South and Southeast to the poor, rural and less educated voters of the Northeast (Zucco 2008).

Despite this transformation, two other voter groups have consistently comprised Lula's core constituencies: identity-based organizations and men. I show here that because of the influence of elite feminists within the PT, Lula promised significant PWC in 2002 and 2006, but otherwise made little effort, and ultimately failed, to mobilize an electorally significant constituency of women, the vast

majority of whom are not activists from the left. Lula instead attracted more male than female voters in every presidential race.

First, identity-based organizations, including some women's and feminist groups, have functioned as one of Lula's most faithful constituencies since 1989. His own identity as a (former) member of oppressed groups helped legitimize his leadership of organizations fighting against discrimination of other marginalized groups. More specifically, Lula drew on his impoverished family background, status as an immigrant from the Northeast and then his time as a factory worker to present himself as a fighter not only for the poor, immigrants and workers but for all historically marginalized groups, including racial and gender minorities (Martins 2016). Platform documents from Lula's 2002 campaign demonstrate his efforts to cultivate an anti-discriminatory image and manage a heterogeneous core constituency of identity-based groups. These documents include proposals for change favoring non-white Brazilians "Brasil Without Racism" (Brasil Sem Racismo); the disabled "Letter to People with Disabilities" (Carta às Pessoas Portadoras de Deficiência); indigenous groups "Commitment to Indigenous Peoples" (Compromisso com os Povos Indígenas); and women "Commitment to Women" (Compromisso com as Mulheres) (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2002a; Partido dos Trabalhadores 2002c; Partido dos Trabalhadores 2002d; Partido dos Trabalhadores 2002e).

"Commitment to Women" reflects the influence of elite feminists on Lula's PWC promises. (The 2002 document is located on the PT's foundation web site but the 2006 version—released at the end of the presidential campaign—is no longer available.) The 15-page document features 29 specific PWC proposals, most of which would be considered feminist. The proposals touch on poverty, domestic violence, discrimination in the workplace, health and childcare. The most prominent and detailed promise was to create a Women's Ministry directly linked to the presidency.

My interviews with elite feminists and academics suggest that Lula did not seem to possess a feminist consciousness in part because he was politically socialized within male-dominated unions (José Alves 2015). Yet, feminism fit well in his discourse of social inclusion, and many interviewees

acknowledged his ability to channel many, although not all, of their demands (Pereira 2015; Soares 2015). The document seems to credit the PT's National Women's Secretary for drafting the proposals. A list of elite feminists within the party includes prominent activists for women's rights, such as the secretary's president Conceição Nascimento (Nascimento 2015). "Commitment to Women" was subsequently signed off by Lula, his running mate, and members of Lula's 2002 election committee. In this sense, Lula did promise significant PWC to try to mobilize women who were part of his broader constituency of heterogeneous social movements.

In addition to identity-based groups, which include organized women from the left, men comprise another pro-Lula constituency. The PT candidate earned a substantial male gap in every election (Hunter 2010). Unlike in Chile, ideology provides little explanatory value. As Chapter III and IV showed that prior to Bachelet's 2005-06 election, Chilean women always voted for conservative presidential candidates, and they tend to profess a more conservative ideology. In contrast, Brazilian women tend to vote for more conservative candidates only slightly more than men and actually profess more left-leaning ideologies (Morgan 2015).[xi]

In sum, Lula seemed to perceive identity-based organizations and men as two of his most loyal constituencies. Specifically, low-educated men from the Northeast had become his most prominent electoral base by the 2005 elections. The presence of elite feminists helps explain why he promised so much significant PWC. Thus, Lula perceived elite feminists as a small slice of his heterogeneous core constituencies but did not view unorganized women as a prominent feature of his electoral base.

3.2. Lula Tries to Mobilize Women in 2005?

Lula's targeting of women was usually part of an overall strategy to mobilize his social movement base. At the beginning of the official campaign in August, the president was scheduling events designed to energize diverse identity-based organizations for his re-election. These groups included retired people, scientists, Afro-Brazilians, evangelicals and women (*O Globo* 2006c). The fact that Lula

focused on social movements relatively early on in the campaign suggests he prioritized efforts to solidify their support.

Lula's agenda later on included courting some women's groups. He met with women at the Progress Foundation (Fundação Progresso) in Lapa, Rio de Janeiro on September 13 (*O Globo* 2006e). He also received official support from the Brazilian Women's Confederation (Confederação das Mulheres do Brasil) at a São Paulo rally at the end of October, when it seemed certain that he would win re-election (Galhardo 2006). "We are supporting Lula because we had many benefits and with government resources we can implement literacy projects for young people and adults," said Amalita Garnier, one of the movement's coordinators.

The fact that my archival searches unearthed so few efforts to galvanize women's groups suggests they were not a priority for his re-election. Yet there are some signs that Lula, responding to a female contender, attempted to cater to women more broadly in certain moments in the campaign. *Folha* reported in August 2006 that he would seek the female vote, a demographic that had continued to elude him (Alencar and Seabra 2006). A Datafolha poll showed that 52% of men and 43% of women declared they would vote for Lula. He also reportedly appealed to women more generally by representing himself as a "leader" in contrast to Alckmin's "manager" image.[xii] Lula's marketing manager, João Santana, commented that the female electorate was "fundamental" and emotion could help captivate it (Alencar and Seabra 2006). An attempt to inject emotion into the campaign could thus be interpreted as a way to court (largely unorganized) female voters. This electoral advertising was designed to avoid a vote loss to the leftist candidate Heloísa Helena (Alencar and Seabra 2006). Her party, PSOL, had broken away from the PT in 2004 due to ideological differences. She attracted little media attention because of her weak voter support, but her recent uptick in the polls began to concern the Lula camp.[xiii]

Consistent with the core constituency hypothesis, Helena was attempting to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity beginning the moment she entered the race. She kicked off her campaign in July 2006 in front of the Praça da Candelária in Rio de Janeiro, the site where eight children were killed

in 1993 while sleeping on the streets (Lamego 2006; *O Globo* 2006a) The female PSOL candidate strategically deployed the theme of protecting children in her speech to highlight her maternal identity:

> This place ... saw the blood of poor children in a slaughter that marked the heart and soul of the Brazilian people. It is a tribute and a commitment to Brazil to see the President of the Republic, a woman, who like the others, does not accept the thievery, lies and betrayal and is committed to the children of Brazil. As a mother, I feel compelled to be here (Lamego 2006)

Helena further deployed her identity as a woman to criticize the Lula administration for the *mensalão* scandal and make broad appeals to Brazilian women.

> Sorry men, I have only a male child, a male brother. My governor is a man, my vice, too, but I mean I feel very honored, not by vanity or pride, in being the first Brazilian woman to run for president the Republic. I represent poor women, who hold onto their children before organized crime and prostitution drags them down, and all Brazilian women who do not accept thievery, corruption and lies (Lamego 2006)

Many political analysts viewed Helena as a leftist female candidate with the potential to grow among female voters. This potential threat from the left seemed to drive Lula to try to mobilize women himself in order to avoid a vote loss.[xiv] Aside from meeting with women's organizations and tweaking his strategy and tone to appeal to women, Lula also leveraged opportunities to highlight his PWC record. One example of this is the passage of the Domestic and Family Violence Against Women Law. Better known as the María da Penha Law, this piece of legislation was written by elite feminists within and outside Congress. The bill originated in Congress, and the executive branch, namely from Brazil's women's ministry (SPM), strongly supported it. It is considered one of the greatest feminist achievements in Brazil in the past decades (Piovesan 2009).

Lula sanctioned the legislation in a formal ceremony on August 7 (*O Globo* 2006b; *O Globo* 2006d; Brasil 2006). Surrounded by women, the president said that the new law would re-establish Brazil's dignity on gender issues. "That is a law made to punish," Lula said. "It is a law made consensually with all the political parties among all societal organizations...Brazil enters, beginning today, in the role of serious countries as it relates to respectful treatment of women." He further commented that "we have to protect women who denounce, and we have to punish, very severely, any human who rapes a woman." In September 2006 when the law entered in full force, Lula began to address domestic violence more on the campaign trail (*O Globo* 2006f).

Despite criticisms from the opposition that Brazil had too many ministries, the president reaffirmed his commitment to keeping the Secretary of Policies for Women (SPM) in an interview with *Folha de São Paulo*. (Scolese and Dias Leite 2006; *Folha De S. Paulo* 2006c).

> You make a mistake in treating, from a point of view of State expenses, the Secretary of Racial Equality, the Secretary of Women, the Secretary of Fishing, the Secretary of Human Rights...Those are secretaries that I have given the status of ministry because it was a demand (*reinvidicação*) of organized society. Those secretaries are symbolic secretaries. The Racial Inequality secretary has a budget of $18 million reais. You know, I am going to maintain those secretaries because there is no reason to diminish (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2006c).

The way he justified this decision further underlines how he viewed activist women (rather than nonactivists who obviously comprise the vast majority of women in Brazil) as a subset of his social movement constituency.[xv] Lula contended that SPM, like other ministries, was a relatively inexpensive way for the state to appease a sector of organized society that demanded an institutional space. In other words, rather than highlighting the intrinsic value of SPM for all Brazilian women, Lula evoked the political efficacy of granting ministries to diverse sectors of organized society as a way to satisfy his social movement base.

Further suggesting that he did not prioritize efforts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, Lula disseminated his PWC proposals towards the very end of the race. *Folha* noted the relatively late arrival of his PWC policies. Days before the first round, Lula began to release 32 thematic documents for his second administration (*O Globo* 2006g; Zanini 2006). One of them was a new version of his 2002 "Commitment to Women," which as suggested in the previous section, also appeared crafted by elite feminists within the PT and other allied parties (Soares 2015).[xvi]

A final point speaks to the importance of common identities for Lula's mobilization efforts. Rather than focusing on women, a group with whom Lula did not share a gender identity, the PT candidate concentrated his efforts on targeting "the poor." As he did in 2002, Lula in 2006 discursively leveraged his humble origins to establish trust with and ultimately votes from low-income voters. One example of this occurred in a September rally in Goiânia with about 2,000 mostly low-income attendees (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2006a). Lula addressed the poor by emphasizing his personal identity and recalled

that his own house flooded three times when he was still living in poverty. "There was a time when I would lose elections because the poor people did not vote for me, and I was angry," Lula said (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2006a). This anger related to the fact that Lula's platform consistently promised pro-poor change. He added that the poor did not vote for him because they thought that poor people were incapable of governing. Lula defied this thinking during his first administration.

> What is the pride that I have? It is that today you have consciousness that any one of you is prepared to govern this country. Every one of you is a cell of my body, every one of you is a drop of my blood…I am not a product of the political elite of this country. I am a product of the workers' strikes of 1978, of living with the homeless, of the fight for agrarian reform, of the fight of people who had floods in their houses. I feel in the skin and in the meat what happens to the poor people of this country…I am poor, but I learned one thing, to walk with my head held high (*cabeça erguida*) (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2006a).

While the poor and workers were his main discursive subjects, Lula also momentarily referred to women in the context of the Bolsa Família and other CCT programs directing benefits to low-income mothers. He alluded to women's supposed superiority in affirming that women know how to manage income better than men. "Who takes care of my business is Mrs. Marisa (his wife)," Lula said. "My check is in her name" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2006a). This attempt by Lula to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity either ignored or demonstrated ignorance concerning elite feminists' criticism of CCT programs' conditionalities which arguably overburden women (José Alves 2015; Lavinas 2015). This isolated instance of Lula evoking women's identities with the goal of attracting their support does not reveal a consistent pattern during Lula's 2006 campaign.

In sum, existing studies describe the evolution of Lula's core constituencies from the well-educated dwellers of the South and Southeast to poor voters and Bolsa Família recipients of the Northeast. Identity-based organizations and men have consistently supported Lula's presidential bids. Elite feminists helped channel PWC proposals into his 2002 and 2006 platforms, and thus in this way, Lula did attempt to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. Lula spent some time on the campaign trail meeting with women's groups, but the only time he seemed to target women more broadly was when he sought to counter a leftist female candidate who was trying to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. Nevertheless, he viewed women activists as a minor component within his diverse core

constituency of social movements and made few efforts to mobilize unorganized women on the basis of gender identity.

Finally, two other findings strengthen the core constituency argument. First, although Helena was non-viable presidential contender (and thus not a primary focus of this dissertation), she evoked her identity as a woman and a mother to galvanize female voters. Second, Lula frequently drew on his own multiple identities as a (previously) poor, immigrant worker to discursively mobilize these sectors of society rather than women. Thus, in Brazil, as in Chile, we notice a pattern of presidential candidates deploying their multiple identities as members of marginalized groups to solicit trust and support from in-group members. The next section argues that even though the PSDB candidates ended up winning more female than male votes, these male contenders, particularly Alckmin, also made little effort to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity.

4. Successful Mobilization of Women? The Case of PSDB Candidates

The core constituency argument suggests that viable male candidates competing against viable female candidates (inter-gender contest) are more likely to devote resources to mobilizing women voters than when they compete only against viable male candidates (intra-gender contest). Because political elites believe that women are more effective at mobilizing women, male candidates in inter-gender contests may perceive female contenders as a threat to their own female base. Male candidates may respond by catering to women by promising more PWC and deploying more women as surrogates in their campaigns.

Consistent with this logic, this section will reveal that Serra seemed to devote more resources to mobilizing women during his 2010 campaign when he competed against two viable women than in his 2002 campaign when he competed primarily against Lula. However, perhaps due to a relatively diminished presence of elite feminist in the Serra campaign, little evidence suggests that he did so to the

extent that Lula did. Of all the campaigns, Alckmin in 2006 made the least effort to try to mobilize women. To preserve electoral sequence, I begin by analyzing Alckmin's 2006 campaign.

Alckmin and Women Voters in an Intra-Gender Contest Alckmin's 2006 platform prioritized his plans for development and growth (PSDB-PFL 2006, 1). In light of the mensalão scandal, he also criticized the Lula administration of corruption and proposed "political" reforms, such as district voting (pg. 2). The centrality of these issues in the platform makes sense in light of the PSDB's electoral base. Since PSDB President Cardoso's second term ended in 2002, the party's core constituency has featured wealthier and better-educated voters. However, partisan identification is very weak in Brazil (with the exception of the PT), and the PSDB has never enjoyed a strong contingency of loyal voters (Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro forthcoming; Samuels and Zucco 2014).

Given that he was a male competing in an intra-gender contest, it is unsurprising that Alckmin offered very little to women as a constituency. The platform mentions the word "women" just four times. In addition to vaguely promising to promote gender equality (pg. 9) and women's employment, he incorporated just one specific PWC promise: to implement the Integral Program for Women's and Children's Health nationwide (pg. 12). The program offered no further details.

Moreover, the archival analysis revealed extremely scarce evidence that Alckmin devoted resources to targeting women. His platform's primary PWC promise related to health, and it was this topic that he spent the most time and money on to promote during the campaign. Alckmin dedicated one night of television advertising to discuss women's health in the second round (Teodoro 2006a). He vowed to reactivate the health task forces, which was one of Serra's achievements as Health Minister under President Cardoso. "We are going to reactive the health task forces that José Serra created, that I did in São Paulo and that Lula ended, in a lack of respect with women's health," he declared (Teodoro 2006a). Because Alckmin made such little effort to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, his substantial female gender gap seems better explained by other factors, which may include women's rejection of the PT and Lula.[xvii]

166

Serra and Women Voters in an Inter-Gender Contest The breakthrough of viable female candidates in 2010 prompted political analysts to pay more attention to women voters and PWC. In April 2010, *Folha* reported that the female electorate had grown from 50.5% of the total electorate in 2000 to 52% in 2010 (Delgado 2010d). The newspaper also observed that the candidates seemed to target women more than in previous presidential races. "There are daily the examples of gestures and speeches by the pre-candidates for the presidency to try to attract the female vote," *Folha* reported (Delgado 2010d). "The entry of two female candidates for Planalto, Dilma and Marina, being the *petista* ... in ... second place in the vote intention polls, increases the concern of politicians with the gender question in the 2010 contest" (Delgado 2010d). Because the 2010 race was inter-gender, my argument expects Serra to promise more PWC than he did in 2002 and more than Alckmin did in 2006.

An examination of Serra's platform confirms this expectation. The document featured 118 proposals, and at number 12, the gender equality section appears relatively well-positioned in his platform (Coligação Grande Aliança PSDB-PMDB 2002). This section lists 22 one-line proposals, which touched on health (10), discrimination (4), education (4), violence (3), and sex trafficking (1). Proposal number 104 detailed four more ways to improve women's healthcare. Perhaps in an effort to compete on more equal footing with Rousseff, Serra included in his 2010 platform more PWC proposals than his 2002 platform, far more than Alckmin's, and almost as many proposals as in Lula's "Commitment to Women" document, which again, was deeply influenced by the PT's elite feminists.

Although his platform listed a range of PWC, Serra seemed to focus almost exclusively on women's health while campaigning. The São Paulo governor seized opportunities to highlight his PWC record months before the official campaign season. He spoke about his record as Cardoso's health minister at the inauguration of a state hospital renovation in April (Delgado 2010d). He targeted women in his speech by promising to create Mãe Canguru, a program to humanize births in public hospitals.

Overall, Serra catered to women by merely mentioning rather than strongly emphasizing PWC issues. For example, in an August 2010 interview with *Jornal Nacional*, he attacked Lula's record on

health and at the very end he referred to women's health. "Health in the last years has not gone well," he asserted. "The number of elective surgeries has diminished, task forces have stopped, a lot of prevention has been left behind, there is a lack of hospitals, there are problems with the health appointments, problems with waiting times, problems related to women's health" (*O Globo* 2010h).[xviii] The report did not say if Serra then promoted his PWC proposals concerning women's health, but it is significant that the former health minister at least mentioned this PWC topic.

There nevertheless was at least one instance of Serra prioritizing female voters. At the end of August, he took one night of television advertising to address women. He kicked off his program by promising to pay special attention to (*olhar especial*) Brazilian women. "Today, I want to speak with you, who is a woman, woman who is a mother, works hard outside, and works hard to raise her children.... As president, I am going to have a special look (*olhar especial*) for Brazilian women, beginning...with health!" (*O Globo* 2010p). He cited some of his PWC programs that he had helped develop as mayor of São Paulo, including Mãe Paulistana (*O Globo* 2010n). Serra again tried to mobilize women by promoting his "Mãe Brasileira" proposal in television advertising during the second round (*O Globo* 2010w).

These events comprise the only archival evidence I could find of Alckmin and Serra's efforts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. Both of this section's conclusions provide support for the core constituency hypothesis. First, neither candidate devoted significant resources to mobilize women on the campaign trail. Second, given that Serra was competing against two viable female contenders, his 2010 platform seemed to target women more than Alckmin's who competed in an intra-gender race. The final section provides additional support for the female surrogate corollary of the constituencies hypothesis by showing that male candidates in 2006 and 2010 often used women to mobilize female voters.

5. Candidates Use Women to Mobilize Women

Because politicians believe that women are more effective at mobilizing women, presidential candidates will deploy their female spouses or other high-profile women to rally female voters, particularly when they feel threatened by female candidates. While all three viable male candidates in Brazil used their wives in this strategic fashion, Lula and Serra also enlisted high-profile female politicians and even an actress as surrogates. These women's mobilization efforts included leading marches of women, promoting PWC proposals in commercials and attacking the opponent on women's issues. I review these efforts by candidate chronologically.

Lula 2006 In early October, Lula's and Alencar's wives, Marisa Letícia and Mariza Alencar, led an hour-long women's march with about 500 female party members and ministerial workers through a mall in the capital of Brasília (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2006b; Lima 2006; *O Globo* 2006h). The event was organized by women from Lula's re-election team. At the end of the march, the spouses piled into a sound car and asked those present to obtain at least 10 more votes for Lula. "Now I go body-to-body," Letícia commented. We started in the PT like that and like that we will win" (*O Globo* 2006h). In the sound car, Mariza Alencar defended the Bolsa Família. "We are going to triple, quadruple the votes that are here," she shouted. "I make a special appeal to women miners and also to all Brazilian women" (*O Globo* 2006h). Another such a march in the Federal District was then scheduled to take place in the next few days.

In late October, Letícia gave her first televised speech during Lula's advertising time. Her appearance ran on the night dedicated to Lula's PWC achievements, including the creation of SPM (Teodoro 2006b). "Women have always had an important role in Lula's life, beginning with his mother, Dona Lulu," Letícia said. "It is for that that he has worked so much in favor of Brazilian women. And this work is going to grow even more in the next four years. *Palavra da mulher* (Women's Word)." Letícia re-appropriated the more common, patriarchal phrase *palavra de homem* (men's word) to emphasize that women can trust her word because she is a woman.

In addition to Letícia and Alencar, Lula employed other high-profile women as surrogates—namely São Paulo's former mayor, Marta Suplicy, a PT philosopher Marilena Chauí and the elected federal deputy Manuela D'Ávila (PCdoB)— to target female voters on his behalf (Teodoro 2006b). *O Globo* reported that campaign coordinator Marta Suplicy dedicated her October 21 agenda to generating support from women and northeasterners. She was scheduled to participate in a march in Santo André in São Paulo's ABC district that morning accompanied by Letícia and Alencar (Paulo 2006).

Alckmin 2006 Although she received less press coverage, Alckmin's wife, "Dona Lu" seemed to play a similar role for her husband (Bautzer 2006). The PSDB's women's section of Maranhão organized a march in October 2006 through the center of São Luís where "Dona Lu" greeted female voters.

Serra 2010 Competing in an inter-gender contest, Serra in 2010 seemed to deploy his wife, Mônica Serra, as a surrogate more than Alckmin did his. "The PSDB's idea is to make Mônica the counterpoint to Dilma—that exploits the fact of being a woman in her campaign," *Folha* reported (Guerreiro and do Valle 2010). This reasoning is consistent with the core constituency's female surrogate corollary: because they believe women could be more effective at galvanizing women, male candidates may feel vulnerable and, responding to the threat to their female support, seek to mobilize women, often by deploying female surrogates.

Mônica Serra, met with PSDB women at the beginning of August 2010. She also planned to interact with women's groups in Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba and Pernambuco and campaign alongside Fernanda Richa, wife of the PSDB's candidate for Paraná's governorship. Serra even enlisted his spouse to attack Rousseff. On the web site "PSDB Mobilizes" Mônica Serra accused the female PT candidate of ignoring a controversy over Brazilian intervention in a stoning of an Iranian woman charged with infidelity. "And the woman candidate?" Mônica Serra asked. "She is mute. She doesn't say anything" (Guerreiro and do Valle 2010). Later, in order to downplay the political significance of Rousseff's gender, Mônica Serra also said to reporters "this is not a gender election. The gender issue is overcome." Serra's wife here seemed to deny the importance of Brazil electing its first *presidenta*. In

these ways, the female spouse of the male candidate highlighted gender when it was perceived as beneficial in attracting female voters (to attack Rousseff on the female stoning controversy) and minimized gender when it was perceived as threatening to siphon off female voters (responding to Rousseff's potential to become the first *presidenta*). Serra's wife also accused Rousseff of being "in favor of killing little children" (Cervellini, Giani, and Pavanelli 2011).

In an additional effort to counterbalance against Serra's main female competitors, high-level women in the Serra camp endorsed his candidacy. "I am very happy in terms of two female candidates, but it is not for being a woman that you have to vote," said PSDB Vice President and Senator Marisa Serrano. "The vote cannot be a gender issue. People vote for the competency of the candidate" (Delgado 2010d). Here again we observe women trying to downplay gender on behalf of their male candidate in order to avoid a loss of female voters to the female candidate.

According to *Folha*, Serrano defended the PSDB's record on women's issues. She stressed President Cardoso's PWC achievements by citing the creation of the Women's Special Secretary (an entity that did not have ministerial status before Lula) and that the Cardoso administration directed maternal benefits to women through CCT programs. She acknowledged Lula's PWC achievements but added "those issues are in the past. We have to look to the future. Women need visibility in other spheres, especially in work and education" (Delgado 2010d).

O Globo also reported that Serrano emphasized health issues in order to cultivate Serra's female vote. "Women feel a lot of security," she said. "They have a strong recollection of him as Health Minister and the general revolution that he did with the creation of Family Health. We have a very clear notion that health is an issue intimately linked to women who end up being responsible for taking care of the health of the parents, the children and the husband" (*O Globo* 2010d). She added that the PSDB was still discussing specific PWC proposals, which would center on public security, health and education. According to her, the party had not yet decided whether to maintain the national women's ministry, one of Lula's most important PWC achievements.

Finally, aside from his wife and female politicians, Serra in 2010 used a high-profile actress to attack Rousseff on television in October (*O Globo* 2010aa). In one of Serra's commercials, the actress claimed that Rousseff called upon Lula every time a problem arose.[xix] She further criticized Rousseff by reminding viewers in another pro-Serra advertisement of the Casa Civil scandal that involved Erenice Guerra, Rousseff's right hand woman.

6. Conclusions

This chapter provided cross-country evidence primarily for the core constituency hypothesis: ceteris paribus, male candidates are unlikely to make sustained efforts and devote substantial resources to mobilizing women on the basis of gender identity. However, my argument predicts male candidates will make such efforts under specific conditions. First, as shown by the case of Lula, when male candidates network with elite feminists, they are more likely to promise PWC. Second, as shown by the cases of Lula and Serra, male candidates will seek to mobilize women—often by using female surrogates—when they feel threatened by female candidates.

I examined the presidential platforms of all viable male candidates in Brazil during the 2002, 2006 and 2010 elections. Analysis of newspaper archives then suggested that while no candidate spent a large amount of resources—that is, time and money—early on in the campaign to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, but each devoted some resources to target women. These male candidates' efforts varied in notable ways. Lula in 2002 followed by Serra in 2010 promised the most PWC—in fact much more than their male counterparts in Chile—while Alckmin in 2006 promised very little. Serra seemed to use female surrogates more than Lula and Alckmin.[xx] My constituency-centered argument predicts candidates—male or female—will promise PWC when they have extensive ties to elite feminists. This is clear in the case of Lula, particularly in 2002.

My argument also expects male candidates to target women when they felt threatened by female competitors. Lula in 2006 seemed to focus on women at one particular moment: when a female PSOL

candidate—consistently aiming to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity—appeared to rise in the polls albeit not enough for her to qualify as a viable candidate. The Lula team nevertheless did react to her campaign by tweaking their strategy to attract more female voters. Overall, however, rather than striving to rally women consistently throughout his re-election campaign, Lula focused primarily on mobilizing the poor by discursively drawing on his impoverished family background.

Comparing Serra's 2002 and 2010 campaigns yields additional evidence for my argument that male candidates often try to mobilize women in inter-gender contests. The comparison is suggestive because it was the exact same candidate and party. Serra, ran mainly against other men in 2002, but in 2010 he competed mainly against two women: Rousseff and Silva. Compared to his previous presidential run, Serra promised much more PWC in 2010. He moreover employed several female surrogates that same year in order to counter-balance against his female competitors. Because my archival analysis does not extend back to 2002, I cannot say that this use of female surrogates in 2010 was more extensive than in 2002.

This chapter therefore provided additional evidence for the core constituency hypothesis by showing the diverse ways that male presidential candidates in Brazil attempted or did not attempt to target women by promising PWC, evoking women's identities and deploying female surrogates. At certain moments that my argument expected, male candidates sought to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. Only one male candidate—Lula—seemed to maintain ties to elite feminists. The next chapter will finish probing the core and personal constituency hypotheses by examining the extent and ways in which Rousseff and Silva tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity in 2010.

---

[i] See Chapter VI for a deeper exploration of "first female" framing by female candidates.

[ii] This definition diverges somewhat from how I identified viable candidates in Chile. I considered Alvear a viable candidate in Chapter IV's analysis because, although she dropped out early, she was considered a frontrunner for much of 2004.

[iii] I analyze seven platforms: Lula 2002, Serra 2002, Lula 2006, Alckmin 2006, Rousseff 2010, Serra 2010 and Silva 2010.

[iv] Unlike in Chile, Brazil's gender gaps cannot be calculated from the official electoral results.

[v] The secondary literature has analyzed much of these data in order to understand candidates' constituencies (for example, Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008; Peixoto and Rennó 2011), but has not fully analyzed these polls from a gender perspective (Alves et al 2012 is the main exception).

[vi] I also included some evidence from *Valor Econômico*, another reputable national newspaper focusing on economics and politics.

[vii] We might also ask: or do Brazilian women, like their counterparts in Chile, tend to vote more conservatively? However, as Samuels and Zucco (2014) point out the main cleavage in Brazil is not left-right but rather pro- and anti-the coalition in power. The PSDB should not be considered a conservative party since it mixes progressive and conservative tendencies.

[viii] This does not yield evidence consistent with the personal constituency hypothesis, which predicts that male candidates are less likely to network with elite feminists than female candidates. The observation, however, is consistent with my broader argument that elite feminists can influence platforms and subsequently the deployment of presidential power to effect PWC. The PT candidate therefore tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity by promising significant PWC—particularly in 2002. Chapter VII will further detail elite feminists' role in shaping Lula's PWC decision-making.

[ix] Some scholars believe that during his second presidency *lulismo* separated from *petismo* (Samuels and Zucco 2014; Singer 2012).

[x] First, in 2005, accusations emerged that the PT administration was offering monthly payments (*mensalão*) to deputies from several parties in exchange for their legislative support. Although never directly linked to President Lula, the revelations resulted in the resignation of several top advisors, including his Chief of Staff José Dirceu. (This later paved the way for Rousseff's rise.) *Mensalão* dominated the news for much of 2005 and 2006 presidential elections, and the scandal seemed to alienate Lula's core constituency of educated urban dwellers who tend to pay the most attention to politics and demonstrate the highest levels of political knowledge (Hunter and Power 2007).

A second factor that contributed to the transformation of Lula's core constituency was the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfers (CCT) program. Lula sought to fulfill his pro-poor campaign promises early in his first administration. After consolidating several CCT programs started by President Cardoso, he dramatically expanded government assistance, and renamed it the Bolsa Família (Family Grant). The program offers small subsidies to families in extreme poverty on the condition that, among other requirements, their children attend school. Mothers are the direct recipients of the subsidies because women traditionally bear the burden of childcare and because policymakers view them as more financially responsible.

The Bolsa Família's success seemed to motivate recipients to electorally reward Lula in 2006 (Hunter and Power 2007; Singer 2009; Zucco 2008). Many of these beneficiaries had low levels of political knowledge and seemed either unaware of or unconcerned by the administration's corruption scandals (Hunter and Power 2007).

[xi] Lula's public persona could help explain this gap. In 1998, the PT conducted qualitative research to understand Lula's difficulty in attracting women. Some women interviewed in the study implied that they did not support Lula because he "seems a lot like my husband" (José Alves 2015). *Folha de São Paulo* pointed out that Lula's image was associated with the common, everyday men that women "have at their side" (Delgado 2006). This image contrasts sharply with 1989's "hearthrob" presidential candidate Fernando Collor de Mello, who defeated Lula in part thanks to his success among female voters. "PT leaders considered the 1989 Lula had a more aggressive image, strong voice impostor," *Folha* wrote. "In 2002, remember, Lula was sweating a lot in the campaign and successively changed shirts" (Delgado 2006). According to some in the PT—and perhaps Lula himself—women did not support the PT's presidential candidate because he did not display qualities that attracted women. A different explanation for Lula's failure among women—and success among men—relates to the PT's masculinism. USP political scientist Teresa Sacchet observed that a masculine culture has predominated the social movements and unionism that gave birth to the PT. "At that time (about 30 years ago), even more than today, political spaces were especially occupied by men," Sacchet said in 2010. "So it doesn't surprise me that Lula has always had greater appeal among the masculine public" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010f) Whether due to gendered aspects of Lula's public image or the masculine culture within his party, Lula's core constituency has consistently been among male rather than female voters.

Lula's common man image and the PT's masculine culture may better explain Lula's gender gap in 2002 rather than in 2006. What is particularly striking about the gap in 2006 is that Bolsa Família recipients seemed to constitute Lula's new core constituency and women comprised about 90% of the program's recipients. Demographer José Alves (2012; personal interview March 11, 2015) argues that Lula's inability to attract the votes of as many female as male beneficiaries could be because the program's conditionalities overburden female recipients. Bolsa Família fathers do not have to do anything, but at the same time, these men are at least partially relieved of financial duties to their families. As a result, beneficiaries who are fathers may support Lula more than the mothers.

[xii] In the context of the unfolding *mensalão* scandal, Alckmin continued to attack Lula on the radio and present himself as an honest administrator.

[xiii] In the last Datafolha poll she enjoyed 12% of vote intentions.

[xiv] In an August 2006 interview with *O Globo*, Helena again linked her female identity to honesty and authenticity. "I have always maintained what I believe and I do not lie I will defend everything I believe it is possible to do," she said. "You are voting for a woman who says what she really thinks. I'm 44 years old and, as Oscar Wilde said, any woman who says age is able to say anything." Helena furthermore described herself as a typical woman in order to directly connect with female voters. "I'm like most women…Tenderness and fury," she said (Pizarro 2006).

[xv] He highlighted his commitment to SPM in September by claiming that only an "extraterrestrial factor" would prevent him from fulfilling his promises. Moreover, those who wanted to eliminate the Secretaries of Racial Equality, Human Rights and Women were "insensitive" (Scolese and Dias Leite 2006).

[xvi] According to *Folha*, the 2006 version discussed a range of PWC achievements—including the Maria da Penha law—and generic proposals concerning employment and food safety for women. Yet, the PWC issue that caught the most attention and generated the most controversy concerned abortion. The document read "The State and Brazilian legislation must guarantee the right of women to decide about their lives and their bodies. For that, it is essential to promote conditions to exercise the autonomy with guarantees for sexual and reproductive rights." *Folha* pointed out that women were historically a difficult (or "refractory") sector of society for Lula to capture. He therefore looked to mobilize them by promising a series of measures to extend abortion access (Zanini 2006).

Folha reported that the document "Commitment to Women," stating that women's rights should not be decided by "belief or religion," was a subtle critique of the Catholic Church and Evangelical Groups (Zanini 2006). Lula during his first term created a commission that sent a bill to Congress concerning broadening abortion rights, which at the time were restricted to cases of rape or health issues for the mother. The bill was unsuccessful because of religious opposition. Vera Soares, one of the document's coordinators, said that Lula's commitment to broadening abortion rights was "renewed." "This was the administration that did the most for women. But maybe there have been faults in communicating those acts," she commented.

[xvii] An exploration of these other factors is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

[xviii] In a direct rebuttal to Serra's attacks, the Health Ministry issued a press release that highlighted the ministry's progress on family planning spending and the stagnation of teen pregnancies from 2003-2009 (*O Globo* 2010j).

[xix] Taken by itself, the accusation of Rousseff depending on men for her political career appears sexist, in that it taps into stereotypes of women's passivity. Following this, another reason why Serra may have used a woman to launch such a sexist critique could be that a female representative attacking a female candidate is better buffered from criticisms than if a male launched the same sexist criticism. This logic rests on the premise that the public has a harder time believing women rather than men are sexist.

[xx] Part of Lula's and Serra's high number of PWC promises is explained by the fact that Brazilian campaigns tend to be more policy-oriented than Chilean campaigns (Boas 2016). However, this "constant cause" cannot fully account for the within-country variation.

CHAPTER VI Female Candidates Targeting Women Voters in Brazil

This chapter completes the plausibility probe of the core and personal constituency hypotheses by examining female candidates' efforts to mobilize women during the 2010 Brazilian presidential race. The main argument is that the leading women contenders, Dilma Rousseff and Marina Silva, repeatedly employed a variety of tactics early on their campaigns to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity to a greater extent than their male counterparts. Limited evidence suggests that Rousseff networked more with other female politicians, but neither female candidate seemed to have stronger or more numerous ties to elite feminists than Lula. The chapter shows that without a significant presence of elite feminists, it is unlikely that any candidate (male or female) will incorporate PWC in their platforms.

The first section "Rousseff's Strategies: Continuity and Female Mobilization" studies the variety of resources—time, money and symbols—the PT candidate employed to galvanize women on the basis of gender identity. Unlike Lula whose female mobilization efforts focused almost exclusively on women's groups, Rousseff appealed to both organized and unorganized female voters. In addition to frequently meeting with women early in 2010, her strategy relied on two dominant discourses: maternalism and a "first female" frame. Both of these somewhat contradictory themes were designed to establish and leverage shared identity with female voters.

Exploring additional implications of the core constituency argument, I suggest that Lula in 2010 tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity more when he was campaigning on behalf of Rousseff in 2010 than when he was campaigning for himself in 2002 and 2006. This observation makes sense in light of my argument that political elites tend to believe that women are more effective at mobilizing women. Overall, Rousseff promised relatively little PWC beyond continuing Lula's legacy. One plausible explanation for this is that, in addition to her campaign's emphasis on continuity rather than change, Rousseff networked relatively little with elite feminists, who seemed to exert little influence in her campaign as well as her platform. Together with Chapter IV, this chapter suggests that the case of Rousseff dramatically contrasts with the case of Bachelet who not only succeeded in mobilizing women

176

on the basis of gender identity, but who also networked extensively with influential elite feminists advising her.

I then turn to the Silva candidacy, which was not considered viable until the very end of the race. The second section "Silva Leverages Multiple Identities to Target Women" shows that she also tried to mobilize women—particularly those who were low-income, racial minorities—on the basis of gender identity. She did this early in the campaign by speaking with women voters and emphasizing her identity as a black, evangelical woman with extremely humble origins. However, this Green Party candidate promised little PWC and, given her affiliation to a highly ideological party, appeared more influenced by environmental activists than elite feminists.

Finally, "Female Candidates' Failures and Successes" uses Datafolha data to model vote choice for Lula in 2006 and Rousseff and Silva in 2010. Results are consistent with the argument that (1) Rousseff's electoral base overlapped with that of Lula in 2006; (2) Rousseff failed to mobilize a significant constituency of women while Silva succeeded. Although Silva attempted to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity *and* she won more female than male votes, it is unclear whether these women moved to her camp because of her pro-women appeals or because of other factors.

1. Rousseff's Strategies: Continuity and Female Mobilization

Existing analysis of the 2010 elections points out that Rousseff's overarching strategy was to emphasize continuity with Lula. She therefore tended to target groups that helped clinch his 2006 re-election. Building on this conventional wisdom, I argue that unlike her male predecessor, she also attempted to mobilize unorganized women—who had historically not supported Lula—on the basis of gender identity. I first review her unlikely emergence as the leading presidential candidate and then expound on the multiple ways that she targeted both organized and the far more electorally lucrative group of unorganized women.

Lula's decision to pick Rousseff as his successor was surprising in part because her roots in the PT were relatively shallow, and she had never run for public office before. She was virtually unknown to

the Brazilian public during the first few months of 2010.[i] In light of Rousseff's weaknesses, Serra maintained a large advantage during the first three months of 2010. Upon leaving the Casa Civil on March 31 to run for president, she viewed April as a crucial time to project a winning public image. One of her chief objectives was to "reverse the fateful luck" of the PT in earning fewer female than male votes (Flor 2010).

Although Rousseff never earned a more support from women than men, she passed Serra in the polls in May. Alves (2012) observed that once she began running political advertisements in August, and thereby convincing the public that she was Lula's true successor, she finally consolidated a lead. The PT candidate opened a 20-point margin over Serra from mid-August until mid-September.

Two weeks before the first round, almost all signs indicated that Rousseff would win a first-round majority and thereby avoid a run-off. Silva was still not considered a viable candidate, earning just 10% of vote intentions until mid-September. A corruption scandal in the Casa Civil involving Rousseff's former right-hand woman, Erenice Guerra, seemed to disappoint some Rousseff supporters. Political analysis of the time interpreted the first-round result as a movement of many of Rousseff's female votes to Silva, and to a lesser extent, Serra (Alves 2012; Cervellini, Giani, and Pavanelli 2011). This chapter's final section will further explore the election results and in particular, the women's vote.

