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dc.contributor.authorGerhart, Barry A.
dc.contributor.authorT., George Milkovich
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-25T14:52:31Z
dc.date.available2020-11-25T14:52:31Z
dc.date.issued1992-05-24
dc.identifier.other160795
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/77181
dc.description.abstract[Excerpt] An organization has the potential to remain viable only so long as its members choose to participate and engage in necessary role behaviors (March & Simon, 1958; Katz & Kahn, 1966). To elicit these contributions, an organization must provide inducements that are of value to its members. This exchange or transaction process is at the core of the employment relationship and can be viewed as a type of contract, explicit or implicit, that imposes reciprocal obligations on the parties (Barnard, 1936; Simon, 1951; Williamson, 1975; Rousseau, 1990). At the heart of that exchange are decisions by employers and employees regarding compensation.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectemployee
dc.subjectcompensation
dc.subjectresearch
dc.subjectpractice
dc.subjectmembers
dc.subjectcost
dc.subjectattitude
dc.subjectorganizationk development
dc.subjectheath care
dc.subjectpension
dc.subjectstaff
dc.subjectrecuit
dc.subjecttrain
dc.subjectpay
dc.subjectperformance
dc.titleEmployee Compensation: Research and Practice
dc.typepreprint
dc.description.legacydownloadsEmployee_compensation_research_92_26.pdf: 20177 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationGerhart, Barry A.: Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationT. , George Milkovich: Cornell University


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