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dc.contributor.authorWelbourne, Theresa M.
dc.contributor.authorCyr, Linda A.
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-25T14:51:05Z
dc.date.available2020-11-25T14:51:05Z
dc.date.issued1996-09-01
dc.identifier.other127985
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/77041
dc.descriptionWorking Paper Redone October 1998
dc.description.abstractAgency theory is used to develop hypotheses regarding the effects of ownership proliferation on firm performance. We examine the effects of CEO ownership, executive team ownership, and all employee ownership, in addition to the moderating effect of risk, on firm survival and stock price. Firms with low CEO ownership outperform those with high levels of CEO ownership across all levels of risk, but the effect is most pronounced for low risk firms. Executive team ownership is negatively related to firm performance, while ownership for all employees is positively associated with firm performance particularly for higher risk firms.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectwork
dc.subjectbusiness
dc.subjectorganization
dc.subjectcompany
dc.subjectownership
dc.subjectincentive
dc.subjectteam
dc.subjectexecutive
dc.subjectemployee
dc.subjectperformance
dc.subjectCEO
dc.subjectstock
dc.subjectprice
dc.titleUsing Ownership as an Incentive: Does the "Too Many Chiefs" Rule Apply in Entrepreneurial Firms?
dc.typepreprint
dc.description.legacydownloadsUsing_Ownership_as_an_incentiveWP96_14.pdf: 495 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationWelbourne, Theresa M.: Cornell University
local.authorAffiliationCyr, Linda A.: Harvard University


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