Distributional Preferences, Reciprocity-Like Behavior, and Efficiency in Bilateral Exchange
dc.contributor.author | Benjamin, Daniel J. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-12T19:47:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-12T19:47:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-08-31 | |
dc.description.abstract | Under what conditions do distributional preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player’s. Each player’s preferences may depend on both his/her own material payoff and the other player’s. I identify two key properties of the second-mover’s preferences: indifference curves kinked around “fair” material-payoff distributions, and materials payoffs entering preferences as “normal goods.” Either property can drive reciprocity-like behavior and generate a Pareto efficient outcome. | |
dc.description.legacydownloads | ICS_Distributional_Preferences.pdf: 197 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020. | |
dc.identifier.other | 4583329 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/73173 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.relation.isversionof | An earlier version of this paper is available in eCommons at https://hdl.handle.net/1813/73188. | |
dc.relation.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/73188 | |
dc.rights | Required Publisher Statement: © American Economic Association. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. | |
dc.subject | distributional preferences | |
dc.subject | fairness | |
dc.subject | altruism | |
dc.subject | gift exchange | |
dc.subject | rotten kid theorem | |
dc.title | Distributional Preferences, Reciprocity-Like Behavior, and Efficiency in Bilateral Exchange | |
dc.type | preprint | |
local.authorAffiliation | Benjamin, Daniel J.: db468@cornell.edu Cornell University |
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