1.1. Devoting Resources to Mobilizing Women Early in the Campaign

Lula earned more male than female votes in all his previous presidential bids. Given that Rousseff's run originated from and depended on Lula's endorsement, we might expect Rousseff to *not* prioritize the female vote. This section nevertheless shows that, consistent with my core constituency argument, Rousseff perceived women as a potential base of loyal supporters because of a prevalent believe that women are more effective than men at mobilizing women. She employed diverse tactics to target both organized and unorganized women early on and then consistently throughout her campaign. The resources she devoted to mobilizing women included time meeting with women's groups and advertisements targeting (mostly unorganized) women. While on the campaign trail, she often mentioned

Lula's PWC achievements, pledged PWC and employed stereotypically feminine symbols to galvanize women.

Eyeing on the presidency, Rousseff sought to cultivate a female following even before leaving her ministerial post. Like Bachelet and Alvear in Chile, she took advantage of International Women's Day to highlight her achievements as a female minister who had defied gender barriers to become a national politician. Yet, unlike her female counterparts in Chile, Rousseff—at this moment and then throughout her campaign—focused on her male predecessor's policy accomplishments. In a speech before the Senate, she reminded Brazilians that women are the direct beneficiaries of many of the president's programs. "I believe it is very important the fact that it is the woman who receives the Bolsa Família and who earns more power to decide what to buy," she said. "Women have preference for being the titleholders in the program Minha Casa, Minha Vida because women also protect" (Ceolin and Ramalho 2010). Thus, one of the first ways that Rousseff tried to mobilize women was to signal Lula's accomplishments, which she argued favored women.[ii]

Rousseff also tried early on to cultivate female support by speaking to women union workers in São Paulo, a traditional PT bastion (Delgado 2010c). This group was a logical target at the beginning of 2010 because it represented an overlap between one of Lula's core constituencies (unions) as well as Rousseff's new target constituency (women). The candidate and the president shared the stage at the end of March during the opening of the Second Women's Metalworker Congress of ABC.[iii] *Folha* described the event as "an act of electoral nature aimed at the female electorate" (Delgado 2010c). Prominent female leaders endorsed Rousseff's candidacy. For example, union director Simone Vieira expressed her support. "Dilma Rousseff is one of the inspirations" for the second congress. "Dilma is our hope" (Delgado 2010c).

Folha also noted that female voters continued to elude her and reported that Rousseff tailored her 30-minute speech to attract this demographic. To this end, the PT candidate made several PWC promises, including improved state childcare. "We have a very important thing in the PAC 2 for women and their children," she announced. "We are going to construct crèches" (Delgado 2010c). She again claimed

Lula's programs benefited women and defended longer maternity leaves. She also emphasized women's competence, affirming that women are "capable of making decisions, of directing, of being good leaders and constructing an environment of understanding and comprehension" (Delgado 2010c). She later expressed enthusiasm about a poster featuring her photo with thousands of people that female metallurgical workers had gifted her. Rousseff thus promised more PWC, highlighted Lula's PWC achievements, and applauded women's leadership capacity in order to energize women very early in the campaign. The fact that she targeted female union workers so far in advance of the official election season suggests that her strategy was to generate a solid core constituency of women and PT faithful before reaching out to other voter blocks.

Reflecting on media expectations also helps confirm my argument that political elites believe women are more effective than men at mobilizing women. Not only those in the PT camp, but also some national reporters anticipated that Rousseff by virtue of her gender would perform well in this demographic. At one point a journalist wrote that women and the poor were "two of Dilma's niches" despite the fact that no poll during the campaign ever showed that she performed better among women than among men. Indeed, newspaper articles repeatedly expressed surprise at the fact that Serra consistently outperformed Rousseff among female voters (Rodrigues 2010).

Additional evidence of the prevalence of the notion that women are more effective mobilizers of women was that reporters asked Rousseff very early in the race what she would do to attract the female electorate. The novice candidate replied that she would converse with women. "I am going to use all the permitted media," she said. "We women, we are 52% of the population. The other 48% are our sons, so we are at home" she said (*O Globo* 2010a). She thus directly evoked her shared gender identity with women—pointing out that they constitute a numerical majority—and then defined women according to their roles as mothers.

In accordance with both the core and personal constituency hypotheses, the PT candidate targeted and networked with women in diverse ways. She set out in April to "fill her agenda" for several weeks with meetings with women and speeches about women's political participation (Flor 2010). One of her

strategies was to be seen near other women—including anonymous mothers and famous women. Pursuing this goal, she was pictured hugging a female welder and receiving a gift from female Petrobras workers (Delgado 2010d). She also networked with elite women when she dined with the daytime talk show host Ana Maria Braga, met with former São Paulo mayor, Marta Suplicy, asked for help from first lady Marisa Letícia and announced a birthday trip for the economist Maria da Conceição Tavares. These interactions with female elites suggest that Rousseff not only sought to craft a pro-women image to the masses of female voters—a potential core constituency—but also aimed to strengthen her relationships with elite women, some of whom seemed to participate in her personal constituency.

The campaign's online strategy provides additional evidence for both hypotheses. Online publicity was not allowed until July 5, but the PT camp seemed so motivated to chase female voters that in April they created a web site aimed at women (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010b). The "Women with Dilma" site featured Rousseff's ideas on various female-related issues and testimonies from her childhood girlfriends, Sônia Macedo and Eda Guillen as well as Neusa Ladeira, one of her political companions.[iv] The site declared that its objective was to "find women who think like we do" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010b). This apparently was the campaign's first blog (Seabra and Costa 2010). Rousseff's campaign thus used online tools in their initial efforts to rally female supporters behind her.

Rousseff continued to work on solidifying a core constituency of left-leaning female supporters toward the end of the crucial month of April. She participated in an international *seminário* entitled "Women and Political Participation in Latin America: Challenges for the Construction of Equality" at the PT headquarters in Brasília. The event was hosted by the PT's National Women's Secretary. Rousseff presented with Senator Lúcia Topolansky, president of the Uruguayan Senate and the deputy Lorena Pena, member of El Salvador's Equality Council. SPM Minister Nilcéa Freire also took part (*Folha De São Paulo Online* 2010). Attending this event was a way to network with elite feminists and galvanize leftist women, a group that the conventional wisdom of the time predicted to be her strongest supporters.

Unlike Lula who directed his female mobilization efforts to women who were already organized, Rousseff launched broad appeals to lure the much larger and electorally lucrative demographic of

unorganized women. For example, she later that month leveraged an interview to appeal broadly to women. Invited at the end of the interview to comment on anything, she decided "without hesitating" to send a message to women in the city of Londrinha (*O Globo* 2010b).

> Londrinha, on the issue of women, gives a show. Then in Londrina, we had very important actions. It was, without doubt, the first to play a role, creating women's departments, creating services with accesses for women, creating a whole women's protection system, the women's house, the city council of women's rights, the women's police station. This I find very important, because we women are, in fact, 52% of the population. We have these rights to have opportunities at work, in the family (*O Globo* 2010b).

Rousseff thus praised Londrinha's progress on PWC and added: "I want to greet (*cumprimentar*) the women of Londrina and wish them an excellent week" (*O Globo* 2010b). The fact that Rousseff, when given an opportunity to broach any topic, turned to PWC issues suggests she prioritized mobilizing (mostly unorganized) women.

In addition to meeting with women, discussing women's issues and promoting PWC, Rousseff drew on a variety of discursive tools to highlight her own identity as a woman and thereby generate female support. One example of this was the PT camp's decision to employ the term *presidenta* instead of *presidente* when discussing her electoral bid (Machado 2010). The decision was somewhat controversial among Brazilian intellectuals and generated debate in the media (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010l). Professor María Helena de Moura Neves of UNESP pointed out that it was not linguistically necessary to use the term *presidenta* but from the point of view of the campaign, "it makes sense because it values the fact that the PT is launching a woman to the presidency" (Machado 2010). The implication was that Rousseff's team preferred the term for electorally strategic reasons. UnB Professor Regina Dalcastagnè commented that although it was impossible to know if its use would have an impact on voters' choice for president, the issue was "political in the broad sense, because it marks the presence of the feminine" (Machado 2010). Language experts, therefore, detected electoral motivations behind the PT camp's preference for the *presidenta* title: to highlight Rousseff's status as a woman, underscore her shared identity with female voters and thereby elicit their support.[v]

Evidence from the staging of the PT's June convention to nominate Rousseff is also largely consistent with the constituency argument (Bragon et al. 2010). *Folha* reported that campaign marketer

João Santana had crafted the event's "women" theme in order to attract the female vote. The convention featured videos of famous Brazilian women, including Princess Isabel and the female composer Chiquinha Gonzaga. Female attendees sat in a special place near the front of the stage and received lilac-colored flags. María da Penha, an elite feminist who inspired Brazil's domestic violence law, appeared at the event manifesting her support. Rousseff opened her speech by declaring, "Here we celebrate, in first place, the Brazilian woman! Here is consecrated and is affirmed women's capacity of being—and of doing. It is in the name of all women of Brazil—especially my mother and my daughter—that I receive this homage" (Vicente 2010). She also offered a version of continuity and change by promising to govern like Lula but "with a women's soul and heart" (Bragon et al. 2010). The PT camp therefore dedicated material resources and symbols to galvanize PT women, including a few elite feminists.

Rousseff continued networking with female elites to persuade them to back her candidacy. At the end of June, she lunched with women in the home of supermarket chain owner Abilio Diniz (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010h). Diniz organized the event in order to enhance Rousseff's image among women. His wife hosted and invited 20 of her friends. Some of the attendees included wealthy socialites, such as soccer player Kaká's mother-in-law and Dior director Rosângela Lyra. "Dilma presented herself to the young women and *senhoras*...valuing her feminine side" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010i).

Rousseff again targeted female union workers in August 2010 by participating in an event entitled "Female Workers Ceremony with Dilma" put on by the women's sections of six São Paulo unions (Suwwan 2010). All but one of the organizations pledged official support for the Rousseff candidacy. The auditorium was decorated with lilac balloons—the color suggesting another effort to emphasize Rousseff's gender identity and symbolically target female voters. The candidate posed with female union members in an *O Globo* photo (Suwwan 2010).

Rousseff continued to promise PWC on the campaign trail even though none of her PWC pledges ended up in her official platform, which was only 11 pages long (Suwwan 2010). Her signature PWC proposals centered on pregnant women's health and infant care. She pledged to expand public services for these women and their babies by establishing specialized clinics, new maternities, intensive care services

and emergency ambulances. "We are going to articulate this network to the SAMU-Stork so that women do not stay here having children in the middle of the street," she announced. "In addition to that, the SAMU (emergency ambulances) with mini-intensive care babies, so that children that are born and run risks in the first months of life can be transported with security" (Suwwan 2010). Rousseff thus focused particularly on women's maternal health which fit well with her maternalist discourse, the next section's topic.

Rousseff symbolically highlighted her gender identity, particularly her femininity, during high-stakes, national events, suggesting this was a centerpiece of her overall electoral strategy (Novaes 2010). Journalist Carolina Isabel Novaes applauded her decision to wear pink in the Rede Globo presidential debate at the end of September.[vi]

> Well-thought was the choice of clothing for the last debate. Pink is a soft red. It is the peace and love side of red. And pink is universally women's color. Dilma was in a structured suit, the classic uniform for female politicians, but it was a pink suit with ruffled satin. Satin and ruffles are female. Dilma sent her message, with the right set of necklace and pearl earrings (Novaes 2010).

This emphasis on femininity could be interpreted as a way to establish shared identity with women voters and thereby elicit their trust and political support. It also served to soften her image as a leader with a masculine leadership style, an image that, as the next section will show, was believed to turn off some women.

In sum, Rousseff tried to galvanize female voters by speaking to crowds of women, promising PWC on the campaign trail, networking with female elites and deploying symbols to highlight shared gender identity. The next section will explain how and why Rousseff so fervently espoused maternalism in order to energize female voters.

1.2 Maternalist Discourse

This section shows that Rousseff adopted a maternalist discourse early on by reminding voters of her status as a literal mother and branding herself as the figurative mother of Brazil. I argue here that one of her primary—but not only—motivations in doing so was to establish shared identity, trust and

ultimately votes from women. This discourse was particularly aimed at unorganized women with a more conservative gender ideology.

Maternalism applied to Rousseff as a public figure actually originates with Lula, years before she ran for president. Lula claimed to have spontaneously dubbed Rousseff "mãe do Pac" (mother of the Growth Acceleration Program) back in 2008 (*O Globo* 2010d). He recalled in an interview how he came up with the title for his successor practically on a whim. "The first moment that it came to my head was when I, in the Rocinha favela in Rio, said that she was the *mãe do Pac*," Lula said. "Then, in truth, I was beginning to prepare her."[vii] Continuing to frame Rousseff in maternalist terms, Lula presented his protégée as the "mãe do Pac" in March while announcing the second stage of the ambitious state developmental plan (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010c; *Folha De S. Paulo* 2010d). [viii] [ix]

One intended goal of this maternalist discourse during the campaign was for Rousseff to establish shared identity with female voters, particularly mothers or future mothers who were unorganized and perhaps were believed to hold more traditional views of gender roles. Prior to running for president, the Casa Civil minister had earned a reputation as a "hard," masculine-style administrator. *Folha* argued that one of the campaign's challenges was to mitigate unfavorable perceptions of Rousseff's masculine side. The newspaper reported that the maternalist discourse was designed to "soften the image of a tough woman that speaks technical jargon" (Scolese and Rocha 2010). Those in the PT believed maternalism could help her shake this aspect of her public persona, which they believed repelled many female voters. Rousseff and her team hoped maternalism would help establish shared identity between Rousseff and "typical" Brazilian women, many of whom are mothers or future mothers (Flor 2010).

Political analysts outside the PT also seemed to view these concerns as a central motivation behind the maternal discourse. According to political scientist Marlise Matos, Rousseff's masculine image was responsible for her failure to attract women. "Dilma's figure represents toughness, aggressiveness," Matos said. "The masculine public identifies with this image, but not the female one. Female voters seem to identify more with traits linked to care, to health" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010f).[x] Therefore, some elites within and outside the PT believed that maternalism could enhance Rousseff's

185

appeal to female voters who preferred women leaders who fit rather than defied traditional gender stereotypes.

Even though Lula initiated efforts to draw out Rousseff's motherly qualities, the candidate herself was the major proponent of this tactic during her presidential bid. In May 2010, in a visit to Rio Grande do Sul, Rousseff said her style was the same as a *mãezona* that gets results (*faz cobranças*) because she wants what is best for her children. "I am not tough," Rousseff said. "I am like a mother. Mothers order (their children) to brush their teeth or do household chores. In the government, I was a kind of mother. I enforced deadlines but I gave support…too" (Scolese and Rocha 2010). *Folha* also quoted her saying "I am firm, but I take care. I protect" (Scolese and Rocha 2010). The newspaper interpreted Rousseff's word choice as aimed at women voters. "Looking for symphony with the female electorate is a result in her poor performance in this segment, in which she has 15 points less than the *tucano* José Serra," *Folha* wrote (Scolese and Rocha 2010). This provides additional evidence that maternalism was meant to broadly appeal to unorganized women who may not have supported Lula in 2006.

Rousseff also seized opportunities such as holidays to symbolically remind voters of her motherhood. Appearing on television on Mother's Day surrounded by women, she addressed the issue of crack–believed to disproportionately affect Brazil's youth and thus was thought to interest many mothers (Fraga 2010). Rousseff thus claimed to share mothers' concerns. *Folha* journalist Plinio Fraga noted that her speech centered on three words: "authority, love and support." "We are going to conquer this fight, and we mothers are going to be on the front lines," Rousseff declared (Fraga 2010). Fraga cast doubt on Rousseff's ability to attract female voters by broaching issues allegedly important to mothers:

> It was a message directed at the segment of the electorate that has presented great resistance to Dilma, women. The PT used the crack ghosts to try to attain the social strata through which any mother of any social class most preserves: children. Appealing? With certainty. Efficient? It is difficult to anticipate (Fraga 2010).

Rousseff's responses during a live *Jornal Nacional* interview with Fátima Bernardes and William Bonner further underscore her tendency to employ maternalism to improve her public image and establish shared identity with mothers. Bernardes brought up Rousseff's reputation for displaying a "difficult

temperament" and few negotiation skills, leadership weaknesses which even some of her allies supposedly criticized (Brisolla and Marqueiro 2010; *Folha De S. Paulo* 2010j). Bonner also cited a video in which Lula had admitted receiving complaints from ministers who accused her of mistreating them. Pressed about her potentially ineffective, masculine style, the candidate took recourse to the mother metaphor. "Do you know housewives?" she asked. "In the role of taking care of the government it's kind of like as if we are mothers. There is an hour to enforce and a moment to incentivize" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010j).[xi][xii][xiii]

Rousseff took recourse to maternalism when rumors circulated that she intended to legalize abortion. In the lead up to the first round, abortion debates gained saliency in part because the PSDB camp calculated that they could erode her support, particularly among social conservatives and therefore tried to put them high on the agenda (Cervellini et al 2011; Pacheco 2012). Abortion is illegal in Brazil, except for the cases of rape and to save the mother's life. Most polls showed that the majority of Brazilians favored the status quo, and none of the 2010 candidates promoted modifying the law.[xiv][xv] The opposition, however, exploited Rousseff's status as a woman from the left to paint her as a pro-choice candidate. A pamphlet circulated saying that Lula and Rousseff had signed the National Plan for Human Rights (PNDH-3) which favored the legalization of abortion (Cervellini, Giani, and Pavanelli 2011; Pacheco Jordão 2015). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Serra enlisted his wife as a surrogate to attack Rousseff on this issue. She publicly accused Rousseff of favoring the "killing little children" (Cervellini et al 2011).

Responding to the opposition's attacks, Rousseff re-emphasized family values and drew even more heavily on maternalism. Her free television time showed pictures of herself with her daughter as a baby. "The family issue was a very strong issue," Rousseff said in one commercial, in which she also was called a "woman, mother and grandmother" (Menezes and Marqueiro 2010). The Rousseff team continued to hammer away messages on the significance and advantages of her multiple identities as a woman, mother and grandmother in electoral propaganda (*O Globo* 2010r). A speaker in one radio advertisement said:

> Women's vision is capable of changing many things. From woman-mother, woman-grandmother, woman who respects life, woman who travels the world publicizing our country, woman capable of creating programs that fulfill the dreams of so many Brazilian families. That is Dilma, and with the strength and faith of women, she is going to make Brazil continue changing (*O Globo* 2010r).

While aiming to cultivate electoral support from mothers, Rousseff repeated that her abortion position favored the status quo. Visiting the crèche Lar de Crianças Casa de Ismael in Brasilia in October, she spoke on preventing unwanted pregnancies (*O Globo* 2010s). Positioning herself as a female candidate discussing abortion—a women's issue—at a union event in São Paulo. Rousseff did not take a feminist position, but instead conflated the issue with domestic violence:

> They continue to say that I am in favor of abortion. I, as a person, am against abortion. Because abortion is violence against women. Now, I, as president of the Republic, will not close my eyes to the thousands and thousands of Brazilian women and adolescents who commit extreme acts and put life at risk (*O Globo* 2010s).

Here it is unclear whose "life" Rousseff was referring to—whether that of the unborn fetus or that of the mother. She was walking a tightrope between portraying herself as a pro-life candidate (and therefore staying in sync with public opinion) but also potentially addressing elite feminists' concerns with maternal deaths related to clandestine abortions. She claimed to defend women during a visit to a São Paulo maternity hospital (*O Globo* 2010t).

> My proposal is to assure that girls and young women have support to have their children, that they not have to hide their pregnancy, that their parents not expel them from the house, that they not have a horrible thing, that is called fear, and be obligated to come to that point, the elimination of life (*O Globo* 2010t).

In sum, from the very beginning of Rousseff's candidacy, maternalism was central to her strategy to attract support from mostly unorganized women who supposedly held more traditional gender views. Rousseff used maternalism to establish shared identity with female voters and to protect herself from diverse attacks on her leadership style and abortion stance. She purposefully selected sites associated with motherhood—for example crèches and maternity hospitals—to further enhance her maternal image. The next section will show that while this discourse rested on a conservative gender ideology, Rousseff also appealed to women's more progressive leanings.

1.3 "First Female" Discourse

I argue here that Rousseff and Lula promoted her image as potentially Brazil's first female president in order to appeal to female voters. The premise of this discursive strategy was that women, and to a lesser extent men, generally liked the idea of electing the country's first female president, which could signal social equality or even cultural modernity (Towns 2012). The logic within the PT camp was that reminding Brazilians that a vote for Rousseff was a vote for the first female president would help attract voters, especially women, who viewed a first-time *presidenta* as a sign of progress. Because this strategy assumes that many female voters as possess some feminist rather than traditionalist inclinations, the "first female" theme could be interpreted as ideologically contradicting the maternalist theme.

Rousseff used the "first female" theme as she had her maternalist discourse—that is, early on and throughout her campaign. An early example of this occurred on International Women's Day in early March. Speaking in front of the Senate, Rousseff praised women's strength and recalled that she was the first female to assume the Casa Civil ministerial post. "They always ask me if women are ready to become president of Brazil," Rousseff said. "I tell you: Brazil is prepared to have a woman president" (Ceolin and Ramalho 2010). The Women's Day address adopted a more progressive tone by reminding Brazilians how Rousseff, having broken down gendered political barriers, was now poised to shatter the country's highest glass ceiling.

Speaking to an audience of women in May, Rousseff returned to the first female theme and the challenges that women leaders face. According to the candidate, many believed that women do not know how to make decisions, but that is a tremendous mistake. "In an indirect reference to herself, the pre-candidate said that women are ready for power," *O Globo* wrote (2010c). She then evoked shared gender identity and linked fate:

> I learned that women are ready to govern Brazil. Not because only one or another woman stands out. But, especially, because Brazil has a group of women of expression in society. I believe that not only women are prepared to govern Brazil as Brazil is prepared to be governed by women in all instances (*O Globo* 2010c)

Rousseff here was aiming to tap into some women's gender progressive leanings. However, rather than adopting a purely feminist message, she often mixed in more traditional ideas. For example, Rousseff sought the female vote by praising women's qualities in a speech to the Rural Women's

189

Association in Uberaba in May (*O Globo* 2010c). She claimed that sensitivity, courage, practicality and good sense differentiated women from men. She added that women were ready to govern the country and thereby hinted at her run to become not only president, but Brazil's first *presidenta*.[xvi] The candidate made essentialist statements about the genders in an effort to unite women behind a common, positive identity.

Rousseff also employed both discourses in a speech in Mato Grosso when she alluded to her plan to succeed Lula. "We all are going to be emotional when President Lula goes down the ramp (of the Presidential Palace Planalto) on December 31," Rousseff said. "And he will be passing to me, to dispute the election, a great responsibility. It is not just governing, but taking care of the people that he loves. That day, the only thing that will console me is that, for the first time a woman will be going up the ramp" (Carvalho Pinto 2010). Rousseff's suggestion that she would take care of Brazilians as did Lula, the metaphorical "father of Brazil" again alluded to maternalist themes. Rousseff therefore mixed both "first female" and maternalist themes.

Rousseff also discussed becoming the first female president in a similar way that Lula had spoken in earlier campaigns about his identity as the first union worker president (Barbosa 2010b). Lula had often remarked that he could not error because he was a unionist: if he made a mistake it would be difficult for another worker to be elected president. Rousseff employed an analogous discursive tactic. In August 2010, accompanied by Lula, Rousseff met with workers from a Mercedes-Benz factory in São Paulo. She declared:

> Your fight resulted in Brazil having, for the first time, a metalworker president. And today Brazil is very different from Brazil of 2002. Today's Brazil has hope. Lula always said that, as a worker, he could not error because, if not, never again would a worker arrive to the presidency. I, as a woman, cannot error either because if I do, a woman is never going to become president of the country…I want to say to you that I am going to be the first *presidenta* of this country, your *presidenta* (Freire 2010b). [xvii]

The expected voter response to the "first worker" message was the same as the expected response to the "first female" frame: the prospect of electing an in-group member to the presidency for the first time should motivate in-group members to turn out to vote.[xviii] Rousseff reprised the theme in September, when she again underscored her "first female" identity in declaring that voters needed to elect a woman to end discrimination (de Carvalho 2010). Seeking votes in the periphery of Curitiba, she drew parallels

between her current campaign and Lula's 2002 campaign which emphasized the "first union member" message. "In electing Lula, the people ended with the prejudice that a metalworker could not be president," Rousseff said. "Now, it is time to finish with the prejudice and elect a woman. Lula always told me that it is not difficult to govern. The difficult thing is taking care of the people. And that is what we are going to do: continue governing so that the country continues forward and people's lives continue improving" (de Carvalho 2010). Rousseff pledged to fight gender discrimination by breaking the glass ceiling and faithfully pursue Lula's political legacy by "caring" for Brazilians. This "first female" speech therefore also featured maternalist undertones.

After the first round, many in the PT tried to spin Silva's surprisingly strong finish as evidence that Brazilians wanted to elect a woman. A Rousseff advertisement from the second round disseminated statements such as "It is time for a woman!" and "If people add the votes that Dilma had in the first round with Marina's votes, it is going to be more than 67%. Brazilians want a female president of the Republic" (*O Globo* 2010r). This specific move could have been a way for the Rousseff camp to court Silva's female supporters who wanted to elect Brazil's first *presidenta*.

Some PT politicians expressed support for the Rousseff candidacy by echoing the same "first female" theme. Applauding her first round performance, Rio de Janeiro Governor Sérgio Cabral drew on Lula's first metalworker identity in promoting Rousseff's presidential bid (*O Globo* 2010q). "Dilma should be congratulated for the performance that she had," Cabral commented. "And having a woman in the presidency...it is so good to see Brazil innovating after having a factory worker in the presidency…" (*O Globo* 2010q).[xix]

Other high-profile female politicians, endorsing Rousseff, also framed their candidate's identity as a "first female" (*O Globo* 2010o). Appealing to notions of shared gender identity, PT Senator Serys Slhessarenko's comments rested on notions of linked fate: "I believe that every woman in this country is going to feel like the President of the Republic with a woman in the presidency" (Ceolin and Ramalho 2010). The implication was that a victory for a first-time *presidenta* would benefit all Brazilian women.

Another example of elite women speaking out for Rousseff occurred in an "act against the *golpista* media" hosted by union organizations and PT leaders. Hundreds of participants gathered at the end of September to condemn the media's treatment of Rousseff's campaign. PSB deputy Luiza Erundina argued that the media's anti-Rousseff coverage was based on fear. "Do you know why the angry reaction from them?" Erundina rhetorically asked. "Because the administration of the first workers of this country succeeded! Because we are going to elect the first woman!"[xx]

To conclude, maternalism and the "first female" identity framing presented ideological tensions, and Rousseff and her team may have crafted these discourses to appeal to different groups of women. While the maternalist discourse targeted those who preferred women in traditional roles, the "first female" framing catered to those with more progressive and even feminist leanings. It is also possible that millions of female voters maintain both maternalist and progressive beliefs, and thus the appeals were directed to women with ideologically inconsistent opinions. Future research can explore both possibilities. Either way, this section has made clear that Rousseff and her team tailored both discourses with the intention to specifically target women.

1.4. Lula Leverages Rousseff's Gender Identity to Try to Mobilize Women

Brazilian law forbids presidents from using state resources (*máquina pública*) to promote a presidential candidate prior to the official campaign period, but Lula often toured Brazil with his hand-picked successor anyway. His message was consistent: she was his choice for president. In light of Chapter V's findings on his scarce efforts to mobilize women in 2006, he seemed to adopt a more pro-women discourse when Rousseff—rather than he—was the candidate. The core constituency argument would explain this by the fact that political elites tend to believe that women are more effective than men at mobilizing women. I argue that because Rousseff was a woman, Lula calculated that he could discursively deploy her gender identity to rally women behind her candidacy.

Lula seized opportunities to evoke gender equality themes while promoting the Bolsa Família. In June 2010, the PT president held an event for Volkswagen workers in São Paulo where he awarded Bolsa Família beneficiaries certificates for completing a professional training program. "I believe that it is

192

extraordinary that 80% of the people educated are women," Lula said. "It means that women companions are no longer content to stay at home waiting for their husbands to work and bring money home" (Freire 2010a). *O Globo* interpreted his praise for these working women as a way for him to cater to women voters, a constituency he had yet to capture for himself, and by extension, for Rousseff.

Another instance where Lula lauded women's progress occurred at the inauguration of a university campus in São Paulo. Due to Brazilian law, the president avoided mentioning his hand-picked successor directly, but dedicated part of his speech to praising women (Barbosa 2010a). He noted that 51% of the masters' and doctoral students were female. *O Globo* again suggested that he complimented Brazilian women to boost Rousseff's support among female voters.

At a rally in August, Lula also defended her against what he interpreted as sexist behavior by a *Jornal Nacional* interviewer. "I have known debates for many years, and I hoped that, for the fact that you are a woman and a female candidate, the interviewer should have had a little more kindness," Lula said. He also had advised Rousseff to maintain her calm when pressured in debates or interviews. "Because the truth is that there are people who are very afraid that a woman can prove that she is more capable than many men" (Vasconcelos 2010). Here Lula's comment might be interpreted as feminist since he first identifies and then challenges conventional gender stereotypes.[xxi] The remarks clearly sought to evoke shared identity between Rousseff and female voters who may have experienced sexism themselves.

Lula directly spoke to women and portrayed himself as an anti-prejudice advocate while stumping for Rousseff at one of the campaign's largest rallies. Lula condemned sex discrimination and reminded the crowd that many predicted that Brazilians would not vote for a woman. Lula claimed to have insisted on his decision because it was time for change. "How can someone have prejudice against women in politics?" Lula asked the crowd. "When I was elected deputy (for the Constitutional Assembly), there was no women's bathroom in the National Congress. Women could not enter Congress with pants" (Lima 2010a). Lula chose this anecdote to acknowledge Brazilian women's struggle to obtain

equal political rights, and he thereby appeal to women voters who perceived gender discrimination in their country.

Lula again trumpeted his own pro-women decision to select Rousseff as his successor in September. At a rally in Minas Gerais, he said those of the PSDB (the opposition) thought he was crazy for picking a woman as his candidate, and now they were going to lose the election: "They said, 'This Lula is crazy. He is going to choose a woman? Brazil does not have the habit of voting for women. He is going to choose a person who does not have political culture, who does not participate in party meetings. Lula is crazy,'"(Brisolla 2010). Lula's speech was not just self-laudatory—a pat on the back for promoting women in politics: he also praised Rousseff for achieving political success despite the odds. According to Lula's speech, his PSDB enemies were nervous about her lead in the polls, and Rousseff would triumph despite her doubters.[xxii]

1.5. Rousseff's Few PWC Promises and Rocky Relationship with Elite Feminists

Rousseff made some PWC promises on the campaign trail—including improved childcare and maternal healthcare. Her platform promised continuity with Lula's legacy, which included significant, but at times controversial, PWC.[xxiii] However, she herself promised little *new* pro-women change and did not include any of the measures she verbally promised into her formal document. This observation accords with her paradoxical, but effective, campaign slogan to "continue changing." I argue that, although Rousseff did seem to network with proportionately more women than her male counterparts, the fact that she did not propose any PWC in her platform relates to her weak ties to elite feminists.

Rousseff's overarching campaign theme of "upward social mobility" evoked Lula's success in raising Brazilians out of poverty and stressed her relationship with Lula (Power 2014, 28).[xxiv] The brief, 11-page document opens by paying homage to the Lula administration which created jobs, facilitated social mobility, maintained low inflation and reduced the debt (pg. 2). The document cites Lula's successful Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), My House My Life program (MCMV), Lights for Everyone (Luz para Todos) and of course the Bolsa Família as its main achievements.

Some elite feminists within the PT view both MCMV and the Bolsa Família as pro-women programs because of their preferential treatment for mothers. However, I do not consider these proposals as presented in the platform to constitute PWC for three reasons. First, the document does not suggest they disproportionately favor women; instead it portrays the programs as targeting the poor. Second, the platform does not propose to innovate with these programs, but merely to extend and maintain them. Although it is consistent with the "continue changing" idea, the interpretation of these proposals representing pure "change" may be questioned. Third, feminists have criticized these programs for promoting traditional stereotypes (Lavinas 2015). Relatedly, elite feminists on the left noted in interviews that neither program was specifically designed to promote women but to assist the poor (Lavinas 2015; Pereira 2015).[xxv]

Aside from statements about faithfully pursuing Lula's legacy, the document claims another advantage of a Rousseff presidency to be her managerial success during the PT administrations. "Dilma had a central participation in the great transformation through which Brazil passed in the last eight years. As Minister of Mines and Energy and as Chief of Staff, she coordinated the Lula administration's great initiatives" (pg. 4). Rousseff is described as the right person to take the reins from Lula because of her personal history fighting against the dictatorship and "for the people," her high level of education and her administrative experiences. The document finally lays out 13 promises, none of which mention gender equality or any kind of PWC.

The archival analysis has so far revealed that while campaigning, Rousseff did promote a few PWC pledges, namely the construction of 6,000 crèches and improved care for pregnant women and infants. Her very short platform, however, tries to link the candidate as closely to the president as possible and offers no PWC promises. Why did Rousseff promise so little PWC? Following Chapter II, a dominant explanation focuses a lack a feminist consciousness due to life choices and experiences that conform to gendered expectations (Klein 1984; Carroll 1989; Reingold and Foust 1998). That chapter argued that Bachelet and Rousseff, in making non-traditional life choices both professionally and personally, challenged the gender status quo, and thus feminist consciousness

theory would predict that both developed an awareness of gender inequalities and pro-women change attitudes. A lack of feminist consciousness can hardly explain why Rousseff promised so little PWC in 2010.

A more plausible explanation for the dearth of PWC proposals points to Rousseff's network of advisers, or personal constituency. Chapter II hypothesized that because elite feminists, by definition, have an interest in increasing women's political representation, they are more likely to network with female candidates than male candidates. Chapter IV showed the Bachelet's network seemed to feature a much greater proportion of elite feminists than Lagos' network. In stark contrast, Rousseff had few ties to elite feminists and drew her own team of advisers from Lula's personal constituency.[xxvi] Rousseff's lack of ties to elite feminists at the same time helps account for the scarcity of PWC proposals.

The question then turns to: why would the first viable female presidential candidate of a country with the region's largest women's movement network little with elite feminists? Even though Rousseff's biographies lead us to expect her to possess a gender consciousness, it also suggests little contact with the women's movement. Rousseff participated in leftist guerrilla warfare groups of the 1960s and 70s rather than in the feminist or women's groups that organized during a similar time period (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010a). Men dominated these leftist militant groups, which seemed to interact little, if at all, with feminist or women's organizations of the time (Alvarez 1990). To sum up, although Rousseff, like Bachelet, possessed a feminist consciousness and PWC attitudes, *unlike* Bachelet, she networked little with elite feminists in Brazil.

In addition to reviewing her personal history for clues to any possible relationships with influential leaders of women's groups, I asked elite feminists in interviews whether Rousseff had close contacts with them or other elite feminists. According to these conversations, only two women within Rousseff's personal constituency qualify as elite feminists: PT Senator Marta Suplicy and Eleonora Menicucci, who shared a prison cell with Rousseff during the 1970s (Avelar 2015; Pacheco Jordão 2015). Rousseff eventually named Menicucci to head Brazil's Women's Ministry.

However, even if Rousseff did not have strong relationships with feminists prior to her presidential bid, she still could have developed them during the campaign. Why did elite feminists not support Brazil's first viable female presidential candidate more fervently? Several elements of the Rousseff strategy drew strong criticism from prominent feminists both within and outside the PT and help explain why so many felt alienated rather than energized by her candidacy.

One week after the PT convention in which Rousseff was nominated for president, a leading feminist, Terezinha Vicente claimed to speak on behalf of all PT feminists in a column entitled "'It's Not Enough to be a Woman,' Defend Feminists." Vicente's first critique of the Rousseff campaign centered on her maternalist discourse, in particular the convention's slogan of "Patria Livre, Patria Mãe".[xxvii] She pointed out that maternalism promoted traditional gender roles and then quoted Brazilian feminist Sueli Oliveira: "We were seen the whole life as mothers and we do not want just that for women" (Vicente 2010). Vicente continued:

> When Dilma says 'We, women, were born with a feeling of caring, supporting and protecting. We are unbeatable in the defense of our children and our family,' valuing these functions as women's great qualities, she is collaborating with patriarchy's and fundamentalists' values in the defense of women's place is in the house, in the home and in the family. And capitalism is thankful for women's continued slavery in the glorious production and reproduction of life, and supplying abundant and cheap labor (2010).

Vicente's second critique related to Lula's paternalistic, dominant role in the Rousseff campaign. She noted that the *Folha* headline after the PT convention was "In Lula's Shadow, Dilma Promises Women's Soul."

> When Lula said that the *cédula* will have an empty space, and 'it is so that that space be filled, I changed my name and I am going to put Dilma,' joking, he reinforces the old belief in women's inferiority, that they need men, in the end she came from his rib. The enormous photo that *Folha* published on Monday, with Lula's shadow in speaking projected on the image of Dilma on the screen, is emblematic of the portrait that they want to fix on the female candidate (Vicente 2010).

Vicente stressed that other PT feminists also worried that perceptions of Rousseff as Lula's hand-picked successor reinforced rather than challenged conventional gender stereotypes. She also lamented the fact that virtually no feminists were advising Rousseff. Another elite feminist, demographer José Alves, echoed Vicente's concerns with Rousseff's maternalist discourse and her subservient image (Alves 2016). He also lamented her lack of PWC proposals and called on the candidate to incorporate ideas from

197

the 2010 electoral platform for gender equality produced by the Brazilian women's movement. The platform was based on the results of the second National Plan for Policies for Women.[xxviii]

In addition to a scarce feminist presence in her personal constituency, Rousseff's team of political and technical advisers overlapped greatly with Lula's.[xxix] Several of Lula's ministers played key roles in the her campaign (*O Globo* 2010e; *O Globo* 2010h). Journalist Eliane Cantanhêde noted that Rousseff did not cultivate a loyal following independent of Lula's. "Dilma is a warrior woman, in addition to being applied, determined and seemingly well-intentioned," Cantanhêde wrote. "But her strength is not team. When she assumed the Mines and Energy post, she hardly brought anyone (with her)" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010m). Cantanhêde added that one person who Rousseff did bring to the Casa Civil was Erenice Guerra. Drawing her own advisers almost exclusively from Lula's inner core was dangerous, according to Cantanhêde, because presidents must cultivate a faithful following of their own or else will face increased vulnerability.

> In the campaign, she found a ready team: the PT president José Eduardo Dutra, deputy José Eduardo Cardozo and... Antonio Palocci. She wasn't a friend, not even close, to any of them. The one of her personal quota was the former mayor Fernando Pimentel...Dilma was right to bring her mother and aunt to Alvorada (the presidential residence), for personal warmth and in maintaining Giles Azevedo, who has accompanied her for 19 years. But more is needed. Her risk is isolation within her own administration (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010m).

Rousseff thus had few prior relationships with these advisers who appeared more loyal to Lula than to her. These men moreover wielded the most influence over her decision-making—exerting far more power than any elite feminist.

Although Rousseff had very few personal constituents who were elite feminists, by some accounts, she seemed to network with other female politicians more than her male counterparts. *O Globo* noted after the election that Rousseff seemed "surrounded by women...In the political and advisory circle, there is a swarm of women" (Lima 2010b). Some of the women, who were reportedly close to Rousseff, served as her most important political and technical advisors, but again, were not elite feminists. The most prominent example is Erenice Guerra, Rousseff's "right hand" who replaced her as Chief of Staff after Rousseff stepped down to run for president (*O Globo*

2010m; *O Globo* 2010n). Gleisi Hoffman acted as Rousseff's "right hand" during Lula's first term. Journalist Helena Chagas, who served as Rousseff's press coordinator during the campaign, had "been her faithful squire, most constant companion in the last eight months, and she was scheduled to accompany her on her first foreign trip as president-elect in Seoul" (Lima 2010b). Ideli Salvatti, Katia Abreu, and PT Senator Marta Suplicy, reportedly had personal strong ties to Rousseff (*O Globo* 2010w). Suplicy also had strong ties to Lula, having helped manage his 2006 campaign. Special advisor to Lula, Clara Ant was set to continue on in the Rousseff administration, but there is no evidence that she was particularly close to Rousseff.

