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dc.contributor.authorMarler, Janet H.
dc.contributor.authorMilkovich, George T.
dc.contributor.authorYanadori, Yoshio
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-25T14:55:08Z
dc.date.available2020-11-25T14:55:08Z
dc.date.issued2002-09-04
dc.identifier.other112481
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/77342
dc.description.abstractDespite the widespread use of incentive pay, there is limited evidence about what factors influence its organization-wide, broad-based application. This study uses data from three sources and multiple levels, including a unique data set of the total compensation of individual employees in 104 firms over a four-year period (1997-2000), and theoretically and empirically examines the use of bonuses and stock options in organization-wide applications. We examine the efficacy of three main rational theories, principal-agency, positivist agency and contingency theories, which are based on the premise that incentives are related to performance. At the individual level we identify two determinants: type of job and level within the hierarchy and four determinants at the organizational level: performance, risk, size, and strategy. Our results indicate that the factors derived from the three theories provide a limited explanation for the variation in the use of broad-based incentives within and across organizations.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectfirms
dc.subjectcompensation
dc.subjectperformance
dc.subjectstock
dc.subjectincentives
dc.subjectvariable pay
dc.titleOrganization-wide Broad-based Incentives: Rational Theory and Evidence
dc.typepreprint
dc.description.legacydownloadsWP02_05.pdf: 1919 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationMarler, Janet H.: State University of New York at Albany
local.authorAffiliationMilkovich, George T.: Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationYanadori, Yoshio: Cornell University


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