Indonesia's Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition

dc.contributor.author	Slater, Dan
dc.date.accessioned	2017-11-10T14:27:15Z
dc.date.available	2017-11-10T14:27:15Z
dc.date.issued	2004-10
dc.description	Page range: 61-92
dc.description.abstract	The fall of Indonesia’s New Order regime set the stage for more competitive elections, but not necessarily for more competitive elites. Party and military leaders have primarily responded to democratic transition by sharing power rather than competing for it, especially by ensuring that all major political groupings enjoy lucrative and powerful positions in the cabinet. The recent introduction of direct presidential elections has inadvertently threatened to unsettle this cozy and collusive elite arrangement—but only at the risk of restoring dangerous patterns of presidential domination.
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1813/54328
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.publisher	Cornell University Southeast Asia Program
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Indonesia
dc.title	Indonesia's Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition
dc.type	article
schema.issueNumber	Vol. 78

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