Rousseff's mother, daughter and aunt, considered her source of emotional support, undoubtedly formed part of her personal constituency. The press often noted that Rousseff enjoyed close relationships with other high-profile Brazilian women, namely first lady Marisa Leticia and talk show host Ana Maria Braga (Lima 2010b; Orrico 2016; *Folha De S. Paulo* 2010e). [xxx] Petrobras president Maria das Graças Foster is widely seen as Rousseff's "best" friend (*O Globo* 2010v; *O Globo* 2010u). Yet, none of these women qualify as elite feminists, that is, as individuals with a history of fighting gender discrimination.

To conclude, Chapter II argued that Rousseff's and Bachelet's similarly nontraditional biographies suggests they had much to gain from feminism and were exposed to feminist ideas, and thus probably developed a feminist consciousness and PWC attitudes. These *presidentas* nevertheless diverged dramatically in terms of their ties to women's groups and elite feminists. While Chile's *presidenta* maintained close ties to many elite feminists before running for president, Brazil's *presidenta* networked little with elite feminists. This dissertation argues that these striking differences in personal constituencies helps make sense of the puzzlingly divergent use of power by these *presidentas*. Chapter VII will statistically test to see whether Rousseff legislated to promote PWC in different ways from Lula.

2. Silva Leverages Multiple Identities to Target Women

Silva was not considered a viable presidential candidate during most of 2010, but I include her in the analysis because of her strong third-place finish. Consistent with the core constituency hypothesis, Silva, like Rousseff, aimed to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity earlier and to a greater extent than her male counterparts. I argue here that Silva leveraged her multiple identities—woman, black (*parda*), evangelical and (previously) impoverished—in order to earn votes not just of women in general, but specific subsets of women.[xxxi] This section will provide strong evidence in favor of the core constituency hypothesis.

Silva's efforts to target women, blacks, the poor as well as evangelicals on the basis of shared identity is particularly notable because her party historically had not attracted these voter segments. The Green Party tended to perform better among the well-educated and middle class. Silva's perceived potential to leverage her identities to mobilize these constituencies energized her team which was eager to become a more electorally viable party. "Marina has good access to poor women, a segment which the PV has never dreamed of getting close to," said Alfredo Sirkis, general coordinator of her pre-campaign. "They identify with her, because of her history, her Christian life" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010k). Sirkis added that her candidacy presented potential for growth among poor women. "It is an extremely faithful electorate, once it is captured," he said. " It is not subject to the oscillations of the middle class, that has a strategic and volatile vote" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010k).

Given these projections about her latent ability to reach specific kinds of women, Silva devoted campaign efforts to these groups early on in the race. *Folha* reported at the beginning of March that Silva was ready to target three (often overlapping) demographics: women, Christians and the lower classes (Delgado 2010a). The Green Party reportedly had crafted a strategy to target popular sectors by stressing her impoverished childhood and Catholic faith. Her pre-campaign coordinators said that due to the high level of unfamiliarity with their candidate, it was necessary to increase her visibility among these groups. They again remarked that these sectors had been difficult to capture in previous elections.

Polls suggesting Silva's potential to grow among female voters reportedly motivated her efforts to reach out to women in March and April. Silva met with Green Party women and female leaders from

the Federation of Rural Workers of the State of São Paulo (FERAESP) in March (Delgado 2010b; Scolese 2010; Ribeiro 2010). She then scheduled another event with female rural workers the following month (Delgado 2010d).

As the official election season approached, Silva was still trying to improve her name recognition among Brazilian voters, a third of whom still did not know who she was (Roxo 2010a). She and her team designed television advertisements to highlight her personal biography as a poor black woman from the Northern state of Acre. According to *O Globo*, Green Party advisers expected Silva's life story to elicit "empathy" with lower class women, who in the past had identified with President Lula.[xxxii]

Although she sought support from lower-class female voters who appeared satisfied with the Lula administration, Silva also drew on her gender and racial identities in an effort to bolster her image as a change candidate (*O Globo* 2010f). She often employed the "first female" frame to hammer away a message of change. In an August interview with the television show *Jornal Nacional*, she reminded viewers that she was the first woman of humble and black origins to run for president. Serra "is the repetition of what was in 2006," she argued while on the campaign trail in Rio de Diamantina. "I am the great novelty. The whole world is looking at Brazil because it signals that it wants to have a female in the Presidency of the Republic" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010k).

Silva also framed her identity as a "first female" while speaking to a São Paulo crowd at the end of August. Her goal at this point in the campaign was to surpass Serra, her next closest competitor, and to this end, she appealed to the crowd's perceived desire for a female president. "If society wants a woman in the second round, we are going to put both of them so that, with equal (free television) time, both can debate," she said. "And after 500 years of history, Brazil can decide which woman it wants to see in the Presidency of the Republic" (*O Globo* 2010k).

Silva again called on "first female" themes in a live *O Globo* interview in September. When asked about gender in the campaign, she argued that Rousseff and Serra were both similar in their world visions and personal styles (*O Globo* 2010l). Her response then implied that Rousseff's leadership was

more stereotypically masculine that her own. "There is a difference, yes, between my style and Minister

Dilma's style," Silva said.

> I believe in process. I believe that leadership should be more multi-centric because processes are multi-centric. From the point of view of trajectories, obviously we all fought for democracy, and it makes me happy that we have two women competing for the presidency, and obviously, I come from a trajectory of a person who had to do everything herself (*O Globo* 2010l).

Silva, finding fault with her female competitor, implied that she owed much of her candidacy to

Lula. After indirectly attacking Rousseff's maternalist discourse ("one who wants to infantilize"), she

returned to the "first female" frame at the end of her response.

> I feel honored to have two women, and Brazil is prepared to surprise itself. After 500 years of history, a woman can win. After having elected a sociologist, having elected an *operário*, you could have in the 21st century leadership for Brazil, not one who wants to infantilize Brazilians, but one who wants Brazil to be a country that is the owner of its own destiny. So that, independent of its mother, father, uncle and grandmother, it (Brazil) manages to establish itself as a country of equal opportunities for everyone (*O Globo* 2010l).

Campaigning in Minas Gerais, Silva returned to "first female" themes at the end of September

(Caballero 2010). "I feel that Brazilian society is prepared to have a woman in the presidency," she

declared to a crowd of evangelicals. The fact that Silva used a "first female" discourse while courting

religious conservatives suggests that she thought these voters would welcome rather than feel threatened

by the prospect of a first-time *presidenta*. "First female" appeals thus at times seemed to transcend

political ideology.

This analysis suggests that like Rousseff, Silva often framed her identity as a "first female," but

unlike Rousseff, Silva decided against using maternalism to establish shared identity with female

voters.[xxxiii] Furthermore, like Alvear and Bachelet in Chile, part of Silva's female mobilization strategy

involved recalling her experiences with sexism.[xxxiv] For example, she taped a television interview in which

she recalled overcoming gender prejudice when she left the *seringal* to study in the university (Delgado

2010d). In these ways, Silva's discourse targeting women might be viewed as more feminist than

Rousseff's.[xxxv]

Silva therefore tried to target specific subsets of the female electorate. However, she also made

several broader appeals to women, which at times make essentialist assumptions about women's

identities. For example, during the high-profile *Sabatina Folha* in June, Silva was asked about the significance of a woman president governing the country. She responded that women "are more inclusive. They have more negotiation ability. They tend much more to consensus than to disputes" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010g). These broad generalizations praising women assumed that all women possessed comparative advantages in leadership, and these essentialist claims were designed to unite Brazilian women behind her candidacy.

Silva thus tried to mobilize female voters on the basis of gender identity by evoking shared identities, but overall she promised little PWC. Representing the highly ideological Green Party, her presidential platform focused on sustainability rather than PWC. The only PWC promise was to fight all forms of discrimination—including sexism—and to promote education, health and social assistance for small children "so that women can work with tranquility" (Silva 2010, 19).

On the campaign trail, the closest Silva came to promising PWC was her pledge to continue the Lula administration's policies, which she, like Rousseff, claimed favored women. In an effort to cultivate the low-income, female vote, Silva promised during a presidential debate to improve existing programs that directly benefited impoverished mothers. "The housing deficit is very serious," Silva said. "In the last 16 years, investment for the poorest families left something to be desired. The program Minha Casa Minha Vida is very good, but it does not reach the population that earns up to two minimum wages. We are going to maintain this program and give it a new quality, so that it reaches even poor women" (*O Globo* 2010p).

Although Silva's campaign reveals strong evidence of a strategy to mobilize women by evoking shared gender identities, it reveals little evidence for the expectation that female candidates are more likely to network with elite feminists and other female politicians. The fact that Silva seemed to interact little with elite feminists helps explain why she promised little PWC.[xxxvi] Little evidence suggests Silva's network included a greater proportion of women than the networks of her male counterparts. However, any conclusions concerning the extent to which her candidacy provides or fails to provide evidence for

the core and personal constituency hypotheses should be tempered by the fact that her campaign received considerably less coverage than Rousseff's and Serra's.

3. Female Candidates' Failures and Successes Among Female Voters

The previous sections have illustrated how both female candidates early on and consistently tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity throughout the 2010 campaigns. In the end, however, these women seemed to enjoy varying degrees of success. To statistically test these arguments derived from the archival research, I used survey data from October 27-28, 2006 and October 28, 2010, the final surveys fielded by Datafolha before the second round. I looked at the question: "Who did you vote for?" and built vote choice models for each candidate. Dependent variables are coded 1 if the respondent said he/she voted for Lula in 2006 (Model #1), for Rousseff in 2010 (Model #2 and #3), or for Silva in 2010 (Model #4) and 0 if the respondent said they voted for another candidate, did not vote or voted blank/null.

The main variable of interest is respondent sex, coded 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if male. I included control variables only if they were asked in both surveys and appear as major voting determinants in the secondary literature (Alves 2012; Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008; Zucco 2013). Controls include a dummy variable for residing in the Northeast region as well as ordinal variables for respondent education, income and age cohort.[xxxvii] Party variables are important for modeling the impact of respondent sex on vote choice because members of these parties may be mostly male, and thus may confound the relationship between respondent sex and candidate vote choice. A question about party preference was not included in the 2006 survey, so I only included party dummies for a second Rousseff model and Silva's model.

Table 1: Determinants of First-Round Vote Choice for Lula, Rousseff and Silva

	Model #1	Model #2	Model #3	Model #4
	Voted Lula 2006	Voted Rousseff 2010	Voted Rousseff 2010	Voted Silva 2010
Sex	-0.25***	-0.24***	-0.13*	0.27***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Northeast	0.76***	0.56***	0.61**	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Education	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.20**	0.32***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Income	-0.0002	-0.004**	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
PT/PV	--	--	2.11***	1.72***
	--	--	(0.09)	(0.25)
Age	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.08**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
N	12,561	4,205	4,205	4,205

***P<0.01 **P<0.05 *P<0.10

Notes: Datafolha fielded the surveys on October 27-28, 2006 and October 28, 2010. "Northeast" is coded 1 if the respondent is from the Northeast region of Brazil and 0 if not. "Education" is measured on a scale of 1-8 where 1 corresponds to illiterate and 8 corresponds to graduate studies. "Income" is measured on a 1-7 scale with 1 in 2006 being less than R$700 and 7 being more than R$17,501; and 1 in 2010 being less than R$1,020 and 7 being more than R$25,501. "Age" is coded on a 1-6 scale where 1 corresponds to 16-17, 2 corresponds to 18-24, 3 to 25-34, 4 to 34-44, 5 to 45-59 and 6 to 60 and over. PT and PV are dummy variables where 1 is coded for respondents identifying with the respective party and 0 is otherwise.

The first three variables in Models #1-#3 are significant and their impacts are in the expected directions. Sex exerts a significant and negative impact, meaning that controlling for several possible confounders, being female decreased the likelihood of voting for Lula or Rousseff. Respondents from the northeast were also more likely to vote for both candidates while respondents with higher education levels were less likely.

Income was not significant in Model #1, meaning that after controlling for various confounders, particularly education, income does not exert an independent impact on vote choice for Lula in 2006. This appears to contradict some conventional wisdom that he attracted poor voters, but is consistent with extant studies of the 2006 elections (Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2013). In Model #2, however, income does appear to exert a significant and, as expected, negative impact, but once we add in a dummy variable for the PT, income is no longer significant. As expected, PT preference appear significant in Model #3. Finally, the age variable was only significant and negative in Model #2, and thus age does not seem an important determinant of vote choice for either candidate.[xxxviii]

Turning to Model #4, the sex coefficient is significant and positive, meaning that after controlling for various confounders, being female augmented the likelihood of voting for Silva in the first round. This is consistent with the argument that Silva mobilized female voters by the very end of the campaign. The northeast and income coefficients are not significant, but the education, Green Party dummy and age coefficients are. As expected, better educated and younger respondents as well as those who preferred the Green Party were more likely to vote for Silva. In sum, these statistical results are consistent with my argument that Rousseff's constituencies greatly overlapped with Lula's in 2006, meaning she failed to mobilize a significant core constituency of women while Silva did succeed in mobilizing this demographic.

What could explain Silva's comparative advantage among female voters? While Rousseff consistently earned more male than female vote intentions throughout the campaign, Silva's female gap emerged during the final days (Alves 2012). Polling analysis suggested that a significant group of female voters stopped backing Rousseff and moved to Silva's camp (Scofield Jr. 2010). Comparisons of Datafolha surveys from September 21-22 and from the eve of the election show that Rousseff's female support fell from 47% to 42% while Serra's rose from 28% to 30% in the same period. Silva's support among women rose 14% to 18%, that is, beyond the statistically significant margin. *Folha* observed that one of the main electoral tendencies was a "green wave" favoring Silva in the C class, with growth in the South, Southeast and Northeast and "an unprecedented support among the female electorate in the final stretch of the campaign" (Canzian 2010). This suggests that although she tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity early on, her female constituency may not have moved to her side because of these specific efforts but because of other factors. In this sense, we cannot infer with much certainty that Silva successfully mobilized women *on the basis of gender identity*.

Fully exploring Rousseff's failure and Silva's success among women is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is worth briefly listing possible explanations. Alves (2012), concurring with the *Folha* analysis cited above, argues that Silva's strong finish and the necessity for a second round was in part thanks to this last minute transfer of women's support. He suggested the Guerra scandal disappointed

many women who were leaning toward Rousseff, and some moved toward Silva. Alves based his conclusion on the fact that the Green Party candidate did not earn more female than male voters until the Guerra accusations emerged. He also argued that Rousseff would have won in the first round had not these female voters changed their minds at the last minute.

> With the increase in uncertainties in the last week of the first round campaign, the Silva candidacy practically doubled in size, going from about 10% to almost 20% of vote intentions. The so-called "green wave" meant that the Green Party candidate had grown among women, among the electorate worried with environmental issues and among some sectors of the evangelical segments. The female electorate behavior was decisive in taking the elections to a second round… (Alves 2012, 33).

In addition to the Guerra scandal, another factor that could have damaged Rousseff's standing among women might have been PSDB attacks. Party members allegedly spread rumors that Rousseff intended to legalize abortion, and this could have turned off conservative women, motivating them to switch to Silva. "The Marina Silva proposal to leave a moral issue, like abortion, to be resolved by plebiscite, plus the pressure of religious groups to convince the conservative female vote, especially in the most backward regions and outside of the great urban centers, changed the position," commented political scientist Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga of the Universidade Federal de São Carlos (Uscar) (Scofield Jr. 2010).

Nevertheless, short-term explanations for Rousseff's failure among women that point to the Guerra scandal or the abortion debate offer limited value because Rousseff struggled to attract women throughout 2010. In other words, Rousseff never earned more vote intentions from women than men and thus the "cause" must be related to long-term factors. Public opinion expert Fátima Pacheco Jordão suggested that Serra's and Silva's advantage among female voters was due to their proposals. "While men are focused on partisan politics and power, concerned with ideological and programmatic disputes, women are more oriented to micropolitics or public policy," she explained. Women are more "attentive to issues like school spaces, attention in health posts, including female issues, like this discussion about abortion. And Marina as well as Serra were more specific on these points, even though they had a discourse that lacked clear proposals" (Scofield Jr. 2010).

In addition to these factors, this chapter's analysis would also suggest that ideological contradictions in Rousseff's discourses targeting women could also have contributed to her failure to mobilize a core constituency of female voters. While maternalism valued women's traditional roles, the "first female" frame praised women who defied gender conventions. Female voters may have been confused and turned off by the mixed messages. Future research can systematically explore the question of why Rousseff failed to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity.

4. Chapter Summary and Conclusions

The Rousseff and Silva campaigns provide strong evidence for the core constituency hypothesis. I found strong evidence for the core constituency hypothesis. Both of their initial campaign efforts involved mobilizing women on the basis of gender identity, and both sought to frame their identities as "first females." Despite these similarities, the specific ways in which they tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity differed. Rousseff made PWC promises related to maternal health on the campaign trail. More importantly, she crafted a maternalist discourse to appeal to women with more traditional gender ideologies—a move that elicited sharp criticism from her opponents and elite feminists. Neither Rousseff nor Silva networked extensively with elite feminists and their platforms promised very little PWC. There is some evidence that they networked more with female elites than their male counterparts, but overall I found much less support for the personal than the core constituency hypothesis.

Rousseff's most successful strategy was to emphasize continuity with Lula and mobilize the same core constituencies that had secured his 2006 re-election. Virtually all analysts agree that Lula's popularity and strong endorsement was essential to Rousseff's victory. The less successful part of her campaign was her female mobilization strategy. Although Silva evoked her female identity to court women *and* she won more female than male voters, it is unclear whether these women moved to her camp because of her gendered appeals or because of other factors.

To conclude, the conventional wisdom would predict that Rousseff, given her unconventional personal history, possessed a feminist consciousness, preferences and attitudes and therefore would use her power to promote significant PWC (Carroll 1989; Klein 1984; Reingold and Foust 1998). However, I argue that because she failed to maintain a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity and networked little with elite feminists, a constituency perspective would not expect her to pursue much PWC once in office. Chapter VII will test this expectation.

---

[i] Why, then, did Lula hand pick Rousseff as his successor? Rousseff rose to one of the most powerful ministerial positions – chief of staff (*Casa Civil*) – during the *mensalão* scandal. The scandal resulted in the resignation of many high-level Lula advisors, including his chief of staff José Dirceu. Power (2014, 20) observed Rousseff had a "steady hand during the crisis," and her success at executing many of Lula's policies seemed to have impressed the president. Given that he could not seek a third consecutive term, Lula appeared to seek someone who would faithfully pursue his legacy of pro-poor, developmental policies but not threaten him as a future competitor. The fact that Rousseff's presidential run would depend almost entirely on Lula's endorsement suggested that Rousseff, as Brazil's first *presidenta*, would be a loyal executor of Lula-inspired policies. Finally, promoting a female presidential candidate would help bolster his domestic and international image as a defender of historically marginalized groups.

[ii] This chapter will later show how these programs do not necessarily qualify as PWC.

[iii] The event took place in exact same auditorium where Lula was elected union president in 1978 "This place, President Lula taught me, is historical," Rousseff said, emphasizing her ties to Lula.

[iv] I am unable to verify whether Rousseff promised PWC on this site, which is no longer available on the internet.

[v] It also reinforced her "first female: president framing of our candidacy, explored later in this chapter.

[vi] This suggests a double-standard for female and male candidates in that men's clothing usually inspires few comments from journalists. It also illuminates Rousseff's symbolic tactics in emphasizing her identity as a woman.

[vii] The term also aligns with Lula's own paternalistic discourse in which he often portrayed himself as the "father of Brazil" and talked about caring for (rather than governing) the Brazilian people. While the paternalism discourse could be viewed as a tool of Latin American populists (Conniff 2012), I argue that maternalism applied to Rousseff was intended to specifically target women.

[viii] *Folha* noted that the "mãe do Pac" name could serve to remind voters of her ministerial competency, one of Rousseff's strengths that Lula and his team played up (Flor 2010; Guimarães 2010).

[ix] Rousseff not only was a literal mother, but also a literal grandmother. In a discursive variation, Lula sometimes called Rousseff the "grandmother of the Pac," thus portraying her as a figurative grandmother (Guimarães 2010).

[x] This suggests a double bind problem, but also the maternalist discourse was meant to target women especially.

[xi] "Housewife, in the role of taking care of the government, is a little like being a mother," she answered. "There is an hour that you have to get results. It is necessary that Brazil exerts itself so that things happen, so that roads are paved, so that there is sanitation. There is an hour in which in your house we get (results). There is another hour that you have to incentivize" (*Folha De S. Paulo* 2010j).

[xii] A *Folha* headline read "*Petista* cites Lula 7 times, compares herself to a "mother" to deny gruff reputation..."

[xiii] An August 2010 *O Globo* article pointed out that Rousseff "herself says that her fame as a tough lady comes from the fact that she got results, as a mother, from the Lula administration's ministers" (*O Globo* 2010g).

[xiv] Rousseff said the issue was "a matter of public health" and should be dealt with by Congress rather than the president. Serra took a stronger pro-life stance while Silva, an evangelical herself, said although she believed abortion was wrong, its legalization should be decided in a national plebiscite (Pacheco Jordão and Alberico Cabrini 2012).

[xv] In 2009 in an interview with *Marie Claire* magazine, Rousseff expressed a pro-choice position on abortion. Lula's National Program for Human Rights (PNDH-3) also took a pro-choice stance, a move that was severely criticized by religious groups. Serra as Health Minister also took measures to make legal abortions more accessible, but in the 2002 contest he declared his position to be pro-life (Cervellini, Giani, and Pavanelli 2011).

xvi Lula often similarly mixed maternalist and "first female" discourse. For example, he presented Rousseff as the "mãe do Pac" and "the first female president of Brazil" in August 2010 (Menezes and Marqueiro 2010).

xvii Rousseff repeated this message in a September campaign event in Santa Catarina "For being a woman, I do not have the right to error in the presidency, because, if I error, it is going to be difficult for another woman to be elected president" (Barbosa 2010b). In a September rally in Goiás, Rousseff accused the opposition of sexism. "They are afraid of a woman succeeding (*dar certo*)" (Jungblut 2010).

xviii Whether the "first member" phenomenon actually works is up for debate (Schwindt-Bayer and Reyes-Housholder Forthcoming).

xix Cabral reiterated the message in Rousseff's second-round radio campaign. "After a factory worker, Brazil and Rio de Janeiro is going to elect Dilma, the first woman president of Brazil," he said (*O Globo* 2010r).

xx Rousseff also employed Lula's wife to help her mobilize women. Chapters IV, V and VI showed that male candidates—namely Lavin, Lagos, Lula, Serra and Alckmin—enlisted elite female surrogates to try to mobilize women on their behalf. Rousseff also strategically deployed Lula's wife to this end. The fact that she did so relatively early in the campaign underscores the importance of this to her overall strategy to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity.

Soon after stepping down from her ministerial post to run for president, Rousseff returned to Brasília to have a "women's conversation" with first lady Marisa Letícia (Camarotti, Jungblut and Lima 2010). "I came from talking with Dona Marisa, our personal conversations. I also ask for her advice. She is a person who has internal strength and, at the same time, a great tenderness. I learned to respect her and admire her and, especially to know that she is a special person" (Camarotti, Jungblut and Lima 2010). Rousseff added that she hoped to count on Letícia's support during the campaign and that she would look for women's votes in all corners (*todos os cantos*).

Letícia did appear as a loyal Rousseff supporter when she accompanied the candidate in a meeting (mentioned above) hosted by the Rural Women's Association in Uberaba in May (*O Globo* 2010c). Both *Folha* and *O Globo* covered the event, and both media characterized Rousseff's use of Letícia as a way to capture female voters. *Folha's* headline read: "Target: At the First Lady's Side, *Petista* Courts Female Electorate." The official campaign season had not officially begun, and therefore the first lady was not permitted to campaign on behalf of Rousseff. According to *O Globo,* her speech seemed to do just that.

xxi But they may also be interpreted as another way that Lula infringed on Rousseff's autonomy during her campaign by offering her too much advice.

xxii Like Rousseff, Lula's pro-women discourse was not always ideologically consistent. At some moments, his actions seemed to reinforce rather than challenge traditional gender stereotypes. Prior to a high-profile interview with *Jornal Nacional*, Lula symbolically evoked his candidate's femininity by giving her a rose (Vasconcelos 2010). This gesture could have been another way for him to soften her image and thereby appeal to women. Yet, the seemingly chivalrous gesture could also be seen as traditionalist, or even sexist.

xxiii Brazilian law requires candidates to submit their platforms to the Electoral Justice agency. Rousseff's team released several versions of her platform during July and August 2010. This section relies on the last version of that Rousseff released during the second round (Falcão and Bragon 2010).

xxiv In order to further emphasize Rousseff's ties to Lula and Serra's ties to President Cardoso, the platform favorably compares the "Lula-Dilma" administration to the "FHC-Serra" administration (pg. 3). The comparison may be unfair since Serra merely served as Health Minister in the Cardoso administration, and thus had less of an influence in the Cardoso administration than Rousseff had in the Lula administration. Nevertheless, the motivation was to use Lula's popularity, and Cardoso's relative unpopularity, to propel Rousseff forward.

xxv See Chapter VII for a more extensive exploration of PWC in the Brazilian context.

xxvi Furthermore, because Lula's personal constituency was so much larger than Rousseff's, the evidence presented in this chapter cannot make clear whether Lula possessed a greater *proportion* of elite feminists in his network than Rousseff did.

xxvii Rousseff's opponents also objected to her use of maternalism. In August 2010, Serra's radio propaganda criticized the maternalist discourse (Agostine 2008; *O Globo* 2010j). One commercial accused Rousseff of treating citizens as children. "Mommy said that everything is going to be wonderful," one radio speaker said. "The PT candidate now says that she is going to be the mother of the whole world." Another speaker said:
What is this mother business? I am of legal age, vaccinated. I am blind, but I overcame the difficulties of being blind. I studied. I work, sustain my family, and pay taxes, moreover a lot of taxes. I don't need a mother in the government, no. I need a true president that does not treat me like a child, like an idiot (*O Globo* 2010j).

Silva also criticized the Lula-Rousseff strategy of presenting themselves as the father and mother of Brazil (*O Globo* 2010i). "They are wanting to infantilize Brazilians with that story of mother and father," she said in an internet debate hosted by *Folha de São Paulo* and UOL. In a visit to the São Paulo stock exchange, Silva repeated this criticism by declaring "Brazil needs a mature discussion about its future. Brazilians cannot be treated in this infantilized way" (*O Globo* 2010i).

In a September 2010 interview with *O Globo* journalist Ricardo Noblat, Silva repeated her criticism of Rousseff's maternalist discourse but avoided specifically mentioning her competitor. "People begin to infantilize society. Now we have a father state, a mother state, an uncle state, a grandmother state," she said. "We have to end this mediocre vision of politics" (*O Globo* 2010l).

xxviii Despite these strong criticisms, elite feminists in Brazil picked their battles, and on one hot-button issue—abortion—many in effect excused Rousseff for not adopting a stronger PWC stance. Rousseff's position, which favored the status quo, disappointed many feminists, but they also realized that PSDB leaders were unfairly attacking by spreading propaganda that painted her as the pro-abortion candidate (Pacheco Jordão 2015). Viewing Rousseff as a victim of a sexist opposition, many realized that this particular debate could jeopardize her electoral prospects, because they still very much wanted to elect Brazil's first *presidenta*. Many analysts pointed out that in light of this context, feminists generally remained silent on the abortion issue during the 2010 campaign (Pacheco Jordão and Alberico Cabrini 2012; Arraes 2014).

This last point suggests evidence for my argument's mechanistic logic. The hypothesis posits that elite feminists are more likely to try to connect with viable female presidential candidates than viable male candidates because elite feminists would like to help improve women's political representation. The fact that elite feminists in Brazil were enthusiastic about the prospect of electing Brazil's first *presidenta* therefore is consistent with this hypothesis (Pacheco Jordão 2015). Vicente—like many elite feminists throughout Brazil—was excited about the prospect of nominating a woman as the PT's presidential candidate. "The possibility of electing, for the first time, a *presidenta* of Brazil, voting for a woman, after having voted for an *operário*, really is worthy of note" (2010).

xxix She also differed greatly from Bachelet who, as Chapter IV showed, sought "new faces."

xxx The media mentioned other high level women from the PT or other allied parties who could be considered for ministerial posts. These women include PT deputy Maria do Rosário, Communist Deputy Manuela D'Ávila and PT Senator Ideli Salvatti. Miriam Belchoir worked with Rousseff in the Casa Civil was also considered a potential ministerial pick.

xxxi Silva also identifies as *parda* or black, but she did not seem to target black women on the basis of racial identity during the campaign.

xxxii Relatedly, in interviews and advertisements, Silva often reminded voters that her last name was the same as the popular out-going president's. She tried to paint herself as someone—other than Rousseff—who would pursue Lula's legacy.

xxxiii Silva's ideology defies easy categorization. Her conservatism was manifested by her pro-life views, but she vowed to call a plebiscite to settle the abortion issue.

xxxiv This strategy is similar to Bachelet's and Alvear's strategy of discussing their experiences with *machismo* in Chile.

xxxv However, Silva's religious affiliation meant that she tended to target not only low-income women, but low-income conservative women. The Green Party camp in August confirmed that it continued to seek votes among poor women (*O Globo* 2010i). Her campaign coordinators reportedly hoped that their candidate would lure away support from poor women who currently backed Rousseff or Serra.

xxxvi Yet, like Rousseff, Silva at times did try to network with female elites in order to generate support. For example, the PV candidate met with women from NGOs and businesswomen in the apartment of female educator and businesswoman Neca Setúbal at the end of August in São Paulo. Setúbal was from a wealthy family linked to Banco Itaú and made significant donations to the Silva campaign (Roxo 2010b).

xxxvii Bolsa Familia recipients are believed to have voted strongly for Lula and Rousseff (Zucco 2013). However, no related question was included in these surveys and thus I am unable to control for this.

xxxviii Models #1-3's results are generally consistent with existing studies. Analyzing the territorial electorates, Terron and Soares (2010) wrote that "In 2010, the spatial pattern of the municipal vote for the president elect is very similar to the regional pattern of President Lula's re-election in 2006." Alves (2012) observed that within the northeast region, Rousseff earned the most vote intentions during the entire year and arrived at the beginning of October with almost a 40 point lead in that region. Like Lula in 2006, the PT candidate triumphed in all the regions, but her comparatively worst performance was in the south. Cavenaghi and Alves (2012) note that after the Casa Civil

scandal involving the former minister Erenice Guerra (Dilma's substitute), vote intentions for the PT candidate fell, especially among those of high income and high education levels.

CHAPTER VII Presidents' Divergent Deployment of Legislative Power

Analyzing both inter- and intra-gender variation, this chapter explores whether female and male presidents differ in their exercise of legislative power to improve women's historically marginalized status.[i] Drafting and promoting PWC policy can have a wide-ranging impact on women's lives. Some of the PWC bills in this chapter offer intangible benefits, for example legislative quotas to advance women's representation in Congress. However, many other bills offer substantial material benefits to thousands, sometimes millions of women and their families.

Why would female presidents use their legislative power more than their male counterparts to advance PWC? What factors explain variation among female presidents? Dominant theories from the socio-psychological literature point to politicians' feminist consciousness as the most important factor. This dissertation challenges this understanding by arguing that constituencies also function as probabilistic mechanisms linking presidential sex to the use of legislative power to promote PWC. Chapters III-VI found evidence from Chilean and Brazilian presidential campaigns for the core and personal constituency hypotheses: viable female presidential candidates are more likely than their male competitors to attempt to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity (core constituency) and to network with elite feminists (personal constituency).

Assuming that increased attempts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity monotonically increases chances of success over time, female presidents are more likely to perceive a core constituency that demands PWC. My argument assumes that presidents aim to enhance their popularity and, if possible, secure a consecutive or nonconsecutive re-election. This is why presidents—male or female—who perceive a core constituency of women demanding PWC are more likely to deploy their legislative power to satisfy these demands. This also means that even if presidents make numerous PWC promises—as Lula did in Chapter V—they may not employ their legislative power to deliver on these promises if they do not face an electorally significant core constituency pressuring them to do so.

Personal constituencies also affect how presidents legislate. The relative presence of elite feminists within presidents' personal constituencies helps determine the extent to which presidents will legislate on PWC issues. Elite feminists, often PWC experts, prefer to elect more women to office, and this is one reason why they are more likely to support and seek contact with viable female–rather than male—candidates. Viable female candidates in turn are more likely than their male counterparts to be influenced by elite feminists and hence include PWC in their campaign platforms. Elite feminists' PWC expertise combined with their desire for PWC can continue to influence the candidates-turned-presidents who must begin to rapidly and effectively make policy: the more information presidents have on an issue, the more likely this issue will rise to the top of presidents' agendas (Light 1999). In short, because *presidentas* are more likely to network with elite feminists, they are more likely than male presidents to use their legislative powers to promote PWC.

This theoretical discussion so far leads to the prediction that because of gendered characteristics of core and personal constituencies, female presidents will use their power more than their male counterparts to promote PWC. Importantly, although female presidents are more likely to have mobilized women and networked with elite feminists, not all female presidents do. Only those who have achieved both conditions are "most likely" to use their legislative power to advance PWC. In other words, variations in these kinds of constituencies correlates with intra-gender variation, accounting for divergences among female presidents' PWC decision-making.

This chapter tests observable implications of the constituency theory with a fine-grained examination of four presidents' legislative decision-making: Ricardo Lagos (2000-06); Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010); Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010); and Dilma Rousseff (2011-14). This data will not allow a general test for whether *presidentas* tend to use their legislative power more than *presidentes* to promote PWC. The data can, however, facilitate two related objectives: (1) an initial test of the constituency theory's "most likely" hypothesis; (2) an examination of the core and personal constituency mechanisms.

The first task is met with statistical analyses. Chapters III-VI showed that all viable female candidates for president in Chile and Brazil from 1999-2010 attempted to mobilize women on the basis of shared gender identity to a greater extent and in different ways from their male counterparts. Importantly, Bachelet was the only candidate who both successfully mobilized a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity and won the presidency. Because Bachelet perceived a core constituency of women demanding PWC, she faced bottom-up constituency incentives to fulfill her PWC campaign promises. Furthermore, of all the viable candidates, Bachelet networked the most with elite feminists. Having incorporated elite feminists into her campaign and subsequent administration, she had easy access to political and technical PWC expertise. Bachelet therefore is most likely to use her legislative powers to pursue PWC. More specifically, I expect Bachelet to use her legislative powers in ways statistically *different* ways from her co-partisan male predecessor, Lagos, and Rousseff to use her legislative power in statistically *similar* ways from her co-partisan male predecessor, Lula. The quantitative results will provide strong evidence for the constituency theory's predictions that presidential sex should matter in Chile but not Brazil.

I then tackle this chapter's second objective of analyzing constituency mechanisms with a qualitative assessment of these presidents' PWC initiatives. For each president, the use of legislative power often, but not always, corresponded to PWC promises made in their platforms or on the campaign trail. For example, Bachelet's targeting of low-income mothers with a variety of material benefits makes sense in light of the Chapter IV's finding that she seemed to perceive this demographic as a core constituency. Lagos' lack of emphasis on delivering benefits to unorganized women also suggests that, unlike Bachelet, he did not perceive a core constituency of women demanding PWC. In Brazil, we find that Lula's most important PWC use of power—the creation of the Women's Ministry— reflects his perception of organized women as part of his broad social movement base. Rousseff's emphasis on expanding Lula's PWC policy legacy also mirrors the fact that her 2010 electoral base was virtually identical to Lula's 2006 base, and she thus had incentives to cater to these same groups.

The qualitative assessment also reveals evidence for the personal constituency mechanism. The strong presence of elite feminists with childcare expertise in Bachelet's personal constituency positively influenced the creation of her Chile Grows with You program. On the other hand, the weak presence of elite feminists with political expertise on maternal health issues impeded the success of a fundamental component of Rousseff's Stork Program. In short, both core constituency incentives and personal constituency expertise shaped how presidents used their legislative prerogatives to advance PWC.

1. Background on How Chilean and Brazilian Presidents Legislate

Chilean and Brazilian presidents exercise similar magnitudes albeit slightly different kinds of legislative power. In both countries, the president and Congress draft legislation and set the legislative agenda. Yet although both Chilean and Brazilian presidents clearly dominate the law-making process, they do so in slightly different ways. I first describe Chilean presidents' powers and then those of Brazilian presidents.

Chilean presidents express their legislative power through "messages" and "urgencies." "Messages" are bills initiated by the executive, and "motions" are initiated by Congress (Siavelis 2000). The constitutional power to assign "urgencies," or deadlines for legislative action, confers agenda-setting power on presidents. A "simple" urgency is meant to compel Congress to address the bill within 30 days; a "high" urgency gives Congress 15 days; and "immediate discussion" urgency, six days.[ii]

Chilean presidents can maintain or intensify pressure on Congress by issuing a simple, high or immediate discussion urgency to any message or motion in Congress at virtually any moment during the legislative process. A president can assign multiple urgencies to the same bill over a period of time. Exercising urgency power to the maximum would mean assigning the most powerful kind of urgency—immediate discussion urgencies—one right after the other. While Congress usually respects presidential urgencies, the Constitution does not stipulate a penalty when Congress ignores the urgency. As a result,

the president sometimes issues an urgency, and if Congress does nothing, the president may issue another urgency to insist on the bill's priority.

A quick example illustrates how presidential urgencies may be used. Bachelet's reproductive rights message entered Congress on June 30, 2009 (Presidente 2009b). On that same day, she assigned a high urgency on the message, meaning that Congress had 15 days to react. On July 7, she withdrew this high urgency and replaced it with another high urgency, effectively postponing Congress' deadline. On July 13, the lower chamber's health committee issued its first report. The Chamber discussed and approved the bill. The bill moved to the Senate's health committee, and on July 28, Bachelet placed a simple urgency authorizing Congress 30 days to act. On August 18, she issued a high urgency, and when that urgency expired on September 1, she assigned another high urgency. The Senate health committee released its report on September 2. Bachelet assigned high urgencies on September 16, on September 29 and on October 13. The Senate finally agreed to address the bill in the legislative session on October 27. On that day, Bachelet attached an immediate discussion urgency to the bill, and the Senate reacted by promptly releasing its first committee report. This pattern of Bachelet issuing urgencies and Congress reacting continued through 2010 until she was able to push her reproductive rights bill through (Presidente 2009b). Urgencies therefore constitute a formidable tool for Chilean presidents striving to push a particular bill through Congress as quickly as possible.

Chilean presidents also can issue either total or partial vetoes (Payne 2007), but no Chilean president ever vetoed a PWC bill that was approved by both Chambers. Bill initiation and urgency assignments therefore are the most relevant measures of Chilean presidents' use of legislative power to advance PWC. This chapter's Chilean dataset required collecting all bills initiated by either branch of government—regardless of whether they were successful—and the corresponding urgencies.[iii]

Unlike their Chilean counterparts, Brazilian presidential power is most prominently expressed through the use of provisory measures (*medida provisória* or MP). MPs automatically become a temporary law (Melo and Pereira 2013; Santos 2003). Congress must vote on the MP within a three-

month period to decide whether the law should continue, and so MPs immediately rise to the top of the Congressional agenda (Leobas 2015). Therefore, while presidents issue MPs to unilaterally alter the legal status quo, Congress ultimately determines the lifespan of any MP.

