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Distributional Preferences, Reciprocity-Like Behavior, and Efficiency in Bilateral Exchange

dc.contributor.authorBenjamin, Daniel J.
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-12T19:47:52Z
dc.date.available2020-11-12T19:47:52Z
dc.date.issued2013-08-31
dc.description.abstractUnder what conditions do distributional preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player’s. Each player’s preferences may depend on both his/her own material payoff and the other player’s. I identify two key properties of the second-mover’s preferences: indifference curves kinked around “fair” material-payoff distributions, and materials payoffs entering preferences as “normal goods.” Either property can drive reciprocity-like behavior and generate a Pareto efficient outcome.
dc.description.legacydownloadsICS_Distributional_Preferences.pdf: 197 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
dc.identifier.other4583329
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/73173
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.isversionofAn earlier version of this paper is available in eCommons at https://hdl.handle.net/1813/73188.
dc.relation.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/73188
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: © American Economic Association. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectdistributional preferences
dc.subjectfairness
dc.subjectaltruism
dc.subjectgift exchange
dc.subjectrotten kid theorem
dc.titleDistributional Preferences, Reciprocity-Like Behavior, and Efficiency in Bilateral Exchange
dc.typepreprint
local.authorAffiliationBenjamin, Daniel J.: db468@cornell.edu Cornell University

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