
CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE JANUARY 1, 1998- JANUARY 31, 1999

The Editors

The present listing shows the holders of key positions in the Armed Forces Headquarters, as well as army central and regional command structures since January 1, 1998, the terminal date of our last listing, up to January 31, 1999. The new listing is less complete than earlier ones because our prime source of information, the military daily *Angkatan Bersenjata*, ceased publication in early August 1998. It hesitantly reappeared under the new rubric *Harian Umum ABRI* in October, but did not begin regular publication until December.¹

During the thirteen months covered by this listing momentous changes took place in Indonesian politics, and few institutions were as seriously affected as the military. With Suharto's resignation from the presidency on May 21, 1998, the officer corps "lost" the retired general who had controlled it for decades; the freeing of the mass media, the rise of student activists, and the reemergence of real political parties have put it on the defensive; and for many reasons it has seen its prestige and authority significantly decline.

In what follows, we will consider in turn: a) the ethnic-regional and Academy backgrounds of the military elite in a time of transition; b) the politics of this elite; and c) military restructuring and the institution's possible short-term future.

¹ It seems that the military's (and the country's) financial difficulties explain *Angkatan Bersenjata's* demise. The daily was always run at a loss because it had few subscribers outside the military itself. It appears that its reemergence, under a new name, has been made possible by help from the Yudhagama Foundation.

A. Ethnic-Regional and Academy Backgrounds

Along these dimensions things appear to have continued in routine fashion. Tables 1 and 2 provide a general profile of the military elite considered from the angles of ethnic origin and of Academy background. Table 1 shows that the traditional overrepresentation of the Javanese continues, but has lessened slightly from earlier listings. Currently, at least 55 percent of army leaders (33 out of 60) at the central level are from that ethnic group. Next, and a very long way behind, are the Sundanese with 6.5 percent (4 out of 60). Minangkabau, Madurese, and Batak come next, and Balinese and Menadonese officers occupy some key positions. In all at least thirteen ethnic groups have some representation, probably a wider range than a decade ago.

Table 1
Ethnic-Regional Distribution of the Central Army Elite

Javanese	33
Sundanese	4
Toba Batak	3
Minangkabau	2
Balinese	2
Madurese	2
Ambonese	1
Menadonese	1
W. Timorese	1
Banjarese	1
Karo Batak	1
Bugis-Makassarese	1
Morotai	1
Unknown	7
Total	60

Table 2
Academy Class Distribution of the Central Army Elite

	ABRI HQ	Army	Total
1966	1	-	1
1967	-	-	-
1968	3	3	6
1970	3	7	10
1971	2	14	16
1972	1	8	9
1973	2	-	-
1974	-	3	3
Unknown	1	2	3

Table 2 shows that men from the classes of 1968, 1970, and 1971 dominate the highest echelons of the ABRI structure, but that it is the classes of 1970-2 that control

the top jobs under the direct supervision of the Army Headquarters. These men were mostly born between 1947 and 1949, are in their early fifties, and will be retiring between 2002 and 2004. They are too young to have experienced as adults either the liberal democratic period, Sukarno's Guided Democracy, or massacres of 1965-66. They are fully creatures of Suharto's New Order.

Table 3, however, shows turmoil rather than continuity. Elite positions changed hands no less than sixty-nine times in thirteen months, and in a few strategic instances a single job was held by four different officers.

Table 3
Timing of Personnel Changes

		ABRI HQ	Army	Total
1998	Jan.	3	-	3
	Feb.	1	1	2
	Mar.	4	5	9
	Apr.	1	6	7
	May	3	7	10
	June	3	6	9
	July	-	6	6
	Aug.	1	-	1
	Sept.	-	-	-
	Oct.	4	4	8
	Nov.	-	-	-
	Dec.	-	-	-
1999	Jan.	4	10	14
Totals		24	45	69

The rapid rotations of March through May coincide with, and were surely part of, the final crisis of the Suharto regime, beginning with the MPR (Indonesian parliament) session in March which unanimously reelected Suharto as president and Habibie as vice-president, through the disastrous cabinet formed in the wake of the MPR, the subsequent student protests, and the riots of May which ended Suharto's rule. The changes of June and July represent the fallout of these events, felt first at ABRI Headquarters, and then, by ripple effect, down the Army hierarchy. It is likely that the rotations of October and especially January reflect General Wiranto's attempts to consolidate his authority.

The information available to us about officers at the level of Korem commanders is rather skimpy, so that conclusions can only hesitantly be drawn.² Table 4 shows that

² This is the place to record that in early October 1998, two Korem were created in Kodam Jaya: Korem 051 Wijayakarta (East Jakarta) with Kodims for East Jakarta, South Jakarta, and Bekasi under it; and Korem 052 Wijayakrama (West Jakarta), handling Kodims for North Jakarta, West Jakarta, and Tangerang.

The numbering system shows that already in October, well before the official announcement in March 1999, the military leadership had in mind a reversion to the pre-1984 system of seventeen, rather than ten Kodam, where Kodam Jaya was numbered 5. See below p. 145. Korem 051's first commander is Col. George Toisutta, forty-five years old and Akabri Class 1976 graduate, who previously served as commander of the core regiment of Kodam II. Korem 052's first commander, Col. Tri Tamtomo, is Prabowo's classmate (1974),

almost two-thirds of Korem commands are now held by graduates of the Akabri classes of 1973 and 1974, with the Class of 1972 only somewhat less represented.

Table 4
Academy Class Distribution Among Korem Commanders

1971	1
1972	8
1973	13
1974	12
1975	2
1976	2
Unknown	3
Total	41

The bulk of the personnel changes at the Korem level took place in the second half of 1998. They seem, on the whole, to be the logical, time-lagged follow-up to transfers at the higher echelons of the military hierarchy.

Table 5
Timing of Personnel Changes at the Korem Level

January 1998	-
Feb.	2
Mar.	-
Apr.	1
May	4
June	2
July	4
Aug.	-
Sept.	-
Oct.	7
Nov.	3
Dec.	-
Jan. 1999	-

B. The Politics of the Military Elite

As the Suharto regime started to unravel in the wake of the complete collapse of the rupiah in the dry season of 1998, it appears that the president tried to ensure that officers in key command posts in and around Jakarta were thoroughly reliable. Wiranto, a former military aide, became Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief in February 1998, and the pliable Subagyo, a former personal bodyguard, took his place as Army Chief of Staff. Suharto's ambitious son-in-law, Lt. Gen. Prabowo, became

who previously served as Assistant for Operations on the Kodam Jaya staff, at a time when another classmate, Maj. En Syafrie Syamsuddin, was Pangdam.

Kostrad Commander in March. Prabowo's friend and Academy classmate, Maj. Gen. Syafrie Syamsuddin had already become Pangdam Jaya before the financial storm broke. Another close friend, Maj. Gen. Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto, succeeded Prabowo as Kopassus commander in March, while his chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Idris Gassing, stayed in place. Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri, another Kopassus man, took command of Kostrad's First Infantry Division the same month. Until early April, another close associate, Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zein, was commander the Second Infantry Division. There is some reason to believe that in February 1998, as the storm clouds gathered, Prabowo proposed to his father-in-law that Kopkamtib (Command for the Restoration of Peace and Order), with effective martial law powers, be revived, and that Suharto, on the eve of his May visit to Cairo, ordered his aides to draft an appropriate decree. It is said that Prabowo urged that Army Chief of Staff Subagyo be made the Kopkamtib Commander (which would have deprived Wiranto of much real authority) but this proposal was—naturally—strongly opposed by the Commander-in-Chief. Wiranto's own assumption of the position is reported to have been vetoed by the presidential son-in-law. So nothing happened. Perhaps this stalemate in some small part explains Suharto's resignation.

But the obvious larger question to be asked is why the military, a major beneficiary of the New Order, and its leaders, mostly former aides and intimates of the dictator, permitted this denouement. An adequate answer would require an article in its own right, but some sketchy observations may nonetheless be useful.

First of all, as a general rule (to which there are spectacular exceptions such as Burma), military government is rarely stable or long-lasting. The military may take power in response to some real or imaginary national emergency, but fairly soon it faces this problem: If it has solved the emergency, why is it still in power? If it has not solved the emergency, again, why is still in power? A general who stays in power too long risks defections from subordinates who expect their own "tour of duty"—at the top. (By the end of his reign Suharto had been head of state longer than any other non-royal figure in the world, with the exception of Fidel Castro.) National crises occurring when the military is dominant, and for which it must take responsibility, shake its institutional morale.³

Second, the end of the Cold War (and it ended earlier in East and Southeast Asia than in most other places) meant that the United States no longer had a deep interest in sustaining open or thinly based military dictatorships. By the early 1990s, only Burma in Southeast Asia was still openly ruled by generals; military regimes in South Asia had collapsed; and South Korea and Taiwan were under civilian rule. The new salience of "democratization" and "human rights" was increasingly unfavorable to regimes like the New Order, and the penetration of electronic communications made the informational quarantine of successful dictatorships more and more difficult to sustain.

Third, in the specific case of Indonesia, one might add the following considerations. The financial collapse of the fall of 1998, which at one point reduced the rupiah to one

³ There are many examples in recent history: the collapse of the Greek and Argentine dictatorships after military failures in Cyprus and the Falklands; the decline of the Brazilian dictatorship during the economic crisis of the early 1980s and of the Marcos regime a little later for the same reasons.

eighth of its 1997 value, and which led to a 15 percent contraction of the national economy in 1997-98, had almost no modern precedents in its severity. How far even the privileged military was affected is shown by *Angkatan Bersenjata* ceasing publication in August 1998. Military leaders were perfectly aware that the states with the means to help Indonesia out of the disaster wanted Suharto to go. By 1998, Suharto was seventy-seven years old, a quarter of a century older than the army leadership, and sharing with them neither military experience nor Academy traditions. (Wiranto graduated from the Academy in 1968, well after Suharto took power and formally left the military.) By 1996, the hitherto shrewd Suharto had started making a series of obvious political blunders, culminating in his cabinet of March 1998, full of discredited bureaucrats like Ginanjar Kartasmita, and featuring his ridiculous daughter Tutut, as well as the widely hated "Chinese" tycoon Bob Hassan. He might demand loyalty, but his own record rivaled the legendary ingratitude of the House of Habsburg. One after another his favorites and confidants were discarded. Not a man to be relied on. Finally, one should remember that his fear of any threat to his rule from the military led to the institution's gradual marginalization from the real centers of decision-making power, to increasingly "nepotistic" and divide-and-rule policies in high-level appointments, and to a substantial erosion of leadership capacities in the Armed Forces. If Indonesians joked that under the banyan-tree (prime visual symbol of Golkar and of the Suharto regime more generally), only moldy and dwarfish plants can grow, the truth of the joke applied fully to the military. In May 1998, it had become incapable of decisive action either to save Suharto or to overthrow him.

