Mergers and Target Transparency
| dc.contributor.author | Hasan, Iftekhar | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kallberg, Jarl G. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Liu, Crocker H. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sun, Xian | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-12T21:09:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-09-12T21:09:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-01-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We empirically investigate the hypothesis that the less transparent (more difficult to value) the target’s assets are the more likely it is that the acquiring firm can obtain higher short- and long-term returns. We analyze a sample of 1,538 friendly acquisitions partitioned in two separate dimensions: acquisitions of public versus private firms, and acquisitions of a firm’s assets versus acquisitions of a firm’s assets and its management. Using a sample of (nondiversifying) real estate transactions with a public REIT as the acquirer, we find that acquisitions of public firms have insignificant short-term abnormal returns. Acquisitions of private targets have positive and significant short-term abnormal returns. The acquirer’s abnormal returns are higher in both cases when the transactions involve acquisition of the target firm’s management. We find parallel results when analyzing the acquirer’s Q over the merger year and the three following years. Our conclusions are robust to the type of financing (cash, stock, or a combination) used in the acquisition. | |
| dc.description.legacydownloads | Liu81_Mergers.pdf: 254 downloads, before Aug. 1, 2020. | |
| dc.identifier.other | 9491753 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/72158 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.relation.doi | https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220140000017001 | |
| dc.rights | Required Publisher Statement: © Emerald. Final version published as: Hasan, I., Kallberg, J. G., Liu, C. H., & Sun, X. (2014). Mergers and target transparency. In K. Johns, A. K. Makhija, & S. P. Ferris (Eds.), Advances in financial economics: Vol. 17. Corporate governance in the US and global settings (pp. 193-227). doi: 10.1108/S1569-373220140000017001 Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. | |
| dc.subject | mergers and acquisitions | |
| dc.subject | information asymmetry | |
| dc.subject | value of firms | |
| dc.title | Mergers and Target Transparency | |
| dc.type | article | |
| local.authorAffiliation | Hasan, Iftekhar: Fordham University | |
| local.authorAffiliation | Kallberg, Jarl G.: Washington State University | |
| local.authorAffiliation | Liu, Crocker H.: chl62@cornell.edu Cornell University School of Hotel Administration | |
| local.authorAffiliation | Sun, Xian: Johns Hopkins Carey School of Business |
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