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dc.contributor.authorWelbourne, Theresa M.
dc.contributor.authorCyr, Linda A.
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-25T14:51:06Z
dc.date.available2020-11-25T14:51:06Z
dc.date.issued1996-11-01
dc.identifier.other127993
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/77043
dc.description.abstractAgency theory is used to expand the research in strategic human resource management (SHRM) by viewing the construct underlying SHRM as control over all employees. We develop hypotheses on the effects of CEO ownership, administrative HRM, and incentive stock ownership on firm performance. The results indicate that administrative HRM has a negative effect on stock price. Incentive alignment via stock ownership has a positive effect on stock price and productivity. CEO ownership has a positive effect on sales but a negative impact on productivity. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectwork
dc.subjectbusiness
dc.subjectorganization
dc.subjectcompany
dc.subjectincentive
dc.subjectexecutive
dc.subjectemployee
dc.subjectperformance
dc.subjectstock
dc.subjectprice
dc.subjecthuman resource
dc.subjectmanagement
dc.subjectSHRM
dc.subjectCEO
dc.subjectownership
dc.titleAgency Theory Implications for Strategic Human Resource Management: Effects of CEO Ownership, Administrative HRM, and Incentive Alignment on Firm Performance
dc.typepreprint
dc.description.legacydownloadsAgency_Theory__Organizational_ControlWP96_17.pdf: 7146 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationWelbourne, Theresa M.: Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationCyr , Linda A.: Cornell University


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