The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence
| dc.contributor.author | DeVaro, Jed | |
| dc.contributor.author | Waldman, Michael | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-17T16:58:09Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-11-17T16:58:09Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007-10-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | [Excerpt] An extensive theoretical literature has developed that investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability. There have been no tests, however, of the empirical validity of this idea. In this paper we develop the theory in a manner that allows us to generate testable predictions, and then investigate the validity of these predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal-labor-market history of a medium-sized firm in the financial-services industry. Our results support the notion that signaling is both a statistically significant and economically significant factor in promotion decisions. The paper also contributes to the extensive literature on the role of education as a labor-market signal. | |
| dc.description.legacydownloads | DeVaro4_signaling_role_revised_10_2007.pdf: 1991 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020. | |
| dc.identifier.other | 343958 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/74715 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.subject | worker | |
| dc.subject | ability | |
| dc.subject | signal | |
| dc.subject | promotion | |
| dc.subject | signaling | |
| dc.subject | education | |
| dc.subject | labor market | |
| dc.title | The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence | |
| dc.type | article | |
| local.authorAffiliation | DeVaro, Jed: jld48@cornell.edu Cornell University | |
| local.authorAffiliation | Waldman, Michael: mw46@cornell.edu Cornell University |
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