Revisiting the Weakest Failure Detector for Uniform Reliable Broadcast*

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Abstract

Uniform Reliable Broadcast (URB) is a communication primitive that requires that if a process delivers a message, then all correct processes also deliver this message. A recent PODC paper [HR99] uses Knowledge Theory to determine what failure detectors are necessary to implement this primitive in asynchronous systems with process crashes and lossy links that are fair. In this paper, we revisit this problem using a different approach, and provide a result that is simpler, more intuitive, and, in a precise sense, more general.

1 Introduction

Uniform Reliable Broadcast (URB) is a communication primitive that requires that if a process delivers a message, then all correct processes also deliver this message [HT94]. A recent PODC paper [HR99] uses Knowledge Theory to determine what failure detectors are necessary to implement this primitive in asynchronous systems with process crashes and fair links (roughly speaking, a fair link may lose an infinite number messages, but if a message is sent infinitely often then it is eventually received).[1] In this paper, we revisit this problem using an algorithmic-reduction approach [CHT96], and provide a result that is simpler, more intuitive, and, in a precise sense, more general, as we now explain.

[HR99] considered systems where up to f process may crash and links are fair, and used Knowledge Theory to show that solving URB in such a system requires a *generalized f-useful failure detector* (denoted G^f in here). Such a failure detector is parameterized by f and is described in Figure 1. [HR99] shows that when $f = n$ or $f = n - 1$, G^f is equivalent to a *perfect failure detector*.

In this paper, we revisit this problem using the approach in [CHT96], and give a simpler characterization of the failure detectors that can solve URB in systems with process crashes and fair links. More precisely,

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[1] [HR99] actually studies a problem called *Uniform Distributed Coordination*. This problem, however, is isomorphic to URB: $init$ and do in Uniform Distributed Coordination correspond to $broadcast$ and $deliver$ in URB, respectively.

A *generalized failure detector* [HR99] outputs a pair (S, k) where S is a subset of processes and k is a positive integer. Intuitively, the failure detector outputs (S, k) to report that k processes in S are faulty. In a run r, the failure detector event $suspect_p(S, k)$ is said to be *f-useful for r* if (a) S contains all processes that crash in r, and (b) $n - |S| > \min(f, n-1) - k$. A generalized failure detector is *f-useful* if, for all runs r and processes p, the following two properties hold (where $r_p(t)$ denotes the prefix of run r at process p up to time t):

- If $suspect_p(S, k)$ is in $r_p(t)$ then there is a subset $S' \subseteq S$ such that $|S'| = k$ and for all $q \in S'$, we have that $crash_q$ is in $r_q(t)$.
- If p is correct, then there is a f-useful failure-detector event for r in $r_p(t)$, for some t.

Figure 1: Definition of a generalized f-useful failure detectors.

we prove that the weakest failure detector for this problem is a simple failure detector denoted Θ. Θ outputs a set of processes that are currently *trusted* to be up,[2] such that:

Completeness: There is a time after which correct processes do not trust any process that crashes.

Accuracy: If there is a correct process then, at every time, every process trusts at least one correct process.

This simple characterization of the weakest failure detector for URB is more general than the one given in [HR99], in the sense that it holds for *any system with fair links, regardless of f or any other types of restrictions or dependencies on process crashes*.[3] To illustrate this point, consider the following three systems with n processors $\{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}$:

1. In system S_1, every processor may crash, except that we assume that p_1 and p_2 cannot both crash in the same run (this assumption makes sense if, for example, p_1 and p_2 are configured as symmetric primary/backup servers). Note that in S_1, up to $f = n - 1$ processors may crash in the same run.
2. In system S_2, every processor may crash, except that processor p_1 is a fault-tolerant highly-available computing server that crashes only when it is left alone in the system (this assumption is not unreasonable: in some existing systems, processes kill themselves if they are unable to communicate with a minimum number of processes). Note that in S_2, up to $f = n$ processors may crash in the same run.
3. In system S_3, the number of processes that crash is bounded, but this bound f is not known. Moreover, there are some additional restrictions and dependencies on process crashes (e.g., if more than half of the processes crash then a certain process p_1 commits suicide) but these are also not known.

What is the weakest failure detector for solving URB in each of S_1, S_2 and S_3? By our result, the answer is simply Θ.

In contrast, the result in [HR99] cannot be applied to S_1, S_2 and S_3, as we now explain. For S_3, this is obvious because f is not even known. For S_1, the value of f, namely $n - 1$, is known. So, one may be tempted to naively plug $f = n - 1$ in the result of [HR99], and to conclude that solving URB in S_1 requires G^{n-1} (i.e., a perfect failure detector). This conclusion is incorrect, because [HR99] explicitly assumes that

[2] Some failure detectors in the literature output a set of processes suspected to be down; this is just the complement of the set of processes that are trusted to be up.

[3] If one assumes that a majority of processes does not crash, then URB can be solved without any failure detector [BCBT96]. As we explain in Section 11, this does not contradict our result.

any subset of up to $f = n - 1$ processors can crash in a run — an assumption that does not hold for S_1. Similarly, for S_2, one cannot just plug $f = n$ in [HR99] to obtain the correct answer.

Since, in some sense, both G^f and Θ are "minimal" for URB, an important question is now in order: What is the relation between G^f and Θ? To answer this question, we introduce the notions of *failure patterns* and *environments* [CHT96]. Roughly speaking, *a failure pattern* indicates, for each process p, whether p crashes and, if so, when. An *environment* $\mathcal{E}$ is a set of failure patterns; and *a system with environment* $\mathcal{E}$ is one where the process crashes must match one of the failure patterns in $\mathcal{E}$. Intuitively, environments allow us to express restrictions on process crashes, such as "either p_1 or p_2, but not both, may crash" (so environments can be used to formally define the systems S_1 and S_2 described earlier). A commonly-used environment in the literature is $\mathcal{E}^f$, the set of all failure patterns in which at most f processes crash: A system with environment $\mathcal{E}^f$ allows up to f process crashes, but there are no other constrains or dependencies, i.e., *any* subset of f process may crash, and these crashes can occur at *any* time.

