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Essays On Optimal Contract Design

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Abstract

the returns to effort increase with the hierarchical levels, which cannot generate the convex wage structure unless further assumptions added on optimal effort levels and cost functions. The third chapter investigates the underlying assumption in Chapter 1 that people are inequity averse to ex-ante payoff differentials. Specifically, an online survey is conducted to test whether ex ante or ex post fairness views affect people's decision making in a social context. I find that the ex post fairness views do make an important role in people's decision making. The results of the survey data do not support the model of inequity aversion. c 2013 Jin Xu ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

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2013-08-19

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other-regarding preferences; wage compression; tournament

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Committee Chair

Benjamin, Daniel

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Waldman, Michael
Bodoh-Creed, Aaron
O'Donoghue, Edward Donald

Degree Discipline

Economics

Degree Name

Ph. D., Economics

Degree Level

Doctor of Philosophy

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Government Document

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dissertation or thesis

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