* * *

In any event, Suharto's fall left a huge vacuum of power—also at the top of the military hierarchy. The first person to make a move was Prabowo. He was surely aware that his family connection to Suharto, which had made his earlier meteoric career possible, was now a liability, both with the political public and within the military. Having spent almost his entire career in Kopassus, he had some reason to believe he could count on many former and current Kopassus officers and troops to back him.⁴ There is also evidence that he imagined he could dominate both the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (General Feisal Tanjung) and the Army Chief of Staff.⁵ In any event, on the evening of May 21 he met the newly installed president, B. J. Habibie, and demanded that Subagyo replace Wiranto as Commander-in-Chief, and that he himself succeed Subagyo as Army Chief of Staff. But Habibie resisted these importunities, and the following morning asked Wiranto not merely to

⁴ Like his hated enemy former Commander-in-Chief Benny Murdani, Prabowo had climbed to the top military elite without ever serving as a Pangdam or spending any substantial time in staff functions. It is widely thought that his brother Hasyim, one of the richest of the late New Order tycoons, provided him with sufficient funds to put Kopassus effectively on his personal payroll.

⁵ See the remarkable interview given by Maj. Gen. Theo Sjafei, printed in this issue of *Indonesia*, where Theo contemptuously describes Subagyo as Prabowo's puppet (*wayang*). In the course of the public uproar over the kidnappings of radical activists by Kopassus and other units (see below) in 1997 and 1998, Feisal Tanjung, who had been Commander-in-Chief until February 1998, in disclaiming all knowledge and responsibility, made the astonishing "confession" that he had always been denied access to Kopassus premises in Cijantung.

remain as Commander-in-Chief but to join his new cabinet as Minister of Defense. Wiranto in turn asked for Habibie's assent to the removal of Prabowo as Kostrad Commander. A deal was struck.

What transpired on the night of May 22-23 is not entirely clear despite extensive reporting in the Indonesian press. What is certain is that Wiranto ordered his Assistant for Operations, Maj. Gen. Johny Lumintang, a Protestant Menadonese, to relieve Prabowo immediately. Lumintang went to Kostrad headquarters in a jeep, accompanied only by his driver. Prabowo was not on the premises, but Lumintang reached him by telephone to tell him that he was taking over. Lumintang held the position for seventeen hours till he was replaced by the Minangkabau Muslim Maj. Gen. Djamari Chaniago, Commander of Kodam III, who, between August 1995 and August 1997, had served, under Wiranto, as commander of Kostrad's Second Infantry Division. Subsequently, Armed Forces Headquarters explained that Lumintang had only been installed on a temporary basis. But a seventeen-hour "temporary appointment" has no precedent in the Indonesian military's history. There is good reason to believe that Wiranto originally intended Lumintang to be a regular successor to Prabowo, but backed down in the face of strong opposition from various quarters to a Christian general assuming so strategic a position. Subsequently, Wiranto made Lumintang Deputy Army Chief of Staff as compensation.

After learning of his dismissal, Prabowo, accompanied by some Kopassus troops, went to Habibie's private residence on Kuningan Street, perhaps to demand again the promotions that Habibie had refused him the previous night. Habibie's military aide and head of personal security, former Maj. Gen. Sintong Panjaitan, told him without mincing words that Habibie was not available.⁶ The new president was then quietly helicoptered to the presidential palace along with his family, while Prabowo roamed the streets looking for him, returning with his men to Kopassus headquarters in Cijantung only early in the morning. Though some military sources say that during the night there was a real risk of fighting between Kopassus men and Marines brought in to Jakarta from their base in Surabaya by Wiranto, no clashes actually occurred, and indeed Prabowo seems to have had no thought-out plan of action.⁷

In the event, none of Prabowo's presumed allies in strategic command positions rallied to his cause. Subagyo, for example, appears to have stayed with Wiranto and personally took over command of Kopassus from Maj. Gen. Muchdi on the night of May 22. Prabowo thus had nothing with him but some Kopassus troops who were personally loyal to him—outside the chain of command. Accordingly, he had no real choice but to acquiesce when Wiranto summoned him on the morning of May 23 and

⁶ It will be recalled that Panjaitan, a favorite of Benny Murdani, had been dismissed from the military in the wake of the storm over the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991 because, as the Commander of Kodam IX, he then had ultimate command responsibility over East Timor. He was rescued from disgrace and obscurity by Habibie.

⁷ Rivalry between the Kopassus and the Marines goes back to the Sukarno era. Kopassus's earlier incarnation, RPKAD, spearheaded the massacres of the Left in 1965-66 and the "silent coup" of March 11, 1966, which drove Sukarno from power. The Marines had always been Sukarnoist, and under the New Order, they were marginalized. Many of them are said to believe that the mysterious death of their revered commander in 1965-66, Lt. Gen. Hartono, was the result of poisoning.

told him of his reassignment as Commander of the Armed Forces Staff and Command School. (It is widely believed that he never actually took up the post).

After May 23, a series of transfers moved purported—but lethargic—Prabowo allies out of key posts in Jakarta. On May 25, Maj. Gen. Syahrir M.S., a long-time Kopassus man serving as Pangdam IX, replaced Muchdi as regular Kopassus commander. In June, after a bare nine months in office, Maj. Gen. Syafrie was relieved as Kodam Jaya commander by Wiranto ally Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman. Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zein was relieved as Kostrad Chief of Staff in July, after only three months in office. Maj. Gen. Damiri, after three months as commander of Kostrad's First Infantry Division, was kicked upstairs to Pangdam IX in June, following the death of the previous Pangdam in a helicopter accident. In July, Brig. Gen. Idris Gassing was moved up and out from deputy command of Kopassus to become Chief of Staff in Kodam VIII. (But the man who replaced him, Brig. Gen. Zamroni, was, under Prabowo, head of the super-elite "anti-terrorist" unit within Kopassus.) Col. Chairawan was removed from his post as commander of the Jakarta-based Kopassus Group 4, and, after interrogation by the Military Honor Board (see below) in August, was no longer allowed to hold any active position in the military.

Another group of officers thought to be Prabowo associates have also been transferred, but it is not always clear that the "tour of duty" factor has not been primary. For example, Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim was replaced as head of BIA (Military Intelligence) by a Wiranto ally (former Pangdam IV Commander Maj. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto), but only in January 1999, and only after serving longer than all but one previous holder of the position. Brig. Gen. Eddy Budianto, commander of Korem 061—whose territory includes the presidential palace at Bogor—had served there well over the normal term when he was removed in May 1998, though his subsequent positioning in the moribund West Java Bakorstanasda (regional office of the National Security Coordinating Agency) looks like punishment. Maj. Gen. Ismed Yuzairi, Kostrad Chief of Staff while Prabowo was still Kostrad commander, was sent up and out to be Pangdam I in April 1998, where he served for almost nine months before being relieved. In early June 1998 Col. Suryo Gino was removed as commander of the Jakarta-based Kostrad 17th Infantry Brigade, but his replacement, Col. Gerhan Lentara, notorious for his role in the Santa Cruz massacre, is certainly a close Prabowo associate.

Can one provisionally conclude that Wiranto has consolidated his control over the military? This is not a question that can be answered simply. On the plus side, his obvious public rival, Prabowo, has no future in the military. He was discharged "honorably" from the corps in December 1998, after being suspended in August in the wake to the findings of the Military Honor Board.⁸ He has since been abroad, most notably in Jordan, where the new king, Abdullah, is an old friend from the time when Prabowo helped train an elite corps under Abdullah's command as a sort of Jordanian Kopassus. Wiranto has also placed close associates in several key top positions: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Chief of the Armed Forces Territorial Staff; Agus Wirahadikusumah as Assistant for General Planning at Armed Forces Headquarters;

⁸ It is notable that no court martial proceedings have been initiated against him and that the fates of many of the kidnap victims remains obscure.

Tyasno Sudarto as head of BIA; Djaja Suparman as commander of Kodam Jaya; and Johny Lumintang as Deputy Army Chief of Staff. He sent Maj. Gen. Suaidi Marabessy, commander of Kodam VII (based in Makasar) to Ambon in March 1999 to take control of the chaotic and bloody situation there. He also sacked the Chief of Police, Dibyo Widodo, and replaced him with a trusted officer on his expert staff, Police Lt. Gen. Roesmanhadi.⁹ One could also look at the small group of generals and lieutenant-generals from whom an immediate successor would have to come: Hendropriyono and Agum Gumelar (both b. 1945, retiring 2000); Subagyo (b. 1946, retiring 2001), Fahrul Razi and Lumintang (like Wiranto b. 1947, retiring 2002), Sugiono and Djamari Chaniago (b. 1948, retiring 2003), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (b. 1949, retiring 2004). Of these men, only Wiranto's close associate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is at present plausible.¹⁰

On the minus side, Wiranto's career path has been such that he has never been in one place or institution long enough to build the kind of network that was possible for Prabowo during his many years in Kopassus. There is as yet little evidence that he commands strong loyalty in the officer corps below the echelon of his closest associates. His position is also complicated by his ties to Suharto, whose military adjutant he once was. On May 21, 1998, he made a public promise to protect Suharto after his resignation, and he evidently keeps in regular touch with him up to the present. Two other problems also need to be underlined. One is the uncertainty about the outcome of the June 7, 1999 elections, which will probably be the first reasonably free elections Indonesia has experienced in forty-four years.

