Antitrust Immunity and the Economics of Occupational Licensing

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dc.contributor.authorJohnson, Steve B.
dc.contributor.authorCorgel, John B.
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-12T21:03:13Z
dc.date.available2020-09-12T21:03:13Z
dc.date.issued1983-01-01
dc.description.abstract[Excerpt] The proposition that the common law tends to evolve in the direction of economic efficiency has been advanced by Posner and others. This proposition implies that, over time, legal precedent which promotes efficiency of exchange in the market, and thus maximizes the wealth of market agents, will displace precedent that is incompatible with this objective. In evaluating market impact, however, it is important to note that legal precedent which is perceived to be compatible with efficient exchange when viewed from the perspective of outmoded economic theory may not be as compatible as it appears.
dc.description.legacydownloadsCorgel63_Antitrust_Immunity.pdf: 76 downloads, before Aug. 1, 2020.
dc.identifier.other6829939
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/71518
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-1714.1983.tb00602.x
dc.rightsRequired Publisher Statement: © Wiley. Final version published as: Johnson, S. B., & Corgel, J. B. (1983). Antitrust immunity and the economics of occupational licensing. American Business Law Journal 20(4), 471-490. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectlicensing schemes
dc.subjectprofessionalism
dc.subjectcurrent economic theory
dc.titleAntitrust Immunity and the Economics of Occupational Licensing
dc.typearticle
local.authorAffiliationJohnson, Steve B.: Louisiana State University
local.authorAffiliationCorgel, John B.: jc81@cornell.edu Cornell University School of Hotel Administration
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