We can now compare G^f and Θ. Roughly speaking, Θ is the weakest failure detector regardless of the environment $\mathcal{E}$, while G^f is necessary and sufficient for environment $\mathcal{E}^f$. When $\mathcal{E} = \mathcal{E}^f$, there is an algorithm that transforms G^f into Θ, and so Θ is at least as weak as G^f in environment $\mathcal{E}^f$.[4]

An important difference between [HR99] and this paper is that [HR99] uses Knowledge Theory [FHMV95] to establish and state its results, while we use algorithmic reductions [CT96]. An advantage of the algorithmic reduction method over the knowledge approach, is that the former allows the derivation of a stronger result: in a nutshell, the knowledge approach determines only what information about failures processes *know*, while the algorithmic reduction method determines what information about failures processes *know and can effectively compute*. Specifically, the result in [HR99] is that, in order to solve URB, processes must *know* the information provided by G^f. This does not automatically imply that processes can actually compute G^f.[5]

In contrast, the algorithmic reduction given in this paper shows that if processes can solve URB with some failure detector $\mathcal{D}$, then they can use $\mathcal{D}$ to *compute* failure detector Θ. This reduction implies that $\mathcal{D}$ is at least as strong as Θ in terms of problem solving: if processes can solve a problem with Θ, they can also solve it with $\mathcal{D}$ (by first using $\mathcal{D}$ to compute Θ). Note we would not be able to say that $\mathcal{D}$ is at least as strong as Θ (in terms of problem solving) if $\mathcal{D}$ only allowed processes to *know* (but not compute) Θ.

Finally, there is another difference between our approach and the one in [HR99], namely, the universe of failure detectors that is being considered. To understand the meaning of a statement such as "$\mathcal{D}$ is the weakest failure detector...", or "$\mathcal{D}$ is necessary...", one needs to know the universe of failure detectors under consideration (because it is among these failure detectors that $\mathcal{D}$ is the "weakest" or "necessary"). In our paper, the universe of failure detectors is explicit and clear: a failure detector is a function of the failure pattern — a natural definition that is widely used [CT96, CHT96, ACT98, HMR97, OGS97, YNG98, LH94] etc. The universe of failure detectors in [HR99], however, is implicitly defined, and the exact nature and power of the failure detectors considered are not entirely clear. This issue is further discussed in Section 8.

In summary, in this paper we consider the problem of determining the weakest failure detector for solving URB in systems with process crashes and lossy links — a problem that was first investigated in [HR99]. In [HR99], this problem was studied using the framework of Knowledge Theory. In this paper, we tackle this problem using a different approach based on the standard failure detector models and techniques of [CHT96]. The results that we obtain are simple, intuitive and general. More precisely:

1. We provide a *single* failure detector Θ, and show that it is the weakest failure detector for URB, *in*

[4] This is modulo a technicality due to a difference in the two models: in [HR99] all the failure detector events are "seen" by processes, while here processes can "miss" some failure detector values.

[5] In Knowledge Theory, processes may know facts that they cannot actually compute. For example, if the system is sufficiently expressive, they known the answer to every unsolved problem in Number Theory, and they also know whether any given Turing Machine halts on blank tape.

any environment. In particular, our result holds even if f is not known.

In environment $\mathcal{E}^f$, Θ is at least as weak as G^f.

2. Θ is simple and a natural candidate for solving URB. As a result, the algorithm that uses Θ to solve URB in any environment $\mathcal{E}$, is immediate.

3. Our results are derived and can be understood from first principles (they do not require Knowledge Theory).

4. Our "minimality" result is in term of effective computation, not knowledge: roughly speaking, if processes can solve URB, we show how they can compute Θ (this implies knowledge of Θ; but the converse does not necessarily hold).

5. The universe of failure detectors (with respect to which our minimality result hold) is given explicitly through a simple definition.

The paper is organized as follows. Our model is described in Section 2. In Section 3, we explain what it means for a failure detector to be weaker than another one. Section 4 defines the uniform reliable broadcast problem. Failure detector Θ is defined in Section 5, and in Section 6, we show how to use it to implement uniform reliable broadcast in systems with process crashes and fair links. In Section 7 we show that Θ is actually the weakest failure detector for this problem. In Section 8, we briefly discuss the nature and power of failure detectors, and in Section 9 we consider the relation between G^f and Θ. Related work is discussed in Section 10 and we conclude the paper in Section 11. In an optional appendix, we give some technical details to substantiate some of the claims of the paper.

2 Model

Throughout this paper, in all our results, we consider asynchronous message-passing distributed systems in which there are no timing assumptions. In particular, we make no assumptions on the time it takes to deliver a message, or on relative process speeds. The system consists of a set of n processes $\Pi = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$ that are completely connected by point-to-point (bidirectional) links. The system can experience both process failures and link failures. Processes can fail by crashing, and links can fail by dropping messages. The model, based on the one in [CHT96], is described next.

We assume the existence of a discrete global clock — this is merely a fictional device to simplify the presentation and processes do not have access to it. We take the range $\mathcal{T}$ of the clock's ticks to be the set of natural numbers.

2.1 Failure Patterns and Environments

Processes can fail by crashing, i.e., by halting prematurely. A *failure pattern* F is a function from $\mathcal{T}$ to 2^{Π}. Intuitively, $F(t)$ denotes the set of processes that have crashed through time t. Once a process crashes, it does not "recover", i.e., $\forall t : F(t) \subseteq F(t+1)$. We define $\text{crashed}(F) = \bigcup_{t \in \mathcal{T}} F(t)$ and $\text{correct}(F) = \Pi \setminus \text{crashed}(F)$. If $p \in \text{crashed}(F)$ we say p *crashes (or is faulty) in* F and if $p \in \text{correct}(F)$ we say p is *correct in* F.

An environment $\mathcal{E}$ is a set of failure patterns. As we explained in the introduction, environments describe the crashes that can occur in a system.

Links can fail by dropping messages, but we assume that links are *fair*. Roughly speaking, a fair link from p to q may intermittently drop messages, and may do so infinitely often, but it must satisfy the following

"fairness" property: if p repeatedly sends some message to q and q does not crash, then q eventually receives that message. This is made more precise in Section 2.3.

2.2 Failure Detectors

Each process has access to a local failure detector module that provides (possibly incorrect) information about the failure pattern that occurs in an execution. A *failure detector history H with range $\mathcal{R}$* is a function from $\Pi \times \mathcal{T}$ to $\mathcal{R}$. $H(p,t)$ is the output value of the failure detector module of process p at time t. *A failure detector* $\mathcal{D}$ is a function that maps each failure pattern F to a non-empty *set* of failure detector histories with range $\mathcal{R}_\mathcal{D}$ (where $\mathcal{R}_\mathcal{D}$ denotes the range of the failure detector output of $\mathcal{D}$). $\mathcal{D}(F)$ denotes the set of possible failure detector histories permitted by $\mathcal{D}$ for the failure pattern F.