Wiranto has publicly cut the military's ties to Golkar and declared the institution's neutrality in the electoral campaign; he has also expressed his willingness to work with all parties whatever the electoral outcome. This stance will not endear him to Golkar should it win. If the opposition parties win, however, they will be under public pressure to do something about a man so intimately involved in the politics of the late New Order and their long-time master. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that the obsolete office of Commander-in-Chief will eventually be abolished. Menacing developments in East Timor, following Habibie's abrupt and astonishing announcement that the local population will be given the option of choosing independence, also suggest the limits of Wiranto's authority. In recent months, armed bands of "pro-integrationists" have committed numerous atrocities against those suspected of being in favor of independence. Not only have the local military done nothing to stop them, but there is every reason to think that these groups have obtained weapons from them, as well as intelligence information and thinly veiled political support. Wiranto has repeatedly denied backing these gangster elements, and

⁹ It is said that Dibyo was sacked for refusing to allow the police to be scapegoated for the killings of six students at Triksakti University in May 1998, which triggered the popular movement that brought Suharto down. Who was really responsible for these shootings remains obscure: a year after the event, no one has been legally charged with the crime, a fair indication that the culprits were military men, and maybe not even Prabowo's "boys."

¹⁰ The first three are now too old, though it is interesting that when Hendropriyono, currently Minister for Transmigration, was, like all other active service officers serving in civilian positions, offered the choice between retirement and returning to active duty, he initially chose the latter option. (He then reversed himself when Habibie insisted on him retaining his ministerial function.) The others simply do not have the broad experience and public visibility required for Commander-in-Chief.

there is no evidence that he is not sincere. But if he is indeed sincere, it is abundantly clear that he does not effectively control the military stationed in the province.¹¹ Finally, Wiranto bears the burden of a flood of public revelations, in a newly free press, about the "dirty" wars the army has fought for years in Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya; the killings in the Tanjung Priok affair of 1984 and the Lampung affair of 1989; the involvement of military personnel in kidnappings and torture; and its handling of bloody clashes in Ambon, East Kalimantan, and elsewhere over the past year. He had the courage to make a public apology to the people of Aceh (but not to the people of Irian Jaya and East Timor) for military atrocities in that province and on August 7, 1998 abolished its status as a Military Operations Zone. But his withdrawal of troops was followed by further tumults, and some at least of the troops were then sent back in. His close associate Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah has gone so far as to state publicly that the military cannot escape responsibility for the blackest side of the New Order regime.¹² These steps, however, have yet to win over public opinion, and at the same time they are bound to be resented by many officers.

C. The Question of Military Reform

Suharto's resignation and the subsequent freeing of the mass media from regime control permitted a storm of public criticism of the military which shows no signs of letting up. At no point in the institution's fifty-four-year history has its prestige, authority, and self-confidence been as low as at present.¹³ Recognition of this situation explains in part the Wiranto's cautious moves in the direction of reforming the military and adapting its role to new political circumstances.

On August 21, 1998 Wiranto spoke publicly for the first time on his ideas for the future. He said that the military was now at a "strategic turning-point," that it was ready for power-sharing with civilian forces, and that it did not necessarily need to play the central role in politics, but would be content with a supporting, albeit

¹¹ It is widely rumored that some of these local military maintain ties with Prabowo, who for many years "ran" East Timor, and perhaps have received money from him. It is also reliably reported that Zacky Anwar Makarim (along with close associate of Prabowo Kiki Syahnakri) has made frequent visits to the troubled territory since his dismissal as BIA chief in January 1999.

It is possible that Wiranto felt he had little choice but to accept these men's interventions as "fixers." In the days of Benny Murdani, his powerful BAIS (Strategic Intelligence Agency) had within it a special directorate for East Timor affairs. This directorate was eliminated in the course of Suharto's replacement of BAIS by the much weaker contemporary BIA, and his purge of Murdani loyalists. In the absence of an East Timor directorate at Armed Forces Headquarters, control of East Timor affairs fell almost completely into the Old East Timor Hands of Prabowo's Kopassus clique.

¹² See the remarkable, jargon-free paper, entitled "Hubungan Sipil-Militer: Visi, Misi, Aksi," that he delivered at the seminar on civil-military relations held at the University of Indonesia, May 24-25, 1999. It is perhaps worth noting that Agus is the son of former vice-president General Umar Wirahadikusumah.

¹³ Some indication of public opinion can be gleaned from a poll conducted by the Institute for Economic and Social Research in Jakarta, Medan, and Surabaya soon after the hearings of the Military Honor Board: 46.5 percent of respondents believed that the Armed Forces did not generally act in the interests of Indonesian society, while 74.5 percent felt that the military should withdraw completely from politics. See David Bouchier, "The Shaming of the Indonesian Military," *The Asia-Pacific Magazine*, 13 (December 1998), pp. 22-24.

influential, position. There would be, he said, a change of *modus operandi* from “a dogmatic and security-oriented approach to an analytical and systematic one.” “ABRI reforms,” he continued, “will also include an evaluation of state security operations and defense systems, including a study of the function and role of the National Police.” He further noted that “Armed Forces Headquarters is determined to review its code of ethics and leadership scheme after realizing that some of its officers were involved in wrongdoing. We want to ensure that there will be no more procedural violations in the future.”¹⁴

Shortly thereafter, on September 1, 1998, there was an announcement of a “new paradigm” for the military’s interminable dual-function, containing four vague principles: 1. The military does not need to be at the forefront of politics; 2. It will shift from “occupying” [key positions] to “influencing” [the political process]; 3. It will exercise this influence indirectly rather than directly; and 4. It is prepared for “political role-sharing” with non-military partners. Wiranto then commented that “the social and political role of the Armed Forces will systematically and automatically decline, along with the growth of our civil society.” He also promised that there would be systematic reduction in the number of officers seconded to non-military departments and agencies of the government.¹⁵

Administrative follow-up to these promises began quite promptly. First of all, on the eve of Armed Forces’ Day (October 5) the Commander-in-Chief announced that by April 1, 1999, the National Police would be separated from the Armed Forces, which would then reclaim its original and historic name—Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI).¹⁶

Second, the military leadership pledged neutrality with regard to the political parties in view of the elections to be held the following year.¹⁷ As these elections drew closer, Wiranto was more explicit that this pledge meant a full break with Golkar, for which, over the previous twenty-eight years, the military had always provided the real backbone.

Third, ABRI accepted a halving of its representation in Parliament, a drop from seventy-five seats to thirty-eight.¹⁸ Wiranto has recently stated that he expects further reductions, not only in the national legislature but in those at the regional level. The

¹⁴ *Jakarta Post*, August 22, 1998. At the same time, however, he defended in general terms the military’s actions in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya, arguing in addition that “the decisions to declare these three provinces military operations zones were not taken by ABRI alone. They were all political decisions taken by the government.” [i.e. Suharto].

¹⁵ *Jakarta Post*, September 2, 1998.

¹⁶ For the time being the police would, however, be placed under the authority of the Minister of Defense and Security (Wiranto’s other “hat”).

The idea of restoring the police’s autonomy had actually been mooted during Benny Murdani’s Pangabship (1983-88) but nothing came of it at that time. Needless to say, Wiranto’s announcement was received with glee among the police, who had long chafed at their subordination to the army.

¹⁷ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono hinted at a separation from Golkar when he stated that the Armed Forces were “not the instrument of a political party, but an instrument of state.” *detikcom*, September 2, 1998.

¹⁸ This is about 8 percent of Parliament’s membership. Since the Armed Forces contain 0.25 of the Indonesian population, the 8 percent still represents thirty-two times what is deserves on a proportional basis.

prospect of an eventual abolition of all unelected ABRI seats in these institutions looms up ahead.¹⁹

Fourth, it was announced on November 9, 1998, on the eve of the Extraordinary Session of the MPR, that the controversial position of Armed Forces' Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs had been abolished, to be replaced by a Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs. Structurally, this would mean that from now on the Assistants for Territorial Affairs and for Social and Political Affairs would come under the Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs, while the position of Assistant for Functional Group Affairs is abolished, with most of its responsibilities transferred to the Assistant for Personnel.²⁰

Fifth, it was announced that about four thousand ABRI personnel then seconded to non-military governmental positions would be required, by April 1, 1999, either to retire from military service and assume civilian status, or return to active military duties. Clarifying this new policy Wiranto said that the assumption by military men of civilian posts "would be based on the capability and accessibility of the individual concerned" (*akan didasarkan kepada kemampuan dan aksesibilitas individu yang bersangkutan*); and that these men would have to undergo "the same selection process as anyone else, not as representatives of ABRI in its dual-function role" (*pemilihan sesuai prosedur yang berlaku umum dan tidak sebagai wakil institusi ABRI dalam peran dwifungsinya*). This statement appeared to mean that from then on Armed Forces Headquarters would no longer see to it that officers be seconded to non-military posts—e.g. mayorships or *bupati*-ships—and such officers would have to go it alone after retirement from military service.

This policy announcement must have been worrying for many officers, especially from the crowded Academy classes of 1970 through 1975, as can be seen below.

Table 6
Size of Army Cadet Classes by Year of Graduation, 1970-85²¹

1970	437
1971	329
1972	389
1973	436
1974	434
1975	304
1976	85
1977	79

¹⁹ According to David Jenkins, Wiranto has said there will be no military members of the national legislature by 2004. See his "Army's Reform Vows Fall on Sceptical Ears," *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 1, 1998.

²⁰ One notes that the Social and Political affairs hierarchy in the military was thus not abolished, it was simply subordinated to the Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs, For further comment, see below.

²¹ Drawn from Douglas Kammen and Siddharth Chandra, *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990's* (Ithaca: Cornell University, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1999), Table 1.1 at p. 31.

