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The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence (CRI 2009-008)

dc.contributor.authorDeVaro, Jed
dc.contributor.authorWaldman, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-12T19:47:57Z
dc.date.available2020-11-12T19:47:57Z
dc.date.issued2009-06-01
dc.description.abstractAn extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability. In this paper we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with a worker’s education level, and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal-labor-market history of a medium-sized firm in the financial-services industry. Our results support signaling being both a statistically significant and economically significant factor in promotion decisions. The paper also contributes to the extensive literature on the role of education as a labor-market signal.
dc.description.legacydownloadscri_2009_008.pdf: 286 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
dc.identifier.other1041149
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/73194
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectpromotion
dc.subjectinternal labor markets
dc.subjectsignaling
dc.titleThe Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence (CRI 2009-008)
dc.typepreprint
local.authorAffiliationDeVaro, Jed: California State University
local.authorAffiliationWaldman, Michael: mw46@cornell.edu Cornell University

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