2.3 Runs of Algorithms

An algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is a collection of n (possibly infinite-state) deterministic automata, one for each process in the system. Computation proceeds in atomic *steps* of $\mathcal{A}$. In each step, a process may: receive a message from a process, get an external input, query its failure detector module, undergo a state transition, send a message to a neighbor, and issue an external output.

A *run of algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ using failure detector $\mathcal{D}$* is a tuple $R = (F, H_\mathcal{D}, I, S, T)$ where F is a failure pattern, $H_\mathcal{D} \in \mathcal{D}(F)$ is a history of failure detector $\mathcal{D}$ for failure pattern F, I is an initial configuration of $\mathcal{A}$, S is an infinite sequence of steps of $\mathcal{A}$, and T is an infinite list of increasing time values indicating when each step in S occurs.

A run must satisfy some properties for every process p: If p has crashed by time t, i.e., $p \in F(t)$, then p does not take a step at any time $t' \geq t$; if p is correct, i.e., $p \in \text{correct}(F)$, then p takes an infinite number of steps; and if p takes a step at time t and queries its failure detector, then p gets $H_\mathcal{D}(p,t)$ as a response.

A run must also satisfy the following "fair link properties" for every pair of processes p and q:

- *Fairness*: If p sends a message m to q an infinite number of times and q is correct, then q eventually receives m from p.
- *Uniform Integrity*: If q receives a message m from p then p previously sent m to q; and if q receives m infinitely often from p, then p sends m infinitely often to q.

3 Failure Detector Transformations

As explained in [CT96, CHT96], failure detectors can be compared via algorithmic transformations. We now explain what it means for an algorithm $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\mathcal{D}'}$ to transform a failure detector $\mathcal{D}$ into another failure detector $\mathcal{D}'$ in an environment $\mathcal{E}$. Algorithm $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\mathcal{D}'}$ uses $\mathcal{D}$ to maintain a variable $\mathcal{D}'_p$ at every process p. This variable, reflected in the local state of p, emulates the output of $\mathcal{D}'$ at p. Let $H_{\mathcal{D}'}$ be the history of all the $\mathcal{D}'$ variables in a run R of $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\mathcal{D}'}$, i.e., $H_{\mathcal{D}'}(p,t)$ is the value of $\mathcal{D}'_p$ at time t in run R. Algorithm $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\mathcal{D}'}$ *transforms $\mathcal{D}$ into $\mathcal{D}'$ in $\mathcal{E}$* if and only if for every $F \in \mathcal{E}$ and every run $R = (F, H_\mathcal{D}, I, S, T)$ of $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\mathcal{D}'}$ using $\mathcal{D}$, we have $H_{\mathcal{D}'} \in \mathcal{D}'(F)$. Intuitively, since $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\mathcal{D}'}$ is able to use $\mathcal{D}$ to emulate $\mathcal{D}'$, $\mathcal{D}$ provides at least as much information about process failures as $\mathcal{D}'$ does, and we say that *$\mathcal{D}'$ is weaker than $\mathcal{D}$ in $\mathcal{E}$*.

Note that, in general, $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\mathcal{D}'}$ need not emulate *all* the failure detector histories of $\mathcal{D}'$ (in environment $\mathcal{E}$); what we do require is that all the failure detector histories it emulates be histories of $\mathcal{D}'$ (in that environment).

4 Uniform Reliable Broadcast

Uniform Reliable Broadcast (URB) is defined in terms of two primitives: broadcast(m) and deliver(m). We say that process p *broadcasts message* m if p invokes broadcast(m). We assume that every broadcast message m includes the following fields: the identity of its sender, denoted $sender(m)$, and a sequence number, denoted $seq(m)$. These fields make every message unique. We say that q *delivers message* m if q returns from the invocation of deliver(m). Primitives broadcast and deliver satisfy the following properties [HT94]:

- *Validity*: If a correct process broadcasts a message m, then it eventually delivers m.
- *Uniform Agreement*: If some process delivers a message m, then all correct processes eventually deliver m.
- *Uniform Integrity*: For every message m, every process delivers m at most once, and only if m was previously broadcast by $sender(m)$.

Validity and Uniform Agreement imply that if a correct process broadcasts a message m, then all correct processes eventually deliver m.

5 Failure Detector Θ

We now define failure detector Θ. Each failure detector module of Θ outputs a *set of processes* that are trusted to be up, i.e., $\mathcal{R}_\Theta = 2^\Pi$. For each failure pattern F, $\Theta(F)$ is the set of all failure detector histories H with range $\mathcal{R}_\Theta$ that satisfy the following properties:

- *[Θ-completeness]*: There is a time after which correct processes do not trust any process that crashes. More precisely:

$$\exists t \in \mathcal{T}, \forall p \in \text{correct}(F), \forall q \in \text{crashed}(F), \forall t' \geq t : q \notin H(p, t')$$

- *[Θ-accuracy]*: If there is a correct process then, at every time, every process trusts at least one correct process. More precisely:

$$\text{crashed}(F) \neq \Pi \Rightarrow \forall t \in \mathcal{T}, \forall p \in \Pi \setminus F(t), \exists q \in \text{correct}(F) : q \in H(p, t)$$

  Note that a process may be trusted even if it has actually crashed. Moreover, the correct processes trusted by a process p is allowed to change over time (in fact, it can change infinitely often), and it is not necessarily the same as the correct process trusted by another process q.

6 Using Θ to Implement Uniform Reliable Broadcast

The algorithm that implements URB using Θ is shown in Figure 2. When ambiguities may arise, a variable local to process p is subscripted by p. To broadcast a message m, a process p first initializes $got_p[m]$ to $\{p\}$; this variable represents the processes that p knows to have received m so far. Process p then forks task *diffuse*(m). In $diffuse(m)$, process p periodically sends m to all processes, and checks if $got[m]$ contains all processes that are currently trusted by p; when that happens, p delivers m if it has not done so already. When process p receives m from a process q, it starts task $diffuse(m)$ if it has not done so already.