1978	93
1979	no class
1980	102
1981	146
1982	85
1983	184
1984	244
1985	254

The number of general rank billets at any one time is sufficiently small that only a minority of any large class can expect to rise that high. Incomplete data indicate that only 11 percent (47 out of 437) of Class 1970 have so far achieved general rank, while Class 1971 has done no better (again 11 percent, or 37 out of 329 graduates). To be sure, these men still have three to five years to go before retirement, so that the final figures should show a certain increase. Even so, probably three-quarters of the members of these crowded classes will end their careers as colonels and lieutenant-colonels. Since many of them remain posted in the region where they were originally assigned on graduation, they have built up social, political, and economic ties with local elites. They have counted on these connections, as well as Armed Forces Headquarters' backing, to move into civilian administrative posts, seats in provincial legislatures, and government-related businesses, both in their later years of active service and after their retirements. Wiranto's announced policy was therefore worrying for two reasons. First, there would be no more opportunities to go into *karyawan* jobs while on active military duty. Second, the Armed Forces Headquarters would not look after them at the time of their retirements.

That Wiranto was quite serious about implementing the policy became evident from a speech he gave a week before the national elections were due to take place. He said that a total of 6,002 officers had been told to choose between return to military duty, transfer to civilian status, or retirement. The dossiers of 3,016 had been processed already, with 528 choosing the first option, 593 the second, and 1,393 the third. The remaining 510 had three months to make up their minds, otherwise Headquarters would decide for them. The dossiers of 2,986 officers were still in process, mostly those of members of the existing national and provincial legislatures.²²

On the other hand, in March 1999, Army Chief of Staff General Subagyo declared that the army's territorial structure would soon revert back to what it had been before Benny Murdani's centralizing rationalization of 1984. This means that the total number of Kodam will rise from ten to seventeen. The "troubled" regions of Aceh, East Kalimantan, Maluku, and Irian Jaya will have their own Kodam, as will East Sumatra, West Sumatra, North and Central Sulawesi, South and Southeast Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, and South and Central Kalimantan. This new policy has implications both external and internal to the military. Under Benny Murdani's system the ten Kodam were envisioned as supra-ethnic. Kodam I covered Acehnese, Batak, and Malays; Kodam II, Minangkabau, Bengkulu, Lampung, Riau and Palembang ethnicities; Kodam III included Sundanese, Bantenese, and Javanese; Kodam V, Javanese and

²² Report of *Agence-France Presse*, June 1, 1999. Presumably their fates would await the final outcome of the June 7 national elections and its aftermath.

Madurese; Kodam VI, Banjarese and many types of Dayak; Kodam VII, Menadonese, Buginese, Toraja, Makassarese, and others; Kodam VIII, various kinds of Moluccans and Irianese; and Kodam IX, Timorese, Balinese, Sumbanese, Rotinese, Sumbawans, Bimanese, Sasak, and so on. Only Kodam IV was solidly Javanese. Subagyo's plan appears to be an effort to accommodate ethnic pressures and restrain inter-ethnic competition and violence. The major ethnic groups will increasingly have "their own" Kodam. In the longer historical perspective the new policy represents a reversion to the system created in the late 1950s, when the military was faced with a plethora of regional mutinies and revolts in which ethnic sentiments had an important role. At the same time, the near-doubling of Kodam will offer plenty of jobs for military officers at the middle and lower ranks. One can interpret the policy as in some degree "compensation" for the impending collapse of the *karyawan* empire of patronage.

Some observers of these changes have expressed concern that they will encourage regional "warlordism" on the pattern of the 1950s. But probably "warlordism" is, as such, not really on the cards. The new Kodam commanders will still represent the "successful" minority of their Academy graduating classes, with prospects for further advancement at the center, which today represents a large bureaucracy for which there was no equivalent in the 1950s. What is more likely is that lower-ranking officers, long stationed in their Kodam, and without much prospect of advancing up the central hierarchy, will band together with local and political elites to push for local autonomies advantageous to their economic interests. The existence of such "mafias" in some regions has been noted for more than a decade.

Concluding Remarks

Throughout the period of the New Order, the military (really the Army) owed its ascendancy to three "doctrines" and their implementation on the ground.²³ These doctrines were those of the Dual Function, of Functional Groups and their right to massive political representation, and of Territoriality. The first, which had its origins in General Nasution's well-known "Middle Way" speech to Academy cadets in 1958, came, in time, to provide a general ideological justification for military meddling in every sphere of political, social, economic, and cultural life. While Suharto still ruled, it was a rare and courageous person who dared publicly to criticize the doctrine. But since May 1998 criticism has become vociferous from civilians of every stripe. In response, the military has spoken of it in increasingly defensive and accommodative terms, and there has been a notable lessening in its public use by Wiranto and his associates. One can imagine that eventually it may quietly wither away. The second doctrine, also born in the late 1950s from Nasution's fertile brain, was used to justify the army's takeover of the vast resources of the Dutch enterprises nationalized in 1958, which was also a way of solving the problem of far too many officers, most of them almost the same age, competing for far too few real military jobs. When Suharto came to power, the same doctrine was used to justify the militarization of the entire civilian bureaucracy. The doctrine is now absolutely unacceptable to the political parties, the civilian bureaucracy, and the public at large, and Wiranto's recent policy

²³ This analysis leaves aside the savage destruction of the Communist Party and its allies in 1965-66, and the toppling of Sukarno in early 1966.

moves mark a real response to such pressures—a response which is unlikely now to be reversed. Thus one could argue that Doctrines 1 and 2 are effectively obsolete and in the end are probably, for the military, expendable.

Such is not at all the case with the oldest and deepest base for military political power. The doctrine of territoriality has its honorable origins in the guerrilla war conducted by the TNI against the Dutch colonial regime in 1945-49. In that era, the military survived by the horizontalization and localization of its operations, and its necessary deep involvement with its popular base. After 1950, the Army gradually shifted from an ex-guerrilla force to becoming a counter-guerrilla or counter-insurgency force without any change in formal doctrine. Though Indonesia has faced no believable external military threat for the last thirty years and more, the territorial system remains ultimately justified in terms of national defense. In reality, however, the territorial system, which parallels that of the civil bureaucracy, and indeed extends even further down into society, gives the military permanent power and influence in every region of the country and right down to the village level.

How formally “obsolete” this doctrine is can be seen by comparison with any genuinely modern military. Neither Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Canada, or the United States has anything like the tiered structure of Kodams, Korems, Kodims, Kodims, and Babinsas. But it is the real foundation for military power in Indonesia. This is why Wiranto and Subagyo are happy to increase number of Kodams (and logically also Korems, Kodims, and Babinsas), and why amid all the talk of reforms and “new paradigms” the issue of territoriality is scarcely mentioned. Most probably civilian politicians also recognize the risks involved in going for the heart of military power, and hence, on the whole, have held their tongues. But the issue cannot permanently be kept under wraps, and its exacerbation or resolution will be a critical issue in the decade that lies ahead.

Cut Off Date: Jan. 31, 1999

Office

-Officeholder

Date and place of birth, ethnic origin
Class and/or year of graduation and
divisional or service background¹
Date of installation, length of tenure
Officeholder's previous post

Armed Forces Headquarters

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

1. Gen. Feisal Etno Tanjung
b. June 17, 1939, Tarutung, Mandailing
Batak
AMN 2, 1961; RPKAD
21 v 93 - 20 ii 98 (57 months)
Armed Forces Chief of General Staff
2. Gen. Wiranto
b. 7 vii 1947, Yogyakarta, Javanese
AMN 1968
20 ii 98 - (11 months)
Army Chief of Staff

Chief of the General Staff (Kasum)

1. Lt. Gen. Tarub
b. June 10, 1942, Malang, Javanese
AMN 6, 1965; RPKAD
15 viii 96 - 20 iii 98 (19 months)
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve
Command
2. Lt. Gen. Fachrul Razi
b. June 26, 1947, Banda Aceh, Acehese
Akabri 1970
20 iii 98 - c. 4 i 99 (9 months)
Assistant for Operations to Armed Forces
Chief of General Staff
- 3 Lt. Gen. Sugiono
b. Sept. 10, 1948, iCilacap, Javanese
Akabri 1971
c. 4 i 99 - (1 month)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff

**Chief of the Social and Political Staff
(Kassospol)**

1. Lt. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah
b. Aug. 7, 1944, in Rappang, Buginese
AMN 6, 1965; RPKAD.
1 ix 97 - 20 iii 98 (7.5 months)
Commander, Armed Forces Staff and
Command School
- 2 Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
b. Sept. 9, 1949, Pacitan, Javanese
Akabri 1973
20 iii 98 - 9 xi 98 (7.5 months)
Assistant for Social and Political Affairs to
Armed Forces Chief of Social and
Political Staff²

Chief of the Territorial Staff (Kaster)

- Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
b. Sept. 9, 1949, Pacitan, Javanese
Akabri 1973
9 xi 98 - (3 months)
Armed Forces Chief of the Social and
Political Staff

Inspector-General (Irjen ABRI)

1. Vice-Admiral Soeratmin
Javanese
Navy Academy 1966
11 viii 97 - c. 2 x 98 (13.5 months)
?
2. First Marshal Tamtama Ali
? ?
?
c. 2 x 98 - (4 months)
Assistant for Operations to the Air
Force Chief of Staff

**Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum) to
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces**

1. Maj. Gen. Tamlicha Ali
b. July 14, 1944, Aceh, Acehese
AMN 6, 1965

¹ Unless otherwise stated all Army officers are from the infantry.

²This post was abolished on Nov. 9, 1998 and many of its functions taken over by the new post of Armed Forces' Chief of the Territorial Staff (Kaster ABRI.)

