SCHOOLING CITIZENS:

EDUCATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND DEMOCRACY IN MALI

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by

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Abstract:

This dissertation draws on original data, including a survey of 1000 citizens, to demonstrate the effect of different types of education on political knowledge and political participation in a nascent, African democracy. I find that any level of education, even informal and Islamic education, is positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of political knowledge as compared to having attend no school at all. I find that formal education, particularly at the secondary and university level, is significantly correlated with higher levels of political participation in difficult activities: campaigning, willingness to run for office, and contacting a government official. I argue that education contributes to political knowledge and participation by building citizens' sense of internal efficacy, and that the highest levels of education can endow citizens with French literacy – a key component of full political empowerment. Additionally, I identify a positive, significant correlation between parents who enroll(ed) their children in public school, and certain forms of electoral participation, as compared to other Malian citizens. I find a negative, significant correlation between madrassa consumers and voting as compared to any other citizens. I argue that state schooling, as a social service, can foster voting among parents of students through policy feedback mechanisms; however, any form of Francophone schooling contributes to a family's ability to participate in politics by endowing them with a linguistic broker.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jaimie Bleck was born and raised in New Jersey. She received her BA in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2003. She worked as a Program Assistant for Winrock International on the African Education Initiative Ambassadors Girls Scholarship Program in Central and Southern Africa from 2004-2006. She began her graduate education at Cornell University in 2006. She will begin as a Ford Family Program Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame in Fall 2011.

In September 2006, Oumar Diakite and more than twenty five other youth activists were killed in a bus accident, while returning from a political rally in Gao. I dedicate this dissertation to Oumar – who was truly a model citizen for the world.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMPUI	Malian Association for the Unity and Progress of Islam
ATT	Amadou Toumani Toure
ADEMA	Alliance for Democracy in Mali
BA	Banconi, Bamako
BBC	Bamako Coura, Bamako
DV	Dependent Variable
EFA	Education for All
F	Faladie, Bamako
K	Kayes N'Dyi
KV	Kayes
IBK	Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
IED	Question and Answer Assembly
IV	Independent Variable
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
M	Mopti
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
S	Sikasso
SR	Sikasso II
SV	Sevare
T	Timbuktu

U	University Student Interview
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Chapter 1

Democratic Transitions and Educational Expansion: Schooling and Regime-building in the 21st Century?

1.1 Introduction

The last two decades have ushered in substantial changes across sub-Saharan Africa as dramatic growth in primary school enrollment has accompanied sweeping transitions to democracy. Heightened donor funding for basic education as well as the growth and accreditation of private schools, including for-profit and religious schools, have greatly expanded access to education for millions of African citizens. Aid to education on the continent doubled between 2000 and 2004: rising from 1.8 to 3.4 billion USD in the context of the Education for All Campaign and Millennium Development Goals (EFA Monitoring Report 2007: 2). Governments have chosen to allocate scarce resources to expand access to public education, while simultaneously partnering with non-state school to reach enrollment targets. Meanwhile, private secular and religious providers have blossomed in response to liberalization and overwhelming demand for education (Boyle 1999; Rose 2006). As a result, primary school enrollment in sub-Saharan Africa increased by 36% between 1999 and 2005 (Education for All Monitoring Report 2008:5). Despite these sweeping societal changes, political scientists have not yet explored their implication for democratic deepening. This study aims to fill that analytical void: What effect do these increases in enrollment have on the democratization process?

There are many reasons to believe that these changes could have an effect on citizens' knowledge of and participation in democracy. Historically, the European state used its monopoly over education as a tool for deepening democracy by teaching citizens how to locate and express their political preferences through democratic channels, fostering loyalty, spurring

participation in formal political channels, and by strengthening the capacity of civil society. However, the current reality in many resource-poor nascent democracies looks very different: in liberalized education sectors, governments have partnered with non-state providers, some of which might use a non-official language of instruction. Greater enrollment in non-state schools, including Islamic providers, as well as the public's perception of a decline in the quality of public education could potentially threaten democratic deepening.

Most African countries or international donors did not articulate educational expansion as a strategy to improve democracy, but rather as a way to improve human development. However, the rich theoretical literature on education and democratization suggests that there may be reasons to expect unintended positive externalities on democracy and citizenship as a result of this dramatic policy change.[1] My dissertation asks three important questions about the impact of education on citizenship in a resource-poor, nascent democracy. What is the effect of different levels and types of education on citizen's political knowledge and participation in the context of declining quality of the public education? What are the effects of non-state education providers on citizens' political knowledge and political participation? Particularly, what are the effects of Islamic schooling, on citizens' political knowledge and participation?

I conduct my study in Mali, a Muslim majority democracy where increases in enrollment are dramatic and schooling providers are diverse. Since the democratic transition in 1991, Malian primary school gross enrollment rates have jumped from 26% to over to 82%.[2] As a strategy to increase enrollment, the Malian government opened up its educational market to for-profit providers, NGO-run community schools, Christian schools as well as madrassas – modern,

[1] In the case of Mali, government documents talked about the importance of education for citizenship, it but never implemented civic education or an equivalent course.

[2] Numbers reflect the 2008-2009 school year. Malian Ministry of Education Annual Report 2007 and Thunnissen 2009: 6.

Arabic language religious providers. During the 2006-2007 school year approximately 38% of Malian primary students attended non-public schools.[3] The recent increase in enrollment as well as the variation in citizens' educational experiences provides fertile ground to test the effects of education on citizenship in nascent African democracies with liberalized education sectors.

Over the course of this educational expansion, Mali successfully held four peaceful presidential elections, which resulted in two executive alternations of power. This procedural progress has earned Mali one of the highest democracy scores on the continent, but we know little about the substantive trajectory of democracy that lies behind these institutional gains. Like all semi-democracies in Africa, a central question among political scientists and policy makers is whether democratic institutions in Mali are deepening or if they will remain trapped in "low intensity" equilibriums.[4] I join those scholars who argue that the quality of democracy depends largely the degree to which democratic institutions are made responsive and accountable to their populations (Bunce 2005, O'Donnell 2010, Ippolito-O'Donnell 2006). These questions are equally pressing for the policy community. In June 2010, Assistant Secretary for Africa Johnny Carson named the "consolidation of democratic gains" the first of five priority areas for US engagement with Africa. Despite its critical importance to democratic deepening, the relationship between citizens and government institutions remains largely unknown in Africa.[5]

Existing comparative literature suggests that education can spur political enlightenment and engagement, thus improving the responsiveness and accountability of democratic regimes to their citizens (Bunce and Wolchik 2007; Almond and Verba 1963). Despite the rich theoretical heritage of the study of education and citizenship and the educational expansion that has

[3] Malian Ministry of Education Annual Report 2007
[4] I use "low intensity democracy" to describe countries that have formal electoral rules, but lack genuinely effective liberal democracy. See Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Bunce 2000, and Tilly 2007;
[5] Prominent studies of citizens democratic attitudes and behavior include in Africa include Bratton, Gyimah-Boadi, and Mattes 2005, Moehler 2008; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; McLean 2010;

accompanied democratic transitions, the direct relationships between education and citizenship has not been thoroughly explored in nascent African democracies.

Documenting the relationship between educational experience and political citizenship is a complex and difficult task. I draw on original research I conducted in Mali in 2007 and 2009 to analyze the effects of greater access to education on citizenship and forecast the implications for the future of Malian democracy. My study yields substantive and surprising findings. I find that *all educational experiences are correlated with increases in citizens' political knowledge.* While higher levels of education are correlated with the strongest increases in political knowledge, I find that even alumni of informal institutions, including Koranic schools and literacy programs, are more informed about politics than their peers with no schooling at all. Contrary to theoretical expectations, I find that there is no significant difference in knowledge between those students who attend secular or Islamic schools at the primary or informal levels. *I find that respondents with the highest levels of education, secondary or tertiary, are able to leverage their educational background to participate in the most difficult political actions*. I argue that French language literacy continues to pose an obstacle to citizens' sense of internal efficacy.

I find a second unintended "democratic benefit" of expanded public provision: greater parental participation in elections. I find that the *average survey respondent whose child attend/attended public school reports voting and campaigning more often than other survey respondents*. As such, social service provision, and education provision in particular, has an added side benefit of pulling parents, as education consumers, into multiparty democracy. In contrast, *parents who send their children to Islamic schools are less likely to say they voted* than other survey respondents. While social service provision offers an opportunity for states to

connect with citizens, it is not the panacea for democratic development. This distinction, between public school parents and other citizens, only holds in the electoral realm; I do not find significant differences between public schooling and Islamic schooling consumers in other forms of political behavior or in their likelihood of having government identification.

This study leverages original qualitative and quantitative data to demonstrate the micro-dynamics of citizenship in a nascent, Muslim democracy. It is one of the first attempts to forecast the impact of rapid increases in enrollment and liberalized provision on democratic deepening in Africa.[6] It is the first study that to compare the impact of secular and religious instruction on citizenship in the developing-nation context. My findings point to the under-studied role that education policy can play in deepening democracies by creating more capable democratic consumers and by contributing to citizens' practical ability to converse with state institutions in the former colonial language. It highlights the important role that religious and indigenous language education can play in heightening citizens' cognitive skills, but also warns of the constraint colonial language acquisition poses to the development of full citizenship in low-literacy environments. By stressing the ingredients for empowered citizenship, this dissertation challenges the ability to discuss democratic institutions or democratic deepening – without first questioning and addressing the citizens' level of information and empowerment.

1.2 Education, Voice, and Loyalty: Strengthening Citizenship and Democracy

To conceptualize the broader impact of individuals' education on the quality of democratic institutions, we must understand the micro-level base of citizenship and its larger relationship to institution-building. Albert Hirschman's logic from Exit, Voice, and Loyalty is helpful in demonstrating the role of citizens in legitimizing and improving democratic

[6]The other study is Lauren MacLean 's analysis of Afrobarometer, which argues that the deteriorating quality of public health and education provision induces those who utilize public services to participate more often than those with who do not use state services (2011).

institutions (1970). Hirschman argues citizens' use of "voice" is necessary to keep institutions from falling into cycles of slack.[7] In his seminal study of African political economies, van de Walle concludes that weak African governments are allowed to "slack" precisely because of the lack of pressure from citizens and civil society on these institutions (2001). Citizens participate in politics to express their *voice* and provide feedback to government institutions, so that those institutions are pressured to improve their performance and become more responsive.

Voice is a straight-forward analogy for political participation, but the concepts of loyalty and exit need further clarification in the contemporary African context. I conceptualize loyalty as a belief in the validity of democratic institutions. Bratton et al have shown that most Africans support the abstract concept of "democracy," but how this support translates to the local context and induces them to participate is complicated (2005). It is important to emphasize loyalty as a trust in institutions rather than specific politicians or regimes. In their sub-regional study of Mexico and Argentina, Cleary and Stokes found that citizens in less democratic systems exhibit higher levels of interpersonal trust and trust in politicians (2006). This type of trust might be an artifact of clientalism – a willingness to appeal to politicians' resources or work with community members to solve problems that the government fails to address. Instead, we might conceptualize loyalty as diffuse trust in democratic institutions and "exit" as non-participation or non-engagement with the secular state.[8] The loyalty Hirschman describes, like external efficacy, is a belief that one's feedback will improve the functioning of an institution.

"Exit" as conceptualized by Hirschman is difficult in current African states. As Pierre Englebert convincingly argues, weak states are deceptively permanent; abetted by rigid sovereignty norms and thus endowed with monopoly over the rule of law, citizens have few

[7] Exit Voice and Loyalty (1970).
[8] I adopt David Easton's specification of "diffuse" trust in a general regime/institution to distinguish it from specific trust of a leader or party (1975).

options other than participate in the perverse system that perpetuates weak state authority (2009). Unlike Hirschman's consumer choosing between two brands, it is increasingly difficult for African citizens to exit away from state authority through rebellion or migration.[9] Without loyalty to secular democratic institutions, citizens might withdraw to the protection of local barons, religious authorities, or extended family networks without making further demands on the state. In the current context, with fixed boundaries of authority, passive exit may be induced by a persuasive local patron or created through alienation. This is problematic for democratic institutions because citizens' retreat releases the government from the constructive pressure of their demands. An extreme example of these dynamics is a 2002 protest in Nigeria where 3,000 women demanded that Chevron Shell provide the communities where they were drilling with clean water, electricity, health care, and free education.[10] The women appealed to Chevron directly without soliciting the mediation of their government.

In his depiction of minority communities in the US, Amyarta Sen warns that exit can lead to lack of representation. Describing the plight of African Americans, he argues,

> Democracy has to be seen as creating a set of opportunities, and the use of these opportunities calls for the analysis of a different kind, dealing with the practice of democratic and political rights. In this respect, the low percentage of voting in American elections, especially by African Americans, and other signs of apathy and alienation, cannot be ignored. Democracy does not serve as an automatic remedy of aliments as quinine works to remedy malaria. The opportunity it opens up has to be positively grabbed in order to achieve the desired effect (1999: 155).

The comparative and Western precedent suggests that Mali's strategy of liberalization and educational expansion bodes well for its democratic future. The vast theoretical literature on political participation and existing empirical evidence highlight a positive relationship between education and democracy in three main ways. 1) Education creates more knowledgeable and

[9] See Lee Seymour's dissertation on the high failure rates of secessionist movements "Pathways to Secession: Mapping the Institutional Effect of Secessionist Violence" (2008).
[10] http://www.ndwj.kabissa.org/Escarvos_Protest/escarvos_protest.html

competent democratic consumers; 2) as a social service it improves the governments' credibility and improves citizens' engagement with the democratic regime, which in turn fosters voice; 3) finally, it can spur participation through both formal institutional channels as well as informal venues of contestation.

First, education is thought to teach citizens what their preferences are and how to express them autonomously. Educated citizens are empowered citizens and less vulnerable to threats and incentives offered by political entrepreneurs. In the 19th and 20th century debates over universal suffrage, opponents centered their arguments on the potential political exploitation of the less educated.[11] How could those individuals who were less educated and less powerful be capable of identifying their own preferences and be trusted to articulate those preferences in formal political channels? Twentieth century theorists of American democracy understand school to be a critical tool for socializing future citizens and teaching them how to participate in democracy. In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba provide an extensive list of practical reasons that more educated citizens are better democratic consumers. More educated citizens consume and disseminate political education to/from a broader range of sources, they are more aware of politics, have greater internal and external efficacy, are more likely to be a member of an organization, and are more confident in their social environment (1963: 317-318). However, education also plays a constitutive role in transforming "subjects into critical citizens" through the process of democratic enlightenment (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik 1996; Norris 1999). Amyarta Sen offers an eloquent description of this empowerment: "Social and economic factors such as basic education, elementary health care and secure employment are important not only on their own, but also for the role they can play in giving people the opportunity to approach the world with *courage and freedom* (1999: 63)." Nie et al argue that enhanced verbal cognitive

[11] I thank David Stasavage for highlighting this parallel

proficiency is at the root of this empowerment (1996). Dalton argues that education decreases citizens' dependence on political parties by expanding their cognitive capacity (2006). These skills aid citizens in obtaining objective information from multiple sources and expressing preferences.[12] These skills improve citizens' own sense of internal efficacy.

Second, education plays a pivotal role in creating loyalty and credibility for the government, which bonds citizens to formal channels of political expression. While established democracies like the present-day US, the governing regime does not compete with alternative hierarchies of power for loyalty, hybrid democracies are still charged with the task of state-building. Education provision played a vital role in the early years of state-building in Europe by establishing legitimacy and citizen support, and fostering civic virtue and nationalism (Hobbsbawm 1990, Gellner 1983; B. Anderson 1983; Laitin 1977; Laitin 1998; Weber 1976). Eric Hobbsbawm writes in Nations and Nationalism Since 1780:

> Naturally states would use the increasingly powerful machinery for communicating with their inhabitants, above all the primary schools, to spread the image and heritage of 'nation' and to inculcate attachment to it and to attach all to country and flag, often 'inventing traditions' or even nations for this purpose (92).

Public education spreads a sense of national unity for learners, but also enables governments to consolidate their role as the exclusive symbol of authority to parents of pupils. Education also gives the government credibility and increased control. In his discussion of the development of the welfare state in Europe and the US, Abram de Swan explains how government used primary education to "extend the reach of the state apparatus directly into the population at large (116)." James Scott makes a similar argument around "legible" public

[12] It is also important to mention the socio-economic gains associated with education. Citizens are attracted to education because of the promise of higher wages, prestige, and greater opportunities. Education endows citizens with connections and resources to invest in politics as well as the credentials "to be heard."

education facilitating standardization and monitoring for the state and increasing its abilities to collect tax revenue (1998: 219).

Government efforts to expand access to education can also be analyzed as potentially fostering political participation through policy feedback mechanisms, which provide resources and incentives for participation, activate citizenship identities, and influence perceived political efficacy (Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993). In the American context, studies have shown that social service programs have the ability to shape political behavior (Mettler 2005; Campbell 2003; Soss 2002). For instance, Mettler and Stonecash find that experience with universal social programs has a positive relationship with the likelihood of voting, while participation in income limited programs was negatively related to the likelihood of voting (2008).

There is also evidence from the developing nation context that governments can use public service provision to build credibility and connect with citizens. Fox chronicles Mexican President Carlos Salinas' use of decentralized service provision in order to re-establish credibility and build direct support for the central government instead of local party bosses (1994). More recent work in Brazil and Mexico has highlights how conditional cash transfer programs have raised voter turnout and support of the incumbent (Zucco 2011; De La O 2011).

Third, it is almost undisputed that education fosters political participation in the Western context. Scholars of American democracy demonstrate that higher levels of education are consistently associated with higher levels of political participation (Converse 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) find that education, even when controlling for income levels, increases the probability of all forms of political participation. Nie et al argue that by inserting citizens in politically relevant centralized networks, education facilitates greater participation in more "difficult" political activities such as

contacting representatives, campaigning, and participating in community organization (1996). Greater citizen action is also a result of lower informational costs associated with political action as well as empowerment (Dalton 2006). Sen argues that education empowers people to become agents that engage with their social, political and economic environment; he defines agents as " someone who acts and brings about change, and those achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well (1999: 19).[13] Education is such a powerful tool, that some governments have feared that it would entice their citizens to make demands that they cannot satisfy. Napoleon allowed public schools to atrophy as part of his strategy to "keep the masses ignorant (de Swann1988, 95)." Many early European states saw the education of the poor as building a revolutionary base.

In addition to conventional forms of political participation, education also builds a richer civil society. These civil society organizations can apply pressure to make the state more accountable through formal channels such as lobbying or through informal repertoires of contentious politics.[14] Contentious mobilization relies largely on the identification of new opportunities for political engagement; education can empower an actor to see openings of political opportunity structures for mobilization. [15] Dalton argues that as educated citizens

[13] Sen continues, "This has a bearing on a great many public policy issues, varying from such strategic matters as the widespread temptation of policy bosses to use fine-tuned targeting (for ideal delivery to a supposedly inert population), to such fundamental subjects as attempts to disassociate the running of governments from the process of democratic scrutiny and rejection (and the participatory exercise of political and civil rights (19)."

[14] Tilly and Tarrow define contentious politics as "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties (2007:4)."

[15] Tarrow and Tilly have identified the opening of political opportunity structures relating to changes in: 1). the multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime; 2). its openness to new actors; 3). the instability of current political alignments; 4). the availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers; and 5). the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making (189).[15]

transition to "engaged" citizenship from partisan, "duty-based citizenship", they are more likely to take part in these direct, contentious forms of participation (2008).

In low-literacy environments, education can play a crucial role in fostering citizenship and democratic participation. Encapsulated in the larger theoretical project of creating "imagined communities" is the practical tool of language, which enables citizens to interact with the newly formed government bureaucracies. In Peasants into Frenchmen, Eugene Weber highlights the pivotal role of village schools in making "French people French" by socializing them into "civilized" French culture, introducing them to the French government, and spreading the French language in the period preceding World War I (1976: 303). Education de-mystifies new forms of authority and gives citizens the skills to understand and participate in this new arena of power. Citizens' familiarity and loyalty to the state facilitate the use of their political "voice." In the American context, scholars have demonstrated the important role that the children of immigrants can play as linguistic brokers. The children's language skills enable them to mediate interactions and engagements between their parents and the state (Bloemraad and Trost 2007; Weisskirch and Alva 2002; Vasquez, Pease-Alvarez, and Shannon 1994).

In addition, expanded literacy and knowledge of technology can connect members of civil society to a greater multiplicity of power centers (Nie et al. 1996). We can imagine that as groups of working-class or rural citizens become adept in the language of politicians and the international community, they can increase their links to people in positions of power and attempt to leverage these connections on behalf of their interests.[16] Bunce and Wolchik argue that one of the reason post-Soviet states have had more complete democratic transitions is that

[16] Keck and Sikkink describe local social movements' use of international allies to pressure governments as the "boomerang effect" (1998).

their literacy rates at democratization were near 100% as opposed to much lower literacy rates in Africa (2007).

1.3 Education, Voice, and Loyalty in Africa

Participation is needed to improve institutional performance. However, before moving forward, it is important to distinguish between blind allegiance to a regime and constructive participation for democratic institutions. While the magnitude of imperfections in African elections is debated, most researchers acknowledge the widespread role of short term incentives on election-day (Collier 2009; Banegas 1998, Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005; Bratton 2008). Skepticism among citizens is rampant. Afrobarometer data has shown that on the whole, most African citizens feel ignored by the democratic process. Existing studies of education and political participation in Africa fail to acknowledge the complexity of motivations for political action as well as the varying capabilities of citizens partaking in the same behavior. As a result, studies of education and political participation have not been able to identify a strong relationship. However, this is likely due to the varying quality of electoral institutions and strength of educational systems in pooled Afrobarometer data as well as the various motivations for the seemingly identical behavior (Robert Mattes and Dangalira Mughogho 2009; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005, Ishamaya and Fox 2006).

Given the preponderance of coerced participation as well as under-performing institutions, it is important to problematize the assumption that all political participation or loyalty to the regime is in of itself good. In a context of imperfect democratic institutions, it is critical to ask what an ideal citizen would look like and how she should act. In many societies that remain largely hierarchical and dependent on patron-brokers to reach voting blocs (Koter 2009), institutions could benefit from citizens who are *informed* and *willing to act independently*.

I borrow Amyarta Sen's terminology to refer to these citizens as *democratic agents*. Therefore, before turning to the question of participation, we must evaluate education's role in transitioning citizens from being "subjects" to *democratic agents.* Even though their behavior might look identical, citizens with knowledge of the political terrain and knowledge of their own political preferences who vote or campaign represent something qualitatively different than those citizens who vote because their political broker told them to. The exclusive reliance on quantitative survey data fails to capture these substantial differences.

Unfortunately, few studies have explored the holistic role education plays in helping citizens transform into democratic agents. The empirical comparative evidence that exists suggests that education could empower citizens by giving them the linguistic skills to access a full range of information, helping them to adjudicate between clientalist appeals and performance-based retrospective voting, and increasing their civic skills. In her study of slum dwellers in Senegal, Resnick found that attending school was positive and significantly correlated to respondent's ability to describe the opposition's development plan *Assises Nationales* (2010: Chapter 4 Page 64). In a related vein, experimental data shows that access to information about incumbent candidate performance influenced citizens' retrospective voting and can help citizens to overcome clientalist pressures to bloc-vote.[17] In a recent Afrobarometer paper Robert Mattes and Dangalira Mughogho argue that more educated citizens as well as those that use news media more frequently are more likely to offer political opinions.[18] Using original data from Senegal, Michelle Kuenzi demonstrates that experience with non-formal education,

[17] See Pande (2011) for a review of experimental work on access to information in developing democracies. See Gine and Mansuri (2010) for the information campaigns on Muslim women's participation; Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) suggest that information asymmetries fuel clientalism.
[18] Political opinions included the ability to provide evaluations of performance of political regime, opinions on democracy as compared to other regime types, and define democracy in their own terms. The authors used political knowledge as a separate independent variable on participation, rather than testing if education had a direct effect on political knowledge.

literacy and numeracy classes, has a strong positive impact on political participation and community participation by increasing participants' self –esteem, civic skills, and community solidarity (2006: 5).

Returning to productive participation, we must ask: how might education help citizens to participate in an empowered fashion in an environment of low external efficacy? While educated citizens might be more supportive of the theoretical idea of democracy (Rose and Evans 2007), it is not evident that they would provide more "specific support" to poorly functioning institutions.[19] It would be naïve to assume that educated citizens would reward under-performing institutions with loyalty or unqualified support. In fact, uneducated citizens might be more likely to succumb to vote-buying and/or more likely to be coerced into support for the ruling regime. In his study of elections in Kenya, Kramon finds more educated citizens to be less susceptible to vote-buying by political entrepreneurs (2010). Recent analysis of Afrobarometer data reveals that educated citizens are more willing to offer critical opinions of the president and other political actors (McCauley and E. Gyimah-Boadi 2009). Devra Moehler notes that citizens who participated in Uganda's reform tended to be more critical of the performance of local government (2008). Rather than generating trust in government, greater knowledge could generate greater disillusionment that stymies participation (2008).

We do not expect education to generate specific trust for individual leaders, but education can aid citizens in making informed decisions about competing candidates or parties and it can also help them to participate in "more difficult" activities, which require greater cognitive and linguistic skills (Nie et al 1996). While not all states, like Nigeria, have educational

[19] I borrow David Easton's concept of specific trust to refer to support or trust for the current democratic actors.

requirements to run for office, it is a known fact that a successful politician will have to demonstrate dexterity in the former colonial language. In Africa, education has an accelerated effect on verbal cognitive proficiency because it helps to eliminate the paradox that plagues most citizens: the government speaks a language that is not your own. Literacy in the colonial language enables citizens to listen to the nightly news broadcast or televised debates, but also helps them to craft a formal written request to state authorities or respond to a government letter without the fear of exploitation. Language acquisition plays a vital role in helping citizens develop their full participatory potential – allowing them to participate in politics without limits and without fear of exploitation. Unfortunately, there is very little literature on these connections on the micro-level. In his study of Nigeria in the 1960s, Abernethy argues that opening educational opportunities, spreading literacy, and the creation of a common language shaped a more powerful and political organized civil society, which was able to levy demands on the newly independent government (1968). In her analysis of Afrobarometer data, Lauren Maclean demonstrates that those people with higher levels of education are most likely to contact an elected official and higher frequency of collective participation (2012).

On the other hand, education might actually disrupt patterns of political mobilization. Education might fashion skeptical and disillusioned consumers who chose not to participate or it might awaken political expectations that nascent budgets and economies cannot meet. Almond and Verba (1963) and Hirschman (1970) warn readers about the consequences of too much "voice;" governments need adequate space to make policy decisions without being suffocated by citizens' demands. Huntington cautions that education and subsequent social mobilization could overwhelm a nascent democratic government (1968). In poorly performing democracies greater knowledge might breed greater expectations and higher criticism of the government that

ultimately leads to rebellion or regime change. While van de Walle's analysis points to the dearth of citizens' voice in African politics, it is important to recognize that education might reshape citizens' expectations about their own economic opportunities as well as the state of democracy (2001). In a worst case scenario, education could be disruptive for democratic society as citizens could take up arms – as was the case of the Shining Path in Peru or anti-colonial liberation movements led by student leaders in Mozambique.[20] Educated citizens' discontent with the governing regime has led to Islamic revivalist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Rofesky-Wickam 2002) and more recently the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. While these movements flourished against authoritarian regime, one might imagine similar revolts against a non-performing democracy or hybrid regime.

However, there is an additional threat that education might disrupt productive, traditional channels of political mobilization. Education, particularly western education, might awaken an individualist spirit in pupils that conflicts with the communitarian organization of larger society. Victor Uchendu argues that education offers opportunities for a few non-elites, but in doing so, extricates them from the struggle of their less-educated peers.

> Education is one of the most important mechanisms of control in all societies. In the first place, education is central because of its relationship to social mobility. Furthermore by offering a personal escape route to those with low status, it tends to weaken interest in collective efforts by those who remain (1978: 29).[21]

With sights on their own personal mobility, students might be less invested in associational or group membership, and therefore, less willing to participate in traditional channels of mobilization for group grievances.

[20] I thank Ken Roberts for highlighting the de-stabilizing potential of education.

[21] As Abram de Swan writes, "Educating the lower ranks of society would not profit them or benefit society; rather the opposite: it might turn workers and peasants away from their appointed course in life, inspire discontent and awaken higher aspirations (1988: 54)."

1.4 Competing for Allegiance: Education in the Third Wave

Two other aspects of the current educational market alter the way that education may affect participation: the declining perceived quality of public education and liberalized education – including partnerships with Islamic schools. We do not yet understand the role and impact of non-state providers on democratic participation – especially in the context of relatively weak democratic institutions. In a worst case scenario, non-state schools could divide citizens, foster parochial attitudes, undermine state legitimacy, and remove one of, if not the only, sources of citizen contact with the state, thus decreasing political knowledge and participation. A middle class exit out of state schools and a perceived decline in the quality of public education might reduce the perceived importance of political voice and/or make the state seem like a less credible form of authority.

Non-state provision, through either a secular or religious provider, could pull people away from public sphere by making performance of the state less relevant to their lives. Scholars have documented a middle class exodus from public schools in Africa due to a perceived decline in public school quality (MacLean 2011; Boyle 1999). In his three country study of Kenya, Congo, and Cameroon, Patrick Boyle highlights the exodus of wealthy citizens to private schools in what he calls the era of "sauve qui peut (1999)." These schools cater to wealthy clientele, who can buy their way out of the poor quality government provider, while public schools are left to atrophy. Boyle argues that this provision scheme is creating a separation of classes that shapes the character of civil society formation in the region. Lauren MacLean highlights broader class stratification through service provision in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire (2007). She finds that the many middle class citizens are mirroring the elite movement away from public schools and paying their way into low cost private providers. Middle class citizens hope to make a future

investment for their children with the scarce resources they have, while the poorest citizens are unable to access the capital to pay private school fees. There has been significant growth of low-cost for-profit providers, primarily in urban and semi-urban, areas in response to the middle class demand for education. The exit away from public institutions makes these institutions less relevant for middle class citizens, thus perhaps, decreasing their incentives to provide political feedback to the government.

Due to the liberalized nature of education provision in weak, nascent democracies, non-state social service provision might compete with or undermine allegiance to the state. Political science research provides evidence that citizens make comparative judgments (Rose, Shin and Munro: 1999). If a non-state provider, even an apolitical organization, is offering better services than the state can provides, citizens could form harsher judgments about their state, which impact the state's perceived credibility and legitimacy. Historically, non-state entities, particularly have used service provision to build support. During the colonial period, Christian missionaries in Africa built schools as entry points to communities where they wanted to build churches (Abernethy 1968). The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have used social service provision as the foundation for their successful political movements (Rofesky-Wickham: 2002). Political parties in India and Lebanon have used social service provision to recruit voters outside of their traditional base of support (Thachil 2009; Camnet and Issar 2010). Rebel groups have also used educational indoctrination and service provision to build legitimacy for the movement (Weinstein 2007). By liberalizing the education sector, African governments may be forfeiting the allegiance-building mechanisms reaped from public goods provision and passing them on to other entities.

New empirical evidence suggests that state service provision can induce citizens to vote. Based on her fieldwork in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire Lauren MacLean demonstrates that in the shadow of structural adjustment reforms those citizens who have contact with either public schools or public health clinics are more likely to vote, contact political leaders, attend community meetings, join with others to make their voices heard, and protest, more frequently over the past year than those than other citizens who did not have this contact (2012). Those citizens who had no experience with public schools or clinics used non-state political channels more frequently (2012: 25). MacLean's contribution is ground-breaking as she is the first to link policy feedback literature to the developing nation context.[22] However, her measure of "non-users" is murky as it could include private service users as well as the most marginalized citizens with access to no service and users of religious or NGO services; it needs to be disaggregated further in order to understand the specific benefits of public provision. The behavior of those citizens without access to any service might be very different from those with access to private services; similarly, different private service providers might trigger different patterns of political participation. Similarly, she cannot disaggregate between people who attended public schools and those who sent their children to these schools.

The proposition of "allegiance-building," seems particularly important since the provision of primary school education funding, along with other tangible government outputs such as health services and infrastructure, represent a way for governments to connect with voters in rural areas. If citizens are without tangible evidence of their governments, it is more difficult for them to recognize the government's capabilities. The need to connect with citizens is particularly pressing in weak states, where citizens have little contact with or evidence of a

[22] By comparing use of schools and hospitals, MacLean is able to respond to criticism that the effects are caused by education itself rather than the receipt of services.

central government. Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan's depiction of rural Central African Republic offers a hyperbole of this struggle (1997). With little physical evidence of the state, government officials work tirelessly to demonstrate the state's existence and authority.

Finally, the educational content offered at non-state schools could differ from the state education that we associate with citizen-making. Non-state providers, particularly ideologically-charged Islamic schools, could pose a challenge to the logic that education breeds support for democracy. Dahl argues that American education emphasizes liberal-democratic value, and thus: "The greater ones formal education, the more likely he is to endorse the key propositions in the prevailing ideology (1967: 335)." Post 9-11, there is an active policy debate about the role of madrassas in Muslim societies (Hefner and Zaman 2007). Islamic providers could have an ideational impact that restricts political knowledge and state-oriented political behavior. Furthermore, education in Arabic or indigenous languages does not provide students with the same linguistic currency needed to interact with state bureaucracy.

In the Sahel, Madrassas and Koranic schools are tied to a specific history of contestation with the secular state. While the Catholic Church and colonial authorities were aligned, Islamic education faced either isolation from the state, in the case of the British, or elimination and resistance, as was the case for French colonial authorities.[23] When the Europeans arrived in West Africa, Koranic schools were already widespread (Sanankoua 1985). For instance, in Guinea in 1907 there were almost 3,000 Islamic schools and 18,000 students (Johnson 1979: 221).[24] The French colonial authorities were astounded that leaders from the Fouta Diallo region of Guinea, who had a weak command of the French language, could speak fluent Arabic (Ibid:

[23] This is reflected in the British policy of indirect rule in Northern Nigerian, but also in Sudan, where British colonial officials forbade missionaries to evangelize among Muslims. See Sanderson (1975) and Abernethy (1968).
[24] Johnson (1975)

221). In Northern Nigeria there was also a relatively strong system of Islamic education. In 1931, approximately 30, 0000 Islamic schools enrolled between 200,000 - 360,000 students (Ibid: 153). The French government, struggling to establish rule in many territories with predominantly Muslim populations, and sought to co-opt or eliminate Koranic education. They feared "Islamic fanaticism" and saw it as a significant challenge to their own "mission civilisatrice.[25]" They closed many schools and led campaigns against Muslim leaders. In some of the French held colonial territory, the campaign against Islam, as well as the colonialists' aggressive forced labor recruitment practices, reduced the numbers of students in Koranic schools.[26] Johnson's study of Guinea highlights the French attack on Koranic education. In Labe, in 1910 there were 1945 Koranic schools with 5538 pupils. By 1940, there were only 192 Koranic schools with 1823 pupils in addition to six French schools with 704 pupils (1979: 224). This tension plagued independence transitions as many post-colonial states continued to exclude Islamic schools from government aid or accreditation.

Given the tumultuous relationship between the government and Islamic education, fear and distrust might linger despite recent pacts and partnerships (Gandolfi 2003). It is unclear that madrassas and Koranic schools will instill the liberal-democratic ethos and support for the ruling regime that Dahl esteemed crucial for democratic citizenship (1967). It is possible that by attending a madrassa a student or parent could become integrated into an alternative community that values concentration on one's personal moral improvement and relationship with God. These communities might encourage civic engagement exclusively through actions mediated by

[25] Mission civilisatrice refers to the French civilizing mission that sought to turn educated African into French subjects through an assimilation process.
[26] The French government routinely captured young men from schools and other public places to complete infrastructure projects through forced labor.

their mosque or religious leader and distrust and opposition to the state and its formal channels of participation.

Alternatively, Afrobarometer finds more religious respondents to be more supportive of the president, more trusting of their compatriots, and to have greater interest in public affairs (McCauley and Gymiah-Boadi 2009: 16). If religious students are somehow more approving of status quo and less willing to be critical, these values could impede their transition from subjects to citizens. Amaney Jamal argues that civic associations need to be contextualized and challenges the assumption that all organizations are breeding grounds for both interpersonal trust and civic participation. She identifies Palestinian associations' link to political power as the crucial factor determining how politically engaged members of each association are and conversely how much interpersonal trust they exhibit (2007: 13). Through a similar logic, the need to conceptualize and disaggregate forms of non-state education and their relationship to government power in the Malian context seems just as pressing.

1.5 Research Design

What is the impact of education on citizenship in Africa in the current democratized, liberalized era? The best existing data on citizenship and education is found in the Afrobarometer survey. However, it is limited in its ability to capture complete educational profiles. It includes each respondent's level of education, but fails to disaggregate their educational profiles by school types. My study's focus on education brings greater precision to each respondent's educational history by including school type as well as the length of schooling experience. Our research team focused on eliciting comprehensive responses about education in all school types. For instance, we found that the French or Bambara translations for school "école" or "kalanso" carried an association with formal western education. When asking Malians about their

educational history, we found that citizens who had attended Islamic schools or participated in informal literacy trainings would often claim that they never went to school. Only after secondary questions that probed into specific types of informal education did respondents reveal that they did in fact go to a school.[27] In addition, my project adds a second dimension by looking at school choice and school performance to analyze how the parents' relationship with the state as a welfare-provider might impact political trust, knowledge, or participation. The expansion of education in Africa represents the largest government push to increase social well-being of citizens. It is critical that we better understand the effects of provision on social service consumers.

My dissertation draws primarily on an original survey of 1000 citizens in ten school districts in five regions in Mali to analyze the relationship between education and citizenship for students as well as parents. The survey generated education profiles for parents and their children, which allows me to analyze the impact of length of education, type of schooling, and participation in school management on respondents' political knowledge, trust, and participation. The survey data uses closed-ended questions, which allow me to compare attributes of different citizens through statistical analysis. My research innovation was the systematic inclusion of qualitative justifications for citizen responses to better understand the mechanisms driving correlations between education, knowledge, and participation.[28] I complement the survey data with more than fifty interviews with educators, government officials, and members of civil society as well as a survey of 200 university students, data on elected officials education profiles, and 450 exit polls during the municipal elections in Bamako. This data provides for a further test

[27] This difference is apparent if one compares the number of respondents who reported attending informal school in my sample (29%) as compared to the Afrobarometer Mali average of 22%.
[28] While justifications were not elicited for all respondents, research assistants were trained to capture the qualitative reasons citizens gave for their responses (if any such justifications were given).

of observable implications of the mechanisms driving correlations generated through survey work by providing insight into observed voting behavior, detailing educational differences between citizens and elected leaders, and allowing us to compare respondents to an "elite" group of university students.[29] In addition, I obtained sub-national data from Ministry of Education and the Administration Territorial as well as data from the national archives and national assembly. This descriptive data allows me to better describe the current and historic educational and democratic landscape in Mali.

I chose a sub-national research design for three reasons as outlined by Snyder (2001). First, my research design enables me to explore a diversity of educational provision profiles in Mali, while controlling for many institutional factors. As described above, even in those countries that have crossed the democratic threshold, the quality of institutions and the comparative value of different educational degrees varies greatly across African countries. While there is also regional variation in terms of educational and democratic quality – restricting the study to citizens in Mali gets us closer to understanding how education might affect knowledge and participation holding these other institutional factors constant. Secondly, the focus on Mali, allowed me to cultivate and capitalize on specialized area knowledge – thus increasing the accuracy of my coding and interpretation of causal inferences.[30] While colonial language knowledge might prove sufficient in countries with higher literacy rates or for a study of elites, an analysis of regular citizens' opinions and behavior in a population where less than 30% of people speak French requires that the researcher speak some Bambara. Language knowledge is useful in earning respondents' trust, but also in dissecting and translating citizens'

[29] Diverse sources of data provide greater potential sources of observable implications. King, Keohane, and Verba advocate collecting data on as many observable implications as possible (1994: 24).
[30] My first visit to Mali was in 2002; I have made five subsequent trips including my year of fieldwork. By living with a Malian host family and through language training with my research assistants, I have obtained proficiency in Bambara.

understanding of democratic concepts that we often assume to be identical to the Western context.[31] Lastly, by comparing residents in school districts thousands of kilometers apart, I can investigate important spatial variation in political phenomena, while again controlling for institutional factors.[32] While it is often more tempting and (academically rewarding) to seek out variation across borders, sub-national variation in many countries remains under-explored despite very important differences across region: ethnicity, language, political economy, proximity to foreign actors, and mobilization patterns. Mali is one of the largest and most diverse countries in Africa. Covering more than 478,767 square miles, Mali contains dense forest regions, vast Savannah, and uninhabitable desert. My original strategy was to select two districts from a geographically diverse group of five regions: Bamako, Kayes, Sikasso, Timbuktu, and Mopti. Due to insecurity in the North of Mali, we were only able to conduct surveys in one school district in Timbuktu.

Given limited time and resources, I felt that I could generate a better contribution to political science with an intensive study of Mali, rather than doing a series of three-month studies in Accra, Cotonou, Bamako, and Lagos. In addition, Mali is understudied by political scientists and possesses key attributes that I sought to examine: rapid expansion of primary education in the context of high illiteracy rates and a diversity of education providers including Islamic schools. I think of my contribution largely as a theory-building exercise, which I would eventually like to test in other poor, Muslim countries with high illiteracy and rapid, liberalized educational expansion.

1.6 Sampling and Survey Implementation in Mali

[31] For instance, during the translation of the survey instrument – I was able to dialogue with my research assistants about the different cultural and contextual meanings of various phrasings.
[32] See for Richard Snyder 2001 for the merits of sub-national research design; Kalyvas' The Logic of Violence in Civil War demonstrates exemplary use of multiple methods and within country-variation.