Theorem 1. *Consider an asynchronous distributed system with process crashes and fair links, and with environment $\mathcal{E}$. The algorithm in Figure 2 implements URB using Θ in $\mathcal{E}$.*

The proof is straightforward and can be found in the optional Appendix A.

```
1   For every process p:
2
3       To execute broadcast(m):
4           got[m] ← {p}
5           fork task diffuse(m)
6           return
7
8       task diffuse(m):
9           while true do
10              send m to all processes
11              d ← D_p                          { d is the list of processes trusted to be up }
12              if d ⊆ got[m] and p has not delivered m
13              then deliver(m)
14
15      upon receive m from q do
16          if task diffuse(m) has not been started yet then
17              got[m] ← {p, q}
18              fork task diffuse(m)
19          else got[m] ← got[m] ∪ {q}
```

Figure 2: Implementing Uniform Reliable Broadcast using $\mathcal{D} = \Theta$

7 The Weakest Failure Detector for Uniform Reliable Broadcast

We now show that, in any environment, a failure detector $\mathcal{D}$ that can be used to solve URB can be transformed to Θ. More precisely, we have the following theorem:

Theorem 2. *Consider an asynchronous distributed system with process crashes and fair links, and with environment $\mathcal{E}$. Suppose failure detector $\mathcal{D}$ can be used to solve URB in $\mathcal{E}$. Then $\mathcal{D}$ can be transformed in $\mathcal{E}$ to the Θ failure detector.*

We now proceed to prove this theorem. Let $\mathcal{E}$ be an environment, $\mathcal{D}$ be a failure detector that can be used to solve URB in $\mathcal{E}$, and $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ be the URB algorithm that uses $\mathcal{D}$. We describe an algorithm $T_{\mathcal{D}\rightarrow\Theta}$ that transforms $\mathcal{D}$ into Θ in $\mathcal{E}$. Intuitively, this algorithm works as follows.

Consider an arbitrary run of $T_{\mathcal{D}\rightarrow\Theta}$ using $\mathcal{D}$, with failure pattern $F \in \mathcal{E}$ and failure detector history $H \in \mathcal{D}(F)$. Processes periodically query their failure detector $\mathcal{D}$ and exchange information about the values of H that they see in this run. Using this information, processes construct a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that represents a "sampling" of failure detector values in H and some temporal relationships between the values sampled. To illustrate this, suppose that q_0 queries its failure detector $\mathcal{D}$ for the k_0-th time and sees value d_0; q_0 then reliably broadcasts the message $[q_0, d_0, k_0]$ (it can use $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ to do so). When a process q_1 receives $[q_0, d_0, k_0]$, it can add vertice $[q_0, d_0, k_0]$ to its (current) version of the DAG. When q_1 later queries $\mathcal{D}$ and sees the value d_1 (say this is its k_1-th query), it adds vertice $[q_1, d_1, k_1]$ and edge $[q_0, d_0, k_0] \rightarrow [q_1, d_1, k_1]$ to its DAG: This edge indicates that q_0 saw d_0 (in its k_0-th query) *before* q_1 saw d_1 (in its k_1-th query). By periodically sending its current version of the DAG to all processes, and incorporating all the DAGs that it receives into its own DAG, a process can construct an ever increasing DAG that includes the failure detector values seen by processes and some of their temporal relationships.

It turns out that a process p can use its DAG to simulate runs of $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ with failure pattern F and failure

detector history H. These are runs that *could have occurred* if processes were running $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ instead of $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\Theta}$.

To illustrate this, let p be a process, and consider a path in its DAG, say $[q_0, d_0, k_0], [q_1, d_1, k_1], \ldots, [q_\ell, d_\ell, k_\ell]$. In $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\Theta}$, process p uses this path to simulate a run R_{sim} of $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$. In R_{sim}, q_0 takes the 0-th step, q_1 takes the 1-st step, q_2 takes the 2-nd step, and so on. In the 0-th step, q_0 broadcasts m_0. Moreover, for every j, in the j-th step process q_j sees failure detector value d_j and receives the oldest message sent to it that it has not yet received (if there are no such messages, it receives nothing). It turns out that, if failure pattern F has some correct process, then process p can extract from R_{sim} a list of processes that contains at least one such a correct process. To see how, consider the step of R_{sim} when a process first delivers m_0, and suppose this is the k-th step. Then, among processes $\{q_0, \ldots, q_k\}$ (those that took steps before the delivery of m_0), there is at least one that never crashes in F. If that were not the case, we could construct another run R_{BAD} of $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ with failure pattern F and failure detector history H, where (1) up to the k-th step, processes behave as in R_{sim}, (2) after the k-th step, processes $\{q_0, \ldots, q_k\}$ all crash, and all messages sent by these processes to other processes are lost and (3) from the $(k+1)$-st step onwards, the correct processes (in F) take steps in a round-robin fashion. Note that in R_{BAD}, (1) process q_k delivers m_0 at the k-th step, (2) correct processes (in F) only take steps after the k-th step, (3) these processes never receive a message sent by k-th step, and so (4) correct processes (in F) never deliver m_0 — a contradiction. Thus, the list $\{q_0, \ldots, q_k\}$ contains at least one correct process (in F), and so p can achieve the Θ-accuracy property by outputting this list.

The list $\{q_0, \ldots, q_k\}$ that p generates, however, may contain processes that crash (in F). Thus, to achieve Θ-completeness, p must continuously repeat the simulation above to generate new $\{q_0, \ldots, q_k\}$ lists, such that eventually the lists contain only correct processes (in F). In order to guarantee that, p must ensure that the path $[q_0, d_0, k_0], [q_1, d_1, k_1], \ldots, [q_\ell, d_\ell, k_\ell]$ that it uses to extract $\{q_0, \ldots, q_k\}$ eventually includes only vertices of processes that do not crash. That will be true if all the processes that crash in F, do so before q_0 obtains d_0 at its k_0-th step. Therefore, process p can achieve Θ-completeness (as well as Θ-accuracy) by simply periodically reselecting a new path $[q_0, d_0, k_0], [q_1, d_1, k_1], \ldots, [q_\ell, d_\ell, k_\ell]$ so that $[q_0, d_0, k_0]$ is a "recent" vertice in its DAG.

Having given an overall account of how the transformation $T_{\mathcal{D}\to\Theta}$ works, we now explain it in more detail. In what follows, let S be a sequence of pairs consisting of a process name and a failure detector value, that is, $S := ([q_0, d_0], [q_1, d_1], \ldots, [q_k, d_k])$. Let m_0 be an arbitrary fixed message. Given S, we can simulate an execution of $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ in which (1) process q_0 initially invokes broadcast(m_0) and (2) for $j = 0, \ldots, k$, the j-th step of $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ is taken by process q_j; in that step, q_j obtains d_j from its local failure detector module, and receives the oldest message addressed to it that it has not yet received (if there are no such messages, it receives nothing). We define $Delivered(S)$ to be true if process q_k delivers m_0 in the k-th step of this simulation.