Brazilian presidents may also send Congress three other types of legislation: ordinary bills (*projetos de lei* or PL); complementary bills (*projetos de lei complementar* or PLP); and constitutional amendment bills (*propostas de emenda à constituição* or PEC).[iv] PLPs are proposals to modify constitutional laws or constitutional regulations (for example, public finances) while PECs are proposals to modify the text of the actual Constitution. In part because they involve amending the Constitution, PLPs and PECs are far less common than PLs.[v]

Presidential urgencies exist in Brazil, but are a less prominent feature of presidents' legislative power than in Chile. Unlike Chilean presidents who can assign urgencies to any bill (of executive or Congressional origin) at any time, Brazilian presidents can only assign urgencies to executive bills and only at one time—right when the bill enters Congress (Leobas 2015). Because Brazilian presidents' urgency powers are limited to their own bills rather than Congressional bills, my Brazilian database does not include all PWC bills initiated by Congress.[vi] Presidents generally do not use constitutional urgencies for their own bills sent to Congress because they can use the MP prerogative – which, in a sense, has an urgency embedded in it (Leobas 2015).[vii] In sum, Brazilian presidents tend to legislate most frequently with either MPs or PLs (without urgencies) to push their policy agenda forward.

2. Data and Method[viii]

Chile and Brazil digitally organize their legislative archives differently. For Chile, a single database of all messages and motions is found on the Chilean Senate's web site. In addition to the CEDAW text, I gathered keywords and phrases from official National Women's Service (SERNAM) documents and publications of Chilean feminist and women's organizations. Individual searches with these key words generated a total of 1,088 results. The number of bills dropped to 602 after I deleted all

duplicates and narrowed the search to bills proposed in Lagos' term (2000-06) or in Bachelet's first term (2006-10).

These 602 bills therefore contained at least one keyword or phrase, and covered the targeted time period. To evaluate whether these bills actually promoted PWC, I read the bill summaries and Congressional debate transcripts and referred to texts from each of the three authorities. To account for Chilean state's conceptions of PWC, I employed SERNAM's *Memorias,* which are found in the SERNAM library in Santiago and contain accounts of SERNAM's goals and activities since 1991. Documents from the Gender and Equality Observatory, Chile's main umbrella organization for dozens of women's groups (Valdés 2010), served as a strong proxy for Chilean women's groups' often contested conceptions of pro-women change. Of the 602 bills, only 252 actually qualified as promoting PWC. I coded them as messages or motions, whether the bill became law and recorded the quantity and types of presidential urgencies issued.

Brazilian archives concerning the use of legislative power by presidents are located in two independent, yet complementary databases.[ix] The Chamber database records all legislation that passes through the Chamber while the Senate database records all legislation that passes through the Senate. This implies that any bill that originates in the Executive and then dies—thereby never making it to the Senate—is not recorded in the Senate's database. I used the Chamber's database because all MPs and bills that originate in the Executive Branch first pass through the Chamber of Deputies (Leobas 2015).

According to my interviews with congressional legislative archival experts, the most effective way to search the Chamber's database is to request internal searches from the librarians. Unlike in Chile, the Brazilian database available to the public is neither reliable nor complete, and the amount of discrepancy between the public and internal databases is unknown. In September 2015, I gathered data by sending requests for internal searches with specific key words and phrases to the Chamber's archival experts.

In addition to CEDAW, I drew keywords and phrases from three primary sources, which capture state and/or civil society authorities on policies favoring women. First held in 2004 and then again in 2007 and 2011, Brazil's first National Women's Conferences gathered thousands of representatives of women's and feminist groups, ordinary citizens, national politicians and international experts to debate policies benefiting women (Pogrebinschi and Samuels 2014). The conference produced the document entitled National Plan for Women's Policies (Presidência da República 2004), which summarizes the outcomes of the conference discussions. My interviews with SPM officials, Brazilian feminists and women's groups suggest this document is perceived as a uniquely legitimate synthesis of some relative consensus between the state's and civil society's conceptions of PWC in the Brazilian context.

For a more critical take on government actions, I also referred to publications from the Feminist Center for Studies and Consulting (CFEMEA). Founded in 1989 by Brazilian feminists who successfully lobbied for several pro-women measures in Brazil's 1988 Constitution, CFEMEA tracks legislative progress on women-friendly bills in Congress. Available beginning in 1998, online archives of its monthly publication *Jornal Fêmea* identify and opine on pro- and anti-women legislation. I complement data from these documents with publications from the Brazilian Women's Articulation, a network attempts to unite women's groups across Brazil (Articulação de Mulheres Brasileiras 2011). Publications from CFEMEA and AMB provide a strong proxy for Brazilian civil society's often contested conceptions of PWC.

In sum, the National Plan for Women's Policies, CFEMEA reports and AMB publications proxy national and civil society conceptions of PWC in Brazil. Using key words from these documents, the number of propositions (MPs, PLs, PLPs, PECs) amounted to 1,352. From there I filtered through the propositions that originated in the Executive (41) and then I read through them to classify them as either PWC (26) or non-PWC (15).

3. Quantitative Results: Presidential Sex Matters in Chile, but not Brazil

Evaluating the magnitude of PWC each president pursued is not as straightforward as summing the number of bills originating in the executive branch. Clearly, presidents' idiosyncrasies affect their ability and likelihood of using their legislative powers and constitute a source of bias. For example, Lula is viewed as a far superior politician than Rousseff. This difference in sheer, across-the-board political skill would likely impact these presidents' overall use of legislative power. I therefore quantify the use of legislative power to promote PWC as a proportion of each president's overall rates of power deployment. This allows me to answer the question: How much did each president prioritize PWC legislation in relation to non-PWC legislation?

Although this dissertation focuses on the deployment—rather than the *successful* use of presidential power to promote PWC—I also compare success rates. This gives a sense of the magnitude of actual PWC effected during these four presidential administrations. When possible, the quantitative analysis includes statistical tests of difference of means, which indicate whether we can reject the null hypothesis that two presidents behaved similarly.

Table 1 displays descriptive statistics concerning each Chilean president's tendencies to send messages to Congress and to assign urgencies to these messages. It distinguishes between (1) all messages initiated by each president; and (2) a subset of all messages that relate to PWC. The final columns of Table 1 suggest how important PWC legislation was to each president's legislative agenda by showing the presidents' PWC bills as a proportion of all their bills.

Table 1: Pro-Woman Change Messages and Urgencies in Chile (2000-10)

	All Messages		PWC Messages		PWC/All Messages	
	Lagos 2000-06	Bachelet 2006-10	Lagos 2000-06	Bachelet 2006-10	Lagos 2000-06	Bachelet 2006-10
Total #	544	392	11	17	0.020*	0.043*
Annual Mean # of Messages	90.7	98	1.8	4.3	--	--
Percent Became Law during Term	78.1*	73.2*	18.2*	76.5*	--	--
% With at Least One Urgency	48.0†	52.6†	54.5†	82.4†	--	--

*Statistically significant difference between Lagos and Bachelet
† No statistically significant difference between Lagos and Bachelet
Note: "Messages" are bills initiated by the president. "Motions" are bills initiated by Congress.
Source: www.senado.cl

Table 1 shows that Lagos initiated more messages (544) than Bachelet (392), and this is in part due to the fact that he governed for a longer period. A constitutional reform in 2005 reduced the Chilean presidential term from six to four years.[x] On average, Lagos send Congress 90.7 messages per year while Bachelet sent 98 messages, indicating both presidents were similarly active legislators. Lagos enjoyed a slightly better (borderline statistically significant) success rate of messages becoming law, 78.1% and 73.2% respectively (p=0.07). Lagos and Bachelet tended to use their urgency powers at statistically indistinguishable rates. Lagos assigned at least one urgency to 48.0% of his messages and Bachelet did the same to 52.6% of her messages (p=0.16). Therefore, when we look at bill initiation and urgency rates for all messages, these presidents appeared to exercise their powers similarly, even if Lagos was marginally more successful.

However, an examination of just the PWC messages reveals dramatic differences between these presidents' decision-making. Lagos sent Congress 11 PWC messages, averaging 1.8 per year. Just 2% of his total messages promoted PWC. In contrast, Bachelet sent Congress 17 PWC messages, averaging 4.3 per year, and 4.3% of her total messages advanced PWC. The difference in the presidential priorities' measure (0.020 vs. 0.043) is statistically significant. This yields compelling evidence that Bachelet pursued more PWC policies than Lagos.

Lagos not only initiated fewer PWC messages and made PWC less of a legislative priority, but he also was far less successful in passing his PWC messages. Just two of his PWC messages passed during his presidential term, a rate of 18.2%. This rate is 59.9 percentage points lower than his overall success rate of 78.1%. In contrast, 13 of Bachelet's PWC messages became law during her administration, a 76.5% success rate, and her PWC success rate is 3.3% higher than her success rate on all messages. A statistical test shows that Lagos' and Bachelet's success rates on PWC messages are different (*p*=0.002). To summarize, Bachelet was far more prolific and successful in advancing PWC legislation than her male predecessor.

Why was Bachelet more successful in passing her PWC messages? One reason could be her greater propensity to issue urgencies on PWC legislation. Table 1 shows the presidents' gap in rates of assigning at least one urgency to PWC messages. Lagos issued at least one urgency to 54.5% of his PWC messages while Bachelet issued at least one urgency to 82.4% of her PWC messages.[xi]

Table 2 extends the analysis by displaying the number of simple, high, and immediate discussion urgencies that each president assigned to his/her PWC messages and Congress's PWC motions initiated during each president's term. Lagos assigned a total of 16 simple urgencies on his PWC messages while Bachelet assigned 41 (about 2.5 times as many as her male predecessor). Lagos also assigned 6 high urgencies to his PWC messages while Bachelet assigned 65 (over 10 times as many). Finally, Lagos issued no immediate discussion urgencies to his PWC messages while Bachelet issued 11 to hers. These descriptive statistics thus underscore how Bachelet deployed her agenda-setting powers in order to prioritize her PWC. In other words, her urgency rates indicate that she was far more insistent on passing PWC legislation than Lagos.

Table 2: Urgencies Assigned to Pro-Women Change
Messages and Motions in Chile (2000-10)

	PWC Messages		PWC Motions	
	Lagos 2000-06	Bachelet 2006-10	Lagos 2000-06	Bachelet 2006-10
Total Number	11	17	58	165
Total Number of Simple Urgencies	16	41	0	65
Total Number of High Urgencies	6	65	0	47
Total Number of Immediate Discussion	0	11	1	3

Chilean presidents can also set the legislative agenda by assigning urgencies to legislation originating in Congress (motions). The third column should that Congress initiated 58 PWC motions during Lagos' term. Of these 58 motions, Lagos only assigned an urgency once—an immediate discussion urgency. He placed no simple and no high urgencies to any PWC motions initiated during his term. The final column shows that Congress produced 165 PWC motions during Bachelet's term, and she issued 65 simple, 47 high and 3 immediate discussion urgencies on 11 different PWC motions. Lagos' 1.7% rate of issuing at least one urgency on a PWC motion is borderline statistically different from Bachelet's 6.7% rate of issuing at least one urgency on a PWC motion (p=0.06). In summary, Bachelet submitted more PWC messages, on average, each year; made PWC legislation a higher priority; more often attached at least one urgency to PWC messages and PWC motions; and more often succeeded in passing her PWC messages. She was more prolific, insistent and successful than her male predecessor in her pursuit of PWC.

Table 3 displays descriptive statistics concerning each Brazilian president's tendencies to exercise different kinds of legislative power. The setup of Table 3 is analogous to Table 1, but because Brazilian presidents have four different types of bills they can send to Congress, Table 3 breaks down the MP, PL, PLP and PEC statistics. The first two columns of the table show that the most common legislative tool for both presidents is the MP, followed by the PL, PLP and PEC. These columns also suggest that Brazilian presidents tend to have the highest success rates when they use MPs since (aside from PEC's) both presidents' success rates were highest when they used MPs. High MP success rates help explain why MPs tend to be the legislative tool of choice for Brazilian presidents (Melo and Pereira 2013).

Table 3: Pro-Women Change MPs and Bills Proposed by Lula and Rousseff (2003-2014)

	All Proposals		PWC Proposals		PWC/All Proposals	
	Lula 2003-10	Rousseff 2011-14	Lula 2003-10	Rousseff 2011-14	Lula 2003-10	Rousseff 2011-14
All Proposals	825	236	22	7	0.0266†	0.0296†
Annual Mean (All)	103	59	3	2	--	--
MP	419	145	12	6	0.0286†	0.0413†
PL	367	84	9	1	0.0245†	0.0119†
PLP	23	5	1	0	0.0434†	0†
PEC	16	2	0	0	0†	0†
All Proposal Success Rates	70.5†	67†	68.2†	71.4†	--	--
MP Success Rate (%)	87*	74*	83†	83†	--	--
PL Success Rate (%)	56†	56†	56†	0†	--	--
PLP Success Rate (%)	30 †	40 †	0†	0†	--	--
PEC Success Rate (%)	38 †	100 †	0†	0†	--	--

*Statistically significant difference between Lula and Rousseff
† No statistically significant difference between Lula and Rousseff

While both Lula and Rousseff generally preferred MPs to other legislative tools, Lula was a more active legislator than Rousseff. The first two columns show that Lula proposed on average 103 pieces of legislation annually while Rousseff averaged 59 annually. The breakdown of MPs, PL, PLP and PECs shows the same pattern of Lula outpacing Rousseff.

Despite these activity differences, some indicators suggest that Lula and Rousseff were similarly successful. 70.5% of all of Lula's proposals and 67% of all of Rousseff's eventually became law, and this difference is not statistically significant (p=0.29). Lula's MP success rate (87%) nevertheless is statistically different from Rousseff's rate (74%) (*p*=0.002). Both Lula and Rousseff enjoyed a 56% success rate with PLs, and differences in their success rates for PLP and PEC are not statistically significant. In sum, the only significant difference between Lula and Rousseff are their MP success rates—where Lula has an edge on Rousseff. According to every other indicator of success—including total proposal success rates – Lula and Rousseff perform similarly.

The analysis so far suggests that Lula was a consistently more prolific and sometimes more successful legislator than Rousseff. The next two columns compare their PWC decision-making. Lula

initiated more PWC proposals than Rousseff (22 vs. 7) overall and initiated more PWC annually (3 vs. 2). Lula also tended to use MP (12) and PL (9) tools more frequently than Rousseff (6 and 1, respectively), and neither president used PLP or PEC powers to promote much PWC. None of the differences in success rates on PWC were significant. Therefore, Lula's augmented across-the-board legislative activity also translated into greater activity on PWC reforms, but his success rates in passing PWC bills are indistinguishable from Rousseff's.

Most importantly, the final two columns suggest that differences in presidential priorities concerning PWC legislation were not statistically significant. First, 2.66% of all of Lula's proposals were dedicated to advancing women-friendly change and this percentage is slightly lower than Rousseff's 2.96%. This tiny difference, however, is not statistically significant ($p = 0.80$). The analysis of the MP, PL, PLP and PEC subsets show no statistically significant differences.

In sum, Lula used his presidential powers more frequently overall, and therefore he initiated a greater number of PWC proposals, both in terms of total sum and annual mean. But relative to their overall use of presidential power. These presidents exercised their legislative powers to similar degrees to advance PWC. The evidence supports the conclusion that Lula and Rousseff's pursued PWC policies in ways that are statistically indistinguishable. Unlike Bachelet who initiated more PWC in statistically significant ways, Rousseff largely behaved similarly to Lula or was even outpaced by his PWC bill-producing rhythm.

4. Chile's Legislative Highlights: International Agreements and Targeting Low-Income Mothers

This dissertation argues that gendered characteristics of core and personal constituencies shape presidents' use of power to advance PWC. A qualitative review of Chilean and Brazilian presidents' PWC legislation reveals evidence for both these mechanisms.   For both the Chilean and Brazilian analyses, I selected cases of PWC messages that appear most frequently in the total population of each

president's PWC messages—that is, Lagos' PWC messages that related to international agreements and Bachelet's PWC messages that related to low-income mothers.

Lagos Five out of Lagos' 11 PWC messages related to international agreements. Other PWC messages related to the Defense Ministry (2 messages), anti-discrimination (1), citizen participation (1) and preschools (1), and fulfilled Lagos' rights-centered campaign promises. His emphasis on seeking PWC through international agreements suggests some influence from elite feminists. It also corresponds to his 1999 platform, in which he promised to ratify international human rights agreements, and to better comply with Chile's pre-existing agreements that protected women's and children's rights. His lack of emphasis on delivering benefits to unorganized women also suggests that, unlike Bachelet, he did not perceive a core constituency of women demanding PWC.

The first PWC message that Lagos sent Congress was emblematic of the international women's movement and thus suggests influence of elite feminists from the left. Signed by SERNAM's minister, the PWC message sought approval of CEDAW's Optional Protocol, which would have allowed an individual or group to formally complain to the U.N. about a CEDAW violation. Although Lagos did not promise in his 1999 campaign platform to pursue CEDAW's Optional Protocol, it did fit generally within his campaign pledge to ratify international agreements that "permit the strengthening of human rights" (Presidente 2001, 28). Importantly, this bill is best characterized as a response to elite feminists' rather than unorganized women's demands. At least on this piece of legislation, elite feminists influenced Lagos' decision-making.

Opposing the bill, members of the conservative coalition in Congress interpreted this protocol as a potential threat to Chilean sovereignty. No congressional or presidential action has advanced the bill since 2004 (Presidente 2001). This decision to not use of urgency powers suggests that, in essence, Lagos was unwilling to spend more political capital and gave up seeking legislative approval.

Lagos also sent Congress a message to approve the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Presidente 2004a). The protocol supplements

the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The president apparently did not need to issue any urgencies to speed the bill through Congress. Congressional debate transcripts suggest that deputies and senators tended to agree on the importance of taking a stand against transnational trafficking and did not interpret the legislation as an infringement upon Chilean sovereignty. This less controversial bill became law in 2005.

Later in his term, Lagos initiated other PWC bills related to international agreements which fulfilled a more specific campaign promise. In July 2004, he introduced SERNAM-sponsored legislation on the protection of childhood (Presidente 2004b). The bill's goal was to better comply with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed by Chile in 1990.[xii] This directly corresponded to his 1999 campaign promise: "we will protect the rights of little boys, little girls and young people, adjusting our legislation to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child" (14).

The bill sat in the lower chamber's Family Committee for over six months. Lagos then withdrew it, and a few days later, he sent Congress a bill with the same title and similar content but attached no urgencies on it (Presidente 2005). Finally, about six weeks before leaving office, Lagos directed a message to approve the Protocol of San Salvador, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Presidente 2006a; Organization of American States 2016). This text includes several provisions specific to women's rights and autonomy. The bill to date has received little attention from Congress, and Lagos did not exercise any urgency prerogatives on it.

Therefore, two observations suggest that neither of these PWC pieces of legislation were a major priority for Lagos. First, he initiated these bills toward the end of his administration, rather than the beginning, and second, he opted out of assigning urgencies. These international agreements would have not directly benefited unorganized women and thus his focus on this kind of PWC reflects how he did not perceive a core constituency of unorganized women demanding PWC.

Bachelet Bachelet's PWC messages mirrored her perception of her core constituency of specific subgroups of women who she seemed to have believed she had successfully mobilized on the basis of gender identity in the 2005-06 election. Her messages aimed to deliver material benefits to low-income mothers (4 messages), female politicians (3), divorced women (2), women seeking to prevent pregnancy (1), women who rely on pensions (1) and female victims of violence (1).[xiii] Again, targeting her base would be a rational move for Bachelet, who, like any other president, cared about maintaining high popularity ratings and securing a future, non-consecutive election (which she achieved in 2013).

Several of Bachelet's PWC messages targeting low-income mothers, reflect her successful efforts to mobilize (mostly unorganized) women on the basis of gender identity and the influence of elite feminists from her personal constituency. Unlike Lagos, Bachelet initiated her first PWC message just weeks after assuming office, thus sending a signal that she planned to prioritize PWC in her legislative agenda. This stipulated that mothers rather than male partners receive family *asignaciones* (Presidente 2006b; Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional 2007a, 15). *Asignaciones* benefit workers who contribute to social security and can provide for their family. According to a congressional report, the bill recognizes an important reality: Most mothers assume the personal care of their children and they therefore should receive this government assistance directly. Bachelet applied high urgencies three times to push Congress to act, and the message became law in 2007.

This particular bill seemed motivated by the *presidenta's* desire to target her core constituency of low-income mothers. Bachelet explicitly stated in her message that the bill fulfilled a promise from the campaign document "100 Days Plan: 36 Commitments" which she had released at the end of December 2005 ("Bachelet Anunció 36 Medidas Para Sus 100 Primeros Días de Gobierno" 2005). The first page of her legislative message then reads: "The present initiative forms part of the commitment assumed by my administration to implement 36 measures that mean more progress for the Chileans in conditions of vulnerability" (Presidente 2006b). Bachelet clearly sensed a mandate to prioritize her PWC promises within her broader legislative agenda.

Bachelet's *asignaciones* bill was just the beginning of a series of measures to deliver material assistance to low-income mothers, thereby addressing her core constituencies' PWC demands. The program Chile Grows with You (*Chile Crece Contigo*) delivered on a specific campaign promise. "We will deliver a subsidy that finances preschool attention for children between zero and three years from homes belonging to population's poorest 40%" ("Bachelet Anunció 36 Medidas Para Sus 100 Primeros Días de Gobierno" 2005). The program assists children from birth through kindergarten by improving maternity care, universal preschools and health services. Serving the poorest 40% of households, Chile Grows with You was estimated to cost $4.8 billion Chilean pesos in 2007 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional 2007b, 4–10). In January 2007 and December 2008, Bachelet sent Congress two messages that helped launch and institutionalize Chile Grows with You (Presidente 2007).

Bachelet's prioritization of delivering benefits to low-income mothers via Chile Grows with You illustrates not only the importance of core constituency incentives to fulfill a campaign promise, but also the influence of elite feminists from within her personal constituency. As Chapter IV described, Estela Ortiz was an influential member of Bachelet's personal constituency who had a long history of promoting changing favoring women. According to Chilean policymakers, she seemed to encourage Bachelet to focus on childcare. "Her close friendship to María Estela Ortiz—a preschool teacher and human rights activist who would come to play a leading role in the expansion of childcare services between 2006 and 2010—was cited as a source of inspiration and influence" (Staab 2016, 172). Ortiz became the first director of the National Council of Kindergartens (JUNJI), part of the Chile Grows with You program.

Although not considered as close to Bachelet as Ortiz was, Loreto Amunátegui was tapped to lead the *Integra* foundation, a childcare service also improved by the Chile Grows with You program. She refused to describe herself as "a radical feminist," (KBS 2001), but Amunátegui qualifies as an elite feminist in the broader sense, given her previous efforts to advance gender equality.[xiv] Staab's interviews with Ortiz and Amunátegui in 2011 reveal that both were concerned with "women's autonomy and the necessity to adapt childcare services to their needs" (Staab 2016, 190). Childcare was believed to target

not only children (who obviously cannot vote) but their mothers who sought opportunities to work outside the home and were some of Bachelet's strongest, most loyal supporters.

The first Chile Grows with You bill was a direct outcome of the Presidential Advisory Council for Childhood Policy Reforms *(Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Reforma de las Políticas de Infancia)* that Bachelet commissioned in her first year in office. The bill established "automatic access to family subsidies to all pregnant women and children under 18 years old who comply with certain characteristics." She issued two simple urgencies and four high urgencies to shepherd the legislation through Congress, and the message became law under her watch. The second Chile Grows with You message established the Intersectorial System of Social Protection and thereby aimed to safeguard the program's future (Presidente 2009c). Bachelet assigned three simple urgencies and 13 high urgencies, and the bill became law in 2009.

Bachelet targeted low-income mothers with material aid via other legislation. She sent a message and exercised urgency powers to augment the minimum wage and family/maternal subsidies (Boletin 6568-05). She also included a special provision in a youth employment bill that any young woman who becomes pregnant has the right to a subsidy for pre and post-maternity leave (Presidente 2009a). Bachelet assigned two high urgencies to this bill, which became law in 2009.

To conclude, Bachelet had greater incentives to pursue PWC and had greater access to PWC than Lagos. This helps explain why Bachelet used her power to initiate bills and issue legislative urgencies on wide-ranging and ambitions PWC bills earlier and more consistently throughout her presidential term. Gendered and sex-related differences in their core and personal constituencies largely account for Bachelet's and Lagos' divergent use of legislative power to advance PWC.

5. Brazil's Legislative Highlights: Social Inclusion Legislation and Then Policies' Extension

In contrast to their Chilean counterparts, the Brazilian presidents perceived similar core constituencies and were influenced by many of the same personal constituents. Chapter VI's showed that

Lula's 2006 and Rousseff's 2010 electoral bases overlapped and that Rousseff drew her team of advisers from Lula's inner circle. As a result, both presidents' use of legislative power targeted similar groups and closely reflects their mandate: for Lula, to promote social inclusion and reduce poverty, and for Rousseff, to build on his policy agenda. This analysis of Brazilian presidents' legislative highlights again focuses on the kind of bills that appeared most frequently within each presidents' population of PWC legislation.

Lula Lula's legislative decision-making on PWC is derived from his broader social inclusion agenda. His specific use of power is characterized by a pursuit of institutional reforms coupled with the delivery of material benefits to impoverished families via the matriarch. Because Lula did not believe unorganized women formed one of his crucial electoral bases, he faced fewer bottom-up pressures to use his legislative power to directly act on his wide-ranging PWC promises (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2002b). This relative lack of such constituency incentives meant that despite his promises, ultimately Lula hardly seemed to prioritize PWC within his overall legislative agenda and most delegated PWC action to Brazil's women's secretariat.

Lula's first PWC initiative fulfilled his most prominent PWC promise: to create the Brazilian women's secretariat (Secretaria de Politicas para as Mulheres, SPM). This use of legislative power, executed on his inaugural day, January 1, 2003, clearly responded to the chief pledge of his 2002 "Commitment to Women" campaign document, described in Chapter V (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2002b). MP 103 established SPM, along with several other ministries such as the Human Rights Ministry (Secretaria Especial dos Direitos Humanos) (Presidência da República 2003a). This reflects Lula's vision of his heterogeneous constituency of identity-based social movements, which included organized women from the left.[xv]

Two other legislative actions strengthened the new state institution for women. Executing part of the government's Pluriannual Plan (Ministério do Planejamento 2007), PL 3959 augmented SPM's technical and managerial team by creating three sub-secretary positions: planning, budgeting and management; combatting violence; and institutional articulation (Poder Executivo 2008). Second, MP 483

upgraded SPM's status from secretariat to a full ministry. According to Article 4.2, this provisory measure changed the title of the head of SPM from "secretary" to "minister."

Lula's prioritization of the creation and institutionalization of Brazil's women's ministry makes sense in light of his perception of his constituencies. Chapter V suggested that dating back to his 1989 presidential campaign, he consistently targeted and mobilized social movements, particularly identity-based activist groups. Upon assuming the presidency, he catered to these groups by creating ministries—not only SPM, but also the Secretary of Policies for the Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR). Thus, Lula's creation of SPM is a rational response to some of his most loyal supporters.

Yet, a strong influence of elite feminists did not extend to all of Lula's PWC initiatives which targeted low-income families by offering material benefits via the matriarch. These policies were designed by advisers who were not necessarily experts on PWC but on social inclusion. As a result, the ostensible goal of these initiatives was not to advance gender equality, but to reduce poverty.[xvi][xvii] In October 2003, he created the now-famous Bolsa Família (Family Grant) program, providing conditional cash transfers to extremely impoverished families with pregnant mothers and/or children under the age of 18. Pregnant women must accept pre-natal care, and children must attend school in order to receive the government assistance. The Bolsa Família reaches almost one in four Brazilians (Lavinas 2013).[xviii]

Classifying Lula's MP 132—which established the Bolsa Família—as a use of legislative power to advance PWC deserves a caveat (Presidência da República 2003b).[xix] As in many other CCT programs across Latin America, mothers rather than fathers receive the monetary benefits, and it is the mothers who are responsible for complying with the conditionalities. State policymakers pushed for a mandated maternal role because they believed mothers are more responsible with their financial resources (Lavinas 2013). Some in the government argue that because of this, the Bolsa Família reduces women's economic dependence on men—thereby enhancing women's autonomy, a central goal of feminism.

Yet, elite feminists in Brazil have criticized gendered characteristics of this conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. They are quick to point out that the Bolsa Família was not intentionally designed

to promote gender equality, and any pro-women benefits are secondary to the poverty-reduction goals. Furthermore, research shows that while some women may appear more independent from their male partners thanks to the program, most women do not (Mendonça 2013). A more trenchant criticism is that the program's conditionalities reinforce traditional gender stereotypes because they obligate women to act as "good mothers" (José Alves 2015; Lavinas 2015; Pereira 2015; Articulação de Mulheres Brasileiras 2011). These policies, far from advancing PWC, actually impede it. Nevertheless, following Chapter I's conceptualization of PWC, MP 132 qualifies as a use of presidential power to advance PWC. Providing direct material assistance to mothers, the creation of the Bolsa Família fits two out of the three authorities' conceptions of PWC: CEDAW's and the state's.

In addition to the Bolsa Família, Lula promoted other PWC bills which also targeted low-income children and thereby assisted their mothers. These pieces of legislation have attracted less attention and hence less criticism from Brazilian feminists. In 2006, Lula issued MP 339, which established the National Fund (FUNDEB), a program that funds crèches (Brazilian preschools and day cares) (Presidência da República 2006). In 2007, MP 411 established the ProJovem program, which aims to empower youth, improve education levels and promote the family. Women from poor families received up to $58 reais per month (less than US$20) (Presidência da República 2007). In 2009, Lula's MP 455 created the Direct Money to School Program, which funded school lunches in public crèches (Presidência da República 2009).

Lula also sent legislation to Congress that benefited mothers, particularly working mothers. This legislation included maternity pay (Senado 2009) and unemployment insurance for women who are heads of families (Poder Executivo 2009). Lula's PL 7514 secured a special pension for Thalidomide victims and thereby targeted a very specific subset of mothers. Finally, his MP 459 created the My House, My Life program (*Minha Casa, Minha Vida* or MCMV), which provides housing for low-income families. This qualifies as PWC because the house title is in the name of the woman.

In sum, Lula's PWC reforms usually were motivated by his concern with fulfilling his mandate to assist marginalized groups, which included low-income women and their families. As a result, many of these PWC programs aimed to broadly reduce income inequalities rather than specifically upend gender inequalities. Yet, all the legislation reviewed here contains provisions that disproportionately benefited women, particularly low-income mothers, and accords with CEDAW's and the state's conceptions of PWC. In this sense, Lula was not responding to a perceived core constituency of organized *and* unorganized women demanding PWC. He instead perceived organized women as a small subset of his broader social movement base. While elite feminist advisers influenced some of his PWC initiatives—namely the creation and institutionalization of SPM—specialists in poverty reduction were more instrumental in designing other PWC initiatives—namely the Bolsa Família.

Rousseff While Lula's legislation is accurately characterized as reformatory, Rousseff's legislation is best characterized as complementary to the status quo. Her use of legislative power to advance PWC corresponds well with her overarching campaign pledge to continue Lula's policy legacy. Four of Rousseff's 7 PWC initiatives directly built on her predecessor's initiatives. Her first PWC bill, MP 521, featured the exact same text of Lula's MP 536, which he issued at the end of his second term (Presidência da República 2010). This MP guarantees paternity or maternity leave for male and female medical residents. Congress rejected Lula's MP 536 but approved Rousseff's MP 521.

One of Rousseff's best-known initiatives was MP 561, which allowed MCMV houses to go to the woman in the case of separation or divorce (Presidência da República 2012a). Scholars have applauded Rousseff for this PWC policy and have pointed to it as evidence of Rousseff's strong promotion of gender equality (Jalalzai 2016; Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015). However, this PWC bill is relatively minor compared to Lula's bill which created the MCMV program and gave house title preference to women—albeit, not specifically in cases of separation or divorce. Thus, one of Rousseff's most important PWC bills can be seen as an extension of Lula's transformative legislative agenda.

There are other examples of Rousseff building on Lula's PWC legacy rather than initiating new kinds of PWC policies. Rousseff's MP 562 also expanded the Direct Money in Schools Program that Lula started (Presidência da República 2012b). Her MP 570 broadened early education access and extended the Bolsa Família by providing extra financial support to crèches for children 0-4 who are already program beneficiaries (Presidência da República 2012c).

My personal interviews with feminist and women's groups leaders in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Brasília as well as SPM officials indicate that Rousseff became best known within Brazil for her initiatives to combat violence against women. MP 615 is a large piece of legislation with diverse elements. It authorized Banco do Brasil S.A. and its subsidiaries to manage resources, works and engineering services related to the project development, modernization, expansion, construction or reforms of the network to attend to women in situations of violence (Presidência da República 2013, 243). This facilitated the construction of the Women's Defense Houses (Casa de Defensa da Mulher), which were an integral part of the Women without Violence program (Mulher, Viver sem Violência) (Clavelin 2013). Rousseff's PL 6022 also clarifies legislation on violence against women—in particular a clause on the assurance of emergency contraception for rape victims (Poder Executivo 2013).

My interviews also indicate that Rousseff tended to promote PWC primarily in the area of violence against women in part because it is less controversial than other areas—namely maternal health. As shown in Chapter VI, Rousseff campaigned to improve maternity-related services, and thus may have believed that legislating in this issue are was a way to fulfill her mandate. I argue here, however, that her use of legislative power to lower Brazil's maternal mortality rates reflects her lack of ties to elite feminists. This weak presence of elite feminists from within her personal constituency meant that she used her legislative power less effectively and, ultimately, less frequently in this issue area.

By far Rousseff's most controversial and unsuccessful attempt to advance PWC was MP 557. The legislation aimed to fulfill her campaign promise to reduce Brazil's relatively high maternal mortality rates and was part of the broader Stork Network (*Rede Cegonha*) initiative (Presidência da República

2011). In June 2011, *portaria* 1459–not a presidential but a ministerial use of power—created the Stork Network which seeks to ensure pre-natal care for low-income mothers. The program immediately generated strong criticism from feminists throughout Brazil (Lemes 2012a). These activists attacked the program's maternalist emphasis, arguing, among other points, that it failed to consider that women possessed interests independent of their children.

As part of the Stork Network program, Rousseff's MP 557 required low-income pregnant women to register in a state-wide database. The registry was designed to facilitate government efforts to track these women and provide them pre-natal services. Brazilian feminists feared that the national registry of pregnant women would enable the government to find out which low-income women had purposefully terminated their pregnancy, and they loudly protested against this kind of government surveillance as they (Lemes 2011). Two of Brazil's largest women's organizations—Marcha Mundial das Mulheres and Articulação de Mulheres Brasileiras—vehemently opposed Rousseff's MP ("Entidades Feministas Repudiam MP Do Nascituro" 2012). SPM Minister Iriny Lopes assumed no responsibility. She stated to the press that she had not participated in the drafting of the MP, and that she had learned about it after its publication (Lemes 2012b). Pressured by vocal feminists, Rousseff eventually withdrew MP 557.

What does this failed attempt suggest about the relevance of elite feminists for presidential decision-making on PWC? According to this dissertation's theory, elite feminists often possess political and technical expertise on PWC. Technical expertise relates to knowledge about which policies are feasible, efficient and effective. In the case of Rousseff's MP 557, what seemed most lacking was *political* expertise, that is, knowledge about which affected groups will support or oppose a particular bill and their reasons for doing so. Brazil's *presidenta* hardly anticipated the negative reaction from organized women and thus seemed to lack the political knowledge that perhaps only elite feminists could provide. After this embarrassing episode, Rousseff hardly legislated in the area of maternal health. This case study implies that had she networked with elite feminists and allowed them more influence over her maternal

health agenda, she probably would have legislated more effectively and more frequently to advance PWC in this issue area.

6. Conclusions

The campaign analyses in Chapters III-VI found that Bachelet was the only president in this study with (1) a core constituency of women mobilized on the basis of gender identity; and (2) a personal constituency with a strong presence of elite feminists. This chapter argues that because of these constituencies, she aggressively and consistently leveraged her legislative powers to promote PWC to a far greater extent than any of the other presidents. Drawing on two original Chilean and Brazilian databases, I systematically operationalized and compared the use of legislative power in Chile and Brazil by Bachelet, Lagos, Lula and Rousseff over a 15-year period. Results from a statistical analysis of the use of legislative power show that according to virtually every indicator and test, Bachelet deployed her prerogatives to initiate and issue urgencies on PWC bills to a greater extent than Lagos. The statistical analysis showed that PWC legislation was a higher priority for Bachelet than for Lagos. Therefore, although these Chilean presidents led the same party and governed the same country during a similar time period, these presidents' deployment of legislative power to effect change benefiting women significantly differed in magnitude.

While presidents' gender influenced the use of legislative power to advance PWC, no such difference occurred in Brazil. The Brazilian comparison demonstrates that not all *presidentas* promote change favoring women more than their male counterparts. Results reveal that, according to virtually every indicator and test, Rousseff's legislative decision-making on PWC did not statistically differ from Lula's decision-making. More specifically, PWC was not a higher priority for Rousseff than for Lula. This means that, in practice, Rousseff pursued continuity with Lula's pro-women reforms rather than change. With the partial exception of the area of violence against women, Rousseff's and Lula's pursuit of PWC differed little in magnitude or kind.

Why did presidential gender matter in Chile but not in Brazil? This chapter found strong evidence for my theory's core and personal constituency mechanisms. Presidents often used their legislative power to fulfill their campaign platforms and cater to their core constituencies. Bachelet's Chile Grows with You program reveals the influence of these kinds of constituencies. Her core constituency of low-income mothers benefitted from this program, which elite feminists from her personal constituency helped design and execute. In contrast, one of Rousseff's most important attempts to pursue PWC failed in part due to a lack of elite feminist influence within her administration. Rousseff's administration established her Stork Program despite criticism from Brazilian feminists, but MP 557 angered feminists to the point where she decided to withdraw her legislation. These contrasting uses of power—Bachelet's Chile Grows with You vs. Rousseff's Stork Network—exemplify the dramatic difference in elite feminist influence in the Bachelet and Rousseff administrations, and ultimately the effects on their PWC decision-making.

Finally, this chapter challenges the conventional wisdom that points exclusively to Bachelet's feminist consciousness as her motivation to pursue PWC (Staab and Waylen 2016). I argue that while Bachelet likely possessed a feminist consciousness, she would have used her legislative powers to far lesser degree had she not also had external incentives (core constituency) as well as the access to policy expertise (personal constituency). These constituency factors motivated and enabled her strategic use of power to advance PWC.

---

[i] Portions of this chapter were originally published as "Presidential Power, Partisan Continuity and Pro-Women Change in Chile, 2000-2010" in Martin and Borelli (2016) *The Gendered Executive: A Comparative Analysis of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Chief Executives*.

[ii] I focus exclusively on bill initiation and urgency assignments because presidents use these powers far more frequently than other legislative prerogatives – namely veto and referendum. Neither Lagos nor Bachelet ever vetoed legislation that hindered or favored PWC and no president has called a referendum on a PWC issue.

[iii] Presidents can assign urgencies to any bill in Congress—including those initiated before the president's inauguration. To provide balance between the analysis of Lagos' and Bachelet urgency assignments, this study focuses on urgencies on bills initiated during each president's term: that is, Lagos' assignment of urgencies to bills initiated from March 11, 2000-March 10, 2006 and Bachelet's assignment of urgencies to bills initiated from March 11 2006-March 10, 2010. I do the same for the Brazilian presidents.

[iv] Unlike Chilean presidents, Brazilian presidents cannot assign urgencies to projetos de lei initiated by Congress. The only relevant action for the Brazilian president vis-à-vis congressional PWC legislation relates to whether the Brazilian president vetoes a PWC Congressional bill. My review of all Brazilian vetoes found only one that blocked congressional PWC legislation.

[v] According to Article 69 of the Brazilian federal constitution, PLPs require a congressional majority while PECs require 3/5 of congressional support (Rosenn 2016).

[vi] Only PWC bills initiated by Congress that are later approved by both Chambers are relevant to this study of presidents' use of legislative powers. I found no instances of Chilean presidents vetoing a PWC bill and only one instance of a Brazilian president partially vetoing a PWC bills approved by both Chambers.