Survey work in Mali is a formidable and expensive task, which I could never have accomplished this project without the help of my research team.[33] The primary members of the team participated in a month long training, in which we covered relevant political science theories and research methodology. After much discussion over phrasing, cultural appropriateness, and measurement, the survey instrument was translated into French, Bambara, and Songhrai.[34] In eleven months together our team grew close as we faced the obstacles that plague any group attempting to do household surveys in five regions in Mali. This data was obtained despite stifling 115 degree heat in Bamako, extensive mechanical problems with my 1984 Mercedes D- 90, bouts of malaria, snakes that invaded our concrete bedrooms in Sikasso, commutes in wooden *pinasses* during bridge outages, and an Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kidnapping and travel warning that prevented me from accompanying my team to the North of the country

The majority of surveys were conducted in a team of two – with one coder and one person who posed the questions. This enabled the coder to capture qualitative justifications for closed-ended responses. In this sense, the surveys often became more like interviews.[35] The vast majority of surveys were conducted without interpretation – enabling respondents to express themselves freely in local language. My Bambara language skills enabled me to participate in the actual survey process as nearly 80% of the surveys were coded in Bambara. I was present and

[33] The team included four assistants. Three research assistants were selected from a group of twenty university graduates who interviewed for the position. One research assistant, who was still enrolled in university, began as an intern, but she was later promoted.
[34] Surveys were also conducted in Arabic, Tamashek, and Peul without formal translation. The research team discussed consistent phrasing of these questions.
[35] While the use of two researchers is ultimately more costly, it yields far better ability to code qualitative justifications for responses than one person would be able to code.

personally coded responses for 190 surveys in seven school districts in Bamako, Kayes, and Sikasso.[36]

The survey uses stratified, area probability sampling from within 10 school districts (Fowler 2009:29). I selected school districts using Ministry of Education national data on education provision by type of school that I had collected during a pre-dissertation fieldwork visit to Mali in 2007. I chose districts based on three factors: 1) to maximize variation on the key independent variable; 2) to facilitate logistics; and 2) to achieve regional variation. First, in order to maximize variation on my independent variable, type of school, I selected school districts that had disproportionately high level of enrollment in each school type – public, private, madrassas, and community schools to increase the probability that respondents would have attended or sent their children to a diverse set of schools. [37] In each school district, we would draw quadrants onto a map or the school district or in the case of rural areas – create a list of "accessible villages."[38] After determining the universe of accessible zones or villages within the school district, we would select four to five quadrants (or villages from a list) using an online randomizer. In urban areas, each group started in the middle of the quadrant. Then, teams proceeded in opposite directions from starting points and surveyed every fifth household. Individual respondents in households were selected randomly using playing cards. Surveys were conducted on weekdays and weekends at varying times of day in order to ensure that we reached

[36] Due to kidnappings and instability as well as a US government travel ban to Timbuktu, I was unable to accompany the team to Timbuktu, Mopti, and Sevare. I did conduct one monitoring visit to Timbuktu where I was able to meet with the additional team members that were trained to help with survey implementation.

[37] As advocated by King, Keohane, and Verba, I chose districts to maximize potential variation on the independent variable (as well as control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables (140).

[38] Accessibility to rural zones was primarily determined by the proximity to our starting point and whether or not roads were accessible and/or if there was alternative transportation (boat, moto taxi, etc).

all population types.[39] In villages, when possible, teams would begin at the *dugutigi'*s (chief's) home and then proceed in opposite directions, stopping at intervals of five (or three houses) depending on villages sizes. In certain instances, especially in the rural school districts in Sikasso II and Sevare, some chiefs called respondents into their compounds to be interviewed.[40] Interviewers recorded GPS coordinates for approximately 40% of all respondents' homes as well as neighboring schools so that I could analyze spatial patterns of school choice and simultaneously to ensure that research teams were operating in the correct zones.

Due to budget and time constraints, the project focuses primarily on urban and peri-urban zones as travel to the rural zones is costly, difficult, and time-consuming. Only two of ten school districts were rural and thus my project has a bias towards a population with a greater choice of educational options. Table One summarizes characteristics of each school district as compared to national averages.

[39] Unlike Afrobarometer, I did not alternate the selection of respondents by gender.
[40] This strategy is not ideal as chiefs can select respondents, respondents might feel restricted speaking in chief's compound, and/or there is usually an oversample of men. However, it reflected the cultural and logistic constraints posed by conducting surveys in villages.

Table 1: Selected School Districts

School District	Region	Gross Enrollment Rate	Public	Community	Private	Madrassa	Rural/ Urban	Poverty Index (2001)[41]
National	N/A	78%	62%	17%	10%	12%	NA	68%
Faladie	Bamako	119%	37%	7%	**44%**	12%	U	29%
Bamako Coura	Bamako	112%	**81%**	0%	16%	4%	U	29%
Banconi	Bamako	126%	38%	11%	**31%**	**20%**	U	29%
Kayes Rive Droite	Kayes	92%	65%	3%	1%	**32%**	U/R	68%
Kayes Rive Gauche	Kayes	103%	73%	6%	5%	**16%**	U/R	68%
Sikasso 1	Sikasso	83%	**71%**	11%	7%	11%	U	82%
Sikasso	Sikasso	48%	59%	**29%**	2%	10%	R	82%
Mopti	Mopti	80%	**83%**	2%	8%	6%	U	79%
Sevare	Mopti	46%	79%	6%	0%	**15%**	R	79%
Timbuktu	Timbuk-tu	148%	67%	**18%**	1%	12%	U	54%

[41] Percentage of the regional population calculated to be living in poverty Source: DNSI, 2004, 2007; ODHD, 2006.

1.7 Dissertation Map: Exploring Education and Citizenship in Mali

The next chapter of the dissertation provides background information about the political culture of citizenship in Mali to situate the analysis of the impact of education on citizenship. I highlight the trends in political participation as well as competing realms of authority, secular and traditional/religious, in contemporary Mali. The third chapter examines the supply side of education in Mali to introduce the diverse schooling providers as well as enrollment trends over time. The fourth chapter explores the impact of education on students' political knowledge and political participation. The fifth chapter examines the relationships between parents who send their children to different education providers and the state. The final chapter assesses the relevance of lessons learned from the Malian case to the relationship between education and citizenship in other nascent Africa democracies.

Chapter 2

Politiki ni Fanga na Mali (Power and Politics in Mali)[42]

2.1 Introduction

I embarked on my preliminary research in Mali in the summer of 2007, directly in the wake of Presidential elections. Eager to delve into popular political opinions, I would ask friends, neighbors, family members, and shop-keepers what they thought about the current state of Malian democracy. To my surprise, I was confronted by citizens' reluctance to discuss politics. Malians, even some of the people I admired most, would respond with a standard phrase: "*politiki man ɲi*" – meaning politics are bad.[43] I had anticipated criticism of specific leaders, parties, or institutions, but the blanket response startled me. I was frustrated by what I initially perceived as Malians disinterest in my topic.

Determined that the intersection of education, an expanding and diversified sector, and politics was a fruitful research area, I continued with my interviews. Eventually, the repetition of *politki man ɲi* forced me to reflect on what multi-party democracy actually meant to most citizens. This skepticism contrasts Mali's heralded position as a democratic star relative to other African countries. Since its democratic transition in 1991, Mali has held four presidential elections and undergone two executive turnovers of power. Despite having characteristic thought to hinder democracy, such as high poverty rates and a predominantly Muslim population, Mali boasts one of the highest democracy and free press scores in Africa.[44]

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[42] I thank Brandon County and Kristin Michelitch for helpful comments on this chapter. While Brandon County's comments helped to improve the spelling of Bambara words, in some instances I adopt phoenetic adaptations that do not use the correct Bambara characters as my Bambara language capabilities are entirely oral/verbal.

[43] "Politiki Man ɲi" is ubiquitous in pop culture. It is the title of a very popular song by the Malian singers Amadou and Mariam; Tiaken Jah Fakoly, a reggae musician, has a song with a similar title.

[44] Mali is ranked 5th worst by UNDP Human Development Indicators 2009, but boasts a Freedom House score of 2 for political rights and 3 for civil liberties (2010).

This pervasive pessimism stirring under Mali's democratic facade merits deeper exploration. There have been few recent political science studies that have explored this curious disjuncture between Mali's exalted democratic position and popular skepticism about politics. Sadly, the divergence of citizens' experience from Mali's democratic record is not unique. In her study of African democracy at the local level, Carolyn Logan finds dramatic variation in terms of perceived democratic opportunities within countries with relatively high democracy scores (Logan 2010). Seventy percent of Malians feel that their voices are not heard between election cycles; sixty-two percent of Africans feel the same way (Logan 2010: 25).[45] Mass skepticism about politicians and politics is far from an African phenomenon. Americans need look no farther than the Tea Party criticisms of greedy, elite politicians whom are out of touch with citizens needs. However, in the US, democratic institutions have consolidated and that there is no threat of authoritarian reversal or civil war. In African countries, this threat is very real. Malians need only turn to its neighbors Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, or Cote d'Ivoire to find contemporary examples of dictatorship, military coups, violent outbreaks, or constitutional sabotage.

This chapter explores the political culture underpinning Mali's democratic landscape to underscore the potential effects of education on political knowledge and participation. First, I seek to demonstrate the existence of popular skepticism toward politics in Malian political culture. I then try to explain the why citizens are wary of multi-party democracy and symbols of the secular state. I highlight obstacles to electoral participation: the French language, the residue of consensual governance, weak parties, and the isolation of religious actors from the democratic system. Then I introduce descriptive statistics of the respondents' answers to survey questions as

[45] The continental average is not much lower at 62%.

well as some comparative Afrobarometer data to paint a picture of the state of Malian political knowledge and participation.

In Chapter 4, I argue that education is crucial for helping citizens gain the skills and confidence to engage with this new system of government. Education empowers citizens to leave the "safety in numbers" offered by traditional communitarian expression in order to make their own personal demands on government. This direct rapprochement, between citizens and government, enables citizens' voices to be transmitted to government directly rather than relying on more familiar traditional or religious spheres of authority as intermediaries to express their concerns. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate how social service provision connects citizens to the state and induces Malians to vote in elections. I argue that direct contact with government institutions helps citizens to overcome the skepticism described in this chapter.

2.2 Politiki Man ɲi: Popular Skepticism in Malian Democracy

Mali's democratic deficit lies in the disconnect between Malians and the institutions of multi-party democracy: elections, political parties, and municipal offices. State bureaucracy operates in the former colonial language - French, which most Malians do not speak in their own homes. The alien-nature of bureaucratic institutions, emblematic of the former colonial power, is tangible to anyone who spends time in the Malian world outside of air-conditioned offices of donors or government ministries. During my fieldwork, I became accustomed to speaking Bambara except for the rare instance when someone initiated a conversation in French. I purchased vegetables in Bambara, spoke to my laundry ladies in Bambara, squabbled over cab fair in Bambara, gossiped with friends and relatives in Bambara, and coached basketball in Bambara. The only instances that required French were my interactions with formal government: when I sought entry into government ministries, needed to get a research permit, or

had to negotiate with police officers over a "ticket. " The formal requests that I wrote in French seemed foreign in my every-day world of Bamanakan.[46]

I had the linguistic ability to switch between languages, but this discomfort is magnified by uncertainty for the millions of Malians who do not speak French. For instance, Nana,[47] a woman in her fifties, was fortunate among her peers to attend school as a young girl living in Kayes, but was not able to obtain French literacy during her few years in primary school. She feels that this directly impedes her ability to interact with government. "Since I can't write (in French), I can't get much from the government (K39)."

The majority of Malians view pluralist democracy and its related institutions as a foreign system, which does little to provide for their own needs. This skepticism is heightened by the fear of political exploitation, since as Nana describes above, the government operates in a language that most citizens cannot speak or write in. The mistrust breeds a characterization of politics as dishonest or un-pure. The following quotes demonstrate other ways that citizens tried to explain "*politiki man ɲi*."

> "Everything that is related to politics in Mali is dishonest. It's to fill pockets and get out (S11)." - Mamadou, 20 year old respondent from Segou with a high school diploma
>
> "I have no trust in *politiki mogo* (politics people) (BA7)." - Salimatou, attended some secondary school. She has 3 children and lives in the Banconi neighborhood of Bamako.
>
> "I don't like politics; it's nothing more than pure lies (M 40)." Aminata is a Bella woman in her 50s. She lives in Mopti and received a Koranic education.
>
> "I don't discuss politics at all. To discuss politics is a bad thing. *Politiki man ɲi* (F81)." Ami, 25, left her village home to go seek work in Bamako. Her child lives with her aunt and attends school back in the village.

[46] Bamanakan is the Bamana language word for Bambara. I will use Bamana and Bambara interchangeably in this dissertation.
[47] All names of respondents have been changed to protect their identities. Their ages are estimated from within a ten year period.

> "The (political) authorities do not do anything, but trick us. We do not get anything from their behalf (SV84)." Amadou, 45, Koranic education, village of Siry in Sevare region.

Gottileb describes Afrobarometer data that corroborates these interviews: 83% of respondents say politicians fail to keep campaign promises, 79% rarely (or never) did their best to promote development, 80 % of voters said politicians often (or always) engaged in vote-buying, 90 % said politicians made promises just to get elected (2009: 10).

This skepticism manifests itself in Mali's low voter turnout. National turnout in the last two presidential polls was less than 40% of all voters. The 2009 municipal elections registered 45% turnout, but this still far below other countries on the continent.[48] Figure 1 compares turnout in the last two presidential elections for Mali and other "democratic regimes" in Africa. Voting rates are much lower in Mali than other top democratic performers and the continent as a whole.

[48] It is important to acknowledge substantial regional variation within Mali. Voter turnout in the Northern region is consistently higher than the rest of the country. For presidential races, the disparities in turnout are even greater than at the municipal level.

Figure 1: Percent of Registered Voters Who Voted in Last Two Presidential Elections[49]



Multiple factors stifle relative turnout in Mali including outdated voter rolls, weak political parties, and or lack of ethnic mobilization. [50] Two of these reasons, weak party structure and lack of ethnic mobilization, can be traced directly related to Mali's history of consensual governance, which I will discuss below.

2.3 *Politiki Man ɲi: The roots of skepticism*

In order to understand the obstacles to citizens' engagement with democracy, it is important to interrogate Malians' conception of *Politiki*. The fact that the Bambara language borrows the French word, *politique*, to describe politics in the current system, reveals the Malian conception of "politiki" as something alien to their traditional understanding of governance. Malians' understanding of *politiki* is directly tied to their understanding of multi-party democracy. The French appropriation is particularly striking when you consider that the Bambara language is brimming with a rich vocabulary related to governance from centuries of

[49] Susana Wing 2008, Administration Territoriale Mali.
[50] The denominator for voter turnout is based on a 1997 census; it will be updated this year. All citizens over 18 are automatically registered to vote.

experience with decentralized rule. Malians have adapted aspects of this vast political vocabulary to describe other parts of the current system of governance.

Table 2: Bambara Political Vocabulary[51]

"Fanga"	Power or force. Someone who has power or is in charge would be referred to as a "fangatigi" or literally the one with power. "Fangaton" – group of people in power.
"Faso"	Homeland, native land
"Jamana"	Collective grouping, country; the president is often referred to as the "jamana-tigi"
Malidenw/Jamandenw	Citizens or literally "children of Mali"
"Nyogon-deme"	Civic spirit or willingness to help one-another

Politiki is conceived by citizens as a narrow range of partisan politics and not public policy or broader subjects related to politics. For instance, the phrase *politiki ton* – literally meaning politics group – describes political parties rather than civil servants or policy makers. In the minds of most Malians, politics is not a means for voicing their preferences or affecting policy change – it is an isolated realm of competition for power. My conversations with citizens revealed the perception of politics' narrow scope. In Kayes, I talked to Ahmed, an artisan who left his native village of Sofara in Mopti region, to look for employment in Kayes. During our survey, he was busy making aluminum cooking spoons, but he took time to respond to each of our questions thoughtfully. He spoke eloquently about the problems facing the residents of Sofara, but when we asked him if he would ever run for office (and participate in *politiki*) in the future, he replied, "I would run (only) if the development of my commune (Sofara) was linked to

[51] For a discussion of the historical roots and appropriation of Bambara political vocabulary see Skinner and County 2008 and Bagayoko 1989.

my candidacy; if politics could affect development (KV38)." Ahmed talked about development and politics as if the two were fundamentally incompatible.

Studies of political culture in Senegal find a similar negative characterization of the Wolof word: *Politig*. Frederic Schaffer traces negative associations with *politig* back to colonial times:

> For Wolofones, then, the "French" meaning of *politig* carries a range of positive connotations; the "Wolof" meaning, in contrast, is strongly pejorative and indicates a variety of dishonest or deceitful behaviors. Many Senegalese associate this Wolof meaning of *politig* with the self-serving lies politicians tend to tell in search of votes and support (1998: 77).

Schaeffer contrasts *politig* with the Wolof word *Demokaraasi,* which has also been borrowed from the French language, but describes the tenants of consensual democracy such as mutual understanding, equality, consensus, and deliberation (58). Sheldon Gellar explains *demokaraasi*:

> The concept of *demokaraasi* is particularly prevalent in villages and local communities where people prefer to come to a consensus on the candidate or party of their choice in order to reinforce local solidarity….The communitarian values inherent in the Wolof notion of *demokaraasi* also work to promote reconciliation after conflict and the likelihood of these conflicts ending in violence (2005: 12).

As the depictions of Senegalese political culture reveal, one problematic aspect of *politi*ki, or pluralist democracy, is that its partisan nature contradicts almost a thousand years of rule through "consensual democracy" in the West African region. Consensual democracy is similar to the idea of deliberative democracy, where citizens are free to express their concerns and discuss multiple perspectives until all group members agree on a final solution. This practice dates back to the 13th century when Soundiata Keita, the founder of the Mali Empire, ruled indirectly over decentralized kingdoms by consulting regularly with leaders from conquered areas. The tradition of consultation continued with the Kulubali *ton fanga* in the 17th

century and Cheikou Amadou's consultative *Madjilis* in the 19th century (Baudais and Chauzal 2006, Sears 2007; Gellar 2005).

In contrast, the concepts of "opposition" and minority vs. majority were not introduced until colonial times and most recently during the transition to multiparty democracy. These dramatic changes to established systems of power and authority were unsettling to many citizens. As a high ranking member of the National Independent Election Commission explained:

> Starting in 1992, the guiding principle – one man, one vote, this was a huge change in the way that Malians perceived participation. At the village level all decision making was done in consensus style – discussions might take forever, but everyone needed to be convinced. It (elections) introduced this aspect of individualism, the ability to dissent. We had to learn about a majority and a minority that opposed it."[52]

Jonathan Sears argues that Mali's history of consensus democracy impedes a full transition to pluralist democracy as citizens are wary of the opposition (Sears 2007: 172). Data from the Afro-barometer support this thesis. Seventy percent of Malian respondents are in favor consensus compared to only 40% of respondents in Namibia, Uganda, Kenya, and Botswana, which do not have comparable histories of consensual democracy over such large expanse of territory (Logan 2008: 9).

The reluctance to embrace the concept of opposition is certainly not just a Malian, or even African, problem. Adam Przeworski explains, "The notion that people can freely oppose the government elected by a majority emerged only gradually and painfully everywhere, the United States included (12)." He shows that the US founding fathers were extremely hesitant to welcome opposition politics, fearing violence and division, and that their initial understanding of

[52] May 18, 2009; An August 25, 2009 interview with a member of a leading democratic think tank also stressed the power of the culture of consensus.

representation was closer to the deliberation and consensus valued by Malians. He cites George Washington:

> "The spirit of the party serves to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasional riots and insurrections. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruptions (2008: 10 citing Washington's Farewell Address 2002: 48.)

The acceptance of the utility of parties, as representing different constituents' interest happened over time as leaders saw that consensual governance was not feasible on a large scale.

Despite the differences between pluralist and consensual systems, Mali's political culture and political institutions have benefitted from elements of its democratic heritage (Pringle 2005). Shortly after deposing dictator Moussa Traore, the transitional governing committee convened a National Conference in July 1991with of members of the military, political parties, labor unions, human rights association, and other members of civil society in what many regard as the most inclusive conference to take place on the continent. The conference shaped the elements that would enter the new constitution. Shortly after the first election, newly elected president, Alpha Konaré introduced the Question and Answer Assembly (IED), an annual forum through which citizens could present their grievances to a national audience (Wing 2008:125).

Villages continue to uphold the tradition of consensual democracy. Aggrieved citizens have the right to present their perspectives to a traditional leader in a specified meeting place. It appears that elected officials in the region have internalized the need to receive constituents and listen to their concerns. Compared to nineteen other African countries, Malian officials rank second best, behind Burkina Faso, in terms citizens' perception that officials listen to their grievances – consistent with the tenants of consensual democracy (2010: 25). Malian officials

also fall above the African median in terms of citizens' perception of their ability to "handle" complaints (25).

Mali also boasts an active civil society. Most Malians are members of groups or associations called *tonw*.[53] These associations exemplify the consensual tradition and provide members with the strength in numbers to protect their rights and aggregate their interests. The Bambara idiom, "putting our hands together, gives power to everyone" predates the democratic era. *Ton* is a popular and expansively utilized term. For instance, in Bambara European Union translates to *Toubabouw ton* or European group and *ton fanga* refers to the ruling group at the center of all political power.

These organizations provide a range of services including access to credit and social support networks, but also provide members with venues to address their grievances. When I spoke to Malians about their interaction with elected officials, the vast majority explained the contact in terms of group membership. Daly, a thirty-something respondent in the Lafiabougou neighborhood Kayes, never attended school, but serves as president of a women's association. She and her fellow members had contacted the authorities multiple times in order to address the flooding problem in her neighborhood (KV53). Other respondents in the same neighborhood confirmed their activism and noted that there was women's association who had gone to speak with the mayor's office about the flooding issue.

Another example was Nanette, who is Bobo – a minority ethnic group in the Sikasso region. She is also one of few Christian respondents. A lifelong Catholic, she attended the mission primary school in the colonial era and is now an active member of the Catholic

[53] Tonw is the plural for ton.

association in Sikasso. She often goes with other Catholics to the mayor's office to address problems (S54).

Associational life even dictates citizens understanding of what is possible. When asked if he had ever contacted a government official, Modibo from Sikasso, responded in reference to the association in which he is a member, which had nothing to do with the phrasings of the Afrobarometer question. "We have a fishing association, but we didn't go see the authorities (S42)." For Modibo, and many other respondents, visiting a government official required a preliminary condition of associational membership. I would always pose the question in the singular and consistently, respondents would reply in the plural (we) referencing what their *ton* had or hadn't done.

Tonw empower marginalized citizens to use their political voice. However, rarely does the civic spirit embodied by *tonw* translate into party politics. *Tonw* are not seen as an element of "politiki;" they are a more organic grouping that reflects a shared interest or background. In contrast, parties are perceived as contrived and potentially disruptive. Kadiatou in Kayes explained why she isn't close to a political party, "We have tried a lot of different paths in vain (K55)." When asked if they were close to any political party – other respondents would say: *u be kele* or they (parties) are all the same.[54] Kissima in Sikasso explained, "They (elected officials) know our problems, but nothing is ever developed to help us. They know what is going on - they just close their eyes (S1)." Citizens also complained that their relationships with party officials' relationships are temporal, unlike traditional leaders who lives are entwined with their constituencies. Like many others Djeneba noted the divergence between the behavior of elected

[54] Similar responses from respondents: BA7, K38, KV18

officials before and after the electoral cycle: “Officials only come to visit during elections (K52)”.

President Toure, affectionately known as ATT, has leveraged the public’s distaste for partisanship by running as an independent in the 2002 and 2007 Presidential elections. ATT capitalized on his reputation as a military hero and national unifier by running on a “consensus” platform. Once in office, he appointed members of all different parties, and his “a-political association” *Mouvement Citoyen* (Citizen Movement), thus eliminating any significant opposition. In the 2007, Toure was backed by a super alliance of forty-three parties including Mali’s strongest party – the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA). ATT’s actions and ADEMA’s willingness to align with the president has neutered the threat of a credible opposition in Mali and significantly weakened the party system. ATT’s strategy has been copied by candidates in legislative and municipal elections; since 2002, one observes an increase in independent candidates and independent victories in Mali.

Political parties have been weakened by “consensual collaboration” between elites, but their ability to mobilize constituents is also handicapped when compared to other African parties because they generally operate without ethnic bases of support. Mali’s unique history has shaped values of tolerance and conflict mitigation mechanisms including *sananku* or *cousinage.* Cousinage is a societal conflict resolution mechanism, which links certain last names - *jamu*- from different ethnic groups together in a joking relationship to create cross-cutting cleavages. Cousins come from different ethnic groups and depending on their last name, members of the same ethnic group can have different joking cousins. Any researcher who has visited Mali can testify to the importance of *jamu* and cousinage. Upon arrival, she is bestowed with a Malian name that enables her to integrate into society. In Mali, I am Yama Coulibaly, and rarely does

anyone ask about my "real" name. Part of becoming a capable researcher in Mali is learning enough history about your *jamu* to be able to defend yourself from constants critiques and jokes from various cousins. For instance, when someone calls me a "bean-eater," I defend myself as a fierce warrior woman invoking the name of Segou's brutal 16th century ruler Biton Coulibaly. I have witnessed minor traffic accidents and disputes where the first question the drivers ask each other after they emerge from the car is – "What is your *jamu*? If the drivers are joking cousins, they will often drive off without any further dispute.

Using a clever experimental design, Dunning and Harrison demonstrated the power of cross-cutting cleavages created through cousinage; Malians are more likely to vote for someone from a cousinage group than another candidate as they are also more likely to vote for someone from their ethnic group (2010). Partially as a result of this cross-cutting cleavage, Malian political institutions are among the least ethnically polarized on the continent (Posner 2004). However, Malians are at a disadvantage in the sense that ethnic or regional party affiliation offers citizens cognitive shortcuts about which parties will best support their interests (Fridy 2007). In the absence of consistent party platforms or stereotyped party-membership, prospective voters have few clues to distinguish between different parties and candidates. Most parties continue to rely on group mobilization and seek out patrons or leaders who can mobilize constituencies of clients, but this happens at a lower level of disaggregation (Koter 2009). The dearth of ethnic mobilization is most likely a factor that contributes to Mali's low voter turnout.

2.4 Alternative Forms of Authority

The other aspect of the strong political legacy is that Malians have other more reliable alternative authorities to turn to. As in most African countries, elected officials operate in

parallel to traditional leaders, religious figures, and economic strongmen. In Mali, most rural zones are governed by hierarchies at the family and village level. There is a head of household in the family compound, usually inhabited by multiple families (and generations), called the (*dutigi*). Most villages have a chief, or *dugutigi* as well as a counsel of advisors (Bagayoko 1989). In addition, *marabouts* (Sufi religious leaders), hunters, *donzon* (also known for their mastery of traditional medicine), councils of elders, griots or *djeliw* (oral historians) and/or imams are all figures who can play advisory or mediatory roles related to every-day governance. Given widespread poverty in Mali, those members of society with substantial resources can also be called upon for advice, material contributions, or brokering relationships with government figures/bureaucracy in times of need.

The existence of "competing" forms of authority in the Malian context complicates voter participation in ways that do not affect turnout in consolidated democracies. While low American voter turnout is comparable to Mali's polling numbers, disaffected American voters cannot turn to paramount chiefs and if they turn to religious authorities, there are only so many steps a church or temple can take without having to involve the bureaucratic state. Faced with a problem or wanting to access a service, Malians have a choice to "exit" out of bureaucratic state channels and consult with a different authority figure who can find a solution. This is problematic because unless these intermediary authorities apply pressure on state authorities to address authentic citizen grievances, the state will be able to fall into a "cycle of slack" (Hirschman 1970). Even when intermediary institutions make contact with the state, there is a

risk that the individual voices of less powerful citizens will be lost or misrepresented in the aggregate lobby, especially when the mediating institution is hierarchical.[55]

In Mali, politics is described in juxtaposition to more "legitimate" forms of political authority: religious and traditional leaders. Seventy-six percent of Afrobarometer respondents wanted their traditional leaders to have greater influence governing the local community (Afrobarometer Mali Summary of Results 2009: 42). Politics, associated with greed and material interest, is described as "dirty" in contrast to religion, which is described as pure and clean. Interviews with survey respondents revealed a mental compartmentalization of the political and religious spheres. Many respondents believed that participation in *politiki* corrupts. Respondents stressed the importance of the separation between the political and religious spheres. Boubacar, a resident of Timbuktu complained, "Religious authorities can act like those in political power – it (religion/religious practice) should be different than politics (T39)." *Politiki* is also perceived as corrupting traditional elites. [56] Afrobarometer Round 4 data reveals that 56% of Malian respondents preferred that traditional leaders stay out of politics (Summary of Results 2009: 43).[57] This separation also reflects a legacy of separation between the communities of scholars and warriors; the former were distinguished by their religious devotion and the latter's distance from them (Brenner 2001: 90).

[55] See Seyla Benhabib "The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era" for a discussion of the difficulties of authentic groups representing culture.

[56] Another respondent in Timbuktu gave a zero vote of confidence to traditional authorities and religious leaders explaining: "They are ruined now; even them - they take part in politics (T6); same sentiment from T39

[57] Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. Statement 1: Traditional leaders must represent all of their people equally. They should remain non-partisan, and not affiliate themselves with any political party. Statement 2: Traditional leaders are citizens like everyone else and have the right to decide for themselves whether to support a particular party

Malians rate their confidence in traditional authorities (82% express a lot or great deal of confidence) higher than confidence in any other political institution (Little and Logan 2008:13). For example the percentage of Malians who trust the courts is only 43%, those who trust local council members 59%, and trust for national assembly from 61% of respondents (2008: 13). Malians also rated traditional authorities as least corrupt of any other institutions (14). The gap between Malians' confidence in traditional authorities and that provided for other types of political authorities is wider than in any of the other 17 countries surveyed. As a result most Malians, especially in rural areas, are reluctant to contact mayors and prefer to consult with traditional or religious leaders (Coulibaly and Diarra 2004:17).

When asked if they would contact the police in case of a future dispute, fewer than 10% of respondents said that they would even possibly contact the authorities.[58] More than 90% replied with an authoritative no. The reasons for the response seem twofold: one is that culturally it is more common for disputes to be settled among families, traditional authorities or religious figures. When we posed the question, many respondents countered that they preferred to go speak with traditional authorities than involve the law (S69, SR47). As Salah, a Tuareg man in his early twenties explained, "We always settle things ourselves, we prefer not to involve the authorities (T54)." Contacting the police was treated as a last resort, a less honorable alternative to problem-solving from within the community. Seydou from the village of Madinel explained, "Muslims shouldn't contact political authorities - it's a bad idea." Some respondents, like Sadio in Kayes, qualified that they only felt the police should be contacted in cases of murder (K34). The population's reluctance to contact the police or judiciary hampers these institutions ability to grow and improve.

[58] I would like to thank Kelly McMann for allowing me to use this question from her questionnaire.

Secondarily, the judiciary and police are generally viewed as corrupt and predatory. "Money has ruined everything," complained Sidiki from Ziguena (SR11). For those without the means, attempts to navigate the justice system will be futile. Idrissa, a resident of Mopti explained his cynical take on the justice system using a Bambara proverb, "Even if it is easy to judge a poor person, it is very difficult to judge a rich person (M36)." Even Moussa, a doctor from Bamako who sends his children to school in Algeria and represents the kind of "rich person" that Idrissa was talking about, complained about the quality of the justice system: "All the judges and lawyers are corrupt (BBC 60)." The exodus out of bureaucratic state channels has the simultaneous effect of reducing the relevance of the state to citizens' lives and lessening the likelihood that they will engage with it in the future. The separation of many citizens from the secular state is exacerbated by religious authorities who willingly court those who are unsatisfied or alienated by secular, state authority.

2.5 Religious Authority: Two Public Spheres?

In other parts of the Islamic world, religious authorities and associations have assisted voters' transition into the world of elections or democracy by offering a credible assurance, familiarity, or social services.[59] However, Mali, like other nations in the Muslim Sahel, maintains a stark divide between religion and formal electoral politics. Religious and secular authorities live in relative harmony and govern separate spheres of societal relations. One pertains to elections and governance through the mayors' office, while the other regulates everyday events such as weddings, baptisms, and conflict resolution. In his dissertation on the political culture in Niger, Abdoulrahmane Idrissa describes this divide as "competing

[59] Pepinsky and Wellborne 2010 show how Indonesian voters think Islamic parties to be more "credible" than other parties, Carrie Wickam-Crowley 2002 describes voter mobilization behind the Muslim Brotherhoods candidates, running as independents, despite Egypt's ban on political parties

modernities" – one tied the West and the other to the Muslim world (2008). In Niger, the struggle for power between political authority between secular and Islamic elites is more contentious than in Mali, but the tension and competition between spheres of authority is relevant. He explains:

> …in a context of great material poverty, images of political modernity which liberal republicans and Islamists strive to invest in their divergent agendas. In this process, they produce the specific cultures of the "civil society" and of the "clerical society," which lead, the dissertation concludes, to a kind of heterogeneous order irreducible to either the liberal republican sovereign or the Islamist sovereign (10).

Like most other nations in Africa, Mali has strict laws banning religious political parties (Bogaards 2008). Most political elites are Western-educated and committed to French secularism (Villalón 2010; Bleck and van de Walle 2011, forthcoming). The transition to democracy facilitated the vast promulgation of religious associations and public discourse surrounding Islamic principles and practices (Soares and Launay 1999; Soares 2005; Villalón 2010).[60] Under the Traore dictatorship, there was only one recognized Islamic organization – AMPUI (Association Malien pour l'Unite´ et Progre´s d'Islam), which was made up of predominantly Sufi clerics by the ruling party. Democratization opened the door for the creation of a multitude of diverse religious organizations and Islamic self-help associations. However, these gains have not translated into the formal political sphere as Islamic actors remain outside of the formal political sphere. Idrissa explains an analogous division of the secular state sphere and Islamic actors in Niger despite the Muslim-majority population.

> Francophone Muslims with no ideological orientation toward Islam, for their part, tend to consider *laïcité* as a form of practical arrangement which does not need to be questioned as such– even though Islam necessarily influences their social and political expectations. *Laïcité* allows them to privatize religion, in a way analogous to how the principle of

[60]The debate has continued and even heightened with Mali's transition to democracy, increased freedom of the press, and dissolution of the ruling party's ban on religious groups outside of its own AMPUI (Association Malienne pour l'unité et le progrès de l'Islam).

> national unity calls for the privatization of ethnicity. Religion and ethnicity are important factors in family life and social gatherings, but are considered invalid orientations on the national public space (240).

Efforts by Islamic associations, such as the Muslim Cultural Union, to integrate into the political sphere were thwarted post-independence and then later under Moussa Traore (Amselle 1985). Similarly, during the National Conference held immediately after the transition to democracy, Islamic groups attempted to create an Islamic state and to allow the formation or Islamic political parties, but both attempts failed (Künkler and Leininger 2009: 1073). At least one Islamic party, Hizbollah, attempted to enter the formal political arena in 1991, but was prevented from forming (Soares 2006: 282; Brenner 294).[61] A more recent attempt by the High Council of Islam to back a presidential candidate, who subscribed to their conditions, also failed (Sears 2007).[62]

Islamic groups in Mali are also hindered by their fragmentation. There are estimated 135 to 190 Islamic organizations and the lack of centralization weakens their potential for mobilization in comparison to the centralized organization to the Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal (Künkler and Leininger 2009:1077). Brenner explains the decline in Sufi power:

> The Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya Sufi orders that dominated the religious and political landscape in the 19th century have been effectively marginalized from the political arena in Mali. The influence of the Sufi order persists, especially in rural regions, but the political economy has changed dramatically from the 19th century when Muslim political authority was sanctioned and reinforced through the hegemony of Sufi spiritual authority ….Still political figures do not intervene in the public political debate based on personal

[61] "Justifications against the religious party ban were twofold: Democracy-minded organizations such as the Association Islamique pour le Salut au Mali (AISLAM) viewed religious parties (just as any type of party) as part of liberal democracy. Others, the so-called integristes, to which the Hizboullah and dissenters of AMUPI belonged, advocated Islamic law as providing a blueprint for a just social order and believed religious parties to be the natural vehicle for an Islamic agenda (Künkler and Leininger2009: 1073).

[62] Sears chronicles candidate Ibrahim Boubacar Keita's (IBK's) failed attempt to run as an "Islamic" candidate during the 2002 Presidential Race as well as the High Council of Islam's failed attempt to find a political party to support their campaign agenda.

> divine inspiration, although this was precisely the kind of discourse that encouraged and legitimated Muslim political expansion in the 19th century (Brenner 2007: 216-217.)

While there is a divide between the historically powerful Sufi hierarchies and the Salafists, which represent a small, but economically powerful group, many other Malians choose to blend elements of "reformist" and Sufi practices, and identify as part of neither specific group (Soares 2005).[63]

Religious organizations have been most successful in demonstrating their organizational potential and political weight in the sphere of contentious politics rather than in formal political channels. Religious leaders continue to play a consultative and advisory role – as well as acting as societal mediators. The High Council of Islam plays an official advisory role for the government. They have successfully vetoed legislature for the abolition of the death penalty and family law. A telling example of their informal political weight is the success of the family code protests.

On the first day of Ramadan, August 22, 2009, more than 50,000 citizens packed the national soccer stadium, spilling out on the surrounding streets of Yirimadio, in protest of recently legislated Family Code. Weeks earlier the National Assembly had passed the code, which contained more than 1,000 resolutions including a minimum age for legal marriage, restrictions on religious marriages, and inheritance laws, with a nearly unanimous vote. Many Malian citizens were outraged by the government's entrance into personal matters that had been largely regulated by religious and traditional authority.[64] Protestors decried their representatives' disregard for citizens' preferences and Western donors' stranglehold over the political agenda.

[63] When asked what their religion was very few respondents cited a particular sect of Islam, but instead claimed simply that they were Muslim.

[64] Interview with Malian Think Tank Director August 2009. The contentious bill divided Malian society. Women's associations and NGOs had spent years lobbying for the passage of the bill in order to increase

Mosques and religious associations played a primary role in organizing the stadium protests, as well the marches in Bamako and Kayes the previous weekend, bussing congregations to the protest sites. Religious leaders lashed out against members of the assembly in televised commercials and local newspapers. The members of the High Council of Islam issued a direct appeal to the Malian President – Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) –to reverse the code. In a televised speech on August 29th, ATT announced that he would send the code back to the National Assembly so that they could revisit the most contentious elements. Islamic actors were allowed to provide input on revisions to the code. At the end of 2010, the code had not yet been voted on in the National Assembly.

2.6 The New Emperor: "Kalanso and Politiki"

Scholars of Mali have described the colonial authorities' introduction of French-language bureaucracy and schooling as a violent assault on local traditions of societal organization. A small group of individuals that attained French literacy became a "fabricated" new class and this social elite was able to dominate the rest of the population with their linguistic skills.[65] Etienne Gerard describes an interview with an illiterate, Malian farmer, "The peasants, themselves affirm in echoes,' We are in the hands of the educated. They have more power and everyone is scared of them. If you are illiterate, you can have the power to support someone in their trip around the world; but if he is educated, he can colonize you (1999:156)."

Due to their reluctance to attend colonial schools, the Malian aristocracy inadvertently allowed poorer and lower caste citizens to profit from Western education (Meillassoux 1970: 102). Shaka Bagayogo compares the post-independence domination of educated elites to the

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legal equality between Malian men and women. See Susana Wing's work (2009) for a discussion of the history of the family code in Mali and in the rest of the West African region.

[65] Louis Brenner2001 and Etienne Gerard 1992

Malian folk tradition of a dominant leader re-ordering chaos with their simultaneous mastery of force, knowledge, and wealth (1987:103). Since the colonial era, fluency in the official language of the Malian state, French, has translated into political power. In the 1960s, post-independence graduates of colonial schools became the political elite in Mali and much of West Africa. At independence, power transferred hands to a narrow bureaucratic elite, who had managed to achieve literacy in French. The illiterate aristocracy and the rich, bourgeoisie were marginalized from the post independence political process (Meillassoux: 98).

In the democratic context, the Malian political landscape remains dominated by a Francophone-educated elite despite its majority Muslim population. French language has also translated into increased job opportunities. In the first decades of independence rule, a college diploma guaranteed a salaried civil service job (Ba 2009). While French language schooling no longer assures government employment, it remains a necessary condition for a position in government, international institutions, or in an international NGO. Malian citizens, the vast majority of whom speak indigenous languages at home, have learned that French schooling is a key to political power and increased economic opportunities.

Malian political leaders, especially at the national level, represent a highly educated elite, contrasting the vastly pre-literate society. Figure 2 contrasts the educational levels current Malian legislators and Malian respondents from Afrobarometer Survey.[66] While the political elite are generally more-educated than the masses that they represent in any country; the gap between educational credentials in Mali is substantial. More than fifty-five percent of legislators have a university degree as compared to two percent of the Malian population.

[66] Afrobarometer uses a representative sample population.

Figure 2: Comparing Assembly Members' Educational Levels to the Malian Population[67]



The same is true for Ministry officials. All but two of Mali's thirty ministers have university degrees and that the remaining two went to Mali's prestigious military academy.

It is logical that Malians, given the high illiteracy rates and widespread poverty, observe the differences between the people that run government and themselves. However, unlike domination by caste, gender, or birthright, educational barriers can be overcome and degrees can be earned. Theoretically, Malians or their children can gain the qualifications to fully engage with their system. This gives parents with the means to pay school fees hop that their children might reach the top of this social hierarchy.

