eCommons

 

How Does External Debt Servicing Ability Affect The Stability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes?

dc.contributor.authorFur, Viola
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-11T23:47:20Z
dc.date.available2024-04-11T23:47:20Z
dc.date.issued2021-01-20
dc.descriptionpage(s) 4-56en_US
dc.identifier.citationFur, Viola. "How Does External Debt Servicing Ability Affect The Stability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes?." Cornell International Affairs Review Vol. 14, Iss. 1 (Fall 2020). https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v14i1.558.en_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v14i1.558
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/115028
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherCornell University Libraryen_US
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.titleHow Does External Debt Servicing Ability Affect The Stability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes?en_US
dc.typearticleen_US
schema.issueNumberVol. 14, Iss. 1 (Fall 2020)en_US

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
558-13-53-1-2-20210120.pdf
Size:
582.91 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format