- 1 ix 95 - 12 i 98 (28.5 months)
 Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Armed Forces Chief of General Staff
2. Maj. Gen. Agus Widjaya
 ? Sundanese
 Akabri 1970
 12 i 98 - c. 4 i 99 (12 months)
 Expert Staff Officer for Security and Defense to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
3. Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah
 b. Oct. 17, 1951, Sundanese
 Akabri 1973
 c. 4 i 99 - (1 month)
 Commander, Army Staff and Command School
- Assistant for Intelligence (Asintel) to Chief of the General Staff**
1. Rear Admiral Yuswadji
 ? Javanese?
 14 viii 97 - 18 iii 98 (7 months)
 Head, Bureau for Social Relations and Foreign Cooperation, Secretariat General, Department of Defense and Security
2. Rear Admiral Berty Ekel
 ? Ambonese
 18 iii 98 - (10 months)
 Assistant for Security to Navy Chief of Staff
- Assistant for Operations (Asops) to Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff**
1. Maj. Gen. Fachrul Razi
 b. July 26, 1947, Banda Aceh, Acehnese
 Akabri 1970
 14 viii 97 - c. 20 iii 98 (7 months)
 Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces Academy
2. Maj. Gen. Johny Lumintang
 b. July 28, 1947, Manado, Menadonese
 Akabri 1970
 c. 20 iii 98 - c. 2 x 98 (9.5 months)
 Commander, Kodam VIII
3. Maj. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
 ? Javanese
 Akabri 1971
 c. 2 x 98 - (4 months)

- Commander, Presidential Security Squad
- Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster) to Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff (till Nov. 2, 1998), and to Armed Forces Chief of the Territorial Staff (since Nov. 2, 1998)**
1. Maj. Gen. Deddy Sudarmadji
 ? Sundanese
 AMN 9, 1968
 c. 1 ix 97 - 25 vi 98 (10 months)
 Expert Staff Officer for Doctrine, Organization and Technology to Army Chief of Staff
2. Maj. Gen. Syafrie Syamsuddin³
 b. Oct. 30, 1952, Makassar, Buginese
 Akabri 1974; RPKAD
 25 vi 98 - c. 23 ix 98 (3 months)
 Commander, Kodam Jaya
3. Maj. Gen. Djoko Mulono
 ? Javanese
 Akabri 1970
 c. 23 ix 98 - (4 months)
 Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Armed Forces Chief of the Social and Political Staff

- Assistant for Communications and Electronics (Askomlek)**
 Air Vice-Marshal Sardjono
 ? Javanese
 8 iii 96 - (35 months)
 Director of Air Force Communications and Electronics

- Assistant for Security and Social Order (Askamtibmas)
1. Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Marwan Haris
 ? ?
 14 viii 97 - c. 28 v 98 (9.5 months)
 Expert Staff Officer for Security and Politics to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

³ Syafrie Syamsuddin was never installed as Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Armed Forces' Chief of General Staff.

2. Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Deddy Gandriyadi
? Sundanese
c. 28 v 98 - (8 months)
Chief of Police, S. Sumatra

Assistant for Personnel (Aspers)

- Maj. Gen. Soeparto S.
b. Sept. 7, 1944, Kudus, Javanese
AMN 7, 1966
14 viii 97 - (17.5 months)
Head of General Affairs, Secretariat,
Bakorstanas

Assistant for Logistics (Aslog)

- Maj. Gen. Makmun Basri
? ?
AMN 9, 1968
14 viii 97 - (17.5 months)
Head, Armed Forces Supply Agency (Babek
ABRI)

Assistant for Social and Political Affairs

(Assospol) to Armed Forces' Chief of Social
and Political Staff (till Nov. 2, 1998), and to
Armed Forces Chief of Territorial Staff
(since Nov. 2, 1998)

1. Maj. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
b. Sept. 9, 1949, Pacitan, Javanese
Akabri 1973
26 viii 97 - 8 iv 98 (7.5 months)
Commander, Kodam II
2. Maj. Gen. Mardiyanto
b. Nov. 21, 1947, Surakarta, Javanese
Akabri 1970
8 iv 98 - c. 6 x 98 (6 months)
Commander, Kodam IV
3. Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi
? Toba Batak
Akabri 1972
c. 6 x 98 - (4 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya

Assistant for Functional Group Affairs

(Asyawan)

- Maj. Gen. Sugito
? Javanese
26 viii 97 - 2 xi 98 (14 months)

Deputy Assistant for Functional Group
Affairs to Armed Forces Chief of Social
and Political Staff⁴

Head, BIA (Armed Forces Intelligence Agency)

1. Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim
b. April 14, 1948, Jakarta, Arab
Akabri 1971; RPKAD
14 viii 97 - c. 4 i 99 (16.5 months)
Assistant for Security to Army Chief of
Staff
2. Maj. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto
b. Nov. 14, 1948, Magelang, Javanese
Akabri 1970
c. 4 i.99 - (1 month)
Commander, Kodam IV

Deputy Head, BIA

1. Brig. Gen. (Marines) Rusdi
? ?
c. 24 ix 96 - c. 2 i 98 (15 months)
Director, Directorate B, BIA
2. Maj. Gen. T. P. Sihombing
? Toba Batak
AMN 9, 1968
c. 2 i 98 - (13 months)
?

Central Executive Organs

**Commander-General, Armed Forces
Academy (Akabri)**

1. Lt. Gen. Muzani Syukur
b. Nov. 5, 1943, Muara Baru, W. Sumatra,
Minangkabau
AMN 6, 1965; RPKAD
11 viii 97 - 12 i 98 (5 months)
Army Inspector-General
2. Lt. Gen. Tamlicha Ali
b. July 14, 1944, Aceh, Acehnese
AMN 6, 1965
12 i 98 - 2 vi 98 (5.5 months)
Assistant for General Planning to
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces

⁴ This post was abolished on Nov. 2, 1998.

3. Vice-Admiral Achmad Sutjipto
 ? Javanese?
 Navy Academy 1969
 2 vi 98 - c. 29 vi 98 (1 month)
 Assistant for Planning and Budgeting to
 Navy Chief of Staff
4. Vice-Admiral Abu Hanifah Hasanudin
 ? ?
 ?
 c. 29 vi 98 - (7 months)
 Governor, Navy Academy

Navy Academy 1970
 23 iii 98 - (10 months)
 Chief of Staff, Eastern Zone Fleet

Commander, Eastern Zone Fleet

Rear Admiral Edi Sujadi
 b. Nov. 4, 1947, Madiun, Javanese
 Navy Academy 1969
 2 viii 97 - (18 months)
 Director for Naval Operations and
 Training

**Commander-General, Armed Forces Staff
 and Command School (Sesko ABRI)**

1. Lt. Gen. Arie Kuma'at
 b. May 20, 1944, Manado, Menadonese
 AMN 7, 1966
 29 viii 97 - 28 v 98 (9 months)
 Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Armed
 Forces Chief of General Staff
2. Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto
 b. Nov. 17, 1951, Jakarta, Javanese
 Akabri 1974; RPKAD
 28 v 98 - 21 viii 98 (3 months)
 Commander, Army Strategic Reserve
 Command
3. Lt. Gen. Johnny Lumintang
 b. July 28, 1947, Manado, Menadonese
 Akabri 1970
 21 viii 98 - 15 i 99 (5 months)
 Assistant for Operations to Armed
 Forces Chief of General Staff
4. Maj. Gen. Agus Widjaya
 ? Sundanese
 Akabri 1970
 15 i 99 - (0.5 month)
 Assistant for General Planning to
 Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
 Forces

**Head, National Air Defense Command
 (Kohanudnas)**

Air Vice-Marshal Moch. Koesbeni
 b. Magetan, Javanese
 Air Force Academy 1969
 14 viii 97 - (17.5 months)
 Director for Air Force Planning and
 Personnel

Service Heads and Army Hierarchy

Navy Chief of Staff

1. Admiral Arief Kushariadi
 b. Nov. 25, 1944, Malang, Javanese
 Navy Academy 1967
 18 iii 96 - 29 vi 98 (27.5 months)
 Deputy for Operations to Navy Chief of
 Staff
2. Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto
 b. Aug. 1, 1944, Boyolali, Javanese
 Navy Academy 1968
 29 vi 98 - (7 months)
 Deputy Navy Chief of Staff

Air Force Chief of Staff

1. Air Marshal Sutria Tubagus
 b. July 20, 1944, Bandung, Sundanese
 Air Force Academy 1967
 18 iii 96 - 29 vi 98 (27.5 months)
 Deputy for Personnel to Air Force Chief of
 Staff

Commander, Western Zone Fleet

1. Rear Admiral Achmad Sutjipto
 ? Javanese
 Naval Academy 1969
 20 iii 96 - 23 iii 98 (24 months)
 Chief of Staff, Eastern Zone Fleet
2. Rear Admiral Mudjito
 b. Tulungagung, Javanese

2. Air Marshal Hanafie Asnan
 - b. Nov. 7, 1945, Bangkalan, Madurese
 - ?
 - 29 vi 98 - (7 months)
 - Assistant for Logistics to Air Force Chief of Staff

Chief of National Police

1. Police Gen. Drs. Dibyo Widodo
 - b. May 26, 1945, Purwokerto, Javanese
 - Police Academy 1968
 - 18 iii 96 - 29 vi 98 (27.5 months)
 - Chief of Police, Metro Jaya
2. Police Gen. Roesmanhadi
 - b. Mar. 5, 1946, Bangkalan, Madurese
 - ?
 - 29 vi 98 - (7 months)
 - Expert Staff Officer for Security and Social Order to Minister of Defense and Security

Commander of Marine Corps

- Brig. Gen. (Marines) Suharto
- b. Dec. 2, 1947, Jakarta, Javanese
 - Navy Academy 1969
 - 1 ii 96 - (36 months)
 - Deputy Governor, Navy Academy

Army Chief of Staff

1. Gen. Wiranto
 - b. 7 vii 1947, Yogyakarta, Javanese
 - AMN 1968
 - 13 vi 97 - 23 ii 98 (8.5 months)
 - Commander, Army Strategic Reserve Command
2. Gen. Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo
 - b. June 12, 1946, Bantul, Javanese
 - Akabri 1970; RPKAD
 - 23 ii 98 - (11 months)
 - Deputy Army Chief of Staff

