Using Ownership as an Incentive: Does the "Too Many Chiefs" Rule Apply  in Initial Public Offering Firms?

dc.contributor.author	Welbourne, Theresa M.
dc.date.accessioned	2020-11-25T14:51:00Z
dc.date.available	2020-11-25T14:51:00Z
dc.date.issued	1996-02-01
dc.description.abstract	Agency theory is used to study the effectiveness of ownership proliferation throughout entrepreneurial organizations. Hypotheses are developed to understand the effect of CEO, top management, and all employee ownership on firm performance. The research is conducted with a sample of IPO firms followed for five years to study ownership and firm performance (survival and stock performance). The results indicate that all employee ownership has a positive effect on survival, while CEO and management ownership have no effect. However, CEO and top management ownership do affect stock price. Ownership significantly interacts with firm risk, indicating riskier firms benefit less from ownership.
dc.description.legacydownloads	Using_Ownership_as_an_IncentiveWP96_04.pdf: 296 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
dc.identifier.other	127437
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1813/77032
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.subject	work
dc.subject	business
dc.subject	organization
dc.subject	company
dc.subject	ownership
dc.subject	incentive
dc.subject	team
dc.subject	executive
dc.subject	employee
dc.subject	performance
dc.subject	CEO
dc.subject	stock
dc.subject	price
dc.title	Using Ownership as an Incentive: Does the "Too Many Chiefs" Rule Apply in Initial Public Offering Firms?
dc.type	preprint
local.authorAffiliation	Welbourne, Theresa M.: Cornell University

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