Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the Incentive to Bargain

Other Titles
Abstract

"This study develops a model of bargaining that demonstrates that an interest arbitration procedure will encourage negotiated settlements to the extent that risk aversion dominates the preferences of the parties and there is uncertainty regarding the arbitrator's behavior. The authors conclude that it is likely that risk aversion does dominate preferences, but the evidence is not conclusive. They also argue that uncertainty may be reduced over time for various reasons, leading to increased use of arbitration and a convergence between the terms of negotiated and arbitrated agreements."

Journal / Series
Volume & Issue
Description
Sponsorship
Date Issued
1979-10-01
Publisher
Keywords
arbitration; outcome; incentive; bargain; settlement; agreement; dispute; arbitrator; union; labor
Location
Effective Date
Expiration Date
Sector
Employer
Union
Union Local
NAICS
Number of Workers
Committee Chair
Committee Co-Chair
Committee Member
Degree Discipline
Degree Name
Degree Level
Related Version
Related DOI
Related To
Related Part
Based on Related Item
Has Other Format(s)
Part of Related Item
Related To
Related Publication(s)
Link(s) to Related Publication(s)
References
Link(s) to Reference(s)
Previously Published As
Government Document
ISBN
ISMN
ISSN
Other Identifiers
Rights
Required Publisher Statement: Copyright by Cornell University.
Rights URI
Types
article
Accessibility Feature
Accessibility Hazard
Accessibility Summary
Link(s) to Catalog Record