2.7 The State of Political Knowledge

Malians' political skepticism should not be misinterpreted as widespread ignorance or apathy. This section describes the political knowledge and political behavior of 1000 respondents

[67] Elected leaders' education levels from : L ASSEMBLE NATIONALE DU MALI SOUS LA TROISIEME REPUBLIQUE, un guide à l'usage des élus, des citoyens et des partenaires extérieurs. 4em legislature 2007-2012. National Education Averages from Afrobarometer 2008. Primary refers to respondents with any primary schooling and high school refers to respondents with any high school or secondary schooling.

from my survey. In later chapters, I argue that education can play an important role in creating political knowledge. It is first important to explore the population's baseline; what do Malians know about their own political system? In my survey, I asked a series of Afrobarometer questions to evaluate each respondent's political knowledge.[68] The questions were asked in the form of a political pop quiz: can you name your mayor, can you name the president of the National Assembly, and can you name the majority party? Do you know executive term limits?

Surprisingly, my survey results revealed that most Malians have internalized the new rules of the democratic game. More than 70% of Malians, most of whom are illiterate, were able to name executive term limits.[69] In fact, when asked about presidential term limits, the majority of the Malians responded in the same way*: san duuru, siŋe fila* (five years, two times). This finding suggests that a comprehensive message about the way democracy works has penetrated Malian society. This knowledge may be due on part to public information campaigns about democracy circulating through local radio.[70] During the second presidential election, a well-known comedian ran as a publicity stunt and has since continued to raise awareness about the importance of voting through comedy skits. While I was in Bamako during the 2009 elections, USAID helped sponsor a commercial that juxtaposed municipal elections in two communes: a "bad commune," where vote-buying was rampant, and as a result was dirty and unorganized neighborhood and a "good" commune where people voted along principles and candidates responded to their needs. The survey results suggest that these awareness efforts have been successful. In addition, all Malians have already witnessed a president step down and there was

[68] Questions borrowed from Afrobarometer Round 3
[69] Thunnissen2009 : 6 and Bleck Survey Data 2009
[70] Interviews with DJS from private and community radio revealed that donors were transmitting messages about how to participate in politics (July 2011).

an active debate about ATT's obligation to step down especially in light of Tandja and Compaore's choices in neighboring Niger and Burkina.

As Figure 3 demonstrates, Malian respondents from my survey outperform peers from the 2005 Afrobarometer survey in Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana. The chart suggests Mali's comparative experience with executive turnover and President Konare's willingness to respect term limits and step down, informed citizens about presidential term limits.

Figure 3: Political Knowledge about their Respective Governments[71]



Malians responded to three other political knowledge questions at lower rates. Malians were third, behind the Senegalese and Beninese, in their ability to name their local representative.[72] Almost half of the Malian respondents were able to name their mayor as

[71] The data from Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal is from Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005), while the Malian data is from my survey administered in 2009. My survey has an urban bias as compared to the other nationally representative samples. However, my figures are not dramatically different than Afrobarometer Round 3 in Mali. Local officials varied according to the specific electoral system; Ghana and Nigeria poll respondents on knowing the Vice President, while the Francophone countries ask about the head of Legislature.

[72] This may be due to the fact that Francophone voters elect municipal officials, while local representatives in Ghana and Nigeria are appointed.

compared to lower percentages who could name the President of the Assembly or the majority party. This is unsurprising given that municipal elections in Mali are often described as "elections of proximity" meaning that citizens mobilize around family members or friends who are candidates.

On the whole, respondents revealed a higher level of familiarity with municipal authorities as well as willingness to evaluate local officials. This familiarity is most pronounced in the village setting, where citizens benefit from the greater visibility of candidates in their "backyard."

Citizens' willingness to evaluate local officials also suggests a greater familiarity with them. Unlike the president, who was often referred to with a statement of deference such as "God gave him power" or political institutions like the national electoral commission that citizens were largely unfamiliar with, respondents spoke about mayors in concrete terms.[73] This critical engagement is also evident in higher electoral turnover at the municipal level. Voting rates in the 2004 and 2009 municipal elections, at 43% and 45% turnout respectively, were higher than either the 2002 or 2007 presidential elections. We also observe lower rates of incumbency wins at the local level in Mali. In 2004 municipal elections, more than half of all mayors were not re-elected (Magassa and Meyer 2008: 16).

Fewer respondents were able to name specific information about national-level politics. Forty-one percent of respondents were able to name the president of the assembly; this is only a

[73] This kind of deference or respect of president's is seen across Africa. Logan uses Afro-barometer data from eighteen countries to show that 66% of respondents assess the president's performance positively, as compared to 51% support for MPs, 50% support for local counselors and 39% support for the ruling party (2008:22)

[73] Example of rating of mayor: Another respondent in Kayes says, "The only contact I had with the community official was during the elections. The municipal authorities in Kayes do not work; the city is dirty and there are major problems with access to water and electricity. I only have confidence in those who work."

little more than half of the percentage Nigerians and Ghanaians who could name their Vice President. It probably reflects the weak visibility and power of the position. However, if we broaden the comparative context Malians do not perform too poorly. For instance, the margin of difference between the percentage of correct responses provided by Malians and Americans is strikingly low given the age of institutions and median education levels in the US. Only about 15% more Americans are able to name their Speaker of the House than their Malian counterparts could name the President of their National Assembly (Pew Survey 2007). Malian politics, like politics in many African nations, remains largely personal. While this does not bode well for the strength of democratic institutions, it does mean the Malians tend to be fairly well-informed about individual politicians.

Malians were least able to name the majority party as compared to respondents in neighboring countries.[74] This finding reflects the large number of Malian parties (113) and relative party weakness in Mali. Given the past history of coalitions and the fact that the majority party, ADEMA, did not run a presidential candidate in the last elections – it is logical that Malians have the most difficulty with this question.

In Mali, it appears that education could make the greatest impact on citizens' knowledge of national-level politics, which reside in Bamako: the name of representatives other than the president and the name of the majority party. Since so many citizens, most of whom did not complete primary school, already articulate executive term limits precisely, we would anticipate a lower likelihood that education has a strong effect on this aspect of political knowledge. Education beyond primary school could have a ceiling effect on knowledge of term limits, but be more productive in learning about politics on the national stage.

[74] Unfortunately, no data is available for Benin, which also boasts a large number of weak parties and would be the best direct point of comparison.

2.8 The Participation Problem

As I have already discussed, voting rates in Mali are much lower than other countries in Africa. Voting only captures one aspect of citizens "voice," so I wanted to explore baselines for different types of reported participation. Figure 4 shows total levels of reported political participation for the survey respondents based on six categories of participation: if the respondent voted in 2007 presidential elections, if she campaigned in the 2007 presidential election, if she feels close to a party, if she has ever run for office, if she would ever consider running for office in the future, and whether or not she has contacted a government official in the last five years.[75]

Sixty-seven percent of respondents report voting, which is consistent with the percentage of respondents claiming to vote in Afrobarometer data. A little over fifty percent of respondents claimed to identify with a party; this is slightly lower than, but consistent with first round Afro-barometer findings of 58% party-identification, but much lower than Afrobarometer Round 4 findings from 2008 of 69% party identification. Lower percentages of people reported partaking in more time consuming forms of participation including willingness to run for office (35%), past participation in 2007 presidential election campaign (29%), and experience contacting a government official to address a problem or express an opinion in the last five years (23%) and past experience running for office (3%).[76]

[75] The questions are taken directly from the Afrobarometer round 3 and 4
[76] After initially including "Ran for office" as a dependent variable for participation, I dropped it from my analysis since so there were so few positive responses.

Figure 4: Reported Rates of Political Participation[77]



Certain forms of political participation require greater efforts compared to voting. Nie et al have termed these "difficult" forms of participation (1996). Among the survey questions, I consider the difficult forms of participation to be campaigning, running for office, willingness to run, and contacted a government official. If a citizen is going to campaign, she needs to be able to convince others to vote for a party and thus have some knowledge about that party and electoral race. If she ran for office or is willing to do so in the future, she needs to be able to imagine herself as a competent and capable elected official. Finally, its takes time and resources to contact a government official who might not listen to demands or requests. This is coupled citizens' fear of exploitation by a bureaucracy that operates in a colonial language. These factors make contacting a government official, especially without the support of an association, much more difficult. Consistent with my categorization, responses for more difficult forms of

[77] Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) find cumulative self reported voting rates at 70% for 17 countries in 2001 Afrobarometer survey.

participation are much lower than reported rates of voting and party identification. Due to the scarcity of positive responses, we can anticipate that education might have the greatest effect and make the greatest gains in more difficult forms of participation.

It is important to acknowledge that these responses are all self-reported and therefore there is a potential for conformity bias in the way that Malians report their behavior. The percentage of respondents claiming to have voted is more than twenty-five points higher than actual national voter turnout for the 2007 Presidential elections. We can assume that respondents are over-reporting voting rates, and perhaps other forms of participation.[78]

To complement the self-reporting, I wanted to include some additional data on Malian participation. In light of Malians' skepticism about the democratic system, I organized an exit poll survey of 450 Malians during the March 2009 Municipal Elections in Bamako to better understand what motivates citizens to come out to vote. Exit poll survey teams at three polls in three districts of Bamako asked a basic question: why did you come out to vote today? [79] Citizens were not prompted with categorical choices; their open responses were sorted and grouped in larger qualitative categories illustrated in Figure 5. We also asked citizens for some basic biographical data including their level of education. I had anticipated that respondents with different levels of education would provide different justifications for participation, so I sorted responses by respondents' levels of education (no schooling to university degree). However, I found that regardless of education, respondents disproportionately claimed to have voted because of a sense of patriotism and civic duty. While these sentiments do not preclude the possibility

[78] This is common in any survey data on voting (Holbrook and Krosnick 2009: http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty//krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf).

[79] Polling stations were selected from the same neighborhoods where surveys were conducted. Enumerators were asked to interview every third person exiting the polls. Respondents were asked for information about their education profile and then asked, unprompted, why they came out to vote.

that the voter received a bribe or voted for a boss, it does demonstrate that Malians share a basic widespread understanding of the importance of elections as an element of multiparty democracy. Short term incentives for voting and the act of voting as an expression of citizenship are not mutually exclusive. These results are further evidence that an understanding of the general rules of the game have penetrated Malian society. Twenty years after the first elections, Bamakoise who vote appear to have internalized the "civic spirit." I caution against generalizing these findings because we do not know if voters and patterns of mobilization are the same in different regions of Mali. In fact, exit polling suggested that voters in Bamako are younger and more educated than what is reflected in the survey data.[80]

Figure 5: Citizens' Reasons for Voting in 2009 Municipal Elections by Education Level



Given the irregularities and group mobilization for voting in Mali, it is tempting to deride voting as artificial or inauthentic in the atmosphere of weak parties and widespread clientalism. However, these findings caution against writing off voting as coerced and manipulated and,

[80] We did not ask respondents' ages, but there were many voters at the polls who did not have children suggesting that they were not yet married.

therefore, less essential to the democratic process. Those citizens who engaged in the act of voting, regardless of how they ended up in the ballot box or what they knew about politics, felt as if they were fulfilling their own civic duty to the country.

2.9 The Obstacles to Deepening Democracy in Mali

This chapter has explored citizen skepticism about democracy and Francophone institutions of government to suggest that gains that education could have on democratic citizenship. The strong legacy of consensual governance as well as the reluctance of religious actors to endorse partisan politics obstructs citizens' willingness to engage with party politics. While, democratic values of tolerance, trust, mutual help, and consensus guide Malians behavior, they just do not always translate into participation in formal politics. Education could help citizens to learn more about democratic institutions and potentially to engage with them.

There are two primary threats to representation in Mali's current system of consensual democracy. The first is the undemocratic aspects of associational membership. As Sears warns, just because decisions are made collectively, this does not require them to be made democratically (2007: 176). Mali is still largely stratified by age, gender, wealth, and in some instances, caste.[81] Many Malians participate in vertical associations, which may include deliberative procedures and offer them a chance to voice their opinions, but ultimately follow the authority of the strongest group member or patron (Benhabib 2002).

The second is the irrelevance of political parties, which I have just discussed. The President, in his tenure as an independent, has contributed to the erosion of a Malian opposition.

[81] Castes are related to Malian last names and integrated into the cousinage system. They are not limiting in the sense of political limits for a particular caste, but some occupations are exclusively occupied by certain types of castes (ie griots or mediators); famously Salif Keita, the most famous Malian singer, defied the wishes of his father to become a singer even though he was not from a griot class. In other instances, people of historically marginalized castes can make requests on other Malians have historically dominated them.

During his second election campaign, 43 parties, all but two, joined the president's coalition. ATT had appointed members of all different parties in his administration, thus eliminating any viable threat of the opposition (Baudais and Chauzal: 2006). When respondents claimed, "parties are all the same," they are accurately describing the political terrain. If citizens continue to turn to traditional leaders or to view parties as irrelevant to their daily existence, that lack of engagement will not push parties to be more accountable to the population's needs. Even in other countries, where strict ethnic or regional mobilization servers as a palliative for skepticism in the system, mobilization still draws citizens through the political process. In the following chapters, I suggest that education can empower citizens with tools to engage with the state and take advantage of the opportunities for self-expression offered by the new multi-party system. Greater engagement by individuals advocating for their own preferences could then stimulate more responsive institutions that would become accountable to a larger subset of citizenry.

Chapter 3:

Mali's Evolving Educational Landscape

3.1 Introduction

Democratization brought a dramatic expansion in primary enrollment due to three factors, liberalization, increased government allocation for primary education, and greater donor support for basic education through Education for All Campaign, the Millennium Development Goals, and the Millennium Challenge Account. Unlike other contexts, where schooling and state-building were simultaneously reinforcing – rapid expansion in Mali and many other African countries focused on increasing access to education to bolster human development indicators. Through liberalization, the Malian public gained greater access to schooling supply, but the Malian government simultaneously forfeited some of its control over the education sector (Lange and Diarra 1999). These policy changes resulted in dramatic increases in enrollment and a more diverse pool of providers. In 1991, only 26% of school aged population was enrolled in public, primary schools,[82] by 2009 82% of school aged students were enrolled in public, private, Francophone schools, madrassas, and community schools. The growth of these different school types and increase in the public investment in education mean that more Malian citizens are making it into the classroom than ever before. By embracing madrassas, the Malian government broke a past tension between secular government schooling and marginalized Islamic schooling; for the first time Islamic schooling was publicly endorsed by the state. The rapid pace of expansion and the diversity of providers make Mali an ideal place to explore the impact of educational changes in the post democratic context. As a result of these policy changes, many interesting questions remain: could expansion have generated unintended benefits for democratic

[82] This 1991 figure does not include students enrolled in madrassas which were not formally acknowledged by the state at that time.

citizenship in Mali? How does government partnership with Islamic schools change the fact of Malian democracy?

This chapter explores Mali's educational landscape in order to outline the schooling choices facing parents, patterns of enrollment, and potential implications for democratization. As described in the previous section, education in Mali has traditionally linked parents and students to different centers of power: secular, Francophone elites and a flourishing trade networks linked to Arabic – the language of Islamic instruction.[83] In present day Mali with the expansion and liberalization of the educational sector – these educational tracks, and their respective modernities, are colliding and combining more than ever – creating a mosaic of educational choices and consumers. I begin with a discussion of the history of education in Mali and then describe recent changes that accompanied the democratic transition. I introduce the various schools in Mali and basic patterns of enrollment based on data provided by respondents to the survey.

3.2 Pre-colonial and Colonial Education

Before 1500, 25,000 students from across Africa, Europe, and the Middle East attended three universities in Timbuktu.[84] When the French arrived in Mali in the late 19th century, little of this educational infrastructure remained, but Koranic schooling was pervasive in the North of the country.[85] Originally established by Muslim traders and intellectuals, Koranic schools indoctrinated students into the Islamic religion through the memorization and repetition of texts. Koranic schools were generally decentralized; students worked under the apprenticeship of their teacher, or *marabout*, and slowly gained access to the more esoteric elements of Islamic

[83] I borrow Abdoul Rahmane's concept of dual modernities, Western and Islamic, in contemporary West African Society (2008).
[84] http://www.Timbuktufoundation.org/university.html
[85] Brenner 2001

knowledge (Soares 2005). These schools generally did not facilitate tremendous social mobility, but reinforced hierarchal lineage structures (Brenner 2001).

The French government feared "Islamic fanaticism" and saw it as a significant challenge to their "mission civilisatrice." Ironically, as the French built infrastructure, Islam and Islamic education spread rapidly through the rest of the country.[86] Colonial authorities sought to co-opt or eliminate Koranic education. In some instances, the French campaign against Islam, as well as the colonialists' aggressive forced labor recruitment practices, reduced the numbers of students in Koranic schools.[87] The French built their own Franco-Arabe schools in an attempt to co-opt local populations into their control (Brenner 2001: 41). The birth of French language schools in Mali faced resistance and distrust from local populations, especially because a parallel Koranic education system was already widespread across much of the country.[88] Many Malians, suspicious of colonial rule, refused to send their children to French schools – preferring instead to send their children to Islamic schools. The French authorities courted the sons and relatives of chiefs and notables, but village chiefs would often send children of lower-caste village members to the *toubabuw ka kalanso* or European school while keeping their own children far from French control (Gerard 1997: 99). The population's suspicion of French education as well as the limited penetration of colonial infrastructure into Malian territory begot one of the lowest literacy rates of any African nation. At independence, only 7% of the Malian population was literate in the former colonial language as compared to an African average of 39%.[89]

3.3 Post-Independence/Pre-Democratization Education

[86] Soares 2004 ; Launay and Soares 1999
[87] See Johnson's study of colonial Guinea (1975)
[88] Ba 2009, Brenner 2001, Gerard 1997
[89] On average, Francophone countries trail their Anglophone counterparts in terms of literacy rates at independence and presently. Ed for all 2008, Grandes orientations de la politique educative: 4, and Harsch 2000.

Historically, education has proved key to political mobility on the continent. In the Francophone Sahel, the few Africans who managed to obtain secondary Western schooling quickly climbed to the highest ranks of political leadership (Ekeh 1975). The Ponty School in Dakar educated the first Presidents of Mali, Benin, Niger, and Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the Prime Minister of Senegal (Sabatier: 266). Even in the current democratic environment, the majority of politicians in Africa reflect this elite, secular training and mastery of the colonial language. Their elite, educational profiles are distinct from the illiterate masses that they represent (Bleck and van de Walle 2011, forthcoming).

In many African states, where colonial language is rarely spoken at home, schooling gives young students the skills to interact with government. Louis Brenner and Etienne Gerard argue that Western education created a "fabricated," social elite class, which was able to dominate the rest of the population.[90] The mastery of colonial languages enables citizens to better interact and navigate the state bureaucracy. A 1989 survey conducted by the Ministry of Education in Mali reports parents' strong attachment to the exclusive use of French as a language of instruction despite the pedagogical challenges it poses to most Malian children who speak other indigenous languages at home:

> For them, mastering it (French) means having a better grasp of administrative procedures, and running less of a risk of being cheated by civil servants. Parents quote examples showing that the mastery of French is not only useful in Mali, but also abroad. They have not had the chance to profit from a mastery of French, but feel that their children should benefit from it (Bergman 1996: 594 quoting 1989 Ministry report (44)).

Mali's first regime campaigned on a platform to expand quality education to the masses. Under the leadership of the first president, Modibo Keita, Mali made substantive progress and

[90] Brenner 2001 and Gerard 1992

increased enrollment rates to 24% in 1964.[91] Like many of his post-independence contemporaries, such as Nyerere in Tanzania or Nkrumah in Ghana, Keita saw the educational system as part of a greater ideological revolution. The 1962 Educational Reform Law established nine years of compulsory education. There were five main principles outlined in the reform: A quality education for all; teaching that can facilitate development; teaching that respects Malian culture, but that creates diplomas that are equivalent to those in other modern states; educational content that respects not only African values and norms, but also universal values; teaching that decolonizes the sprit and that rehabilitates Africa and its own valor (Système Educatif Malien: 20 and Obichere: 199). Keita's ambitious efforts struggled in part due to budgetary limitations, but reflect his consistent, nationalist ideology. He enlisted students to spread the party message and policies and guaranteed state employment for all secondary school employment – a practice that was continued until structural adjustment in the 1980s (Brenner 2007: 201). In the post-independence era, even those citizens' who managed to obtain a 6th grade diploma could qualify for a well-paying position as a civil servant.[92] Parents, who enrolled their children, or at least tolerated their enrollment, began to see the financial returns to education.

Keita's Marxist government was strongly secular and nationalized one of the largest madrassas in Bamako as well as the French-era madrassas. The schools were required to teach in French and Arabic, but were stripped of their religious curriculum. Keita planned to do the same with other madrassas in Mali before succumbing to a military coup in 1968 led by Moussa Traore (Brenner 2007: 214). Following the 1968 coup, the education system floundered under

[92] Two, seventy-something respondents to our survey, admitted to obtaining status as civil servants with only a 6th grade diploma.

the Traore dictatorship; a World Bank report estimates that the gross enrollment ratio had dropped to 20% in 1973 (Bender et al: 1; Lange and Diarra 1999). Fifteen years later gross enrollment improved a mere six percentage points. Traore sought tight control over the education sector; he stripped civic education from the curriculum in 1972. In the mid 1980s Traore made harsh changes to the educational sector as a part of structural adjustment reforms. Seeking to reduce recurrent expenditures, including teachers' salaries,[93] the Traore government reduced health and education expenditures from 20 billion FCFA ($40 million USD) in 1987 to 16 billion FCFA ($32,000 million USD) in 1991. One of the reforms was the "voluntary departure program" through which 1,000, or 12.5 %, of all teachers left the education sector (Bender: x). These changes dissuaded many high school graduates from joining the teaching profession. Five of eight teacher training institutes were closed due the inability to recruit new teachers (Bender: 15).[94] Traore reluctantly integrated madrassas into the national education system in the 1980s. He only responded to heightened societal pressure for education and legalized private schools in 1990.[95] Primary school enrollment rates remained dismally low, estimated at approximately 26% gross primary school enrollment, leading up to the democratic transition in 1991.

In the backdrop of colonialism and government mismanagement of the primary education sector, madrassas emerged as educated West Africans returned from studies abroad in North Africa and the Middle East in the mid 20th century.[96] Schools were opened by Malians with a

[93] Teachers' salaries were estimated at 13 times GDP per capita.
[94] Some school officials interviewed referred to this period as the "demobilization" period where there was not only the oppression of political life, but limited educational opportunities.
[95] Interview with former Ministry of Education Official July 2007; Lange and Diarra 1999;
[96] I refer to independent madrassas established by private founders rather than French madrassas that had been established in Timbuktu and Djenne as a way to co-opt local leaders (Brenner 2007: 200). "The first madrassas appeared in the 1940s when Mali was still the French colony of Soudan Français. Two of

cosmopolitan vision of a pan-Muslim community; they sought to construct modern, Islamic education facilities (Brenner 2001: 54).[97] The schools offer a modern curriculum, in addition to religious studies, and use Arabic as the language of instruction. Initially, many of their founders aligned with an emerging "reformist" version of Islam that aimed to align Malian religious practice with those throughout the rest of the Muslim world. They were critical of hierarchical Sufi networks that dominated Koranic education and faced conflict form Koranic school advocates (Brenner 2007: 202; Brenner 2001:91; Launay and Soares 1999). For religious parents, madrassas offered a "modern," pedagogy, which also reflected their values (Villaón forthcoming).

Since their inception, there has been considerable tension between the government authorities and madrassas (Brenner and Sanankoua 1991; Brenner 2007; Amselle 1985).[98] Unlike the partnerships between the French colonial system and Catholic Church across much of the continent, the colonial authorities were fearful of Islamic education. The colonial administration restricted the curriculum that these schools could legally offer by classifying them as "Koranic schools" and tried to ban them from teaching in Arabic (Brenner 2007: 213). It was not until after independence that madrassas were allowed to teach French (Brenner 2001: 15). The French government refused to grant licenses that would qualify these schools for state aid such as that received by the Catholic schools.

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these initial schools were tiny, semirural institutions that could barely be distinguished from local Qur'anic schools, except by the pedagogical aims for their founders, which included the introduction of formalized and modernized curriculum and the teaching of Arabic as a foreign language. The third, which was eventually authorized to open in Bamako, was a much larger institution that counted its students in the hundreds within years of inception (Brenner 2007: 199)."

[97] This modern Islamic schools are not unlike the Deobandi brand of madrassa in Pakistan and India, which have grown substantially since 1900 (Hefner and Zaman 2007).

[98] The French government associated madrassas with a Salafist school of Islam they found threatening, despite the fact that some madrassas had a Sufi orientation.

Even without state assistance or recognition, madrassas flourished, especially in the 1970s with the influx of petrol-dollars from the Middle East. Brenner estimates that enrollment in madrassas outstripped enrollment in public schools in the 1980s.[99] Madrassas educated 6% of primary learners in 1960, but by they represented 25% of all primary enrollment by the 1980s (2001: 170, 172). Traore reluctantly integrated madrassas into the Ministry of Education in the 1985; however many schools viewed the incorporation as an attempt at "domestication" reminiscent of French efforts to control Islamic schooling at the turn of the century (Brenner 2001:260; Brenner 2007: 215).

3.4 Education in the Democratic Era

When Alpha Konare, a PhD and former educator, became Mali's first democratically elected president, he brought with him high expectations for education reform. A longtime democratic activist, he was elected with a broad base of support from networks of teachers, health workers, and students across Mali. Quickly after being elected, Konare expressed the development of education sector as one of the democratic regime's priorities (Lange and Diarra 1999: 166)

Within a year, he held the National Education Forum where citizens were invited to express their opinions on the future of Malian education. For the first time, supporters of Islamic education were allowed to provide input into government education policy. Members of diverse groups of newly flourishing Muslim voluntary associations, including the Union Culturelle Musulmane and Shubban al-muslimin, were staunch advocates of the modernization of Islamic schooling (Brennner 2007: 201). Proponents of Islamic education were very vocal and

[99] Lange and Diarra argue that between 1980-1985, parents chose not to enroll their children in school in protest of the changing socioeconomic landscape of fewer opportunities for mobility through schooling (1999: 166).

demanded more schools and government resources (Brenner 2001: 281). Unlike forced integration of the Traore era, this conference represented a victory for Islamic interest-groups in a democratic context of new possibilities.

Konare moved quickly to write new laws to integrate private and community schools as well as to formalize the state's relationship with madrassas (Lange and Diarra 1999). Madrassas, along with for-profit secular schools, and NGO-run community schools, were awarded accredited status in as government schools. As a result, the schools were subject to government inspections, followed government sanctioned curriculum, and issued government diplomas. This change was also welcomed by advocates of Islamic education as well as recent, unemployed university graduates who opened their own schools to meet the heavy demand in urban centers. The number of private schools grew from 54 in 1980 to 711 in 1998 (Bender et al: 21). [100] Enrollment in madrassas also grew – albeit at a weaker rate and the government continued with the integration of madrassas into the Ministry of Education. By 2007, the students could take the baccalaureate in Arabic.[101] The state has gradually developed a system of monitoring and standardization. Ministry of Education officials conduct school visits, oversee exam grading, and run training seminars for teachers from all different school types.

Konare's 1998 campaign of "a school or literary center in every village" earned Mali much needed donor-support for the education sector. The government's quest to increase access to education was in line with the Education for All Campaign, which Mali signed in 1990 as well as the emerging Millennium Development Goals and Millennium Challenge Account's emphasis on girls' enrollment (Bleck and Guindo 2010). The government and donors poured support into

[100] Previous to this almost all private schools were run by the Catholic Church, which were granted status as formal schools by the colonial regime.
[101] Interview with Madrassa monitoring representative for Ministry of Education (July 2007)

the creation of teacher training institutes and accelerated teacher training programs to boost the number of teachers at school. The Malian government built hundreds of new schools in order to accommodate new learners. Konare embarked on an explicit partnership with non-state schools as a way to boost enrollment

The government efforts were complemented by donor support for community schools in under-served rural areas. USAID, Norway, France, Canada and the World Bank financed schools, which used indigenous language instruction and local resources to reach children without access to other forms of education.[102] Designed to complement decentralization, schools were managed and funded directly by committees of parents and community members, while NGOs took a lead in providing technical support and guidance on school management. Community school teachers were often recruited from among the local community members. Their salaries were generally paid by the local community with money and/or in kind contributions such as land, food, and crops. Eventually, after debt relief, the state began to subsidize the salaries at roughly $50 a month (Bierschenk 2007). The community school program was able to increase the number of community school teachers from 1,106 in 1996 to 5,808 in 2003 and increase enrollment in some target regions from 35% to 62% (USAID Meeting EFA Targets: 5; Bender et al: 13).

Figure 6 shows the dramatic increase in primary school enrollment following democratization in 1991. With increased aid to education as well as the liberalization of the education sector, Malian primary school gross enrollment climbed from less than 30% before the democratic transition to 78% in the 2007-2008 school year.

[102] Most schools teach in indigenous languages using peadogie convergente, but there are some NGOs who use French language immersion

Figure 6: Number of Children Enrolled in Malian Primary School 1968 - 2009[103]



This growth was matched by significant government efforts to build more public infrastructure, train teachers, and commit a larger percentage of the budget to education. Despite these efforts, there is a growing perception that the quality of public schools is declining due in part to larger class sizes, shorter hours of schooling, lower requirements for teacher qualifications, and frequent strikes (Diakite 2000; Bleck and Guindo 2010). Public opinion of the quality of state education has significantly declined. As a seventy-year old respondent who was educated during the colonial system claimed, "My sixth grade French can beat any university student's French in the current educational system."(BBC 25– May 2009). In order to accommodate the growing number of students, public schools began offering "double sessions" of schooling, where two separate cohorts of students would attend a morning and afternoon session separately (Gerard 1999). Due to the lack of infrastructure in rural areas, some schools grouped multiple grades in the same classroom.[104] In 2006, over 34% of all urban and 14% of all rural students in Mali were attending these shortened classroom sessions. [105]

[103] Authors' calculation using Ministry of Education Data
[104] Both of these methods had originally been adopted during structural adjustment programs
[105] Ministry of Education Annual Report 2005-2006

3.5 Educational Content: Forming Democratic Citizens?

The 1999 educational law stressed the importance of education for creating "patriotic citizens and building a democratic society", but this discourse was not matched with policy changes (Portant Loi d'Orienter sur l'éducation 2). It justified the importance of education for democracy by explaining that it helps citizens to learn and practice their obligations as "active members of democratic societies, who respect of peace and basic human rights of men and citizens" (Portant Loi d'Orienter sur l'éducation 2). However the Malian state did little to revise the school curriculum to reflect the democratic discourse. Civic and moral education, stripped from the Malian school curriculum during the Traore dictatorship, was not reinstated until 2009 after teachers pleaded for its inclusion during a 2008 education conference.[106] The forward to Mali's newly issued 2009 Civic and Moral Education textbook laments this loss:

> Moral and civic instruction," which structured our life as students in the past, have lost their force over the course of time; their pedagogical purpose disintegrated. It is fortunate that this new volume embodies the effort to actuate in our children, lost in the whirlwind of modernity and globalization, the reflection on what is good and what is bad, what they have the right to do and not to do. Aiming to help them to become citizens who are conscious of their duties and their rights in the community, mothers and fathers conscious of their familial and social responsibilities is not a frivolous mission. Civic and moral education is an essential task for us as educators (Keita et al: ii). "[107]

The post-transition Malian governments have not capitalized on the "state-building" aspects of educational content beyond the proliferation of French as the national language. Through liberalization and inattention to civic curriculum, Mali failed to capture the unifying or nationalizing benefits of education as extolled by those who study European transitions to state-hood. Beyond increasing provision to a larger base of citizens, the Malian government did not use a systematized approach to transmit messages about democracy or citizenship. Students are

[106] Interview with conference participant and university educator March 2009
[107] Author's translation from French

taught about the transition to democracy as well as Malian political history in history class, but up until recently, the Malian government did not use a civics or democratic curriculum to teach student about how to be better citizens or how to participate in democracy.

3.6 The Growth of Religious Schooling

In the democratic era of greater school choice, enrollment in madrassas is growing beyond its traditional base within trading communities.[108] Historically, Malian society has critiqued madrassas for limited the employment opportunities of their graduates but they do offer a "negotiable social statute, and up to a certain point, a social mobility, which is not available to the majority of students of Koranic school." (Sanankoua and Brenner: 8). The state's recognition of madrassas as well as the rising popularity of Arabic as a language of cosmopolitan trade, increased trade with the non-Western world, and the spread of Islam has helped dissuade fears that graduates of madrassas have few job options.[109] One of the leading proponents of madrassas education, Wahhabis, have created a nouveau riche class in Bamako with a cosmopolitan Muslim, rather than Western, orientation and frame of reference (Launay and Soares 1999: 512). They represent a concrete material power tied to commerce networks in the Middle East. Previous tensions between Wahhabyi and marabouts have largely subsided, as many Malians chose to blend and select practices they feel appropriate to their own lives (Soares 2005).[110] As the graph below demonstrates enrollment in madrassas has continued to grow despite the increase in the availability of French-language schooling options and it even outpaces enrollment in secular Francophone counterparts.

[108] Gerard notes an increase in madrassas in Niger and Burkina as well (1999).
[109] Interview Madrassa Director July 2007; Interview Ministry of Education Liaison to Arabic language schools July 2007; Interview with Arabic teacher Sikasso October 2009.
[110] The French initially labeled Salafist or reformists as Wahhabis, but eventually many of them came to accept this identity (Brenner 2007: 211). Today, many Malians refer to reformists, usually those who wear a full burqa or those men with long beards, as Wahhabis.

Figure 7: Primary Enrollment over Time[111]



Arabic teachers in Bamako explained that there has been a substantial increase in demand for their services in the last few years. Many of them teach part time at private schools, which increasingly offer Arabic classes, in addition to their full-time work at madrassas.[112] Initially, donors attributed the new increases in enrollment to the formal inclusion of madrassas into the Ministry records, but the recent statistics reveal that this growth is real– even in an environment of expanding Francophone options.

Maybe a quote from one of the teachers here

3.7 Schooling Supply in Mali

To understand the breadth and diversity of educational increases it is important to describe the educational sector in Mali. Schooling in Mali is comprised of 9 years of basic or primary education, followed by four years at formal, lycée or in 2 or 4 year degree at a vocational school. The primary cycle is divided into a first and second cycle. After students

[111] Graph calculated using Brenner 2001, The Annual Min of Education Report for 2004-5 and 2006-7.
[112] Interview with focus group of 4 Arabic teachers at secondary madrassa in Faladie (March 2009)

complete six years of school, they must pass an exam to enter the second cycle of primary school. After they complete three additional years, they take an entrance exam, which determines if they can place into a lycée. There are still very high attrition rates in the second cycle of primary and in high school.

Table 3: Malian Schooling System

Elementary Education First Cycle CP1 – Year 1	**Secondary** Lycée Year 1 Lycée
CP2 – Year 2	Year 2 Lycée
CE1 – Year 3	Year 3 Terminale
CE2 – Year 4	Vocational Track 1 Year 1
CM1 – Year 5	Year 2 (Take CAP Exam)
CM2- Year 6 (Take CP Exam)	Vocational Track Vocational Year 1
Second Cycle 7th Grade (Start of Second Cycle)	Vocational Year 2 (Take Exam BT1)
8th Grade	Vocational Year 3
9th Grade (Take DEF Exam)	Vocational Year 4 (Take Exam BT2)

Most Malians, including the respondents in my survey, never make it past the first cycle of elementary school. Many factors, including poor student performance, lack of resources to pay school fees, increased need for agricultural or domestic labor, sickness, disability, and early marriage for girls, contribute to high attrition rates. The chart below demonstrates the

percentages of the population that have attained the commensurate levels of education. Only about 45% of the population has had any kind of formal schooling. This does not mean that they have completed the 9 year cycle, but that they have any experience in primary school. Less than 10% of the population has attended any secondary school and less than 2% of Malians report attending university.

Figure 8: Respondents' Highest Level of Educational Attainment[113]



3.7.1 Types of Schooling

The educational expansion has changed perception of schooling options. For those Malians with sufficient means, public school is increasingly viewed as being of inferior quality to private schooling. In most rural areas, public schools are the only educational institutions – especially at the secondary level. Public schools are managed and funded by the Malian Ministry of Education. Schools fees, which range from $.50 to $10 dollars a year per pupil, are managed by the parent-teachers association (APE). Enrollment still outpaces the public school infrastructure; the Malian government pays for the majority of its secondary students to attend

[113] Percentages based on Afrobarometer 2005 survey data, which is based on a nationally representative sample.

private high schools because there are insufficient numbers of public secondary schools. Competition for secondary placement is fierce and the government institutes age cut-offs, which make all graduates over 17 ineligible for government scholarship to high school. The university system, based in Bamako, is public; it is not uncommon for more than 1000 students to crowd into a lecture hall.

Private schools mushroomed in capital cities, and now represent up to 50% of provision in some schools districts in Bamako, Sikasso, and Kayes.[114] In these schools education is Francophone and secular; schools typically offer smaller class sizes than public schools. This is made possible through more lenient regulations about teacher qualifications and building codes. Christian schools historically received subsidies from the state and many of them continue to receive funding in the current context (Lange and Diarra 1999). There is a great diversity between types of private schools. A typical private school charges between 2,000-2,500 CFA ($4-5) a month, but more elite private schools in Bamako can cost upwards of $2,000 a year. Private high schools outnumber public providers at the secondary level. For instance, only four of approximately fifty high schools in Bamako's Rive Gauche are public.

Private schools provide jobs for many unemployed graduates. A private school direct or in Bamako explained his motivations for starting his school in Niamakoro in 1992: "I already had the idea I wanted to do something for myself – that was my philosophy – I didn't really want to work for the state; it was very difficult – I was without resources, without anything – I started with 16 students, but with time, and good exam results - people talked and more people came."[115] The schooling economy in Bamako is growing as many parents, with sufficient means, forgo public schools to enroll children in private schools with higher passage rates.

[114] Ministry of Education Annual Report 2006-2007
[115] Interview February 26, 2009

Some public school teachers are wary that private schooling has commoditized education and incentivized grade inflation.[116] Private universities have just been introduced in the past few years.

The Malian state groups *Christian schools* as a sub-set of private schools. During the colonial and post-independence periods the government worked in exclusive collaboration with the Catholic Church as the only accredited private provider. Catholic schools received subsidies from the Malian government despite the fact that Christians make up a small minority of the Malian population. The Catholic Church is still the dominant Christian provider in Mali and has primary and as secondary schools in many regional capitals. Some learners attend mission schools at subsidized rates, but others pay more than $300 a year for tuition. Catholic schools are recognized for quality; most survey respondents that reported attending these schools were Muslim.

Decentralized *community schools* have existed since de-colonization, but flourished in the mid-1990s as a result of the USAID-funded community school program. In 1994, community schools were formally acknowledged as "a subcategory of private schools in Mali, defined as any not-for-profit education center created and managed by a community or association, as opposed to an individual or corporations."[117] NGOs provide community members with training on management as well as supplementary literacy courses; the government provides monitoring and teacher training.[118] Many of the teachers are community members themselves. Some community schools use French as the language of instruction and others use indigenous languages to transition to French instruction. Most community schools only offer education through the first cycle of primary school.

[116] Interviews with public school teachers in Bamako July 2007 and Sikasso October 2009
[117] http://www.equip123.net/docs/e2-MaliCaseStudy.pdf
[118] Interview M. Coulibaly, World Education Employee March 2009

Related to community schools are community literacy centers, which offer indigenous-language literacy classes to citizens' who did not receive formal education. These literacy centers were part of Konare's campaign for" a school or community educational center (CED) in each village." Classes are designed to help participants learn to read, write, and calculate in Bambara (or another relevant indigenous language) – allowing them to better organize themselves and their agricultural/market activities (Gerard 1997: 75).

Madrassas are Arabic-language private schools that offer a modern curriculum in addition to religious instruction. Currently, the largest percentages of learners attending madrassas are in districts in Bamako, Sikasso, and Kayes.[119] Madrassas charge tuition rates between $3-5 per month, but like their Christian-peer institutions, many offer subsidized tuition to some poorer learners.[120] Some madrassas receive external funding through remittances from the US and Europe.[121] Foreign donors, notably Kaddafi, have also contributed money into the construction of madrassas.[122] Although more recently some madrassas have begun to offer secondary education, the majority of respondents in the sample attended madrassas exclusively at the primary level. Presently, the Malian government monitors and provides technical support to madrassas through the Center for the Promotion of the Arabic Language housed in the Ministry of Education. Students hoping to continue their studies set their sights on scholarship programs abroad in other Islamic nations including Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.[123] Madrassas also represent mobility and the links to the broader Muslim world that are a scarce resource in Mali; many of the teachers in madrassas have spent time abroad and are

[119] Ministry of Education Report 2006-2007
[120] Interview with Madrassa director in Niamokoro, Bamako (February 2009)
[121]Interview with teachers and school directors in Kayes (July/August 2009)
[122] During recent UN/NATO attacks on Libya, local radio DJs championed Khaddafi and criticized Malians for their lack of support to a man who had paid for so many mosques and madrassas. There were a series of protests in Bamako during the beginning of the UN occupation
[123] Soares 2005 and Brenner 2001

perceived as having access to resources and personal connections in other countries. The Malian 2005-2006 Annual Education Report revealed that there were 81 primary school teachers in madrassas with four-year college degrees, more than three times the number of primary school teachers in public schools with the same level degrees.[124] Madrassas use Arabic as their primary language of instruction although the law requires them to teach French as a subject.

