We investigate the effects of human capital mobility on venture capital (VC) investment and outcomes. To establish causality, we use a difference-in-differences approach that relies on plausibly exogenous variations generated by states' staggered recognition of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD). We _find that a reduction in human capital mobility reduces VCs' investment propensity and successful exit. Further analysis shows that the effects are more pronounced in industries with more high-skilled workers, in industries with higher patenting intensity, and in earlier-stage VC investment. To mitigate the adverse effect of the IDD, VCs stage finance startups more and are more likely to syndicate with other VCs. Finally, we show that the IDD reduces the mobility of inventors, which contributes to a reduction in startups' patenting and successful exit. Our paper sheds new light on the effects of an important but underexplored determinant of VC investment --the human capital of startups.