Deputy Army Chief of Staff

1. Lt. Gen. Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo
 - b. June 12, 1946, Bantul, Javanese
 - Akabri 1970; RPKAD
 - 10 vi 97 - 17 iii 98 (9 months)
 - Commander, Kodam IV

2. Lt. Gen. Soegiono
 - b. Sept. 10, 1948, Cilacap, Javanese
 - Akabri 1971
 - 17 iii 98 - 18 i 99 (10 months)
 - Commander, Army Strategic Reserve Command
3. Lt. Gen. Johny Lumintang
 - b. July 28, 1947, Manado, Menadonese
 - Akabri 1970
 - 18 i 99 - (0.5 month)
 - Commander, Armed Forces Staff and Command School

Army Inspector-General

1. Maj. Gen. Nurdin Yusuf
 - b. Mar. 7, 1944, Banda Aceh, Acehnese
 - AMN 9, 1968; RPKAD
 - 5 viii 97 - c. 4 i 99 (17 months)
 - Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve Command
2. Maj. Gen. Djoko Subroto
 - b. Jan. 19, 1947, Kediri, Madurese
 - Akabri 1970
 - c. 4 i 99 - (1 month)
 - Commander, Kodam V

First Assistant (Security, Aspam)

1. Maj. Gen. Yudomo Sastrosuhardjo
 - b. March 1, 1949, Karanganyar, Javanese
 - Akabri 1971; RPKAD
 - c. 2 viii 97 - 1 vi 98 (10 months)
 - Chief of Staff, Jakarta Garrison
2. Maj. Gen. M. Noor Aman
 - ? ?
 - AMN 1968
 - 1 vi 98 - (7 months)
 - Commander, Army Intelligence Center

Second Assistant (Operations)

1. Maj. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy
 - b. Jan. 5, 1947, Ambon, Ambonese
 - Akabri 1971
 - 5 viii 97 - c. 14 v 98 (9.5 months)
 - Deputy Assistant for Operations to Armed Forces Chief of General Staff
2. Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri
 - b. 1948, Krawang, Sundanese
 - Akabri 1971

c. 14 v 98 - (8.5 months)
Deputy Assistant for Operations to Army
Chief of Staff

Third Assistant (Personnel)

Maj. Gen. Sukardjo
? Javanese?
AMN 9, 1968
5 viii 97 - (18 months)
Deputy Assistant for Personnel to Army
Chief of Staff

Fourth Assistant (Logistics)

Maj. Gen. Wahidin Yusuf
? Javanese
AMN 9, 1968
5 viii 97 - (18 months)
Deputy Assistant for Personnel to
Army Chief of Staff

Fifth Assistant (Planning and Budgeting)

1. Maj. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto
b. Nov. 14, 1948, Magelang, Javanese
Akabri 1970
7 x 96 - c. 17 iii 98 (18.5 months)
Director, Directorate C, BIA
2. Maj. Gen. Sugiarto Maksum
? Javanese
c. 17 iii 98 - (11.5 months)
Deputy Assistant for Planning and
Budgeting to Army Chief of Staff

Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)

Maj. Gen. Djoko Mulono
? Javanese
Akabri 1970
5 viii 97 - (18 months)
Deputy Assistant for Territorial Affairs to
Armed Forces Chief of General Staff

**Commander, Army Strategic Reserve
Command (Kostrad)**

1. Lt. Gen. Sugiono
b. Sept. 10, 1948, Cilacap, Javanese
Akabri 1971
20 vi 97 - 20 iii 98 (9 months)
Commander, Presidential Security Squad

2. Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto
b. Nov. 17, 1951, Jakarta, Javanese
Akabri 1974; RPKAD
20 iii 98 - 22 v 98 (2 months)
Commander, Special Forces Command
3. Maj. Gen. Johnny Lumintang
b. July 28, 1947, Manado, Menadonese
Akabri 1970
22 v 98 - 23 v 98 (1 day)⁵
4. Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago
b. April 8, 1949, Padang, Minangkabau
Akabri 1971
23 v 98 - (8 months)
Commander, Kodam III

Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve

1. Maj. Gen. Ismed Yuzairi
b. Jan. 1, 1949, Sawahlunto, Minangkabau
Akabri 1971
30 vii 97 - 13 iv 98 (8.5 months)
Commander, Kostrad 1st Infantry Division
2. Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zein
b. 1949, W. Sumatra, Minangkabau
Akabri 1971
13 iv 98 - 9 vii 98 (3 months)
Commander, Kostrad 2nd Infantry Division
3. Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
? ?
Akabri 1974
9 vii 98 - c. 4 i 99 (6 months)
Commander, Kostrad 2nd Infantry Division
4. Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
b. May 10, 1949 Balinese
Akabri 1971; RPKAD
c. 4 i 99 - (1 month)
Commander, Kodam VI

Commander, Kostrad First Infantry Division

1. Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
b. May 10, 1949 Balinese
Akabri 1971; RPKAD
11 viii 97 - 18 iii 98 (7 months)
Commander, Officer Candidate School
(Secapa)

⁵As "caretaker" while serving as Assistant for Operations to Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

2. Maj. Gen. Adam R. Damiri
b. Nov. 20, 1949 ?
Akabri 1972
18 iii 98 - 23 vi 98 (3 months)
Chief of Staff, Jakarta Garrison

3. Maj. Gen. I. G. Purnawa
? Balinese
Akabri 1971
23 vi 98 - (6 months)
Deputy Commander, Army Staff and
Command School

**Commander, Kostrad Second Infantry
Division**

1. Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zein
b. 1949, W. Sumatra, Minangkabau
Akabri 1971
14 viii 97 - 7 iv 98 (8 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam VII
2. Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
? ?
Akabri 1974
7 iv 98 - 28 vii 98 (3.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam II
3. Maj. Gen. Willem T. Da Costa
b. Apr. 13, 1949, Kupang, W. Timorese
Akabri 1971
28 vii 98 - (6 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam IX

**Governor, General and Army Division,
Armed Forces Academy**

1. Maj. Gen. Djoko Subroto
b. Jan. 19, 1947, Kediri, Madurese
Akabri 1970
8 viii 97 - 9 vii 98 (11 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam IV
2. Maj. Gen. Irvan Edison
b. Aug. 13, 1946, Morotai ?
Akabri 1970; Cavalry
9 vii 98 - (6 months)
Deputy Governor, Military Academy

**Commander, Army Staff and Command
School (Seskoad)**

1. Maj. Gen. Affandi
? ?
Akabri 1970

15 viii 97 - 7 x 98 (14 months)
Deputy Commander, Army Staff and
Command School

2. Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah
b. Oct. 17, 1951, Sundanese
Akabri 1973
7 x 98 - c. 4 i 99 (3 months)
Expert Staff Officer for Politics and
Security to Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces
3. Maj. Gen. Djoko Besariman
? Javanese
Akabri 1970; Engineers
c. 4 i 99 - (1 month)
Deputy Assistant for Logistics to Army
Chief of Staff

**Commander, Kopassus (Special Forces
Command)**

1. Maj. Gen. Prabowo Subianto
b. Nov. 17, 1951, Jakarta, Javanese
Akabri 1974; RPKAD
4 xii 95 - 26 iii 98 (28 months)
Deputy Commander, Special Forces
Command
 2. Maj. Gen. H. Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto
b. Apr. 15, 1949, Sleman, Javanese
Akabri 1970; RPKAD
26 iii 98 - 25 v 98 (2 months)
Commander, Kodam VI
- Maj. Gen. Syahrir M.S.
b. July 20, 1947, Baturaja, Minangkabau
Akabri 1971; RPKAD
25 v 98 - (8 months)
Commander, Kodam IX

Head, State Intelligence Board (Bakin)

1. Lt. Gen. Moetojib
b. July 11, 1940, Surakarta, Javanese
AMN 1962; Cavalry
1 iv 96 - 17 ix 98 (29.5 months)
Governor, National Defense Institute
2. Lt. Gen. Zaini (Zein) Azhar Maulani
b. Jan. 6, 1939, Marabahan, Banjarese
AMN 2, 1961
17 ix 98 - (4.5 months)
Secretary to Vice-President (B.J. Habibie)

**Deputy Head, State Intelligence Board
(Bakin)**

1. Maj. Gen. Soeharto
? Javanese
AMN 2, 1961; Artillery
? i 91 - c. 2 i 98 (84 months)
First Assistant (Security) to Army Chief of Staff
2. Maj. Gen. (Marines) Rusdi
? ?
c. 2 i 98 - (13 months)
Deputy Head, BIA

**Commander, Presidential Security Squad
(Paspampres)**

1. Maj. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
? Javanese
Akabri 1971
4 vii 97 - c. 2 x 98 (15 months)
Deputy Assistant for Operations to Army Chief of Staff
2. Maj. Gen. Suwandi
? Javanese
Akabri 1971
c. 2 x 98 - (4 months)
Deputy Commander, Presidential Security Squad
?