Koranic schools are the only school type that has not been integrated into the government system. Koranic teachers were upset at the government decision to omit Koranic education from government subsidies or accreditation programs. They felt that it was unjust for madrassas to receive support, while the vulnerable populations they educate, are excluded from government aid. As one Koranic school director told me, "Our students – they too are *jamandenw* (citizens); we house them, we cloth them, and feed them – we should receive help from the government to accomplish these tasks.[125] As discussed earlier, Koranic schools focus on memorization and deeper understanding of the Koran. Louis Brenner describes them:

> Virtually all Muslim children in the past attended Qur'anic schools where most of them learned to recite at least some verses of the Qur'an and where they learned the fundamentals of their religion. A minority of these students might continue their schooling until they are able to recite the entire Qur'an, and a still smaller minority might continue their studies in *majlis*, where they would study selected texts of Muslim religious sciences. *Majlis* studies began with elementary books, usually in *tawhid* and *fiqh*, and depending on the student could continue for many years to include major Islamic texts. It was only in the majlis that Arabic was taught systematically (Brenner 2007: 203).

At the most advanced levels, Koranic schools provided an opportunity of advancement and mastery unavailable in madrassas. A minority of Koranic school students have been able to reach advanced levels of study in *majlis*, while most madrassas schooling offered only primary degrees. Informal Koranic education continues to flourish in Mali, often accommodating poorer

[124] Author's calculation using 2006 Ministry of Education Report
[125] Interview with Kayes Association of Koranic teachers in Kayes August 2009

populations who cannot afford to go to formal school and/or providing supplementary religious instruction for students who go to state schools (Gandolfi 271). Students read text from Arabic, but most of the instruction is in local language until the highest levels of study. Education is hierarchical and personal; a teacher transfers knowledge to his student. A Koranic student is generally required to beg for alms totaling 100cfa or $.20; in some cases students live with their teachers and this money goes toward their food and educational expenses.[126] Other students attend Koranic schools to supplement Francophone education.[127]

Table 4: Comparative Analysis of School Type in Mali

School Type	Language of Instruction	Accredited by State?	Highest Level of Schooling Available?	Primary School Fees?
Public	French or Bambara to French	Yes	University	$.50 to $10 per year
Private, Secular	French	Yes	University	$4-5 a month for most; some in Bamako up to $20-40 a month
Christian	French	Yes	High School	$10-15 a month
Madrassa	Arabic (Franco-Arabic schools also teach in French)	Yes	High School	$3-5 a month
Koranic	Local Language/Arabic	No	Until mastery of Islamic Knowledge	$1 a month

[126] Data from surveys with parents who send their children to Koranic schools

[127] This group is underreported in the survey as parents who sent children to a school, did not receive a second prompt to ask if they sent the same children to another school type; if parents responded that their children went to no school, then they received a second prompt question asking specifically about Koranic school.

Community	French or Local Language to French	Yes	Most only through first cycle of elementary school	Sometimes goods in lieu of school fees
Literacy Centers	Local Language	No	Informal only	The majority are free

3.7.2 Enrollment Patterns

In the 2006-2007 school year, 65% of primary school children attended public school, 11% attended madrassas, 17% attended decentralized community schools, and 7% attended private secular or Christian schools in Mali.[128] In my survey sample, 44% of respondents attended public school, 31% attended Koranic schools, 10% attended madrassas, 12% attended private secular or Christian schools, and three percent attended community schools or literacy centers. Since community school programs are relatively recent, I was not able to sufficiently capture students who had attended community school in my survey sample. I was able to include some recipients of government-sponsored literacy training in my sample who are coded as having received "informal education." Like literacy centers, I treat Koranic instruction, regardless of length of tutelage, as informal education.

[128] 2006-2007 Ministry of Education Annual Report. The state report does not include Koranic enrollment.

Figure 9: Highest Level of Education for Survey Respondents



The respondents' educational levels are slightly higher than national averages. In 2006 the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment rates in Mali was 36.7% as compared to 53% of all survey respondents who had primary, secondary, or tertiary schooling.[129]

3.8 Girls' Education

In Mali, women are about 1.5 times as likely as men to be illiterate (Education for All 2010: 96). Due to the strong educational disparities between men and women, it is important isolate and review women's educational profiles. In many ways, the story of educational expansion in Mali is a story about unprecedented opportunities for girls. During the colonial period, few members of Malian society enrolled their daughters in school. In 1949, only 21% of primary school students in the French Soudan were girls (Gerard 1997: 106). In the post independence period, little progress was made in terms of women's education. However, the transition to democracy, and concurrent campaign for Educational for All, has targeted women's

[129] Data from Thunissen 2009 citing UNICEF 2006

enrollment. In Mali, girls' net enrollment has increased from 16% before the democratic transition to almost 43% in 2004.[130]

Many challenges to girls' education remain. Parents frequently pull girls out of school for early marriage or out of fear that they will become pregnant if allowed to fraternize with boys outside the home. Gerard adds that some rural households worry that educated daughter-in-laws will become too empowered and refuse arranged marriage and/or be able to seek administrative recourse in the case of a conflict with her husband (1999). Girls' primary completion rates are less than 40%, while boys' completion rates are almost 60% (*World Bank Education Statistics April 2008).*The obstacles to girls' education are higher in certain ethnic groups. Primary school teachers in Kayes region explained that they faced particular problems encouraging Soninke girls to stay enrolled past sixth grade despite sensitization campaigns.[131] It should be noted that expected returns for education are different for boys and girls as boys are expected to contribute to the household after they are married, while girls join their in-laws family and are not required to continue to send money to their own parents. This makes the productive investment aspect of education, less relevant for daughters than sons.

Despite the many gender inequities in Mali, it should be noted that women who are able to achieve the highest levels of education are able to attain the highest positions in government. In spring 2011, following the resignation of Prime Minister Modibo Sidibe, President Toure appointed Madame Cisse Mariam Sidibe Kaïdama as Mali's first female prime minister. In addition, 22% of ministers are female as well as 15 members of the National Assembly. Women have had a more difficult time winning votes at the local level, but this also reflects their lower level of educational attainment: women make up fewer than 9% of municipal officials

[130] http://www.indexmundi.com/mali/net-enrolment-ratio-in-primary-education,-girls.html
[131] The teacher noted success of PAM and UNICEF competitions for attendance rates on female student retention.

3.9 Regional Variation

<u>Figure 10: Map of Mali[132]</u>

Mali is 1.24 million square kilometers and each region has vastly different types of schooling infrastructure and opportunities.[133] I selected survey sites in to maximize the variation in the citizens' educational experiences: the prevalence and popularity of different school types in each school district. My research design created a substantial urban and peri-urban bias as rural areas of the country have far fewer schooling opportunities and fewer schooling choices. I did include two rural school districts, in Sikasso and Sevare, to try to capture the specific challenges facing rural communities. I take a cue from Lauren MacLean's rich depiction of

[132] Nations Online Map of Mali: www.nationsonline.org
[133] http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Mali.html

village life in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire (2010) and offer a brief description of the ten districts: Faladie, Banconi, and Bamako Coura in Bamako, Kayes Rive Droite and Kayes Rive Gauche, Sikasso 1 and 2, Mopti, Sevare, and Timbuktu.

3.9.1 Bamako

Bamako is a dusty, sprawling city with an estimated 1-3 million inhabitants representing most of the country's sixty-two ethnic groups.[134] Bamako has the largest educational market in the country. Bamako is home to the national university, which attracts learners from all regions of the country. As the national capital, Bamako has always had the most schooling options. In 2009, Bamako's red dirt roads were still paved only in the most trafficked areas. Architecture in the capital city ranges from large cement three-story houses that hold large extended families to more modest mud/cement one-story homes. Bamako's "sky scrapers," which can be counted on two hands, include awkward government ministries, banks, and newly constructed Libyan/Chinese hotels. With few landmarks or street signs, the cities plan eludes all but the most seasoned public transport drivers. Music blares from all angles and seems to intensify Bamako's frenzied pace. In the last eight years, donkey carts have given way to privately owned vehicles and flashy SUVs. Cell phones and plastic motorbikes called "jakartas" are fairly commonplace in most Bamakoise households.

Bamako's most prominent feature is the Niger River that divides the city in two distinct sides: Rive Droite and Rive Gauche. Two bridges strain to facilitate the steady morning flow of cars, motos, and bicycles from the residential neighborhoods in Rive Droite to the commercial centers in Rive Gauche. The oldest neighborhoods in Bamako, as well as the most famous markets, are located in Rive Gauche. Rive Droite, settled in the 1950s when residents could still

[134]Despite this diversity, intermarriage is common and most households speak Bambara. http://www.joshuaproject.net/countries.php?rog3=ML

purchase land using kola nuts, is home to the Bamako airport. The educational landscape of each side of the river reflects their historical legacies. The older neighborhoods in Rive Gauche have greater rates of public school provision per capita, while the recent private school boom is most apparent in the Rive Droite.

Public schools on the newer side of the Niger have been overwhelmed by this demographic growth. School teachers struggle with more than 100 learners in a classroom. As one sixth grade teacher explained, "Technically, we are only supposed to allow a maximum of 75 learners in the class, but often you face more than 100 pupils in your class. What are you going to do – turn those kids away?"[135] Over-enrollment and overcrowding in public schools has diverted many learners to private school. A private school director in Bamako explained, "There has been a certain demographic growth that makes it difficult to satisfy the demand for education. There are a lot of students who cannot get into public school, so they are forced to go to private school."[136] In addition, lower poverty rates and less reliance on agricultural labor in Bamako, mean more students are enrolled in school than any other region of the country and that on more parents have the disposable income necessary to send their children to private school. As a result, some school districts in newer settlement districts in Bamako have private school enrollment rates of over 40% - more than four times the national average. My sample includes one district in Rive Droite: Faladie. Faladie is one of Bamako's newest communities and stretches from the Northern perimeter of the city towards the airport and includes the peri-urban village of Senou, which was not yet electrified at the time of the survey.

There other two districts are in the more established Rive Gauche – Bamako Coura and Banconi. Bamako Coura, whose name ironically means "new Bamako," lies at the heart of

[135] Interview with Niamakoro public school teacher (July 2007)
[136] Interview with Private school director, Niamakoura (February 2009)

downtown Bamako. Its faded sidewalks and European style parks are reminiscent of another era. Banconi lies further along the railroad line toward Koulikoro. It is home to one of Mali's most prolific religious figures – Haidara. His presence is felt, not only through his merchandise sold along street corners, but in the high rate of enrollment in madrassas in this school district.

Bamako has a strong market for Islamic education. Some of the first madrassas were built in Bamako in the 1950s including the Ecole Coranique Supérieure, a madrassa founded by university-educated Malians who returned from studies in Egypt and felt deceived and disappointed by the lack of opportunities in spite their prestigious diplomas (Brenner 2001: 56). As in other regions, madrassas find their base with members of the trading communities – particularly Soninke traders and those Malians that subscribe to a "reformist" version of Islam.[137] Some wealthy members of these communities constitute a differentiated market for Islamic education and clearly choose to enroll their children in religious schools despite the many school types that exist in Bamako.

3.9.2 Kayes

Kayes is the final railroad stop in Mali before the Senegalese border. The culture and legacy of the railroad resonates throughout the city. [138] Kayes, the former colonial capital, was home to the first French schools in Mali. Kayes is one of the hottest cities in the world, but many of the villages in the region are inaccessible during the rainy season. The majority of citizens in Kayes are Kassonke, Peul, Malinke, and Soninke. The former French capital, it is one of the few places in Mali where you can see remnants of colonial architecture including the railroad station. Kayes, like Bamako, is divided by a river – the Senegal; the bus from Bamako

[137] As explained, this is not an exclusive profile, but just the predominant groups that we associate with demand for schooling in madrassas. Gerard also finds that trading communities prefer madrassas in a study of education in Burkina Faso (1999: 158).

[138] See Brandon County's dissertation: Cheminots into Citizens: Labor, Migration, and Political Imagination along the Dakar/Niger Railroad, 1923-1974 for a history of political activism along the rail

first reaches the urban part of Kayes Rive Gauche (Kayes N'Dyi) – a much larger school district encompassing a vast network of villages in the region, before crossing the Senegal to the smaller, more compact Kayes Rive Droite. Residents complain that life in Kayes is expensive. There is no public transit in the city; taxi rides in Kayes cost a fixed rate of 1000 CFA ($2), which relative to the distance covered would be considered exorbitant in Bamako. The price reflects the poor quality of the roads, which are nearly impenetrable when muddy. Juxtaposed with the dirty landscape of city are the extravagant villas, built by Malian expatriates.

Kayes' education profile also reflects the disjuncture between the French legacy and expatriate remittance flows. The first French schools in Mali were built in Kayes in the late 1800s. However, two ethnic groups, the Soninke and Peul, have historically opted to send their children to Islamic schools. In one of the two school districts in Kayes, encompassing many of its surrounding villages, more than 30% of all primary learners go to madrassas. Unfortunately, the ministry of education does not capture enrollment in Koranic schools, but Kayes had the largest number of parents who send their children exclusively to Koranic schools. The Soninke, a migrant community, have dominated trade that stretched across the Sahel since before the Middle Ages.[139] Like all trading communities, the Soninke have had a contentious relationship with government regimes who seek to restrict movement and collect taxes. Known for their religious fervor, Soninke traditionally refused to send their children French "Christian" education (Manchuelle 1997: 204). The tension continues as Soninike emigrants in France chose to build new madrassas instead of helping to fund existing public schools in their villages. Teachers and doctors working in rural Kayes reported that Soninke expatriates in France and the US send remittances to build ostentatious houses and private health centers in villages throughout the

[139] See Francois Manuchelle's Willing Migrants for a comprehensive study of Soninke trade and migration.

region.[140] I interviewed a public school director who works in a village in the region of Kayes with a predominantly Soninke population. He explained how Soninke expatriates in France sent remittances to fund a state-of- the art madrassa in the same small village. He wrote a letter to the men in France and appealed to them to send some funding for his under-financed public school, but he was ultimately unsuccessful.[141]

Soninke emigration from the region is so pronounced, that the absence of Soninke males from households is tangible during our survey work; we encountered many female-headed households, where young women would respond to our questionnaires clutching state of the art camera-phones from France. The Fulani, or Peul, while less affluent, also tend to favor Islamic education –particularly Koranic schools. However, a parallel community of Soninke and Peule parents exists, which preferred Islamic education. Many members of the Peule community in the Kayes region prefer Koranic education because it is tied to their religious heritage and membership in the Sufi brotherhoods.[142] Of the 42 parents who enrolled children in Koranic schools, twenty-seven claimed to speak Pulaar at home.

3.9.3 Sikasso

Sikasso is an agricultural region in Southern Mali bordering Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Guinea. Sikasso produces the majority of Mali's cotton - Mali's primary export and weak world cotton prices have hurt producers. Referred to as the Sikasso paradox, the rich agricultural region has Mali's second highest poverty rates and lowest regional school enrollment averages (Delarue et al 2008). As an agricultural region, many families rely on their children's labor to work the family farms. The city of Sikasso's population is predominantly Senoufo, Mianka, and Bambara though immigration into the region by a vast number of ethnic groups is common given

[140] Interviews doctor, teachers, school director working in rural Kayes (August 2009)
[141] Interview with School Director (August 2009)
[142] Most students in the North go to Koranic school in addition to any government instruction.

its position on the roads to neighboring countries. Sikasso, particularly in the city, also has a growing market for Islamic education.[143] In comparison to Kayes, Sikasso's shady, tree-lined streets lack the same energy or cosmopolitan accoutrements. The Sikasso region was home to some of the strongest colonial resistance movements including those of Samory Toure and Babemba Traore. In the sheep market in the center of the city, you can still spot the crumbling remains of a wall built by Tieba Traore in the late 1800s, which protected the city from French invaders until his ultimate defeat.

Sikasso has traditionally had the lowest rates of school enrollment in the country, but has benefitted greatly from the community school program. Now close to thirty percent of all primary school learners in Sikasso attend community schools. As with the other regions, initially, madrassas in Sikasso were populated by the children of the Malian trading community (Amselle 1985). Sikasso is also highly dependent on agricultural labor; many parents explained tradeoffs between sending their child to school and having enough labor for their farms.

We conducted surveys in both Sikasso city and villages in Sikasso II, 40-20 miles Northwest of Sikasso city. Most community schools are found in the rural villages, such as those that make up Sikasso 2. The villages selected for our study in Sikasso II were predominantly Senoufo and most residents worked as farmers on the lush green landscape. Survey work in these zones required preliminary meetings with a village leader (*dugutigi*) and, in the larger villages, mayor.

3.9.4 Mopti/Sevare

Mopti and Sevare are twin cities in the middle of Mali, found along the country's "best road," which stretches from Bamako to Douentza. The gateway to the Northern part of Mali, Mopti and Sevare school districts reflect a blend of the cultures. A small, crowded city, Mopti

[143] Interview with school director and Arabic teacher Sikasso (October 2009)

exports fish to the other regions of Mali. Mopti sits along a narrow peninsula straddled by the Niger and Bani rivers. Referred to as the Venice of Africa, Mopti's ports welcome large, colorful *pinasses* ferrying people, livestock, and commerce from villages along the river into the vibrant market. Sevare city sits a couple of kilometers inland from Mopti. Its central location on the roads to Douentza, Bamako, Dogon Country, and Koutiala makes it a popular stop for tourists and NGOs. Like other historic cities in the region, including Djenne, Mopti has a long history of Islamic education.

We conducted surveys within Mote's urban school district as well as a second set of surveys in the greater Mopti region (Sevare school district). Our survey work in Sevare school district was done in villages in the surrounding region up and down the roads between San and Douentza. The villages are ethnically diverse: Peule, Bozo, Soninke, Songhrai, and Dogon. Mopti has high public school enrollment – greater than 80% of all students attend public primary school. Madrassa education is popular in the villages of Sevare region – 15% of all primary students in the school district attend madrassas and many others attend Koranic schools

3.9.5 Timbuktu

A center of Islamic and scientific thought, Timbuktu was home to some of the oldest universities in the world. By the 16th century under the Askia Dynasty, the approximately 25,000 students attended the famed University of Sankore, which was made up of independent colleges and schools run by single professors.[144] A full degree took approximately ten years and required mastering Arabic as well as memorization of the Koran. During this period, Timbuktu had one of the highest literacy rates in the world. Timbuktu also sits on the Niger - a day's drive up the dirt road from Douentza. The tree lined entrance to the city is reminiscent of Mopti, but the sandy

[144] http://www.Timbuktufoundation.org/university.html; http://www.muslimheritage.com/topics/default.cfm?TaxonomyTypeID=101&TaxonomySubTypeID=19&TaxonomyThirdLevelID=280&ArticleID=371; http://www.grioo.com/info5511.html

landscape quickly reminds visitors that they are on the edge of the desert. The sandy side streets are impenetrable to all but 4x4s and Peugeot motorcycles. The city's unique architecture and meticulously adorned wooden doors exude its rich heritage.

Like the other regions in the North of Mali, Kidal and Gao, Timbuktu looks distinct from the rest of Mali - as Bambara gives way to Songhrai as the prominent market language. Timbuktu's diverse population includes Tuaregs, Songhrai, Arabs, Bella, and Peule. Respondents to our surveys included those living in permanent houses as well as nomadic dwellers in make-shift huts nestled in openings within the city streets. In recent years, residents of Timbuktu have been victims of conflict. The Tuareg uprising of the 1990s, destroyed many schools and disrupted education provision in the region. Though these disputes were initially settled, insecurity has begun to plague Timbuktu and the rest of the North of the country again with the introduction of rebel and intra-community fighting in 2008 and 2009. Tension between the central government and the North remains as the Northerners feel marginalized from access to fewer job opportunities and state-resources. Attacks on soldiers and military installations by rebel groups have increased in the last few years. In addition, AQIM kidnapped a record number of foreigners in Mali and the surrounding areas in 2009 – drawing international attention to the region.

According to one of my research assistants, who grew up in Timbuktu, all public school learners also attend Koranic schools. He explained, "I remember getting up early to do my lessons at Koranic school, then we would all go to public school, and then after public school, we would return to Koranic school." Our surveys in Timbuktu confirmed this pattern of public

school parents simultaneously enrolling their children in Koranic school for supplementary religious instruction.[145]

3.10 Conclusion

The dramatic increases in enrollment and the recent accreditation of non-state schools generate interesting questions about the impact of educational policy on democratization. Historically, we imagine the state monopoly over education shaping citizens political knowledge, experience, and expectations. What are the effects of a massive educational expansion on democratic citizenship? The expanding role of Islamic education raises additional questions about the role of madrassa alumni in the future of Malian democracy. How might different types of schools shape citizens' knowledge or patterns of political participation? The next chapter explores the relationship between citizens' educational experiences and their political knowledge and participation to forecast the effects of these policy changes.

[145] Koranic enrollment was generally under-reported among parents who simultaneously send their children to other school types in addition to Koranic school. Parents were only primed with a second question about Islamic education if they provided a no education response.

Chapter 4

Can Education Create Better Citizens: Students?

4.1 Introduction

We started our survey in Bamako on a Sunday afternoon. Djenebou and I walked down a red, dirt-road in Niamakoro[146] counting houses. At the fifth house, we saw Mamadou[147], a wealthy, Soninke business man, sitting outside drinking tea with his *grin.*[148] We approached the group, explained our mission, and asked those members who lived in the household if they would be willing to participate in our survey. The group laughed at the sight of two women, an American and a university student, speaking Bambara and inquiring about their opinions. Everyone agreed to participate so we passed out playing cards. Mamadou pulled the highest playing card, and was thereby selected to participate in the survey (F70). Djenebou read the first series of questions about education, but as she broached the topic of politics, Mamadou grew impatient with us. I coded one "I don't know" response after another before he stood up from his metal chair, sipped a shot of tea, and then explained that he was busy and needed to stop the interview. As we reluctantly packed up, he defended his early departure, "I never went to school, so I am not involved in politics. I don't know anything about politics – I focus on the market." Like many Soninke, Mamadou had attended an informal Koranic school as a youth, but had never gone to Francophone school. He then offered, "My children are in school, so maybe they can get involved in politics." Mamadou saw different possibilities for his two boys and two girls who attend an elite, private Francophone school in Bamako.

[146] Niamakoro is a newer, neighborhood in Bamako in the Faladie school district.
[147] The names of all respondents have been changed to protect their identity.
[148] "Grin" is a Bambara word that refers to a group of friends who gather weekly to drink tea and hang out; the group can be same sex or mixed, but members are generally roughly the same age.

Mamadou's understanding of the relationship between education and politics mirrors that of many political scientists and policy makers: more educated citizens are better able to understand and participate in politics. Will this assumption hold in a nascent, Muslim, African democracy with a diverse portfolio of accredited education providers? Can Islamic schooling also increase one's capacity as a citizen?

This chapter analyzes the schooling experience of citizens to assess the impact of education on political knowledge and political participation. I find that all forms and levels of education, even informal and Islamic education, are significantly correlated with increased political knowledge compared to citizens with no education. I argue that education increases citizens' political knowledge by building citizens' cognitive skills. I also find that formal education is correlated with a greater likelihood of participating in difficult political activities including campaigning, willingness to run for office, and contacting a government official. I argue that education facilitates these activities by empowering citizens with greater internal efficacy and through the transmission of French literacy. Contrary to my initial expectations, I do not find significant differences among the political knowledge and most forms of participation for the alumni of state schools and citizens who attended non-state schools including madrassas and Koranic schools at the primary level.[149]

4.2 What do Citizens Know and Why do they Participate: Building Initial Hypotheses.

Existing theoretical literature and empirical research suggests that educated Malian students will know more about politics than their uneducated peers. Education could generate political knowledge through a number of mechanisms: democratic/liberal curriculum,

[149] This analysis is conducted exclusively for citizens with a maximum of primary and informal levels of school since so few respondents attended secondary madrassas (9).

empowerment, literacy, and socialization.[150] Drawing on this literature, I begin with a basic hypothesis that the citizens with any level of education will have greater political knowledge than citizens who did not attend any school.

H(1): *Citizens who have had any level of schooling will be more likely to provide correct responses to the political knowledge questions than those citizens with no education.*

Currently, students attend accredited non-state schools including secular, private schools, Christian schools, and madrassas as well as Koranic schools. It is possible that these schools will not develop Malian citizens as well as public schools[151] because are less invested in democratic/civic ideologies, because they discourage students from learning about secular politics, and/or because they teach in languages other than French (the language of the bureaucracy). For instance, private schools, which are primarily profit-seeking enterprises, could be less committed than state-schools to the project of state building.[152] Dahl's argument that education created better democratic citizens was predicated upon the assumption that schools were committed to liberal, democratic ideals (1967). It is possible that Islamic schools may be less committed to these ideologies. Also due to the history of contention between religious authorities and the secular state in West Africa, Islamic schools may be less invested in state-building and they might even discourage students from learning about or participating in secular politics (Manchuelle1997; Brenner 2001; Idrissa 2008). This juxtaposition further suggests that alumni of Islamic schools might be less willing to follow or engage in politics. For these reasons, I expect students who attend state schools should be more informed about politics than

[150] See Chapter 1 for a complete review of this literature that includes diverse thinkers such as Amyarta Sen (1999), Weber (1976), Nie et al (1996) and Almond and Verba (1963).
[151] I use state and public schools interchangeably to refer to schools that are managed directly by the Ministry of Education.
[152] In their criticism of private schools, many public school educators made this assertion (Interviews Bamako 2007).

those students who attend non-state schools including madrassas, private secular schools, Koranic schools, and community schools.

H(2): *Citizens who attended public schools will be more likely to provide correct responses to political knowledge questions that peers with the same level of education who attended other schools*

Literature on American political participation demonstrates that the most educated citizens are also the most active in all forms of politics due to higher internal efficacy, greater investment in and support for democratic institutions, higher skill levels, and closer connections to central nodes of political power.[153] However, studies of voting and political mobilization in Africa problematize this assumption. Voters are often mobilized by political entrepreneurs through the use of short-term incentives such as bribes and threats (Collier 2009, Banegas 1998). In our exit polling during the 2009 Municipal Elections, my research team observed voters being rewarded with breakfast sandwiches or money. When I asked people in my neighborhood who they voted for, too often the respondent, sometimes adorned a party t-shirt, would turn to someone else in the compound and ask: "Which party is it that I support?" During election week, the streets of Bamako became plastered with layers of party posters, roving teams of party supporters on motorcycles, and professional "animators" paid to dance on the back of rented trucks.[154] Citizens complained that parties were not giving out as many gifts to urban zones this

[153] Extensive literature includes Almond and Verba 1963, Lipset 1959, Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, Scholzman, Verba, and Brady 1995, and Nie et al 1996

[154] If citizens reported engaging in these activities, they were coded as 1; if they did not know or responded that they had not engaged in these behaviors – they were coded as 0. For voting behavior, I excluded those respondents who were ineligible to vote in 2007, but due to Afro-barometer coding options that I had adopted unregistered and young voters were grouped together in the same category. I relied on notes from coders, but may have included some no responses for voters who were not eligible thus deflating turnout for younger voters. I coded all no responses as 0 except for instances where the respondent noted that they were prevented from voting, which I excluded. All non-responses were

year; there were fewer t-shirts or household supplies. However, young people still managed to earn a couple of dollars rounding up people to go to the polls and political parties continued to hold high profile soccer matches in most neighborhoods. ADEMA, which dominated the municipal elections, reportedly paid $1000 prize to a winner of one of these tournaments.[155]

If certain aspects of participation, such as voting and political identification, are rewarded or punished by a third party, we need to expand the "D" term in Riker and Ordeshook's infamous voter's calculation (1970).[156] These incentives could obfuscate the relationship between education and participation. If, as some research suggests, educated voters are less reliant upon political parties and therefore less vulnerable to these threats and incentives, then they might be less likely to be targeted for mobilization and/or less likely to turn-out to the polls (Kramon 2010; Dalton 2006). Blaydes argues that the negative relationship between education and voting is due to the poor's vulnerability to vote-buying (2006).

Because of the noise introduced by these short-term incentives, I focus on other aspects of participation, such as campaigning, running for office, and contacting a government official outside of the electoral context, which require greater skill regardless of incentives offered. These activities require skill beyond stating your party of preference or stepping into a rented *sotrama*[157] that transports voters to the polls. Nie et al refer to these as "difficult forms of participation (1996)." I hypothesize that education will increase difficult participation: campaigning for a candidate, running for office, and contacting an official in the electoral off-

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dropped from the sample. I keep all activities as isolated dependent variables since it is unclear which aspects of participation are associated.

[155] Informal interview with participating soccer player (March 2009)

[156] The D term refers to benefits that voters receive from voting; this is not to assert that all African voters are confronted with these incentives, but to state that I feel they are prevalent enough to obstruct the relationship between education and voting.

[157] *Sotramas* are privately-owned green mini-vans that form the Malian public transit system.

cycle. This does not eliminate the possibility that these activities are also incentivized, but the skill threshold would serve as an impediment to those who are less educated.

H (3): *Citizens with greater levels of education will participate in "difficult" forms of politics more often.*

Different schools might foster or restrict participation in different ways. For instance, we might imagine students who attend private school, will be less dependent on or familiar with the state and thus be less inclined to participate in democratic politics (Hirschman 1970). I have already discussed the separate spheres of influence occupied by religious and secular authorities. Unlike many Muslim countries where Islamic clerics mobilize voters, we do not observe effective political mobilization in formal electoral channels by religious leaders (Sears 2007).[158] Therefore, students who attend religious schools might be more committed to solidarity with religious and traditional leaders and hesitant to express their preferences directly to the secular authorities (Brenner 2001; Gandolfi 2003; Soares 2006). Despite government requirements that madrassas teach French, few madrassas provide comprehensive French instruction. A study of Malian madrassas revealed that the schools spent an average of 5 hours a week teaching French and Koranic schools included no French in their curriculum (Moussa et al 2007).[159] Therefore alumni of Islamic schools are less likely to gain the linguistic skills needed to participate in difficult forms of politics than those citizens who attended Francophone schools.

H (4): *State school graduates will participate in all forms of politics at higher levels than their peers who attended non-state schools.*

4.3 Analyzing the Relationship between Education, Knowledge, and Participation

[158] In contrast to informal political mobilization such as the 2009 Family Code Protests described in Chapter 2.

[159] Usually lack of French language proficiency creates barriers for madrassa learners to switch over to Francophone school. When students switch from Arabic to French schools, they usually have to repeat multiple grades in order to gain French language skills.

To assess Malians' perspectives on politics, the government, and education, our research team walked through cities and villages in Mali. We sat in compounds, and talked to respondents as they washed clothes, played cards, nursed babies, chopped wood, pounded millet, cooked, collected well water, and tinkered with broken appliances. After eleven months, we amassed a survey of one thousand citizens in ten school districts.[160]

I used a stratified, area probability sampling within ten school districts for my sample (Fowler 2009:29). I selected school districts using Ministry of Education data on education provision to maximize potential variation on my independent variable: type of school.[161] Ten districts were selected from 5 regions: Bamako, Kayes, Sikasso, Mopti, and Timbuktu. Because I hoped to capture a diverse group of providers, and due to logistic and budget constraints, my sample also reflects an urban bias as compared to a representative national sample. As detailed in Chapter 1, neighborhoods were selected using an online randomizer. Households and individuals were selected using Afrobarometer protocol.[162]

The survey included questions about two main dependent variables, political knowledge and political participation as well as questions about respondents' education profiles, my primary explanatory variable, and a series of socio-economic controls.[163] I assessed respondents' education in two ways: the highest level of education they had attained and the schools that they

[160] School districts were selected for to maximize independent variable, school type, and neighborhoods, households, and individuals were selected randomly. For survey procedures please refer to Chapter 1.
[161] As advocated by King, Keohane, and Verba, I chose districts to maximize potential variation on the independent variable (as well as control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables (140).
[162] Due to limited time and resources, we followed Afrobarometer regulations except we did not alternate respondents by gender, we only chose among household members who were in the compound on arrival, and we did not return to houses, which had members absent.
[163] Full survey protocol explained in Chapter 1

had attended.[164] This allows me to test the effects of the *length of schooling* as well as the *type of provider*.

We asked five Afro-barometer questions to evaluate the first dependent variable: citizens' political knowledge. One question evaluated local level political knowledge by asking respondents to name their mayor. Three questions asked about familiarity with national level politics: 1) What is the name of the president of the national assembly? 2) What party has the majority of seats in the assembly? 3) What are the term limits for the president?
During my stay in Mali, citizens and news outlets were engaging in heated debates over issues such as the revised Family Code and the secondary school promotion system. While my indicators only scrape the surface of political debates or national issues of interest, they do offer insight into citizens' abilities to name important and relevant political players and one basic rule in their constitution.

[164] For *education level*, people who did not attend any school were coded as 0, those who received informal education, including Koranic school and literacy training, were coded as 1, those who received ant primary education were coded as 2, those with secondary education were coded as 3 and those with university education were coded as 4. Only the highest category of response was coded. For instance, someone who attended Koranic school and public secondary school was coded as both Koranic and public for school type and level of education as 3. To measure school types, I created dummy variables based on schools that respondents attended based on the categories of public, private/Christian, Koranic, CED/Community school or madrassa

Table 5: Dependent Variables

Political Knowledge	Who is the mayor of (name locality)?	Who is the President of the National Assembly?	What party has the most seats in the National Assembly?	How long can someone serve as President?	
Political Participation	Did you vote in the 2007 Presidential Elections? (Easy)	Do you feel close to a political party? (Easy)	Did you participate in a campaign for the 2007 Presidential Elections? (Hard)	Would you Run for Political Office? (Hard)	Have you ever visited a government official to express an idea or to resolve a problem? (Hard)

I include multiple Afro-barometer indicators to capture a broad range of formal "political participation." Following Nie et al., I separate participation into two categories based on the skill required: easy and difficult (1996). These measures of participation are far from inclusive, but provide insight into some fundamental political behaviors. I did not feel that a survey instrument could capture candid responses about contentious participation such as protests or boycotts, so the dependent variables focus on participation in formal channels.[165]

I include control variables for factors that might obscure or inflate the relationship between education, knowledge, and participation: gender, age, rural/urban, school district, and poverty. [166] Mali has one of the lowest gender parity ratings in the world (Wing 2009). Studies

[165] I also thought that these questions might invoke suspicion or fear in respondents. I tried to keep the survey as mundane and practical as possible.

[166] The index combines the number of household possessions (radio, television, motorized vehicle, and cell phone) and the frequency of deprivation from food, water, medicine, and firewood/charcoal. Respondents get two points for each item they own and four points if they own a motorized vehicle, so that the wealth index ranges from 0-10. Deprivation ranges from never (0) to always (4), so the maximum

using Afrobarometer data reveal that African men are more likely than women to engage in all aspects of politics (Logan 2010: 17; MacLean 2011:17). Historically, many fewer women attended school than men, so it is important to separate gender effects out from education, since excluding gender might inflate the effect of education as women are also less active in the public sphere than men. Afro-barometer data also reveals that older citizens are more likely to vote (MacLean 2011; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005). In Mali, primary school enrollment has increased dramatically in the last twenty years; therefore older respondents will have been less likely to have attended school. Fox and Ishayama found a reverse correlation between age and partisan identification, where younger Malians were more likely to claim attachment to a party (2006). Age might obscure the relationship between participation and education, since older citizens generally vote more often or might identify with a party less strongly, but are also likely to be less educated. [167] I code all respondents by decade of birth to separate out the effects of age.

Although socio-economic indicators have not proven determinant in previous studies of voting behavior, (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005), Maclean found poverty to be correlated with higher rates of reporting contact with a politician (2012); higher levels of education and household wealth are generally correlated so I include a proxy for poverty in order to try to separate these effects. Political mobilization is different in villages than in urban areas. Many rural zones continue to operate through consensual governments where residents unanimously select a candidate with the "guidance" of traditional leaders.[168] In her study of Afrobarometer countries, Logan finds that rural citizens are more likely to participate in politics than urban citizens (2010:17). Fox and Ishayama find rural residents of Afrobarometer countries have

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score is 16. Then separated all scores into five quintiles: 10to 6 rich, 5 to1 comfortable, 0- to -4 average,-5 to-9 poor, and -10 to -16 very poor.

[167] Coded as: 18-28=1; 29-38=2; 39-48=3; 49-58=4; 59-68=5; 69+=6.

[168] Interview with executive member of the National Independent Election Committee (CENI)

stronger partisan identification (2006). MacLean finds rural residents more likely to contact a political leader (2012:21). People in rural zones are also typically less educated since there is less school infrastructure in rural areas. It is important to control for rural/urban residence to eliminate this bias. Finally, the school districts surveyed vary greatly in terms of educational possibilities, political candidates, party strength, and voter turnout, so I add a control for districts to parse out regional effects from those that are truly a result of education.[169]

I include two additional controls in my evaluation of education's role in facilitating political participation: membership in a secular organization and membership in a religious organization. [170] Scholars of West Africa have found that "agencies of mobilization," including parties and civil society organizations play an important role in mobilizing turnout (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Koter 2009; Beck 2008). In her analysis of Afrobarometer data MacLean finds that rural residents and poorer respondents are more likely to report "joining together to make claims (2011)." Using 2001 Afrobarometer data, Fox and Ishayama find that membership in a Malian civil society organization is correlated with identifying with a party (2006).

I observed this phenomenon while sitting in on campaign meetings for a municipal candidate in Bamako. The primary strategy for getting voters out to the polls was to target patrons or associational presidents who could organize members to come out to vote. Prospective campaign members would tout their ability to mobilize specific demographics such as neighborhood youth organizations. This "consensual" system was of organizing and voting is even more exaggerated at the village level.[171] If more educated citizens are also more or less

[169] For instance, we know that there are substantial regional differences in terms of voter turnout.
[170] Each respondent was asked about her degree of involvement in religious and other associations: no involvement, member, active member, or leader so that responses for both religious association and associational membership are coded on a scale of 0-3.
[171] Interview with executive members of the National Electoral Commission May 2009; Interview with Malian academic March 2009

likely to join organizations than average citizens, correlations might capture the effect of these organizations rather than education itself. Therefore I include it as a control to exclude that possibility.

Table 6 provides summary statistics for my sample and from Round 3 of Afrobarometer, which was administered in 2005. I caution that these surveys are not completely comparable since the Afrobarometer data references the Presidential election in 2002, while respondents in my sample referenced the 2007 elections.[172]

Table 6: Summary Statistics

Education Level	**My Sample 2009**	**Afrobarometer 2005**
None	17%	43%
Informal	29%	22%
Primary	34%	24%
Secondary	16%	9%
University	3%	2%
Knowledge		
Can name the Mayor	50%	65%
Can name President of the National Assembly	36%	41%
Can name Majority Party	41%	12%
Can name Term Limits	70%	60%
Participation		
Voted in 2007/2002	66%	78%

[172] In 2002-2007, the majority party (URD) only had a 1 seat advantage over ADEMA, while ADEMA now enjoys a substantial number of seats in the Assembly. The President of the national assembly in 2005 (IBK) was more well-known figure than the current president. Finally, our surveys were completed during municipal election time – leading to some confusion between the former and newly elected official.

Identify with a Party	52%	61%
Campaigned in 2007/2002	29%	NA
Would Run for Office	34%	NA
Contacted a Government Official	23%	30%
Women	54%	42%
Rural	20%	73%
N	1006	1244

4.4 Education and Political Knowledge

In order to compare the effect of the each level of education (informal, primary, secondary, and university) as compared to a reference category of citizens with no education, on the four political knowledge variables, I generate dummy variables for each level of education. In my first model, I regress the knowledge variables on the level of education and controls for sex, poverty, rural, age, and school district. Bamako is used as the regional reference category for all regressions except the question on "the majority party," which compares all school districts to Timbuktu due to ADEMA[173]'s strong presence in Timbuktu region.[174]

The evidence uniformly supports Hypothesis 1 (*higher levels of education are correlated with more correct responses on the political knowledge questions*). Any level of formal education (primary, secondary, and university) has positive and significant ($p<.01$) effect on the predicted probability that the respondent will provide correct responses to each question as compared to the reference category of no education. In addition, informal education has a

[173] ADEMA-PASJ (Alliance for Democracy in Mali-Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity and Justice) is the currently the party with most seats in the National Assembly
[174] See Appendix for full regression charts.

significant, positive predicted effect on political knowledge for all questions except knowing the name of the president of the national assembly ($p<.05$).

In addition, I run a variance inflation factor (VIF) index to check for multicollinearity. I run the model for all dependent variables with all controls, except school districts, and find a mean VIF of 1.16 with no variable more highly correlated than 2.[175] I run the complete model for all dependent variables, with school districts and controls, and find the mean VIF to be 2.02. In weaker logistic regressions, scores of 2.5 or higher could indicate multicollinearity (Allison 1999). The rural school districts, Sevare and Sikasso II, are correlated with "rural;" they have scores of 3.56, 3.16, and 4.25 respectively. To ensure this correlation was not affecting the outcome variable, I repeat the regression dropping one variable at a time. This does not produce any change to education level, the explanatory variable, which remains positive and significant ($p<.000$). Since a logistic regression assumes the dependent variable has a linear relationship with the independent variables, I run a link test. It shows no evidence that the model was mis-specified.[176] In addition, I run Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for goodness of fit for logistic regression, but the model shows no evidence of lack of fit.[177] I run the regressions without controls to test the explanatory power of education on knowledge alone. The effect of education remains positive and significant.

I use the Gary King's Clarify software to calculate the impact of being exposed to each level of education on the probability of a correct response. The chart below graphs the models' predicted increase in probability of a correct response for each significant level of education as

[175] I use OLS regression in order to calculate the VIF scores.
[176] The _hat value is significant ($p<.000$), but _hatq is not significant. See Stata Regression Diagnostics Chapter 3: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/logistic/chapter3/statalog3.htm
[177] With a p value ranging from .42 - .96, Hosmer and Lemeshow's goodness-of-fit test indicates that the models fit the data well.

compared to the reference category of citizens with no education. Note that I could not graph university students' responses for president of the National Assembly because I had a case of complete separation: every university-educated respondent correctly named Dioucounda Traore.

