Exploring Voting Anomalies Using a Demand Revealing Random Price Voting Mechanism

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dc.contributor.authorMesser, Kent D.
dc.contributor.authorPoe, Gregory L.
dc.contributor.authorRondeau, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorSchulze, William D.
dc.contributor.authorVossler, Christian A.
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-21T17:09:52Z
dc.date.available2018-08-21T17:09:52Z
dc.date.issued2006-10-01
dc.descriptionWP 2006-22 October 2006
dc.descriptionJEL Classification Codes: C91; C92; D64; D72; H41
dc.description.abstractRecent papers show that in group decisions individuals have social preferences for efficiency and equity. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods, has not been thoroughly examined. This study investigates whether voting decisions are affected by the distribution of net benefits associated with a proposed public program using a new Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM). Theoretical and econometric analysis of experimental results presented in the paper suggest that observed differences from selfish voting are caused by a concern for social efficiency, and that voting may be more efficient than previously thought.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/57869
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherCharles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University
dc.titleExploring Voting Anomalies Using a Demand Revealing Random Price Voting Mechanism
dc.typearticle
dcterms.licensehttp://hdl.handle.net/1813/57595
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