[vii] While presidents almost always will prefer to employ MP powers, there are some legislative areas in which the Constitution says the president cannot use MP to legislate. Brazilian presidents have to send a bill to Congress with a constitutional urgency to obtain a similar effect. Brazilian presidents only can "require" or "request" a constitutional urgency on their own bills that they send to Congress. The only way to verify if the president "required" or "requested" a constitutional urgency is to refer to the archives on the Relações Institucionais web site. The Institutional Relations Ministry was created by Executive Decree 4596 in February 2003 (http://www.relacoesinstitucionais.gov.br/sobre/assuntos_parlamentares).

[viii] The PWC conceptualization detailed in Chapter I guided the selection of search words for Chile's and Brazil's online legislative databases. For both countries, I drew keywords and phrases from the CEDAW text, their respective state women's institutions and publications from Chilean/Brazilian pro-women organizations at the civil society level. To qualify as "pro-women," a bill must correspond to at least two of the three authorities—CEDAW, state and/or civil society organizations. I excluded any bill that was unrelated or that hindered rather than advanced PWC. For example, if I did not find evidence that a particular bill related to any PWC ideas according to civil society organizations, but I did find evidence that it corresponded to both CEDAW articles and the state's explicit goals, then the bill *did* count as PWC. If I found evidence that it only reflected CEDAW articles and did not reflect the state's objectives or any PWC ideas as expressed in civil society documents, then it did not count as a PWC bill.

[ix] The description of the Brazilian archives is based on a series of personal interviews conducted with archival experts at Brazil's Congress in Brasília in September 2015.

[x] Lagos governed from March 11, 2000 to March 11, 2006 while Bachelet governed from March 11, 2006 to March 11, 2010.

[xi] This difference, however, is not statistically significant (p=0.12). The lack statistical significance could be due to the small number of total PWC messages (11 for Lagos and 17 for Bachelet.)

[xii] Article 24 of the convention aims to protect mother's pre and post-natal health ("Convention on the Rights of the Child" 1989).

[xiii] Case studies of gender equality policies during the Bachelet administration have examined, for example, reproductive rights (Sepúlveda-Zelaya 2016) and social security reform (Staab 2016).

[xiv]Her undergraduate thesis topic was on the situation of middle and lower class women who were separated. She held workshops for single women in the Carlos Casanueva Institute, advised and monitored the Women's Project at the Frei Foundation and later worked in SERNAM (KBS 2001). She thus qualifies as an elite feminist.

[xv] Prior to SPM, the State Secretary for Women's Rights (Secretaria de Estado dos Direitos a Mulher SEDIM) functioned as Brazil's state institution for women by working to implement CEDAW (Pitanguy 2015; Faleiros Pimenta 2010).

[xvi]His 2002 platform criticized Cardoso's Bolsa-Alimentação and Bolsa-Escola for their limited coverage and promised to review them (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2002a, 43). "The Bolsa-Escola of the federal government is still very timid concerning benefits and sustains a limited and insufficient vision of the social exclusion problem" (31).

[xvii] Nevertheless, the creation of the Bolsa Família did not seem motivated by Lula's 2002 core constituencies. As Chapter V pointed out, Lula's core constituencies did not include the low-income voters until 2006. (Although in multi-variate vote choice models reviewed in Chapter VI, controlling for education renders income variables insignificant.) Lavinas (2013) shows that the creation of the Bolsa Família was inspired by technocrats pushing for the region-wide diffusion of CCT programs. In this strict sense, MP 132 does not provide evidence of the core constituency mechanism at play in determining presidential decision-making on PWC. On the other hand, we might infer that while Lula did not seem to pursue these pro-poor programs in order to satisfy his 2002 base, he was looking ahead to his 2006 re-election campaign and accurately predicted that he would be able to court low-income, low-educated voters by delivering benefits such as the Bolsa Família.

[xviii] As is often noted, the Bolsa Família subsumed the Bolsa Escola (School Grant), another much smaller conditional cash transfers program initiated by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 2001.

[xix] In Chapters V and VI, I did not classify the promise of multiple presidential candidates to continue and/or expand the Bolsa Familia as a PWC promise primarily because: 1. The candidates did not seem to be targeting "women," but the "poor"; 2. the promise to *continue* a program is not a purely pro-women *change* promise.

CHAPTER VIII *Presidentas* Rise: Consequences for Women in Cabinets?

Do *presidentas* use their delegative power more than their male counterparts to promote PWC?[i] This chapter argues that ceteris paribus, *presidentas*—particularly when they are least constrained—are more likely than male presidents to promote PWC by appointing *ministras*. Two theoretical mechanisms from Chapter II that converge on this prediction. The previous chapters' campaign analyses of 10 viable presidential candidates in five elections in Chile and Brazil showed initial evidence for both these propositions. Female candidates tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity early on and more often in their campaigns than male candidates. We might expect *presidentas* throughout Latin America to be more likely than their male counterparts to view their core constituencies as demanding a greater female presence in the executive branch.

Personal constituencies also matter. Due to the forces of gender homophily, the personal constituencies of Latin America's *presidentas* will likely contain more female politicians than male presidents' networks. Presidents tend to seek ministers that are loyal and like-minded, *Presidentas* are more likely to perceive female ministerial candidates as possessing these qualities because they tend to interact more with other female politicians than male presidents.

Given these affinities between *presidentas* and *ministras* postulated in Chapter II and the initial evidence supporting the core and personal constituency hypotheses, this chapter further contends that *presidentas* are most likely to "make a difference" when they are least constrained, and one of the most important constraints is the supply of female ministerial candidates. Political capital resources are an important determinant of ministerial supply, and this dramatically reduces the female pool of ministerables. It follows that *presidentas* are most likely to nominate more *ministras* than male presidents when the supply of women ministerial candidates is most abundant. Conversely, *presidentas* behave in similar ways as their male counterparts when the female supply is low or depleted.

I probe the plausibility of constituency influence on presidential decision-making on a case study of Michelle Bachelet's 2006 cabinet. This illustrates how Bachelet's popular mandate (core constituency)

and elite networks (personal constituency) help explain her gender parity cabinet. I test the argument statistically with a dataset of all ministers appointed by democratically-elected presidents from 1999-2015 in 18 Latin American countries. Results show that the relationship between *presidentas* and *ministras* is statistically significant at the p<0.10 level. Consistent with this article's argument, the most robust relationships between *presidentas* and *ministras* occur when *presidentas* enjoy the most decision-making latitude in terms of the supply of female ministerial candidates.

1. Why Would *Presidentas* Appoint Women?

It is well documented and realistic to assume that all presidents (male or female) aim to fulfill their mandates and achieve their policy objectives (Amorim Neto 2006; Martínez-Gallardo 2012). In light of these fundamental goals, at least two mechanisms converge on the prediction that *presidentas* will appoint more women to their cabinets. While the first mechanism focuses on bottom-up pressures from core constituencies, the second highlights elite-driven factors from personal constituencies.

First, as argued in Chapter II, viable female presidential candidates are more likely to attempt to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity. Chapters III-VI provided strong evidence that female candidates targeted women voters early in their campaigns. They attempted to elicit female support by promising more PWC than their male counterparts and Assuming that increased efforts leads to increased success, female candidates also are more likely to accomplish this than male candidates. Existing scholarship suggests that presidents respond to popular demands for certain kinds of ministers (M. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005). And thus, because female presidents are more likely than their male counterparts to maintain a core constituency of women demanding PWC, they are more likely to nominate more women to their cabinets.[ii]

Yet, bottom-up pressures from voters are not the only possible drivers of executives' cabinet choices. As argued in Chapter II, personal constituencies are especially relevant for appointment processes, which often rely on trust and recommendations (Amorim Neto 2006; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Martínez-Gallardo 2012). The second reason why *presidentas* would appoint more *ministras* than

male presidents highlights the consequences of homophily, the tendency of individuals with similar characteristics to "flock together." Recurrent throughout societies, homophily exerts a powerful homogenizing effect on perceptions and worldviews (Marsden 1988; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986). Sociological research on gender homophily coupled with feminist institutionalist scholarship on gendered networks suggests that elite female politicians, compared to their male counterparts, tend to interact and exchange information more frequently with other women (Bjarnegård 2013; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Kenny 2013). However, because men continue to dominate most political networks, it is likely that *presidentas'* networks will still contain a male majority. The difference is that *presidentas'* personal constituencies will have a higher percentage of women than male presidents' networks.

A comparatively higher proportion of women in *presidentas'* personal constituencies could lead to a greater likelihood of a *presidenta* naming a female over a male minister. Scholars of cabinet selection tend to agree that executives look for "loyal" and "like-minded" ministers to faithfully pursue the administration's policy agenda (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Dewan and Myatt 2010; Indridason and Kam 2008; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). Regarding loyalty, presidents seek evidence—direct and indirect—that the ministerial candidate will not betray them. Repeated personal interactions as well as references from trusted advisors create trust, reduce uncertainty and therefore can enhance mutual perceptions of loyalty. Regarding like-mindedness, a *presidenta* also is more likely than a male president to regularly exchange political information with other elite female politicians. This gendered flow of information may help foster mutual perceptions of like-mindedness on a range of political issues. Because these homophilous interactions foster mutual perceptions of both loyalty and like-mindedness, these characteristics are best conceived as intertwined rather than independent. All of this suggests that while homophily under a male president can work against women with ministerial ambitions, under a female president, homophilous forces can work against men's overrepresentation in cabinets.

In sum, *presidentas* are more likely than male presidents to interpret at least part of their mandate as core constituency demands for enhanced female representation in the executive branch. Second, because *presidentas'* personal constituencies contain more elite female politicians than those of male

presidents, *presidentas* are more likely to perceive female ministerial candidates as like-minded and loyal. Both the core and the personal constituency mechanisms converge on the prediction that, ceteris paribus, *presidentas* are more likely than their male counterparts to strategically name *ministras*. The next section explains how a reduced pool of female ministerial candidates powerfully curtails *presidentas'* decision-making latitude.

2. *Presidentas'* Constraints and the Female Supply

Aside from nationality and age requirements for ministers, Latin American constitutions impose virtually no restrictions on selecting cabinet members. How does a citizen come to be considered for a ministerial position? Latin American presidents draft their lists of *ministeriables* according to informal norms that define the supply of "qualified" ministerial candidates. This helps explain why, when women constitute half the general population and possess similar education levels as men, the female ministerial pool turns out to be substantially shallower than the male pool (Borrelli 2002; Franceschet 2016).

Executives seek "competent" appointees to execute their legislative agendas. "Competency" – the perceived capacity to achieve presidents' goals – is associated with notions of political capital, technical expertise and partisan ties (Dewan and Myatt 2010; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). Following this, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (M. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2014) demonstrate that Latin American presidents recruit ministers with "political capital resources" (PCRs), which they operationalize as political skills, ties to organizations related to the ministry and status as an expert on the ministry's portfolio. More PCRs do not guarantee that ministers indeed will perform their jobs effectively, but Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson do find statistical evidence that ministers with more PCRs tend to be more successful.[iii] All of this suggests that because men tend continue to dominate politics, they are more likely to possess PCRs and thus the pool of male ministerial candidates will tend to be deeper than the pool of female candidates.

In Latin America's presidential systems, the relative importance of each PCR may vary. For example, in multi-party systems, party leadership experience and reputation among party elites is a

particularly relevant resource. In countries such as Chile and Brazil, presidents tend to abide to "Gamson's law" by distributing ministerial assignments among party members (R. Carroll and Cox 2007). This allows presidents to preserve coalition discipline and legislate effectively. Party leaders often recommend other political elites as ministerial candidates, and thus a positive reputation among party elites is often the key to first qualifying as a ministerial candidate, and then potentially earning an appointment.[iv]

The concept of ministerial supply employed here diverges from conceptions of supply in some women in politics scholarship (Hinojosa 2012; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Revised modernization theories often argue that the female supply for politicians is growing, and this literature operationalizes supply with national-level measures of gender equality—for example female fertility rates and female participation in the labor force. However, in a global study of cabinets, Krook and O'Brien (2012) found that mass indicators of gender equality are relatively poor predictors of female ministerial appointments. In contrast to the operationalization of supply prevalent in the modernization literature, this article's concept of supply could be operationalized by a variety of elite-based factors. Some of these factors include women's national political trajectories, women's experience as leaders in the business and intellectual spheres, as well as their standing among (historically male) party leaders. However reliable, quantitative cross-national data on these variables are unavailable.

I therefore use cabinet appointment theories to derive two determinants of the quantity of female *ministeriables*: (1) timing within a presidential administration; (2) gender stereotypes associated with ministries. First, Dewan and Myatt (2010; 2012) have formalized the argument that the pool of all ministerial candidates is largest at the beginning of executive terms. Executives routinely replace ministers who unexpectedly underperform, become implicated in a scandal or retire for exogenous reasons.[v] Because replacements happen relatively quickly and the candidate pool is finite, by the end of their administrations, executives are often forced to substitute some of their once-preferred ministers with their second- and third-choice candidates. They contend that the supply of high-quality ministers eventually can deplete, thereby diminishing cabinet performance. Dewan and Myatt's (2010; 2012)

influential models generate the expectation that presidents are best equipped to pursue their preferences at the beginning of their administration, when the talent pool is deepest and executives can select their most desired candidates.

Because the female ministerial pool is much shallower than the male pool, it is more prone to depletion. This leads to the first hypothesis concerning the conditions under which *presidentas* will name more women. In light of the *presidenta* mandate and gendered networks, *presidentas* are more likely to make a difference in terms of women's cabinet representation at the beginning of their administration rather than at the end of their terms.

In addition to intra-administration timing, the second factor that affects the supply of female ministerial candidates and thus reduces *presidentas'* decision-making latitude relates to gender stereotypes. Certain ministerial portfolios are often associated with stereotypically feminine characteristics (for example education and health) while other ministries are associated with stereotypically masculine characteristics (such as finance and agriculture) (Davis 1997; Krook and O'Brien 2012). Multiple studies in Latin America and other parts of the world show that women tend to be disproportionately assigned to "feminine" ministries (M. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009; M. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

There are at least two reasons why women are more likely to possess political capital resources related to stereotypically feminine ministries, and therefore why the female ministerial pool would be relatively larger for "feminine" rather than "masculine" or "neutral" ministries. Theories of the gendered division of labor predict that women will possess more ties to organizations relevant to "feminine" ministries and more technical expertise in "feminine" domains.[vi] Women could "naturally" gravitate toward these areas, but the male political establishment's sexism also could play a role. For example, Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson (2005) show that in Latin America, male legislators marginalize their female counterparts by assigning them to "feminine" committees, which often are low-prestige ones. Female politicians may accrue more political capital resources disproportionately related to "feminine" ministries not because women are necessarily more attracted to these domains but also

248

because male elites have limited these women's political experiences to "feminine" areas. In either case, "feminine" ministries are more likely to have an abundant pool of female candidates—that is, women with political capital resources—than "masculine" or "neutral" ministries. Because elite women are more likely to have political capital resources tied to "feminine" ministries, the pool of female ministerial candidates is deepest for these ministries. *Presidentas* therefore are least constrained in appointing women to "feminine" ministries.

I so far have argued that gendered differences in core and personal constituencies mean that, ceteris paribus, *presidentas* are more likely than male presidents to appoint *ministras*. *Presidentas* are nevertheless constrained by the informal imperative to name ministers with political capital resources, and this means that the supply of female ministerial candidates is more reduced than the supply of male candidates. I hypothesize that *presidentas* will tend to nominate more women than male presidents when the female supply is most abundant—that is, at the beginning of their administrations and for "feminine" ministries.

In the next section, I probe the plausibility of this argument by examining opportunities and constraints in cabinet decision-making during Michelle Bachelet's first term in office. This case study illustrates how Bachelet's popular mandate and elite networks help explain her gender parity cabinet.

3. An Illustrative Case: Bachelet's First-Term Cabinet

On January 15, 2006, Bachelet earned over 53 percent of the vote in the second round—handily defeating her conservative male opponent. The media immediately began to pepper her with questions concerning her ministerial line-up, and Bachelet told the press her cabinet would be "made up of the best." What did "the best" really mean?

Bachelet had three aspirations. First, she asserted that "nadie se repite el plato"—or that "nobody go for seconds" (Navia 2007). This phrase indicated that she looked for new faces within the dominant coalition, and the promise seemed to respond to a widespread perception (confirmed by polling data) that

Chileans, after 15 years of Concertación rule, were tired of the political establishment and desired new leadership.

The second aspiration—not entirely at odds with the first—was to assemble Chile's first gender parity cabinet. Bachelet had pledged to voters that she would allocate half of her cabinet to women during the presidential campaign. She thus perceived a mandate from her core constituency—her strongest supporters and those who secure her electoral victory—to dramatically advance women's representation in the executive branch. Gender parity challenged traditional norms concerning the criterion used to evaluate ministerial candidates. Opposition to this promise emerged both within and outside the Concertación, but it was the right that most fiercely attacked the gender parity principle (*El Mercurio* 2006; Solinas 2007).

While Bachelet's first and second criteria constituted responses to popular, constituency demands for certain kinds of leaders, her third criterion responded to concerns of political elites. *Cuoteo*, or party quotas, was not a priority that Bachelet herself trumpeted, but nevertheless was evident given the historical context, party leaders' statements and journalists' speculations (P. Siavelis 2006). Even though constitutionally presidents can appoint virtually any citizen to their cabinets, Bachelet confronted intense pressure to continue the Concertación tradition of distributing posts among the coalition's party elites. Two days before the second round, coalition parties were preparing resumes and reference letters for their proposed ministerial candidates (Astorga 2006). Socialist Party Senator Carlos Ominami asserted that Bachelet's cabinet should reflect the substantial number of socialist votes (Alcaíno Padilla 2006). Radical Party President José Antonio Gómez said he expected that members from his party would be named to the cabinet since during the election the radicals managed to elect three senators and seven deputies (*UPI Chile* 2006a). "If the commitment is not fulfilled, we are going to act with absolute independence," he affirmed. Bachelet's ability to legislate would be jeopardized if she did not—at least partially—satisfy party leaders' appetite for ministerial posts.

Chile's first *presidenta* therefore faced a tall order. She aimed to deliver on her campaign promises and appease her coalition's party leaders. On January 30, 2006, Bachelet unveiled her country's

first gender-parity cabinet. The cabinet also, according to the press, featured new talent and partisan balance. Seven positions were allocated to the Christian Democrats, five to the Party for Democracy, four to the Socialists, three to Independents and one to the Radical Party (*UPI Chile* 2006b). Bachelet appeared to meet all of her proposed goals upon her inauguration: she was relatively less constrained because supply is most abundant at the beginning of a presidential administration.

Mechanisms Why did Bachelet name so many women? In addition to numerous other PWC proposals, she promised voters a gender parity cabinet. Advancing women's presence in the executive branch appeared as a clear mandate from her core constituencies. Yet, in addition to the fact that her decision clearly responded to her core constituencies, gendered characteristics of Bachelet's personal constituency appeared to play a role in Bachelet's cabinet decision-making. Franceschet's interviews with Chilean politicians reveal that Bachelet seemed to network more with elite women (potential ministerial candidates) than her male predecessors. According to one interviewee, Bachelet nominated more women than other Chilean presidents "because she knew more women and she saw more women. Women see women. Men do not see women" (quoted in Franceschet 2016). Some news reporters speculated that Bachelet—like many Latin American presidents—would name some of her "friends" to ministerial positions. All of the alleged friends mentioned were women—Estela Ortiz, María Angélica Álvarez and Ingrid Antonijevic. Ortiz ended up as the Director of the National Preschool Association (Junji). Álvarez became Bachelet's agenda director, and Antonijevic was named Economy Minister ("Gabinete: Lo Que Tienen Las Carpetas" 2006). Bachelet's Health Minister María Soledad Barría was also described as Bachelet's "friend." Like the nominations of other Latin American presidents, Bachelet's appointments – although not all of them ministerial – suggest the relevance of personal networks, which can foster mutual perceptions of trust, loyalty and like-mindedness.

Therefore, both core and personal constituency mechanisms appear as key factors for Bachelet's decision-making. First, the fact that Bachelet promised gender parity during the campaign provides straightforward evidence for the core constituency/mandate mechanism. Second, evidence from personal interviews and the national press suggest that Bachelet's personal constituency featured an unusually high

251

number of female politicians. The *presidenta* personally knew more female ministerial candidates and appointed at least a handful of female friends or acquaintances.

End of Parity In accordance with Dewan and Myatt's (2012; 2010) theory, the supply of female ministerial candidates seemed to diminish over time. Soon after her presidential "honeymoon," she confronted several crises that prompted her to fire and hire ministers. The first crisis that prompted a cabinet shake-up was a series of student protests known as the "Penguin Revolution." Hundreds of thousands took the streets to demand education reforms. Bachelet shuffled her cabinet and managed to maintain gender parity—in part because the Education Minister happened to be male and could be replaced by another male without affecting the proportion of *ministras*.

The second crisis was the disastrous implementation of Transantiago, the capital's renovated public transportation system. Chileans questioned her leadership and decision-making capacity, Bachelet's approval rating fell to about 40 percent, and the *presidenta* publicly apologized for her administration's mistakes. She was able to maintain relative partisan balance after reshuffling her cabinet, but the modifications ended gender parity. Consistent with this article's argument, Bachelet tended to name a high proportion of women to stereotypically "feminine" ministries. Women in her 2006 inaugural cabinet occupied 80 percent of "feminine" ministries, and after Bachelet's first cabinet shuffle, women led 100 percent of such ministries.

The case study thereby advances this article's theoretical argument. Given a perceived core constituency demand for gender parity and a personal constituency with a seemingly higher proportion of women, Bachelet tended to appoint more women when her female pool was largest—at the beginning of her administration and to "feminine" ministries. The next section tests whether the hypotheses hold up cross-nationally and through time.

4. Data and Modeling

To conduct statistical tests, I built an original dataset of ministers appointed by all democratically elected presidents in 18 Latin American countries from 1999-2015. The online CIA World Leaders

Factbook lists minister names and ministries by monthly intervals, and I sampled both inaugural and end-of-term cabinets (Central Intelligence Agency 2015). To help preserve balance among the number of observations per president, I only include the first inaugural term and their end-of-term cabinet for each president who was elected to a consecutive term.[vii]

The first modeling objective is to find out whether *presidentas* employ their delegative power to "make a difference" in terms of women's representation in cabinets. "Making a difference" refers to whether *presidentas* display statistically different nomination patterns from male presidents. Three dependent variables assess this: the percent female in a cabinet (OLS), a count of women in cabinets (Poisson), and the minister's sex (logistic). The unit of analysis for the OLS and Poisson models is the cabinet, and the dataset includes 104 cabinets. The unit of analysis for the logistic models is the minister, coded 0 for male and 1 for female. My dataset includes 1,908 ministers. The same president appoints all of her/his ministers, and therefore observations of ministers appointed by the same president are likely to be correlated in the logistic models. Fifty-four is a large enough number to use either random effects for president or to cluster the standard errors by president (Angrist and Pischke 2009). I report the results for the random effects models and all results are robust to clustering the standard errors by president. The first set of models includes all the observations in my dataset to test whether *presidentas* use their powers to make an impact on women's overall cabinet representation. This chapter's argument also implies that *presidentas'* impact is most likely to be statistically robust when *presidentas* are least constrained by the pool of female ministerial candidates. Following Dewan and Myatt's (2010) modeling of pool depletion, I first expect *presidentas* to name more women to "inaugural" cabinets but not necessarily "end-of-term" cabinets. I disaggregated the data by "inaugural" and "end-of-term" cabinets/ministers to test these predictions.[viii] I again use OLS, Poisson and logistic models to examine the potential *presidenta* effect.

The next empirical implication is that *presidentas* are most likely to advance women's representation for "feminine" ministries. Only the logistic models can test the ministry gender hypotheses (feminine vs. masculine/neutral) since these data are at the minister level (with the dependent variable

being the minister's sex). I used Krook and O'Brien's (2012) gender stereotype classification and coded each ministry as -1 if "feminine," 0 if "neutral" and 1 if "masculine."[ix] This generated the variable *ministry gender*. Many scholars have pointed out that "feminine" classifications often overlap with low-prestige classifications. To untangle the effect of ministry gender from ministry prestige, I coded low prestige ministries as "1," medium prestige ministries as "2" and high prestige ministries as "3" according to Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson's (2005) classification of Latin American ministries. The ministry gender and prestige categories indeed tend to correlate (p=0.53). The logistic models—featuring minister-level data—thereby employ *ministry prestige* and *ministry gender* variables.

The OLS and Poisson models are not equipped to test the ministry gender hypotheses because they contain cabinet-level rather than minister-level data. Yet, these models also must control for prestige and gender because these variables could confound the relationship between *presidentas* and *ministras*. Cabinets vary cross-nationally and temporally in terms of the proportion of "high," "medium," and "low" prestige ministries and the proportion of "feminine," "masculine," and "neutral" ministries. These models require modified versions of the variables since presidents with a higher proportion of high-prestige and/or "masculine" ministries may face greater constraints in naming women to their cabinets. I totaled the ministry prestige and ministry gender scores and averaged them for each cabinet to produce the variables *cabinet prestige score* and *cabinet gender score*. Higher prestige scores mean that the cabinets contain a greater proportion of prestigious cabinet positions. Higher gender scores mean the cabinets are more "masculine."

All models control for additional variables that could mediate or confound the relationship between *presidentas* and *ministras*. First, female presidents could be elected in times and places characterized by greater female access to elite positions. I use two proxies to account for this possibility: the percent female in Congress and the number of women in the predecessor's end-of-term cabinet.[x] The former variable routinely appears in models of female appointments (Arriola and Johnson 2014; Claveria 2014; M. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Krook and O'Brien 2012; O'Brien et al. 2015). Data on the percent female in the legislature comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Inter-

Parliamentary Union 2016). If a country has both an upper and a lower chamber, I average the percentages of each chamber. I include the second variable because some of the *presidentas* in the sample were ministers in their predecessors' cabinets and identified with the same party. *Presidentas* potentially could govern countries that already are on a path toward greater female presence in cabinets.

I also control for presidential ideology since *presidentas* may appoint more women not because of their same sex but because of their common ideology. In Latin America, ideology generally is conceptualized on a left-right continuum according to state intervention policy stances (Kitschelt, Luna, and Hawkins 2010). Some scholarship suggests that left-leaning presidents express a commitment to social equality, and therefore they are more likely to appoint women (Levitsky and Roberts 2011). However, regional public opinion polls show that female citizens in Latin America often self-identify as more conservative, and thus conservative presidents could strive to please women by naming more *ministras* ("AmericasBarometer" 2004). Since the relationship between ideology and female appointments therefore may be non-linear, I include dummies rather than a single ordinal variable. I coded president's ideology according to Murillo, Oliveros and Vaishnav (2010). Three *presidentas* were classified as "left" (Bachelet, Fernández and Rousseff) while one was classified as "far right" (Moscoso) and another as "center" (Chinchilla).

Finally, time may confound the relationship between *presidentas* and *ministras*. *Presidentas* tend to appear in the sample at later time periods, and the number of *ministras* increases over time as well. For the logit models, I control for the year the minister was appointed and for the OLS and Poisson models, I control for the year the cabinet was appointed. I also include a cabinet size variable (M. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

5. Results

Table 1 shows the results for the full OLS, Poisson and logistic models, which examine both inaugural and end-of-term cabinets and all ministry gender types. The *presidenta* coefficient is positive and significant at the p<0.10 level in all of the models. This is consistent with the argument that, ceteris paribus, *presidentas* tend to deploy their power to enhance women's cabinet representation. The OLS

results show that the presence of a *presidenta* increases the percent female in a cabinet by just 6 percent. I used the margins Stata command to calculate the predicted probabilities for the number of female ministers (Poisson models) and the probability of observing a *ministra* (logistic models). According to the Poisson results, the presence of a male president generates the prediction of 3 female ministers, while the presence of a *presidenta* predicts 6. According to the logistic results, the probability of observing a *ministra* under male and female presidents is 19 percent and 27 percent, respectively. In other words, the presence of a *presidenta* augments the probability of observing a female minister by 8 percentage points, or about 40 percent.

---

[i] Portions of this chapter were originally published as "*Presidentas* Rise: Consequences for Women in Cabinets?" *Latin American Politics and Society* 58: 3–25.

[ii] Relatedly, a democratic vote allowed each of the *presidentas* in this study to become the first female chief executive of their respective countries. This suggests these women presidents, even if they did not mobilize women on the basis of gender identity, could justifiably interpret part of their own mandates as popular demands for a greater presence of women in the executive branch. Although the most important aspect of a *presidenta's* mandate may not be to increase women's representation in the executive branch, it still remains that male presidents therefore are less likely than *presidentas* to infer a public call for greater female representation from their mandate.

[iii] For the purposes of this chapter, the supply of ministerial candidates is primarily determined by those who possess PCRs, although other scholars of parliamentary systems continue to debate formal and informal determinants of supply (Annesley 2015).

[iv] Partisan quotas in coalition governments could diminish the female ministerial supply if allied parties tend to have fewer women with PCRs than the president's party, but if the reverse is true, then partisan criteria could actually provide presidents more options in naming women.

[v] Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009) found that ministerial careers in Latin America last on average about 2.2 years.

[vi] Gender stereotypes may serve both as a gateway toward a greater female presence or as a hindrance to cabinet gender equality. Nevertheless, this particular issue is beyond this article's scope.

[vii] "End-of-term" cabinets are taken from the month immediately before the elected president hands power off to her/his successor. All 54 elected presidents have an inaugural cabinet, but not every president has an end-of-term cabinet. I include only the end-of-term cabinets of presidents who already have handed off power or who will do so within a year. Six presidents do not meet this requirement, and therefore their end-of-term cabinets do not appear in the dataset. Aside from those presidents, Fujimori fled to Japan four months after his second re-election, and only his 2000 inaugural cabinet is included in the analysis. Sánchez de Lozada, Zelaya, Gutiérrez and de la Rúa were elected and in power for more than a year, but did not finish their terms. I used their last cabinet configuration as their end-of-term observations. Two presidents were re-elected non-consecutively but are still in power, and therefore those presidents have three cabinets (two inaugural and one end-of-term) included. The dataset thus features 104 cabinets total. I later ran robustness checks that dropped Sánchez de Lozada, Zelaya's Gutiérrez's and de la Rúa's "end-of-term" cabinets and found that no results changed.

[viii] End-of-term cabinets might be unusual in ways that could affect the findings. For example, in some countries ministers with presidential ambitions must resign from their post to run for president. Nevertheless, a large literature argues that ministerial supply depletes over time and models this in similar ways. Although perhaps not ideal, this article's strategy thus appears as the comparatively best way to model supply depletion.

[ix] All results are robust to re-coding the Chief of Staff and Presidency posts as "masculine" rather than "neutral."

[x] Both of these variables could also be measures of the supply of elite female politicians – and potentially female ministerial candidates. My argument suggests that *presidentas* in times and places with more women in the legislature and/or more women with ministerial experience are more likely to have an impact on women's cabinet

representation. However, the small number of *presidentas* in this study does not permit enough statistical power to test interactions between *presidentas* and these variables and thereby probe these other empirical implications of my argument.

Table 1: Model Results[iiii]

	FULL MODELS			INAUGURAL			END-OF-TERM			FEMININE	MASCULINE NEUTRAL
	OLS	Poisson	Logistic	OLS	Poisson	Logistic	OLS	Poisson	Logistic	Logistic	Logistic
Presidenta	0.06*	0.31*	0.46*	0.12**	0.54**	0.70***	0.02	0.12	0.15	0.84**	0.29
	(0.03)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.05)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.41)	(0.28)
Cab. Gender Score	-0.26**	-1.65**	--	0.06	0.51	--	-0.43***	-2.57**	--	--	--
	(0.13)	(0.73)	--	(0.21)	(1.21)	--	(0.14)	(1.04)	--	--	--
Ministry Gender	--	--	-0.83***	--	--	-0.75***	--	--	-0.92***	--	--
	--	--	(0.09)	--	--	(0.12)	--	--	(0.13)	--	--
Cab. Prestige Score	-0.08	-0.38	--	-0.12	-0.96	--	-0.22	-1.01	--	--	--
	(0.11)	(0.65)	--	(0.18)	(0.98)	--	(0.15)	(1.05)	--	--	--
Ministry Prestige	--	--	-0.34***	--	--	-0.38**	--	--	-0.34**	-1.20***	-0.43***
	--	--	(0.11)	--	--	(0.15)	--	--	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.11)
% Female in Congress	0.19*	1.16**	1.56**	0.29*	1.72**	2.20**	0.09	0.54	0.38	1.98	1.46*
	(0.11)	(0.55)	(0.77)	(0.17)	(0.82)	(1.00)	(0.13)	(0.86)	(1.02)	(1.37)	(0.88)
# Fem. Pred. Cabinet	0.02***	0.05**	0.09***	0.01*	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.06	0.14**	0.09	0.09**
	(0.006)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Far Left	0.17***	0.71***	1.05***	0.09	0.38	0.67*	0.22***	1.09***	1.67***	1.15**	0.98***
	(0.05)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.07)	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.07)	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.56)	(0.34)
Left	0.05*	0.19	0.32	0.01	0.08	0.12	0.06*	0.33	0.59*	0.80**	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.04)	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.27)
Right	0.06*	0.31*	0.41	0.04	0.26	0.39	0.06	0.29	0.39	0.69	0.23
	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.05)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.04)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.42)	(0.28)
Far Right	0.01	0.001	-0.07	-0.02	-0.10	-0.07	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.42	-0.38
	(0.04)	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.06)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.05)	(0.46)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.36)
Year Appointed	0.003	0.01	0.01	0.002	0.01	0.02	0.01***	0.05**	0.07**	0.03	0.01
	(0.002)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.003)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.003)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)

Cabinet Size	-0.01**	0.01	-0.04***	-0.01	0.02	-0.04*	-0.01***	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.07**	-0.04**
	(0.003)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.004)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
N	104	104	1,908	56	56	999	48	48	909	365	1,543

[i] Tests are two-tailed.
[ii] *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

A review of the cabinet characteristics for the OLS and Poisson models shows results generally consistent with the anticipated relationships. The cabinet gender score shows the expected sign (negative), and the coefficient is significant. This means that cabinets with a greater proportion of masculine and/or neutral ministries have a lower percentage female (OLS) and feature fewer female appointees (Poisson). Ministry gender is negative and significant for the logistic model. Cabinet prestige score is not significant for the OLS or Poisson models, but ministry prestige is significant and negative for the logistic model. The percent female in Congress is positive and significant in all of the models as is the number of women in the predecessor's cabinet.

In terms of presidential ideology, far left presidents (none of whom are women) exert a significant and positive impact on women's representation in cabinets. The dummy variable for far left presidents has a larger magnitude than the *presidenta* variable and is significant at the p<0.01 level. This result on the impact of left-leaning male leaders confirms findings from O'Brien et. al.'s (2015) study, which shows that left-leaning prime ministers tend to nominate more women.

These initial results that reveal that *presidentas* employ their power to make a difference, but when we take into account all the observations, the *presidenta* coefficient fails to attain the p<0.10 significance level for a few of the robustness checks, explained at the end of this section. Nevertheless, we do find some evidence consistent with the argument that *presidentas* influence women's cabinet representation overall. Is the evidence stronger when *presidentas* are least constrained by the supply of female ministerial candidates? Because the pool of female ministerial candidates is deepest at the beginning of executives' term, *presidentas* should be most effective in enhancing women's cabinet presence right after presidential elections. The ministerial supply diminishes as presidents replace ministers over the course of their administration, and *presidentas* are less likely to have an impact when they are about to hand power off to their successor.

The middle columns in Table 1 show the first set of results, consistent with this argument, concerning the supply-sensitive conditions under which *presidentas* are most likely to use their power to make a difference. The *presidenta* coefficient is positive and significant at the p<0.05 level for all the

inaugural models and fails to reach significance for all the end-of-term models. I again used the margins command to generate predicted probabilities for the other inaugural models. The Poisson results show that the number of *ministras* under male presidents is 4, and under *presidentas*, that number jumps to 8. The logistic results further reveal that the probability of appointing a *ministra* is 0.21 for male presidents – while this probability is 0.32 for female presidents, a difference of 43 percent.[i]

The results again show that far left presidents exert a significant and positive impact on women's representation according to the results for the inaugural logistic model and all the end-of-term models. This might suggest that unlike *presidentas*, far left presidents may not be so prone to a depleted pool of female ministerial cabinets. This could be because parties from the far left are more likely to have a plentiful supply of female politicians—and hence women with political capital resources (Beckwith 2000). Presidents with other ideologies—such as the *presidentas* in this study—may be more susceptible to female pool depletion.

The rest of the inaugural and end-of-term results are roughly similar to those produced by the full model. Cabinet gender is significant and negative for the end-of-term cabinets but not for the inaugural cabinets. Furthermore, ministry gender and ministry prestige are significant and negative for the logistic models. The percent female in the legislature is significant and positive for the inaugural models, and the number of women in the predecessor's cabinet is significant for the OLS inaugural model and the logistic models.

I also argued that *presidentas* are most likely to improve women's presence for "feminine" ministries because they face weaker constraints than for "masculine" and "neutral" ministries. Table 1's final columns display results consistent with this chapter's hypotheses: the *presidenta* coefficient is positive and significant at the p<0.05 level for the feminine model, but not for the masculine/neutral model. The probability of a male president appointing a *ministra* to a feminine ministry is 0.31, and the probability of a female president nominating a woman to the same kind of ministry is 0.46, about a 48 percent increase.

As expected, ministry prestige is negative and significant at the $p<0.01$ level. The percent female in Congress and the number of women in the predecessor's cabinet is not significant for the feminine model, but both are significant and positive for the masculine/neutral model. Again, far left presidents name more women to both "feminine" and "masculine/neutral" posts, perhaps suggesting that these leaders are less constrained by gender-specific ministerial pools.

To check the robustness of the findings, I pulled data from the ILO and World Bank to add three indicators of female empowerment that vary by country and year.[ii] Female in labor force is the percent of women 15 years and over who are actively employed. The second indicator is fertility rate, the number of children born to women. The third is female education, the female to male ratio of tertiary enrollment. Including these female empowerment variables does little to change the results. The *presidenta* coefficient is always significant at the same level of significance as the models without the controls for female empowerment with one exception: For the Poisson model, the *presidenta* coefficient is positive, but nevertheless fails to reach conventional significance levels ($p=0.13$). I also removed Bachelet's 2006 inaugural cabinet from the models to see whether the results were robust to excluding this extreme case of gender parity. The *presidenta* coefficient failed to reach significance for the full models, but again reached significance for the inaugural and "feminine" models.

In sum, this chapter contends that when *presidentas* are least constrained, they are most likely to deploy their power to enhance women's representation in cabinets. Model results provide some evidence that *presidentas* make a difference when we observe both the inaugural and end-of-term cabinets and all ministry types. Consistent with this chapter's argument, we find the stronger evidence that *presidentas* make an impact under two conditions: at the beginning of their administration and for "feminine" ministries. I have argued that both of these conditions are best interpreted as indicators of a relatively abundant supply of female ministerial candidates. The following section considers a few rival interpretations and reveals that each falls short of accounting for the empirical results.

6. Alternative Explanations

Could a lack of political capital instead of a lack of supply act as *presidentas'* primary constraint on female ministerial appointments? Presidents' political capital is often operationalized as public approval, the margin of victory in the previous election, and partisan support in Congress (Light 1999). According to this alternative explanation, *presidentas* face a trade-off between like-mindedness/loyalty and "competence." *Presidentas* have strategic reasons to name women but because of this trade-off, doing so requires extra presidential capital. *Presidentas* therefore only improve women's representation in executive cabinets at the beginning of their terms when they are still on their honeymoon and tend to enjoy greater public approval.

It is likely that both measures of presidential capital and female ministerial supply can be interpreted as constraints on *presidentas'* appointments, and because presidents often shuffle their cabinets when their popularity falls, both of these variables tend to decline over time (Light 1999). Diminished capital and supply could together contribute to the empirical finding on inaugural cabinets. While we cannot completely untangle the presidential capital vs. supply variables with the Bachelet case study, a quick look at her cabinet decision-making nevertheless yields little immediate evidence for this rival explanation. Women's cabinet presence under Bachelet did not seem to co-vary well with her political capital. First, Bachelet's coalition controlled a similar percent of the lower and upper chamber— that is, majorities ranging from 54-56 percent—during her 2006 and 2014 terms. Thus, the party support in Congress component varies little and cannot help explain variations in women's cabinet presence. Second, Bachelet won a greater vote share in 2013 (about 62 percent) compared to 2006 (about 53 percent). Yet, she named women to 50 percent of her cabinet in 2006, and just 39 percent in 2014. Third, Bachelet ended her first term with record-breaking popularity – about 80 percent approval – but she never re-obtained a gender parity cabinet.