Figure 11: Change in Predicted Probability of Correct Answer by Level of Schooling[178]



Holding all other variables at their mean, the models' predict a higher probability of a correct response with each level of higher education as compared to the reference category of no education. The most pronounced effects are generated by secondary and tertiary education. The effects of higher education were strongest on respondent's knowledge of the president of the assembly and the majority party. The results are not surprising since most Malians are more

[178] Includes predicted probability with 95% confidence intervals. Full regression charts are included in the appendix. The predicted probabilities were calculated in Stata using Clarify software.

familiar with their local governmental officials like their mayor rather than national political actors and institutions.[179]

Informal education, which includes Koranic education and indigenous language literacy instruction, is associated with a greater probability that citizens will know the answers to all knowledge questions than Malians who attended no school except the name of the President of the Assembly. The Malian government and most donors have dismissed Koranic schools as lesser educational institutions, by refusing to give them accredited status along with madrassas. Koranic schools are plagued by stereotypes that associate with them with the *talibes* that beg on the streets of cities and towns. However, this finding suggests that there may be some democratic merit in Koranic education as well as government literacy trainings as compared to having no education at all.

The five control variables were significant for various aspects of political knowledge: being a woman, living in a rural zone, poverty, and age. Being a woman has a consistent negative and significant ($p<.001$) predicted effect on the probability of the respondent providing the correct answer to any political knowledge questions. Controlling for all other characteristics, the probability that a woman could give a correct response was 15%-26% lower than for a male respondent. This finding demonstrates the progress that remains to be made in terms of gender equality in political awareness and empowerment Mali.

Living in a rural zone, increased the likelihood that citizens could name their mayor. This finding is intuitive given that there are fewer political actors at the rural, decentralized level and citizens live in close proximity to their representatives. Living at a higher level of poverty was associated with a lower likelihood of naming the president of the national assembly,

[179] See discussion in Chapter 2

Dioucounda Traore, or executive term limits. This may be because poorer respondents are so focused on their daily struggles that they have less time and energy to invest in abstract political figures or rules. Older residents were also more likely to be able name Dioucounda Traore. The most striking regional finding is that residents of Timbuktu knew more about ADEMA than residents of any other school district. This is a testament to the organization of ADEMA in Timbuktu as each year they manage to mobilize more voters for elections than most other voting districts and were able to win the first round of presidential elections for the last four elections, even when ATT was a favored incumbent in 2007.

4.5 Political Knowledge and School Type

To test my second hypothesis, *(State school alumni will know more about politics than students who attended non-state schools*), I run two separate regressions. The first compares state-school learners to learners in four other school types at the primary level: madrassas, private schools, community schools, and Christian schools. I restrict my analysis to citizens who only attended primary school for two reasons. First, so few respondents attended madrassas at the secondary level, that I do not have enough data to generate a comparison.[180] Secondly, government sponsorship of students at private secondary schools conflates any attempt to differentiate between the school types at the secondary level. In other words, a student could receive a public school education from a private school. I do not have enough data to disaggregate those students who received government scholarships to attend private school and those who parents paid the fees themselves.

For primary-educated respondents, I only find one statistically significant difference between Malians who attended a government school and those who attended a non-state school.

[180] Only nine respondents attended secondary school at a madrassa.

Private school alumni were less likely to name executive term limits than public school alumni, while respondents who had attended community schools performed slightly better than those who had attended public school. I find no statistically significant differences between respondents who attended Islamic schools and those who attended public schools at the informal or primary levels. These finding defy my theoretical expectations, as I cannot reject the null of Hypothesis 2 (*Public schools will generate more knowledgeable learners than non-state schools*).

Table 7: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting Political Knowledge Restricted to Primary Educated Respondents[181]

School Type	Mayor's Name	President of the Assembly	Majority Party	Executive Term Limits
Private Secular	-.31	-1.25	-.43	-1.30*
	(.67)	(.81)	(.63)	(.56)
Christian	Perfect Prediction	.27	.22	-1.45
		(1.98)	(1.56)	(1.50)
Community	.55	.57	.60	.90*
	(.35)	(.34)	(.32)	(.39)
Madrassa	.33	-.40	-.22	-.01
	(.34)	(.34)	(.31)	(.33)
Observations	334	336	335	336

Secondly, I examine a sub-category of citizens with only informal schooling to see if those learners who went to Koranic schools are less knowledgeable than the reference category of people who attended government literacy centers. Again, I find no significant differences

[181] Complete regression tables are listed in the appendix

between alumni of Koranic schools and those who attended government-sponsored literacy centers, thus I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Table 8: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting Political Knowledge of Alumni of Koranic Schools compared to Government Literacy Centers

School Type	Mayor's Name	Majority Party	Executive Term Limits
Koranic Schools	.18	-.32	.27
	(.51)	(.42)	(.44)
Observations	254	251	270

I caution that my non-findings only apply to the primary and informal levels of education. The fact that there is no significant difference between public schools and madrassas is particularly unexpected. For over four decades public education was linked to the state, while madrassas served a separate group of particularly devout learners without any state recognition. I would have expected learners in madrassas, most of whom attended school before the change in government policy, to be less knowledgeable about formal politics. With the data I have, I cannot assess the difference of attending secular or religious schools at the secondary and/or university institution – where the effect of education and linguistic skills is expected to be most pronounced. French proficiency remains low for primary school learners (Thunnissen 2009); therefore they do not develop their comparative linguistic advantage until they achieve higher levels of formal schooling. Even still, since the majority of Malians have not obtained education past these levels, it is very interesting that children at any primary school, secular or religious, do not have significant differences in terms of their political knowledge. As I will discuss in the "mechanisms" section, this finding suggests that schools bestow political knowledge through cognitive development rather than a specific civic curriculum.

4.6 Education and Political Participation in Difficult Activities

To test the impact of education on difficult political participation (H3), I run models similar to that used to evaluate its impact on political knowledge. I conduct a maximum likelihood estimation that regresses "campaigned in 2007," "would run for office," and "contacted government official" on the different levels of education and the controls including membership in an association (religious and secular). I also use a logistic regression to assess the easier participation variables: voting and political party identification. The findings support Hypothesis 3 (*Citizens with higher levels of education will be more likely to participate in difficult activities).* All levels of formal education have positive, significant predicted effects on campaigning and willingness to run as compared to those with no education. Only the highest levels of education, secondary and tertiary, were significantly, correlated with and greater likelihood that a respondent had contacted a government official. This finding indicates that primary school education was not enough to affect this aspect of political behavior and may indicate the importance of French language acquisition that happens after primary school.

I run bivariate regressions with education level and difficult types of participation. Education is positive and significant ($p<.000$) for all difficult activities: campaigned, contacted government official, and willingness to run. In addition, I check for multi-collinearity using variance inflation factor (VIF). Without including the school districts, no variable had a score higher than 1.5. The mean VIF score was 1.14. However, when I run the full regression, the rural school districts, Sikasso 2 and Sevare, were correlated with the control variable "rural;" they had VIF scores of 3.94, 3.25, and 4.31 respectively indicating collinearity. I ran the regression dropping each variable, but found that the omission of any of the variables had no effect on the explanatory variable: level of education. I run link test for all of the models and find no evidence of misspecification. I find no problems except for the model for government

contact, which suggests non-linear relationships between the independent and dependent variable. [182] In addition, I run Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for goodness of fit for logistic regression, but the model shows no evidence of lack of fit.[183]

Figure12 graphs the models' predicted increase in the probability of participation in difficult activities for each level of formal education with significant effects as compared to a reference category of no education. I note that the predicted effect of education is lower on participation than it was on political knowledge. I suspect that this is due to the myriad of other factors that might affect participation. Education might serve as a necessary, but insufficient condition for participation, whereas once citizens have greater political knowledge – it impacts their ability to answer a question immediately.

[182] I find problems with model misspecification for the contact government variable, suggesting that some variables relationships may not be linear I run a Box-Tidwell model to assess the linearity of my variables, but none of them come up as significant and nonlinear.
[183] With a p value ranging from .16- .99, Hosmer and Lemeshow's goodness-of-fit test indicates that the models fit the data well.

Figure 12: Change in Predicted Probability of Participating in Activity by Level of Education[184]



In this model, university education appears to have a particularly strong predicted effect as compared to other forms of education. For instance, the model predicts a sixteen percent higher probability that secondary students will contact a government official than citizens with no education and a twenty two percent higher probability that university-educated respondents have contacted a government official than their peers with no education. In the next section, I suggest that the pronounced effect of university education is related to French fluency.

4.7 Participation and Control Variables

Two control variables had strong, consistent effects on participation: gender and associational membership. Being a woman is negatively associated with the likelihood that a citizen will identify with a party, willingness to run for office, contacted a government official, or campaigned. At times, our survey team was refused interviews with women who feared violent reprisals from their husbands who were not home. This experience further illustrates the

[184] Includes 95% confidence intervals; the graphs was generated using Clarify software in Stata. Full regression tables are included in the appendix.

lack of women's voice in the public sphere. Salimata, a woman who lives in the village of Madinel about 15 kilometers from Kayes, made the limitations and barriers to women's participation very clear. She explains in Pulaar, "I have never seen a woman run for any office here. It's because they are scared and the men won't allow them to run (K6)." The research suggests that there are significant socio-cultural barriers to women's political mobilization that require further study.

Consistent with theories of "mobilization associations," membership in an association is positive and significant for all forms of political participation except willingness to run for office. Membership in religious association does not have a significant effect.[185] As described in Chapter 2, membership in associations provides citizens with a traditional venue through which to express group grievances and ideas.

Age has significant, but contradictory effects on participation. Being a member of the highest age category increases the predicted probability of voting by 29% compared to the youngest cohort (18-28).[186] Age was also positively correlated with contacting a government official, but negatively associated with campaigning or willingness to run for office. Older citizens' hesitancy to campaign or run for office is probably due to the high level of effort and energy that is required for these activities.[187]

4.8 Higher Education, Voting, and Party Identification

As expected, the highest levels of education do not affect voting or party identification. Only citizens with the lowest levels of education, had a greater likelihood of stating they voted in

[185] If I run for contact with a religious figure as a dependent variable, religious associations become significant, but secular associations are also significant.
[186] This is consistent with Kuenzi and Lambright's findings that oldest voters are more likely to turn out
[187] Many older respondents said they are too tired or old to run for office or that they wanted to focus on religious activities at this stage in life.

2007 or identified with a party as compared to the reference category of people with no education. Voting in 2007 was positively correlated with primary and informal education, while party identification was correlated exclusively with primary education. The inverted u shaped findings may suggest that political entrepreneurs target those with enough education to have some political consciousness, but who require the partisan assistance for expression. These findings loosely support Russell Dalton's work on the evolution of citizenship. Dalton argues that those who have higher levels of education, the secondary and university alumni, are sophisticated enough to use "cognitive mobilization" based on independent information rather than "partisan mobilization"(2006). In other work, Dalton argues more educated citizens participate directly through "engaged" citizenship instead of voting out of duty-based citizenship that ties them to political parties (2008). While these findings speak roughly to Huntington's thesis about political alienation of the educated class, I caution against reading too far into the relationship between higher education and easier forms of participation, as my findings were not significant.

In addition, more educated Malians' refusal to turn out at the polls might also be linked to their own voting calculus than political dissent. During the municipal elections, I asked some "middle class" Malians whom I knew if they planned on voting. Most expressed apathy stating that the $2 that was being handed out certainly couldn't buy their vote or that they were "too busy" to turn out. For unemployed students or lower-class Malians, the promise of $2 or an egg sandwich to turn out to the polls in the context of a political carnival might be enough of an incentive to jump in a van and go to vote.

Informed, skeptical political consumers contrast the more marginalized citizens who take what they can from the cash and goods that circulate during election time, but are generally

uninformed about politics. We frequently encountered respondents who were unable to offer any evaluations of political institutions or answer any political knowledge questions, but claimed to have voted and that they were members of a political party. Saouda, a Tuareg woman in Timbuktu, represents an extreme example of the disconnect between knowledge and participation. She was one of the poorest respondents that we spoke with and could not afford school fees to send any of her five children to any school. She was could not answer any political knowledge questions, but claimed to identify with ADEMA (T25). We do not know why Saouda claims to like ADEMA, but another respondent, Karim, from another neighborhood in Timbuktu offered a potential explanation. Karim explained how aid from abroad is often appropriated as a political resource. "The neighborhood received some aid from abroad, so I went to the "chef du quartier" to get my allotment, but he refused to give it to me. This was unjust as I'm very poor with a lot of children to feed. Not long after, when the election campaigns started, I saw him coming around with electoral cards. He told me to vote for a certain party, but I refused. I never got any aid. The relationship between power and politics happens like that (T39)." This phenomenon is not isolated in Timbuktu. Alassane, a seventy-year old Kayes resident explained, "I don't know who I voted for, they just brought me the paper (K54)." These interviews are not meant to demonstrate that elections in Mali are meaningless, but only to demonstrate that other incentives to vote or identify with a party do exist. This evidence suggests why the connection between high degree of education and easier forms of participation are weak.

4.9 School Type and Political Participation

I use the same model, restricted to include only primary and informal learners, to compare participation of learners from state and non-state schools. The results from the

regression do not support H (4) (Non-*state schools will generate less participation than public schools*). Again, I compare of alumni of non-state schools to a reference category of citizens who attended public school. The only significant, difference that I find between school types is that community school alumni are more likely to campaign, say they would run for office, and identify with a party than primary educated respondents who went to public school. I ran an interaction to see if level of education and rural environment to see if education had greater returns for people living in places where comparative literacy rates were lower, but I was unable to reject the null. In fact, I found a significant correlation between education interacted with living in a city on participation. This suggests, at a minimum, different patterns of mobilization at the urban and rural environments. Perhaps students are mobilized at a greater rate in urban centers, while villages mobilize all inhabitants regardless of education levels. These differences in mobilization and voter calculation present interesting venues for future research.

Table 9: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting Participation Restricted to Primary Educated Respondents[188]

School Type	Voting	Party ID	Campaign	Willingness to Run	Contact Government Official
Private	-.13	.07	-.91	-.97	.51
	(.63)	(.57)	(.81)	(.63)	(.67)
Community	.49	.65*	1.07**	.70*	.38
	(.37)	(.32)	(.32)	(.32)	(.36)
Madrassa	.23	.15	.05	.20	.31
	(.34)	(.30)	(.33)	(.32)	(.36)

[188] Full Regression listed in Appendix 1. Christian schools dropped out because there were only three respondents who attended them and none of them participated in any political activities we asked about.

Table 10: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting Participation of Koranic School Alumni Compared to Respondents who Attended Government Literacy Centers

School Type	Voting	Party ID	Campaign	Willingness to Run	Contact Govt Official
Koranic School	-.03	-.57	.51	-.95*	-.84
	(.46)	(.41)	(.47)	(.42)	(.46)

There were no significant differences between alumni of state and Islamic schools at the informal or primary level except for the lower predicted likelihood that Koranic alumni say they will run for office. The similarity of response rates from alumni of Islamic and secular schools is surprising because of the historical separation between secular and religious authority. We see many religious school alumni claim they "get their hands dirty" in secular politics through voting, party identification, campaigns and willingness to run for office. Again, I stress that I only make this comparison for students with comparable levels of education and do not have data on school type at the secondary level. The growth and popularity of religious, Arabic language schools at the secondary level raises interesting questions about learners who receive higher education at Islamic schools. Will madrassa education qualify them to participate in the elite world of secular politics now that the state endorses and accredits these schools? To assess this important question, we must have a better idea about what aspect of education facilitates political participation.

4.10 Refining and Isolating Mechanisms

Before moving forward, I address the endogenity problem that plagues most social science research. I must confront the fact that some other characteristic associated with being educated drives greater knowledge and participation. My best strategy to address endogenity is

to develop observable implications of the various causal mechanisms.[189] A benefit of the focus on students is that most children are in an educational track, madrassas or laic school, before their political coming of age ruling out reverse causation. However, it possible that parental preferences could play a confounding role determining both school choice and their children's subsequent political orientation. The American participation literature has found that parents play a fundamental role in shaping their children's political perspectives (Franklin 1984). Perhaps political attitudes and information are transmitted through familial venues in Mali as well. Malian parents who choose to send their children to school could be more political aware and most invested in teaching their children about politics. As a result, educated students learn political messages at home rather than in the classroom. Table 11 lists the observable implications that we would expect to see if parents were responsible for the correlation between education and knowledge and participation.

Table 11: Do Parents Transmit Political Information and Practices?

Mechanism	**Implication**	**Observed?**
Parents	1. Students whose parents send them to Francophone schools should know more about politics than students of Islamic schools	No
Parents	2. Students whose parents send them to Francophone schools should participate more in politics than their peers who went to Islamic schools	No
Parents	3. The youngest generation of respondents who attended school should know more about politics and be more willing to participate since there is a greater probability that their parents went to school	No

Our survey research revealed that parents enroll their children in different types of schools for different reasons.[190] The majority of survey respondents reported sending a child to a madrassa for religious reasons, while many respondents favoring Francophone schools

[189] King, Keohane, and Verba 1994 (30).
[190] Chapter 5 will discuss school choice in greater depth.

described education as an investment in their child's future earnings. I anticipate parents who send their children to madrassas to be less knowledgeable and invested in the world of secular politics than parents who send their children to secular schools. As a result we would expect to observe greater participation and knowledge from parents who sent their children to state schools. Following this logic, parents who chose to send their children to state schools should be more likely and capable of teaching their children about politics. However, as discussed earlier, I find that there is no significant difference between the knowledge and participation of people who attended state or religious schools. Even though I can only make this claim at the primary level, I would still expect to see a difference between learners at the two types of schools if politically minded parents transmit political knowledge to their children.

My third observable implication takes advantage of the changing educational environment in Mali. Due to the increase in educational enrollment over time, there is a greater probability that a child who went to school in the last ten years has an educated parent than was the case for prior generations of students. I would imagine that parents who went to school would be more likely to know about politics. If parents transmit knowledge about education, I might anticipate that the youngest cohort of educated respondents will know more about politics than other cohorts of educated peers since their parents are most likely to be educated. I test this observable implication by creating an interaction term for education and age. This enables me to compare the political knowledge of the youngest cohort of educated respondents compared to older educated citizens. I regress political knowledge variables on educational level, the controls, and the interaction term. I do not find the interaction term to have a significant effect on correct responses to any knowledge question.

While observable implications are imperfect measures of causality, the evidence that I was able to generate suggests that parents are not, at least entirely, responsible for spreading political knowledge or spurring participation. The root of causation appears to be linked, at least in part, to some aspect of the schooling experiences. The next section attempts to adjudicate between competing causal mechanisms explaining the correlation between education and political participation and knowledge.

4. 11 Education: Exploring Causal Mechanisms

There are many ways that schooling might create greater political knowledge and/or increased participation in "difficult activities": democratic curriculum, heightened socialization, increased literacy, political mobilization by teachers, increased internal efficacy and increased cognitive development. This section introduces complementary data to interrogate mechanisms linking education to political knowledge and participation. I draw on qualitative justifications responses to the surveys as well coders' notes on respondents, interviews with 200 university students, and data on politicians' educational profiles to evaluate and refine the proposed causal mechanisms. The student interviews were conducted by my research team in February 2009 on all the four of the university campuses. Interviewers stood in public areas and stopped every fifth student who passed them. All interviews were recorded with voice-recorders. In Table 12, I list potential mechanisms and their observable implications. I quickly discuss three potential mechanisms that I didn't find evidence for and then move on to make an argument in support of the two mechanisms I believe are driving the process: cognitive development, internal efficacy, and French language skills.

Table 12: Uncovering Education's Mechanisms

Mechanism	Outcome Variable	Observable Implication	Evidence
Democratic Curriculum	Knowledge	Students who received "democratic curriculum" will know more about politics than peers who haven't gotten the same curriculum	No
	Participation	Students who received "democratic curriculum" will participate in politics more than peers who haven't gotten the same curriculum	No
Socialization	Knowledge	Education will have a greater effect on girls' knowledge than boys' knowledge	No
	Participation	Education will have a greater effect on girls' participation than boys' participation	No
Political Organization in Schools	Participation	Current university students should be more likely to campaign than average respondents	No
French Literacy	Knowledge	Higher levels of education should generate progressively higher political knowledge scores	Yes
	Participation	Respondents will stress the importance of French as a skill for participation	Yes
	Participation	Francophone secondary and/or tertiary educated respondents, will be most likely to participate in the most difficult forms of politics	Yes
	Participation	Current politicians' educational portfolio will include elite, Francophone education.	Yes
Cognitive Development	Knowledge	Higher levels of education should generate progressively higher political knowledge scores	Yes

Cognitive Development	Knowledge	Education, regardless of school type, should increase citizens' political knowledge	Yes
Internal Efficacy	Participation	1. People at higher levels of education should claim to discuss politics more often	Yes
Internal Efficacy	Participation	2. Less educated people will emphasize their non –participation in terms of inability to do so, confusion, the degree of difficulty, fear of exploitation more than educated people	Yes

4.11.1 Curriculum

The Traore dictatorship struck civic education from the curriculum in 1972 and the Ministry of Education did not reintroduce it until 2009. Only the first decade of post independence learners received lessons about how government functioned and the duties and rights of citizens. If civic education matters, students who were exposed to this curriculum should have better ability to answer questions and a greater likelihood of participating in politics than students who did not receive the curriculum. In order to test the effects of civic education, I generate a variable "Civic Education" for those learners who were likely to have attended schools between 1960 and 1972.[191] I regress the political knowledge questions on education level, the controls, and a new interaction term that tests the effects of "civic education" and "education level" together. This enables me to see if education has a greater effect on the participation of learners who received the democratic curriculum. The interaction term is not significant for any aspect of political knowledge and therefore, does not provide evidence for support of the democratic curriculum mechanism

[191] I code using the Age variable: all respondents 49-58 and 59-68 were marked as having "Civic Education," while everyone else was coded as "No Civic Education." This is an imperfect measure, but the closest approximation I can generate.

I repeat the regression to assess the effect of the interaction term on participation. I regress the aspects of participation that were correlated with higher education, campaigning, contacting a government official, and willingness to run for office, on education level, the controls, and the interaction term. The test does not provide evidence for support of the democratic curriculum mechanism. The interaction term is insignificant for campaigning or willingness to run for office. For contacting a government official, it is significantly negative ($p<.05$) for secondary school learners who were exposed to civic education, opposite of what one would expect if democratic curriculum was the mechanism.

4.11.2 Socialization[192]

Higher political knowledge and participation could be caused by socialization around schooling activities rather than the educational experience itself. Children could learn about politics by talking to peers or being exposed to new experience and information. In this scenario, knowledge is not linked to curriculum, but to the experience and interactions that happen in the schooling space. In order to rule out this possibility, I test the mechanism of socialization using gender differences. Malian girls have much more limited social interaction than boys due to heavier loads of household chores in the compound and stricter societal regulations. The gender segregation, of women at home and men in the public sphere, continues as children grow up[193]. Since boys have more opportunities to socialize outside of the home, the socialization effect of school should be greater for girls – who have more limited exposure to new experiences and ideas except in the schooling space. I run a logistic regression with an interaction term for

[192] In this section, I am not referring to political socialization, but rather exposure to external stimuli through socialization or exposure to other people beyond the compound walls.
[193] I am not implying that women's mobility in Mali is limited as in other Muslim nations, such as Saudi Arabia or the North of Nigeria, but they are generally relegated to the home sphere, where boys explore the public sphere.

woman and education level. The effect of education on woman's political participation or political knowledge is not different from the effect on men.[194] However, this could also mean that the average family who allows their daughter to attend school, also affords her greater freedom of movement than the average Malian family – thus there is a less of a difference in the socialization opportunities between boys and girls that attend school.

4.11.3 Political Mobilization

Scholars have described the powerful role of teachers in students in shaping the democratization movements in the early 1990s across Africa (Smith 1998). Frequent teacher and student strikes and battles over school conditions are a testimony to the legacy of political activism in schools (Diakite 2000). In other instances the connections between schools and politics are even clearer. The only female presidential contender in 2007, Aminata Diallo, was a university professor who ran her campaign largely using her base of students as a support network. She was later named Minister of Education. Given the politicized school environment, I explore the possibility that students in schools are targeted and mobilized by teachers and political leaders. I draw on data from interviews that we conducted with 203 university students at the various campuses of University of Bamako in February 2009.[195] Our team asked students a series of questions about their expected political participation during the upcoming municipal elections. The questions were slightly different than those posed in the household survey: we asked students about participation in municipal elections, while we asked

[194] It is only significant for campaigning at the university level, but not for secondary. We would expect consistent effect for secondary and university if socialization was the determining factor.
[195] University of Bamako is the only national university and has students from all around the country; we surveyed respondents at each of its four campuses.

survey respondents about participation in presidential elections.[196] Only 33% of 203 University Students interviewed claimed they would participate in the 2009 Municipal elections as compared to national average of 29% who said they had participated in presidential campaigns.[197][198] If students were mobilized by teachers and political parties at campuses, there should be a much greater difference in reported participation rates between active university students and average respondents.[199]

The above analysis leaves three remaining paths of causation that affect the outcome variable: cognitive development, French literacy skills, and internal efficacy. I will discuss how education affects citizenship through each mechanism below. I argue that education stimulates cognitive development which can create greater political knowledge as well as enhanced internal efficacy. Education that fosters French language skills offers a further boost in internal efficacy by providing citizens with the language of government bureaucracy and enhances political knowledge by enabling them to access to diverse and elite forms of political information including written government texts. As shown in Figure 12, cognitive development can create political knowledge and internal efficacy, which in turn can increase the probability of political participation. In addition, greater political knowledge further strengthens internal efficacy. If education is sufficient to endow French language skills, it provides citizens with access to a greater diversity of news sources as well as the ability to verify the written word – scarce skills in

[196] University students were surveyed approximately one month before the communal elections, which we might expect would inflate predicted behavior as compared to survey respondents who gave retrospective accounts of participation. The majority of respondents were male, which I would have expected to inflate participation.
[197]The university student interviews do not provide data about mobilization at the secondary level. The possibility that students are mobilized at the secondary level still exists.
[198] This might also reflect the nature of the municipal elections.
[199] It is possible that participation patterns are different for national and local elections and that students play a larger role in national-level elections.

an environment of mass illiteracy. French further builds internal efficacy as citizens are less afraid of exploitation by government bureaucracy. I discuss these individual mechanisms below.

Figure 13: Pathways to Political Knowledge and Political Participation



4.11.4 Cognitive Development

Theories of cognitive development stem largely from Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget who describes people's changing "frameworks" and "grammar" for understanding the world through the process of equilibration. In equilibration someone incorporates information and processes the new information into existing cognitive structures in addition to making changes to those cognitive structures (Piaget1985). Education exposes children to new information, ways of reasoning, and logic, which they can incorporate into the equilibration process. It is not the content of education that matters, but how children engage with the ideas and information.

Piaget understands cognitive development passing through four stages, which culminates in final formal operational stage. Arlin describes this stage, " Specifically, the formal stage implies the ability to engage in abstract thought, that is, to deal with propositions, to generate hypotheses and subject them to empirical investigation, and to employ proportionality and combinatorial systems in problem solving (1975: 602)."[200] Only approximately 50% of Americans ever achieve Piaget's fourth stage, so we can imagine that there would be sufficient

[200] Other psychologists have elaborated on a fifth – problem finding phase of development, but each of these theories builds off of Piaget's stages.

variation among African citizens' cognitive development as well (Arlin 1975: 605). We can imagine the consciousness required to conceptualize the possibilities for political action as residing in this final stage.

Theories of cognitive development are helpful in teaching us about political socialization. Somit and Peterson critique the typical conception of political socialization as overly passive. They argue that the literature fails to incorporate their dynamic interaction between a changing political structure and the citizen as an agent, which is what they refer to as the "phenomenology of political consciousness" (1987:219). They explain how theories of political socialization would benefit from theories of cognitive development: "And that might have thrown some light on the oddest paradox in the political socialization literature: that the 10-year-olds of 1958, who did the "benevolent leader" studies for Greenstein, Hess and Easton, were also the 20-year-olds of 1968 who overthrew Lyndon Johnson (220)."

Building from their argument, I understand cognitive development not contributing to a linear form of political socialization, but rather equipping citizens with the tools to understand, question, and adapt their behaviors to their political environment. This understanding of political socialization is especially important given under-performing regimes in developing democracies, where blind allegiance and socialization into political behaviors without questioning authority would be counterproductive to institutional development.

Afrobarometer studies already provide some evidence that education stimulates cognitive development by demonstrating that educated respondents are more able to formulate political opinions and critique authority figures (Mattes and Mughogho 2009; McCauley and E. Gymiah Boadi 2009). The results from the regressions demonstrate that every level of education is correlated with increased political knowledge compared to respondents with no education. The

statistical analysis of survey results does not capture the most persuasive examples of the intellectual empowerment offered by education. Most telling, perhaps, are descriptions of interviews with women in villages, who had difficulty answering any of our survey questions. I describe my interview with Aminata below to illustrate these dynamics.

We met Aminata in the village of Dandaresso, which lies about sixty miles Northwest of Sikasso. Aminata was the youngest of Madou's four wives. Madou, a jovial, fast-talking man, lives a large compound with his extended family, wives, and twenty children. Two of Aminata's co-wives sat on the wooden chaise structure with her. They nursed babies and encouraged her as she struggled to answer the most basic survey questions. Aminata looked away from us and mumbled her responses at a whisper. It was unclear if this was out of fear or deference. Once we reached political questions, Aminata responded with either "I don't knows" or attempted to give the answer she thought we wanted to her by agreeing with most of the statements we read. Her inability to think critically and communicate with outsiders demonstrates her isolation from the public sphere. Aminata has only been out of her village once – to visit Sikasso. Aminata is about 18 or 19 years old, but has never attended any school. Schooling might have exposed Aminata to a world beyond the household; it might have helped her interact with new people and have the confidence to express herself. This counterfactual is impossible to recreate, but we can consider responses from another woman in her village with a slightly higher level of education.[201]

Daoda is also around 18 years-old and attended primary school when she was younger. She doesn't yet have any children. Daoda was able to name the mayor of Danderesso as well as

[201] Aminata was typical of many uneducated female respondents in both urban and rural answers who gave answers they thought were "compliant" and/or simply said "I don't know." In many instances, coders wrote, "very hesitant and uniformed."

the President of the National Assembly. When asked about her confidence in various political institutions – her response was far from Aminata's deference. She gave a zero confidence rating to everyone from the president to the mayor stating, "They are all the same." It is possible that other factors have led Daouda to live a less sheltered life than Aminata, but one cannot help but suspect that her time in school has given her the confidence to learn about and critique government. I met many other women like Aminata, who had not participated in any kind of schooling and, who struggled to imagine and describe the world outside of their compound walls.

This comparison is not meant to communicate that uneducated citizens are powerless and naïve, only that education is one factor that can increase a citizen's cognitive development. I can contrast Aminata with Salimatou - a Soninke woman in Kayes who never went to school, but had the resolve and determination to contact her government authorities twice with her association to address water and road problems. She didn't participate in other forms of politics, but was able to openly criticize officials who only visited citizens during the election season. She stressed neighborhood solidarity and self-sufficiency.[202] Salimatou used traditional expressions of group grievance by approaching her elected official in the company of her *ton*. (other examples)

4.11.5 Internal Efficacy

Most respondents, regardless of their level of education, expressed a sense of low external efficacy.[203] One after another, respondents gave reasons that they abstained from various aspects of political engagement. Lala, who had a primary school education, explained why she never contacted the government, "You can tell them (your problems), but they won't do

[202] Perhaps it is relevant that Salimatou lives in a city and Aminata lives in a village. My study has focused on urban and peri-urban dwellers, but if I could test a larger sample of rural women I would expect the effect of education to be even more pronounced.
[203] Internal efficacy refers to one's ability to understand and participate in politics, while external efficacy refers to the responsiveness of existing political institutions (Miller et al 1980).

anything, so it's just a waste of energy." Salimatou, who I referenced earlier, explained similar discontent despite her attempts to contact the Kayesian municipal authorities: "Nothing will ever change because they (elites) are comfortable." Salah, an Arab respondent from Mopti region had similar reasons for not coming out to the polls, "I do not vote because nothing is transparent (M60)." Fatoumata, a fifty something respondent in Sikasso never attended school. She explained her disdain for politics, "I no longer need the president or any other candidate anymore - that's enough. There has been no change, I am struggling … I have already had enough difficulty already - I don't even trust you who are asking these questions right now (S4)." Moussa, who attended Koranic school in Sikasso explained, "They (elected officials) know our problems, but nothing is ever developed to help us. They know what is going on (in our lives) - they just close their eyes (S1)." A primary school educated respondent, Mamadou, in Bamako explained, "Officials are not accessible, outside of elections they never come visit, we don't see any trace of them (BBC10)." Bintou is in her mid-thirties, she attended public primary school. She describes the difficulty of getting government officials to be responsive. "Up until present - I haven't been able to benefit from inheritances from when my husband passed away. It's the law of the strongest (S17)."

While most respondents deftly identified core power relations between the elites and the masses, Malians struggled to give productive examples of how politics or democratic practices might improve. Often politics was presented as something that would trick and deceive them or as something that would never change regardless of their efforts. In most Malians' depictions, the inner workings of politics and *politiki mogo* were far removed from their lives or their realm of understanding.

Many political scientists argue that internal efficacy can motivate political action, even despite of low-trust or cynical environments such as what we observe in present day Mali (Craig 1980; Fraser 1970; Gamson 1968). Pollock argues,

> To be sure, the following analysis shows that individuals who harbor feelings of personal political competence (high internal political efficacy) and relatively cynical assessments of the responsiveness of the political system (low external political efficacy) are more prone toward unconventional, nonconformist participation. However, they also engage in high initiative conventional participation closely connected with the ongoing political process (1983: 401).

Pollock's high-initiative forms of conventional participation, campaigning and contacting a government official, are nearly synonymous with those behaviors I have termed difficult: campaigning, contacting an official, and running as a candidate. The evidence I presented here, that education increases participation in high difficulty, activities support's Pollock's general claim.

More educated respondents shared a similar sense of skepticism about politics, but demonstrated a greater willingness to critique it and/or engage with the political authorities, at least through more substantive activities, due to heightened internal efficacy. I present excerpts from interviews with university students to highlight the differences in the ways that they spoke about politics. Those university students who disliked politics offered very specific, concrete justifications for their non-participation in politics including concerns about the lack of platforms, lack of confidence in a party, corruption, deception, and mayors who were not living up to campaign promises. When university students explained non-participation, they justified their non-action in terms of protest not due to lack of internal efficacy. Djackary, a medical student explained: "If we vote, then they do what they want (U98)." Amadou, who attends FAST in Bamako said he planned on voting but that he would cast an empty ballot because "they

are elected, and then they do nothing." Oumar was born and raised in Bamako. He complained, "The elected don't do anything, so I won't vote… but I am going to campaign - I am going to sensitize young people to tell them that they shouldn't vote!"

Striking were those respondents who claimed to get involved in electoral politics to learn about the political system so that they could run for office one day (U132, U84, U85). Issouf, a twenty-year old medical student, grew up in Mopti where he attended public school. He rated the Malian state's performance in the education sector 10/10 and went as far as to say "the educational system is perfect" in Mali. His optimism may reflect his own success; the medical school is the most competitive university in Mali and it is widely acknowledged that the strongest students in the country enter the medical track. In the future, Issouf hopes to be employed by the Malian state because he hopes to contribute to "the construction of his state." Like many others, he planned to vote in the municipal elections due to his civic duty. He said that he would participate in a campaign because one day he hopes to become a politician (U154).

In addition, I observed that more educated citizens claim to discuss politics more frequently. I create a new dichotomous dependent variable, "discuss politics," based on citizens' responses to a question of how often they discuss politics.[204] Every level of formal education, primary, secondary, and university, has a significant positive impact on the likelihood that citizens discuss politics as compared to those respondents with no education. This finding implies that educated citizens have a greater degree of interest, ability, and comfort in discussing political material.

4.11.6 The Resilience of the Colonial Legacy: The Political Power of French

[204] Those who responded that they discuss politics at all were coded as 1 and all others 0. I coded the variable dichotomously because there was little variation – most respondents claimed "not to discuss politics at all."

I find mixed evidence to support the claim that French language acquisition impacts political knowledge. I find progressively higher predicted probabilities of correct responses for each level of higher education, which is consistent with increased verbal proficiency in French. For instance, every respondent who had attended university was able to answer the national assembly question correctly. However, increases in French literacy cannot explain the fact that informal and primary educated students know more about politics than citizens with no education, since students at that level have either no exposure or a minimal command of the French language.[205]

French literacy could affect political knowledge in the sense that citizens who do not speak French are limited from receiving news from sources such as newspapers, the internet, or French-language debates or information on the radio. I found some anecdotal evidence that this restricts their access to political knowledge. Citizens like Mobido, a farmer in the Sikasso region who scored one out of four on our political knowledge quiz, felt excluded from politics as well as television media. He explains, "I don't have confidence in politics. Politicians do not take the time to look at farmer's problems. ATT hasn't done anything to help us (farmers). I never watch television because I don't speak French (SR11)." However, local-language community radio is widespread in Mali and national news has two broadcasts: French and Bambara, so citizens do have access to news through alternative language sources. This evidence suggests that French language acquisition does not play a major role affecting political knowledge as I have measured the variable. However, one could imagine that French language might play a role in higher level debates about government policy that become adulterated once they are translated in local languages and/or editorialized by radio DJs. It also raises interesting questions about the

[205] Thunissen 2009 describes minimal French competency rates of 6th grade Malian students.

additional importance French language skills play for members of marginalized language group communities, who do not benefit from extensive local language programming.[206]

French has a clearer, more palpable impact on "difficult" forms of participation. I argue that this is for two reasons. First, French literacy qualifies citizens to participate in "elite" aspects of politics such as running for office or convincing other citizens who to vote for. As shown in Chapter 2, the majority of Malian politicians are highly educated as compared to the general population. While the education profiles of national-level politicians are elevated compared to "normal citizens" throughout the world, the nature of language and elite politics in Africa, make this dynamic particularly powerful. American or French voters speak the same language as their politicians and candidates strain to make their language and gestures accessible to the masses. However, in most countries in Africa, the political sphere uses languages that citizens do not speak in their homes. Advanced education qualifies you to speak the former colonial language and that act of speech alone can separate you from other citizens. Many Western politicians exert tremendous effort to prove their working class roots. They eat hot dogs, go bowling, and attend sporting events.[207] Barack Obama regularly appears in hamburger shops and sub joints ordering the special "with everything" on it despite his healthy foods initiatives. Now imagine the impossible – a Malian politician being mocked during his campaign for eating arugula. This type of critique would not happen because in Mali it is politically acceptable, even a political prerequisite, to be elite. This may be in part because politicians need to prove to voters than they have "money in the bank" and thus they do not need the job to become wealthy. A frequent rite of passage for potential presidential candidates is a

[206] In interviews with national radio directors in July 2011, my research assistant reported that certain language groups – particularly from the North of Mali – receive very little programming centrally broadcast from government stations.
[207] I thank Nicolas van de Walle for raising this point of comparison.

self-funded social service project that demonstrates that they are willing to share their own personal wealth to help greater society.[208] By exalting wealth and status, society widens the gap between politicians and the masses. This environment makes elite education and the mastery of French that much more relevant.

Most African citizens do not aspire to be Ministers or members of the National Assembly, but interviews with citizens about local elections revealed their perceptions of French as prerequisite for running for office. Most citizens interviewed saw formal education and French language fluency as a necessary condition for running for office. For instance, when we asked Kadiatou, an articulate and informed woman from Kayes if she had ever run for office or would consider running in the future, she retorted rhetorically: "I can't speak French. Do you think that someone with no (French) education can run for office (K39)?" Ironically, Kadioutou had attended some public schooling under the colonial system, but did not stay in school long enough to learn French well. Salimatou, another Kayesian, said that she would not run for office. She had not gone to school, but suggested that perhaps her children, two of whom are receiving government scholarships to attend high school, might be able to run (K40). While interviewing a third, female respondent from Kayes, Aminata, I broke my role of objective survey enumerator out of frustration. She clearly knew community problems that should be resolved, but did think she was capable of getting involved in politics. After Aminata had given a perceptive lecture about the problems of Malian democracy, and more specifically, the municipal authorities of Kayes, then she responded to our question about running for office in the future by stating, "No, you need to have studied." I spoke out of turn and insisted that she is knowledgeable and a very articulate speaker. She insisted again, "Yes, I do (know how to speak well), but I didn't go to school (KV78)." However, it was not just the women of Kayes who

[208] Interview with member of Malian civil society (June 2009)

repeated the importance of having attended school and speaking French. I offer just a few quotes from other respondents as examples.

> "I didn't study, so I can't run (K54)." Drahmane, seventy-something male respondent in Kayes.
>
> "I never went to school, so I can't run (K2)." Lala, thirty-something woman from the village of Madinel.
>
> "I didn't go to school so I cannot run (SR11)." Zoumana, a fifty-something Senoufou man, who lives in Ziguena and attended literacy training.
>
> "I didn't study, so I can't run for office (M71)." Kadi, forty-something woman with Koranic education.
>
> "I didn't study, so I don't think so (K60)." Brahama, twenty-something man from Soutoucoule.
>
> "If you can't write your own name, can you be mayor (SR60)?" Issouf, sixty-something Senoufou man, Ziguena resident.
>
> "(I can't)…I'm not educated (SV81)." Seydou, Peule man from the village of Fatoma, attended primary school in a madrassa.