The detailed algorithm that transforms $\mathcal{D}$ to Θ is given in Figure 3. As we explained above, each process p maintains a directed acyclic graph DAG_p, whose nodes are triples $[q, d, seq]$. The transformation algorithm has three tasks; in the first task, a process p periodically queries its local failure detector, creates a new node $[p, d, curr]$ in DAG_p and adds an edge from all other nodes in DAG_p to this new node. Then, p uses $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ to broadcasts its new DAG_p to all processes. In the second task, upon the delivery of DAG_q from a process q, process p merges its own DAG_p with DAG_q. In the third task, process p loops forever. In the loop, p first waits until its Task 1 adds a new node to DAG_p, and then waits until there is a path starting at this new node that truthifies $Delivered$. Once p finds such a path, it sets the output of $\mathcal{D}'$ to the set of all processes that appear in the path. Then, process p restarts the loop.

The detailed correctness proof of this algorithm is given in the optional Appendix B.

```
1   For every process p:
2
3       Initialization:
4           DAG ← ∅
5           curr ← −1
6           D'_p ← Π                                          { trust all processes }
7
8       cobegin
9           || Task 1:
10              while true do
11                  d ← D_p
12                  curr ← curr + 1
13                  add to DAG the node [p, d, curr] and edges from all other nodes to [p, d, curr]
14                  broadcast(DAG)                            { use URB algorithm to broadcast }
15
16          || Task 2:
17              upon deliver(DAG_q) from q do
18                  DAG ← DAG ∪ DAG_q
19
20          || Task 3:
21              while true do
22                  next ← curr + 1
23                  wait until DAG contains a node of the form [p, ∗, next]
24                  wait until DAG contains a path P = ([q_0, d_0, seq_0], ..., [q_k, d_k, seq_k]) such that
25                      (1) q_0 = p and seq_0 = next and
26                      (2) Delivered([q_0, d_0], ..., [q_k, d_k]) is true
27                  D'_p ← {q_0, ..., q_k}                    { all processes in this path }
28      coend
```

Figure 3: Transformation of $\mathcal{D}$ to $\mathcal{D}' = \Theta$

8 On the Nature and Power of Failure Detectors

As we mentioned in the introduction, to understand the meaning of a statement such as "$\mathcal{D}$ is the weakest failure detector...", or "$\mathcal{D}$ is necessary...", we need to know the universe of failure detectors under consideration. For such minimality results to be significant, the universe of failure detectors should be reasonable. In particular, it should not include failure detectors that provide information that have nothing to do with failures, e.g., hints on which messages have been broadcast, information about the internal state of processes, etc. To see why, suppose that a "failure detector" is allowed to indicate whether a message m was broadcast; then processes could use it solve the URB problem without ever sending any messages! Similarly, with the Consensus problem, if a "failure detector" could peek at the initial value of a process and provide this value to all processes, processes could use it to solve Consensus without messages and without $\Diamond\mathcal{W}$ [CHT96]. Thus, a *failure* detector should be defined as an oracle that provides information about *failures* only.

In [HR99], it is not clear what information failure detectors are allowed to provide: On one hand, the formal model defines failure detectors as generic oracles;[6] on the other hand, their behavior is implicitly

[6]Even though the definition of a failure detector states that it must output a set S of processes, and that S should be "interpreted" as processes suspected of being faulty, there is nothing in the definition to enforce this interpretation: the model does not tie the output S to the crashes that occur in a run. Thus, the formal definition allows a failure detector to use its output S to encode

```
1   For every process p:
2
3       Initialization:
4           D'_p ← Π                                              { trust all processes }
5           got ← ∅
6
7       cobegin
8           || Task 1:
9               while true do send (I-am-alive) to all processes
10
11          || Task 2:
12              upon receive (I-am-alive) from q do
13                  got ← got ∪ {q}
14
15          || Task 3:
16              while true do
17                  if there exists S, k such that
18                      (1) p got event suspect(S, k) (from G^f),
19                      (2) k > |S| − n + min(f, n − 1), and
20                      (3) got contains Π \ S
21                  then D'_p ← got; got ← ∅                      { trust processes in got }
22      coend
```

Figure 4: Transformation of G^f to $\mathcal{D}' = \Theta$ in $\mathcal{E}^f$.

restricted by a closure axiom (on the set of runs of the system) that is introduced later in the paper.[7] The difficulty is that this axiom is technical and quite complex; furthermore, it does not mention failure detectors and it captures other assumptions that are not related to failure detection (e.g., the fact that processes are using a full-information protocol). Thus, the nature and power of the failure detectors that actually satisfy this axiom, and the universe of failure detectors under consideration, are not entirely clear.

9 Relation between G^f and Θ

In environment $\mathcal{E}^f$, Θ is at least as weak as G^f, that is, it is possible to transform G^f to Θ in $\mathcal{E}^f$. This transformation is given in Figure 4. Initially, each process p sets its failure detector output to Π (trust all processes). There are three concurrent tasks. In the first task, p repeatedly sends "I-am-alive" to all processes in the system. In the second task, when p receives one such message from process q, it adds q to the set got. In the third task, process p loops forever. In each iteration, p checks whether at some time G^f has output a pair (S, k) such that $k > |S| - n + \min(f, n-1)$ and got contains the complement of S. In that case, p sets its failure detector output to got, and then resets got to the empty set.

Theorem 3. *The algorithm in Figure 4 transforms G^f into Θ in environment $\mathcal{E}^f$.*

The proof is simple, and can be found in the optional Appendix C.

information that has nothing to do with failures.

[7] This axiom, A4, is given in the optional Appendix D.

10 Related Work

The difference between the concepts of Agreement and Uniform Agreement was first pointed out in [Had86] in a comparison of Consensus versus Atomic Commitment. The term "Uniform" was introduced in [GT89, NT90], where it was studied in the context of Reliable Broadcast. In these papers, it is shown that with send and receive omission failures, URB can be solved if and only if a majority of processes are correct.

[BCBT96] consider systems with process crashes and fair (lossy) links, and addresses the following question: given any problem P that can be solved in a system where the only possible failures are process crashes, is P still solvable if links can also fail by losing messages? [BCBT96] shows that if P can be solved in systems with only process crashes, then P can also be solved in systems with process crashes *and* fair links, provided that (a) P is *correct-restricted*[8], or (b) a majority of processes are correct (i.e., $n > 2f$). As a corollary of this result (and the fact that URB is solvable in systems with only process crashes), we get that URB is solvable in systems with $f < n/2$ process crashes and fair links.

[HR99] is the first paper to consider solving URB in systems with fair links and $f \geq n/2$. As mentioned above, this cannot be done without failure detectors, and [HR99] determined that failure detector G^f is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem in $\mathcal{E}^f$. A discussion of the differences between [HR99] and this paper was given in Section 1.