Moreover, if the presidential capital argument were true, we would expect the costs of naming *ministras* to depend on ministry prestige. According to this alternative explanation, *presidentas* should be most willing to sacrifice "competence" for low-prestige ministries since the costs would be lower than the costs of appointing women to high-prestige ministries.[iii] Empirical implications of the presidential capital

263

argument are that *presidentas* make a difference for low-prestige, possibly medium-prestige and not high-prestige posts. Empirically, however, the *presidenta* variable is positive and significant at the p<0.10 level when we observe either low or high-prestige ministries, but not medium prestige ministries.[iv] In sum, although presidential capital usually does offer presidents greater decision-making latitude and thus the argument appears theoretically compelling, this study reveals little empirical evidence consistent with its observable implications.

A rival interpretation of the ministry gender results relates to the role of public opinion in determining cabinet appointments. This article argued that *presidentas* tend to name more women to "feminine" ministries because the supply of candidates is deepest for these ministry types. However, it could be that voters prefer to see *ministras* in charge of "feminine" ministries and *presidentas* appoint more women at the beginning of their term because this is when the public pays the most attention (Martin 1988). *Presidentas'* decision-making is exclusively motivated by public demand, according to this account.

One way to probe this pure popular demand explanation for the "feminine" ministry type results is to see whether presidents seeking immediate re-election reshuffle their cabinet—ostensibly to earn greater public support. Using the CIA World Leaders Factbook, I reviewed ministerial lists for the months leading up to the election contests for all presidents seeking re-election. Ministerial lineups are extremely stable as cabinet shuffles rarely appear during these relatively short, campaign periods. There are no signs that these executives began to appoint more women to feminine ministries—or to any cabinet positions—in anticipation of the next presidential election. In sum, this article maintains that *presidentas'* mandates for a greater female presence in the executive branch could help motivate *presidentas'* strategic choices to name more women when they are least constrained. A pure public demand theory falls short of accounting for this article's main empirical results. The article's elite-based supply explanation thus seems to constitute a more plausible interpretation of the empirical results concerning ministry gender type and administration timing.

A third alternative explanation again relates to the finding that *presidentas* are more likely to appoint women to "feminine" ministries. Rather than supply factors accounting for these results, they may be driven by the fact that that *presidentas* and *ministras* are like-minded on precisely the issues handled by "feminine" ministries—such as health, corruption and social welfare. It is possible that *presidentas* and *ministras* may share similar views *especially* on issues handled by "feminine" ministries. Research on homophily and gendered networks would nevertheless predict that elite female politicians would share information and exchange ideas on a broader range of topics. Furthermore, given that loyalty and like-mindedness are related characteristics, it is unclear why *presidentas* would value these traits only for "feminine" and not other positions as well. Again, future research should explore homophilous interactions among elite politicians to sort out exactly when homophily plays a role in generating perceptions of like-mindedness.

7. Conclusions

This chapter provides strong evidence that since 1999, *presidentas* have been employing their delegative power to effect PWC. I first theorized that *presidentas* are more likely than their male counterparts to perceive a core constituency of voters demanding PWC, specifically a greater female presence in the executive branch. I then argued that *presidentas*, because they network more with other female politicians, are more likely than their male counterparts to view female ministerial candidates as loyal and like-minded, two qualities that presidents generally seek.

I then conducted a plausibility probe of the core and personal constituency hypotheses for Michelle Bachelet's cabinet decision-making during her first term. I found that both mechanisms seemed to be at work: Bachelet faced core constituency pressures to deliver on her parity promise, but her personal constituency also seemed to feature a greater number of female politicians. I then tested my argument on cabinet decision-making by all democratically elected Latin American presidents from 1999-2015 and found evidence consistent with my main argument: *Presidentas* are more likely to appoint women when the female ministerial supply is deepest.

[i] I standardized the variables to compare the OLS coefficients. For the full OLS model, the *presidenta* coefficient is 0.17 and significant at the $p<0.10$ level; for the inaugural OLS model, it is 0.32 and significant at the $p<0.05$ level; and for the end-of-term OLS model, it is 0.06 and not significant.

[ii] The appendix contains tables of all of the results for the robustness checks.

[iii] I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

[iv] Results from these models will be available in an on-line appendix.

CHAPTER IX Conclusions

Gender inequalities in income, social status and political representation persist throughout Latin America, and yet women have won the presidency more times here than in any other region in the world. Latin American presidents exert vast legislative and delegative powers, and *presidentas* possess enormous potential to enhance equality between men and women. Despite the substantive importance of *presidentas'* rise, scholars are just beginning to study whether and how they deploy their power to effect change favoring women. Among the *presidentas* democratically elected since the 1990s, Bachelet's and Rousseff's divergent use of power to effect PWC is particularly striking—not only because of the magnitude of the difference but especially because these *presidentas* were so similarly situated.

To understand this variation, I revisited long-standing debates on descriptive representation (the presence of women in office) and substantive representation (change favoring women). A dominant theory for variation in female politicians' use of power to effect PWC argues that some female politicians are feminists while others are not. However, Bachelet's and Rousseff's life stories suggest they developed a feminist consciousness and maintained pro-women attitudes. As left-leaning, single mothers operating in the male-dominated fields of defense, energy and economics, both benefited from previous feminist advances, were exposed to feminist ideas and personally experienced gender discrimination. Other factors highlighted in the literature, such as the percent female in Congress, their party's and coalition's ideologies, and the magnitude of their formal powers fall short of fully accounting for the dramatic contrasts in their deployment of power. The Bachelet-Rousseff divergence defies easy theoretical explanation.

This concluding chapter first reviews this dissertation's constituency theory, which not only solves the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle but also offers fresh insights on the probabilistic relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. I then summarize my empirical findings and re-assess the feminist consciousness account to again highlight its shortcomings and the comparative strengths of my constituency argument. Following this, I recap the diverse ways that viable female candidates in Chile

267

and Brazil have tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity and identify some factors that may facilitate or impede success. I conclude by outlining additional avenues for future research on the consequences of *presidentas'* rise.

1. Summary of Argument and Evidence

Scholars exploring the link between descriptive and substantive representation have largely overlooked the role of constituency influence. Chapter II presented the constituency theory, which accounts for (1) why female politicians, specifically presidents, are more likely to use their power to promote PWC than their male counterparts (inter-gender variation); and (2) why some women do so more than others (intra-gender variation). I first took a step back to theorize how core and personal constituencies crystallize during campaigns and then affect presidents' use of legislative and delegative power once in office.

I begin with core constituencies. Campaigns are intense periods of candidate-voter interaction. Candidates make promises, formalized in platforms, to attract enough voters to win the election. These promises shape how candidates-turned-presidents interpret their mandates. Assuming that presidents aim to raise their approval ratings and/or augment their re-election prospects, they have incentives to deploy their power in ways that align with their mandate. Presidents tend to prioritize legislation benefiting their core constituencies, and presidents who believe their core constituents demand a certain kind of cabinet minister are more likely to subsequently appoint ministers with these characteristics. In these ways, perceptions of core constituencies, crystallized during campaigns, affect presidents' legislative and delegative decision-making.

Regarding personal constituencies, campaigns are unique moments when members of campaign leadership teams demonstrate their potential to serve a future president. They prove their political and technical skills by designing campaign proposals, managing agendas, and executing events. My theory stresses how personal constituents during the campaign supply the candidate with political and technical expertise to formulate winning platforms. Once victorious, presidents-elect then formulate their

268

legislative agendas based on these platforms (for an exception, see Stokes 2001). Presidents-elect also draw their ministerial picks directly from this campaign teams secured the electoral victory (Boas 2016). Personal constituencies solidify during campaigns and subsequently affect how presidents exercise their legislative and delegative power.

One of the constituency theory's primary interventions is in explaining how does candidate sex affects gendered and sex-related characteristics of these core and personal constituencies. Political elites tend to believe that female candidates are more effective than males at mobilizing women voters. Due to this widespread belief, viable female presidential candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to attempt to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. Female candidates thus are more likely to target women voters by evoking their gender identities and/or promising PWC. Assuming that greater female mobilization attempts augments chances of success, female candidates are also more likely to perceive a core constituency of women demanding PWC by the end of the election. If these women win the election, they are then more likely to use their power to satisfy this constituency who they believe are demanding PWC. The "female surrogate corollary" states that when seeking female support, male candidates will often deploy women to campaign on their behalf. Due to the belief that women are more effective at mobilizing women, male candidates often are concerned with securing female support when they compete against female candidates.

My second argument was that viable female presidential candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to network with elite feminists and female politicians. The principle of gender homophily would lead to the prediction that female candidates are more likely to interact with other female politicians. Because of the importance of networks in appointing ministers, this means that *presidentas* are more likely to name women to cabinets. Second, elite feminists by definition seek the advancement of women in politics and thus are more likely to avidly support and seek contact with viable female candidates. Due to the influence of elite feminists in personal constituencies, these female contenders are more likely to include PWC in their platforms. If victorious, these female presidents-elect are more likely to exercise their legislative power in ways that promote PWC because they are more

likely to have promised PWC during the campaign and, once in office, they will have greater access to political and technical expertise on PWC.

In short, the mechanisms of core and personal constituencies do not compete with each other, but instead converge on the prediction that *presidentas* will use their power to effect PWC. However, because these hypotheses are probabilistic, individual female presidents will not always promote more PWC than male presidents. Any individual president—male or female—who successfully mobilizes a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity and networks extensively with female politicians and elite feminists is the most likely to use her or his power to promote PWC.

Evidence Table 1 summarizes the findings from Chapters III-VIII. The first column lists all viable candidates from Chile's and Brazil's presidential campaigns from 1999-2010. The second column displays candidates' gender gap according to the first round results, with positive signs indicating a female gap and negative signs indicating a male gap. This gender gap serves as an initial indicator of whether they successfully mobilized a core constituency of women. The next columns indicate the number of PWC promises included in their platforms but does not capture the promises candidates made in speeches or interviews on the campaign trail. The rest of the columns show the extent to which candidates evoked women's identities in their campaign discourse and, for the election winners, the extent to which they used their legislative and delegative powers to promote PWC. For these columns, I qualified these extents as, in ascending order, "none," "little," "some" and "a lot."

Table 1: Chapters III-VIII Summary of Findings

Candidates	Year	Gender Gap	PWC Promises in Platform	Gender Identities in Discourse	Use Legislative Power	Use Delegative Power
Lavín	1999-00	6%	7	Some	--	--
Lagos	**1999-00**	**-5%**	**9**	**Little**	**Little**	**Some**
Piñera	2005-06	-2.8%	9	Little	--	--
Lavín	2005-06	9%	8	Little	--	--
Bachelet	**2005-06**	**2%**	**40**	**A lot**	**A lot**	**A lot**
Alvear	2005-06	--	--	A lot	--	--
Lula	**2002**	**-8.5%**	**29[i]**	**No**	**Some**	**No**
Serra	2002	4.9%	11	Little	--	--
Lula	**2006**	**-6.3%**	**7[ii]**	**No**	**Some**	**No**
Alckmin	2006	6.8%	4	No	--	--
Serra	2010	4.4%	26	Some	--	--
Rousseff	**2010**	**-6.4%**	**0**	**A lot**	**Some**	**Some**
Silva	2010	3.3%	1	A lot	--	--

Notes: Winners of general elections are in bold. Positive gender gaps are for the first round and indicate that more women than men voted for the candidate.

I begin with the all-male Chilean campaigns in 1999-00 from Chapter III. Joaquín Lavín won more female than male votes during both of his presidential bids, but he promised little PWC, a sign that he had networked little or not at all with elite feminists. Lavín thus mobilized women, but not primarily on the basis of gender identity. Female voters in Chile at the time seemed attracted to the stereotypically "feminine" aspects of his public image and his "depoliticized" campaign.

Ricardo Lagos earned a substantial male gap in both rounds, indicating that he did not mobilize a core constituency of women in these campaigns. Overall, Lagos made little effort to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. He made few PWC promises in his platform, focusing on international agreements to fight discrimination against women. Once in office, Lagos mainly promoted PWC with his exercise of delegative power, setting a record for Chile by nominating women to about one-third of his cabinet positions. On the other hand, he deployed his legislative powers to pursue PWC to a very limited extent—mostly on the international relations front—in order to fulfill some PWC promises from his platform. Elite feminists from within his party seemed to influence some of his PWC promises.

Chapter IV explored the Chile's inter-gender campaigns of 2005-06, with two viable men and two viable women vying for the presidency. Lavin again earned an important female gap in the first round, but as in the last election, this did not translate into a constituency mobilized on the basis of gender

271

identity. His competitor from the right, Sebastián Piñera, earned a substantial male gap in the first round. Political analysts at the time thought male voters were attracted to his "rational" and "cold" businessman image, which was stereotypically masculine. Piñera promised little PWC in his platform, networked little with female politicians and elite feminists. It was only at the very end of his second-round campaign that he initiated efforts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity by evoking their identities as wives and mothers.

The 2005-06 race featured two viable female contenders: Soledad Alvear and Michelle Bachelet. Alvear was considered a leading contender for the Concertación nomination until 2004. She dropped out of the race months before the first round, having never widely disseminated a campaign platform. However, there is strong evidence that she tried to mobilize women voters on the basis of gender identity by meeting with them and sharing her experiences as a mother and a victim of sexism.

Bachelet's small 2005 female gap is significant in light of the fact that in all previous elections Chilean women had disproportionately voted for conservative presidential candidates. Bachelet promised far more PWC than any other candidate, suggesting that she perceived women as a potential core constituency and/or that elite feminists influenced her campaign. On the campaign trail, Bachelet further tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity by meeting with women, sharing her struggles as a single mother and recalling her experiences with sexism. She cultivated numerous strong ties to elite feminists: her mother, several best friends and advisers had participated in Chile's pro-democracy women's movement in the 1980s. These feminists were PWC experts who played diverse roles in her campaign.

Once in office, Bachelet immediately fulfilled her promise to assemble a gender parity cabinet. She subsequently departed significantly from Lagos' legacy by deploying her legislative powers to advance PWC throughout her term. Her PWC legislation ranged from social security to domestic violence to women's political participation. Bachelet thus emerges from this analysis as a paradigmatic case of a viable female presidential candidate (1) attempting to and succeeding at mobilizing women on the basis of gender identity, (2) networking with elite feminists and female politicians, (3) winning the presidency

and then (4) aggressively and persistently deploying both her delegative and legislative powers to promote PWC.

Chapters V and VI showed that no candidate in Brazil achieved all four of these feats, although female candidates in this country also tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity and one male candidate, Lula, was influenced by elite feminists in his party. Looking first at the male opposition candidates, we see in Table 1 that José Serra earned more female than male votes in both 2002 and 2010. However, this relative success among women voters was probably due to factors other than his efforts to rally women on the basis of gender identity. Serra promised little PWC and rarely evoked women's identities in his discourse. Geraldo Alckmin in 2006 earned an even larger female gap than Serra, but promised virtually no PWC and there is no evidence that he evoked women's identities in his campaign discourse.

Lula in 2002 and 2006 earned substantial male gaps and did not try to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity by evoking their gender identities in either campaign. However, elite feminists from within his party did exert important influence by drafting a long list of major PWC reforms for his platforms, particularly in 2002. Once in power, Lula did not significantly augment women's cabinet presence, but he did use his legislative power to pursue a handful of his PWC promises, most notably the creation of Brazil's women's ministry.

Turning to Brazil's female candidates, the Green Party's Marina Silva captured more female than male votes, but failed to advance to the second round. Although she promised little PWC, she tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity in a different way—by drawing on her identities as a black female from an impoverished family. In so doing, she targeted specific subsets of women that her party had historically failed to attract. However, it is unclear the extent to which Silva's female gap was due to her mobilization efforts or other factors, such as the Guerra scandal which appeared to motivate a transfer of female votes from Rousseff to Silva.

Rousseff, like her male predecessor, earned a substantial male gap. She promised some PWC on the campaign trail, but none of her promises were formalized in her platform. Unlike Lula, she made

273

extensive efforts to cultivate a female constituency on the basis of gender identity. These efforts included meeting with women, highlighting her femininity with symbols, networking with female political elites and drawing on both maternalist and "first female" discourses. The fact that she promised little PWC suggests that she networked little with elite feminists. My interviews helped confirm her scarce ties to elite feminists. Once in office, Rousseff named the most women to her cabinet in Brazilian history, but later replaced several of them with men. She used her legislative powers in limited ways to promote PWC—primarily by extending Lula's policies and advancing domestic violence bills.

Finally, Chapters III-VI provided evidence for the female surrogate corollary. Male candidates often become concerned with securing female votes when polling or first-round results reveal significant gender gaps. They also often feel that their female voter base could be threatened when they are competing against a viable female candidate. Under these circumstances, male candidates will often use female surrogates because they believe women are more effective than men at mobilizing women. The first-round results in 1999 revealed significant gender gaps in the top two finishers' electoral results. In response to the heightened the importance of the female vote, both Lavín and Lagos employed this strategy to court female voters during the second round. Lavín's wife traveled Chile to energize women on behalf of her husband by appealing to their identities as mothers and wives. Lagos hired a popular female minister—Soledad Alvear—to lead his campaign and attract more female support.

Male candidates also are more likely to leverage female surrogates in inter-gender contests, when they are competing against at least one viable female candidate. According to Chapter IV, Lavín worried that Bachelet was siphoning off his core constituency of women, which he had solidified during the previous presidential race. One of his responses was to hire a female campaign manager to attract female voters. Yet, we also see examples of the female surrogate tactic at play in Brazil. Competing against Rousseff and Silva motivated Serra to adopt this strategy in 2010. Chapter V revealed that his wife, female politicians and even an actress served as surrogates for the PSDB candidate. They did this by defending his PWC proposals and attacking Rousseff.

2. Conditions Under Which Presidents Use Their Power to Promote PWC

A key contribution of the constituency theory is that it specifies the conditions under which female and male presidents are most likely to deploy their power to effect PWC. Chapter VII contended that *presidentas* are most likely to use their delegative power to enhance PWC when the supply of female ministerial candidates is deepest. Even more specifically, *presidentas* are most likely to enhance women's representation in cabinets (1) when they are assembling their inaugural cabinets; and (2) when they are appointing ministers to "feminine" ministries.

While Chapter VII's findings suggest that *presidentas* are more likely than their male counterparts to use their delegative power to promote PWC, we cannot conclude from Chapter VII's study of legislative power that *presidentas* also use their legislative power more than their male counterparts to promote PWC. What this chapter *does* suggest is that presidents—male or female—who are able to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity and network extensively with elite feminists are most likely to do this.

To what extent are these two mechanisms—a core constituency of women mobilized on the basis of gender identity and ties to elite feminists and female politicians—necessary to obtain a significant use of power to obtain PWC? In terms of legislative power, Bachelet represents a paradigmatic case: both variables are present and she deployed her legislative and delegative powers the most to effect PWC.

The answer may depend on the type of power in question. After Bachelet, Lula seemed use his legislative powers the most to advance PWC, even if Rousseff may have prioritized PWC slightly more than he did (although this difference was not statistically significant). Lula's case is one of a president who was influenced by elite feminists from within his party and thus promised significant PWC in his platform. Yet he did not mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity. His case demonstrates that it is not enough to, under the influence of elite feminists, promise significant PWC in a platform. A president also needs strong electoral pressures from the masses to incentivize a serious prioritization of PWC. Lula seemed to believe that most of his work in satisfying women's demands for PWC was accomplished when he created the Women's Ministry. Although he did pursue some PWC legislation, his efforts were not as sustained as Bachelet's. However, of the two conditions, networking

275

with elite feminists (the personal constituency factor) may be the more important determinant of the extent to which presidents will employ their legislative power to advance PWC.

In terms of delegative power, both variables seem necessary for a president to deploy his or her power "a lot" to advance PWC, as Bachelet represents the only example of this. As shown in Chapter VII's case study, both mechanisms seemed to be at work for Bachelet's first-term cabinet. On the other hand, Lagos was able to nominate a historically high number of female ministers with neither a core constituency of women mobilized on the basis of gender identity nor a personal constituency of many female politicians. This could be because the bar was set so low in Chile prior to Lagos' administration, that he only needed to have networked with a handful women with ample political capital resources in order to achieve this goal.

3. Consciousness vs Constituency Explanations

Chapter II concluded that the strongest alternative explanation to my constituency theory was a socio-psychology theory of feminist consciousness applied to female politicians. One may insist that Chapter II did not present enough evidence for Rousseff's feminist consciousness and feminist consciousness could still explain the Bachelet-Rousseff puzzle. Anticipating this objection, I included pieces of evidence throughout the dissertation that undermine the feminist consciousness explanation and strengthen the alternative constituency theory. While the constituency theory does not constitute a frontal challenge to the feminist consciousness theory, as it still may explain some inter- and intra-gender variation. Here, I re-cap this evidence here to underscore the constituency theory's comparative strengths, particularly when applied to the study of presidents in Chile and Brazil.

The feminist consciousness explanation predicts that feminist politicians will promote more PWC than non-feminist ones. In contrast, the constituency theory can specifically predict *how* presidents will use their power to advance PWC. Presidents will likely legislate on PWC issues on which they campaigned and on PWC areas that correspond to their personal constituents' areas of expertise. These areas may or may not be the ones that the president knows most about. For example, Bachelet as a

medical doctor possessed greater expertise in healthcare than childcare and social security, and yet she effected the most change in these two latter areas thanks to the expertise of elite feminists from within her personal constituency.

The constituency theory can also make predictions about the PWC areas where presidents will *not* legislate. For example, Bachelet decided not to act on issues that could jeopardize her standing with key constituencies who were socially conservative. Chapter IV showed that she—like her male predecessor—opted out of promising to alter abortion's legal status quo. The constituency theory stresses that candidates and presidents face political constraints in constructing their platforms and exercising their power. In short, compared to feminist consciousness theory, the constituency theory yields a greater quantity of and more specific predictions concerning when and how politicians use their power to advance PWC.

The empirical analysis even suggests that a president may not even need a feminist consciousness in order to use his or her power to advance PWC. The Lula case exemplifies this. Elite feminists in Brazil who I interviewed argued that he did not personally embrace feminism because he was politically socialized in unions, deeply masculinist institutions. Despite his lack of feminist consciousness, Lula used his legislative power to the same extent or even more than Rousseff, who *did* appear to possess a feminist consciousness. I explain Lula's use of power to advance PWC by his ties to elite feminists within his party who influenced his campaign platform and likely provided him in at least limited ways with expertise in his PWC decision-making.

To sum up, the constituency theory recognizes that even if presidents possess a feminist consciousness and maintain PWC attitudes, they cannot legislate on any or all PWC. Even feminist presidents face two constituency-based constraints, which conversely can be viewed as opportunities: (1) voter demands (core constituency); (2) access to PWC expertise (personal constituency). Second, the constituency theory can predict which PWC issues the president is most likely to prioritize. It does this by examining campaign promises and elite feminists who are personal constituents. Elite feminists' areas of expertise will likely be the same PWC issue domains that the president focuses on the most. The third

point is that my argument illuminates the reasons why a president with *no apparent feminist consciousness* would use her or his power to advance PWC. As long as a president has access to PWC expertise and at least promised some PWC during the campaign, it is likely that this president will exercise power to fulfill at least some of these promises.

4. Women Mobilizing Women

> *The ultimate response members of Congress seek is political support; but the instrumental response they seek is trust… Contextually and verbally he gives the impression that 'I am one of you.' 'I think the way you do and I care about the same things you do.' 'You can trust me because we are like one another'* (R. F. Fenno 1977, 899).

Shared identity creates trust which generates political support. Fenno may have formulated this causal chain while observing US congressmen, but as this dissertation has shown, his insight on the power of personal identification with voters applies to the case of presidential candidates in Latin America. In Chile and Brazil female candidates were more likely to seek female voters' support because they believed that shared identity could be discursively leveraged for electoral gain. The goal of mobilizing women on the basis of gender identity may have been similar yet these female candidates chose different tactics to this end and achieved different levels of success.

Chapter IV showed that Bachelet and Alvear tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity by evoking their shared experiences *as women*. These experiences include operating in sexist, male-dominated worlds and balancing career and family responsibilities. Bachelet highlighted her experiences as a single mother in speeches, debates and campaign advertisements. She aimed to secure female votes by crafting a nuanced, gendered public image. She displayed a series of stereotypically feminine traits, each of which was unusual for a Chilean politician at the time. In particular, she sought to appear distant from the parties, which at the time was a trait more associated with women than with men. She strove to come off as empathetic and warm, two stereotypically feminine traits.

Turning to Brazil, Chapter V and VI examined three female candidacies: Rousseff, Silva and Helena. All three employed a "first female" frame, but only Rousseff and Helena used maternalism to

establish shared identity with mothers or future mothers. From the very beginning of her 2006 campaign Helena discursively deployed her status as a mother and a "first female:" she erroneously claimed to be Brazil's first female presidential contender. Helena's female mobilization efforts in some ways foreshadowed Rousseff's 2010 campaign. Of all the female candidates, Rousseff appeared the most persistent attempts in her diverse efforts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. Like Helena, Rousseff relied on a maternalist discourse, but in so doing, she emphasized her ties to her male predecessor Lula.

The implications of women's increased efforts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity are important for disparities in women's and men's representation in Latin America. A primary implication of the findings of the diverse strategies of female presidential candidates in Chile and Brazil bodes well for these democracies. On the one hand, the rise of female presidential candidates seems to increase the channeling of PWC demands since female candidates are more likely to promise PWC. Furthermore, when male candidates feel threatened by a female candidate, they often promise more PWC in the hopes of courting female voters. The rise of female presidential candidates and *presidentas* in turn may ameliorate long-standing gender equalities in substantive representation in ways beyond just *presidentas* promoting PWC by motivating male candidates. On the other hand, the campaign studies showed that female candidates in their attempts to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity often resort to essentializing women's identities and interests. This ultimately could serve to reinforce rather than challenge gender stereotypes.

4.2. The Effectiveness of Female Candidates' Strategies

Although the constituency theory does not predict when female candidates will successfully mobilize women, the studies of female presidential candidates in Chapters IV and VI offer some ideas about which strategies might work best. Three variables seemed to enable Bachelet to galvanize women on the basis of gender identity more effectively than Rousseff: (1) gendered leadership styles; (2) gendered discourses; (3) autonomy from male predecessors.

The first relates to Bachelet's and Rousseff's approaches to leadership. I argued in Chapter IV that Bachelet's gendered image was believed to be key to her successful mobilization of women voters. Prior to running for president, Bachelet had already established a reputation—at least among those she had worked with—as a politician with a stereotypically feminine, horizontal leadership style. She was able to build on this in crafting a similarly "feminine" national public image. Unlike Bachelet, Rousseff had earned a reputation among those she had worked with as a leader with a stereotypically masculine style prior to running for the presidency. This was generally viewed as a weakness rather than an asset. Rousseff tried to correct this by employing her maternalist discourse and playing up her femininity. The net effect on female voters' evaluations of Rousseff is unknown, but maternalism's conservative assumptions were in ideological tension with her "first female" discourse. These contradictions may have confused or turned off female voters.

Relatedly, both Bachelet and Rousseff emphasized their maternal identities and either indirectly alluded to or openly discussed their status as potentially their country's first *presidenta*. Yet, a primary difference in Bachelet's and Rousseff's use of their maternal identities is that Bachelet related her struggles and challenges as a single mother, but never resorted to a *figurative* use of her motherhood. While Rousseff and her team used metaphorical expressions such as "mother of the Pac" or even "mother of Brazil," Bachelet never claimed to be a mother of any governmental program or the mother of her country. Rousseff's maternalism drew significant criticism from the opposition and feminists—perhaps hindering rather than enhancing her standing among women voters.

In addition to evoking the challenges of single motherhood, Bachelet freely and strategically recalled experiences struggling as a single mother and confronting sexism from the very beginning of her campaign. This seemed to deeply resonate with female voters in Chile. In contrast, I found no evidence that Rousseff did anything similar. Doing so may have allowed her to appear more vulnerable but also more transparent and authentic to Brazilian female voters. Rousseff may have opted out of this approach, so characteristic of Bachelet's 2005-06 campaign, because discussing gender inequalities in these ways may have made her male advisers uncomfortable. Nevertheless, the fact that Lula himself often discussed

gender inequality while campaigning on behalf of Rousseff suggests the potential viability of this discursive tactic.

The third factor speaks to Bachelet's and Rousseff's relative autonomy from their male predecessors. Both enjoyed the benefit of high ratings of co-partisan incumbents. However, Bachelet also from the beginning of her campaign made a concerted effort to appear independent from Lagos. She reportedly insisted that Lagos maintain a minimal role in her campaign, a request that he generally heeded. Bachelet and her team feared that because of her gender, voters would assume that Lagos had played a more prominent role than he actually did in helping her secure the Concertación nomination. As a female candidate, she sought to avoid being branded as a passive beneficiary of Lagos' success, and one of her campaign narratives was her rise to power via "the people" rather than via the political elites. Chilean voters, particularly women, may have appreciated her relative autonomy from her male predecessor, which defied rather than reinforced traditional gender stereotypes.

In contrast, Rousseff fully embraced Lula—and all the benefits associated with his overwhelming popularity. She selected her advisers and campaign team from Lula's inner core. She took advice from marketing experts, for example, João Santana, who had established a close relationship previously with Lula. There is little doubt that Rousseff never would have run for president without Lula's passionate endorsement. Her heavy dependence on Lula and the clear impression that he *created* her candidacy may also have discouraged some female voters—at least, as Chapter VI showed, it drew sharp criticism from the PT's feminists. Rousseff's lack of autonomy may have suggested to many female voters that although she would become Brazil's first *presidenta*, she would not bring about significant PWC—either symbolically or substantively—but rather would serve to further reinforce traditional gender stereotypes.

In short, differences in leadership styles, discourses and autonomy from male predecessors may have explain Bachelet's success and Rousseff's failure to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. As more and more female presidents make viable runs and win the presidency, scholars can analyze the relative importance of these variables to facilitating female candidates' successful mobilization of female voters.

5. Scope Conditions

The constituency theory presents several limitations in terms of its scope. To what degree could it account for the use of power by members of other historically marginalized groups? The theory depends on the potential for the historically marginalized group to vote as a significant block for a particular candidate. If they are able to vote disproportionately for a particular candidate, women, representing roughly half of the electoral population, constitute an especially lucrative demographic. Incentives to broadly appeal to women are often very strong because women often represent over half the voting population.

The same at times may be true for other historically disadvantaged groups. For example, indigenous groups in Bolivia have constituted another electorally lucrative base in recent elections. As a presidential candidate, Evo Morales attempted and apparently succeeded in mobilizing diverse indigenous groups on the basis of their shared indigenous identity (Madrid 2012). They voted overwhelmingly for Morales who subsequently deployed his presidential power—both legislative and delegative—to pursue change favoring indigenous groups. Morales appeared to possess both core constituency incentives and ties to experts on pro-indigenous change, and thus he was motivated and enable to use his power to effect reforms favoring indigenous groups. The constituency theory thus may apply to the case of Bolivia.

However, the theory may not explain the case of African Americans in the U.S. because they represent only about 10% of the population, and thus are a group that offers less potential gain in terms of votes. It is hardly surprising then that Barack Obama, despite winning an extraordinarily high percentage of black votes, rarely deployed his presidential powers to effect change favoring the African-American community. The constituency theory may only be exportable to instances of historically disadvantaged groups that are numerically large enough to be a cost effective group to target.

Although this dissertation only examined center-left presidents, components of the constituency theory may offer substantial explanatory power concerning strategies of ideologically diverse candidates. Chapters IV-VI showed that female presidential candidates—holding a range of political beliefs—from

two different countries tried to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. While Bachelet, Rousseff and Helena may be classified as social liberals, Alvear's partisan identification and Silva's religious affiliation evidence their social conservatism. Ideologically diverse candidates who are women may all attempt to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity. In other words, the belief that women are better at mobilizing women than men mean transcends ideology and partisan affiliation.

The personal constituency mechanism features two prongs: the first relates to female politicians and makes predictions concerning delegative power and the second speaks to elite feminists and articulates expectations about legislative power. The female politicians prong may also apply to ideologically diverse candidates since gender homophily is a widespread phenomenon that theoretically should not vary according to ideology: relative to men, women tend to network more with other women, ceteris paribus. This means that independent of ideology, female politicians with delegative power are more likely than their male counterparts to use this power to advance PWC. This is consistent with Chapter VII's statistical results.

The second, elite feminist prong of the personal constituency argument may apply best to the left and has conditional implications for the use of legislative power. Elite feminists—at least in Latin America, the U.S. and Europe—tend to associate more with the left than the right (Beckwith 2000; Ríos Tobar, Godoy Catalán, and Guerrero Caviedes 2004; Swers 2002). Because of this, they may network more with left-leaning rather than right-leaning female candidates. My argument posits that variation in ties to elite feminists leads to variation in female politicians' use of power to promise PWC and act on these promises. Yet, conservative female politicians may network little with elite feminists across the board and thus ties to elite feminists for this subset of female politicians would vary little, if at all. In this way, predictions concerning the role of elite feminists in moderating female politicians' legislative impact may be best applied to the left.

Moreover, as suggested in Chapter I's discussion of my PWC operationalization, my argument may apply to other countries that feature an organized women's movement, some kind of state agency that defines and promotes PWC and yet has never elected a female president. Looking further into the

283

future, the elite feminist prong of my argument might also lose some relevance as more and more female presidents win elections in the same country. That is, elite feminists might become particularly enthusiastic at the prospect a first-time female president, and due to reduced novelty, they may seek less contact with second- or third-time female presidents.

What about the future impact of *presidentas* on women's presence in cabinets? Following Chapter VII's analysis, my argument cautiously predicts that future *presidentas* will advance women's representation more than what this first generation of *presidentas* has already done—provided that elite women continue to accrue more political capital resources. As supply constraints ease, subsequent *presidentas* may pursue their strategic preference for *ministras* to an even greater extent.[iii]

6. Additional Research Avenues

Men won every Latin American presidential election from colonial independence until the 1990s. Scholars still know very little about *presidentas'* current and future impact. This study constitutes the most systematic cross-national, inter-gender analysis of the impact of Latin America's *presidentas*. Given the novelty of the phenomenon at hand, this dissertation has helped open a broad research agenda. I highlight here some additional avenues for future research on the consequences of *presidentas'* rise.

One of this dissertation's more consistent findings from the campaign case studies was that political elites tend to believe that women are more effective than men at mobilizing women. How accurate is this belief? Under what conditions are female candidates more effective than their male counterparts at mobilizing women? Are they more effective in when they do so on the basis of gender identity? Additional case studies of intra-gender and inter-gender elections could help tackle these questions, but experiments may be better suited for the task since they identify causality and causal direction by eliminating potential confounders—such as promises to effect PWC. One study could randomly assign candidate sex in a laboratory setting to estimate the causal effect of candidate sex on dependent variables such as the likelihood of voting for the candidate and perceptions of the candidate. The experiment may find that, holding PWC promises constant, being a female candidate exerts a positive

causal effect on the likelihood of a voter supporting that candidate. Such results would help confirm that women are—by virtue of their shared identities with women—more effective than men at mobilizing women on the basis of gender identity.

Other research could examine the use of legislative power cross-nationally by choosing a series of proxy PWC issues that are particularly salient in Latin America—for example maternal health, political representation and domestic violence. This project would require the construction of an original dataset and fieldwork in each country studied. However, if such a dataset could be obtained, a scholar could then construct regression models to more systematically estimate the impact of *presidentas* on the use of legislative power to advance PWC.

A final avenue for future research would examine PWC promises by male and female candidates. To further test the core constituency hypothesis, scholars could collect presidential platforms from elections across the region and conduct a content analysis using automated techniques. Do female candidates promise more PWC than their male counterparts?

Presidentas' rise is a new phenomenon, but the sustained emergence of viable female presidential candidates suggests that it is not one that will quickly pass. Research on the consequences of female chief executives in Latin America—and the rest of the world—will keep scholars busy for decades to come.

---

[i] All promises appeared in the 2002 "Commitment to Women" document.

[ii] 2006 "Commitment to Women" document is not available, but most likely contained more PWC pledges.

[iii] In this sense, this study could be interpreted as a study of "contagion" when the enhanced presence of women in one political office leads to greater gains for women in other offices (Thames and Williams 2013).

REFERENCES

"25 Claves Para Entender a Los Protagonistas de La Segunda Vuelta." *La Tercera*, December 12, 2005.

"A grande guerra." *O Globo*. September 17, 2010, sec. Economy.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/751141402/abstract/1F931E78CE9A40DFPQ/1.

"A segunda guerra." *O Globo*. August 12, 2010, sec. Economy.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/741820631/abstract/F87C41BBEED141D8PQ/1.

Acevedo, Patricio. "Graciela Borquez, Dirigente de Las Mujeres DC: 'Sí, va a Caer, Palabra de Mujer.'" *Archivo Chile*, April 1, 1986.
http://www.archivomuseodelamemoria.cl/uploads/1/8/184830/00000013500009000022..pdf.

"Agenda: Dilma vai a almoço entre mulheres na casa de Abilio Diniz." *Folha De S. Paulo*. June 25, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/519153854/abstract/91BA3DE6EC1346EFPQ/1.

Agostine, Cristiane. "Aécio estréia na campanha de Alckmin antes de Serra." *Valor Econômico*. August 8, 2008, sec. Politics.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/378001022/citation/3965863196A842D1PQ/2.

AIC, and JAQ. "Figuras Claves Del No Intentan Dar Giro a Campaña: Los Hombres Del '88 Fortalecen a Lagos." *La Tercera*, October 20, 1999.

Alamo, Claudia. "'Bachelet Tiene Que Cortar El queque' Entrevista Con Patricio Aylwin." *La Tercera*, August 14, 2005, sec. Reportajes.

———. "En El Debate No Se Mostró El País Real." *La Tercera*, October 23, 2005.

———. "Hoy Hay Ni Un Apoyo de La Familia Para La Reelección." *La Tercera*, December 4, 2005, sec. Reportajes.

———. "'No Pretendamos Que Michelle Sea Como Lagos' Entrevista Con Ex Presidente Eduardo Frei." *La Tercera*, November 6, 2005.

Alcaíno Padilla, Rodrigo. "La Propuesta de Ominami." *El Mercurio*. January 21, 2006.
http://diario.elmercurio.com.

Alencar, Kennedy, and Catia Seabra. "Eleições 2006/Presidência: Na TV, Lula deve priorizar a busca pelo voto feminino." *Folha De S. Paulo*. August 13, 2006, sec. Politics.

Alexander, Amy C. "Change in Women's Descriptive Representation and the Belief in Women's Ability to Govern: A Virtuous Cycle." *Politics and Gender* 8, no. 4 (2012): 437–64.
doi:10.1017/S1743923X12000487.

Alvarez, Sonia E. *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.

———. "Feminismos Latinoamericanos." *Estudos Feministas* 6, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): 265.

Alves, José. "Diferenças Sociais E de Gênero Nas Intenções de Voto Para Presidente Em 2010." In *As Mulheres Nas Eleições de 2012*, 12–21. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres, 2012.

———. "Presidenta Mãe Ou Mulher, Feminina Ou Feminista?" *Portal EcoDebate*. Accessed November 8, 2016. https://www.ecodebate.com.br/2010/08/31/presidenta-mae-ou-mulher-feminina-ou-feminista-artigo-de-jose-eustaquio-diniz-alves/.

Amaral, Ricardo Batista. *A vida quer é coragem : a trajetória de Dilma Rousseff, a primeira presidenta do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Primeira Pessoa, 2011.

