How Does External Debt Servicing Ability Affect The Stability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes?
dc.contributor.author | Fur, Viola | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-04-11T23:47:20Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-04-11T23:47:20Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-01-20 | |
dc.description | page(s) 4-56 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Fur, Viola. "How Does External Debt Servicing Ability Affect The Stability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes?." Cornell International Affairs Review Vol. 14, Iss. 1 (Fall 2020). https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v14i1.558. | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v14i1.558 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/115028 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Cornell University Library | en_US |
dc.rights | Attribution 4.0 International | * |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | * |
dc.title | How Does External Debt Servicing Ability Affect The Stability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes? | en_US |
dc.type | article | en_US |
schema.issueNumber | Vol. 14, Iss. 1 (Fall 2020) | en_US |
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