This strongly contrasts university students, like Tiecoura, who are eager to take advantage of political opportunities. He also wants to work for the government in order to "fix his country." He says he plans on voting and campaigning in the municipal elections, "I want a good mayor in my commune; I want to participate in the development of my commune." For these young students, electoral politics represented a personal opportunity rather than a foreign and oppressive system. Unlike most Malians, they can visualize themselves at the apex of the political system and they felt capable and willing to exercise "complete citizenship."

I want to caution that French literacy does not guarantee that citizens will embrace politics, but rather that it serves as a necessary condition for their individual involvement. Many educated citizens chose not to participate in politics because of its negative stigma. For instance, some university students chose not to participate in campaigns because of the stigma associated

with politics. Abdoullaye, a student from Sevare, explained that he wouldn't campaign in the municipal elections because "I don't want people to think that I'm a liar (U40)." Brahmane, a student at FAST from Segou, explained his reticence to get involved, "By taking part in politics, you can make a lot of enemies (U170)."

French facilitates more difficult forms of participation is that it helps to build internal efficacy so that Malians can navigate bureaucracy without fear of exploitation or non-responsiveness. Our surveys reveal that most people who reported frequent contact with the mayor's office, outside of the context of traditional mobilization through an association, had a high school or university education. As the most educated members of their families and communities, these citizens often served as spokespeople for a friend or relative and met with government officials on their behalf. Our interviews were filled with examples of educated citizens brokering or mediating interactions with government for their networks of family and friends. Mariam is from Bamako; she contacted a government official on behalf of her cousin who had a problem with her market stall (BBC81). Drahmane, a sixty year old Songhrai man in Timbuktu, frequently visits the mayor to discuss the poor quality of the roads during rainy season because "in Timbuktu people are passive and scared" to approach the authorities on their own (T20). In the colonial and post-independence era, citizens prized French language skills because they helped to navigate bureaucracy and to avoid exploitation and deception by government officials (Bergman 1996; Gerard 1997). Remnants of these ideas remain as most respondents avoid the police and formal legal system because of the perception that these groups only cater to the most powerful. University education qualifies citizens as certifiable French-speakers, but also provides access to networks of advocacy in case of potential injustice. French creates a greater sense of internal efficacy in a world that is largely defined by bureaucratic mazes.

4. 12 What Does Mass Education Mean for the Future of Democracy?

The findings suggest that by expanding education to the masses, the Malian government is creating more savvy and empowered citizens. Even with only informal or primary education, respondents outperformed their peers with no education. At a primary or informal level of education, this political knowledge and internal efficacy might not be enough to engage in difficult political activities, but it could help them to better understand and communicate their needs in the electoral context. The results are encouraging especially given the government's recent focus on achieving gender parity in education. As we see, women still lag behind men in terms of political knowledge and most forms of participation. Perhaps the greater rates of female enrollment will generate more politically empowered women and potentially enhance the prospects of greater female representation in political offices.

Education's correlation with political knowledge appears rooted in citizens' heightened cognitive development rather than civic education or history lessons about democracy. The policy choice of expansion and liberalization has been beneficial to democracy in that education creates more knowledgeable and capable democratic consumers as cognitive development feeds directly into internal efficacy. This study did not find that non-state schools were less able to generate informed or active citizens. At lower levels of education, attending a religious school instead of a state school did not appear to stymie political participation. However, the resilience of French raises significant questions about the future of Islamic education in the democratization process. Madrassa education has gained notoriety after its endorsement by the government and with the rising popularity of Arabic as a cosmopolitan language. However until Arabic is given status as a national language, the acquisition of the French language appears to be a pre-requisite for madrassa-educated who want to get involved in politics.

The findings suggest that the French language penetrates Malian politics at a deeper level in the imaginations of every-day Malians. Elite, secular political power is deeply associated with French, Western education. Mastery of the French language dictates who can fully participate in politics. Experts have lauded African elections for their early embrace of universal suffrage, but, if dig deeper we uncover a massive rift that divides the politically empowered from the dispossessed. Even if indigenous or Arabic language education builds citizens internal efficacy, they are constrained by their inability to communicate with formal bureaucratic institutions. French language serves as the bridge between the divide by helping people to feel "capable" of exercising their voice beyond the ballot box in more difficult venues. In the minds of many Malians French fluency is a necessary condition to run for elected office. If primary education is not enough to achieve command of the French language then government efforts to expand basic education might not do enough to bridge the gap between elite secular power and the masses.

Chapter 5:

Parents as Social Service Consumers

5.1 Introduction

Born in 1932, Tiemoko fought for the French army in French Indochina and later Algeria (BA51). When he returned to Mali, he married and had four girls. He supported Mali's independence movement and its first political party, USRDA, in its first electoral victory; he has continued to vote for them ever since. Tiemoko had never gone to school, but the educational choice for his daughters was simple since there was only one school in his neighborhood of Banconi in the 1960s – the Sikoroni public school. All four of his daughters attended that public school. Now his neighborhood is filled with schooling options: the madrassa Dar es Salaam, another public school Nelson Mandela, a community school, and at least three private schools - Chez Kamikoko, Mamadou Konaté, and Jean Marie Cissé. He explains, "Back then, there was only one school where we lived. Now, given the choice, I would send my children to private school." In Tiemoko's lifetime, Mali has not only become a sovereign nation-state, but vastly expanded the availability of access to education as well as the schooling options it offers to parents.

The changes in Mali's educational landscape raise interesting questions. How could the expansion of public education, as a government social service, affect citizens' political behavior? Education, after all, is not just a venue to inculcate future citizens, but also a way for political leaders to demonstrate its capacity and commitment to its population. Furthermore, how might the diversity of education providers, including private secular schools and madrassas, detract from the government's ability to forge these types of connections with citizens? This chapter attempts to evaluate the impact social services on parents' democratic participation, and in doing so, forecast the effects of educational policy changes on democracy in Mali. Are citizens who

benefit from public school education more likely to participate in formal politics than those citizens who do not benefit from these same services? In other words, does a concrete connection to the state, through the receipt of social services, induce citizens to vocalize their political preferences? The Malian government also relied heavily on private partners to reach the maximum number of learners. Its privatization strategy in the context of democratization raises a second set of questions: how might the receipt of non-state education provision affect citizens' relationship with the state?

An emerging literature in American politics suggests that universal social service programs can have a positive effect on political participation through policy feedback mechanism (Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Mettler 2005; Campbell 2003). What happens when the government is not the only state-accredited social service provider? Debates within US politics have long tried to determine whether private education pulls pupils and parents out of civic affairs and/or if it segregates them from a larger social community.[209] Stakes are even higher in nascent democracies – where the state government competes with other entities for "public authority.[210]" In the developing state context, rebel groups, religious organizations, and political parties have all used education provision as a way to siphon support away from the incumbent regime. As demonstrated in Abernethy's work on Nigeria in the late 1960s, the Catholic Church effectively used education provision to recruit converts, while Weinstein shows how rebel groups have used education as a successful method to indoctrinate recruits (Abernethy 1968; Weinstein 2007). Across a broad comparative context, political parties and candidates

[209] For a defense of school choice that draws on European examples, see Wolf, Patrick and Stephen Macedo. 2004. Educating Citizens: International Perspectives on Civic Values and School Choice. Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press.

[210] I borrow this word from "The Upside Down View of Governance" to describe institutions (formal and informal) that undertake core governance functions (2010: 9).

have used education to gain support outside of their political base (Issar and Cammett 2010; Thachil 2009; Fox 1994).

Mali, like many nascent African democracies, still harbors multiple forms of political authority including traditional and religious authorities. As described in Chapter 2, religious authority has strong legitimacy in the eyes of the Malian population, but rarely engages in formal, electoral politics. Furthermore, religious schooling has had a tumultuous relationship with the secular state. Until democratization, the government authorities tried to co-opt, control, or subjugate these schools. The contentious relationship between Islamic schooling and secular, government authority in Mali raises questions about their current collaboration. Do parents who send their children to Islamic schools have different patterns of political participation and interaction with the state than other citizens?

I argue that public education contributes to democratization by helping to bring parents into electoral politics. I find that citizens who send (or sent) their children to public school are more likely to report voting or campaigning in the 2007 presidential elections and more likely to have a voter id card than any other citizens or any other parents. I offer two possible mechanisms: first, educated, literate children can act as "linguistic brokers" – pulling their parents into politics and secondly, that use of a good public service reinforces a citizenship identity that can be further fulfilled by voting through a policy feedback mechanism. These findings suggest state expansion of public education has had a secondary, and perhaps unintended effect, on democratic deepening to the extent that it gets more citizens involved in the electoral arena. All francophone education, public or private, enables students to serve as linguistic brokers between their families and the political process, but only state education reinforces citizenship identities through a policy feedback mechanism.

In contrast, I find that parents who send their children to Islamic schools are less likely to seek representation through voting or campaigning. However, this distinction between public schooling and madrassa consumer does not carry beyond the realm of electoral politics. I do no find other significant differences in the political participation or likelihood of having government documents between consumers of different schooling services.

5.2 Why Social Service Provision Matters for Democracy

While the democratic transition has brought many important changes to the life of citizens in Mali, citizens are still very wary of the credibility of electoral politics. As discussed in Chapter 2, most citizens view electoral politics with a very skeptical lens: "politiki man ɲi." In Mali, where voter participation rates are far below the continental average – this skepticism taints electoral participation. As one astute Malian citizen, a 36 year old driver named Bina from the Mopti region agrees with the many Malians who prize the liberalism of the democratic era over actual gains in representation:

> The thing I appreciate most about the democratic transition is the aspect of freedom of speech. Now you can say and do what you want. However, for most Malians – electoral politics represents nothing but lies, nothing but politicians who are hoping to make fast money.[211]

Even if Malians are making accurate assessments and politicians fail to live up to electoral promises, if they withdraw from voicing their opinion through electoral channels, the political process will continue to remain unaccountable to their needs unless they are able to leverage other types of contentious participation. A citizen's willingness to engage and critique politicians with a vote is critical first step to making democratic politics relevant. Although participation itself is not sufficient for a democratic transformation of society, the other elements – including democratic values and social capital, remain compartmentalized from the state or

[211] Interview March 18, 2011 in Bamako

under-developed without political participation. I am not suggesting participation for participation's sake, but rather, as an important step forward in Mali's democratic trajectory.

In the past, governments have used state education to gain legitimacy and allegiance, build credibility, and extend their reach into popular imagination.[212] Primary school provision represents one of few, or only, venues for citizens to interact with governing authorities in weak democratic states. A trip to most rural villages in Mali reveals, at a minimum, a school with a Malian flag as a symbol of the democratic state even if no other government infrastructure is visible. Could the state, through visible social service provision, induce citizens to "give multiparty democracy a chance?"

If citizens do not engage with public education and instead gain social services through outside channels, a worst case scenario might emerge where citizens "exit" to other forms of authority such as religious movements, rebel groups, or foreign armies infringing on Malian sovereignty. While this scenario might represent an appropriate analogy for Northern Malian youth who could be recruited by Al Queda of the Islamic Maghreb, an alternative militia group, or transnational trafficking chains, these options are less plausible for the other regions of Mali. Alternatively, private provision might foster exit away from any form of political participation. Those who can buy their way out of state services or rely on a different form of authority for provision might withdraw from greater political participation. If the state is less relevant for these citizens' lives, they will be less likely to engage with it. This threat of their exit weighs heavily on the democratic quality, rather than the actual sovereignty, of these states (Englebert 2009). If citizens do not participate in democracy, the state cannot benefit from their feedback, and as Hirschman anticipates, government institutions will demonstrate "a tendency toward

[212] James Scott 1998 and Abraham de Swann (1988) discusses how public education spread's the state's reach into the population; Many authors discuss the use of education to foster allegiance and support including Hobbsbawm 1990, Gellner 1983; B. Anderson 1983; Laitin 1977; Laitin 1998;

slack," which in practical terms means that they will be less accountable or responsive to citizens' needs (1970).

This chapter starts by exploring the parental educational preferences and school choice of the survey respondents to explain enrollment patterns and justifications for these choices. It then demonstrates that public school parents are more likely to claim voting and campaigning than other types of citizens. I then contrast the public school parents finding with the political behavior of parents who send their children to madrassas – and are less likely to claim that they participate in electoral politics. I complement the survey data with exit polling data from the 2009 municipal elections in Bamako, which loosely supports the findings of greater turnout by public school consumers and weaker turnout from Islamic schooling consumers.

5.3 Schooling Options and Schooling Choice in Mali

Malian parents in urban and peri-urban zones have increasingly diverse schooling options available including: public schools, private secular schools, madrassas, Christian schools, community schools, and Koranic schools. These schools are very different in terms of cost, religious orientation, language of instruction, curriculum, and perceived quality. Before addressing questions of school enrollment and political participation, it is important to ask a preliminary question: when there are multiple providers available, what determines why parents send their children to different types of schools?

The interviews and surveys revealed that fathers or male guardians generally make schooling decisions for the household. In fact, in many households, wives and mother were unable to provide the names of the schools that their children attended, the child's grade level, or what the child's school fees were.[213] In some instances, female members were permitted by the

[213] Bleck notes from interviews in Bamako, Sikasso, and Kayes; Research assistant Guindo notes on respondents in Mopti

absence of a male family member to enroll their children in the school of their choice.[214] In other instances, children were sent to live with relatives who sponsored the child's education and then the relatives were the ones who made schooling decisions for that child. The practice of sending children to live with friends and family is most common at the secondary and tertiary levels where students must travel far distances to attend the closest schooling option. These students board with families who are generally expected to pay most of the students' fees, food, and provide accommodation.[215] However, for the most part, Malian fathers selected schools and found resources to pay for school fees.[216]

Literature on school choice often assumes that parents choose schools in order to maximize educational quality and the family's utility in their selection of that school (Friedman 1955, Hirschman 1970). This utility can be thought of as both a consumptive good, improving the well being and personal development of their children, and as productive good, investing in a child's future ability to bring income into the household (Becker 1976, Bast and Walberg 2003). In developing nations, such as Mali, it is especially important to stress the productive quality of schooling: the child's future earnings can benefit the entire household and/or extended family (Orazem and King, Bergmann 1996, Sahn and Glick 2000; Gérard 1997). In Mali, it is not uncommon for an educated, employed individual to shoulder the burden of his/her entire extended family.

[214] In one example, a Soninke woman in Kayes revealed how her family capitalized on her father's absence to enroll one of her children in private, secular school. "In reality, our dad did not want to send the children to school (Francophone), but only to madrassa….we profited from his absence to send some of the children to French-language school (KV55).
[215] Informal interviews and observation of Malian households in Bamako 2007 and 2009. This was also the experience of all of my research assistants as they attended university in Bamako.
[216] I note that many families rely on help from extended family and friends to pay for their children's school fees.

School choice is restricted by the costs of schooling as well as the opportunity costs of forgone earnings from that child's potential labor. Parents who are unable to absorb these short term costs are unable to enroll their children in school. In our interviews many of the most impoverished respondents were unable to send their children to school. Aminata lives in city of Mopti with her husband and three children. They recently lost their house and all of their possessions in a fire. None of her three children are enrolled in schools. She explained, "I am too poor even to send my kids to an Islamic school (M7)." Adama, a respondent from Kayes, was only able to enroll one of his children in school. He explained, "These days, poor people can't send their kids to school like everyone else (K23)." Drahmane, a respondent in Mopti, implies that five of his six children left school early because they needed to help generate income for the family: "All the others left school because of the difficulties that our family faces every day (M67)." Most parents expressed the desire to enroll their children despite these obstacles. However, there were certain parents who remained ambivalent about sending their children to school and questioned its practical utility – especially in the rural context.[217] As one respondent in the village of Ziguena, about 75 kilometers northwest of Sikasso on the road to Koutiala, explained why his nine children are not in school. "Because they (my children) are farmers. Everyone cannot be at school (SR50b)!"[218] Ali, in Timbuktu explained that school was not a possibility for three of his four children, because, "we are nomadic (T55)."[219] His son stays with a relative so he can attend Bahadou public school in Timbuktu, while the rest of the family migrates.

[217] Gérard (1997) finds that public schooling is out of synch with the lives and rhythms of many Malians in Sikasso region.
[218] Also Sr67, Sr84
[219] Similar response from Bozo respondent, "We are Bozo, our children don't do (any school), we move too much." (SV 63)

Historically, Francophone schooling represented economic and political opportunities. Students that mastered the language of their colonizers could climb a social ladder to the rungs of the educated elite.[220] Mission and public education helped individuals to advance in the colonial bureaucracy and escape the boundaries of their village communities. However, unlike earlier eras, educational attainment in the current context does not guarantee a place in the civil service.[221] Many parents felt deceived and disappointed when their child completes secondary school or university with no job prospects. Despite increasing numbers of unemployed graduates, many parents still hold out hope for education creating greater economic opportunities.[222] Parents still described French language education, in a public, private, or Christian school as necessary for securing a good job.

Additionally, French-language schools gives students the skills for NGO or government jobs, but also helps citizens to navigate government bureaucracy (Bergman 1996). Even if a child eventually drops out, his ability to acquire reading and mathematics skills is a resource for the family (Gérard 1997: 59). In rural areas, parents might enroll one child in Francophone school just to help with "decoding and documentation" and "dealings with bureaucracy" (Brenner 2001: 186)." In his study of a rural area near the Bougoni region of Sikasso, Etienne Gérard interviewed a respondent with a primary school degree, who explains his role collaborating with traditional authority.

> It's me who was the first to serve the village – administratively and politically. Because of that - we the educated – are highly solicited. I even have the impression that the villagers – the old wise men – are starting to understand these things….We are here to serve the village. It's indispensable. If you gave responsibility to he who has the pens

[220] Abernethy 1968, Boyle 1995,1999, Uchendu 1979;
[221] Louis Brenner explains that this process ended in the 1980s under structural adjustment reforms (2007: 209).
[222] Etienne Gérard describes a similar hope for economic returns on French education in his study of a Malinke region in Southern Mali (1997: 44).

(who knows how to write), it's him who is responsibility. He needs to help all (1997: 187).[223]

The respondent goes on to explain his partnership with those in traditional authority. His education does not displace the power or authority of the older elites, but enables him to work in collaboration with them.

When I entered households to conduct surveys, it was very common for the respondent to seek out the child in the household with the highest level of education to "assist" with the interview. Our surveys were conducted in local languages, but having the "educated" child there as a mediator seemed to put the respondents at ease. The fixation with French attainment fuels parents' resistance to "pédagogie convergente[224]" curricula despite producing better academic results (Bender et al 2007, Interviews Summer 2007). Parents with children at schools with pédagogie convergente would often complain about non-French instruction. I spoke with many respondents who would say, "What good is sending my child to school, if she isn't learning in French? She can speak Bambara at home."

Almost universally, respondents preferred private to public schools citing better quality, fewer strikes, and higher passage rates on exams (Bleck and Guindo 2010). In most instances, the choice between a private and public schools is based on a family's economic resources and or the availability of private schools. Initially, private school teachers were thought of as less qualified then public school teachers, but with the rise of contractual teachers, those who are less educated and not employed by the civil service, in public schools and the increasingly numbers of public teachers who moonlight in private school classes, these lines have blurred (Bleck and Guindo 2010). However, household income limited a family's ability to enroll children in

[223] Bleck Translation of Original French Text

[224] Pedagogie convergente slowly phases primary students in from local languages to French instead of immediate immersion in French language primary school classes. After being taught as a subject, French is used as the language of instruction after 6th grade.

private schools where fees generally range from $2-$8 dollars a month.[225] If a household has enough resources to pay for private education then parents said they want to enroll some of their children in these schools. There is a near universal perspective the private schools provide better job prospects than public schools. A Bamakois respondent, Issouf, lamented the poor quality of public education and the shifting loyalty of the Malian population to private providers: "It's the season to send your children to private school (after BA58)." Lassana, a respondent from Kayes, also gave a private school endorsement, "If you want quality education, you have to pay money for private school (K39)."

The exception to this rule comes from teachers and school directors who work at public schools and see private school promoters as nothing more than entrepreneurs hoping to turn a profit. Salif, a director of a public school in the village of Fatoma in the Sevare region explains: "Me, I would never send my child to a private school… they are (only) interested in money (SV65)."

From a strictly economic or productive perspective, a choice between a French language education and an Arabic education seems more puzzling. A resource-based argument might explain why some parents enroll their children in inexpensive Koranic schools instead of no school at all. Students who attend Koranic schools generate their own school fees by "begging" for alms once a week. Generally each student is required to bring in approximately 100 CFA ($.20) to the *karamogo*.[226] This amount is less than what is charged at public school (approximately $10-20). Salif, a fifty year old respondent lives in Mopti where his three children attend Koranic school. He explains his schooling choice as motivated by his limited resources. "I was in an accident 14 years ago; I don't have anything; that is why my kids are at a Koranic

[225] 1,000 -4,000 CFA for most average private schools. There is a separate class of elite private schools that cost thousands of US dollars a year.
[226] Term translates as religious teacher in Bambara.

school (M24)." In some cases, parents send their children to live with the Koranic school teachers. The teachers become responsible for providing housing and food to subsidize what the children can earn in alms.

However, arguing that parents enroll children in Islamic schools as purely a second best option or for economic reasons ignores the socio-cultural realties and tradition of the Malian educational landscape. Koranic schools have existed in some regions of Mali since the 12th century (Sanankoua 1985). In addition, the other form of Islamic schooling – madrassas – is not a cheaper educational option. Madrassas cost as much as most private schools and more than public school options, but the medium of instruction is Arabic – which is not a recognized language of the state bureaucracy. In the past, madrassas were criticized for limiting graduates' job opportunities since they did not provide the linguistic instruction vital for participation in government channels. Many believed that graduates of madrassas could only obtain jobs as teachers in madrassas.[227] Despite these challenges madrassas represented their own form of social power. Sanankoua and explain the social and political power knowledge of Islam can wield:

> But they (madrassas) also represent a strategy for creating, occupying, and controlling a defined social and political space. If madrassas have not succeeded in providing productive economic employment for the majority of their students (this is why they are often critiqued), they have certainly created a negotiable social statute, and up to a certain point, a social mobility, which is not available to students of Koranic schools (1991: 8)."[228]

Despite their productive limitations, some parents choose religious education because they see it as morally imperative to their child's development as a Muslim. Some fearing that, as Louis Brenner described, "...Secular state schools might turn their children into 'unbelievers,"

[227] Interview with Ministry Monitor for Madrassas 2007; Interview with Madrassa teachers 2007
[228] Translation from French by author

(2007:199). Aboubacar a forty-something respondent, Tuareg respondent in Timbuktu explained why he sends all of his three children to Koranic school: "Many say they are Muslims, but they haven't gone to Koranic school or a madrassa or done any kind of (religious) studies. How can you declare yourself Muslim? Maybe because they pray they think that that suffices? (T2)." [229] In his study of school choice in Mali and Burkina Faso, Etienne Gérard found religious leaders who forbid their children to attend secular, public school and others who sent their children to public school, while supplementing their education with Koranic studies at home (1999). Gérard describes these different choices as two distinct strategies for dealing with the reality of the growing importance of French language education and trying to preserve one's own religious authority.

5.4 Justifications for Enrollment Decisions

To get to the heart of why parents send their children to different types of schools we asked them directly. Survey team members asked all respondents with children, if and where their children attended school. Then, each respondent was asked to provide a reason for enrolling their student in each relevant type of school. The pie charts in Figure 2 show the reasons parents gave for enrolling their children in each school type. [230] We observed that parents chose different school types for different reasons. Sixty-three percent of respondents sending their children to public school said they did so for reasons of proximity and an additional 14% said they did so for reasons of affordability. Only 13% chose the public school for reasons of quality.

[229] Gérard found that parents who had attended Islamic school enroll their children at lower rates than those who had attended public school (71.7%compared to 82.8%), but this may also be a result of other control variables such as urban/rural residence or income (1999: 159).
[230] Parents responded for each school type where they had a child; multiple justifications for school enrollment were coded cumulatively.

Issoufou, who lives in Senou, a peri-urban suburb about 10 km from Bamako, has two school-aged children. He used to work in the field as a day laborer at a neighboring farm, but now that he is in his fifties and is unable to withstand the intensive labor that farm work requires, so he is no longer working. He said he enrolled only some of his children in public school because, "private school is too expensive (F43)." He said he would happily enroll the other children if he had the money.

Similarly, most parents enrolled their children in community school because their choice-sets were limited. Predominantly in rural zones, seventy percent of parents enrolled their children in community schools because they were the closest available education providers. This is intuitive since the vast majority of community schools were built in places that had very little educational infrastructure.

In contrast, the majority of parents who send their children to private, Francophone schools or madrassas stated that they "chose" to do so. Fifty-two percent of respondents sent their children to private, secular school because they felt they would receive a quality education there. Abou, who lives in Samé, a suburb of Bamako enrolled his child in a private school because "public school is sick. Plus, I know the director. It was less expensive (than the other private schools) and the teachers are capable (BBC76)." Fifty-four percent of students attending madrassas and fifty-five percent of Koranic students were enrolled for religious reasons. When asked why he chose to enroll his children in a madrassas, Samba, a resident in a village in Fatoma in the Mopti region, explained, "Allah is the unique creator (Sv85)."

Seventy-one percent of parents with children at Christian school reported enrolling their children for the reasons of quality and the majority of them said they were Muslim.[231] Twenty-nine percent who sent their children to Christian school cited religious reasons. Daoda is one of the many Muslims who choose to enroll their children in Catholic school. He explains his choice, "There are serious studies there. The administration has good relations with the parents. For instance, if my child isn't at school, as a parent - I am alerted immediately (BA60).

Decisions to enroll a child in an Islamic or Francophone school are not always a direct outcome of parental preferences, but are can also be dictated by logistical or financial constraints or other outside factors. In some instances, a friend or relative encourages a family, with an Islamic schooling pedigree, to enroll a child in a Francophone school. As an example, I describe the Diallo family in the village of Soutoucoulé just on the outskirts of Kayes N'Dyi. We sat outside their small two room cement house and Karim, the father, energetically answered our survey questions, while his wife Mariam watched –often nodding in approval. The Diallos are a Peule family, so they didn't think twice when his Karim's father suggested they enroll their son, Ibrahim, in the local Koranic school where he had gone as a child. Ibrahim was busy reading his hadiths, rather conspicuously, during his dad's interview. The family was very pleased with their sons' education, but decided to enroll their daughter in public school. When I asked why – Karim explained that he had a friend who works in the mayor's office who thought that it would be a good idea and they had enough resources that they could pay (K60).

In the same village of Soutoucoulé, Kadiatou explained that she sends her children to Dar es Salaam, the big public school in downtown Kayes N'Dyi approximately 3 kilometers away. However, during rainy season the massive craters in Soutoucoulé fill with water, separating

[231] Thus I do not explore the ideological effects of Christian schools. Nicolas Hopkins found the same pattern of Muslim enrollment in Christian schools in Kita in the 1960s due to the perception of better quality French instruction (1972).

compounds scattered along the highest peaks of embankments like small islands. The village becomes nearly impossible to navigate except with a small boat. During the period, Kadiatou sends her children to the local Koranic school located in Soutoucoulé because it is too difficult to make the journey to Dar es Salaam (K13).

In Sikasso, I met a marabout, Salah, and his wife Haoua. They used to enroll all of their children in a madrassa, but due to economic constraints on the family, they were forced to transfer their youngest son into a less expensive public school. Salah was pleasantly surprised by his son, Mamadou's, performance. This year, Mamadou was first of the hundred students in his class. Salah is very satisfied with the public school performance and rated it "very good", while only rating the madrassa his other two children attend "OK." (S78). Salah was not alone, other respondents stated that they preferred Islamic schooling, but did not have the resources to place their children in madrassas. Chaka from Mopti has his four girls enrolled in public school, despite the fact that he thinks "boys should go to Francophone school and girls should go to madrassas (M61)."

It is also important to note that religiosity is not perfectly correlated with Islamic schooling. Some of the most active members of Islamic Associations had their own children in public schools. Abdoulaye is Peule and lives in Mopti where he is an active member of the High Council of Islam – one the primary organizations that organized the family code protests. During his interview, he complained about the National Assembly saying that the Family Code was against Islam. He attended some primary school at a madrassa, however, all of his children attend public school – the symbol of the secular state (M5). Abdoulaye claimed to enroll his four children in public school because it was the closest school to his house. He rated his children's

educational experience there as “good.” This evaluation might reflect the fact that three of his children had already continued on to secondary and university.

The pie charts below in Figure 14, demonstrate how parents made schooling decisions for different types of schools.

Figure 14: Respondents' Reasons for Choosing Each School Type (N=983)[232]



[232] Based on respondent responses for each school type where they had a child enrolled; Parents could provide more than 1 justification for enrollment, so total number of justifications exceeds number of parents with children in each school type: Public N=520, Private, Secular =299, Madrassa =75, Koranic =39, Community = 36, Christian = 14; Other category includes multiple types of justifications .

Many parents who enroll their children in Islamic schools simultaneously enroll their children in secular, Francophone schools. The Venn Diagram in Figure 15 demonstrates the number of parents that enroll their children in the most popular schools, public, private, and madrassas, as well as the number of parents that enroll their children in multiple school types. In fact, only approximately a third of respondents send their children exclusively to madrassas.

Figure 15: Overlapping Enrollment between School Type (N=600)



In Etienne Gérard's study of the Malian education sector in southern Mali, he similarly found that only 20% of guardians sent their children exclusively to public school and 13% of parents sent their children exclusively to an Islamic school; the remaining 67% use some kind of mixed strategy (1997:58). This strategy of diversification is consistent with findings in Pakistan, where a study found that only 25% of families who send their children to madrassas do so exclusively (Andrabi et al 2005). The majority of parents enrolling children in madrassas also enroll their other children in public and/or private schools.

A respondent in the village of Fatoma, about 30 kilometers outside of Sikasso, has children enrolled in both public school and a madrassa. He attended Koranic school and when asked what school type he prefers he said madrassas or Koranic school but, "if the person has a lot of children, then I think he should divide them up and send certain children to madrassas or Koranic school and others to French schools."

Parents gave multiple reasons for diversification including a preference for religious education for girls and supplemental education for children who are not yet old enough to attend public school. For some parents, especially those who are reluctant to send their girls to school at all, madrassas represent a more culturally appropriate and conservative educational venue.[233] Most madrassas in Mali are not gender-segregated, but they do require female pupils to cover their heads, which few Malian girls do outside of that context.[234] The public school age requirement prevents younger children from registration, however parents know that if they do not pass the DEF by age 17, they will be unable to go to formal "lycée" with a government scholarship and have to attend a vocational school or pay for private school.

5.5 Hypothesis Building

For numerous reasons, we can anticipate that parents who send their children to public school will be more likely to engage with the government than other types of Malian citizens. Policy feedback literature suggests multiple mechanisms that might lead parents who use public services would be more likely to interact with the government providing *resources and incentives* for participation as well by affecting *interpretive* aspects of citizenship (Pierson 1993). Below I discuss the potential for these mechanisms to affect political behavior in Mali and

[233] Interview World Education Employee (July 2007)
[234] In Mali, it is uncommon to see young girls with covered heads. In most cases, head-covering is not required until a woman marries.

include two additional mechanisms, which are particularly relevant to the developing world context: *state capacity, legibility,* and *linguistic brokerage.*

5.5.1 Incentives and Resources

First, drawing with the logic of Albert Hirschman, I expect parents with a child in public school to be more likely to exercise their political voice because it is in their political interest (1970). Expanded public provision provides incentives to parents to voice their political opinions in the administration of state schooling or other public services. As direct social service consumers of the state, these citizens have more invested in the performance of the state and will therefore be more active in politics as opposed to other citizens with less at stake during elections.

In the first study to apply policy feedback mechanism to the developing world, Lauren MacLean looks that the negative consequences of state social service retrenchment as a product of structural adjustment (2012). She analyses cross-national Afrobarometer data and finds that citizens with experience using state health or schooling services are more likely to report registering to vote and voting as compared to citizens with no exposure to these services. Drawing on original survey and interview data in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, she argues that the voting is incentivized among public service users to voice concern over the declining quality of public services (20).

The expansion of public education, as well as the growth of state-sanctioned community schools, foster citizens' participation in PTAs and school management committees.[235] By bringing citizens together in the context of these associations, such as the PTA, enrolling your child in school might heighten what Schlozman et al refer to as civic skills (1994). Parent teacher associations or school management committees serve important functions for budget

[235] Madrassas and private schools have no comparable outlets for parental participation and management.

management and allocation in public schools. These organizations provide parents with an opportunity to come together collectively and "exercise their voice" and interact with a government service in an institutionalized channel.[236] More broadly, sending your child to school could broaden your social network and force you to associate with others from more diverse groups and backgrounds. Enrolling a child in school could increase a citizens' propensity to join groups and activate their social capital.

5.5.2 Interpretive Mechanisms

Social service provision can build a citizenship identity through the interpretive feedback mechanism. Literature on social service provision in the US suggests that certain social services, like social security, are seen in a positive light, and can stimulate participation while others, like welfare, have a negative stigma can create isolation (Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Soss 2002; Gordon 1994). Surveys have found that citizens who receive "positive" services are more likely to participate in politics, while those receiving "negative" services are more likely to withdraw from the political realm (Campbell 2003). In the American context, Andrea Louise Campbell has demonstrated how government provision of social security has shaped an active constituency of "uber-citizens" out of the nation's once marginalized seniors; the receipt of social security boosts Americans cognitive ability to understand their political interests (2003). Suzanne Mettler shows the GI Bill had a similar affect on creating more politically active citizens who feel capable and empowered (2005).[237] In all feedback studies, the perceived status of the social service, affects the political identity and subsequent political behavior of the recipients (Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Soss 2002). They explain:

[236]The government pays teachers' salaries directly, but the APE is responsible for all purchases/repairs. Interviews July 2007

[237] Mettler finds the strongest effect among low income groups.

> As a result, the ‘‘advantaged’’ may be more likely to gain the message that they are valued citizens, to adopt an orientation to government that the political game is open, fair, and winnable, and thus to participate in conventional forms of participation at high levels. Conversely, ‘‘dependents’’ may be more likely to receive a message that they are helpless and needy, to adopt a disinterested and passive orientation to government, and thus to participate at low levels (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, 1997). (275).

The Malian state has made pronounced visible campaigns to increase access to education through former President Alpha Konare's "one school or adult education center in every village campaign during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Malian state has gone to great lengths to sensitize populations about the importance of education and therefore most Malian citizens, especially those receiving public school services, are likely to view education in a positive light. By enrolling their children in Malian schools, they are activating their citizenship status; political participation could build upon this base of positive citizenship actions. Citizens may pursue other activities, such as voting, that validate their status as "good citizens."

In a recent study, Keefer and Khemani find that greater exposure to radio signals was correlated with higher enrollment averages in rural schools in Benin (2011). They argue that access to radio led households to make greater investments in their children's education. These findings suggest that popular media, in a comparable democratic environment, persuaded parents of the importance of education.

5.5.3 External Efficacy and State Capacity

In the atmosphere of pervasive skepticism about politics, government services could provide citizens with tangible evidence of a functioning state making their vote seem more relevant. While demonstrating state capacity is not commiserate to a belief that a state will be responsive and accountable to citizens' demands, it is a first step towards demonstrating the possibility of external efficacy. Unlike many other African democracies, the government in Mali did not go as far as making school free, but instead concentrated on developing

infrastructure (Stasavage and Harding 2011).[238] Although public school is not free, parents with children in public school can observe the state at work. Concrete proof of a state's "work" allows citizens to be sensitized to the functioning of government bureaucracy increasing their perception of the state's external efficacy.

During my survey work, I found some evidence that state capacity/external efficacy (or lack thereof) enters a citizen's calculus on about whether or not to vote. In Kayes, where voting rates are habitually low, I would ask respondents, taxi drivers, and other people I met while living there, why so few people were showing up to vote. I can paraphrase their response "Look at the quality of our roads. Look at how dirty our city is. Our politicians do not do anything." Rather than using the ballot box to punish incumbents, many Kayesians chose to exit or forgo politics altogether.

5.5.4 Legibility

In the most basic sense, before a parent enrolls a child in public school, she is forced to interact with the state by producing a birth certificate for her child. As many children are born at home and lack documentation, this often requires a trek down to the municipal government office and request for a legal document. This simple act engages the parent with local government, which might otherwise exist merely as an abstract symbol of state power. The need to connect with citizens is particularly pressing in weak states, where citizens have little contact with or evidence of a central government (Bierschenk and de Sardan 1997).[239] James Scott argues that public schooling increases the legibility of citizens for the state – enabling the state of

[238] By law Malian school fees are free, but in practice all parents pay a nominal fee (around $1) per month.

[239] In an extreme version of this scenario in rural parts of the Central African Republic, they show how little evidence citizens have of the state and the constant struggle of the state to demonstrate its existence and authority.

to observe and control its population.[240] However, we can also imagine this type of interaction as making the state more "legible" to parents. Parents, at a minimum, learn where state buildings are located and gain a sense of what the process is. This knowledge might result greater contact with state bureaucracy and/or greater willingness to participate in state politics. If children have greater contact with government (through public schooling), their families will be less intimidated and reluctant to interact with the state actors out of fear of exploitation. The connection is more than symbolic since public schools transform into polling stations during elections.

5.5.5 Linguistic Brokerage

Public school parents, or any other parents who children receive francophone instruction, might benefit from greater access to government through the education of their children as linguistic/social brokers. An emerging literature on immigrant populations in the US suggests that political socialization can move from children to parents – in addition to the traditional conceptions of political ideas traveling from parents to children (Bloemrad and Trost 2007). [241] Malian parents like immigrant parents, especially those who are less educated or who do not speak the language of the state, could benefit from their children's linguistic skills in order to interact with government bureaucracy. As we observed in the previous chapter, Malians who do not speak French feel stigmatized as second class citizens. By endowing a child with the skills to participate – education could impact the political capability of the entire family. Therefore, we can imagine educated children bringing their parents into the political process.

For the many reasons listed above, I propose the following hypothesis:

[240] Scott 1998
[241] De Ment et al (2005), Parke and Buriel (2006).

H1: *Parents who enroll(ed) their children in public school will be more likely to engage with the Malian government than other citizens and (or) other parents.*

5.6 Islamic Schooling

Are consumers of religious education just as likely to participate in bureaucratic and electoral channels as their peers? There are reasons to believe that these parents would be more likely to turn to contentious or informal participation – mediated by their mosques and religious leaders, than traditional, institutional political channels. Islamic schooling is unique due to its religious focus and because the primary language of instruction, Arabic, is not recognized as an official government language. If we think of public school or private Francophone schools endowing students and their families with a linguistic broker capable of dealing with government, parents who send their children exclusively to madrassas or Koranic schools will fail to access these resources. This, in and of itself, might make a parent at an Islamic school less likely to engage with state bureaucracy than parents whose children attend Francophone schools.

Since formal, political participation is associated with secular, Western power, it is possible that parents that align themselves with religious authorities, including Islamic education, will forgo formal, secular channels of political expression. As demonstrating by the Family Code protests in 2009, 50,000 mosque members protested after elected officials failed to represent their interest. This contentious action succeeded and ATT was forced to send the debated parts of the code back to the National Assembly for Review. As of Spring 2011, a new version of the family code had not yet emerged.

The history of hostility, cooption, and oppression of religious education and religious leadership by the colonial and postcolonial government regimes suggests that Islamic schooling consumers would be particularly reluctant to engage with the state (Brenner 2001; Amselle

1985). Islamic schooling, in either modern, madrassas or Koranic schools, represents a realm of knowledge and power distinct from the secular, Francophone state. We can anticipate that parents whose children receive education from these venues might be less likely to contact the formal secular political realm and more likely to engage with traditional or religious leaders. In the past, members of these communities, usually illiterate in French, have been fearful and suspicious of the state (Villalón forthcoming).

As a citizen's loyalty to a government system erodes and he or she chooses to "exit" out of public provision, s/he may be dissuaded from exercising his "voice" in the formal realm of governmental politics. As discussed in Chapter 2, Islamic actors have profited from the opening of the public sphere facilitated by democracy, but have failed to capitalize in the formal political sphere. As a result, politics are viewed as the inverse of religion and many devout Malians claim to abstain from politics. Islamic organizations have been more effective in applying pressure on the executive and other top policy makers outside of formal political channels. Religious leaders have been extremely successful mobilizing people to protest, however we have not seen Islamic political movements or candidates draw and mobilize these constituencies. We might expect Islamic schooling communities to encourage their members to avoid "dirty politics." Therefore, I generate the following hypothesis:

H2: Parents who enroll their children in madrassas will be less likely to engage with the Malian government than other Malian citizens.

5.7 Empirical Tests

As in the previous chapter, I draw on an original survey of 1000 individuals from 10 school districts. The survey was conducted in three school districts in Bamako, two in Kayes,

two in Sikasso, two in Mopti/Sevare region, and one in Timbuktu.[242] I selected school districts using Ministry of Education enrollment statistics disaggregated by school type to maximize potential variation on the primary independent variable- where children are enrolled in school. Neighborhoods, households, and individuals were selected at random using an online randomizer and Afro-barometer protocol.[243] Interviews were conducted at various times of the day and evenings and on weekends in order to try to capture residents who were home at different times.