"AmericasBarometer." Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2012 2004. www.LapopSurveys.org.

Amorim Neto, Octavio. "The Presidential Calculus Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas." *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 4 (May 1, 2006): 415–40. doi:10.1177/0010414005282381.

Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. 1 edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Annesley, Claire. "Rules of Ministerial Recruitment." *Politics & Gender* 11, no. 4 (December 2015): 618–642. doi:10.1017/S1743923X15000434.

"Após críticas de Ciro, Dilma volta a afirmar que está preparada para assumir a Presidência." *O Globo*. April 26, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/89154894/abstract/947839E37A8949C9PQ/1.

Aránguiz, Daniela. "Lavín Presenta a Su Generalísima Cristina Bitar." *El Mercurio Online*, February 22, 2005. http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2005/02/22/173755/Lavín-presenta-a-su-generalisima-cristina-bitar.html.

Archivo Chile. "Transcripción Completa Del Debate Presidencial Televisado Entre Michelle Bachelet, Sebastián Piñera, Tomás Hirsch Y Joaquín Lavín," November 16, 2005. http://www.archivochile.com/Portada/Elecciones_2005/elecciones048.pdf.

Arraes, Jarid. "A Estratégia Feminista de Dilma E a Cobrança Dos Movimentos de Mulheres." *Revista Fórum Semanal*, October 27, 2014. http://www.revistaforum.com.br/digital/170/ok-estrategia-feminista-de-dilma-e-cobranca-dos-movimentos-de-mulheres/.

Arriagada, Arturo, and Patricio Navia. "Jefes de Campaña En Elecciones Presidenciales En Chile, 1970-2005," Documentos de Trabajo ICSO, 12 (2005). http://www.icso.cl/images/Paperss/septimo.pdf.

Arriola, Leonardo R., and Martha C. Johnson. "Ethnic Politics and Women's Empowerment in Africa: Ministerial Appointments to Executive Cabinets." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 2 (2014): 495–510.

Articulação de Mulheres Brasileiras. "Políticas Públicas Para a Igualdade: Balanço de 2003 a 2010 E Desafios Do Presente." Centro Feministas de Estudos e Assessoria, 2011. Brasília, Brazil. http://www.cfemea.org.br/images/stories/publicacoes/politicaspublicasparaigualdade_balanco20032010.pdf.

"Ascensos Y Descensos." *La Tercera*, October 14, 1999.

Astorga, María. "Se asoma el nuevo gabinete." *El Mercurio*, January 13, 2006. www.emol.cl.

"Asume Activo Rol En Nueva Etapa: Esposa de Lavín Lanzó Campaña Del Voto." *El Mercurio*, December 20, 1999.

Avelar, Lucia. Personal Interview., June 25, 2015. São Paulo, Brazil.

"Aylwin Y Arriagada En Puestos Claves: Amplia Participación DC En Comando de Lagos." *El Mercurio*, July 10, 1999.

Bachelet, Michelle. "Estoy Contigo: Programa de Gobierno Michelle Bachelet 2006-2010," October 18, 2005.

"Bachelet Anunció 36 Medidas Para Sus 100 Primeros Días de Gobierno." Radio Cooperativa, December 27, 2005. http://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/pais/politica/presidenciales/bachelet-anuncio-36-medidas-para-sus-100-primeros-dias-de-gobierno/2005-12-27/104541.html.

"Bachelet Promete No Más Impuestos, Y Lavín Y Piñera Enfocan Debate En Segunda Vuelta." *La Tercera*, November 17, 2005.

"Bachelet Se Reunió Con Los Presidentes de La Concertación Para Diseñar Futuro Gobierno." *UPI Chile*, January 20, 2006. LexisNexus Academic database.

"Bachelet Suspende Cierre de Campaña Tras Fatal Accidente de Partidarios." *La Tercera*, December 7, 2005.

"Bachemelenas Aseguran Que Un Nuevo Gobierno de La Ex Presidenta No Ser Mas de Lo Mismo Y Piden Activar Agenda de Género." *La Segunda*, March 30, 2013.

"Bajo El Lema 'Estoy Contigo' La Candidata Dio a Conocer La Segunda Etapa de Su Campaña Y Salió Al Paso de Las Críticas de La Derecha: Bachelet Presenta Nuevo Eslogan Y Gráfica." *La Tercera*, August 16, 2005.

Baker, Andy, and Kenneth F. Greene. "The Latin American Left's Mandate: Free-Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies." *World Politics* 63, no. 1 (January 2011): 43–77. doi:10.1017/S0043887110000286.

Baldez, Lisa. *Why Women Protest: Women's Movements in Chile*. Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Banaszak, Lee Ann, and Jan E. Leighley. "How Employment Affects Women's Gender Attitudes: The Workplace as a Locus of Contextual Effects." *Political Geography Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (April 1991): 174–85.

Barbosa, Adauri Antunes. "Grevistas vaiam Goldman ao lado de Lula, em SP." *O Globo*. August 21, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/746339464/abstract/9023E409CA2E402EPQ/1.

———. "Presidente fala em 'extirpar o DEM.'" *O Globo*. September 14, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/750401904/abstract/316AA8A29C2740E7PQ/1.

Barnes, Tiffany D., and Diana Z. O'Brien. "Defending the Realm: The Appointment of Female Defense Ministers Worldwide." presented at the 4th European Conference on Politics and Gender, Uppsala, June 11, 2014.

Bautzer, Tatiana. "Dona Lu pede votos para Jackson Lago." *Valor Econômico*. October 26, 2006, sec. Politics.

Beckwith, Karen. "Beyond Compare? Women's Movements in Comparative Perspective." *European Journal of Political Research* 37, no. 4 (June 1, 2000): 431–68. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00521.

Beckwith, Karen, and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers. "Sheer Numbers: Critical Representation Thresholds and Women's Political Representation." *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 3 (September 2007): 553–65. doi:10.1017/S153759270707154X.

Bem, Sandra L. "The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 42, no. 2 (1974): 155–62. doi:10.1037/h0036215.

Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds. *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods." *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, no. 1 (2006): 455–76. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104918.

Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional. "Historia de La Ley 20.203," August 3, 2007. http://www.bcn.cl/historiadelaley/nc/historia-de-la-ley/5299/.

———. "Historia de La Ley N 20.172," February 16, 2007. https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=258339.

Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. "Expositor: Juan Antonio Coloma," n.d. https://www.bcn.cl/seminarios_actividades/expositor.html?h=10221.1/40278&hs=10221.1/40270.

———. "Reseña Biográfica Parlamentaria: Carolina Tohá," n.d. http://historiapolitica.bcn.cl/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Carolina_Toh%C3%A1_Morales.

"Biografia de Michelle Bachelet." *Biografías Y Vidas*. Accessed February 25, 2017. http://www.biografiasyvidas.com/biografia/b/bachelet.htm.

Bjarnegård, Elin. *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Boas, Taylor C. "Presidential Campaigns in Latin America." *Cambridge University Press*, 2016. http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/latin-american-

government-politics-and-policy/presidential-campaigns-latin-america-electoral-strategies-and-success-contagion?format=HB.

———. "Varieties of Electioneering: Presidential Campaigns in Latin America." University of California, Berkeley, 2009.

———. "Varieties of Electioneering: Success Contagion and Presidential Campaigns in Latin America." *World Politics* 62, no. 4 (2010): 636–75.

Bohn, Simone R. "Social Policy and Vote in Brazil: Bolsa Família and the Shifts in Lula's Electoral Base." *Latin American Research Review* 46, no. 1 (2011): 54–79, 281–82, 286.

Bolzendahl, Catherine I., and Daniel J. Myers. "Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality: Opinion Change in Women and Men, 1974-1998." *Social Forces* 83, no. 2 (2004): 759–89.

Borrelli, Maryanne. *The President's Cabinet: Gender, Power, and Representation*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2002.

Braga, M. S. S., and J. Pimentel, Jr. "Os Partidos Politicos Brasileiros Realmente Não Importam?" *Opinião Pública*, 2011, 17 edition, sec. 2.

Bragon, Ranier, Valdo Cruz, Fabio Amato, and Ana Flor. "Dilma diz que fará Brasil de Lula com 'alma de mulher.'" *Folha De S. Paulo*. June 14, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/375352757/abstract/C387F478B8604D5BPQ/2.

Brasil, Agencia. "Marido que bate na mulher agora pode ficar três anos detido." *O Globo*. August 6, 2006, sec. Politics.

"Brasília - Eliane Cantanhêde: A solidão do poder." *Folha De S. Paulo*. November 14, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/884341652/abstract/CC80683E3C68432DPQ/5.

Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." *The Journal of Politics* 61, no. 3 (1999): 658–79.

Bratton, Kathleen A., and Leonard P. Ray. "Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway." *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 2 (2002).

Brisolla, Fábio. "Para Lula, tucanos estão com tremedeira." *O Globo*. September 18, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/751399511/abstract/136FC6AB3F1A41BBPQ/1.

Brisolla, Fábio, and Paulo Marqueiro. "Dilma culpa FH por atraso." *O Globo*. August 10, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/741052728/abstract/904D354553BD4CABPQ/1.

Caballero, Miguel. "Marina fala em 'Silva contra a Rousseff.'" *O Globo*. September 29, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/755693939/abstract/4D12712CE8264085PQ/1.

Camerlo, Marcelo, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. "Minister Turnover, Critical Events, and the Electoral Calendar in Presidential Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 77, no. 3 (2015): 608–19. doi:10.1086/681028.

"Caminhando com Nego: A presidente eleita é mais discreta nas horas de lazer. E bem menos festeira que Lula." *O Globo*. November 1, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/761277765/abstract/26F3ACBB18664BACPQ/1.

"Campañas de Lavín Se Basó En Debilidades Del Gobierno: Las Claves Del Empate." *La Tercera*, December 12, 1999.

"Campanha de Lula tenta motivar movimentos sociais." *O Globo*. August 9, 2006, sec. Politics.

Campusano S., Mauricio. "Uso de Dinero Para Conseguir Respaldos: Bachelet Repone Denuncia Y Piñera La Refuta." *El Mercurio*, December 16, 2005.

Canales, Paula, and Gloria Faúndez. "La Amiga de Bachelet Que Ocupa Un Lugar Destacado En Su Campaña." *La Tercera*, December 11, 2005.

Canales, Paula, and Juan Pablo Salaberry. "Escalona Y Ominami Se Aliaron Para Destroner Viera-Gallo Y Darle Un Parlamento 'más Socialista' a Bachelet." *La Tercera*, August 7, 2005.

"Candidato de La Concertación: Rotundo Triunfo de Ricardo Lagos En Las Primarías." *El Mercurio*, June 27, 1999.

"Candidato RN-UDI: Joaquín Lavín Inicia Ofensiva Comunicacional." *El Mercurio*, June 1, 1999.

"Candidaturas Presidenciales Definen Prioridades de Su Programa Energético." *La Tercera*, November 7, 2005.

Canzian, Fernando. "Arrancada de Marina, voto de SP e queda de Dilma na classe C explicam o 2º turno." *Folha De S. Paulo*. October 4, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/885007246/abstract/8E38C98BB694540PQ/1.

Carroll, Royce, and Gary W. Cox. "The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre-Election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2007): 300–313.

Carroll, Susan J. "Gender Politics and the Socializing Impact of the Women's Movement." In *Political Learning in Adulthood: A Sourcebook of Theory and Research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.

———. *The Impact of Women in Public Office*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

Carvalho, Ana Paula de. "Lula diz que o povo não se deixará enganar por falsas promessas." *O Globo*. September 22, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/752069846/abstract/120C9242F574432FPQ/1.

Carvalho Pinto, Anselmo. "Dilma fala em subir a rampa e faz críticas a Serra." *O Globo*. August 25, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/747165630/abstract/CF241CE50DF4113PQ/1.

Cavenaghi, Suzana, and José Eustáquio Diniz Alves. "Quem Vota Em Quem: Um Retrato Das Intenções de Voto Nas Eleições Para Presidente Em Setembro de 2010." In *As Mulheres Nas Eleições de 2012*, 91–135. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres, 2012.

Central Intelligence Agency. "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments," 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/.

Centro de Estudios Públicos. "Encuesta CEP." *Www.cepchile.cl*, 2006 1999. http://www.cepchile.cl/cep/site/edic/base/port/encuestacep.html.

Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública – CESOP. "Datafolha." Universidade Estadual de Campinas, October 2002.

Ceolin, Adriano, and Renan Ramalho. "Dilma diz que visita a obras 'vale a pena.'" *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 10, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336434894/abstract/473EEB1C090F4A58PQ/1.

Cervellini, Silvia, Malu Giani, and Patrícia Pavanelli. "Economia, Religião E Voto No Brasil: A Questão Do Aborto Na Eleição Presidencial de 2010." presented at the IV Congresso Latinoamericano de Opinião Pública da WAPOR, May 4, 2011.

Chapochnick, Michele, and Andrés Silva. "Comando de Lavín Reafirma Estrategia de Campaña." *La Tercera*, October 1999.

———. "Equipo Afiatado." *El Mercurio*, November 11, 1999.

Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra, and Esther Duflo. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72, no. 5 (2004): 1409–43.

Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. "Critical Mass Theory and Women's Political Representation." *Political Studies* 56, no. 3 (October 1, 2008): 725–36. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00712.x.

———. "Should Feminists Give Up on Critical Mass? A Contingent Yes." *Politics & Gender* 2, no. 4 (December 2006): 522–30. doi:10.1017/S1743923X06251146.

———. *Women and British Party Politics: Descriptive, Substantive and Symbolic Representation*. Routledge, 2008.

Clavelin, Isabel. "Dilma Sanciona Medida Provisória 615." SPM/Portal Brasil, October 10, 2013. Brasília, Brazil. http://www.brasil.gov.br/cidadania-e-justica/2013/10/dilma-sanciona-medida-provisoria-615.

Claveria, Silvia. "Still a 'Male Business'? Explaining Women's Presence in Executive Office." *West European Politics* 37, no. 5 (September 3, 2014): 1156–76. doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.911479.

Coligação Grande Aliança PSDB-PMDB. "Programa Do Governo José Serra: Trabalho E Progresso Para Todos," August 2002.

"Con Banda Tropical Y 100 Amigos, Bachelet Celebró Su Cumpleaños." *La Tercera*, October 1, 2005.

"Confira o perfil dos ministros e presidentes de estatais do governo de Dilma Rousseff." *O Globo*. December 17, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/818407285/abstract/318DD5CAEBBF4787PQ/1.

Conniff, Michael L. *Populism in Latin America: Second Edition*. University of Alabama Press, 2012.

"Conteo Presidencial: Concepto Más Utilizado." *La Tercera*, November 20, 1999, sec. Reportajes.

"Convention on the Rights of the Child." United Nations Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner, November 20, 1989. http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.

Cordero, Rodrigo. "Primera Encuesta Nacional de Opinión Pública ICSO-UDP." Universidad Diego Portales Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales, August 2005. http://encuesta.udp.cl/descargas/banco%20de%20datos/2005/Principales%20Resultados%202005.pdf.

Correa, Raquel. "El 'fenómeno Bachelet': ¿Una Mujer a La Moneda…?" *El Mercurio*, September 15, 2002.

———. "Entrevista a Michelle Bachelet 'Me La Puedo Ser Presidenta de Chile.'" *El Mercurio*, December 25, 2005. Archivo Chile. www.archivochile.com/Chile_actual/Elecciones_2005/Bachelet/16_bachellet.pdf.

———. "La Crisis de La DC Y de La Concertación: Con La Artilleríalista Para La Junta," January 12, 2003.

Craske, Nikki. *Women and Politics in Latin America*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999.

"Cristina Bitar Ya No Es Más La Cara Visible de La Campaña de Joaquín Lavín." *El Mostrador*, May 28, 2005. http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2005/05/28/cristina-bitar-ya-no-es-mas-la-cara-visible-de-la-campana-de-joaquin-Lavín/.

Crowder-Meyer, Melody. "Gendered Recruitment without Trying: How Local Party Recruiters Affect Women's Representation." *Politics & Gender* 9, no. 4 (2013): 390–413.

Crowley, Jocelyn Elise. "When Tokens Matter." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (2004): 109–36.

Dahlerup, Drude. "From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 11, no. 4 (1988): 275–98.

"D. Marisa usa avião oficial para ajudar Dilma." *O Globo*. May 4, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/249928329/abstract/CBAEF385DC974FFEPQ/1.

Davis, Rebecca Howard,. *Women and Power in Parliamentary Democracies: Cabinet Appointments in Western Europe, 1968-1992*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997.

"DC Entregó Nombres Para Comité." *El Mercurio*, July 9, 1999.

"De forma indireta, Serra ataca governo Lula no horário eleitoral; Dilma volta a mostrar pesquisa Datafolha." *O Globo*. August 31, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/749453460/abstract/D2399469A0F34A71PQ/1.

De la Maza, Gabriela. "Martín Rodríguez, Socio de Feedback, Analiza Las Posibilidades de Bachelet, Lavín Y Piñera: 'En Ningún Caso La Elección Está Decidida.'" *La Tercera*, August 21, 2005.

De la Maza, Gabriela, and Pedro Vega. "Soledad Alvear Asumió Ayer Como Generalísima de La Campaña Del Candidato Concertaciónista: La Mujer Que Apoyará a Lagos." *La Tercera*, December 15, 1999.

De La O, Ana L. "Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 1–14. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00617.x.

"Debate: Más Coincidencias Que Diferencias." *La Tercera*, November 3, 1999.

"Decisiones Políticas: Lavín Y Samurais En Hora Clave." *El Mercurio*, March 9, 2004. http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={e9c22b82-0061-4195-8fc1-e4e4ced1fb25}.

Del Solar Vera, Bernardita, and Loreto Daza N. *Piñera: Historia de un ascenso*. DEBATE, 2011.

Delgado, Malu. "Candidatos priorizam eleitorado feminino." *Folha De S. Paulo*. April 11, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336370187/abstract/4013B55E8EAA4FADPQ/1.

———. "Eleições 2006/Presidência: Intenção de Voto Em Lula É Menor No Eleitorado Feminino." *Folha De S. Paulo*. September 15, 2006.

———. "Líder de atos contra Serra divide palco com Dilma." *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 26, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336440744/abstract/B3C9C386C1864007PQ/1.

———. "Marina mira mulheres, cristãos e classes C e D." *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 2, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336401760/abstract/A24E9D36CBFC4937PQ/1.

———. "Marina vira 'celebridade' no Dia da Terra." *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 18, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336445073/abstract/3A29891129C04AD7PQ/1.

"Delincuencia: Elevado Indice de Temor En Chilenos." *El Mercurio*, June 6, 1999.

"Develan Importancia de Su Influencia: Ofensiva de Candidatos Ante Iglesias." *El Mercurio*, November 23, 1999.

Dewan, Torun, and David P. Myatt. "Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence." *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 1 (February 2012): 123–145. doi:10.1017/S000305541100058X.

———. "The Declining Talent Pool of Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 2 (2010): 267–86.

"Día de Michelle Bachelet Partió Con Una de Sus Hijas Diciendo Que No Participará En Segunda Vuelta." *La Tercera*, December 12, 2005.

"Día En Familia Tuvieron Los Candidatos Antes de La Elección: Va de Compras Y Prepara Almuerzo Familiar." *La Tercera*, December 11, 2005.

Diaz, W., M. Donoso, and M. Saldivia. "Bachelet Privilegia a 'colorines' de La DC Y Molesta a Alvearismo." *La Tercera*, August 26, 2005.

Diaz, Waldo. "Comando de Bachelet: Zaldívar Instala Su 'delfín' Para Potenciar Parlamentaria." *La Tercera*, August 25, 2005.

———. "Los Reservados Contactos Entre Bachelet Y La Iglesia Católica," October 16, 2005.

Díaz-Tendero, Eolo. "La Deuda Pendiente de Bachelet," October 31, 2005.

"Dilma diz que existe hipocrisia na discussão sobre o aborto." *O Globo*. October 10, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/757097825/abstract/D6907A40DE2640C8PQ/1.

"Dilma potencializa antiga resistência de mulheres ao PT." *Folha De S. Paulo*. April 25, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336452001/abstract/81F6CDAEE1D949A1PQ/1.

"Diputado Burgos: No Estoy de Acuerdo Con Paridad En El Gabinete." *El Mercurio*. January 26, 2006. www.emol.com.

"Discrepancias: Concertación Excluyó Los Temas Valóricos." *El Mercurio*, August 19, 1999.

Dodson, Debra. *The Impact of Women in Congress*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Donoso, Mauricio. "Bachelet Gana En Segunda Vuelta Y Lavín Y Piñera Están Empatados." *La Tercera*, September 2, 2005.

Dovi, Suzanne. "Political Representation." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2014., 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/political-representation/.

———. "Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black, or Latino Do?" *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 4 (2002): 729–43.

Dovi, Suzanne Lynn. *The Good Representative*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2007.

Durán, P., Waldo Diaz, and P. Olavarría. "Debate Presidencial Ante 2.500 Mujeres Termina Entre Pifias Y Riñas," October 26, 2005.

Durán, Phillip. "Lavín Sale a La Caza Del Voto Femenino Tras Oficializar Candidatura." *La Tercera*, September 9, 2005.

Duvares, Eduardo. "Candidatos Marcan Diferencias Sobre La Reforma Previsional," September 1, 2005.

Editorial. "El Rostro Femenino." *La Tercera*, December 16, 1999.

"El Debut Político de Estela León." *La Tercera*, December 15, 1999.

"El 'mensaje' de Ominami En La Cena de Chile 21." *La Tercera*, October 11, 2005.

"El Voto Femenino." *La Tercera*, December 18, 1999.

"Eleições 2006/Sabatina Folha: Presidente descarta reduzir número de ministérios." *Folha De S. Paulo*. October 19, 2006, sec. Politics.

"Eleições 2010: 'Eles falam em acabar com o PAC, mas vão ter que combinar sabe com quem? Com os prefeitos.'" *O Globo*. April 20, 2010, sec. Politics.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/335122469/abstract/12ED2D77189842BAPQ/1.

"Eleições 2010: Partidos já montam propostas para mulheres, eleitorado no qual petista tem desempenho baixo." *O Globo*. May 9, 2010, sec. Politics.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/251729308/abstract/1EE297C4148E4872PQ/1.

"Em dois eventos, Dilma volta a falar de aborto." *O Globo*. October 9, 2010, sec. Politics.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/757049185/abstract/AF48FD4453B04102PQ/1.

"Em entrevista ao Jornal Nacional, Marina diz que Serra e Dilma são mais do mesmo: [1]." *O Globo*. August 10, 2010, sec. Politics.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/741230886/abstract/9F74C65FD2C849F3PQ/1.

"Em entrevista, Lula diz que Dilma era 'um animal político não trabalhado.'" *O Globo*. August 7, 2010, sec. Politics.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/740179756/abstract/FDD5097C7B4B48B1PQ/1.

"Em torno da polêmica do aborto, Dilma e Serra ressaltam valores da família na primeira propaganda na TV no segundo turno: [1]." *O Globo*. October 8, 2010, sec. Politics.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/756976919/abstract/F8FF4FE0CC15469DPQ/1.

"En Elecciones: Lagos Atribuye a Descontento Menor Votación." *El Mercurio*, December 14, 1999. http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={310ffa53-777e-4a08-94f1-b25d7ff0f9d9}.

"En Eventual Gobierno de Lagos: S. Alvear Podría Desempeñar Cartera de Interior." *El Mercurio Online*, December 17, 1999. http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={6dc1233b-66cb-44f9-b602-a82168d42e59}.

"En Iquique: Lavín Reafirma Carácter Popular de Su Campaña." *El Mercurio*, July 12, 1999.

"Encuesta Precipitó Fortalecimiento Territorial: Lagos Intenta Revertir Empate Con Lavín En La Metropolitana." *La Tercera*, September 8, 1999.

"Entidades Feministas Repudiam MP Do Nascituro." Viomundo, January 14, 2012. http://www.viomundo.com.br/politica/as-duas-maiores-entidades-feministas-no-brasil-dizem-nao-a-mp-557.html.

"Entrego Plan de Medidas Concretas: Joaquín Lavín Definió Sus Sesenta Tareas." *El Mercurio*, October 2, 1999.

"Erenice Guerra, ex-ministra da Casa Civil." *O Globo*. September 17, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/751141295/abstract/C3391AFD56944BFFPQ/1.

Errázuriz L, María José. "Carrera Presidencial: Lavín Lucha Contra El Cambio Que Implica Elegir a Una Mujer." *El Mercurio*, May 14, 2004.

"Es Bastante Populista Plantear Una Pensión Para Las Dueñas de Casa." *La Tercera*, November 27, 2005, sec. Reportajes.

Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C., and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. *Representation: The Case of Women*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C., Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. "Representing Women: Empirical Insights from Legislatures and Cabinets in Latin America." In *Representation: The Case of Women*, edited by Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon and Michelle A. Taylor-Robinson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Escobar-Lemmon, Maria, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson. "Getting to the Top: Career Paths of Women in Latin American Cabinets." *Political Research Quarterly* 62, no. 4 (2009): 685–99.

———. "Minorities Not Tokens: Toward Gender Equality Within Cabinets." presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, August 28, 2014.

Escobar-Lemmon, Maria, and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. "Women Ministers in Latin American Government: When, Where, and Why?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 4 (October 2005): 829–44.

"Estado foi 'omisso' e 'mínimo' na gestão FHC, critica Dilma." *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 30, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336435048/abstract/AC71893E9C3A4B7CPQ/1.

Estrada, Daniela. "Women – Chile: Steps in the Right Direction." *Inter Press Service News Agency*, February 9, 2006. http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/02/women-chile-steps-in-the-right-direction/.

Falcão, Márcio, and Ranier Bragon. "Novo programa de Dilma retira teses polêmicas." *Folha De S. Paulo*. August 10, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/741043532/abstract/15460371C5594B0BPQ/1.

Faleiros Pimenta, Fabrícia. "Politicas Feministas E Os Feminismos Na Política: O Conselho Nacional Dos Direitos Da Mulher (1985-2005)." Universidade de Brasília, 2010.

Faúndez, Gloria. "Ricardo Lagos Weber Renunció a Ser Diputado Y Es Uno de Los Favoritos de Bachelet: ¿El Primer Nombre Del Gabinete?" *La Tercera*, August 7, 2005.

Faúndez, Gloria, and Paula Canales. "Bachelet: Nerviosismo En La Recta Final," November 13, 2005, sec. Reportajes.

———. "El Ataque de Nervios Del Comando de Bachelet." *La Tercera*, November 20, 2005.

———. "El Poder Invisible de Escalona." *La Tercera*, September 18, 2005.

Fenno, Richard. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. New York: Pearson, 1978.

Fenno, Richard F. "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration." *American Political Science Review* 71, no. 3 (September 1977): 883–917. doi:10.1017/S0003055400265143.

Fiorina, Morris P. *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies by Morris P Fiorina*. Lexington Books, 1974.

Flor, Ana. "Campanha procura reverter desvantagem." *Folha De S. Paulo*. April 25, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336451944/abstract/A8F108996A564E72PQ/1.

"Foco: Cada eleitor de Lula deve conseguir 'mais dez votos' para o petista, diz Marisa." *Folha De S. Paulo*. October 11, 2006, sec. Politics.

"Foco: Em chá com socialites, Dilma promete reforma tributária." *Folha De S. Paulo*. June 26, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/520630953/abstract/47839FA3704942AAPQ/1.

"Foco: Site de apoio a Dilma está em nome de mulher, mas ela diz que é um 'engano.'" *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 9, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336365835/abstract/204E50FB3CCA4A8FPQ/1.

"Foro Se Centra En Desigualdad, Pero No Surgen Nuevas Propuestas." *La Tercera*, November 17, 2005.

Fraga, Plínio. "Mamãe urso na TV." *Jornal Do Commercio*. May 11, 2010, sec. Opinion.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/275772874/abstract/26E199FD102D4D4CPQ/1.

Franceschet, Susan. "Disrupting Informal Institutions? Cabinet Formation in Chile in 2006 and 2014." In *Gender, Institutions and Change in Bachelet's Chile*, edited by Silke Staab and Georgina Waylen, 67–94. New York: Palgrave, 2016.

———. *Women and Politics in Chile*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

Franceschet, Susan, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. *The Impact of Gender Quotas*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. "Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina." *Politics & Gender* 4, no. 3 (2008): 393–425.

Freire, Flávio. "Dilma: 'Serei a 1ª presidenta deste país.'" *O Globo*. August 24, 2010, sec. Politics.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/747927881/abstract/113853CDB96D48F6PQ/1.

———. "Lula promete campanha em porta de fábrica." *O Globo*. June 2, 2010, sec. Politics.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/356983841/abstract/3B2D5F796D734967PQ/1.

"Gabinete: Lo Que Tienen Las Carpetas." *Economía Y Negocios*, February 6, 2006.
www.economiaynegocios.cl.

Galhardo, Ricardo. "Lula admite que cometeu erros no primeiro governo." *O Globo*. October 25, 2006, sec. Politics.

Gálvez, Mario. "Celebración En La Moneda: Lagos Oficializa Apoyo Para Que Una Mujer Opte a La Presidencia." *El Mercurio*, March 9, 2004.

Garrido, Meche. "Precandidata de La Izquierda Concertaciónista: Bachelet Retomó Sus Actividades." *El Mercurio*, December 14, 2004.

Geddes, Barbara. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003.

"Gender Gap in Voting." Center for American Women and Politics., 2016. New Brunswick, New Jersey.
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/voters/gender_gap.

"Geraldo Alckmin." *UOL Educação*. Accessed November 8, 2016.
http://educacao.uol.com.br/biografias/geraldo-alckmin.htm.

Gerber, Elisabet. "Comunicación y Política: Análisis de la Campaña Presidencial de Michelle Bachelet." *Centro de Competencia en Comunicación*, 2005, 7–94.

Gerring, John. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Gerrity, Jessica C., Tracy Osborn, and Jeanette Morehouse Mendez. "Women and Representation: A Different View of the District?" *Politics & Gender* 3, no. 2 (June 2007): 179–200. doi:10.1017/S1743923X07000025.

Gerson, Kathleen. "Emerging Social Divisions Among Women: Implications for Welfare State Politics." *Politics & Society* 15, no. 2 (1987): 213–21.

———. *Hard Choices: How Women Decide About Work, Career and Motherhood*. University of California Press, 1986.

Gertzog, Irwin N. *Congressional Women: Their Recruitment, Integration, and Behavior*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995.

Gibson, Edward L. *Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Glynn, Adam N., and Maya Sen. "Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?" *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 37–54. doi:10.1111/ajps.12118.

"Golpe de Timón En El Comando: Hijo de Lagos Asume Puesto Clave En Campaña." *La Tercera*, October 14, 1999.

González, Lucas, and Miguel Ignacio Mamone. "Who Distributes? Presidents, Congress, Governors, and the Politics of Distribution in Argentina and Brazil." *Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudios Legislativos* 4 (2015). http://presidential-power.com/?p=3586.

"Governo aumenta pena para a violência doméstica." *O Globo*. August 8, 2006, sec. Politics.

"Governo sai em socorro de Dilma." *O Globo*. August 13, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/742646371/abstract/A5B2EED01B7345CAPQ/1.

Guerreiro, Gabriela, and Dimitri do Valle. "Foco: Mulher de Serra passa a fazer corpo a corpo em capitais." *Folha De S. Paulo*. August 21, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/746326506/abstract/1DB05EAC9AAC4D5BPQ/1.

Guimarães, Larissa. "Lula diz que mídia cobre governo com 'má-fé.'" *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 25, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336442145/abstract/CBAA79FAD63B41E2PQ/1.

Guzmán Bravo, Rosario, and Gonzalo Rojas Donoso. *La Hija Del Tigre: Bachelet, Biografía a Fondo*. Santiago de Chile: RiL Editores, Santiago, 2005.

Haas, Liesl. *Feminist Policymaking in Chile*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.

Heath, Roseanna, Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. "Women on the Sidelines: Women's Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures." *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (2005): 420–36.

"Heloísa Helena visita a Candelária, 'o palco das lutas do povo do Rio.'" *O Globo*. July 7, 2006, sec. Politics.

Hertel, Bradley R., and Michael Hughes. "Religious Affiliation, Attendance, and Support for 'Pro-Family' Issues in the United States." *Social Forces* 65, no. 3 (March 1, 1987): 858–82. doi:10.1093/sf/65.3.858.

Hinojosa, Magda. *Selecting Women, Electing Women: Political Representation and Candidate Selection in Latin America*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012.

Hoffman, Karen S. "Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences." *Congress & the Presidency* 28, no. 2 (September 1, 2001): 185–207. doi:10.1080/07343460109507752.

Htun, Mala. *Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family under Latin American Dictatorships and Democracies*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Htun, Mala, and Timothy J. Power. "Gender, Parties, and Support for Equal Rights in the Brazilian Congress." *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 83–104. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2006.tb00366.x.

Huber, John D., and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. "Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 102, no. 2 (2008): 169–80.

Hunter, Wendy. *The Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil, 1989–2009*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Hunter, Wendy, and Timothy J. Power. "Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy, and the Brazilian Elections of 2006." *Latin American Politics and Society* 49, no. 1 (April 1, 2007): 1–30. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2007.tb00372.x.

Indridason, Indridi H., and Christopher Kam. "Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift." *British Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 4 (2008): 621–56.

"Informalmente, ministros ajudam campanha de Dilma." *O Globo*. August 8, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/740252055/abstract/1AEB4B6267E245F5PQ/1.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

"Inició Gira Presidencial: J. Lavín Siente Apoyo Popular Bastante Sólido." *El Mercurio*, January 7, 1999.

"Insulza, Valdés Y Pérez Yoma: El Caso En Manos de Tres Hombres de Lagos." *La Tercera*, October 9, 1999.

Insunza, Andrea. "Se Mostrará a La Ex Ministra Como La Futura 'mujer Fuerte' En Un Eventual Gobierno Concertacionista: Oficialismo Potenciará Dupla Lagos-Alvear." *La Tercera*, December 17, 1999.

Inter-Parliamentary Union. "Women in Parliaments: World and Regional Averages," 2016. http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm.

Jalalzai, Farida. *Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties?* New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.

Jalalzai, Farida, and Pedro G. dos Santos. "The Dilma Effect? Women's Representation under Dilma Rousseff's Presidency." *Politics & Gender* 11, no. 1 (March 2015): 117–145. doi:10.1017/S1743923X14000579.

Jaquette, Jane S.,. *Feminist Agendas and Democracy in Latin America*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

"Joaquín Lavín." *La Tercera*, September 20, 1999.

"Joaquín Lavín, Candidato de La Alianza Por Chile: 'Cambio Es Que Se Vayan Los Que Están.'" *La Tercera*, August 15, 1999.

"Joaquín Lavín Cree En Versión de La Ministra." *El Mercurio*, April 21, 2003, sec. Nacional.

"Joaquín Lavín Es Contrario a Privatización de Codelco." *El Mercurio*, July 15, 1999.

José Alves. Personal Interview., March 11, 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

"José Serra Biografía." São Paulo, Brazil. Accessed November 5, 2016. http://www.joseserra.com.br/biografia/.

Jungblut, Cristiane. "Lula diz que Serra está nervoso e cairá mais." *O Globo*. September 7, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/749675509/abstract/4485A442A0824C49PQ/1.

KBS. "Conocimos a Loreto Amunátegui, La Nueva Gobernadora." *Www.chicureo.com*. January 5, 2001.

Kenny, Meryl. *Gender and Political Recruitment: Theorizing Institutional Change*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Kitschelt, Herbert, Juan Pablo Luna, and Kirk A. Hawkins. *Latin American Party Systems*. Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Klein, Ethel. *Gender Politics: From Consciousness to Mass Politics*. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Kriner, Douglas L., and Andrew Reeves. "Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics." *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 1 (Fevereiro 2015): 155–171. doi:10.1017/S0003055414000598.

Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana Z. O'Brien. "All the President's Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers Worldwide." *The Journal of Politics* 74, no. 3 (July 2012): 840–855. doi:10.1017/S0022381612000382.

"La Advertencia de Bachelet." *La Tercera*, August 7, 2005.

"La 'Estela' Del Cambio." *El Mercurio*, November 7, 1999.

"La Mujer Estrella Del Gabinete." *La Tercera*, September 3, 1999.

"La 'operación Duplas' de La Campaña de Lagos." *La Tercera*, October 24, 1999.

"La Relación de Luisa Durán Y La Candidata Oficialista." *La Tercera*, November 20, 2005.

"La Semana Política: Etapas Finales de La Campaña." *El Mercurio*, October 24, 1999.

"La Semana Política: Un Gobierno En Aprietos." *El Mercurio*, June 20, 1999.

Lagos, Andrea. "El Talón de Aquiles de Lagos." *La Tercera*, October 10, 1999.

———. "Soledad Alvear Y Michelle Bachelet: Cara a Cara." *El Mercurio*, October 14, 2003.

Lagos, Marta. "Nueva Elite, ¿burguesía Derrotada?" *La Tercera*, August 13, 2005.

Lagos V., Maria Paz. "Canciller Soledad Alvear En Terreno: Tengo Energía Para Rato." *El Mercurio Revista Ya*, July 13, 2004.

Lamego, Cláudia. "Heloísa Helena começa campanha pelo Rio." *O Globo*. July 6, 2006, sec. Politics.

"Las Medidas de Lavín." *El Mercurio*, June 7, 1999.

Lavín, Joaquín. "Curriculum Vitae Joaquín Lavín Infante." Universidad de Desarrollo, 2014. http://negocios.udd.cl/files/2014/09/CV_jLavín.pdf.

"Lavín Mantendrá La Distancia." *La Tercera*, October 8, 1999.

"Lavín Presentó Inédita Campaña Presidencial." *El Mercurio*, April 12, 1999.

Lavinas, Lena. "21st Century Welfare." *New Left Review* 84 (December 2013): 5–40.

———. Personal Interview., March 6, 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

"Lavín Se Margina." *La Tercera*, October 24, 1999.

"Lavín Y Lagos: Refuerzan Planes de Campaña Para Próximos 34 Días." *El Mercurio Online*, December 13, 1999, sec. Portada. http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={c210aadc-b7b6-40f8-82cb-92d82370e445}.

Lemes, Conceição. "Fátima Oliveira: Governo Dilma Submete Corpo Das Brasileiras Ao Vaticano." Viomundo, January 5, 2012. http://www.viomundo.com.br/denuncias/fatima-oliveira-governo-dilma-submete-corpo-das-mulheres-ao-vaticano.html.

———. "Ministra Iriny Lopes: A Secretaria de Mulheres Não Teve Nenhuma Participação Na MP 557." Viomundo, January 12, 2012. http://www.viomundo.com.br/politica/ministra-iriny-lopes-a-secretaria-de-mulheres-nao-teve-nenhuma-participacao-na-mp-557.html.

———. "Telia Negrão: Compromissos Assumidos Pelo Ministério Da Saúde Com a Rede Feminista de Saúde Não São Cumpridos." Viomundo, July 31, 2011. http://www.viomundo.com.br/entrevistas/telia-negrao-portaria-da-rede-cegonha-deixa-a-desejar.html.

Leobas, Lucas. Personal Interview, September 2, 2015. Brasília, Brazil.

Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth M. Roberts. *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.

Lewis, Paul H. "The 'Gender Gap' in Chile." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 36, no. 4 (2004): 719–42.

Lieberman, Evan S. "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research." *The American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (August 1, 2005): 435–52.

Light, Paul. *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Lima, Maria. "Esposas de Lula e José Alencar saem às ruas para reforçar campanha." *O Globo*. October 10, 2006, sec. Politics.

———. "Lula: Dilma tem 'sorte desgramada.'" *O Globo*. August 27, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/749434806/abstract/9B108E5C54CD48BEPQ/1.

———. "Mulheres à beira e dentro do governo de Dilma Rousseff." *O Globo*. November 7, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/762622373/abstract/AB687A090A65454BPQ/1.

"Los Expertos Se Los Adjudican." *El Mercurio*, June 12, 2005.

"Los Principales Puntos Que Estarán En Juego En El Debate Presidencial." *La Tercera*, October 19, 2005.