Regional Military Commanders

**Kodam (Military Region Command) I
Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra)**

Commander, Kodam I/Bukit Barisan

1. Maj. Gen. Tengku Rizal Nurdin
b. Feb. 21, 1948, Bukit Tinggi, Serdang, Malay
Akabri 1971
13 viii 97 - 21 iv 98 (8 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam I
2. Maj. Gen. Ismed Yuzairi
b. Jan. 1, 1949, Sawahlunto, Minangkabau
Akabri 1971
21 iv 98 - c. 4 i 99 (8.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve Command

3. Maj. Gen. Abdul Rahman Gaffar
b. March 20, 1949, Pamekasan, Madurese
Akabri 1972
c. 4 i 99 - (1 month)
Senior Officer seconded to Armed Forces Headquarters

Chief of Staff, Kodam I

1. Brig. Gen. Djibud Hindartono
? Javanese
Akabri 1971
c. 13 viii 97 - (17.5 months)
Commander, Korem 023 Sibolga

Kodam II/Sriwijaya (South Sumatra)

Commander, Kodam II

1. Maj. Gen. Suadi Atma
b. June 22, 1947, S. Kalimantan ?
Akabri 1970
7 viii 97 - c. 7 x 98 (14 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam VIII
2. Maj. Gen. Affandi
? ?
Akabri 1970
c. 7 x 98 - (3 months)
Commander, Army Staff and Command School

Chief of Staff, Kodam II

1. Brig. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
? ?
Akabri 1974
6 viii 97 - 21 iv 98 (8.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Kostrad 2nd Infantry Division
2. Brig. Gen. M. Ansyori Deas
? ?
Akabri 1972
21 iv 98 - (9 months)
Commander, Korem 044 Palembang

Kodam III/Siliwangi (West Java)

Commander, Kodam III

1. Maj. Gen. Djamari Chaniago
b. April 8, 1949, Padang, Minangkabau
Akabri 1971

5 viii 97 - 25 v 98 (10.5 months)
Commander, Kostrad 2nd Infantry Division

2. Maj. Gen. Purwadi
b. July 20, 1949, Bojonegoro, Javanese
Akabri 1971; Cavalry
25 v 98 - (8 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam III

Chief of Staff, Kodam III

1. Brig. Gen. Purwadi
b. July 20, 1949, Bojonegoro, Javanese
Akabri 1971; Cavalry
c. 6 viii 97 - 3 vi 98 (10 months)
Senior Officer seconded to Armed Forces
Staff and Command School
2. Brig. Gen. Darsono
? Javanese
Akabri 1972
3 vi 98 - (8 months)
Commander, Korem 064 Serang

Kodam IV/Diponegoro (Central Java)

Commander, Kodam IV

1. Maj. Gen. Mardiyanto
b. Nov. 21, 1947, Surakarta, Javanese
Akabri 1970
18 vi 97 - 13 iv 98 (10 months)
Deputy Governor, General and Army
Division, Armed Forces Academy
2. Maj. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto
b. Nov. 14, 1948, Magelang, Javanese
Akabri 1970
13 iv 98 - 15 i 99 (9 months)
Assistant for Planning and Budgeting to
the Army Chief of Staff
3. Maj. Gen. Bibit Waluyo
b. August 5, 1949, Klaten, Javanese
Akabri 1972
15 i 99 - (0.5 month)
Chief of Staff, Kodam IV

Chief of Staff, Kodam IV

1. Brig. Gen. Bibit Waluyo
b. August 5, 1949, Klaten, Javanese
Akabri 1972
c. 12 ix 97 - 14 i 99 (16 months)
Commander, Korem 043 Lampung

2. Brig. Gen. Songko Purnomo
? Javanese
Akabri 1971
14 i 99 - (1 month)
Officer seconded to Armed Forces
Headquarters

Kodam V/Brawijaya (East Java)

Commander, Kodam V

1. Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman
b. Dec. 11, 1949, Sukabumi, Sundanese
Akabri 1972
23 vii 97 - 9 vii 98 (11.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam II
2. Maj. Gen. Djoko Subroto
b. Jan. 19, 1947, Kediri, Madurese
Akabri 1970
9 vii 98 - 14 i 99 (6 months)
Governor, General and Army Division,
Armed Forces Academy
3. Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
? ?
Akabri 1974
14 i 99 - (0.5 month)
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve
Command

Chief of Staff, Kodam V

1. Brig. Gen. Syamsul Maarif
b. Sept. 27, 1950, Kediri, Javanese
Akabri 1973
c. 11 viii 97 - 29 vi 98 (10.5 months)
Commander, Korem 084 Surabaya
2. Brig. Gen. Sudibyo Tjiptonegoro
? Javanese
Akabri 1972; Artillery
29 vi 98 - (7 months)
Expert Senior Officer for Culture and
Sport. to Army Chief of Staff

Kodam VI/Tanjungpura (Kalimantan)**Commander, Kodam VI**

1. Maj. Gen. H. Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto
 - b. Apr. 15, 1949, Sleman, Javanese
 - Akabri 1970; RPKAD
 - 11 viii 97 - 24 iii 98 (7.5 months)
 - Chief of Staff, Kodam V
2. Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
 - b. May 10, 1949, ? Balinese
 - Akabri 1971; RPKAD
 - 24 iii 98 - 12 i 99 (9.5 months)
 - Commander, Kostrad 1st Infantry Division
3. Maj. Gen. Zainuri Hasyim
 - b. Malang, Javanese
 - Akabri 1971
 - 12 i 99 - (0.5 month)
 - Chief of Staff, Kodam VI

Chief of Staff, Kodam VI

1. Brig. Gen. Zainuri Hasyim
 - b. Malang, Javanese
 - Akabri 1971
 - c. 1 ix 97 - 11 i 99 (16.5 months)
 - Commander, Korem 121 Pontianak
2. Brig. Gen. Yudo Wibowo
 - ? Javanese
 - Akabri 1971
 - 11 i 99 - (1 month)
 - Senior Officer seconded to Armed Forces Headquarters

Kodam VII/Wirabuana (Sulawesi)**Commander, Kodam VII**

1. Maj. Gen. Agum Gumelar
 - b. Dec. 17, 1945, Tasikmalaya, Sundanese
 - AMN 9, 1968; RPKAD
 - 19 viii 96 - 18 v 98 (21 months)
 - Expert Staff Officer for Politics and Security to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
2. Maj. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy
 - b. Jan. 5, 1947, Ambon, Ambonese
 - Akabri 1971
 - 18 v 98 - (8.5 months)
 - Assistant for Operations to Army Chief of Staff

Chief of Staff, Kodam VII

1. Brig. Gen. Ampu Nur Kamal Tanujiwa
 - ? Sundanese
 - Akabri 1972
 - 8 viii 97 - c. May 1998 (9 months)
 - Commander, Korem 064 Serang
2. ???

Kodam VIII/Trikora (Irian Barat and Maluku)**Commander, Kodam VIII**

1. Maj. Gen. Johny Lumintang
 - b. July 28, 1947, Manado, Menadonese
 - Akabri 1970
 - 20 viii 96 - 6 iv 98 (20 months)
 - Chief of Staff, Kodam VIII
2. Maj. Gen. Amir Sembiring
 - b. Aug. 3, 1947, Pancur Batu, N. Sumatra
 - Karo Batak
 - Akabri 1970
 - 6 iv 98 - (10 months)
 - Director of Army Doctrine, Educational and Training Command

Chief of Staff, Kodam VIII

1. Brig. Gen. Abdul Rachman Gaffar
 - b. March 20, 1949, Pamekasan, Madurese
 - Akabri 1972
 - 11 ix 97 - 4 vii 98 (10 months)
 - Commander, Korem 072 Yogyakarta
2. Brig. Gen. Mohammed Idris Gassing
 - b. May 1951, Makasar, Makassarrese
 - Akabri 1974; RPKAD
 - 4 vii 98 - (6 months)
 - Deputy Commander, Special Forces Command

Kodam IX/Udayana (Nusatenggara)**Commander, Kodam IX/Udayana**

1. Maj. Gen. Syahrir M.S.
 - b. July 20, 1947, Baturaja, Minangkabau
 - Akabri 1971; RPKAD
 - 24 vii 97 - 27 v 98 (10 months)
 - Chief of Staff, Kodam IX
2. Maj. Gen. Yudomo Sastrosuhardjo
 - b. March 1, 1949, Karanganyar, Javanese
 - Akabri 1971; RPKAD

27 v 98 - 4 vi 98 (9 days)

First Assistant (Security) to Army Chief of Staff⁶

3. Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri

b. Nov. 20, 1949, ? ?

Akabri 1972

17 vi 98 - (7.5 months)

Commander, Kostrad 1st Infantry Division

Chief of Staff, Kodam IX

1. Brig. Gen. Willem T. Da Costa

b. Apr. 13, 1949, Kupang, West

Timorese

Akabri 1971

c. 24 vii 97 - 25 vi 98 (11 months)

Director of Guidance and Education, Army Staff and Command School

2. Brig. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon

b. 1951, Samosir, Toba Batak

Akabri 1974; RPKAD

25 vi 98 - (7 months)

Chief of Staff, Kostrad 2nd Infantry Division

Kodam Jaya (Greater Jakarta)

Commander, Kodam Jaya

1. Maj. Gen. Syafrie Syamsuddin

b. Oct. 30, 1952, Makasar, Buginese

Akabri 1974; RPKAD

24 ix 97 - 13 vii 98 (9.5 months)

Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya

2. Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman

b. Dec. 11, 1949, Sukabumi, Sundanese

Akabri 1972

13 vii 98 - (6.5 months)

Commander, Kodam V

Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya

1. Brig. Gen. Sudi Silalahi

? Toba Batak

Akabri 1972

17 ix 97 - 6 x 98 (12.5 months)

Deputy Assistant for Social and Political Affairs to Armed Forces Chief of the Social and Political Staff

2. Brig. Gen. Achmad Yahya

b. Oct. 11, 1948, Bangkalan, Madurese

Akabri 1971

6 x 98 - (4 months)

Chief of Staff, Jakarta Garrison

Sub-Regional Military Commanders (Korem)

Notes for Korem listings: (a) We only list birth date and place when known. So few are known that we have not used question marks to indicate missing birthdates and birth places. (b) We have only listed those officers who have served since Jan. 1, 1998 (so many have only one listing). c) We have not attempted to register ethnicity.

Kodam I

Korem 011 Lilawangsa (HQ Lho' Seumawe)

1. Col. Dasiri Musnar

Akabri 1974

9 vi 97 - 4 xi 98 (17 months)⁷

Asst. for Intelligence, Kodam I

2. Col. Djoni A. Wahab

Akabri 1974

4 xi 98 - (3 months)

Asst. for Logistics, Kodam IX

Korem 012 Teuku Umar (HQ Banda Aceh)

1. Col. Mustafa Sacky Akbar

Akabri 1975; Artillery

c. 1997 - 29 iv 98

(?) ?

2. Col. Asril Hamzah Tanjung S.

Akabri 1973

29 iv 98 - [8 v 99] (9 months)

Asst. for Operations, Kodam IV

⁶ Died in a helicopter accident in E. Timor. Post held temporarily by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo.