All respondents were asked if they had children who were at least 7 years of age.[244] If they had children, they were asked if their children had ever been enrolled in school, and if so, what school type (s). Each respondent was asked their reason(s) for enrolling their child(ren) in each relevant school, evaluations of schools, and their general attitudes toward the Malian education system. In my sample, 694 respondents reported having at least one child seven years of age or older.[245] Of parents with children who attend/attended school[246]: 442 respondents had children who attend/attended public school, 179 had children who attend/attended private, secular school, 91 had children who attend/attended madrassa, 58 had children at community I

[242] I originally intended to conduct surveys in two districts in Timbuktu, but due to insecurity in the region we were only able to conduct surveys in Timbuktu city.
[243] Once school districts were selected, I drew quadrants on the map of the accessible areas of the school district and selected quadrants at random. Survey teams started in the middle of the quadrants and interviewed respondents at every fifth house. Once inside a compound, all residents over 18 were asked to pull a playing card and the respondent with the highest number was selected for the interview. We did not alternate between gender and thus have a slightly higher sample of women in our sample.
[244] Most Malian children are enrolled in school by this age; this is also the age needed to enter Malian public school.
[245] The question tries to generate information about children in school as well as those who had already gone through school, but in some instances respondents only gave information for children still living in their households. In some instances respondents would reference extended family as their own: parents with grown children spoke regarding the experience of grandchildren or aunts and uncles would answer the questions for any school aged child living in the household even if s/he was a nephew rather than a son.
[246] This number captures parents who had children who went through the educational system and those with children currently enrolled. Some of these parents are counted twice as they have children enrolled in multiple schools.

purposefully targeted zones with different types of schools, but as a result my sample has a strong urban/peri-urban bias: only 20% of respondents live in rural zones and therefore the percentage of respondents enrolling their children in community schools and of parents not enrolling a child in any school is below the national average. My sample also captures older respondents with children who attended school in the earlier decades in order to capture not just those parents who are benefitting from a state service, but also those parents who previously benefitted from state services.

5.8 Public Schooling Consumers

Using my survey data, I divide all citizens into two dummy groups: those with children who attend/attended public school and those who do not.[247] The second category includes those parents who send their children to "other schools" such as community schools, madrassas, and private, Francophone schools, as well as those citizens who do not have school-aged children and those who do not have their children enrolled in school at all.[248] To test hypothesis H1, I needed to determine if public school parents are more likely to engage with the government than other types of citizens. I measure engagement through a series of dichotomous dependent variables that measure government documentation including whether or not the respondent has a birth certificate, national id, and voting card as well as political engagement: whether the respondent voted or campaigned in the 2007 presidential election, whether or not they identify with a party, whether or not they would run for office, and whether or not they have contacted a government official.

[247] I use dummies because a large number of parents have children who attend multiple school types and in comparing school type dummies certain parents (with children in multiple schools would fall out).
[248]The first category includes parents who have children enrolled exclusively at public school as well as those parents who have children enrolled in public school and other school types.

I regress each of the dichotomous variables on the public school dummy and controls including age, educational level, gender, urban/rural, school district, associational membership and poverty index.[249] I observe positive and significant relationship between public school parents and three of the dependent variables: having voting identification card, reporting voting, and reporting campaigning in the 2007 presidential election, but not for contacting a government official, willingness to run for office, partisan identification, or any of the other documentation variables.[250] This suggests that public school enrollment affects a narrow range of electoral politics, but not citizens' general linkages to the state.[251] As the previous chapter suggests, participation in two of the more difficult acts – willingness to run for office and contacting government officials – might be dependent on skill sets (like language) that merely sending your child to school could not provide.[252]

I regress the three variables, voted in 2007, campaigning, and having a voter id, on whether a respondent enrolled a child in public without any of the controls. I find that having the enrolling a child in public school's impact on voting in 2007 and having a voter identification card remains significantly and positive ($p<.00$), but that campaigning loses its significance has a negative coefficient in the bivariate regression. I test for multicollinearity using a variance inflation factor (VIF) test, and again do not find signs of multicollinearity. I run the regression dropping each control and I find that campaigning is only significant once controls for gender

[249] These are the same controls included in the previous chapter in addition to the respondents own educational level.
[250] For other documents, birth certificate and national id, poverty is the only variable that appears to affect the likelihood that a citizen has these documents. Since party allegiance is largely temporal in Mali, I am not concerned that parents with children in public schools could have a higher likelihood of reporting that they campaigned and that party ID is non-significant.
[251] Pierre Englebert suggests that African government's weak sovereignty is pervasive and that all citizens, regardless of how invested they are in the state, have to engage with minimal bureaucracy to survive.
[252] Identifying with a party is also not effected. This could mean that citizens' mobilization happens outside of party allegiance/party mobilization.

and age are included. I know that both variables are negatively related to having reported campaigning in 2007. I run interaction terms with each of the two variables and enrolling your child in public school, but neither interaction term is significant.

Additionally, I run a link test to test for non-linear relationships, but do not find evidence of model misspecification for any of the models. I also run a Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test and do not find any signs indicating lack of fit for any of the models.

Holding all other variables at their mean, if a citizen has a child enrolled in public school, there is an 18% increase in the predicted probability that she will have a voter id card. The predicted effect is stronger than most of the control variables: for instance, increasing a respondent's age by 10 years or increasing their degree of associational membership only increases the predicted probability of having a voter id by 5%.[253] Increasing the respondent's education level is associated with a 3% increased predicted probability in having a voter identification card. Finally being a woman only has a 10% decreased predicted probability.

Having at least one child who was or is enrolled in public school can be interpreted as increasing the predicted probability of having reported voting in the 2007 presidential election by 11% when holding all other variables at their mean. The predicted effect of consuming government schooling services is larger than all of the other control variables except education.[254] Being a public school consumer increases the predicted probability of having participated in a campaign during the 2007 presidential election by 7%. Level of education, gender, age, and

[253] I use Clarify (King) to calculate predicted probabilities.

[254] For instance, increasing age of a respondent by ten years only increases the probability of having voted by 6%. Increasing a respondent's level of education from one level to the next, for instance none to informal or informal to primary, translates into a 2% increase in the probability of voting; while going from no education to university education increases the probability of having voted by 13%. Note that education is a continuous variable in this estimation since I already tested the effects of specific levels of education in the previous chapter.

associational membership are also significant. This finding is somewhat surprising as I have theorized campaigning as a "more difficult" form of participation, which requires a certain degree of internal efficacy. However, we might also conceptualize "the mobilized" participating in campaigns alongside those citizens who are "mobilizing" others.

Table 13:Public School Consumers' Political Participation as Compared to Other Citizens[255]

Where Child Enrolled	Vote in 2007 Pres Election?	Campaign in 2007 ?	Voter Id Card?
Public	**.53** **(.17)`**	**.35*** **(.18)**	**.82***** **(.18)**
Controls			
Education	.11* (.06)	.19*** (.06)	.13* (.06)
Woman	-.20 (.17)	-.77*** (.17)	-.47** (.17)
Urban	.17 (.38)	.54 (.40)	-.26 (.37)
Poverty	.02 (.07)	-.01 (.07)	-.18* (.07)
Age	.26*** (.06)	-.12* (.06)	-.20** (.06)
Associational Membership	.26** (.08)	.35*** (.07)	.23** (.08)
Faladie	-1.07** (-.36)	Reference Category	-2.16*** (.38)
Banconi	-.43 (.37)	-.62 (.35)	-1.48*** (.39)
Bamako Coura	-.82* (.34)	.14 (.32)	-1.23** (.41)
Sikasso 1	-1.37*** (.36)	-1.02** (.35)	-1.63*** (.38)
Sikasso 2	-.18 (.51)	.05 (.48)	-.52 (.54)
Timbuktu	Reference Category	-.14 (.33)	Reference Category
Kayes Rive Droite	-1.31*** (.37)	.06 (.35)	-1.17** (.40)
Kayes Rive Gauche	- 1.20.*** (.34)	-.18 (.32)	-1.99*** (.37)
Mopti	-.80* (.37)	.10 (.34)	-1.40*** (.40)
Sevare	-.07 (.57)	.77 (.54)	-.33 (.59)
Constant	.10 (.54)	-1.37** (.54)	-1.11 (.56)
McFadden's[+]/Pseudo R-squared	.09	.08	.13
Log Likelihood	-503.72	-504.10	-514.82
Observations	859	914	910

[255] p<.05=*, p<.01=**, p<.001=***

It is important to isolate the effect of sending a child to a public school compared to simply being a parent since the majority of parents send their students to public school and since age has a significant effect on all forms of participation. In order to ensure that this distinction is a result of public schools, and not just having children in school, I repeat the regressions on a subpopulation of parents. I drop all respondents who do not have school-aged children from the regression, so that the reference category only reflects those citizens who are currently parents.[256] I find the identical results on the relationship between public school parents and voting as with the previous regression, except that the effect of having children in public school is slightly stronger – estimated at increasing the probability of having voted by 12%. I repeat the regression with whether or not the respondent has a voting card as a dependent variable, again with a restricted subpopulation of respondents with school-aged children and I find identical and again slightly magnified results.

However, when I run the regression exclusively with parents with school aged children on whether or not a respondent campaigned as a dependent variable, the relationship between public school consumption and campaigning loses its significance. Perhaps, schooling had a stronger effect on campaigning for older citizens, who had children at public school, and thus could benefit from their political brokerage, as compared to peers in their cohort. Those parents with older children, who have already attended school, are more likely to benefit from their linguistic skills than parents with children in primary school – who have not yet achieved the level of literacy in order to be a competent linguistic broker.

5. 9 Mechanisms

[256] This means that younger respondents as well as older respondents who no longer have school age children are excluded from the regression.

As I suggested earlier, there are many ways that sending a child to public school might make parents more likely to vote. Since enrolling your child in school in urban and peri-urban districts is usually a choice between large numbers of competing schools, there is a concern that parents' preferences could drive both school choice and political participation. The parents' political attitudes, acting as a confounding variable, could determine both enrollment and political behavior. However, few parents interviewed claimed to enroll children in public school because it was their first preference. The majority of parents enrolled their children in public schools due to reasons of practicality, 63% due to proximity and 14% due to affordability.[257] This finding partially offsets the possibility that students are enrolled there as part of a parent's larger political project. These justifications are coupled with the fact that most Malians expressed a desire to enroll their child in private school if they had the means available. The majority of choices appear to be driven by external constraints rather than a desire for state education, so there is less evidence that parents' preferences drive both school choice and ideology.[258]

If the experience of sending your child to public school is driving voting, then there are multiple reasons that this could be the case. Below, I try to explore some of the potential ways that consuming a state service could make a citizen more likely to vote. These various pathways are not mutually exclusive, but I offer evidence for each mechanism that might determine participation behavior in some cases.

[257] These findings are consistent with MacLean 2007 and Boyle 1999 who find that finds that poorer citizens are "forced" into public services by financial constraints, well wealthier citizens use private services

[258] I do not find evidence of a significant relationship between income and voting, which would rule out the possibility of poverty as a confounding variable for school enrollment and higher voting rate.

Table 14: Evidence of Potential Mechanisms?

Mechanisms	**Observable Implication 1**	**Observable Implication 2**	**Observable Implication 3**	**Possible?**
Legibility: Public schooling gives state increased visibility/legibility, prompting citizens to engage with it	Should see positive correlation between public school consumers and all forms of documentation**(No)**	Receipt of public schooling should have greater effect on parents with less education **(No)**		**No**
Incentives and Resources: Parents with children at public school are more invested in government performance/ Parents with children in public school have greater social capital, connections to other citizens	We should not observe heightened voting or campaigning from private school parents as compared to other citizens **(Yes)**	Parents with children in public school have greater social capital, connections to other citizens **(Yes)**	PTA members are more likely to vote and campaign **(No)**	**Maybe**
State capacity: Parents with children see state as more capable and are more willing to vote	Those parents with better experience in school should be more likely to vote **(No)**	Qualitative Data should suggest that parents think the state is putting a "good effort" into education provision **(Yes)**	Public schooling consumers are more likely to say that government responds to citizen needs questions? **(Yes)**	Maybe
Interpretive: Parents with children in public school want to continue to act as "good citizens"	See qualitative evidence that parents have positive associations of enrolling their children in school **(Yes)**	Large Public Relations campaigns to promote the idea of schooling **(Yes)**		**Yes**
Linguistic Broker: Children who attended public school bring	Observe evidence of educated children as linguistic brokers,	Focus group of university students said that educated	Parents with children in non-state francophone	**Yes**

their parents into the political process	helping parents to interact with "outsiders" **(Yes)**	children bring candidates to rural areas for a campaign/provide parents with political info **(Yes)**	schools should have higher rates of participation than other citizens **(Yes)**	

Legibility

I found evidence for a series of mechanisms and I am only able to exclude the legibility argument. If public schools made the government more legible to the population, we should have seen differences between public school consumers and others citizens on all forms of government documentation, but this is not the case. I also ran an interaction to see if public school consumption had a greater effect on parents with less education, and who were therefore less likely to interact with the state themselves, but I did not find any significant results.

Incentives and Resources

I find evidence for the argument that public school parents are more invested in education due to the fact that they are stakeholders in government performance (incentives) and through the social capital resources provided by schooling communities (resources). Public school enrollment might also bring parents into contact with other parents and thus increase their likelihood of being a member of an association as a proxy for increased social capital. In order to test this mechanism, I create a dichotomous dependent variable for associational membership, which I have previously used as a control.[259] I regress being a member in an organization on the dummy for "public school consumers" and the controls. I find being a public school consumer is

[259] I dichotomize this value because I am less interested in the role that parents play in the organization (or their level of activity) than their involvement compared to a control category of no-involvement; I anticipate that responses of whether someone participated or not are more valid than their estimation of level of participation. Member=1 (I consolidate all three categories of associational members) and non-member =0

positive and significantly ($p<.01$) correlated with being a member of an association. Holding all variables at their means, enrolling a child in public school creates a 12% increase in the predicted probability that a citizen is a member of an association. This finding suggests that membership in a larger public school community could increase likelihood of joining an association, which in turn translates into social capital and willingness to turn out to the polls on election-day as associational membership is significant for all forms of political participation. To make sure that this socialization effect is not just a result of having a child at any school, I repeat the regression with dummies for parents with children in the two other most popular school types: madrassas and private schools. However, I do not find a significant relationship between these schools and associational membership in either regression. This correlation appears to be distinct to public school parents. I included associational membership in my initial regression, so I know that public school consumption matters on its own. However, this finding suggests that they may be voting more often as a result of some kind of social capital or maybe a certain type of group membership. I run a regression to see if PTA membership is correlated with greater political participation. However, I do not find that membership is significant. Very few respondents reported being active members of parent teacher associations. This implies that social capital/resource mechanism might work through more informal contact and association with other parents rather than a formal organization.

State Capacity and Interpretive Effects

I find evidence for both state capacity and the interpretive effects of public schooling consumption. The policy feedback literature stresses that public policy efforts must be visible and legible in order to generate an effect on citizens (Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993). Harding and Stasavage argue that democratic governments in Africa employ visible, measurable

policies through free public schooling in order to earn electoral support (2011). The provision of public schooling, even if school fees exist, offers governments a venue to demonstrate their capacity using the physical presence of schools. Moving beyond infrastructure, it is possible that a citizen could evaluate the state based on the quality of their own experience with social service provision; this evaluation may also influence their decision to vote. Joe Soss describes the impact of welfare programs on recipient's political learning and subsequent participation in the American context.

> To summarize, clients draw political lessons from their program experiences because welfare agencies are usually the most accessible and consequential government institution in their life. Welfare agencies are easily recognized as a part of government and have clear links to its other branches. For many clients, they serve as the most direct source of information about how government works (369).

I run an additional test to see whether parents' positive evaluation of their children's experience is correlated with higher reported turnout to the polls. I restrict the analysis to parents with children whom attend/attended public school. During the survey, parents were asked to evaluate their children's experience in each relevant school type on a scale of 0 (no quality) to 5 (very good).[260] I include a public school rating variable with the expectation that people who give public schools the highest rating will be even more likely to vote. However, a high rating of a child's educational experience is not positively correlated with a higher predicted likelihood of voting. In fact, rating has negative predicted effect on voting significant at the .1 level. Therefore, I do not find support for perceived school quality as a proxy for state capability - inducing parents to vote.

There is the possibility that parents view the act of school construction, rather than the quality of content, as fulfilling the state's role and proving that it is a capable actor or that some

[260] I averaged the evaluations for parents with students in multiple public schools

parents are not capable of evaluating educational content.[261] The median rating of public schooling was "good" despite that fact that many parents were critical of the public school system and talked about a pervasive educational crisis. This suggests that parents are less aware of the actual content of what is being taught at school and therefore more likely to use visible infrastructure criteria, than the content of curriculum or quality of teacher performance.

Figure 16: Public School Evaluations by Parents (N=442)



Lauren MacLean adds a third dimension to the policy feedback framework that is useful in this analysis. She argues that feedback is affected by the gap between popular expectations and actual implementation (2012: 21). Contrary to her study of the more developed economies of Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, Malian parents had lower expectations for the state's role in education provision. Parents spoke of the state efforts at education as 'doing its best.' Occasionally, when I followed up with questions about a perceived decline educational quality, public school parents defended the state by saying: 'well, you can't possibly do both (quality and access); the state has really put tremendous focus on access.' In the Malian case, policy

[261] In instances when parents did evaluate individual schools, they often based their evaluation on their child's rank in the classroom and/or whether the child had passed standardized exams.

feedback may be triggered by positive assessment of the government's efforts as proof of its capacity.

In order to test the state capacity argument further, I used another Afrobarometer question that surveys respondents' evaluations of government performance: "Does the Malian state respond to citizens needs?" If receipt of public education leads to a evaluation of state capacity, then respondents who have children who attend/attended public school should rate the state at a higher capacity than other citizens. To evaluate this hypothesis, I create a binary dependent variable: good evaluation and bad evaluation.[262] I regress the evaluation on the control variables: living in a rural area, being a woman, age, poverty, education level, and whether or not someone had a child enrolled in public school. I find that having a child who attend/attended public school is positive and significantly ($p<.05$) correlated with a "good evaluation" of the state responses to citizens' needs. In fact, it increases the predicted probability that respondents would give a good evaluation by 8%. However, when I include regional controls, public school consumers' remain positive, but the significance drops down to .1. These findings offer tentative support for the state capacity argument.

I also observe interpretive effects of social service receipt on citizenship. The government, under Konare, as well as donors embarked on nation-wide educational sensitization campaigns. Most Malians know that schooling is a good thing that the government supports. In addition to proving state capacity, enrolling your child in public school might reinforce the recipient's identity as a good citizen. Just as American citizens who receive a "positive" social service from the state, Malians who have access to education – as a positive government distribution program, might have reinforced identity as good citizens. This identity could bring

[262] Ratings of 0, 1, and 2 were consolidated as a negative rating; ratings of three (OK) and up were rated as positive evaluations.

them to vote at the polls. As I discussed in Chapter 2, our exit polling during the 2009 municipal elections revealed that voting citizens' primary justification for coming out to the polls was because of "a patriotic duty."

Finally, I find some evidence that linguistic broker mechanism increases participation. If participation was inducted by a child's acquisition of linguistic skills, then we should see that private school parents, who also benefit from having children in French school, are also more likely to participate than other citizens. I test a dummy of "private school parents" and I do not find a significant effect on voting or campaigning. However, if I drop public school parents from the reference category and compare private school parents to all other citizens, having a child enrolled in private school becomes positively and significantly correlated with having voted ($p<.01$) in 2007 and having a voter identification card ($p<.05$). This suggests that private school parents may also be pulled into the electoral system by their children.

Additionally, I found qualitative evidence that citizens are pulled into political campaigns and the voting booths by their educated children. I ran a small focus group in Bamako in the spring of 2011 with a group of university students from regions outside the capital to determine how their grandmothers, uncles, parents, and neighbors back in the village access political information and or get involved in politics. Their response was nearly unanimous: their educated children tell them how to vote. More concretely, students and former-students in Bamako participate in campaigns as brokers for political parties. They act as guides - introducing candidates and party representatives to traditional leadership in the village. These findings suggest that, at least in rural areas, educated children play a role in bringing their parents into the political arena. However, this mechanism would benefit not only public school parents, but any parent whose child receives a French language education.

All of the mechanisms support the idea that the expansion of public primary education has created democratic returns in a secondary way: by fostering the participation of parents in the political arena. In the face of widespread skepticism, public school parents are making a choice to vote. The implications for liberalization are mixed. If the linguistic brokerage element is playing the strongest causal role – then liberalization to include other Francophone schools is also benefitting Malian democracy. However, if the increased participation is a result of greater civic identity associated with the receipt of a good social service, greater interest/investment in government performance, and/or greater belief as the state as a capable actor, then a premium should be placed on public provision and/or expanding the visibility of the state's role in private provision.

5.10 Islamic Schooling Consumers

Our surveys revealed that only forty-two parents had their children enrolled in Koranic schools. Due to the nature of the survey design, I think that enrollment in these schools was underreported in instances where parents enrolled their child in Koranic schools to supplement other forms of education. The survey asked if the child was enrolled in school and went on to code the school types. Parents were only prompted with a second question: but does your child go to any informal or Islamic schooling if they replied that the child was not enrolled elsewhere? Koranic schools are less expensive than other school types since the children generate the fees themselves by begging. Many of the parents who send their children to Koranic schools are from rural areas that do not have access to other types of educational infrastructure and/or the means to pursue other types of education.

Parents who enroll their children in madrassas come from a wider socioeconomic spectrum. In the sample, ninety-two parents reported sending their children a madrassa; although

only a third of these parents exclusively enroll their children in Islamic schools. However, the two types of Islamic schooling are very distinct and have a history of contention as madrassas were explicitly built to offer a modern alternative to local, hierarchical Koranic education. It does not make theoretical sense to combine the two types of schooling into one category since they cater to different groups and due to socioeconomic differences of their consumers. Therefore, I decide to test each hypothesis with two different categories of parents: those who send their children to Koranic schools and those that send their children to madrassas.

In order to test the hypothesis 2, I create two dummies for Islamic schooling: one for those with a child who attends/attended a madrassa and a second dummy for parents whose children attend/attended a Koranic school and other citizens.[263] I regress the dichotomous outcome variables for government documentation (whether or not they have a birth certificate, identification card, or voting card) and political participation (party identification, campaigning, voting, willingness to run for office, and contacting a government official) on each Islamic schooling dummy and the controls. This allows me to compare parents with children in madrassas (or Koranic schools) to a reference category of all those citizens who do not have a child enrolled in these school types.

I find that having a child enrolled in madrassa had no significant effect on the likelihood that a parent has any government document. Having a child in a Koranic school was significantly correlated with a lower predicted probability of having a birth certificate, but this was the only significant difference. This finding suggests, consistent with Englebert's argument, that even communities that prefer to operate outside the realm of the secular state are not

[263] The category of citizens who have a child in an Islamic school includes those parents who have other children in other school types. The category of other citizens includes parent with children in non-Islamic schools as well as non-parents. Again, due to the prevalence of parents enrolling their children in multiple school types, I wanted to create exclusive categories through the creation of this kind of dummy.

completely isolated from it. In order to function in Malian society, one still needs to pursue government documentation – no matter what your religious or schooling preferences are. We often associate madrassa consumers with traders and reformist Islamist movements, but these findings curtail suspicions of separatism, but rather suggest a willingness to engage with the state as necessary.

As demonstrated in Table 15 below, having a child attend a madrassa is correlated with a lower predicted likelihood that a citizen reports voting as compared to other respondents. Additionally, enrolling a child in a madrassa negatively correlated with campaigning and significant at the .1 level. [264] However, there is no significant difference between Islamic schooling consumers and other citizens for any of the other participation variables. I do not find any significant results comparing parents with children at Koranic schools to all other citizens. This may be in part because of large number of parents with students enrolled in Koranic schools simultaneously as they attend public, private schools or madrassas who did not report having a child in Koranic school.

If a parent has a child enrolled in a madrassa there is a 13% lower predicted probability that she reported voting in the 2007 presidential elections. There is no significant relationship between sending your child to a madrassa and any of the other participation or documentation variables except campaigning as mentioned above ($p<.1$). These findings suggest that receipt of services from Islamic providers is only negatively correlated with participation in the narrow range of electoral politics.

[264] If I combine madrassa and Koranic parents, the campaign variable is negative and significant.

Table 15: Madrassa Consumers' Participation Compared to Other Citizens[265]

	Voted in 2007 Pres Elections	Campaigned in 2007 Pres Elections
Where Child Enrolled		
Madrassa	**-.55****	**- .59**
	(.26)	**(.33)**
Controls		
Education	.08	.17**
	(..05)	(.06)
Woman	-.05	-.67***
	(.17)	(.17)
Urban	.29	.73
	(.38)	(.41)
Poverty	.02	-.01
	(.07)	(.07)
Age	.33***	-.07
	(.06)	(.06)
Associational Membership	.26**	.36***
	(.08)	(.07)
Faladie	-1.22**	.04
	(..36)	(.38)
Banconi	-.55	.22
	(.37)	(.33)
Bamako Coura	-.89*	-.48
	(.38)	(.36)
Sikasso 1	-1.38***	-.84*
	(.35)	(.36)
Sikasso 2	-.11	.41
	(.51)	(.50)
Timbuktu	Reference Category	Reference Category
Kayes Rive Droite	-1.31***	.22
	(.37)	(.36)
Kayes Rive Gauche	- 1.23.***	-.05
	(.34)	(.33)
Mopti	-.90*	.19
	(.36)	(.33)
Sevare	-.07	1.04
	(.57)	(.56)
Constant	.13	-1.60**
	(.54)	(.55)
McFadden's[+]/Pseudo R-squared	.09	.08
Log Likelihood	-513.56	-507.87
N	871	921

I run an additional regression excluding any parents who sent their children to public school from the reference category. Since the previous regression showed that there is a positive correlation between public school parents and voting, I want to ensure that their presence in the reference category is artificially inflating the negative relationship between madrassa consumers and voting. I find that when comparing madrassa parents to citizens with no children, citizens with children in private school, community, or Koranic schools, and citizens without children

[265] p<.05=*, p<.01=**, p<.001=***

enrolled in school, being a madrassa consumers is still significantly and negatively correlated with a lower likelihood of voting ($p<.005$).[266] In addition, as with the previous regressions, I ran the link test, VIF tests for multicollinearity, and Hosmer-Lemeshow test for goodness of fit and none of the tests indicate problems with either multicollinearity or model specification.

These findings suggest that receipt of services from Islamic providers specifically affects participation in the narrow range of electoral politics. I run additional regressions to see if school choice affects willingness to contact government officials. I find that receipt of Islamic social services is not correlated with a decreased likelihood of contacting a government official. I ran a second regression to see how sending you child to a religious school might heighten the likelihood of contacting a religious leader, but I did not find any significant relationship. Additionally sending your child to a madrassa does not have significant relationship with probability of being in a religious organization. These results suggest that there is not a divisive counter-culture emerging, but rather that the receipt of social service has a particular correlation with electoral participation.

5.11 Mechanisms

The regressions suggest that parents with children enrolled in Islamic schools are less likely to report voting or campaigning. Since the majority of parents report enrolling their children in madrassas for religious reasons, ideology could be a determining force of both enrollment and political behavior. We do not know if patterns of participation are an actual result of the receipt of schooling or an underlying characteristic which determines parents' school preference and their non-participation. In the chart below, I try to create a list of observable implications for each causal path: A. Islamic schools generate allegiance to non-

[266] Note that when I drop "public school parents," I also drop those madrassa consumers who have a child simultaneously enrolled in public school.

secular authority → less political participation or B. Parents who chose Islamic schools are also predisposed to participate less in politics. I find evidence for both causal pathways.

Table 16: Observable Implications for Potential Causal Mechanisms

Observable Implications of Mechanisms	**A: Receipt of Schooling Affects Participation**	**B. Self selection Bias (Parents who choose Islamic schools also less likely to participate)**
Does public schooling affect participation?	Parents who have other children at public school will be more likely to vote. **(Yes)**	No difference between parents with diverse educational profiles and those who use Islamic schools exclusively. **(No)**
Gender difference in turnout?	Parents with children at school should be equally affected by educational provision. **(No)**	Since male members of the household make educational choices, fathers with children at Islamic schools should be less likely to participate than mothers with children at Islamic schools. **(Yes)**
Different participation patterns from those enrolling for "ideological vs. non-ideological reasons"	The reason for enrollment should not affect turnout within the subpopulation. **(Yes)**	Those parents, who enroll for ideological reasons, should be less likely to vote than parents enrolling children for other reasons **(No).**

In looking at the distinct sub-population of parents who send their children to Islamic schools, I wanted to explore if there are differences among citizens who also send their children to public school and those who send their children exclusively to madrassas. If parents who also have children at public school are more likely to vote, it suggests that the schooling experience itself matters. The qualitative data presented in Chapter 3 suggests that many parents enroll their children in public schools for non-ideological or non-strategic reasons such as cost, friend's recommendation, or proximity. I restrict my analysis to a population of madrassa consumers, and regress voting in 2007 on my controls and variable of interest, on whether the respondent also had a child enrolled in public school. Having a child enrolled in public school has a positive and significant ($p<.05$) predicted effect on voting. Within the subpopulation of madrassa

consumers, holding all other variables at their mean, enrolling a child in a public school, increases the predicted probability that a parent will vote by 40%.

These findings suggest that the integration of "religious" parents into the public school system might have beneficial effects on their political participation and that political behavior may be malleable. If schooling does affect allegiance, the findings suggest that the receipt of state social services can induce citizens to vote- even among populations that also receive religious schooling.

Next, I explore the differences between male and female respondents within the sub-population of respondents with children at Islamic schools. Since men make schooling choices for the household, if ideological predispositions determine both schooling choices and political behavior, we would expect to see a lower likelihood of voting from men than women. I regress the gender and the other control variables on reported voting in 2007. In this subpopulation, being a woman ($p<.01$) is positive and significant correlation with voting. The coefficient can be interpreted to mean that holding all other variables at their constants, being a woman increases the predicted probability of having voted by 53%.[267] This finding is particularly interesting because being female is generally negatively correlated with all forms of participation.[268] These findings confirm the opposite path of causation. However, these results should be interpreted with caution as women's responses may be subject to higher levels of conformity bias.

Finally, I compare parents who send their children to madrassas for ideological reasons as compared to those parents who stated sending their children to madrassas for practical reasons. If those parents who send their children to madrassas for ideological reasons have lower predicted likelihood of voting than parents who enroll for practical reasons, it suggests that prior

[267] In the general population, being a woman is negative, but not significantly correlated to voting behavior.

[268] Associational membership, usually correlated with voting, is not significant for this subpopulation.

ideology, rather than experience as a madrassa consumer, is probably playing the strongest role in determining voting behavior. I do not find evidence to support this implication. There is a positive, but insignificant correlation between ideology and voting. I run a simple correlation test to see if the relationship is negative for a subpopulation of men – those we know to be responsible for schooling decisions, however, I find a weak (less than .2) correlation between ideology and voting.

The observable implications of these causal pathways are inconclusive as I have evidence for different mechanisms. However, the fact that sending your child is negatively correlated to voting is an important descriptive contribution on its own. Though many have studied specific Islamic communities in West Africa, this is the first study to demonstrate different patterns of participation by different social service consumers.

5.12 Additional Data: Bamako Municipal Election Exit Polling 2009

Since all participation behavior data from survey is self reported, we have no way of knowing if correlations with participation represent actual behavior or just how respondents want to present themselves. If public school parents know that "good citizens vote" then they might want to over-represent that behavior. Similarly, if there is a stigma against voting for members of certain religious communities, then they might want to downplay their own electoral participation.

To complement reported participation data, I collected exit poll data on the school enrollment patterns of voters during the 2009 Municipal Elections in three school districts in Bamako. All school districts were located in zones near where we conducted our surveys to capture potential variation on schooling experiences. I organized three teams of threes to stand

outside a large polling station (usually a public school) in each of the districts.[269] Each team was composed of three members, primarily university students and recent graduates, who were tasked with interviewing every third person who exited from the polls. The teams all conducted their polling from the time when polls opened at 8 am until they had collected 150 total responses. Therefore there is a potential for bias towards a subpopulation of early voters as compared to voters who come later in the day.

If the survey data are correct, we should see a large number of public school parents at the polls as compared to a much smaller percentage of parents who enroll their children in madrassas. Figure 17 shows where most voters enroll their children in the three different polling stations (Banconi, Bamako Coura, and Faladie). However, it is also important to remember that Bamako, as the urban capital, may not be representative of national trends. For instance, while age is generally correlated with people stating that they have voted, note the large number of respondents from the exit polls claim that they do not have children or school aged children. It may be that mobilization in Bamako targets youth at a higher rate than in other regions. However, I have no reason to suspect that the mechanisms would be different in Bamako than elsewhere in the country.

[269] Polling stations selected were among the largest and most popular to capture the greatest amount of voter flow.

Figure 17: Where Voters in 2009 Municipal Elections Enroll their Children



Of the people with children, we see the largest turnout from those people with children in public and private school. Interestingly, quite a few voters – almost 5% in two of the polling stations - claimed to have children not enrolled in any school type. This is substantially higher than what we found in our surveys and could suggest either that a). poor voters have higher than average turnout or b). survey respondents underreported the number of children who were not in school. Participation by the most economically marginalized actors raises concerns about vote-buying, cooptation, or other short-term threats and incentives.

Previously, I ran a regression that compared parents of children in private schools to other citizens and did not find a significant relationship with any form of political participation. The exit poll data suggests at a minimum that in Bamako, private school parents are still engaging with the electoral political process and suggests evidence of the linguistic broker mechanism.

Again, it is important to note that these data are only from Bamako and were taken during the municipal elections, while the survey references the presidential elections of 2007.

Municipal elections, often described as "elections of proximity," might offer greater incentives for madrassa consumers to be involved in that a family member or neighbor might be running and election and encourage him or her to come out to the poll. In presidential elections, where contenders are foreign and generally secular, Western-educated elites, madrassa consumers would have a lower likelihood of an allegiance that would overcome societal stigma about voting.

5. 13 Implications

These findings suggest that government social services, such as public education, provide the state with a tool to connect with their citizenry and encourage participation in electoral institutions. The last chapter demonstrated how the educational expansion of the democratic era has benefitted citizens by increasing their political knowledge, and to some degree, fostering political participation. These findings suggest that expanding state education provision has created an additional benefit – it has helped connect parents to the state and the democratic system by demonstrating state capacity and increasing citizenship identity. Furthermore, by increasing the number of children who make it into secondary or university schooling, policy changes endow families with linguistic brokers. Despite concerns mass concerns about school quality, most parents with a child in a public school rated that education as "good" and seemed content with the state's efforts to provide public education. Unlike many countries in West Africa, the Malian government has not made steps to eliminate school fees.[270] This suggests that the mere provision of the good itself, rather than quality or a complete subsidy, is might enough to build credibility for the state in the Malian context.

[270] Even though primary school is supposed to be free, everyone knows that in practice all schools charge some form of fee.

This finding also cautiously warns against complete liberalization of the educational sector. It appears that a tangible connection between a citizen and a public service benefits the democratic system, thus we need to consider this additional factor when deciding how much of the educational system should be privatized. However, Francophone private schools can also contribute to the integration of citizens in that they can endow students with French language skills necessary for linguistic brokers who can help integrate their parents into politics. These skills would be most valuable for parents who are illiterate and therefore, most likely benefit children who are attending public school, but perhaps also more affluent Malians who are Arabic language educated and/or never learned French themselves. The exit polls in Bamako revealed that private school parents do not appear to be dissuaded from voting.

The second finding, that madrassa consumers vote less, highlights important distinctions between sub-populations of service consumers in Mali and challenges for their integration into national politics. I have identified a negative correlation between Islamic schooling consumers and participation in elections – through voting or campaigning. My initial attempts to adjudicate endogenity concerns are inconclusive. However, while some parents might chose to abstain from politics prior to their enrollment decisions I have found some evidence that the schooling experience itself deters parents from voting. The finding that receipt of public schooling remains positive and significant for voting for the subpopulation of Islamic schooling consumers also suggests a potential pathway for this group's integration through a gradual process as more of these families are willing to enroll their children in secular, public schools.

While, questions of endogenity remain, it is important to demonstrate that this sub-group has distinct political behavior patterns and that those parents who are also integrated into the larger public school community are more willing to get involved in elections. Further research

needs to be done to determine the exact path of causation and the effects of schools themselves. However, the finding that Islamic schooling consumers, as a distinct subpopulation, are less inclined to participate in electoral politics is important. If these populations can mobilize effectively through contentious politics, then perhaps Malian politics can continue in its current trajectory with two distinct spheres of authority. However, if these populations begin to feel marginalized in formal politics and chose to withdraw completely from political endeavors, then Mali's democratic society with not benefit from the voice or participation of a significant subpopulation with the risk of fragmenting and estranging this population.

Perhaps people sending their children to Islamic schools might be willing to participate in elections if the electoral landscape included some of "their candidates," who reflect their values and backgrounds. The Malian state's accreditation of madrassas creates the possibility of the emergence of "Islamic" candidates with state diplomas. Since most parents who send their children to Islamic spheres appear integrated, rather than isolated, from other citizens, I think that possibility of their incorporation into an electoral system with more conservative candidates is high. Those existing candidates who have attempted to run on an "Islamic" platform, such Ibrahim Boubacar Keita's presidential run in 2002, were not credible because they come from an elite Francophone background. The resilience of French as the language of formal politics raises significant questions about the future of Islamic education in the democratization process. Madrassa education has gained notoriety after its endorsement by the government and with the rising popularity of Arabic as a cosmopolitan language. However until Arabic is given status as a national language, the acquisition of the French language appears to be a pre-requisite for madrassa-educated who want to get involved in politics.

Chapter 6:

Education and Citizenship in Africa

6.1 Introduction

I selected education as the "practical lens" through which I would explore contemporary African democratic politics, while working on a USAID-funded girls' scholarship program. During three years collaborating with twenty NGOs to distribute thousands of primary school scholarships to girls in Central and Southern Africa, I was exposed to a range of political systems in flux. A decade after third wave transitions, countries and institutions were evolving at different rates: despite regular elections Bongo still ruled Gabon as his personal fiefdom, while other countries like Madagascar, Mozambique, and Namibia were experiencing their first alternations in power. However, at the village level - in the context of poverty and local government bureaucracy, the distinction between electoral democracies and closed regimes collapsed into a murky blur. Conversations about social service provision, tax rates, and unaccountable government institutions made me reflect on what democracy or governance actually means in the quotidian level. In most of these hybrid regimes, there was a sense that institutions were shifting and citizens were negotiating their own opportunities for political involvement. Village chiefs, former educators, taxi drivers, and homemakers prompted me to think long and hard about what "democracy" means to everyday African citizens.

Across all of these countries, I was dumbfounded by the ability of a small public school scholarship, comprising of school fees, supplies, a uniform, and/or a kerosene lamp, to change the trajectory of a girl's life. I was doubly struck by how deeply parents cared about these educational opportunities as a key to both social mobility and "complete" citizenship. To many of these parents, or grandparents, the African state seemed far out of reach, an alien institution reserved for the privileged, educated elite. Their hopes and dreams for their daughters and

granddaughters culminated in their abilities to navigate and profit from state institutions. The girls, many proudly speaking a colonial language that was unintelligible to their families, radiated a hope that through education anything was possible.

I started graduate school with these images fresh in my mind and decided to explore the micro-dynamics of democracy, education, and citizenship in a country that experienced the most extreme educational changes post-transition - Mali. Through donor-funded programs, like the one I had worked on, and the liberalization of the education sector, the government was able to expand gross primary enrollment from less than 30% prior to the democratic transition to almost 80% less than 20 years later. Theoretically, I expected that education mattered for democracy, citizenship, and state-building, but my fieldwork revealed that its impact is far more lasting and profound than I anticipated. I found that educational expansion aids democratic transformation and state-building in three important ways: by improving students' cognitive ability to process political information, by endowing students with the language of state bureaucracy, thus increasing their perceived internal efficacy, and in building connections with parents through social service provision.

6.2 The Democratic Benefits of Educational Expansion

Mali is not the only county to make significant gains in primary school enrollment in the last twenty years. Primary school net enrollment has increased in Sub Saharan Africa from 56% in 1999 to 70% in 2007.[271] The expansion was driven by multiple factors including citizen demand as well as donors' universal access agenda through programs such as the Education for All Campaign and the Millennium Development Goals. Historically, Francophone countries lag behind their Anglophone counterparts and represent some of the largest gains in enrollment in the recent era. Figure 18 below shows increases in enrollment between 1990-1998. While

[271] 2010 Education for All Monitoring Report

Mali's increases are the largest, we observe similar increases in the other two democratic frontrunners – Senegal and Benin.

Figure 18: Educational Expansion in Neighboring Francophone "Democracies" 1990-1998[272]



My findings have demonstrated that education helps citizens to learn about politics by increasing their cognitive capacity and internal efficacy. Citizens with greater levels of education, even informal education, were able to answer questions about politics more accurately than those with no education at all. I did not find significant differences across school types at the primary or informal levels of education. This is a sharp departure from the way that we typically imagine schools contributing to state-building – as communal institutions teaching and reinforcing the importance of democratic or nationalist institutions. Instead, African schools have created better democratic citizens by heightening individuals' ability to process and evaluate political information. This is not to say that Malian schools could not benefit from civic

[272] "Evolution des taux bruts de scolarisation" UNESCO Country Reports : Niger, Benin, Senegal, and Mali: rhttp://www.unesco.org/education/wef

education curriculum, but the progress that has been made to date is a result of increases in individual capacities as citizens.

Qualitative data from the surveys revealed a remarkable skepticism about politics and citizens' sense of alienation from the process. Education offers citizens an opportunity to increase their ability to understand politics, and despite an environment of low external efficacy, empowers them to feel like democratic agents. Educated citizens' increased cognitive skills and internal efficacy could reduces their dependence on political parties holds in the African context, education may prove a powerful tool to off-set short-term incentives and issue-framing offered by political entrepreneurs. Cognitive skills and internal efficacy lay the foundation for informed political participation as *democratic agents.*

I did not find there to be a significant difference in the political knowledge of those students who attended Islamic schools, public schools, or Francophone private school. At the primary school level, I found that a madrassa prepares a democratic citizen as well as a public school. I even found that citizens with a Koranic education or literacy training were on average better informed about politics than their peers with no education. From a policy perspective, my findings suggest that the expansion of education through privatization has increased prospects of democratic deepening in Mali, as it has increased the number of children who are attending school and the number of learners that are continuing to secondary and university education. These changes happened without explicit democratic curriculum; the positive relationship between education, knowledge, and participation is not linked to the specifics of what occurred in Malian classrooms. Therefore, these lessons from Mali should transfer to other countries that experienced a comparable expansion after a democratic transition.[273] I would hypothesize that

[273] This is not to say that citizens in these countries could not benefit from specific democratic curriculum such as civics courses.

any and all educational expansion in Africa increased population's political knowledge and internal efficacy among students in the same ways.

