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dc.contributor.authorBloom, Matthew C.
dc.contributor.authorMilkovich, George T.
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-25T14:50:55Z
dc.date.available2020-11-25T14:50:55Z
dc.date.issued1997-09-01
dc.identifier.other125510
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1813/77020
dc.description.abstractIn this study we extend agency based research by examining the role of risk in the structure of managerial compensation and its relationship to organization performance. Our results suggest that organizations facing higher risk do not place greater emphasis on short term incentives, they place less emphasis on it. Also, higher risk firms which rely on incentive pay exhibited poorer performance than high risk firms which de-emphasize incentive pay.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectemployee
dc.subjectmanagement
dc.subjecttheory
dc.subjectorganization
dc.subjectperformance
dc.subjectrisk
dc.subjectpay
dc.subjectincentive
dc.titleThe Relationship Between Risk, Incentive Pay, and Organizational Performance
dc.typepreprint
dc.description.legacydownloadsThe_Relationship_Between_RiskWP97_23.pdf: 5560 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020.
local.authorAffiliationBloom, Matthew C.: University of Notre Dame
local.authorAffiliationMilkovich, George T.: Cornell University


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