⁷ Simultaneously Commander of the Red Net Military Operations Command (Kolakop Jaring Merah [DOM Aceh])

Korem 022 Pantai Timur (HQ Pematang Siantar)

Col. Drs. H. Machfud HW
?
c. ? vi 97 - (c. 20 months)
?

Korem 023 Kawal Samudera (HQ Sibolga)

Col. Haryanto Rahman
Akabri 1974
c. 1998 (?)
?

Korem 031 Wirabima (HQ Pekanbaru)

1. Col. Songko Purnomo
Akabri 197
1 4 vi 96 - 9 v 98 (23 months)
Commander, Infantry Regiment, Kodam Jaya
2. Col. Mohammad Gadillah
b. Palembang
Akabri 1973
9 v 98 - (9 months)
Lecturer, Army Staff and Command School

Korem 032 Wirabraja (HQ Padang)

1. Col. Sugiono WA
Akabri 1973; Cavalry
16 vii 97 - 6 xi 98 (15.5 months)
Asst. for Territorial Affairs, Kodam I
2. Col. Dahler Syaiful Hasibuan
Akabri 1974
6 xi 98 - (3 months)
Asst. for Logistics, Kodam VII

Kodam II

Korem 041 Garuda Mas (HQ Bengkulu)

Col. Syahril BP Peliung
Akabri 1973
7 vi 97 - (20 months)
Asst. for Operations, Kodam II

Korem 042 Garuda Putih (HQ Jambi)

Col. Soepriadi SE
Akabri 1973; Cavalry
c. 2 x 97 - (15 months)
?

Korem 043 Garuda Hitam (HQ Lampung)

Col. Cornel Simbolon
b. 1951, Tapanuli Utara
Akabri 1973
12 ix 97 - [22 v 99] (16.5 months)
Asst. for Operations, Kodam I

Korem 044 Garuda Dempo (HQ Palembang)

1. Col. Ansyori Deas
Akabri 1972
8 x 96 - 21 iv 98 (18.5 months)
Asst. for Operations, Kodam Jaya
2. Col. Sunarso
Akabri 1973; Artillery
30 v 98 - (8 months)
Asst. for Personnel, Kodam V

Kodam III

Korem 061 Suryakencana (HQ Bogor)

1. Col. Eddi Budianto
Akabri 1974
? iii 96 - 29 v 98 (26 months)
Commander, Infantry Brigade, Kodam Jaya
2. Col. Suprpto
?
29 v 98 - (8 months)
Commander, Infantry Educational Center

Korem 062 Tarumanegara (HQ Garut)

1. Col. Muhammad Yasin
Akabri 1973
? iv 96 - 15 vii 98 (25 months)
Asst. for Intelligence, Kodam VII
2. Col. Atori Herdiana Djaya
Akabri 1972
c. 15 vii 98 - (6.5 months)
Commander, Core Infantry Regiment,
Kodam I

Korem 063 Sunan Gunung Jati (HQ Cirebon)

Col. Herry Tjahyana
?
c. 1998 (?)
?

Korem 064 Maulana Yusuf (HQ Serang)

1. Col. Darsono
Akabri 1972
18 ix 97 - x i 98 (4 months)
Asst. for Operations, 1st Infantry Division,
Kostrad
2. Col. Bambang Sugito
Akabri 1974
? c. 8 vii 98- (6.5 months)
? Kodam IV

Korem 071 Wijayakusuma (HQ Purwokerto)

1. Col. Amirul Isnaeni
Akabri 1975
20 vii 96 - 16 vii 98 (24 months)
Asst. for Intelligence, Special Forces
Command
2. Col. Mochamad Noer Muis
Akabri 1976
? 16 vii 98 - (6.5 months)
Staff Officer, Army Headquarters

Korem 072 Pamungkas (HQ Yogyakarta)

1. Col. Djoko Santoso
b. Sept. 8, 1952, Solo
Akabri 1975
17 ix 97 - 2 xi 98 (13.5 months)
Asst. for Social and Political Affairs,
Kodam Jaya
2. Col. Ridwan Sulandjana
b. 1 March 1951, Bogor
Akabri 1974
2 xi 98 - (3 months)
?

Korem 073 Makutarama (HQ Salatiga)

- Col. Arri Sujono
Akabri 1974
28 ix 96 - ? (28 months?)
Asst. for Personnel, Kodam IV

Korem 074 Warastratama (HQ Surakarta)

- Col. Sriyanto
Akabri 1974
5 ix 97 - [10 v 99] (16 months)
Kodam V

Korem 081 Dhirot Saha Jaya (HQ Madiun)

- Col. Suhartono
Akabri 1975
? 8 x 97 - (16 months)
Personal Secretary, Army Chief of Staff

Korem 082 Citra Panca Yudha Jaya (HQ Mojokerto)

- Col. Sambas A.
Akabri 1972
c. 2 ii 98 (c. 11 months)
?

Korem 083 Baladhika Jaya (HQ Malang)

1. Col. Achmad Dj. Sikki
Akabri 1973
9 vii 97 - 6 ii 98 (7 months)
Asst. for Operations, Kodam V
2. Col. Agus Suyitno
Akabri 1973
6 ii 98 - (11 months)
Asst. for Social and Political Affairs,
Kodam V

Korem 084 Bhaskara Jaya (Surabaya)

- Col. Bambang Satriawan
b. 1949, Sragen
Akabri 1972; Artillery
21 ix 97 - (16.5 months)
Department Head, Army Staff and Command
School

Korem 091 Aji Surya Natakusuma (HQ Balikpapan)

1. Col. M. Djali Yusuf
b. 1949, Sigli
Akabri 1972
? x 96 - 18 vi 98 (20 months)
Asst. to Operations, Kodam IX
2. Col. Rudy Landung
Akabri 1972
18 vi 98 - (7.5 months)
Asst. for Territorial Affairs, Kodam VI

Korem 101 Antasari (HQ Banjarmasin)

1. Col. Mahmud Yunus Palar
Akabri 1972
31 v 97 - c. ? x 98 (16 months)
Commander, Officer Corps, Army Staff and
Command School
2. Col. Bahir Alamsyah
Akabri 1974; Cavalry
c. ? x 98 (4 months?)
?

Korem 102 Panju Panjung (HQ Palangka Raya)

1. Col. Yudo Wibowo
Akabri 1971
17 iv 96 - 30 v 98 (25 months)
Asst. for Operations, Kodam VI
2. Col. Drs. Saut Lubis
Akabri 1972
30 v 98 - (8 months)
?

Korem 121 Alambhana Wana Wai (HQ Pontianak)

1. Col. Erwin Soedjono
Akabri 1975
24 vi 97 - c. ? x 98 (c. 16 months)
Asst. for Operations, Kodam VI
2. Col. Encip Kadarusman
Akabri 1974
c. ? x 98 (c. 4 months)
? Kodam VII

Korem 131 Santiago (HQ Manado)

- Col. HM Ali Fathan
Akabri 1972; Engineers
31 v 97 - (20 months)
Asst. for Social and Political Affairs,
Kodam VII

Korem 132 Tadulako (HQ Palu)

- Col. Djumara Frassad
Akabri 1973
? xi 97 - (c. 15 months)
Asst. for Operations, Kodam VII

Korem 141 Toddopuli (HQ Watambone)

- Col. Salim Nengga
Akabri 1974; Cavalry
c. ? xi 97 - (c. 15 months)
?

Korem 142 Taroda Tarogaru (HQ Pare Pare)

- Col. Darmawi Chaidir
Akabri 1974
c. 1997 - (?)
?

Korem 143 Haluoleo (HQ Kendari)

- Col. J. Harry Pisand Pinem
Akabri 1974
9 x 97 - (16 months)
Asst. for Intelligence, Special Forces
Command Kodam VIII

Korem 171 Praja Vira Tama (HQ Manokwari)

- Col. K.A. Ralahalu
Akabri 1972
10 vi 97 - (19.5 months)
Staff Officer, Army Territorial Center

Korem 172 Praja Vira Yakthi (HQ Abepura)

- Col. Joseph Samuel
Akabri 1971
30 v 97 - (20 months)
Asst. for Planning and Budget, Kodam VIII

Korem 173 Praja Vira Braja (HQ Biak)

1. Col. Purnawa
?
c. ? iii 97 - c. ? vii 98 (16 months)
?
2. Col. F.X. Agus Edyono
Akabri 1973
c. ? vii 98 - (c. 6 months)
?

Korem 174 Pattimura (HQ Ambon)

- Col. Hikayat
Akabri 1973
? vi 97 - (c. 19.5 months)
Asst. for Operations, Kodam VIII

19 x 98 - (3.5 months)

Asst. for Operations, Kodam Jaya

Korem 161 Wiraskati (HQ Kupang)

Col. Bambang Soemardji

Akabri 1972

c. ? viii 97 - (c.17 months)

?

Korem 162 Wirabhakti (Mataram)

Col. Soekotjo Hadi Soeprapto

Akabri 1974

21 vi 97 - ? (c. 19.5 months)

Deputy Commander, Korem 164, East Timor

Korem 163 Wirasatya (HQ Denpasar)

Col. I. Made Yasa

Akabri 1973

8 x 97 - (16 months)

Director, Physical Training, Infantry

Weapons Center

Korem 164 Wiradharma (HQ Dili)

1. Col. Selamat Sidabutar

Akabri 1975

31 v 97 - 4 vi 98 (12 months)

Commander, Group 2, Special Forces

Command⁸

2. Col. Suhartono Suratman

Akabri 1975

10 vi 98 - (7.5 months)

Commander, Group 3, Special Forces

Command

Korem 051 Wijayakarta (East Greater Jakarta)

Col. George Toisutta

b. Ambon?

Akabri 1976

19 x 98 - (3.5 months)

Commander, Core Infantry Regiment,

Kodam II

Korem 052 Wijayakrama (West Greater Jakarta)

Col. Tri Tamtomo

Akabri 1974

⁸ Died June 4, 1998, in a helicopter crash in Baucau, East Timor.