Education, especially at the secondary and tertiary level, helps citizens participate in more "difficult" forms of participation including campaigning, willingness to run for office, and contacting a government official by endowing them with French language skills. Qualitative data revealed that citizens' continue to revere the French language fluency as a critical characteristic of citizens who are fully empowered. Secondary and tertiary education had no effect on voting or party identification, but those citizens with informal or primary education were more likely than their uneducated peers to report doing both. Since I was not able to reject the null for the highest forms of education (that educated respondents were more likely to report voting the citizens with no education), it is possible that education might have a ceiling effect on easier forms of participation like voting and campaigning after primary school. Highly educated Malians might be too cynical about those running for office or too busy to become involved in the electoral process. This suggests that with post-democratic educational expansion at the primary level, we might see an increase in electoral participation by citizens who have enough education to increase their internal efficacy and willingness to engage with politics at the ballot box. If educated citizens are more active participants in politics, and African democracies spend more on primary education than non-democracies due to mass demands (Stasavage 2005), we can imagine a generative cycle in which a greater number of citizens are educated and thus more supportive of the democracy as the governing system.

The most recent wave of educational expansion has focused primarily on young girls. This study, as well as much of the secondary literature on Africa, has shown that women are less knowledgeable and less likely to participate in politics (Logan 2010; Kuenzi and Lambright

2005). Since the increases in access and enrollment have targeted women, we might interpret the story of greater educational access as being a story about laying the foundations for girls' political empowerment. This study has shown how education instructs and empowers citizens, including women, to become engaged in politics. If a larger subset of girls is able to be educated, this bodes well for their ability to participate and to be represented in democracy. Mali's first female Prime Minister took office in the spring 2011 – setting an example for future generations of educated Malian girls. However, there is still a very long way to go for most African girls as many cultural and economic barriers to school completion remain. As of 2005, only 46 per cent of girls who were enrolled in school in sub-Saharan Africa were able to complete primary school (Oxfam 2005). Given the importance of secondary and tertiary education for empowerment as a complete citizen, it is imperative that programs continue to focus on girls' retention and completion in order to for them to achieve the skills and self-confidence of "complete citizens."

6.3 Social Services as a Medium to Connect Citizens to the State

Students of public policy have shown us that policy can impact the ways that citizens view and engage with government. In the edited volume Public Policy for Democracy, the editors argue for the importance of looking past questions of efficiency or how citizens shape policy, but instead the effects of the reverse process of how policies shape citizens. In his contribution Marc Landy writes:

> Policies also constitute a teaching: they instruct the public about the aims of government and the rights and responsibilities of citizens. These scholars have enriched public discourse by reintroducing and legitimizing words like character, civic virtue, public spiritedness, and deliberation. This essay seeks to illuminate further nature of the relationship between policy and polity by focusing specifically upon the effects of policy on citizenship (1993: 19).

There is an emerging literature on the affect of conditional cash transfers on retrospective voting and citizenship. Ana De La O Torres' experimental work on conditional cash transfers suggests that they can improve turnout as well as incumbent vote share in Mexico.[274] Cesar Zucco's analysis of cash transfers in 2006 Brazilian elections also demonstrate that voters benefitting from programs reward incumbents (2011). Radical changes in welfare policy in Africa could potentially impact African citizens' relationship with their government.

In the same vein of research, this study has shown the education expansion can affect democratization in an unexpected way: through a policy feedback mechanism. I have identified a few different mechanisms that link public schooling consumers with electoral politics by fostering connections to stakeholders that rely on its services through increased sense of civic identity earned as recipients of a "good social service," through greater perceived state capability, greater incentives and resources, or because of their children's newly gained skills as linguistic brokers. Each mechanism has dramatically different policy implications and therefore further research should identify when and how each of these mechanisms is at play.

If being a public stakeholder, citizenship identity, and increased perception of state capacity are critical for inducing citizens to vote, then we should stress the importance of state involvement in the educational sector. The liberalization and privatization trends that the continent is currently experiencing could be damaging in that they steal opportunities for the state to prove its capacity and forge connections with citizens through welfare provision. These mechanisms also suggest that the state might increase citizens' participation through other visible, universal types of social services – like health services or road improvement as Lauren MacLean has noted in her Afrobarometer study (2012).

[274] 'Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico,' Working Paper: http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/PMF-papers/delao_progresa_finalb.pdf

However, if linguistic brokerage, endowing family members with skills to communicate with government, drives the process then we would to see benefits to all families with children in Francophone schools whether public or private. A premium should be put on French language instruction in all schools as a way to reach illiterate families, which are hesitant to get involved in politics. Government service provision and citizenship behavior offers an interesting and fruitful venue for scholars of African democracies. I hope to conduct future research, which tests the strength of these different mechanisms through different government welfare policies and for different types of political engagement.

6.4 Obstacles that Remain

My findings about the importance of language suggest that if basic education does not endow citizens with language skills it will not be enough to help citizens realize their full citizenship in Mali. Although Mali's literacy rates are among the lowest in Africa, the basic dichotomy between indigenous languages, representing popular culture and everyday interactions, and colonial languages that are required for citizens' interaction with government persists in many countries in Africa. Unlike most other countries in the world, citizens in Africa states speak a different language at home than they do when they deal with government bureaucracy. Post colonial theorists have long warned of the danger of the colonial language as a lingering force of personal subjugation as well as the endangerment of indigenous languages and culture.[275] I would like to suggest that beyond this abstract and symbolic alienation, colonial language has practical implications on democratization in countries where literacy rates remain so low. Most states do not have formal education requirements for political participation - unlike

[275] I would like to thank Desmond Jagamond for drawing these parallels. See Fanon 1967, Achebe 1965, Thiong'o 1985, Gandolfi 2009

the American South in the 1800s that imposed literacy tests on African Americans. [276] Instead, the political constraints of language were largely "imposed" through a societal understanding of linguistic power. The power of French as a necessary condition for full political participation is both a product of the Malian population's collective imagination and understanding of politics and a direct effect of French language colonial institutions.

I have sipped a shot of tea during many a *grin* conversation when two of the most educated group members discuss Malian politics or current world events. When a less educated third party tries to offer an opinion, the first two members offer a sharp, commonly repeated Bamana retort: "You cannot even enter this conversation because you didn't go to school.[277] Those with an education, or similarly those who have traveled, often reassert their cosmopolitan perspective over those with local and specialized knowledge. Similarly in a conversation between neighbors or friends, one person might offer that something happened in the news and second person adds another detail that they heard. The first person denigrates the second's opinion because he "heard" it, while his own sources of information came from a more official written source. In some sense, knowledge from reading is more valuable or more authoritative. This hierarchy of information is most likely a result of the harsh reality facing most illiterate Malians: they are unable to interact with formal government institutions without an interpreter or information broker.

For those citizens who manage to obtain fluency in a colonial language – education endows them with more complete citizenship. However, the idea of the political sphere as being dominated by a Western, educated elite permeates many other countries where literacy rates remain low for the masses. In talking about the difficulties that illiteracy poses to development,

[276] Some countries like Nigeria due require candidates to have a secondary education.
[277] The Bambara "catchphrase" as *N t'i foi fo fina parce qu' i m'a kalan*.

Brock-Utne writes, "It seems paradoxical that most them (donors) are not more concerned with the fact that some 90% of the people in Africa have no knowledge of the official language of their country, even though it is assumed to be the language of communication between citizens and government (2002: 17)." She cites Paulin Djité on citizens in Francophone African countries, which historically have had the lowest literacy rates:

> It is hard to believe that there can be, or that one can possible argue, for a true and lasting development under such policy when so many people do not know their constitutional and legal rights, cannot understand the development goals of their governments and therefore cannot exercise their basic democratic rights, simply because they are writing in foreign languages (Brock-Utne 2002: 16 citing Djité 1990: 98).

These arguments seem even more compelling as they relate to democracy. How can we expect citizens to fully engage with a political system that is largely out of their linguistic reach?

As the chart below demonstrates, less than seventy percent of adults are literate in the state language in many African countries. Only in a few places, does literacy hover near 90%.

Figure 19: Percent Adult Literacy Rates in Selected African Countries (2005-2008)[278]



[278]UNICEF State of the World's Children Report: http://www.unicef.org/statistics/index_step2.php?

In her studies, Brock-Utne argues that fewer than 5% of all African children schooled in European languages reach proficiency (Gandolfo 2009 citing Brock-Utne 2003,68); not only does this have an impact on the quality of their substantive education, but on their potential as participants in democracy.

This linguistic dilemma is applicable to other countries where the government policies and programs operate in language other than that of mass popular, discourse. Paulin Djité 's work on South East Asia suggests similar dynamics in another complex multi-lingual environment (2011).While local language radio operates in many of these contexts, the inability of citizens to personally interact with democratic institutions without a third party substantially impacts the potential for autonomous citizenship and representative democracy. When information is difficult for citizens to access, they become dependent on linguistic brokers with "official" language skills who can represent their interests.

Experimental work has shown that information campaigns can overcome clientalist efforts at political mobilization regardless of education levels (Pande 2011). However, in the real world, even if, as I find, citizens are able to learn discrete facts about politics without knowing how to speak French fluently, they are limited by available information sources and subject to the whims and reliability of information brokers: local radio DJs, chiefs, or educated people in their villages. A meta-trading language, like Bamana or Songhrai, might give citizen access to greater information than someone who speaks Bozo or Tamasheq, but in order to achieve "complete" autonomous citizenship one has to deal in the currency of the former French language. More importantly, there remain institutional obstacles posed by French language: the police, the judiciary, the public records office, hospitals. These institutions operate exclusively

in French, so in order to file a complaint, get a land title, register your child at school, or get a prescription filled – you need the assistance of someone else who speaks French.

Given that language appears to be a critical element of complete citizenship, we should put a premium on official language instruction for students in all schools, including madrassas, and consider the ways that French literacy classes for adults might help them to gain political autonomy. However, since education is unlikely to reach the poorest of the poor, those in remote rural areas, and poor women, a complementary, and more radical, strategy would be to reshape the nature of democratic politics in Africa to embody and reflect more widely spoken indigenous languages (Gandolfo 2009). While this might be a less possible option in places where linguistic fractionalization is high, it is possible in places like Mali or Kenya or regionally in Nigeria where meta-trading languages, like Bambara, Swahili, and Hausa are widely spoken. This does not necessarily require a "linguistic renationalization" of democratic spaces, but greater efforts in the translation and dissemination of resources in local languages or Arabic. For instance, only two courts in Mali, one in Segou and one in Bamako offer offices of operational assistance – that translates and explains judicial information to everyday citizens. The state could undertake efforts to make these kinds of resources more accessible to citizens – especially rural populations. While these initiatives would take scarce resources away from the Malian state, it is critical to raise questions about the ability of the median Malian citizen to be able relate to and understand her democratic institutions.

6.5 Islamic Education and Democracy

There has been debate in political science about the compatibility of democracy and Islam, but little attention has been given to the emerging Muslim democracies of West Africa:

Senegal, Mali, and more recently, Niger, and Guinea.[279] Villalón's (2010) pioneering work on Islam in West Africa has moved past the reductionist questions of whether Islam and Democracy are compatible to focus on the ways that Islam and democratization affect each other. In upcoming work, Villalón and Idrissa will examine the major education policy changes subsequent to democracy, in which many countries – including Mali responded to mass demand for state support for Islamic education (forthcoming.) Partnership with Islamic providers was a groundbreaking change considering that collaboration between the government and Islamic schools had been plagued by suspicions and hostility from colonial time throughout independence.[280] Under colonialism in Mali, madrassas were banned from offering French – which isolated many of their graduates from the political system. The current system, which acknowledges madrassas as accredited institutions of state education, mandates that they teach French, and offers Arabic language testing options, attempts to incorporate them in the citizenship project. For the first time, constituencies that support Islamic education, have tracks gain access to higher education and in government.

There has been much debate about the role of madrassas in state-building or the proliferation of terrorism, but little has been said about their democratic potential. This study suggests that incorporating Islamic schooling has two potential effects on democratic deepening. First, Malian madrassas appear as capable of shaping informed citizens, who are as willing to vote and participate, as their francophone counterparts. In this sense, Islamic schooling has the ability to encourage more informed and more active democratic citizens from communities that prefer religious education. Koranic schools are typically cast-off as archaic centers of rote memorization, which preserve hierarchy and or places where children begging for alms are

[279] Steven Fish 2002; John Espisito 1996.
[280] The hostility between secular states and "Muslim" schools and pupils continues in Europe; Belgium allows Christian, but not Muslim religious schools (Wolf and Macedo 2004).

pulled out of productive classroom time. However, my results suggest that Koranic schools have the democratic potential of other schools to instill critical thinking and cognitive ability. Policy makers might reexamine how they could engage with Koranic teachers to offer short courses on citizenship and democracy to make students more aware of their rights and obligations in the current political system.

What we cannot guarantee is that madrassas or Koranic schools will produce democrats with liberal values. Since I did not observe school curriculum I do not want to make claims about educational content beyond what is included in the Ministry of Education guidelines. I can say that, anecdotally, when I dropped in on a madrassa in Niamakoro to observe classrooms and interview teachers, I walked into a history lesson in Arabic on the democratic transition in Mali. A study of madrassas in Mali found that the majority were teaching content on "peace and tolerance (Moussa et al 2007)." However, as we saw in Chapter two values that are associated with democracy can vary substantially. My research can speak to how education might elicit and encourage citizen engagement in politics, but cannot specify what the content of their demands will be. It is likely that if Islamic schooling graduates, particularly those alumni of madrassas get more involved in the political realm, there will be greater political representation of a broader set of values systems including some of the more conservative ideas within reformist schools of Islam. This could lead to greater debate and contestation within electoral politics and in the National Assembly.[281]

Secondly, chapter 5 demonstrated that parents who choose Islamic education are less likely to participate in elections. This is the first study to disaggregate citizens and their behavior by school choice and offers initial evidence that there are differences in the ways Islamic

[281] See Bleck and van de Walle 2011, forthcoming and Villalón 2010 on the description of secular, elite political class that currently dominates Malian politics

schooling consumers and secular consumers participate in electoral politics. While I do not make a causal argument, this descriptive evidence confirms popular attitudes within Mali that the most pious Malians, who choose Islamic schooling, simultaneously abstain from politics. This might reflect the paucity of ideological diversity among the field of candidates as much as their indifference toward the system. It suggests important future research that focuses political attitudes and behavior of Islamic schooling in Mali and other Sahelian countries.

The current collaboration between the state and Islamic schooling in the democratic context sends signals to Islamic consumers that their preferences are recognized and legitimated by the state. State support for Islamic education and the newly instituted Arabic university entrance exam could change the future political terrain of Mali. Until now, Western educated elites have held a monopoly over national level politics. This is because higher education was synonymous with Francophone education. It remains to be seen if high "qualified candidates" with Islamic schooling backgrounds emerge. These candidates could potentially offer a broader set of values-based political stances, and we might see something analogous to conservative political movements in the US. My research suggests that this will depend both on their French language acquisition and/or government language policy toward Arabic.

Other states, such as Gambia, Senegal, and Niger have adopted similar policies to integrate madrassas in national efforts to expand enrollment.[282] In all these cases, government willingness to partner with Islamic providers favored by subsets of the population who may have been reticent to participation in secular politics is one step forward to incorporating these communities into electoral processes and democratic representation. By expanding the range of citizens who are exercising their "political voice," this policy change has the potential to increase

[282]In countries like Niger and Gambia, where the state is sponsoring most Islamic education, greater time is spent on official language instruction – so the question posed by the differences of languages of instruction becomes less relevant.

the representativeness of African democracies, but also change the elite, secular values we currently associate with West African politics.

6.6 Educational Policy and Democracy: Future Work

Donors and governments should consider the effects of education provision and education policy on the state of democracy in Africa. Many of the positive changes that I have outlined are unintended benefits of efforts to reach development goals, rather than calculated government strategy to improve the quality of democracy. The increase in girls' and rural enrollment and partnership with Islamic schools, though driven in part by citizen demand, was also largely engineered to reach development targets. Ironically, these democratic gains have happened accidentally. Unlike the post independence era, democratic expansion has not been accompanied by national efforts to inculcate citizens and shape their democratic behavior. Given the young age and the limited resources of African democracies, inattention to building more representative or participatory democracy is unsurprising. After all, many politicians and theorists of fledgling democracies might prefer less citizen participation as not to overwhelm nascent institutions (Almond and Verba 1963).

However, citizen "voice" is critical for legitimizing democratic institutions and for making them more accountable. In that sense, we should celebrate these accidental "democratic gains," but also look to expand on them. The case study of Mali has revealed citizens who feel largely isolated from the democratic institutions that represent them. I suspect that this cynicism plagues many other African democracies – especially among the less educated and the less powerful. In the future, donors and governments should be mindful of how education policy might be used to forge connections with citizens and further their capacity to build the democracy that best represents their interests and ideas. In environments of low external

efficacy, internal efficacy is necessary characteristic for empowered engagement. I hope to continue the investigation of the relationship between different levels and types of education, cognitive development, and internal efficacy in other African countries to test the following hypotheses:

H(1): *Any type of education can foster cognitive development*

H(2): *This cognitive development increases citizens' political knowledge*

H(3): *Increased education translates into increased internal efficacy*

H(4): *In low literacy environments, proficiency in former colonial languages plays a critical role in building the highest levels of internal efficacy.*

Moving forward, I would like to develop better measures of "cognitive development" and "internal efficacy" in order to test their relationship to political knowledge and political participation in a more sophisticated way. Additionally, I would like to run my additional hypotheses in countries with strong civic education programs – such as Tanzania or South Africa – to see the role that civic education plays on knowledge and participation and how it interacts with internal efficacy. My country of study did not have a strong civic education provision, but my findings do not preclude that citizens in other countries exposed to these curriculums might have an even better understanding of politics and sense of internal efficacy.

6.7 Survey Research in Africa: Moving Forward

This study builds on the survey tradition of citizens in Africa stemming from the ground-breaking first wave of Afrobarometer surveys. I am indebted to this tradition for the methodology it has afforded me. Surveys enable us to quantify the opinions and behavior of "everyday citizens," which is crucial for understanding the inner workings of democracy. However, researchers often are at the mercy of Western concepts and interpretations; response

categories can obscure different motivations for observed behavior. My survey used a methodological innovation: I coupled survey research with open ended justifications for responses in order to try to understand the ways that respondents understood the questions and the ways that they talked about their own political action.[283] I believe this one of the first studies of African citizens' attitudes and behaviors toward democracy that offers qualitative data to disaggregate similar looking behavior and to better anticipate bias. In the pre-testing phase, I removed questions when I felt that they were not resonating with respondents or when I didn't think they were internally valid. In later stages as I recorded responses into Excel, I saw patterns of qualitative responses that contradicted the closed- responses from the same survey, I decided not to use these particular dependent variables because of potential conformity bias or lack of internal validity. [284]

Given my experience administering this project, I challenge survey research in the developing world, and African in particular, to better explore and address the following issues: distinctions between "empowered" and non-empowered participation, theoretical and contextual understandings of concepts in translation, non-response categories, and establishing expectations for bias in responses. There are many different reasons a respondent might vote or campaign; they could support a relative, reward or punish a candidate's performance, receive a bribe, out of curiosity, out of patriotism, and/or out of fear. However, when this participation is coded it all looks the same. While I cannot place a value judgment on what type of voting behavior is better and/or exclude the possibility of multiple motivations at play, but it is important to establish if

[283] This strategy differs from using open ended responses for some questions and closed for others. It includes observing respondents' justification for a given closed response – enabling the coder to see the logic behind the number or grade awarded.

[284] For instance, I had envisioned using confidence in government institutions/actor as a dependent variable, but I observed too many respondents who gave government high ratings while simultaneously criticizing how unresponsive and selfish they were.

the actor fully understood the action they were participating in. Behavioral research in Africa needs to disaggregate between the political competences of respondents who report participating in "easy" activities. As an example, a survey could assess an actor's degree of political competence – do they know who they voted for, do they know what party they were in, do they know anything about the party or candidate? This evaluation could then be used to as an interaction term with participation variable (voting, party identification): informed* participation or uninformed*participation variable. Social inequality and interpersonal dependence is widespread in African countries; given rampant group mobilization - especially in rural zones or among hierarchically stratified groups – informed participation should be disaggregated. This kind of disaggregation is essential for identifying instances of agency in democratic participation.

Surveys have to be translated from English to French to local languages. In addition, surveys need to incorporate the local conceptualizations of the topics of interest. For instance, to ask about trust in political authority – you must understand "trust," "political authority," and any specific actors you reference. African survey research often has a weak theorization or discussion of these translations. However, my results suggest that local understandings can create noise or distort the validity of closed-ended responses. I offer two respondents from the village of Fatoma in Sevare region to illustrate this point. Salif, a 35 year old respondent with a Koranic education, rated his trust of the institution of the Presidency as "very high" (SV85). However, Salif clearly understood the question to reference his current president ATT – rather than the abstract institution. However, while providing the "very high" rating, Salif offered, "He (ATT) is my relative, but he doesn't care about me." The stark contradiction between the high rating the president's disregard for Salif needs further interrogation to be properly understood. Is he just

making up responses, is he trying to be compliant and then giving himself away, or can he somehow reconcile trust in the president and the president' neglect of his situation? Safiatou, from the same village, also rated trust in the president and every other institution as "very high." She offers an explanation of this contradiction, "People have trust in them (institutions) because they are the superior authorities (SV83)." Responses like these led me to the belief that Malians conception of trust could be rooted in communitarian conceptions of hierarchy rather than performance evaluations. Later I began to observe patterns, where respondents would always afford the president this immunity, but be more willing to critic municipal officials. This finding could explain inflated trust ratings for the President in almost all Afrobarometer surveys as being based on deference rather than a performance evaluation (Logan 2008).

I was overwhelmed with the number of "I don't know" responses, which could make up to 15% of total responses for certain questions. Watching different citizens run through "I don't knows" made me reflect on their reasons for doing so. While some citizens clearly were not interested or did not care about the question, others, especially uneducated rural women, had difficulty understanding the hypothetical questions and concepts that we were describing. Survey research in Africa must have a better understanding of respondents' cognition abilities and/or ways to make the questions more accessible to respondents. For instance, Bambara uses hundreds of traditional proverbs that resonate with all of its speakers and NGOs in Mali frequently employ picture boards to illustrate concepts. A survey in Mali might be better served to integrate proverbs, illustrations, or to test other ways to make concepts and questions clearer to respondents. Citizens' understanding and interpretation of the questions is critical for generating good data. Survey teams and local research experts should collaborate to improve the

quality of this communication. High categories of non-response should be analyzed to understand the reasons the respondents do not want to share or cannot share the information.

Finally, years of survey research in the United States have generated priors about respondent compliance bias and other expected behaviors of respondents. Citizen surveys in Africa need to formulate a better understanding of who conceals and exaggerates behavior and why. In the US, educated citizens often exaggerate their levels of participation, but in Mali – I observed the most destitute respondents and female respondents were most likely to exaggerate their participation because they were most interested in "pleasing us" as interviewers. Survey practitioners should collaborate to create a better expectation for response bias in Africa. Better knowledge of how respondents interact with surveys will heighten our ability to use surveys productively and to better represent citizens' ideas, opinions, and behaviors.

Appendix 1: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Models

Table 1: **Mayor's Name**	Model 1 Education Level	Model 2a Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Model 2b Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	.67* (.26)		
Primary	1.16*** (.26)		
Secondary	1.51*** (.32)		
University	2.16*** (.51)		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular		-.31 (.67)	
Christian		Perfect Prediction	
Community		.55 (.35)	
Madrassa		.33 (.34)	
Koranic			.18 (.51)
Controls			
Woman	-.94*** (.17)	-1.15*** (.30)	-.90** (.32)
Rural	1.03** (.38)	-.01 (.65)	1.37* (.64)
Poverty	.05 (.08)	.20 (.13)	-.25 (.15)
Age	.08 (.06)	.07 (.11)	.00 (.11)
Faladie	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Banconi	1.53*** (.36)	1.91** (.63)	.43 (1.07)
Bamako Coura	1.91*** (.36)	2.51*** (.63)	.16 (1.31)
Sikasso 1	3.88*** (.41)	3.47*** (.66)	Perfectly Predicted
Sikasso 2	2.50*** (.51)	3.17*** (.87)	2.72* (1.11)
Timbuktu	3.00*** (.38)	2.87*** (.66)	3.17*** (.83)
Kayes Rive Droite	1.36** (.39)	1.28* (.64)	1.67 (.89)
Kayes Rive Gauche	.61 (.38)	-.24 (.69)	1.17 (.90)
Mopti	1.14** (.39)	1.25* (.60)	.88 (.90)
Sevare	1.74** (.54)	3.35** (.99)	1.23 (1.05)
Constant	-2.54*** (.27)	-1.91 (.66)	-1.40 (1.00)
McFadden's+/Pseudo R-squared	.26	.27	.28
Log Likelihood	-490.78	-167.45	-126.18
Observations	952	334	254

Table 2: **President of the Assembly**	Model 1 Education Level	Model 2a Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Model 2b Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	.29 (.28)		
Primary	.77** (.26)		
Secondary	2.42*** (.33)		
University	Dropped since All Answered Correctly		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular/Christian		-1.25 (.81)	
Christian		.27 (1.98)	
Community		.57 (.34)	
Madrassa		-.40 (.34)	
Koranic			.56 (.48)
Controls			
Woman	-1.20*** (.18)	-1.22*** (.29)	-1.41*** (.41)
Rural	-.41 (.46)	-.43 (.73)	-.29 (.81)
Poverty	-.36*** (.09)	-.41** (.14)	-.54** .20
Age	.22*** (.06)	-.10 (.11)	.39** (.12)
Faladie	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Banconi	.65 (.35)	.56 (.58)	-.11 (.81)
Bamako Coura	.63 (.36)	1.54** (.56)	-.12 (.94)
Sikasso 1	-.19* (.33)	-.30 (.57)	-.58 (.83)
Sikasso 2	-.15 (.53)	-.50 (.84)	-.27 (1.03)
Timbuktu	-.04 (.36)	-.24 (.59)	-.18 (.65)
Kayes Rive Droite	-.87* (.42)	.09 (.59)	-1.67 (.98)
Kayes Rive Gauche	- .66 (.36)	-.93 (.60)	-.24 (.75)
Mopti	.11 (.34)	-.18 (.55)	.53 (.67)
Sevare	-.59 (.61)	.30 (.93)	-2.76* (1.42)
Constant	-.54 (.44)	1.00 (.59)	-.55 (.87)
McFadden's+/Pseudo R-squared	.24	.17	.22
Log Likelihood	-449.15	-175.84	-112.21
Observations	919	336	270

Table 3:	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b
Majority Party	Education Level	Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	.70*		
	(.27)		
Primary	1.29***		
	(.26)		
Secondary	2.55***		
	(.32)		
University	3.37***		
	(.62)		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular		-.43	
		(.63)	
Christian		.22	
		(1.56)	
Community		.60	
		(.32)	
Madrassa		-.22	
		(.31)	
Koranic			-.32
			(.42)
Controls			
Woman	-1.12***	-1.03***	-.99**
	(.17)	(.28)	(.35)
Rural	.07	-.39	-.20
	(.37)	(.65)	(.58)
Poverty	-.04	-.04	-.21
	(.08)	(.12)	(.16)
Age	.06	.04	.08
	(.06)	(.10)	(.11)
Faladie	-2.45***	-1.73**	-3.02
	(.36)	(.60)	(.70)
Banconi	-2.31***	-1.93**	Perfectly predicted failure
	(.37)	(.64)	
Bamako Coura	-1.88***	-1.49*	-2.84 ***
	(.38)	(.61)	(.92)
Sikasso 1	-2.56***	-2.48***	-2.89***
	(.37)	(.63)	(.74)
Sikasso 2	-2.33***	-3.45***	-2.10**
	(.50)	(.90)	(.79)
Timbuktu	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Kayes Rive Droite	-1.66***	-1.48*	-1.53**
	(.27)	(.63)	(.57)
Kayes Rive Gauche	- 2.33***	-2.14***	-2.36***
	(.35)	(.58)	(.62)
Mopti	-2.31	-2.22***	-2.12***
	(.37)	(.61)	(.59)
Sevare	-3.04***	-2.78**	-3.77***
	(.56)	(.94)	(.91)
Constant	1.02*	2.05**	2.54**
	(.44)	(.62)	(.76)
McFadden's+/Pseudo R-squared	.21	.12	.22
Log Likelihood	-507.93	-198.82	-130.81
Observations	947	335	251

Table 4:	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b
Term Limit	Education Level	Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	.64**		
	(.22)		
Primary	1.08***		
	(.22)		
Secondary	2.08***		
	(.34)		
University	2.31**		
	(.77)		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular/Christian		-1.30*	
		(.56)	
Christian		-1.45	
		(1.50)	
Community		.90*	
		(.39)	
Madrassa		-.01	
		(.33)	
Koranic			.27
			(.44)
Controls			
Woman	-83**	-.82*	-.84**
	(.18)	(.32)	(.31)
Rural	-.33	.40	-.47
	(.38)	(.65)	(.61)
Poverty	-.16*	-.24	-.22
	(.07)	(.13)	(.14)
Age	.07	-.10	.04
	(.06)	(.11)	(.10)
Faladie	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Banconi	-.04	-.43	-.37
	(.33)	(.57)	(.67)
Bamako Coura	.65	.75	.13
	(.38)	(.61)	(.80)
Sikasso 1	.83*	.58	2.23
	(.35)	(.56)	(1.14)
Sikasso 2	.33	-.62	3.23*
	(.48)	(.77)	(1.26)
Timbuktu	.41	.15	.53
	(.33)	(.58)	(.57)
Kayes Rive Droite	-.19	-.06	.14
	(.34)	(.57)	(.63)
Kayes Rive Gauche	.24	.39	-.18
	(.32)	(.52)	(.62)
Mopti	.91	.93	.63
	(.36)	(.61)	(.63)
Sevare	-.50	.21	-.16
	(.51)	(.93)	(.83)
Constant	-.37	1.95**	1.06
	(.40)	(.60)	(.74)
McFadden's+/Pseudo R-squared	.13	.07	.15
Log Likelihood	-498.32	-177.59	-146.49
Observations	952	336	270

Table 5:	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b
Voted	Education Level	Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	.49* (.24)		
Primary	.57** (.23)		
Secondary	.42 (.29)		
University	.67 (.48)		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular		-.13 (.63)	
Christian		Perfectly predicted failure	
Community		.49 (.37)	
Madrassa		.23 (.34)	
Koranic			-.03 (.46)
Controls			
Woman	-.11 (.17)	.06 (.30)	.03 (.33)
Rural	-.36 (.38)	-.29 (.68)	-.09 (.61)
Poverty	.02 (.07)	-.01 (.13)	.06 (.15)
Age	.31*** (.06)	.30** (.12)	.20 (.11)
Member of Association	.26** (.08)	.29 (.15)	.14 (.18)
Member of Religious Association	.09 (.10)	.15 (.19)	.20 (.20)
Faladie	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Banconi	.71* (.34)	.14 (.63)	.86 (.75)
Bamako Coura	.41 (.34)	.37 (.64)	.56 (.85)
Sikasso 1	-.14 (.32)	- .28 (.61)	-.41 (.71)
Sikasso 2	1.24* (.50)	.47 (.88)	2.05* (.98)
Timbuktu	1.28** (.37)	1.20 (.73)	1.93* (.70)
Kayes Rive Droite	-.12 (.34)	-.69 (.62)	.02 (.65)
Kayes Rive Gauche	-.04 (.31)	-.33 (.56)	.14 (.64)
Mopti	.34 (.34)	-.08 (.60)	.62 (.66)
Sevare	1.13* (.55)	1.17 (1.04)	.77 (.90)
Constant	-1.05 (.41)	-.47 (.65)	-.63 (.79)
McFadden's+/Pseudo R-squared	.09	.10	.11
Log Likelihood	-507.67	-166.60	-135.39
Observations	869	296	254

Table 6:	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b
PartyID	Education Level	Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	.27 (.22)		
Primary	.49* (.21)		
Secondary	.30 (.27)		
University	.31 (.45)		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular		.07 (.57)	
Christian		Perfectly predicted failure	
Community		.65* (.32)	
Madrassa		.15 (.30)	
Koranic			-.57 (.41)
Controls			
Woman	-.48** (.16)	-.51 (.27)	-.66 (.31)
Rural	.33 (.35)	.33 (.61)	.33 (.59)
Poverty	.05 (.07)	-.08 (.12)	-.12 (.14)
Age	.06 (.05)	.06 (.10)	.11 (.10)
Member of Association	.22** (.07)	.29* (.13)	.39* (.16)
Member of Religious Association	-.10 (.07)	-.16 (.15)	.03 (.17)
Faladie	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Banconi	.28 (.30)	-.07 (.15)	.34 (.73)
Bamako Coura	.79 (.32)	.92 (.57)	-.31 (.95)
Sikasso 1	-.01 (.30)	- .11 (.52)	-.18 (.76)
Sikasso 2	.18 (.43)	-.34 (.74)	.78 (.85)
Timbuktu	.65* (.31)	-.06 (.54)	2.05** (.64)
Kayes Rive Droite	-.26 (.33)	-.16 (.55)	.90 (.67)
Kayes Rive Gauche	-.31 (.30)	-.72 (.50)	.73 (.67)
Mopti	.23 (.31)	-.06 (.52)	.57 (.66)
Sevare	.63 (.50)	.13 (.87)	1.72 (.90)
Constant	-.44 (.38)	.23 (.55)	-.36 (.76)
McFadden's+/Pseudo R-squared	.06	.08	.15
Log Likelihood	-591.61	-201.01	-152.21
Observations	909	317	258

Table 7:	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b

Campaign	Education Level	Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	.26 (.27)		
Primary	.61* (.26)		
Secondary	.79* (.31)		
University	1.24* (.48)		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular		-.91 (.81)	
Christian		Perfectly predicted failure	
Community		1.07** (.32)	
Madrassa		.05 (.33)	
Koranic			.51 (.47)
Controls			
Woman	-.65*** (.17)	-.69* (.30)	-.71* (.34)
Rural	-.59 (.40)	-.47 (.70)	1.31 (.75)
Poverty	.01 (.08)	-.03 (.13)	-.13 (.15)
Age	-.08 (.06)	-.22 (.12)	.11 (.10)
Member of Association	.35*** (.07)	.44** (.13)	.40* (.16)
Member of Religious Association	.05 (.10)	-.09 (.15)	-.10 (.20)
Faladie	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Banconi	.19 (.32)	-26 (.59)	.25 (.91)
Bamako Coura	-.55 (.35)	-.20 (.59)	.65 (1.04)
Sikasso 1	-.96** (.35)	-.85 (.62)	.11 (.93)
Sikasso 2	.23 (.48)	-.64 (.82)	2.18* (1.04)
Timbuktu	-.06 (.33)	-.53 (.60)	.66 (.74)
Kayes Rive Droite	.06 (.35)	.24 (.58)	.80 (.82)
Kayes Rive Gauche	-.16 (.33)	-.20 (.54)	.69 (.81)
Mopti	.13 (.33)	-.15 (.56)	.15 (.85)
Sevare	.85 (.53)	-.01 (.94)	2.55* (1.09)
Constant	-.97 (.42)	-.12 (.60)	-1.51 (.90)
McFadden's[+]/Pseudo R-squared	.08	.10	.07
Log Likelihood	-506.47	-178.13	-137.02
Observations	916	318	260

Table 8:	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b
Would Run	Education Level	Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	-.03		
	(.26)		
Primary	.56*		
	(.24)		
Secondary	.68*		
	(.29)		
University	1.22**		
	(.46)		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular		-.97	
		(.63)	
Christian		Perfectly predicted failure	
Community		.70*	
		(.32)	
Madrassa		.20	
		(.32)	
Koranic			-.95*
			(.42)
Controls			
Woman	-.35*	-.32	.46
	(.16)	(.28)	(.36)
Rural	.56	.91	.81
	(.37)	(.65)	(.76)
Poverty	- .04	-.23	-.03
	(.07)	(.12)	(.16)
Age	-.24***	-.26*	-.20
	(.06)	(.11)	(.12)
Member of Association	.13	.16	.08
	(.07)	(.12)	(.17)
Member of Religious Association	.03	-.33*	.20
	(.09)	(.16)	(.20)
Faladie	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Banconi	.19	.54	1.53
	(.31)	(.57)	(.85)
Bamako Coura	-.01	.21	.99
	(.32)	(.55)	(1.00)
Sikasso 1	-.06	.14	1.40
	(.31)	(.54)	(.76)
Sikasso 2	-.38	-1.29	.47
	(.46)	(.80)	(1.05)
Timbuktu	-.08	-.15	1.07
	(.33)	(.57)	(.78)
Kayes Rive Droite	-.30	-.45	- .36
	(.35)	(.57)	(.94)
Kayes Rive Gauche	-.27	-.27	.21
	(.31)	(.52)	(.88)
Mopti	-.38	-.19	-.55
	(.34)	(.55)	(1.00)
Sevare	-.67	-.91	.13
	(.52)	(.90)	(1.13)
Constant	-19	.64	-.87
	(.40)	(.58)	(.90)
McFadden's+/Pseudo R-squared	.07	.07	.11
Log Likelihood	-536.95	-195.64	-127.41
Observations	887	314	253

Table 9:	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b
Contact Government	Education Level	Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	.04		
	(.30)		
Primary	.47		
	(.28)		
Secondary	.81*		
	(.34)		
University	1.01*		
	(.49)		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular		.51	
		(.67)	
Christian		Perfectly predicted failure	
Community		.38	
		(.36)	
Madrassa		.31	
		(.36)	
Koranic			-.84
			(.46)
Controls			
Woman	-.65***	-.58	-1.20**
	(.19)	(.32)	(.46)
Rural	.77	1.00	-.05
	(.40)	(.68)	(.74)
Poverty	.02	.06	-.06
	(.09)	(.14)	(.20)
Age	.17**	-.01	.34*
	(.06)	(.12)	(.13)
Member of Association	.32***	.33*	.45*
	(.08)	(.14)	(.18)
Member of Religious Association	.12	.11	.32
	(.10)	(.16)	(.21)
Faladie	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Banconi	.14	-.19	.14
	(.34)	(.66)	(.92)
Bamako Coura	.01	.70	
	(.35)	(.60)	Perfectly predicted Failure
Sikasso 1	-.79*	- .68	-.30
	(.37)	(.68)	(.93)
Sikasso 2	-1.03*	-1.15	-.44
	(.51)	(.88)	(1.04)
Timbuktu	-.55	-1.37	.42
	(.40)	(.88)	(.76)
Kayes Rive Droite	-.24	.19	.37
	(.39)	(.62)	(.86)
Kayes Rive Gauche	.04	-1.15	.12
	(.34)	(.88)	(.87)
Mopti	-.58	-.74	.28
	(.40)	(.67)	(.82)
Sevare	-2.15*	-1.36	
	(.66)	(.99)	Perfectly Predicts Failure
Constant	-1.87	1.40*	-1.80
	(.47)	(.66)	(.99)
McFadden's+/Pseudo R-squared	.10	.10	.16
Log Likelihood	-433.04	-154.77	-95.95
Observations	908	316	217

Table 10:	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b
Discuss Politics	Education Level	Restricted to Citizens with Primary School Education	Restricted to Citizens with only Informal Education
Maximum Level of Education Achieved			
Informal	.42		
	(.23)		
Primary	.88***		
	(.23)		
Secondary	1.28***		
	(.28)		
University	2.24**		
	(.60)		
Types of School Attended			
Private Secular		.27	
		(.56)	
Christian		.14	
		(1.57)	
Community		.73*	
		(.32)	
Madrassa		-.25	
		(.31)	
Koranic			-.26
			(.39)
Controls			
Woman	-.73**	-1.03***	-.46
	(.16)	(.28)	(.32)
Rural	.26	0.09	.66
	(.36)	(.62)	(.60)
Poverty	-.11	.00	-.24
	(.07)	(.12)	(.14)
Age	-.13	-.23*	-.11
	(.05)	(.10)	(.10)
Member of Association	.34	.38**	.39*
	(.08)	(.13	(.15)
Member of Religious Association	-.06	-.07	-.28
	(.09)	(.15)	(.19)
Faladie	Reference Category	Reference Category	Reference Category
Banconi	.78*	.89	-.92
	(.33)	(.59)	(.74)
Bamako Coura	.79*	1.26*	-1.16
	(.33)	(.57)	(.94)
Sikasso 1	.76*	1.56**	-.74
	(.32)	(.56)	.75)
Sikasso 2	.05	.27	-1.36
	(.49)	(.75)	(.86)
Timbuktu	.62	.16	.09
	(.33)	(.57)	(.60)
Kayes Rive Droite	.35	1.02	-.22
	(.34)	(.57)	(.66)
Kayes Rive Gauche	.41	.90	-1.09
	(.31)	(.52)	(.69)
Mopti	.24	.58	-.35
	(.33)	(.54)	(.65)
Sevare	-.49	.96	-2.25*
	(.51)	(.87)	(.93)
Constant	-.48	.12	1.27
	(.39)	(.58)	(.77)
McFadden's+/Pseudo R-squared	.12	.10	.11
Log Likelihood	-553.53	-198.70	-153.67

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