"Los pro Y Los Contra de Cristina Bitar Como 'gerenta' de Campaña de Lavín." *El Mostrador*. Accessed November 7, 2016. http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2005/02/14/los-pro-y-los-contra-de-cristina-bitar-como-gerenta-de-campana-de-lavin/.

"Lula afirma que pobres são 'cada célula do seu corpo e cada gota do seu sangue.'" *Folha De S. Paulo*. September 12, 2006, sec. Politics.

"'Lula defendeu quem não teve sigilo violado.'" *O Globo*. September 10, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/750144949/abstract/2FF302953D8B492EPQ/1.

"Lula desiste de encontro com." *O Globo*. September 13, 2006, sec. Politics.

"Lula deve prorrogar de novo Luz Para Todos." *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 21, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336441259/abstract/91A68C140B074E4APQ/1.

"Lula sanciona lei que endurece punição por violência doméstica." *O Globo*. August 10, 2006, sec. Politics.

"Lula vai lançar plano de governo para as mulheres." *O Globo*. September 26, 2006, sec. Politics.

Macaulay, Fiona. *Gender Politics in Brazil and Chile*. New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/gender-politics-in-brazil-and-chile-fiona-macaulay/?K=9780333736142.

MacDonald, Jason A., and Erin E. O'Brien. "Quasi-Experimental Design, Constituency, and Advancing Women's Interests: Reexamining the Influence of Gender on Substantive Representation." *Political Research Quarterly*, March 19, 2010. doi:10.1177/1065912909354703.

Machado, Uirá. "Foco: Dilma copia ex-presidente chilena e quer se lançar candidata a 'presidenta.'" *Folha De S. Paulo*. April 24, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336449089/abstract/D8D36980D70A4CC9PQ/1.

Madrid, Raúl L. *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Mainwaring, Scott, Timothy J. Power, and Fernando Bizzarro. "The Uneven Institutionalization of a Party System: Brazil." In *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Erosion, and Collapse*, edited by Scott Mainwaring. New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Shugart, eds. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Mansbridge, Jane. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes.'" *The Journal of Politics* 61, no. 3 (1999).

"Maria das Graças Foster, diretora de Gás e Energia da Petrobras." *O Globo*. November 7, 2010, sec. Politics.

http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/762622256/abstract/70447703EE7F43FEPQ/1.

"Marina." *O Globo*. August 31, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/749447621/abstract/5F01BAEA74C247EAPQ/1.

"Marina busca espaço." *O Globo*. August 20, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/746192826/abstract/A41A04D5A1C041C2PQ/1.

"Marina diz ser a única capaz de provocar '2º turno competitivo.'" *Folha De S. Paulo*. October 3, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/885190085/abstract/E6A9BF58539941CEPQ/1.

"Marina Silva Biografía." Accessed November 5, 2016. http://marinasilva.org.br/biografia.

"Marisas vão à luta." *O Globo*. October 11, 2006, sec. Politics.

Marré V, Ximena. "Ministras En Campaña: Alvear Y Bachelet Miden Fuerzas Y Se Ponen a Prueba En Terreno." *El Mercurio*, April 4, 2004, sec. Nacional.

Marsden, Peter V. "Homogeneity in Confiding Relations." *Social Networks* 10, no. 1 (March 1988): 57–76. doi:10.1016/0378-8733(88)90010-X.

Martin, Janet M. "Frameworks For Cabinet Studies." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1988): 793–814.

Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia. "Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections From the Government in Presidential Systems?" *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 1 (2012): 62–90.

Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia, and Petra Schleiter. "Choosing Whom to Trust Agency Risks and Cabinet Partisanship in Presidential Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 48, no. 2 (February 1, 2015): 231–64. doi:10.1177/0010414014544361.

Martins, José de Souza. *Do PT Das Lutas Sociais Ao PT Do Poder*. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora Contexto, 2016.

Mayhew, David R. *Congress: The Electoral Connection, Second Edition*. 2 edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

McPherson, J. Miller, and Lynn Smith-Lovin. "Sex Segregation in Voluntary Associations." *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 1 (February 1, 1986): 61–79. doi:10.2307/2095478.

Melo, Marcus André, and Carlos Pereira. *Making Brazil Work: Checking the President in a Multiparty System*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Mendonça, Ricardo. "Bolsa Família Só Dá Autonomia a Uma Parte Das Mulheres Inscritas, Diz Pesquisador." *Folha De São Paulo Online*. October 20, 2013. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/10/1359120-bolsa-familia-so-da-autonomia-a-uma-parte-das-mulheres-inscritas-diz-pesquisador.shtml.

Menezes, Maiá, and Paulo Marqueiro. "Na TV, Dilma e Zé à sombra de Lula." *O Globo*. August 18, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/744634370/abstract/DA1DF6A47AE0472DPQ/1.

"Michelle Bachelet Los Supera a Ambos En Todas Las Mediciones de Atributos: Piñera Supera a Lavín En Liderazgo, Pero Pierde En Integridad Y Empatía." *La Tercera*, August 14, 2005.

Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *The American Political Science Review* 57, no. 1 (1963): 45–56. doi:10.2307/1952717.

"Mínimas Diferencias En Las Preguntas Del Público." *La Tercera*, November 3, 1999.

"Ministério da Saúde diz que Serra deu declarações incorretas sobre ações no governo Lula." *O Globo*. August 12, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/742435084/abstract/4159AAC3E2154BFFPQ/1.

Ministério do Planejamento. "Desenvolvimento Com Inclusão Social E Educação de Qualidade: Plano Plurianual 2008-2011," 2007. Brasília, Brazil. http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/arquivo/spi-1/ppa-1/2008/081015_ppa_2008_mespres.pdf.

"Modelo Será Vocera Del Comando Juvenil de Lagos." *La Tercera*, August 3, 1999.

"Molestía En Comando Del Candidato de La UDI." *La Tercera*, August 13, 2005.

"Mônica Bergamo." *Folha De S. Paulo*. April 19, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336380833/abstract/349FA2B62B6C46BDPQ/1.

Montaner, Lidia Baltra. *Señora presidenta: mujeres que gobiernan países*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Mare Nostrum, 2006.

Montes, Rocío. "Michelle Bachelet Y Ángela Jeria: 'Mi Mamá Es Mi Aliada… Admiro Su Valentía.'" *Caras*, April 24, 2014. http://www.caras.cl/tag/angela-jeria/.

Morales Quiroga, Mauricio. "La Primera Mujer Presidenta de Chile: ¿Qué Explicó El Triunfo de Michelle Bachelet En Las Elecciones de 2005-2006?" *Latin American Research Review* 43, no. 1 (2008): 7–32.

Morgan, Jana. "Gender and the Latin American Voter." In *The Latin American Voter*, edited by Ryan E. Carlin, Matthew Singer, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015.

Morgan, Jana, and Magda Hinojosa. "Women in Political Parties: Seen But Not Heard." Conference Paper presented at the Women Latin America Lead, Houston, Texas, 2015.

Mur, Robert. "¿Cuál Es El Talante de Bachelet?" *La Tercera*, October 12, 2005.

Murillo, María Victoria, Virginia Oliveros, and Milan Vaishnav. "Electoral Revolution or Democratic Alternation?" *Latin American Research Review* 45, no. 3 (2010): 87–114.

"Na estreia do rádio no 2º turno, Dilma agradece a Deus e diz que vai 'fazer campanha em defesa da vida'; Serra ataca petista." *O Globo*. October 8, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/756945167/abstract/49FE335106F7449EPQ/1.

"Na TV, Dilma mostra a família e Serra ataca rival." *O Globo*. October 11, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/757138258/abstract/65124EDF2A6540D4PQ/1.

Nascimento, Conceição. Personal Interview., May 16, 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Navia, Patricio. "El Tercero Es El Vencido." *Anuario La Tercera*. 2007. https://files.nyu.edu.

———. "Entrevista de Trabajo." *La Tercera*, October 16, 2005.

———. "La Paridad de Bachelet." *La Tercera*, August 27, 2005.

———. "Lagos Y Sus Círculos de Poder." *Capital*, October 1999. http://patricionavia.com/capital/cp991002.htm.

———. Personal Interview, December 2013.

"No 'JN', Dilma defende apoios de Sarney e Collor." *Folha De S. Paulo*. August 10, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/741040677/abstract/40A36B40826D4309PQ/1.

"No Jornal Nacional, Serra diz que próximo presidente não pode ir na garupa." *O Globo*. August 11, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/742656097/abstract/706B5DB5056E4ABBPQ/1.

Norris, Pippa. *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, 1997.

"'Nos últimos 16 anos o investimento para as famílias mais pobres ficou a desejar', diz Marina Silva no debate da TV Globo." *O Globo*. September 30, 2010, sec. Politics.

http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/755792637/abstract/309A67E8B400473BPQ/1.

Novaes, Carolina Isabel. "Candidatas optam por tons suaves." *O Globo*. October 1, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/755908436/abstract/5AF1E6C3A7A341FCPQ/1.

"O importante." *O Globo*. September 1, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/749458584/abstract/C21FCD54285E4847PQ/1.

O'Brien, Diana Z., Matthew Mendez, Jordan Carr Peterson, and Jihyun Shin. "Letting Down the Ladder or Shutting the Door: Female Prime Ministers, Party Leaders, and Cabinet Ministers." *Politics and Gender* 11, no. 4 (December 2015): 689–717. doi:10.1017/S1743923X15000410.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism; Studies in South American Politics*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973.

Olivares C, Eduardo. "Empresarios Por Bachelet Recolectan Fondos Y Estrechan Lazos Con El Mundo Privado." *La Tercera*, September 20, 2005.

Organization of American States. "Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." Accessed November 5, 2016. http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-52.html.

Orrico, Alexandre. "7 Amigas Pessoais de Dilma Que Têm Poder No Governo." *BuzzFeed*. Accessed November 8, 2016. http://www.buzzfeed.com/alexandreorrico/amigas-pessoais-de-dilma-que-tem-poder-no-governo.

Ortega, Javier. "Los Defectos de Lavín," October 10, 1999.

Osborn, Tracy L. *How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Gender, and Representation in the State Legislatures*. 1 edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Pacheco Jordão, Fátima. Personal Interview, June 22, 2015. São Paulo, Brazil.

Pacheco Jordão, Fátima, and Paula Regina Alberico Cabrini. "A Questão Do Aborto E as Eleições de 2010." *Opinião Pública UFMG*, 2012. http://opiniaopublica.ufmg.br/site/files/biblioteca/PachecoeAlberico2012.pdf.

Partido dos Trabalhadores. "Brasil Sem Racismo." Fundação Perseu Abramo, Setembro 2002. São Paulo, Brazil. http://csbh.fpabramo.org.br/uploads/brasilsemracismo.pdf.

———. "Carta Às Pessoas Portadoras de Deficiência." Fundação Perseu Abramo, September 2002. http://csbh.fpabramo.org.br/uploads/cartaaspessoasportadoras.pdf.

———. "Compromisso Com as Mulheres." Fundação Perseu Abramo, October 2002. http://csbh.fpabramo.org.br/uploads/compromissocomasmulheres.pdf.

———. "Compromisso Com Os Povos Indígenas Do Brasil." Fundação Perseu Abramo, September 2002. http://csbh.fpabramo.org.br/uploads/compromissocomospovosindigenas.pdf.

———. "Programa de Governo 2002 Coligação Lula Presidente: Um Brasil Para Todos," 2002.

"Pasquale Cipro Neto: A presidente, a presidenta." *Folha De S. Paulo*. November 4, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/884626318/abstract/2BB05A118B5F44BAPQ/1.

"Patricia Politzer Dejó La Secretaría de Comunicación Y Cultura." *El Mercurio de Valparaíso*, April 27, 2001. http://www.mercuriovalpo.cl/site/edic/20010426202322/pags/20010426221543.html.

Paulo, Fabrício Calado Moreira. "Marta Suplicy compara Alckmin do debate a Maluf." *O Globo*. October 20, 2006, sec. Politics.

Payne, J. Mark. *Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America*. IDB, 2007.

Peña y Lillo, Macarena, and Patricio Gómez. "Última Semana de Campaña: Candidatos Tras El Apoyo de Los Indecisos." *El Mercurio*, January 9, 2006, sec. Nacional.

Pereira, Hildete. Personal Interview, January 26, 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

"Perfil - Dilma Rousseff: Ilusões armadas." *Folha De S. Paulo*. February 21, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/336427013/abstract/FDE7E6C4A22245A7PQ/1.

Phillips, Anne. *The Politics of Presence*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1995.

"Piñera Califica a Lavín Como 'un Niño Muy Agresivo.'" *La Tercera*, October 22, 2005.

Piovesan, Flávia. "Violence against Women in Brazil: International Litigation and Local Advances." In *Feminist Agendas and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Jane S. Jaquette, 113–29. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009.

Pitanguy, Jacqueline. Personal Interview, February 5, 2015. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

Pizarro, Rui. "Principais trechos da entrevista de Heloísa Helena no 'Globo.'" *O Globo*. August 29, 2006, sec. Politics.

Planalto, Portal do. "Biografia." Página. *Palácio do Planalto*. Accessed February 25, 2017. http://www2.planalto.gov.br/presidencia/presidenta/biografia/biografiadilma.

Plutzer, Eric. "Preferences in Family politics:Women's Consciousness or Family Context?" *Political Geography Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (January 1, 1991). doi:10.1016/0260-9827(91)90018-p.

———. "Work Life, Family Life, and Women's Support of Feminism." *American Sociological Review* 53, no. 4 (1988): 640–49. doi:10.2307/2095855.

Poder Executivo. Acrescenta § 6º ao art. 2º da Lei nº 8.900, de 30 de junho de 1994, para ampliar a quantidade de parcelas do seguro-desemprego paga à mulher arrimo de família., Pub. L. No. Projeto de Lei 6038 (2009). http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra;jsessionid=AB38FBB225050275312F3D7EBF638F86.node2?codteor=696667&filename=Avulso+-PL+6038/2009.

———. Altera a Lei nº 12.845, de 1º de agosto de 2013, que dispõe sobre o atendimento obrigatório e integral de pessoas em situação de violência sexual., Pub. L. No. Projeto de Lei 6022 (2013). http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=585806.

———. Dispõe sobre a criação de cargos em comissão do Grupo-Direção e Assessoramento Superiores - DAS, destinados à Secretaria Especial de Políticas para as Mulheres., Pub. L. No. Projeto de Lei 3959 (2008). http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=408402.

Pogrebinschi, Thamy, and David Samuels. "The Impact of Participatory Democracy: Evidence from Brazil's National Public Policy Conferences." *Comparative Politics* 46, no. 3 (2014): 313–32.

Politzer, Patricia. *Bachelet en tierra de hombres*. Santiago de Chile: Debate, 2010.

"Por que Alckmin tem dificuldade para decolar?" *O Globo*. September 17, 2006, sec. Politics.

Power, Timothy J. "Continuity in a Changing Brazil: The Transition from Lula to Dilma." In *Brazil under Lula: A Country in Transformation*, edited by Fábio de Castro, Kees Koonings, and Marianne Wiesebron. New York: Palgrave, 2014.

"Precandidatura de Bajo Perfil?" *El Mercurio*, December 29, 2004, sec. Editorial.

Presidência da República. Altera a Lei no 6.932, de 7 de julho de 1981, que dispõe sobre as atividades do médico-residente e prorroga o prazo de pagamento da Gratificação de Representação de Gabinete e da Gratificação Temporária para os servidores ou empregados requisitados pela Advocacia-Geral da União., Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 521 (2010). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Mpv/521.htm.

———. Altera a Lei no 10.836, de 9 de janeiro de 2004; dispõe sobre o apoio financeiro da União aos Municípios e ao Distrito Federal para ampliação da oferta da educação infantil; e dá outras providências., Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 570 (2012). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/Mpv/570.htm.

———. Altera as Leis no 12.409, de 25 de maio de 2011, no 11.578, de 26 de novembro de 2007, no 11.977, de 7 de julho de 2009, e no 10.188, de 12 de fevereiro de 2001., Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 561 (2012).

———. Autoriza o pagamento de subvenção econômica aos produtores da safra 2011/2012 de cana-de-açúcar e de etanol da região Nordeste e o financiamento da renovação e implantação de canaviais com equalização da taxa de juros; dispõe sobre os arranjos de pagamento e as instituições de pagamento integrantes do Sistema de Pagamentos Brasileiro - SPB; altera a Lei no 12.783, de 11 de janeiro de 2013, para autorizar a União a emitir, sob a forma de colocação direta, em favor da Conta de Desenvolvimento Energético - CDE, títulos da dívida pública mobiliária federal; e dá outras providências., Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 615 (2013). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2013/Mpv/mpv615.htm.

———. Cria o Programa Bolsa Família e dá outras providências, Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 132 (2003). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/mpv/Antigas_2003/132.htm.

———. Dispõe sobre a organização da Presidência da República e dos Ministérios, e dá outras providências, Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 103 (2003). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/mpv/antigas_2003/103.htm.

———. Dispõe sobre o apoio técnico ou financeiro da União no âmbito do Plano de Ações Articuladas, altera a Lei no 11.947, de 16 de junho de 2009, para incluir os polos presenciais do sistema Universidade Aberta do Brasil na assistência financeira do Programa Dinheiro Direto na Escola, altera a Lei no 11.494, de 20 de junho de 2007, para contemplar com recursos do FUNDEB as instituições comunitárias que atuam na educação do campo, altera a Lei no 10.880, de 9 de junho de 2004, para dispor sobre a assistência financeira da União no âmbito do Programa de Apoio aos Sistemas de Ensino para Atendimento à Educação de Jovens e Adultos, e dá outras providências., Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 562 (2012). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2012/Mpv/562.htm.

———. Dispõe sobre o atendimento da alimentação escolar e do Programa Dinheiro Direto na Escola aos alunos da educação básica, altera a Lei no 10.880, de 9 de junho de 2004, e dá outras providências., Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 455 (2009). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2009/Mpv/455.htm.

———. Dispõe sobre o Programa Nacional de Inclusão de Jovens - ProJovem, instituído pela Lei no 11.129, de 30 de junho de 2005, altera a Lei no 10.836, de 9 de janeiro de 2004, e dá outras providências., Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 411 (2007). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2007/Mpv/411.htm.

———. Institui o Sistema Nacional de Cadastro, Vigilância e Acompanhamento da Gestante e Puérpera para Prevenção da Mortalidade Materna, autoriza a União a conceder benefício financeiro, e altera a Lei no 9.782, de 26 de janeiro de 1999., Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 557 (2011). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2011/Mpv/557.htm.

———. Regulamenta o art. 60 do Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias e dá outras providências., Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 339 (2006). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2006/Mpv/339.htm.

Presidência da República, Secretaría de Políticas para as Mulheres. "Plano Nacional de Políticas Para as Mulheres," 2004. Brasília, Brazil. www.presidencia.gov.br/spmulheres.

"Presidenta Electa Bachelet Cumplió Con Nombrar Gabinete Paritario." *UPI Chile*, January 30, 2006. LexisNexus Academic database.

Presidente. Aprueba el protocolo para prevenir, reprimir y sancionar la trata de personas, especialmente mujeres y niños, que complementa la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la delincuencia organizada transnacional, aprobado por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en su resolución A/RES/55/25, de 15 de noviembre de 2000, y suscrito por Chile el 8 de agosto de 2002, Pub. L. No. Boletín 3445-10 (2004).

———. Aprueba Protocolo facultativo de la Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer., Pub. L. No. Boletín 2667-10 (2001).

———. Crea el Sistema Intersectorial de Protección Social e institucionaliza el Subsistema de Protección Integral a la Infancia, Chile Crece Contigo., Pub. L. No. Boletín 6260-06 (2009).

———. Crea el subsidio al empleo., Pub. L. No. Boletín 6393-05 (2009).

———. De protección de los derechos de la infancia y adolescencia, Pub. L. No. Boletín 3596-18 (2004).

———. Información, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad., Pub. L. No. Boletín 6582-11 (2009).

———. Modifica normas relativas al subsidio familiar y a la adopción., Pub. L. No. Boletín 4812-13 (2007).

———. Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos humanos en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, denominado Protocolo de San Salvador., Pub. L. No. Boletín 4087-10 (2006).

———. Regula el derecho de la madre a percibir directamente las asignaciones familiares e incorpora nuevo causante de dicho beneficio., Pub. L. No. Boletín 4204-13 (2006).

———. Sobre protección de derechos de la infancia y de la adolescencia, Pub. L. No. Boletín 3792-07 (2005).

"Presidentes de centrais sindicais mandam representantes à manifestação, que teve ataques à imprensa e apoios a Dilma." *O Globo*. September 23, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/753558987/abstract/2F3D16EAD4674678PQ/1.

"Primarias de La Concertación: Lagos Y Zaldívar Se Inscribieron," April 17, 1999.

"Proclamación Comprendió Críticas Al Gobierno: UDI Dio Independencia a Lavín." *El Mercurio*, August 8, 1999.

"Programa de Gobierno Candidatura Presidencial de Joaquín Lavín: Crear Un Millón de Nuevos Empleos." Centro de Estudios Miguel Enríquez: Archivo Chile, 1999.

"Programa de Gobierno de Ricardo Lagos: Para Crecer con Igualdad." *Archivo Chile*, 1999. http://www.archivochile.com/Gobiernos/gob_rlagos/de/GOBdelagos0002.pdf.

"Programa de Serra diz que brasileiro não precisa de 'mãe de governo'; Dilma foca em educação." *O Globo*. August 26, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/747384101/abstract/9A2E45EB5CC54992PQ/1.

"Promesa de Lagos." *El Mercurio*, May 31, 1999.

"Pronósticos Presidenciales." *El Mercurio*, April 7, 2004, sec. Editorial.

"Propuestas Contra El Delito: Fórmulas de Los Presidenciables." *El Mercurio*, July 12, 2005.

PSDB-PFL. "Programa Do Governo Geraldo Alckmin: Coligação Por Um Brasil Decente," 2006.

Quezada, Juan Andrés. "Análisis de Corporación Tiempo 2000 Sobre Estrategia Presidencial de Lavín: Oficialismo Reconoce Posibilidades de La Derecha." *La Tercera*, August 29, 1999.

———. "Concertación Reconoce Éxito de La Campaña Opositora Y Sale a La Calle: Nuevo Ajuste En La Estrategia de Lagos." *La Tercera*, October 6, 1999.

———. "Darán Más Participación a Los Partidos: Crean Nueva Estructura En La Campaña de Lagos." *La Tercera*, October 11, 1999.

———. "Ventaja de Bachelet Desata Competencia Por Presidir Partidos." *La Tercera*, October 11, 2005.

Quezada, Juan Andrés, and Andrea Insunza. "El Diputado Roberto León Y Maríana Aylwin Tienen Roles Importantes En El Comando: Los DC Que Están Con Lagos." *La Tercera*, December 9, 1999.

Quezada, Juan Andrés, and Andrés Silva. "Con Actos Masivos En Curanilahue Y Calama, Ambos Candidatos Lanzan Hoy Sus Campañas: Los Entretelones Del Duelo Presidencial," September 20, 1999.

Quiroga, Anita. Personal Interview, December 2013.

"Redestinados Asesores: Soledad Alvear Impone Cambios En Laguismo." *El Mercurio*, December 16, 1999.

Reed, Pablo. "Campaña de Soledad Alvear: La Candidatura Que No Pudo Salir de La UTI." *El Mercurio*, May 25, 2005.

"Reeleito governador, Cabral promete se dedicar para eleger Dilma presidente." *O Globo*. October 4, 2010, sec. Politics.

http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/756193711/abstract/144104450AF24E75PQ/1.

Reingold, Beth. *Representing Women: Sex, Gender, and Legislative Behavior in Arizona and California*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Reingold, Beth, and Heather Foust. "Exploring the Determinants of Feminist Consciousness in the United States." *Women & Politics* 19, no. 3 (June 11, 1998): 19–48. doi:10.1300/J014v19n03_02.

"Réplica a Ministras 'presidenciables': Gremialismo Defiende Liderazgo de Lavín." *El Mercurio*, December 27, 2003, sec. Nacional.

Reyes-Housholder, Catherine, and Gwynn Thomas. "Latin America's Presidentas: Challenging Old Patterns, Forging New Pathways." In *Gender and Representation in Latin America*, edited by Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. Philadelphia, PA, 2016.

Reynolds, Andrew. "Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling." *World Politics* 51, no. 4 (1999): 547–72.

Ribeiro, Veridiana. "Marina critica uso da máquina pública por adversários na eleição." *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 28, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/336440821/abstract/150C9A6470044EBFPQ/1.

"Ricardo Lagos." *La Tercera*, September 20, 1999.

"Ricardo Lagos-Joaquín Lavín: Debate Presidencial Sin Divergencias Importantes." *El Mercurio*, November 3, 1999.

Ríos Tobar, Marcela. "Feminist Politics in Contemporary Chile: From the Democratic Transition to Bachelet." In *Feminist Agendas and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Jane S. Jaquette, 21–45. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009.

———. "Seizing a Window of Opportunity: The Election of President Bachelet in Chile." *Politics & Gender* 4, no. 3 (2008): 509–19. doi:10.1017/S1743923X0800041X.

Ríos Tobar, Marcela, Lorena Godoy Catalán, and Elizabeth Guerrero Caviedes. *¿Un Nuevo Silencio Feminista? La Transformación de Un Movimiento Social En El Chile Post Transición*. Santiago de Chile: Cuarto Propio, 2004.

Riquelme, Paola. "Los Énfasis Que Marcarán Los Candidatos En La Franja Electoral." *La Tercera*, October 5, 2005.

Rodrigues, Fernando. "Sul, pobres e mulheres alçam tucano." *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 27, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/336358881/abstract/596C7437C532421DPQ/1.

———. "Veja Cronologia Da Vida de Dilma Rousseff." *Noticias BOL UOL*. February 21, 2010. http://noticias.bol.uol.com.br/brasil/2010/02/21/veja-cronologia-da-vida-de-dilma-rousseff.jhtm.

Rosenn, Keith S. "Brazil's Constitution of 1988 with Amendments through 2014." www.constituteproject.org, April 18, 2016. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf.

Roxo, Sérgio. "'Até com traço, vou continuar', diz Marina." *O Globo*. September 1, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/749458641/abstract/F8BEE2DF3314500PQ/1.

———. "Marina destacará trajetória de vida." *O Globo*. August 1, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/734522519/abstract/320BDD91E2304024PQ/1.

Roza, Vivian. "Gatekeepers to Power: Party-Level Influences on Women's Political Participation in Latin America." Georgetown University, 2010.

"S. Alvear Al Comando de Lagos." *El Mercurio*, December 15, 1999.

"Sabatina Folha - Marina Silva: Brasil não precisa de um 'continuador', diz Marina." *Folha De S. Paulo*. June 17, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous.

http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/500441208/abstract/536228205A7548D4PQ/1.

Saint-Germain, Michelle A. "Does Their Difference Make a Difference? The Impact of Women on Public Policy in the Arizona Legislature." *Social Science Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (1989): 956–68.

Saint-Germain, Michelle A., and Cynthia Chavez Metoyer. *Women Legislators in Central America: Politics, Democracy, and Policy*. University of Texas Press, 2009.

Salinas, Claudio. "Titulares de Relaciones Exteriores Y Defensa: Las Ministras Estrella Salieron a Terreno." *El Mercurio*, March 6, 2004.

———. "Vicepresidente Del Partido Por La Democracia, Jorge Schaulsohn." *El Mercurio*, June 18, 2005.

Samuels, David. "From Socialism to Social Democracy Party Organization and the Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil." *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 9 (November 1, 2004): 999–1024. doi:10.1177/0010414004268856.

Samuels, David, and Cesar Zucco. "The Power of Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 212–25. doi:10.1111/ajps.12050.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. "Gender-Related Political Knowledge and the Descriptive Representation of Women." *Political Behavior* 25, no. 4 (2003): 367–88.

Santos, Fabiano. *O Poder Legislativo No Presidencialismo de Coalizão*. Belo Horizonte: Editora da UFMG, 2003. http://www.lexml.gov.br/urn/urn:lex:br:rede.virtual.bibliotecas:livro:2003;000677314.

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. *Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America*. Oxford, [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

———. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 3 (July 1, 2006): 570–85. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00202.x.

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., and William Mishler. "An Integrated Model of Women's Representation." *Journal of Politics* 67, no. 2 (2005): 407–28.

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., and Catherine Reyes-Housholder. "Citizen Responses to Female Executives: Is It Sex, Novelty or Both?" *Politics, Groups and Identities*, Forthcoming.

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., and Michelle A. Taylor-Robinson. "Introduction." *Politics & Gender* 7, no. 3 (2011): 417–18.

Scofield Jr., Gilberto. "Voto feminino foi decisivo para levar a eleição ao 2º turno, dizem especialistas." *O Globo*. October 7, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/756786536/abstract/8D33EECD262B4242PQ/1.

Scolese, Eduardo. "Marina decide abrir mão de marqueteiro." *Folha De S. Paulo*. March 23, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/336439954/abstract/1F2FDB9CD86C4413PQ/1.

Scolese, Eduardo, and Pedro Dias Leite. "Eleições 2006/Presidência: Para Lula, só 'fator extraterrestre' o impedirá de cumprir promessas." *Folha De S. Paulo*. September 1, 2006, sec. Politics.

Scolese, Eduardo, and Graciliano Rocha. "Presidente 40/Eleições 2010: Lula diz que não vai deixar a cena política." *Folha De S. Paulo*. May 13, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/276106074/abstract/BF15A21DBF014F92PQ/1.

Seabra, Catia, and Breno Costa. "Partidos já armam bunkers para campanha presidencial." *Folha De S. Paulo*. April 7, 2010, sec. Miscellaneous. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/336465942/abstract/5D97EAF0A67E430EPQ/1.

"Se Reunió Con Directiva DC: Lagos Promete Una Campaña Corta." *El Mercurio*, June 8, 1999.

"Se Va de Giras Solo Acompañada de Sus Hijos." *El Mercurio Online*, December 16, 1999. http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={a0d2a921-514a-496e-8981-7ea2e322c546}).

"Seguirá Formalmente a Cargo Del Área Comunicacional, Pero Sin Ningún Poder En El Comando: El Senador Ominami Perdió La Pelea." *La Tercera*, December 17, 1999.

"Sem a Imprensa, Dilma Participa de Seminário Sobre Mulheres Na Política." *Folha De São Paulo Online*. April 22, 2010. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u724723.shtml.

Senado. Dispõe sobre medidas de estímulo à prática de cidadania fiscal e dá outras providências., Pub. L. No. Projeto de Lei 354 (2009). https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/92678.

Sepúlveda-Zelaya, Carmen. "Formal and Informal Institutional Challenges to Women's Reproductive Rights: Emergency Contraception and the Constitutional Tribunal in Chile." In *Gender, Institutions and Change in Bachelet's Chile*, edited by Silke Staab and Georgina Waylen. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Siavelis, Peter. "Accommodating Informal Institutions and Democracy in Chile." In *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America*, 33–56. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.

Siavelis, Peter M. *The President and Congress in Postauthoritarian Chile: Institutional Constraints to Democratic Consolidation*. University Park, Pa: Penn State University Press, 2000.

Silva, Andrés. "Acepta El Apoyo de Las Colectividades a La Campaña, Pero No Que La Conduzcan: Lavín Insiste En Marginar a Los Partidos," September 23, 1999.

———. "Clima Confrontacional Con La Concertación Complica Al Candidato Opositor: Fiscalización Divide Al Comando de Lavín." *La Tercera*, October 15, 1999.

———. "Cristián Larroulet, Encargado Programático, Busca Nuevos Nombres Para El Comando: Falla Estratégica En Campaña de Lavín." *La Tercera*, August 29, 1999.

———. "Lavín No Responderá Emplazamientos." *La Tercera*, October 6, 1999.

———. "Lavín Promete Nuevo Estilo." *La Tercera*, September 21, 1999.

Silva, Marina. "Juntos Pelo Brasil Que Queremos: Diretrizes Para Programa de Governo Da Candidatura de Marina Silva Para a Presidência Da República." Partido Verde, 2010.

Singer, André. *Os Sentidos do Lulismo: Reforma Gradual e Pacto Conservador*. Cincias Humanas e Sociais edition. São Paulo, Brazil: Companhia das Letras, 2012.

Soares, Vera. Personal Interview., June 23, 2015. São Paulo, Brazil.

"Solari Transversal." *Capital*, May 2, 2014. www.capital.cl/poder/2014/05/02/070557-solari-transversal.

Solinas, María Teresa. "RN Emplaza Al Gobierno a Terminar Con El Criterio de Paridad Y Con El Cuoteo Político." *El Mercurio*, March 24, 2007. www.emol.com.

Staab, Silke. "Opportunities and Constraints for Gender-Egalitarian Policy Change: Michelle Bachelet's Social Protection Agenda (2006-10)." In *Gender, Institutions and Change in Bachelet's Chile*, edited by Silke Staab and Georgina Waylen. Palgrave, 2016.

Staab, Silke, and Georgina Waylen. *Gender, Institutions and Change in Bachelet's Chile*. New York: Palgrave, 2016.

Staff. "The Best Alternative." *The Santiago Times*. April 12, 2004. http://santiagotimes.cl/the-best-alternative/.

Stephen, Lynn. *Women and Social Movements in Latin America: Power from Below*. University of Texas Press, 2010.

Stokes, Susan C. *Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democractic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. 1 edition. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Suwwan, Leila. "Dilma diz que vai evitar salto alto." *O Globo*. August 18, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/744634417/abstract/F869551E2FC24B6CPQ/1.

Swers, Michele L. "Connecting Descriptive and Substantive Representation: An Analysis of Sex Differences in Cosponsorship Activity." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (2005): 407–33.

———. "Representing Women's Interests in a Polarized Congress." In *Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future*, edited by Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. Oxford University Press, 2014.

———. *The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in Congress*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

———. *Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the Senate*, 2013.

Tedin, Kent L., David W. Brady, Mary E. Buxton, Barbara M. Gorman, and Judy L. Thompson. "Social Background and Political Differences Between Pro- and Anti-Era Activists." *American Politics Research* 5, no. 3 (July 1, 1977): 395–408.

Teodoro, Plínio. "Esposas de candidatos participam do programa na TV." *O Globo*. October 26, 2006, sec. Politics.

———. "Programas na TV não refletem clima quente da campanha." *O Globo*. October 18, 2006, sec. Politics.

"Terapia de Shock En El Comando de Bachelet." *La Tercera*, December 4, 2005, sec. Reportajes.

Terron, Sonia Luiza, and Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares. "As Bases Eleitorais de Lula E Do PT: Do Distanciamento Ao Divórcio." *Opinião Pública* 16, no. 2 (November 2010): 310–37. doi:10.1590/S0104-62762010000200002.

Thames, Frank, and Margaret Williams. *Contagious Representation: Women's Political Representation in Democracies around the World*. New York: New York University Press, 2013.

Thomas, Gwynn. *Contesting Legitimacy in Chile: Familial Ideals, Citizenship, and Political Struggle, 1970–1990*. 1 edition. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2011.

———. "Michelle Bachelet's Liderazgo Femenino (Feminine Leadership)." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13, no. 1 (2011): 63–82.

———. "Promoting Gender Equality: Michelle Bachelet and Formal and Informal Institutional Change within the Chilean Presidency." In *Gender, Institutions and Change in Bachelet's Chile*, edited by Silke Staab and Georgina Waylen. New York: Palgrave, 2016.

———. "Women Presidents and Troubled Coalitions: How Party Crisis Shapes Presidential Agendas and Government Capacity." presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, Washington, DC, August 28, 2014.

Thomas, Sue. *How Women Legislate*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Thomsen, Danielle. "Ideological Moderates Won't Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress." *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 3 (2014): 786–97.

———. "Why So Few (Republican) Women? Explaining the Partisan Imbalance of Women in the U.S. Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (2015): 295–323.

Tironi, Eugenio. "Más, O Mejor?" *El Mercurio*, December 27, 2005, sec. Editorial.

"Tironi Se Acerca a Bachelet Tras Decretar Muerte Del Mapu." *La Tercera*, November 30, 2005.

Tohá, Carolina. "Paridad de Género Y Buen Gobierno." *La Tercera*. August 4, 2005. http://www.expansiva.cl/columnas/detalle.tpl?idcolumna=08042005103636.

Torres Cautivo, Ximena. "Michelle Y Sus Amores: La Necesidad de Un Primer Damo | | Ximena Torres Cautivo," April 11, 2015. http://noticias.terra.com/ximena-torres-cautivo/blog/2015/04/11/michelle-y-sus-amores-la-necesidad-de-un-primer-damo/.

Towns, Ann E. "Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion 'From Below.'" *International Organization* 66, no. 2 (April 2012): 179–209. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000045.

———. *Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

"Tras Consulta Nacional: Joaquín Lavín Asumió Sus Primeros 10 Compromisos." *El Mercurio*, June 7, 1999.

"Tras Convención de La Alianza: Lavín Puso En Marcha La Campaña Nacional." *El Mercurio*, July 4, 1999.

"Tras Triunfo En Primarías: Laguismo Reforzará Los Lazos Partidarios." *El Mercurio*, June 1, 1999.

Trujillo, Alejandro. "El Análisis Posterior: Lo Que El Encuentro Dejó a Alvear Según Las Encuestas." *El Mercurio*, April 29, 2005, sec. Nacional.

United Nations. "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)," 1979. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/.

Valdés, Teresa, ed. *¿Construyendo Igualdad? 20 años de Políticas Públicas de Género*. Santiago de Chile: Centro de Estudos para el Desarrollo de la Mujer, 2010.

———. Personal Interview, December 2013.

Vasconcelos, Adriana. "Durante comício, presidente diz que Dilma vai vencer no primeiro turno." *O Globo*. August 11, 2010, sec. Politics. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/latinamericanews/docview/741384077/abstract/672F942EA5C04EDDPQ/1.

Vicente, Terezinha. "'Não Basta Ser Mulher', Defendem Feministas." *Caros Amigos*, June 18, 2010. http://www.carosamigos.com.br/index.php/artigos-e-debates/2847-qnao-basta-ser-mulherq-defendem-feministas.

Wängnerud, Lena. "Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2009): 51–69. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.123839.

Warner, Rebecca L. "Does the Sex of Your Children Matter? Support for Feminism among Women and Men in the United States and Canada." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 53, no. 4 (1991): 1051–56. doi:10.2307/353008.

Warner, Rebecca L., and Brent S. Steel. "Child Rearing as a Mechanism for Social Change: The Relationship of Child Gender to Parents' Commitment to Gender Equity on JSTOR." *Gender and Society*, 1999.

Waylen, Georgina. "Gendering Politics, Institutions, and the Executive: Bachelet in Context." In *Gender, Institutions, and Change in Bachelet's Chile*, edited by Georgina Waylen and Silke Staab, 13–39. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Wedeen, Lisa. "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science." *The American Political Science Review* 96, no. 4 (2002): 713–28.

Williams, Melissa S.,. *Voice, Trust, and Memory : Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Wolbrecht, Christina. "Explaining Women's Rights Realignment: Convention Delegates, 1972-1992." *Political Behavior* 24, no. 3 (2002): 237–82.

———. *The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Yáñez, Nelly. "Comando Presidencial: Bachelet Integra a DC Y Hiere Al Alvearismo." *El Mercurio*, August 26, 2005. http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={54337445-3589-41fa-9509-e3301c97f88c}.

Zanini, Fábio. "Lula elenca medidas para ampliar acesso ao aborto, mas evita palavra." *Folha De S. Paulo*. September 28, 2006, sec. Politics.

Zucco, Cesar. "The President's 'New' Constituency: Lula and the Pragmatic Vote in Brazil's 2006 Presidential Elections." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 40, no. 1 (February 2008): 29–49. doi:10.1017/S0022216X07003628.

———. "When Payouts Pay Off: Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior in Brazil 2002–10." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 810–22. doi:10.1111/ajps.12026.

Zuñiga, Francisco, and Carlos Gutiérrez Moya. "Crónica de La Elección Presidencial En Chile." *Revista de Derecho Político* 47 (2000): 289–307.