Confidentiality and Integrity with Untrusted Hosts: Technical Report
| dc.contributor.author | Zdancewic, Steve | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Myers, Andrew C. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-04-09T19:48:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-04-09T19:48:55Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2000-08-22 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Several security-typed languages have recently been proposed to enforce security properties such as confidentiality or integrity by type checking. We propose a new security-typed language, SPL@, that addresses two important limitations of previous approaches. First, existing languages assume that the underlying execution platform is trusted; this assumption does not scale to distributed computation in which a variety of differently trusted hosts are available to execute programs. Our new approach, secure program partitioning, translates programs written assuming complete trust in a single executing host into programs that execute using a collection of variously trusted hosts to perform computation. As the trust configuration of a distributed system evolves, this translation can be performed as necessary for security. Second, many common program transformations do not work in existing security-typed languages; although they produce equivalent programs, these programs are rejected because of apparent information flows. SPL@ uses a novel mechanism based on ordered linear continuations to permit a richer class of program transformations, including secure program partitioning. This report is the technical companion to [ZM00]. It contains expanded discussion and extensive proofs of both the soundness and noninterference theorems mentioned in Section 3.3 of that work. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 289613 bytes | |
| dc.format.extent | 515809 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/postscript | |
| dc.identifier.citation | http://techreports.library.cornell.edu:8081/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/cul.cs/TR2000-1810 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/5800 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Cornell University | en_US |
| dc.subject | computer science | en_US |
| dc.subject | technical report | en_US |
| dc.title | Confidentiality and Integrity with Untrusted Hosts: Technical Report | en_US |
| dc.type | technical report | en_US |