11 Concluding Remarks

In some environments, URB can be solved without failure detectors at all, and this seems to contradict the fact that Θ is the weakest failure detector for URB in any environment. There is no contradiction, however, because in such environments Θ can be implemented.

For example, as we saw in the previous section, URB can be solved without failure detectors in an environment $\mathcal{E}_{maj}$ where a majority of processes are correct. This does not contradict Theorem 2 because Θ can be implemented in $\mathcal{E}_{maj}$, as we now explain.

To implement Θ in $\mathcal{E}_{maj}$, processes periodically send an "I-am-alive" message to all processes, and each process p keeps a list of processes $Order_p$. This list records the order in which the last "I-am-alive" message from each process is received. More precisely, $Order_p$ is initially an arbitrary permutation of the processes, and when p receives an "I-am-Alive" message from q, p moves q to the front of *Order*. To obtain Θ, a process p repeatedly outputs the first $\lceil (n+1)/2 \rceil$ processes in $Order_p$ as the set of trusted processes. It is easy to see why this implementation works: any process that crashes stops sending "I-am-alive" messages and soon moves towards the end of $Order_p$. Since at most $\lfloor (n-1)/2 \rfloor$ processes crash, all processes that crash are eventually among the last $\lfloor (n-1)/2 \rfloor$ processes in $Order_p$ — so they do not appear among the first $\lceil (n+1)/2 \rceil$ processes. Thus our implementation satisfies Θ-completeness. To see that it also satisfies Θ-accuracy, note that among the first $\lceil (n+1)/2 \rceil$ processes in $Order_p$, there is *always* at least one correct process (since no majority of processes can crash in $\mathcal{E}_{maj}$).

In general, from the transformation algorithm in Figure 3, the following obviously holds:

Remark 1. *Consider an asynchronous distributed system with process crashes and fair links, and with environment $\mathcal{E}$. If URB can be solved in $\mathcal{E}$ without any failure detectors then Θ can be implemented in $\mathcal{E}$.*

[8] Intuitively, a problem P is correct-restricted if its specification does not refer to the behavior of faulty processes [BN92, Gop92]. Note that URB is *not* correct-restricted.

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Optional Appendices

A Proof of Theorem 1

We now prove that the algorithm in Figure 2 implements URB in any system with process crashes and link failures, and with any environment. Consider a run of the algorithm using $\mathcal{D} = \Theta$ in any environment.

Lemma 4. *If a correct process p starts task $diffuse(m)$ then eventually all correct processes start task $diffuse(m)$.*

Proof. Let q be a correct process. In task $diffuse(m)$, process p repeatedly sends m to all processes, including q. By the Fairness property of links, eventually q receives m from p, and starts task $diffuse(m)$ if it has not done so already. □

Lemma 5. *If a correct process p starts $diffuse(m)$ then p eventually delivers m.*

Proof. Let q be a correct process; we first argue that eventually $q \in got_p[m]$ holds forever. Indeed, by Lemma 4, q eventually starts task $diffuse(m)$. In that task, q sends m to p an infinite number of times. By the Fairness property of links, p eventually receives m from q and adds q to $got_p[m]$. Once that happens, q remains in $got_p[m]$ forever.

We conclude that eventually every correct process is in $got_p[m]$ forever. By the Θ-completeness property, there is a time after which the output d of $\mathcal{D}_p$ contains only correct processes. Therefore, eventually $d \subseteq got_p[m]$, and p delivers m. □

Corollary 6. *If a correct process p broadcasts a message m then p eventually delivers m.*

Corollary 7. *If some process p delivers a message m then all correct processes eventually deliver m.*

Proof. If there are no correct processes, the corollary is vacuously true, so assume there is some correct process. If p delivers m then for some d, (1) p obtained d from $\mathcal{D}_p$ and (2) $d \subseteq got_p[m]$. By (1) and the Θ-accuracy property, d contains at least one correct process q. By (2), $q \in got_p[m]$. It is easy to show that this implies that q started task $diffuse(m)$. Since q is correct, by Lemma 4 all correct processes start task $diffuse(m)$. By Lemma 5, all correct processes deliver m. □

Lemma 8. *For every message m, every process delivers m at most once, and only if m was previously broadcast by $sender(m)$.*

Proof. From the code of the algorithm: (a) a process only delivers a message m if it has not done so previously, and so every process delivers m at most once; and (b) a process can only deliver m if it starts task $diffuse(m)$. By the Uniform Integrity property of links, it is easy to show that a process only starts $diffuse(m)$ if m was previously broadcast by $sender(m)$. □

Theorem 9. *Consider an asynchronous distributed system with process crashes and fair links, and with environment $\mathcal{E}$. The algorithm in Figure 2 implements URB using Θ in $\mathcal{E}$.*

Proof. Validity, Uniform Agreement and Uniform Integrity follow from Corollary 6, Corollary 7 and Lemma 8, respectively. □

B Detailed Proof of Theorem 2

Let $\mathcal{E}$ be an environment, $\mathcal{D}$ be a failure detector that can be used to solve URB in $\mathcal{E}$, and $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ be the URB algorithm that uses $\mathcal{D}$. Consider a run $R_{T_{\mathcal{D}\to\Theta}}$ of the transformation algorithm of Figure 3, and we let C be the set of correct processes in this run. In order to differentiate between the suspicions of $\mathcal{D}$ and of $\mathcal{D}'$, we henceforth prefix the word "trust" by the failure detector to which it refers. For example, we say "p $\mathcal{D}'$-trusts".

Lemma 10. *If there is a correct process then, at every time, every process p $\mathcal{D}'$-trusts at least one correct process.*

Proof. Initially, p sets $\mathcal{D}'_p$ to Π, so clearly if there is a correct process q, then p $\mathcal{D}'$-trusts q.

Now suppose p sets $\mathcal{D}'_p$ to a set S in line 27 at time t. In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that S contains no correct process, i.e., $S \cap C = \emptyset$. At time t, DAG_p contains a path $P = ([q_0, d_0, seq_0], \ldots, [q_k, d_k, seq_k])$ such that (1) $q_0 = p$, (2) $Delivered([q_0, d_0], \ldots, [q_k, d_k]) = true$, and (3) $\{q_0, \ldots, q_k\} = S$. Since DAG_p contains P, we claim that there exists a of run R_{BAD} of $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ in environment $\mathcal{E}$ such that

- the set of correct processes is C, and
- process $p = q_0$ initially invokes broadcast(m_0), and
- for $j = 0, \ldots, k$, the j-th step is taken by process q_j; in that step, q_j obtains d_j from its local failure detector module, and receives the oldest message addressed to it that it has not yet received (if there are no such messages, it receives nothing), and
- after the k-th step, (1) the set of messages sent by the k-th step and not yet received are lost and (2) processes in C take steps in round-robin fashion, obtain some value from their failure detector, and receive the oldest message not yet received that was sent after the k-th step

To see why the claims holds, note that DAG_p was constructed in a run $R_{T_{\mathcal{D}\to\Theta}}$ with failure detector $\mathcal{D}$ in environment $\mathcal{E}$; since DAG_p contains P, then in this run the following happened in chronological order: (1) q_0 took a step and obtained d_0 from its local failure detector; (2) q_1 took a step and obtained d_1 from its local failure detector; (3) q_2 took a step and obtained d_2 from its local failure detector; and so on. Note that C is the set of correct process in $R_{T_{\mathcal{D}\to\Theta}}$. Thus, there is a run R_{BAD} of $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ with $\mathcal{D}$ in environment $\mathcal{E}$ in which q_0 broadcasts m_0, such that: (1) C is the set of correct processes; (2) for $j = 0, \ldots, k$, in the j-th step, q_j obtains d_j from its local failure detector and receives the oldest message addressed to it that it has not yet received; (3) messages sent by the k-th step that were not received by the k-th step are lost; (4) after the k-th step, processes in C take steps in a round-robin fashion, obtain some value from their failure detector, and receive the oldest message not yet received that was sent after the k-th step. This is a valid run in our model because the correct processes C take an infinite number of steps, and only a finite number of message are lost (the lost message are those that are sent, but not received by the k-th step). This shows the claim.

Now consider run R_{BAD}. Up to the k-th step, no process in C takes a step (since only processes in S take a step, and $S \cap C = \emptyset$ by assumption). At the k-th step, process q_k delivers m_0, since $Delivered([q_0, d_0], \ldots, [q_k, d_k]) = true$. After the k-th step, only processes in $C \neq \emptyset$ take a step, and they never receive a message sent by the k-th step. It is easy to see that processes in C do not deliver m_0. Since q_k delivers m_0 and processes in C are correct, R_{BAD} violates the Uniform Agreement property of URB — a contradiction. □

Lemma 11. *If p is a correct process and at some time DAG_p contains a path P, then eventually for every correct process q, DAG_p contains path $P \cdot [q, d, seq]$ for some d and seq.*

Proof. Suppose DAG_p contains a path P. Eventually p broadcasts DAG_p and since p and q are correct, eventually q delivers that broadcast and incorporates P into DAG_q (if it is not already there). After that, in Task 1, q queries its failure detector, obtains a value d, and adds to DAG_q a new node $[q, d, seq]$ with incoming edges from all other nodes. When that happens, DAG_q contains the path $P \cdot [q, d, seq]$. Then q broadcasts DAG_q. Since both p and q are correct, eventually p delivers that broadcast and incorporates $P \cdot [q, d, seq]$ into DAG_p. □

Lemma 12. *If p is a correct process then p does not block forever in lines 23 or 24.*

Proof. Let p be a correct process. Then p does not block forever in line 23, since eventually its Task 2 adds to DAG_p a node of the form $[p, *, next]$. To see that p does not block forever in line 24, let seq_0 be the value of $next_p$ when p starts line 24, and let d_0 be such that $[p, d_0, seq_0]$ belongs to DAG_p (such a d_0 exists because p has just executed past line 23). We claim that eventually DAG_p contains a path $P = ([p, d_0, seq_0], [q_1, d_1, seq_1], \ldots, [q_k, d_k, seq_k])$ such that $Delivered([p, d_0], [q_1, d_1], \ldots, [q_k, d_k])$ is true. This claim immediately implies that p does not block forever in line 24.

To show the claim, let $r = |C|$, $q_0 = p$ and $q_1, \ldots, q_{|C|-1}$ be the processes in $C \setminus \{p\}$ in some arbitrary order. In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that at every time, any path P in DAG_p whose first node is $[p, d_0, seq_0]$ satisfies $Delivered(P) = false$. We now define inductively an increasing sequence $P_0, P_1, \ldots$ of paths that are all eventually in DAG_p. Let P_0 be the singleton path $([p, d_0, seq_0])$ and note that DAG_p contains P_0. For $j \geq 1$, given that P_{j-1} is in DAG_p, by Lemma 11 eventually DAG_p contains a path $P_{j-1} \cdot [q_{j \bmod |C|}, d_j, seq_j]$ for some d_j and seq_j. We set P_j to be such a path.

We can now construct a run R_0 of $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ using $\mathcal{D}$ in environment $\mathcal{E}$, where:

- the set of correct processes is C, and
- process q_0 initially invokes broadcast(m_0), and
- for $j \geq 0$, the $(j+1)$-th step is taken by process $q_{j \bmod |C|}$; in that step, $q_{j \bmod |C|}$ obtains d_j from its local failure detector module, and receives the oldest message addressed to it that it has not yet received (if there are no such messages, it receives nothing).

Note that R_0 is a valid run of $\mathcal{A}_{URB}$ using $\mathcal{D}$ in environment $\mathcal{E}$. Since q_0 is correct in R_0, it must eventually deliver m_0, say at some step k. Therefore, we have that $Delivered(P_k) = true$. This contradicts the assumption that $Delivered(P) = false$ for every path P in DAG_p whose first node is $[p, d_0, seq_0]$. □

Lemma 13. *There is a time after which correct processes do not $\mathcal{D}'$-trust any process that crashes.*

Proof. Let p be a correct process and q be a process that crashes. We now show that there is a time after which p does not $\mathcal{D}'$-trusts q. Let t_0 be the time when q crashes. Let $curr_p^{t_0}$ be the value of $curr_p$ at time t_0.

We claim that for any $seq \geq curr_p^{t_0} + 1$, DAG_p can never contain a path whose first node is $[p, *, seq]$ and that has a subsequent node of the form $[q, *, *]$. To see why, note that for any path $P = ([p, d_0, seq], [q_1, d_1, seq_1], \ldots, [q_k, d_k, seq_k])$ in DAG_p, it must be the case that after time t_0 p obtains d_0 from $\mathcal{D}_p$ and adds node $[p, d_0, seq]$ to DAG_p, which happens no later than p broadcasts a DAG_p containing node $[p, d_0, seq]$, which happens no later than q delivers a DAG_p containing node $[p, d_0, seq]$.

Note that there is an edge $[p, d_0, seq] \rightarrow [q_1, d_1, seq_1]$ in DAG_p, and so there must be such an edge in DAG_{q_1} (this is because for any process q, an edge of the form $[*, *, *] \rightarrow [q, *, *]$ must appear DAG_q before it appears in the DAG of any other process). Therefore, q_1 delivers a DAG_p containing node $[p, d_0, seq]$ no later than q_1 adds node $[q_1, d_1, seq_1]$ to DAG_{q_1}. Moreover, through a similar reasoning, we have that for any $j : 1 \leq j < k$, q_j adds node $[q_j, d_j, seq_j]$ to DAG_{q_j} no later than p adds this same node to DAG_p, which happens no later than q_{j+1} added node $[q_{j+1}, d_{j+1}, seq_{j+1}]$ to $DAG_{q_{j+1}}$.

With all that, we conclude that for any $j : 0 \leq j \leq k$, q_j added node $[q_j, d_j, seq_j]$ to DAG_{q_j} after time t_0. Since q crashes at time t_0, we conclude that $q \neq q_j$. Thus DAG_p can never contain a path whose first node is $[p, *, seq]$ and that has a subsequent node of the form $[q, *, *]$.

Now let $t_1 \geq t_0$ be the time when p reaches line 27 with $next_p$ set to $curr_p^{t_0} + 1$. Note that eventually a path is selected in line 24 after time t_1. By the claim, no path selected after time t_1 contains a node of the form $[q, *, *]$. Thus, after time t_1, p does not $\mathcal{D}'$-trust q. □

Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 10, $\mathcal{D}'$ satisfies Θ-accuracy, and by Lemma 13, $\mathcal{D}'$ satisfies Θ-completeness. Therefore the algorithm in Figure 3 transforms $\mathcal{D}$ to Θ. □

C Proof of Theorem 3

We now show that the algorithm in Figure 4 transforms G^f into Θ in a system with process crashes and link failures, and with environment $\mathcal{E}^f$. Consider a run of the transformation algorithm in environment $\mathcal{E}^f$.

Lemma 14. *If there is a correct process then, at every time, every process $\mathcal{D}'$-trusts at least one correct process.*

Proof. Assume that there is a correct process, and let p be any process. Initially, p $\mathcal{D}'$-trusts all processes, so clearly there exists some correct process that is $\mathcal{D}'$-trusted by p. Now assume that p sets its failure detector output in line 21, and consider the value of some pair (S, k) that truthifies lines 18 and 19. Then, in environment $\mathcal{E}^f$, the definition of G^f implies that $\Pi \setminus S$ contains at least one correct process. Thus, by condition (3), got_p contains some correct process, and so when p sets $\mathcal{D}'$ in line 21, p $\mathcal{D}'$-trusts at least one correct process. □

Lemma 15. *If p is a correct process then p executes line 21 infinitely often.*

Proof. In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that p executes line 21 only finitely often, and let t_{final} be the time when p executes this line for the last time (if p never executes this line, let $t_{final} = 0$). Let C be the set of correct processes. After time t_{final}, p never resets got to the empty set. Since p receives messages from correct processes infinitely often, then eventually got contains C after time t_{final}. Moreover, by definition of G^f, eventually p gets an f-useful event $suspect(S, k)$. That means that S contains $\Pi \setminus C$ and condition (2) in line 19 holds. Thus C contains $\Pi \setminus S$. Since got contains C after time t_{final}, then got contains $\Pi \setminus S$ after time t_{final}, and so condition (3) in line 20 holds. Thus, after time t_{final}, p executes line 21 — a contradiction. □

Lemma 16. *There is a time after which correct processes do not $\mathcal{D}'$-trust any process that crashes.*

Proof. Let p be a correct process. Let t_0 be the time when the last process crashes, and let $t_1 > t_0$ be the time after which no messages sent by t_0 are received (such a time t_1 exists because of the Uniform Integrity property of links and the fact that only a finite number of messages are sent by t_0). Then, after t_1 all messages received were sent by correct processes. By Lemma 15, there exists a time $t_2 > t_1$ when p executes line 21. Note that after time t_2, variable got contains only correct processes. Let $t_3 > t_2$ be next time when p executes line 21 (such a time t_3 exists by Lemma 15). Then, after t_3 p does not $\mathcal{D}'$-trust any process that crashes. □

Theorem 17. *The algorithm in Figure 4 transforms G^f into Θ in environment $\mathcal{E}^f$.*

Proof. Lemmata 14 and 16 show that $\mathcal{D}'$ satisfies Θ-accuracy and Θ-completeness, respectively. □

D The A4 Axiom of [HR99]

The axiom that implicitly restricts the behavior of failure detectors in [HR99] is:

(A4) If φ is a stable formula local to some process p in $\mathcal{R}$ that is insensitive to failure by p and there is some $S \subseteq Proc$ such that $(\mathcal{R}, r, t) \models \bigwedge_{q \in S} \neg K_q \varphi$, then there exists a point (r', t) such that (a) $r'_q(t) = r_q(t)$ for $q \in S$, (b) for $q \notin S$, there is a prefix h of $r_q(t)$ (not necessarily strict) such that $r'_q(t)$ is either h or $h \cdot crash_q$, and $r'_q(t) = h \cdot crash_q$ only if $crash_q \in r_q(t)$, (c) $(\mathcal{R}, r', t) \models \neg\varphi$.

In this definition, $\mathcal{R}$ is a system (a set of runs), $Proc$ is the set of processes in the system (in our paper, this is denoted Π). The notation $(\mathcal{R}, r, t) \models \varphi$ means that formula φ is true at point (r, t) in system $\mathcal{R}$, where r is a run in $\mathcal{R}$ and t is a time. Roughly speaking, $r_q(t)$ is the prefix of run r at q up to time t (for details, see [HR99]). $crash_q$ is an event that is in q's history if q crashes. The allowed formulas φ are primitive propositions, closed off under Boolean combinations, $\Box$, and the epistemic operators K_p for each process p. Among the primitive propositions are $send_p(q, msg)$, $recv_q(p, msg)$, $crash(p)$, $do_p(\alpha)$, and $init_p(\alpha)$.[9] A formula φ local to q is said to be *insensitive to failure by* q if for all runs $r, r' \in \mathcal{R}$, if $r'_q(t') = r_q(t) \cdot crash_q$, then $(\mathcal{R}, r, t) \models \varphi$ iff $(\mathcal{R}, r', t') \models \varphi$.

[9] Recall than in [HR99], broadcast and deliver correspond to $init$ and do, respectively.